Cisco Root CA 2048 Certificate Policy Cisco Systems Certificate Policy Cisco Systems has implemented a Root Certificate Authority (CA) to provide a trust anchor for cryptographic communications using X.509 certificates. The Root CA consists of systems, products and services that both protect the Root CA’s private key, and manage the subordinate CA X.509 certificates (sub-CA certificates) issued from the Root CA. The purpose of this document is to describe the framework for the use (issuance, renewal, revocation, and policies) of the Root Certificate Authority 2048 within Cisco Systems Inc., and with external entities. Version 1.3
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CiscoRootCA2048CertificatePolicy
CiscoSystemsCertificatePolicy
Cisco Systems has implemented a Root Certificate Authority (CA) to provide a trust anchor forcryptographiccommunicationsusingX.509certificates.TheRootCAconsistsofsystems,productsandservicesthatbothprotecttheRootCA’sprivatekey,andmanagethesubordinateCAX.509certificates(sub-CA certificates) issued from the Root CA. The purpose of this document is to describe theframework for the use (issuance, renewal, revocation, and policies) of the Root Certificate Authority2048withinCiscoSystemsInc.,andwithexternalentities.
Section1.4.2 Added:"ContactInformation"heading Section2.3 Added: "Each provision of this Policy has been subject to mutual
consultation, negotiation, and agreement, and shall not be construedfororagainstanyparty."
Section2.3.1 Deleted:"Theenforceability,construction,interpretation,andvalidityofthis Policy shall be governedby the lawsof theUnited States and theStateofCalifornia."Added:"ThisPolicyshallbeconstrued,andanylegalrelationsbetweenthepartiesheretoshallbedetermined, inaccordancewith the lawsoftheUnitedStatesandlawsoftheStateofCalifornia,withoutregardtoanyconflictoflawprovisionsthereof."
Section2.3.2 Deleted:"Nostipulation"Added: "Disputes among Cisco Systems and a Benefiting Party will beresolved pursuant to provisions in the applicable Certificate TrustAgreementsbetweenCiscoandtheBenefitingParty.Disputesbetweenentities who are not Benefiting Parties and Cisco Systems carry nostipulation."
Section4.9 Added:"TheCAprivatekeywillbemaintainedin itsHardwareSecurityModule (HSM) for 7 years past either terminationor expirationof theCA certificate, after which it will be destroyed using the FIPS 140-1approvedmechanismsuppliedbytheHSM."
1.2 2010-Jul-04 Changes
Section1.2.1 Added:”WithrespecttoanyEVcertificatesthatareissuedbyasub-CA,boththesub-CAandtheCiscoRootCA2048willconformtothecurrentversion of the CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for Issuance andManagement of Extended Validation Certificates published athttp://www.cabforum.org.IntheeventofanyinconsistencybetweenthisdocumentandthoseGuidelines, thoseGuidelines takeprecedenceoverthisdocument.”
Section2.8 Fixedtypo"governeCertificate"to"governedbyaCertificate". Section4.4.6 Fixedtypo"superceded"to"superseded". Section6.1.1 Moved "CA, andRA keysmust be...either hardware or software" from
1 IntroductionCisco Systems has implemented a Root Certificate Authority (CA) to provide a trust anchor for cryptographiccommunications using X.509 certificates. The Root CA consists of systems, products and services that bothprotecttheRootCA’sprivatekey,andmanagethesubordinateCAX.509certificates(sub-CAcertificates)issuedfromtheRootCA.
The purpose of this document is to describe the framework for the use (issuance, renewal, revocation, andpolicies)oftheRootCertificateAuthority2048withinCiscoSystemsInc.,andwithexternalentities.
1.1 BackgroundApublic-keycertificatebindsapublic-keyvaluetoasetof informationthatidentifiestheentityassociatedwithuseofthecorrespondingprivatekey(thisentityisknownasthe"subject"ofthecertificate).Acertificateisusedbya"certificateuser"or"benefitingparty"thatneedstoutilizethepublickeydistributedviathatcertificate(acertificateuser is typicallyanentity that isverifyingadigital signaturecreatedby thecertificate'ssubject).Thedegree towhich a certificate user can trust the binding embodied in a certificate depends on several factors.ThesefactorsincludethepracticesfollowedbytheCertificationAuthority(CA)inauthenticatingthesubject;theCA'soperatingpolicy,procedures,andsecuritycontrols;thesubject'sobligations(forexample,inprotectingtheprivatekey);andthestatedundertakingsandlegalobligationsoftheCA(forexample,warrantiesandlimitationsonliability).
The Cisco Root CA 2048 will only issue subordinate CA certificates, according to the policies stated in thisdocument.
TheCiscoRootCA2048 is operated in anoffline (non-networked)modeand is physicallysecured separately from the rest of the Cisco Systems’ computing assets. The CiscoCorporate Information Security group is responsible for the physical access controlsprotectingtheofflineRootCA.
1.2 PolicyIdentificationThe assertion of a Certificate Policies Object Identifier (CP OID) within the CertificatePolicies X.509 v3extensionwillonlybecarriedoutbysubordinateCAswhichissueend-entitycertificates.Therefore,thereisnoCPextensionpresentintheCiscoRootCA2048certificateandtheassignmentofaCPOIDisnotwithinthescopeofthisdocument.
WithrespecttoanyEVcertificatesthatareissuedbyasub-CA,boththesub-CAandtheCiscoRootCA2048willconformtothecurrentversionoftheCA/BrowserForumGuidelinesforIssuanceandManagementofExtendedValidation Certificates published at http://www.cabforum.org. In the event of any inconsistency between thisdocumentandthoseGuidelines,thoseGuidelinestakeprecedenceoverthisdocument.
1.3 Community&Applicability1.3.1 CertificationAuthorities(CAs)ThisPolicyisbindingontheofflinerootCA“CiscoRootCA2048”.SpecificpracticesandproceduresbywhichtheRoot CA implements the requirements of this Policy shall be set forth by the CA in a certification practicestatement ("CPS") or other publicly available document, or by contract with any Benefiting Party (see 1.3.5below).
1.3.5 BenefitingPartiesThisPolicy is intended for thebenefitof the followingpersonswhomayrelyoncertificates that reference thisPolicy("BenefitingParties"):
1.3.6.1 SuitableApplicationsSub-CA certificates issued under this policymay be used in any application which requires the assembly of acryptographic chain up to the Cisco Root CA 2048 for signature verification, establishment of trust, and/orcertificatevalidationpurposes.
1.4.1.2 ChangeNotificationBenefitingParties aredefinedhereasentitieswhohaveentered intoaCertificateTrustAgreementwithCiscoSystemswherein thisCertificatePolicy isspecifically referenced.Cisco'sPMAwillnotifyallBenefitingPartiesofanychangestotheCPorCPSasdefinedinthespecificCertificateTrustAgreementbetweenCiscoSystemsandthe Benefiting Party. Entities who are not Benefiting Parties will not be notified of changes butmay learn ofchangesbyviewingthecurrentCPorCPSpublishedtoCisco'spublicrepository.
2 GeneralProvisions2.1 Obligations2.1.1 CAObligationsThe rootCA “CiscoRootCA2048” is responsible for all aspectsof the issuance andmanagementof its issuedcertificates, including control over the application/enrollment process, the identification and authenticationprocess, the certificate manufacturing process, publication of the certificate (if required), suspension and/orrevocationofthecertificate,renewalofthecertificate,validationservices,andforensuringthatallaspectsoftheCAServicesandCAoperationsandinfrastructurerelatedtocertificatesissuedunderthisPolicyareperformedinaccordancewiththerequirementsandrepresentationsofthisPolicy.
• TheCAhasissued,andwillmanage,thecertificateinaccordancewiththisPolicy• The CA has complied with the requirements of this Policy and its applicable CPS when authenticating the
stepstoverifyadditionalinformationinthecertificateunlessotherwisenotedinitsCPS• Informationprovidedby thesubscriber in thecertificateapplication for inclusion in thecertificatehasbeen
2.1.1.2 BenefitingPartyWarrantiesUnlessanexplicitcontractualagreementexistsbetweenCiscoSystemsandaBenefitingParty,CiscoSystems isnotrepresentinganywarrantytoaBenefitingPartythatexercisesrelianceoncertificatesissuedbytheCiscoRootCA2048. In such instanceswhere an explicit and separateCertificateWarranty agreement exists between theBenefitingPartyandCiscoSystems,CiscoSystemsmaywarrantthat:
• TheIssuingCAhasissuedandmanagedtheCertificateinaccordancewiththisPolicy;• The Issuing CA complied with the requirements of this Policy and any applicable CPS when authenticating
hastakenstepsasrequiredunderthisPolicytoverifytheinformationcontainedintheCertificate;• The IssuingCAhas taken the steps requiredby thisPolicy toensure that theCertificateHolder's submitted
These warrantiesmay be applied to any Benefiting Party who: (i) enters into a separately executed warrantyagreementwithCiscoSystems;(ii)reliesontheissuedCertificateinanelectronictransactioninwhichtheissuedCertificate played a material role in verifying the identity of one or more persons or devices; (iii) exercisesReasonable Reliance on that Certificate; and (iv) follows all procedures required by this Policy and by theapplicable Benefiting Party Agreement for verifying the status of the issued Certificate. These warranties aremade to the Benefiting Party as of the time the CA's certificate validationmechanism is utilized to determineCertificatevalidity,andonlyiftheCertificaterelieduponisvalidandnotrevokedatthattime.
2.1.1.3 WarrantyLimitationsThewarranties offered to both Certificate Holders and Benefiting Partieswill be subject to the limitations setforthinthisPolicy.CiscoSystemsmayprovidefurtherlimitationsandexclusionsonthesewarrantiesasdeemedappropriate,relatingto:(i)failuretocomplywiththeprovisionsofthisPolicyorofanyagreementwiththeIssuingCA; (ii) other actionsgiving rise toany loss; (iii) eventsbeyond the reasonable controlof theCA; and (iv) timelimitationsforthefilingofclaims.However,such limitationsandexclusionsmaynot, inanyevent,be lessthanthoseprovidedforin2.1.1.2.
2.1.1.5 CertificateRevocationandRenewalThe Issuing CA must ensure that any procedures for the expiration, revocation and renewal of an issuedCertificate will conform to the relevant provisions of this Policy and will be expressly stated in a CertificateAgreement and any other applicable document outlining the terms and conditions of certificate use, includingensuring that: (i) Key Changeover Procedures are in accordancewith this Policy; (ii) notice of revocation of aCertificate will be posted to an online certificate status database and/or a certificate revocation list (CRL), asapplicable,withinthetimelimitsstatedinthisPolicy;and(iii)theaddressoftheonlinecertificatestatusdatabaseand/orCRLisdefinedintheissuedcertificate.
TheIssuingCAwillensurethatanyCertificateAgreementsincorporatebyreferencetheprovisionsofthisPolicyregarding the IssuingCA’s and theCertificateHolder's rights andobligations. In the alternative, the IssuingCAmayensurethatanyCertificateAgreements,bytheirterms,providetherespectiverightsandobligationsoftheIssuingCAandtheCertificateHoldersassetforthinthisPolicy,includingwithoutlimitationtheparties’rightsandresponsibilitiesconcerningthefollowing:
• Procedures, rights and responsibilities governing (i) application for an issued Certificate, (ii) the enrollmentprocess,(iii)Certificateissuance,and(iv)CertificateAcceptance;
2.1.1.7 EnsuringComplianceTheIssuingCAmustensurethat:(i)itonlyacceptsinformationfromentitiesthatunderstandandareobligatedtocomplywiththisPolicy;(ii)itcomplieswiththeprovisionsofthisPolicyinitscertificationandRepositoryservices,issuanceandrevocationofCertificatesandissuanceofCRLs;(iii)itmakesreasonableeffortstoensureadherenceto this Policy with regard to any Certificates issued under it; and (iv) any identification and authenticationproceduresareimplementedassetforthinPart3.
2.1.2 RegistrationAuthority(RA)ObligationsTheoperatorsoftheCiscoRootCA2048shallberesponsibleforperformingallidentificationandauthenticationfunctions and all certificate manufacturing and issuing functions. The Cisco Root CA 2048 may NOT delegateperformanceof theseobligationstoaregistrationauthority (RA).TheCAmustremainprimarilyresponsible forthe performance of all CA services in amanner consistentwith the requirements of this Policy. The ability todelegateorsubcontracttheseobligationsisnotpermitted.
• Generate a key pair using a trustworthy system, and take reasonable precautions to prevent any loss,disclosure,orunauthorizeduseoftheprivatekey
• Warrantthatall informationandrepresentationsmadebythesubscriberthatare included inthecertificatearetrue
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• Usethecertificateexclusivelyforauthorizedandlegalpurposes,consistentwiththisPolicy• Instruct the CA to revoke the certificate promptly upon any actual or suspected loss, disclosure, or other
• The Benefiting Party entered into a Benefiting Party Agreement which incorporates by reference theprovisionsofthisPolicyregardingtheIssuingCA’sandtheBenefitingParty’srightsandobligations.
2.2 LiabilityThe Issuing CA assumes limited liability only to Benefiting Parties who have entered into a Benefiting PartyAgreement. The Issuing CA may be responsible for direct damages suffered by benefiting parties who haveexecutedaBenefitingPartyAgreementthatarecausedbythefailureoftheIssuingCAtocomplywiththetermsofthisPolicy(exceptwhenwaivedbycontract),andsustainedbysuchbenefitingpartiesasaresultofrelianceona certificate in accordance with this Policy, but only to the extent that the damages result from the use ofcertificates for the suitableapplications listed inSection1.3.6.The liabilityof the IssuingCA is limited to theseconditionsandtoconditionssetforthinthetermsofspecificBenefitingPartyAgreements.
Except as expressly provided in this Policy and in its CPS, the Issuing CA disclaims all other warranties andobligations of any type, including any warranty of merchantability, any warranty of fitness for a particularpurpose,andanywarrantyofaccuracyofinformationprovided.
The liability of the Issuing CA under this Policy to Benefiting Parties who have executed a Benefiting Partyagreementshallbelimitedtodirectdamages,andshallnotexceed$1000.00,exceptwhenwaivedbycontract.The IssuingCAshallhaveno liability forconsequentialdamages.Undernocircumstanceswill the IssuingCAberesponsible for direct or consequential damages to benefiting partieswho have not entered into a BenefitingPartyAgreementwithCiscoSystems,Inc.
2.3.1 GoverningLawThis Policy shall be construed, and any legal relations between the parties hereto shall be determined, inaccordancewiththe lawsoftheUnitedStatesandtheStateofCalifornia,withoutregardtoanyconflictof lawprovisionsthereof.
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2.3.2 DisputeResolutionProceduresDisputes amongCisco Systems and aBenefiting Partywill be resolvedpursuant to provisions in the applicableCertificate Trust Agreements between Cisco and the Benefiting Party. Disputes between entities who are notBenefitingPartiesandCiscoSystemscarrynostipulation.
2.3.6 NoticeAllnoticesandothercommunicationshereundershallbe inwritingandshallbedeemedgiven(a)onthesameday if delivered personally, (2) three business days after being mailed by registered or certified mail (returnreceiptrequested),or(c)onthesamedayifsentbytelecopy,confirmedreceipt,toeachofthecontactslistedinsection1.4.2above.
2.5 Publication&ValidationServices2.5.1 PublicationofCAInformationTheIssuingCAshalloperateasecureon-linerepositoryand/orothercertificatevalidationservicethatisavailableto Benefiting Parties and that contains: (1) issued certificates that reference this Policy, when publication isauthorizedbythesubscriber;(2)aCertificateRevocationList("CRL")oron-linecertificatestatusdatabase;(3)theCA'scertificateforitssigningkey;(4)pastandcurrentversionsoftheCA'spublicCPS;(5)acopyofthisPolicy;and(6)otherrelevantinformationrelatingtocertificatesthatreferencethisPolicy.
2.5.2 FrequencyofPublicationAll informationauthorizedtobepublished inarepositoryshallbepublishedpromptlyaftersuch information isauthorized and available to the Issuing CA. Certificates issued by the CA that reference this Policy will bepublishedpromptlyuponacceptanceofsuchcertificatebythesubscriber,andwhenpublicationisauthorizedbythesubscriber.Informationrelatingtotherevocationofacertificatewillbepublishedinaccordancewithsection4.4.3.
2.5.3 AccessControlsTherepositorywillbeavailabletoBenefitingParties(andsubscribers)onasubstantially24hoursperday,7daysperweekbasis,subjecttoreasonablescheduledmaintenanceandtheCA'sthencurrenttermsofaccess.TheCAshallnot imposeanyaccesscontrolsonthisPolicy, theCA'scertificate for itssigningkey,andpastandcurrentversionsoftheCA'spublicCPS.CAmayimposeaccesscontrolsoncertificates,certificatestatusinformation,or
2.6 ComplianceAuditTheIssuingCA(andeachRAand/orVSP,asapplicable)shallsubmittoanannualcomplianceauditbyanentityasdirectedbyCiscoSystems’CorporateInformationSecuritygroup.SaidentityshallbeapprovedbyCiscoSystemsandqualified toperforma securityauditonaCAbasedon significantexperience in theapplicationofPKIandcryptographic technologies. The purpose of such audit shall be to verify that the CA has in place a system toassurethequalityoftheCAServicesthatitprovides,andthatcomplieswithalloftherequirementsofthisPolicyanditsCPS.
IssuingCAinspectionresultsmustbesubmittedtotheIssuingCA’sregulatororlicensingbodywhereapplicable,andthePolicyManagementAuthority(PMA)ofthisPolicy.Ifirregularitiesarefound,theIssuingCAmustsubmitareporttoitsregulatororlicensingbodyandthePMAastoanyactiontheIssuingCAwilltakeinresponsetotheinspectionreport.WheretheIssuingCAfailstotakeappropriateactioninresponsetotheinspectionreport,theIssuingCA’sregulator, licensingbodyorthePMAmay: (i) indicatethe irregularities,butallowthe IssuingCAtocontinueoperationsuntilthenextprogrammedinspection;(ii)allowtheIssuingCAtocontinueoperationsforamaximum of thirty (30) days pending correction of any problems prior to revocation; (iii) downgrade theassurancelevelofanyCertificatesissuedbytheIssuingCA(includingCrossCertificates);or(iv)revoketheIssuingCA's Certificate. Any decision regarding which of these actions to take will be based on the severity of theirregularities.Any remedymay includepermanentor temporaryCA cessation, but all relevant factorsmustbeconsidered prior to making a decision. A special audit may be required to confirm the implementation andeffectivenessoftheremedy.TheIssuingCAwillpostanyappropriateresultsofaninspection,inwholeorinpart,sothatit isaccessibleforreviewbyCertificateHolders,AuthorizedBenefitingPartiesandRAs.ThemannerandextentofthepublicationwillbedefinedbytheIssuingCA.
2.7 ConfidentialityPolicyInformationregardingsubscribersthatissubmittedonapplicationsforcertificateswillbekeptconfidentialbytheIssuingCAand shallnotbe releasedwithout theprior consentof the subscriber,unlessotherwise requiredbylaw.Inaddition,personalinformationsubmittedtotheCAbysubscribersmust:
The foregoing shall not apply, however, to information appearing on certificates, or to information regardingsubscribersthatisobtainedbyCAfrompublicsources.UndernocircumstancesshalltheCA,anyRA,oranyVSPhaveaccesstotheprivatekeysofanysubscribertowhomitissuesacertificatethatreferencesthisPolicy.
2.8 IntellectualPropertyRightsTheCiscoRootCA2048keypair, certificate, certificationpractice statement,and this certificatepolicyare thephysical and intellectual property of Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco retains all Intellectual Property Rights in and tothese items. IntellectualPropertyRightsbetweenCiscoandBenefitingPartieswillbegovernedbyaCertificateTrustAgreement.
3.1.1 TypesofNamesThe subject name used for certificate applicants shall be the subscriber's authenticated common name in theformofanX.500DistinguishedName.
3.1.4 NameUniquenessThe subject name or a combination of the subject name and other data fields listed in a certificate shall beunambiguousanduniqueforallcertificatesissuedbytheCA.Ifnecessary,additionalcharactersmaybeappendedtotheauthenticatedcommonnametoensurethename'suniquenesswithinthedomainofcertificatesissuedbytheCA.
3.1.5 VerificationofKeyPairThe CA shall establish that the applicant is in possession of the private key corresponding to the public keysubmittedwiththeapplicationinaccordancewithanappropriatesecureprotocol,suchasthatdescribedintheIETFPKIXCertificateManagementProtocolorthroughotherverifiablemeans.
3.1.6 SubscriberIdentification&Authentication(I&A)A certificate request may only be made by an agent of Cisco Systems Inc. on behalf of current or proposedsubordinate Certificate Authority and for whom the certificate request is attributable for the purposes ofaccountability and responsibility. For I&A of the requesting agent, the Issuing CA must follow this Policy'srequirements,asoutlinedinsection3.1.7Theapplicantisrequiredtoprovideauthenticationinformationandanyapplicableattributes,publickeysandcontactinformation.
3.1.7 CiscoSystemsAgentIdentificationandAuthentication(I&A)The IssuingCAmustestablish the identityof theagentandauthenticate theagent’spermission to representacurrentorproposedsubordinateCApriortocertificateissuance.
In addition, the CAmay deliver certificate activation datawith respect to such agent by (i) in-person delivery,basedontheCA’spersonalknowledgeoftheagentorreasonableidentificationatthetimeofdelivery,or(ii)useof a Shared Secret between the CA and the agent, previously established in connection with the prioridentificationandongoingrelationshipdescribedabove.
The CAwill ensure that it has collected, reviewed, and kept records of the information regarding the agent’sidentitythatmeetstheminimumrequirementsofitsHumanResourcepolicy,orothersimilarprocedures,whichmay include verification of all of the following identification information supplied by the Applicant: (i)
3.2 RenewalApplicationsRenewalsshallbeperformedunderthisPolicybytreatingallrenewalrequestsasiftheywerefirst-timecertificateapplicationrequests.AllSubscriberandIssuingCAobligationsstatedinthisPolicyapplytotherenewalrequest.Asubscriberwillsubmitthenewcertificaterequesttothe IssuingCA.The IssuingCAshall issueanewcertificateusing thenewly submitted informationandadhering to the I&Apolicies set forthhereinand in theassociatedCPS.
3.3 Re-KeyafterRevocationRevoked or expired certificates shall never be renewed. Applicants that reference this Policy shall be re-authenticatedbytheCAorRAduringthecertificateapplicationprocess,justaswithafirst-timeapplication.
Upon receipt of a revocation request, the identity of the requestor will be authenticated using the samemechanisms.
4 OperationalRequirements4.1 CertificateApplicationAnapplicantforacertificateshallcompleteacertificateapplicationinaformatprescribedbytheIssuingCA.Allapplications are subject to review, approval and acceptance by the Issuing CA. The subscriber certificateapplicationprocessmayonlybeinitiatedbyagentsofCiscoSystems,Inc.
4.2 CertificateIssuanceUponsuccessfulcompletionofthesubscriberI&AprocessinaccordancewiththisPolicyandtheCPS,theCAshallissue the requestedcertificate,notify theapplicant thereof,andmake thecertificateavailable to theapplicantpursuanttoaprocedurewherebythecertificateisinitiallydeliveredto,oravailableforpickupbythesubscriberonly.
4.4.3 ProcedureforRevocationRequestAcertificaterevocationrequestshouldbepromptlycommunicatedtotheIssuingCA.Duetotheofflinenatureofthe root CA, all certificate revocation requestsmust be communicated to the root CA in person by providingadequateproofofidentificationinaccordancewiththisPolicy.
4.4.3.1 CertificateStatusorCRLUpdatePromptly following revocation, the CRL or certificate status database, as applicable, shall be updated inaccordancewiththeCPSforthatCA.All revocationrequestsandtheresultingactionstakenbytheCAshallbearchivedinaccordancewiththeCPSforthatCA.
4.4.5 CertificateSuspensionThe procedures and requirements stated for certificate revocation must also be followed for certificatesuspensionwhereimplemented.
4.4.6 CRLIssuanceFrequencyCRLswillbeissuedatleastannually,eveniftherearenochangesorupdatestobemade.Uponanewrevocation,anewCRLwillbe issuedandpublishedwithin twohours.The IssuingCAwillensure that supersededCRLsareremovedfromtheCRLDistributionPointlocationuponpostingofthelatestCRL.
4.6.3 ProtectionofArchiveThearchivemediamustbeprotectedeitherbyphysicalsecurityalone,oracombinationofphysicalsecurityandsuitable cryptographic protection. It should also be provided adequate protection from environmental threatssuchastemperature,humidityandmagnetism.
4.6.4 ArchiveBackupProceduresAdequate backup proceduresmust be in place so that in the event of the loss or destruction of the primaryarchives,acompletesetofbackupcopieswillbereadilyavailablewithinashortperiodoftime.
4.8 CompromiseandDisasterRecovery4.8.1 DisasterRecoveryPlanThe CA must have in place an appropriate disaster recovery/business resumption plan and must set up andrenderoperational,afacility,locatedinanareathatisgeographicallyremotefromtheprimaryoperationalsite,that is capable of providing CA Services in accordance with this Policy within seventy-two (72) hours of anunanticipatedemergency.Suchplanshallincludeacompleteandperiodictestofreadinessforsuchfacility.SuchplanshallbereferencedwithinappropriatedocumentationavailabletoBenefitingParties.
4.8.2 KeyCompromisePlanThe CA must have in place an appropriate key compromise plan that addresses the procedures that will befollowedintheeventofacompromiseoftheprivatesigningkeyusedbytheCAtoissuecertificates.Suchplan
4.9 CATerminationIn the event that the CA ceases operation, the subscribers, RAs, VSPs, and Benefiting Partieswill be promptlynotifiedofthetermination.Inaddition,allCAswithwhichcross-certificationagreementsarecurrentatthetimeof cessationwill be promptly informedof the termination. All certificates issuedby theCA that reference thisPolicywillberevokednolaterthanthetimeoftermination.TheCAprivatekeywillbemaintainedinitsHardwareSecurityModule(HSM)for7yearspasteitherterminationorexpirationoftheCAcertificate,afterwhichitwillbedestroyedusingtheFIPS140-1level3orhigherapprovedmechanismsuppliedbytheHSM.
5 Physical,Procedural,andPersonnelSecurityControls5.1 PhysicalSecurity--AccessControlsThe CA, all RAs, and VSPs, shall implement appropriate physical security controls to restrict access to thehardwareandsoftware(includingtheserver,workstations,andanyexternalcryptographichardwaremodulesortokens)usedinconnectionwithprovidingCAServices.AccesstosuchhardwareandsoftwareshallbelimitedtothosepersonnelperforminginaTrustedRoleasdescribedinSection5.2.1.Accessshallbecontrolledthroughtheuseof;electronicaccesscontrols,mechanicalcombinationlocksets,ordeadbolts.Suchaccesscontrolsmustbemanuallyorelectronicallymonitoredforunauthorizedintrusionatalltimes.
5.2 ProceduralControls5.2.1 TrustedRolesAll employees, contractors, and consultants of the Issuing CA (collectively "personnel") that have access to orcontrolovercryptographicoperationsthatmaymateriallyaffecttheCA'sissuance,use,suspension,orrevocationofcertificates,includingaccesstorestrictedoperationsoftheCA'srepository,shall,forpurposesofthisPolicy,beconsidered as serving in a trusted role. Such personnel include, but are not limited to, system administrationpersonnel,operators,engineeringpersonnel,andexecutiveswhoaredesignatedtooverseetheCA'soperations.
The Root CA must ensure that no single individual may gain access to the private key of the Root CA. At aminimum,proceduraloroperationalmechanismsmustbe inplace forkey recovery, suchasaSplitKnowledgeTechnique, toprevent thedisclosureof theEncryptionKey toanunauthorized individual.Multi-user control isalsorequiredforCAKeygenerationasoutlinedinSection6.2.2.AllotherdutiesassociatedwithCArolesmaybeperformedbyanindividualoperatingalone.TheIssuingCAmustensurethatanyverificationprocessitemploysprovidesforoversightofallactivitiesperformedbyprivilegedCAroleholders.
To best ensure the integrity of the Issuing CA equipment and operation, it is recommended that whereverpossible a separate individualbe identified foreachTrustedRole. The separationprovidesa setof checks andbalancesovertheIssuingCAoperation.Undernocircumstanceswill the incumbentofaCAroleperformhisorherownauditorfunction.
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5.2.3 IdentificationandAuthenticationforEachRoleAll IssuingCApersonnelmusthave their identity andauthorizationverifiedbefore theyare: (i) included in theaccess list for the Issuing CA site; (ii) included in the access list for physical access to the system; (iii) given aCertificate for the performance of their CA role; or (iv) given an account on the PKI system. Each of theseCertificatesand/oraccounts(withtheexceptionofCAsigningCertificates)must:(i)bedirectlyattributabletoanindividual; and (ii) be restricted to actions authorized for that role through the use of CA software, operatingsystemandproceduralcontrols.Whenaccessedacrosssharednetworks,CAoperationsmustbesecured,usingmechanismssuchastoken-basedstrongauthenticationandencryption
5.3 PersonalSecurityControls5.3.1 BackgroundandQualificationsCAs, RAs, and VSPs shall formulate and follow personnel and management policies sufficient to providereasonable assurance of the trustworthiness and competence of their employees and of the satisfactoryperformanceoftheirdutiesinmannerconsistentwiththisPolicy.
5.3.2 BackgroundInvestigationCAs shall conduct an appropriate investigation of all personnel who serve in trusted roles (prior to theiremployment and periodically thereafter as necessary), to verify their trustworthiness and competence inaccordancewiththerequirementsofthisPolicyandCA'spersonnelpracticesorequivalent.Allpersonnelwhofailaninitialorperiodicinvestigationshallnotserveorcontinuetoserveinatrustedrole.
6 TechnicalSecurityControls6.1 KeyPairGenerationandProtection6.1.1 KeyPairGenerationKeypairsfortheIssuingCA,RAs,VSPs,andsubscribersmustbegeneratedinsuchawaythattheprivatekeyisnot known by anyone other than the authorized user of the key pair. Acceptable ways of accomplishing thisinclude:
6.1.3 SubscriberPublicKeyDeliverytoCAThesubscriber'spublickeymustbe transferred to theRAorCA inaway thatensures that (1) ithasnotbeenchangedduringtransit;(2)thesenderpossessestheprivatekeythatcorrespondstothetransferredpublickey;and(3)thesenderofthepublickeyisthelegitimateuserclaimedinthecertificateapplication.
6.2 CAPrivateKeyProtectionThe Issuing CA shall protect its private key(s) using a FIPS 140-2 level 3 or higher compliant hardware baseddevice,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisPolicy.
6.2.1 StandardsforCryptographicModuleThe “Cisco Root CA 2048” signing key generation, storage and signing operations shall be performed using ahardware-basedcryptographicmoduleratedatFIPS140-2Level3orhigher.Subscribers(sub-CAs)shallalsouseFIPS140-2Level3orhigherapprovedcryptographicmodules.
6.2.2 PrivateKeyMulti-PersonControl(M-of-N)Multi-personcontrol isa securitymechanism that requiresmultipleauthorizations foraccess to theCAPrivateSigning Key. For example, access to the CA Private Signing Key should require authorization and validation bymultipleparties, includingCApersonnel and separate securityofficers. Thismechanismpreventsa singleparty(CAorotherwise)fromgainingaccesstotheCAPrivateSigningKey.
TheIssuingCA’sprivatekeymustbeprotectedbymultipersoncontrolforallfunctions.Thepartiesusedfortwo-person control will be maintained on a list that will be made available for inspection by the audit personnelidentifiedinsection2.6above.
6.2.5 PrivateKeyArchivalTheprivate keys for both the IssuingCA and Subscribers (sub-CAs)must be archived in accordancewithCiscoSystems’“PKIRootCreationandStorageGuidelines”document.
6.3.3 RestrictionsonCA'sPrivateKeyUseThe CA's signing key used for issuing certificates that conform to this Policy shall be used only for signingcertificatesand,optionally,CRLsorothervalidationserviceresponses.
6.4 ActivationDataThere is no activation data needed or required for subscribers of the Cisco Root CA 2048 because everysubscriberisasubordinateCAandthesub-CAcertificatesarehand-deliveredbacktothesub-CAandinstalledbyagentsofCiscoSystems,Inc.
6.5 SecurityManagementControls6.5.1 NetworkSecurityControlsTheIssuingCA(CiscoRootCA2048)servermustbeofflineatalltimes.Undernocircumstanceswilltheserverbenetworked in any fashion. Any repositoriesmust be protected through application level firewalls (or separateportsofasinglefirewall)configuredtoallowonlytheprotocolsandcommandsrequiredforthesecureoperationoftherepository.
8 References8.1 NormativeReferencesThis document attempts to address control elements enumerated in RFC 2527, the guidelines contained inversion2.0oftheAICPA/CICATrustServicePrinciplesandCriteriaforCertificationAuthorities(WebTrustforCA),andtheguidelinescontainedintheamendedversion1.1oftheAICPA/CICAWebTrustforCertificationAuthoritiesSSLBaselineRequirementsAuditCriteria.
AnaffiliatedindividualisthesubjectofacertificatethatisaffiliatedwithasponsorapprovedbytheCA(suchas an employee affiliatedwith an employer). Certificates issued to affiliated individuals are intended to beassociatedwiththesponsorandtheresponsibilityforauthenticationlieswiththesponsor.
AuthorizedCAA certification authority that has been authorized by the Certificate PolicyManagement Authority to issuecertificatesthatreferencethispolicy.
BenefitingPartyArecipientofadigitallysignedmessagewhoreliesonacertificatetoverifytheintegrityofadigitalsignatureon the message (through the use of the public key contained in the certificate), and the identity of theindividualthatcreatedsaiddigitalsignature.
CACertificationAuthority
CertificateA record that, at a minimum: (a) identifies the certification authority issuing it; (b) names or otherwiseidentifies itssubscriber; (c)containsapublickeythatcorrespondstoaprivatekeyunderthesolecontrolofthesubscriber;(d)identifiesitsoperationalperiod;and(e)containsacertificateserialnumberandisdigitallysigned by the certification authority issuing it. As used in this Policy, the term of “Certificate” refers tocertificatesthatexpresslyreferencethisPolicyinthe"CertificatePolicies"fieldofanX.509v.3certificate.
CertificationAuthorityAcertificationauthorityisanentitythatisresponsibleforauthorizingandcausingtheissuanceofacertificate.A certification authority can perform the functions of a registration authority (RA) and a certificatemanufacturingauthority(CMA),oritcandelegateeitherofthesefunctionstoseparateentities.
A certification authority performs two essential functions. First, it is responsible for identifying andauthenticating the intended subscriber to be named in a certificate, and verifying that such subscriberpossessestheprivatekeythatcorrespondstothepublickeythatwillbelistedinthecertificate.Second,thecertification authority actually creates (or manufactures) and digitally signs the certificate. The certificateissuedbythecertificationauthoritythenrepresentsthatcertificationauthority'sstatementastotheidentityofthedevicenamedinthecertificateandthebindingofthatdevicetoaparticularpublic-privatekeypair.
CertificationPracticeStatement(CPS)A statement of the practices that a certification authority employs in issuing, suspending, and revokingcertificates andproviding access to same. It is recognized that somecertificationpracticedetails constitutebusiness sensitive information thatmay not be publicly available, but which can be provided to certificatemanagementauthoritiesundernon-disclosureagreement.
CPSSeeCertificationPracticeStatement.
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AppendixA:DefinitionsandAcronyms�25
CRLSeeCertificateRevocationList.
FIPS(FederalInformationProcessingStandards)These are Federal standards that prescribe specific performance requirements, practices, formats,communications protocols, etc. for hardware, software, data, telecommunications operation, etc. FederalagenciesareexpectedtoapplythesestandardsasspecifiedunlessawaiverhasbeengrantedinaccordancewithFIPSwaiverprocedures.
KeyPairTwomathematically relatedkeys,having theproperties that (a)onekey canbeused toencryptamessagethatcanonlybedecryptedusingtheotherkey,and(b)evenknowingonekey,itiscomputationallyinfeasibletodiscovertheotherkey.
ObjectIdentifierAn object identifier is a specially formatted number that is registered with an internationally recognizedstandardsorganization.
OIDSeeObjectIdentifier.
OperationalPeriodofaCertificateThe operational period of a certificate is the period of its validity. Itwould typically begin on the date thecertificateisissued(orsuchlaterdateasspecifiedinthecertificate),andendonthedateandtimeitexpires(asnotedinthecertificate)unlesspreviouslyrevokedorsuspended.
PINPersonalIdentificationNumber
PKIPublicKeyInfrastructure
PKIXAn IETFWorkingGroupdeveloping technical specifications for a PKI components basedonX.509Version3certificates.
PrivateKeyThe key of a key pair used to create a digital signature. This keymust be kept secret, and under the solecontroloftheindividualorentitywhoseidentityisassociatedwiththatdigitalsignature.
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AppendixA:DefinitionsandAcronyms�26
PublicKeyThekeyofakeypairusedtoverifyadigitalsignature.Thepublickeyismadefreelyavailabletoanyonewhowill receivedigitally signedmessages from theholderof thekeypair. Thepublic key isusuallyprovidedviadeliveryofacertificateissuedbyacertificationauthorityandmightalsobeobtainedbyaccessingarepository.A public key is used to verify the digital signature of a message purportedly sent by the holder of thecorrespondingprivatekey.
TrustworthySystemComputerhardware,software,andproceduresthat:(a)arereasonablysecurefromintrusionandmisuse;(b)provide a reasonable level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; (c) are reasonably suited toperformingtheirintendedfunctions;and(d)adheretogenerallyacceptedsecurityprocedures.
ValidCertificate/ValidityAcertificate isonlyvalidwhen(a)acertificationauthorityhassigned/issued it; (b) thesubscriber listed in ithasacceptedit;(c)ithasnotyetexpired;and(d)hasnotbeenrevoked.
