Citizenship and Legislative Dept Complete

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CITIZENSHIP

CASE 1:

MERCADO V. MANZANO 307 SCRA 630

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado (100T votes), private respondent Edu Manzano (103T

votes), and Gabriel Daza III (54T votes) were Makati vice mayor candidates in 1998.Despite the margin, the proclamation was suspended while Ernesto Mamaril’s petition

for Edu’s disqualification was pending. The petition is based on the ground that Manzano

misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. In his answer, Manzano

admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged

that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino

mother. He was born in San Francisco, CA in 1955 and has thus acquired US citizenship.

It would appear that Manzano holds dual citizenship, being both a Filipino and a UScitizen. Sec. 40(d) of the LGC provides that “persons with dual citizenship are

disqualified from running for any elective position.”

Thus, ruling on the petition, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation

of Edu’s COC. COMELEC En Banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declaredManzano qualified to run. Being brought to the Philippines at the age of 6 using an

American passport and being registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of

Immigration did not result in the loss of Manzano’s Philippine citizenship, as he did not

renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United

States.

It was also an undisputed fact that when Manzano attained the age of majority,

he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,

which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Pursuant to the

resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers proclaimed Manzano as

Makati vice mayor on August 31. Mercado files a petition for certiorari.

ISSUES: WON Manzano is a Filipino citizen. YES

WON dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification. NO

HELD:

Has Manzano effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship? YES. In Frivaldo v.COMELEC it was held that “By the laws of the United States, Frivaldo lost his American

citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he

ran for Governor thrice. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to

the Philippine Government.” In Aznar v. COMELEC, the Court applies mutatis mutandis

(the necessary changes). “When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose

Philippine citizenship must be “express,” it stands to reason that there can be no suchloss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either “express” or

“implied.” To recapitulate, by declaring in his COC that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is

not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and

support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and

that he does so without mental reservation, Manzano has, as far as the laws of this

country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anythingwhich he may have said before as a dual citizen. Manzano’s oath of allegiance to the

Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,

received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past

elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship arises when,

as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a

person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. It may arise when a

person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus

sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso

facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of

both states. Considering the citizenship clause of our Constitution, it is possible for the

following classes of Filipino citizens to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which

follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the

laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are

considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renouncedPhilippine citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person

simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual

citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. Sec. 5,

Art IV provides that “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and

shall be dealt with by law.” During the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, Comm.

Blas Ople, concerned that dual allegiance can siphon scarce national capital to other

countries in light of Filipino-Chinese citizens bound by a second allegiance to Peking or

Taiwan, stressed the difference between dual allegiance and dual citizenship, describing

dual allegiance as “larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenshipwhich is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious.”

In including sec. 5, the concern of the ConCom was not with dual citizens per se

but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin

even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” must be

underst ood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual

citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

As Fr. Bernas has pointed out: “Dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us

because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a

child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another

country is something completely beyond our control.”



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CASE 2:

TECSON V. COMELEC G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving

of the privilege. It is a “precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,”that

cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who disputeit.

FACTS:

Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ) filed his COC on 31 Dec 2003

representing that he was a natural-born citizen, born on 20 Aug 1939 in Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier initiated a petition to disqualify FPJ on the ground of material

misrepresentation. Fornier alleged that FPJ’s parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie

Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the

son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.

If Allan F. Poe was Filipino, he a lso could not have transmitted his citizenship to

FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the

allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe

contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to BessieKelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married

Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

ISSUE: WON FPJ is a Filipino citizen

HELD: YES.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. Today,

an ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global

village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizensof the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect

their Philippine citizenship." Having died in 1954 at 84 years old, FPJ’s grandfather

Lorenzo Pou would have been born under Spanish rule and would have benefited fromthe “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That

citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,

father of FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen

first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens

regardless of whether such children are legitimate or i llegitimate.

Amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he questioned the

relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service. “What possible state

interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public

officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive thechild of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate

child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his

parents. If there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction

transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated. When the Constitution

says: “The following are citizens of the Philippines ... ‘Those whose fathers are citizens of

the Philippines’”, t he Constitution means just that without invidious distinction. Ubi lex

non distinguit ne nos distinguere debemus, especially if the distinction has no textual

foundation in the Constitution, serves no state interest, and even imposes an injustice on

an innocent child. To hold that the illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his Filipino

mother but that an illegitimate child does not follow the citizenship of his Filipino fatherwould be to make an invidious discrimination.” Wherefore, the court resolv es to dismiss

all the petitions.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion. The words of the

Constitution should as much as possible be given ordinary meaning because it is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of the people. As Sec. 3, Art. IV of the

1935 Constitution does not distinguish between a legitimate and an illegitimate child of a

Filipino father, we should not make a distinction.

Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion. We have repeatedly ruled that an illegitimate

child does not enjoy any presumption of blood relation to the alleged father until filiationor blood relation is proved as provided by law. Art. 887 of the Civil Code expresslyprovides that “[I]n all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.”

The illegitimate child becomes a Philippine citizen only from the time he establishes his

blood relation to the Filipino father. If the blood relation is established after the birth of

the illegitimate child, then the child is not a natural-born Philippine citizen since an act is

required after birth to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. FPJ is not a natural-

born Philippine citizen since there is no showing that his alleged Filipino father Allan F.

Poe acknowledged him at birth. The Constitution defines a natural-born citizen as a

Philippine citizen “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect”

his Philippine citizenship. FPJ does not meet this citizenship qualification.

Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should have

been remanded. Following the suggestion of amicus curiae Justice Mendoza, I am

adopting the rule that an illegitimate child of an alien-mother who claims to be an

offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural- born citizen if he was duly

acknowledged by the latter at birth, thus leaving the illegitimate child with nothing more

to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship. No evidence has been submitted to show that

Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as his own son at birth. Since FPJ then was born

out of wedlock and was not acknowledged by his father, the only possible Filipinoparent, at the time of his birth, the inescapable conclusion is that he is not a natural-born

Philippine citizen.

Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion. Allan F. Poe (1) obtained degrees

from UP and the Philippine Dental College, (2) became a leading movie actor in the

Philippines, (3) served in the Philippine Army, inducted into the USAFE, fought inBulacan, was in the “Death March” and was awarded the “Gold Cross” by the President,

and (4) died with his death cer reflecting political status as “Filipino.” Allan Poecomported himself as a Filipino citizen, was regarded as such in the community where he



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lived, and was acknowledged to be a Filipino by the Philippine government during his

lifetime. The paternity of Allan Poe having been admitted, and his Filipino citizenship

having been established, FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

CASE 3:

CO V. HRET 199 SCRA 692 (1991)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Jose Ong Jr.’s grandfather Ong Te arrived from China in 1895 and

established residence in Laoang, Samar. Jose Ong Jr.’s father Jose Ong Chuan was born in

China in 1905 and was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan

spent his childhood in Samar, absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices and

eventually got married to natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao in 1932. Jose Ong Jr. was

one of their 8 children. In 1955, the CFI of Samar approved his application for

naturalization and in 1957, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance. Jose Ong Jr. was

at that time a minor of 9 years. Jose Jr. graduated from college, took and passed the CPABoards and found a job in the Central Bank. Later, he worked at the Ong’s hardware

business in Binondo but frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up andspent his childhood days. He married a Filipina named Desiree Lim in 1984. He

registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there in 1984

and 1986. In 1987, respondent Jose Ong Jr. ran in the elections for representative in the

second district of Northern Samar and was overwhelmingly voted for with a margin of

more than 7,000 votes against petitioners Antonio Co and Sixto Balanquit. Upon

proclamation, Co and Balinquit filed election protests with the HRET.

ISSUE: WON Ong is a Filipino Citizen. YES

HELD:

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both

considered as natural-born citizens. There is no dispute that Jose Ong Jr.’s mother was a

natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of

whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes

material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to

children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon

reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing

elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He

was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had

been naturalized when the respondent was only 9 years old.

In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and

unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old. Hecannot be expected to have elected citizenship as he was already a citizen. In the case of

In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the

right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act

of election of Philippine citizenship. Jose Ong Jr. did more than merely exercise his

right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. The filing of sworn

statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect

citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of

deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to

Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during

election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature arethemselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.

The petitioners argue that Ong's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen

because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship but the Court cannot go into

the collateral procedure of stripping Ong Chuan of his citizenship after his death and at

this very late date just so we can go after the son. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a

person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask

the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void

would run against the principle of due process. A dead man cannot speak. Jose Ong

Chuan cannot be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. Furthermore, the same issue

of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the ConCon of 1971 and by the

Batasang Pambansa. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and

accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.

Is Jose Ong Jr. a resident of Northern Samar? Yes . The term "residence" has

been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous

Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed

permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to

return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from

said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the

domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi

(Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])

CASE 4:

BENGSON III V. HRET G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

The act of repatriation allows the person to recover, or return to, his original status

before he lost Filipino citizenship.

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in

San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. However, in 1985, Cruz

enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the

Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the U.S. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino

citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose

his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in thearmed forces of a foreign country." Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of



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Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990. In 1994,

Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. He ran

for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in 1998 by

a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over Antonio Bengson III. Subsequently, Bengson

filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the HRET on the ground that Cruz was

not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, sec. 6 of the Constitution. HRETdismissed the petition and likewise denied Bengson’s MR, thus this present petition for

certiorari.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, may still be

considered a natural- born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. YES.

HELD:

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the

same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates

the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

(1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their

citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the

allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any

other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic

necessity. Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the p lace

where the person concerned resides or last resided. Moreover, repatriation results in the

recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost hiscitizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the

other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine

citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered

the same in the Civil Registry, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a

natural-born citizen. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Panganiban, concurring opinion. Repatriation is simply the recovery of original

citizenship. In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be infavor of [its] claimant."Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of private

respondent, who claims to be a natural-born citizen. Under the present Constitution,

private respondent should be deemed natural-born, because was not naturalized. The

court likewise has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the

people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with

fractured legalism. In such instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of

the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to defeat the will of the

people. Lastly, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards

globalization. It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for

naturalization in foreign countries, because of the great economic or social opportunities

there. Hence, we should welcome former Filipino citizens desirous of not simply

returning to the country or regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino

people as well.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion. The status of being a natural-born

citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by law directly to those who intended, and

actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Island. Even at the time of its conception

in the Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was conferred did not have to do

anything to acquire full citizenship. I reiterate that Sec. 2, Art. IV defines natural-born

citizens as " those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to

perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Cruz had to take an

oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the Local

Civil Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American citizenshipand had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. If citizenship is

gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen concerned can not

be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a

citizen.

CASE 5:

Cordora vs. COMELEC; G.R. No. 176947; February 19, 2009

Facts: Gaudencio Cordora accuses Gustavo Tambunting for the election offense of

making false claims in his certificate of candidacy relating to his citizenship and as to the

residence requirement. Cordora bases his claims from a certification of the Bureau of

Immigration that “in two instances Tambunting claimed that he is an American citizen

upon arrival in the Philippines and upon leaving for the United States that is in 2000 and

2001 respectively. Furthermore, is the fact that Tambunting possesses an American

passport which according to him reinforces his claim. Tambunting denies the allegations

and presented a copy of his birth certificate showing that he is the son of a Filipino

mother and an American father thus confirming that he is a dual citizen. Also Cordura

stresses that the fact that Tambunting gained American citizenship means he has lost his

residence to run for public office. The COMELEC recommended the dismissal of

Cordura’s claim for which the present case hinges on the Highest Tribunal to rule upon

the matter.

Issue: Is Tambunting a Filipino citizen, having in mind the allegations of Cordora?

Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative that Tambunting is aFilipino citizen,

regardless of the fact that he is of dual citizen status. He is a Filipino citizen because by

the circumstances of his birth, his father being an American follows the place of the birth

principle, whilst his mother, a Filipino citizen follows the blood principle or jus

sanguinis. It is beyond his control that he is a dual citizen. Nevertheless he can run for

public office because the law on the matter in The Local Government Code of 1991

provides that it is not dual citizenship that the law prohibits but that of dual allegiance as

held in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano. Furthermore the law regarding the

reacquisition of Filipino citizenship does not apply to Tambunting because it only applies

to those persons who have been naturalized as citizens of other jurisdictions and desiresto reacquire their Filipino Citizenship, whilst under the given facts Tambunting never



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lost it. As to the residency requirement, it need not be stressed because again as the

court has already held, Tambunting never lost his Filipino citizenship.

CASE 6:

Roseller De Guzman vs. COMELEC and Angelina DG. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009

Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts: Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were

candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized

National and Local elections. Private respondent filed against petitioner a petition for

disqualification alleging that he is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and

resident of the United States of America. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a

naturalized American. However, he argued that he re-acquired Philippine Citizenship

when his application for dual citizenship was approved under Republic Act No. 9225.

During the May 2007 elections, private respondent won as vice-

mayor. Consequently, petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of irregularities

and massive cheating. While the said case was pending, the COMELEC ruled to disqualify

petitioner stating that he should have renounced his American citizenship before he can

run for any public elective position.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed by the

COMELEC for having been rendered moot in view of private respondent’s victory.

Thereafter, the trial court in the Election Protest rendered a decision declaring petitioner

as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty position. As a result, Petitioner filed the instant

petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion indisqualifying him from running as Vice-Mayor.

Petitioner invokes invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Mercado v.

Manzano, that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy,

containing an oath of allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his foreign

citizenship. Moreover, he claims that the COMELEC En Banc prematurely dismissed the

motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, private respondent claims that the passage of

R.A. No. 9225 effectively abandoned the Court’s rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado.

Issues: 1) Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioner’s

motion for reconsideration for being moot; and

2) Whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor in the May

2007 elections.

Held: 1. YES. An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy

so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In this case,

the resolution of the issue remained relevant because it could significantly affect the

outcome of the election protest. In view thereof, a definitive ruling on the issue of

petitioner’s citizenship was clearly necessary. 2. YES. Contrary to petitioner’s claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy

does not amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship. The rulings in the cases

of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225

provides for more requirements. Hence, the law compels natural-born Filipinos, who

have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained

their Philippine citizenship for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to

additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship

before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates

of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

CASE 7:

LABO vs. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his

citizenship by Lardizabal by quo warranto. He was married in the Philippines to an

Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in

Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian

records, Labo is still an Australian citizen. Labo returned to the philippines using the

Australian passport and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later

changed status from immigrant to returning citizen, it was denied since he has not

applied for reacquisition of his philippine citizenship. Although no direct evidence

wasvpresented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian

citizen, thelaws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who

is grantedAustralian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this

oath includes arenunciation of all other allegiance .

Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.



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Held: The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did

not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or

finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became

a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive

process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a

condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made

the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the

record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship. Nordid Australia confer dual citizenship to him.

He is not qualified to vote, much more run for elections as his citizenship is an

impediment to his qualification.



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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CASE 1:

[G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994.]

TOBIAS vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS

BIDIN, J:

FACTS:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwiseknown as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly

Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of

Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo

Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,

sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed

R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994. A plebiscite was held, people of

Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality

of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The turnout at the plebiscite was only

14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911voted "no." R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Petitioners Contentions:

FIRST OBJECTION:

- Unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the

Constitution. That R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

"As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its

own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in

the next national elections after the passage of this Act. Theremainder of the former legislative district of San

Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San

Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election.”

- Contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule. That the inclusion of the

assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two

principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly

urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San

Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

- That the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of

R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly

urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law.

SECOND AND THIRD OBJECTIONS:

- Article VI, Sections 5 (1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:

"Sec. 5 (1).The House of Representatives shall be composed of not

more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixedby law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned

among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area inaccordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on

the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as

provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of

registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations."

"Sec. 5(4).Within three years following the return of every census,

the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts

based on the standard provided in this section."

- That under Section 49 of the assailed law, division of San Juan and

Mandaluyong, has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of

Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution.- That said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the

subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.

- That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to

reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as aforecited.

MAIN ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. No. 7675 was constitutional? YES.

HELD per contention:

1. Whether it complied with one title one subject rule? YES.

- The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a

subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly

urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a

highly urbanized city. It necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated

under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for

Mandaluyong. A liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been

invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The

constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be

given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient

compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and allthe provisions are germane to that general subject."



8

2. Whether it violated the limit on the number of representatives in the

House of Representatives, which was “not more than 250 members?”

NO.

- A reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as

aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The

Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of

not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable

import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be

increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.

3. What is gerrymandering? Is it present in the case? NO.

Gerrymandering, is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a

particular candidate or party.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep.

Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of theformer San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By

dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been

diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

Other Rulings:

- The inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said

plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring

Mandaluyong.

- The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regularcongressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of

the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At

any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all

relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.

- The contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right

of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the

absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which

drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof.Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

CASE 2:

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC

GR 119976 September 18, 1995

Facts: Imelda R. Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte stating, among others, that her residence inthe place was seven months. Cong. Cirilio Roy Montejo, another candidate, filed a Petition

for Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEC contending, among others, that

she failed to comply with the one-year residence requirement under the Constitution. An

order was issued by the COMELEC disqualifying and cancelling her certificate of

candidacy. She filed an Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the “seven

months” to since childhood.” It was denied because it was filed out of time. In an en banc

resolution, the COMELEC declared her as qualified to run and allowed her proclamation

should it appear that she is the winner. In another resolution on the same day, it directed

that the proclamation be suspended in the event that she obtained the highest number of votes. She obtained the highest number of votes; hence she went to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte for a

period of one year at the time of the election

Held: YES

The Court ruled that: for purposes of election, residence and domicile are synonymous. It

is only in Civil Law that we keep the distinction between the two which is:

Residence – where one stays at the moment; involves the intent to leave when the

purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends.

Domicile – where one stays permanently characterized by actual residence or physical

presence at one point, with animus manendi (intent to stay if present) or animus

revertendi (intent to return if absent).

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be

decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s

residency requirement. (The “seven months” was merely an honest mistake of

petitioner).

In the case of IMR, her domicile by operation of law or necessity (domicilium

necessarium) is Tolosa, since, as a minor she could not choose her domicile, and her

father chose Tolosa as their domicile. Her marriage to Ferdinand Marcos did not

necessarily result in the loss of that domicile in favor of a new one since (1) a woman

follows only the actual residence of her husband and not his domicile and (2) as a rule,



9

change of domicile is proved only by the concurrence of thre eelements, (1) actual

removal from original domicile, (2) intent to abandon domicile, and (3) acts effecting

that intent. IMR may have practically left Leyte, but the animus revertendi remained as

evinced by her celebrating her birthdays, fiestas and important milestones in Tacloban

and Tolosa, and her careful cultivation of a political base in that district, thereby negating

the last two requirements. Assuming but not conceding that she lost her domicile when,

by her acts she proved her intent to follow her husband’s domicile, her act of writing the

PCGG for the recovery of her “ancestral” house in Tolosa, and public announcement torepresent the 1st District in Congress after she returned from US exile and almost three

years before the 1995 elections, showed her decision to re-establish her domicile there

(domicilium voluntarium or domicile of choice), satisfying the minimum residency

requirement.

Hence, the COMELEC erred in disqualifying her.

For the purpose of Election Law, “residence” is the same as “domicile.” Successfully

changing residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the old one.

To successfully effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) actual change indomicile, (2) bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and

establishing a new one; (3) acts which correspond with the purpose

CASE 3:

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) VS COMELEC CARPIO, J .: APRIL21, 2009

G.R. No. 179271

FACTS

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties

under the Party-List System.[6]

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution,

[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have

recently been quoted in the national papers that the

[COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement

the Veterans ruling , that is, would apply the Panganiban

formula in allocating party-list seats.” [7]

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC ResolutionNo. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as

winners in the party-list elections

Party-List Projected total number of votes

BUHAY 1,178,747

BAYAN MUNA 977,476

CIBAC 755,964

GABRIELA 621,718

APEC 622,489

A TEACHER 492,369

AKBAYAN 462,674

ALAGAD 423,190

BUTIL 409,298

COOP-NATCO 412,920

ANAKPAWIS 370,165

ARC 375,846

ABONO 340,151

Proportion of votes received

by the first party

Additional seats

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat

Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the

following percentage:

1,178,747

- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%

16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other

qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as

expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htm#_ftn6










10

No. of votes of

concerned party No. of additional

Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to

a concerned party No. of votes of first party

first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as

follows:

Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1

GABRIELA 1.05 1

APEC 1.05 1

A TEACHER 0.83 0

AKBAYAN 0.78 0

ALAGAD 0.71 0

BUTIL 0.69 0

COOP-NATCO 0.69 0

ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0

ARC 0.63 0

ABONO 0.57 0

Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2

BAYAN MUNA 1

CIBAC 1

GABRIELA 1

APEC 1

Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07 -88 on 3

August 2007, which reads as follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List

Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay

Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for

National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty.

Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group

submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National

Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition

to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives

Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs,

to wit:

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of

Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article

VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which

prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized

with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section

12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only

to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on

the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be

applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the

number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they

received and the additional seats shall be allocated in

accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion

to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group

in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list

election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those

which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure



11

in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by

Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

RECOMMENDATION :

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic .

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60

promulgated July 9, 2007 re “In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations

and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System

During the May 14, 2007 National and Local

Elections” resolved among others that the total number of

seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be

determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation

Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the

canvass of the party-list results.”

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as

NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC

Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution

and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) . On the same day, the COMELEC denied

reconsiderationduring the proceedings of the NBC.[11]

ISSUE

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list

representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution

mandatory or merely a ceiling? MERELY A CEILING

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941

constitutional? Yes3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of

RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional? No

4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties

from participating in the party-list elections? No

If not, can the major political parties be barred from

participating in the party-list elections? No

HELD:

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election

has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference,

these are:

First , the twenty percent allocation — the combined number

of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the

total membership of the House of Representatives, including

those elected under the party list ;

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties

garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the House

of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of

the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of

three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats

which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion

to their total number of votes

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of

the term “proportional representation,” this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for

the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the “House of

Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty

members, unless otherwise fixed by law.” The House of Representatives shall

be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The

Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the

House of Representatives.

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratioof party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We

compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the

number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first

formula in Veterans, thus:







12

Ran

k

Party

Votes

Garnere

d

Votes

Garnere

d over

Total

Votes for

Party

List, in

%

(A)

Guarantee

d Seat

(First

Round)

(B)

Additiona

l

Seats

(Second

Round)

(C)

(B) plus

(C), in

whole

integer

s

(D)

Applyin

g the

three

seat cap

(E)

1 BUHAY 1,169,23

4

7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

2 BAYAN

MUNA

979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

9[31] COOP-

NATCCO

409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.

13 ANAKPAWI

S

370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

26 SENIOR

CITIZENS

213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.

30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

31 ANGKASANGGA

170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.

32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.

Tota

l

17 55

Number of seats available

to legislative districts x .20 =

Number of seats available to

party-list representatives

.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total

number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats

available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.







13

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold

and the Three-Seat Cap

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued

operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as

found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This

Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible toachieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of

available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent

threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the

permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist

of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million

votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two

percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further

assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat

despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent

threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats

to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the

maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always

impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the

two percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the

distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of

R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full

implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the

attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests

in the House of Representatives.”[30]

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section

11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the

highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during

the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two

percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be

entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking

in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their

total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more

than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be

included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional

seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the

guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.

No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our

allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of

votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of

votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for

party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation

the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which isthe difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List

System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer

of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seatscorresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats

we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all

available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the

remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply

the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list

candidate is entitled

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are

55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with

sufficient number of votes for one whole seat , in no case to exceed a total of three

seats for each party.

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties

from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the

Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list

elections through their sectoral wings.

In defining a “party” that participates in party -list elections as either “a

political party or a sectoral party,” R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major







14

political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major

political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the

intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form

coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There

should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth

wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their

chosen sector or sectors.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A.

No. 7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be

nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born

citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the

Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately

preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona

fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent

for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at

least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be

twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day

of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who

attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to

continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee “wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity”[34] as there is no

financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral

party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented

sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a

fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a

senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the

entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The

Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number

of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: “The House of

Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,

unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x.” The 20% allocation of party-list

representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than

20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the

continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the

constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-

seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization

may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating

the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated inaccordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

It will be remembered that the petitioners in Ang Bagong Bayani sought the

disqualification of the major political parties on the ground that the party-list system

was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented, and not the mainstream

political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresentedThere is no gainsaying the fact

that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the political

arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political

parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the

fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission 19 that major

political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162

parties which participated, the seven major political parties 20 made it to the top 50.

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of

the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today . It is through the party-list

system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying

the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and

powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties

who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we

allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we

will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray

the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of theparty-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties

into the party-list system.

NACHURA, J., concurring:

Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote

requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful

and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans

Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed —

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list

seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts,

and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is







http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/show_article/51886?search=%28%28banat+vs+comelec%29%29+OR+%28%28banat+vs+%22Commission+on+Elections%22%29%29#footnotes












15

no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that

come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it

prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5

(2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for

the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted

by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision,

contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach,totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as

an affront to the fundamental law

I submit that, until Congress shall have effected an acceptable amendment to the

minimum vote requirement in R.A. 7941, we abide by the sensible standard of

"proportional representation" and adopt a gradually regressive threshold vote

requirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the number of party-list seats.

Thus, at present, considering that there are 55 seats allocated for party-list groups, the

formula should be:

100%

(Total number of votes cast for party-list)

—————————————————— = 1.818%

55 party-list seats

The minimum vote requirement will gradually lessen as the number of party-list seats

increases. Accordingly, if the scenario we presented above should ever come to pass, and

there are 100 seats allocated for party-list groups, then the threshold vote should be 1%,

based on the following computation: cEITCA

100%

(Total number of votes cast for party-list)

————————————————— = 1%

100 party-list seats

This is the more logical and equitable formula. It would judiciously respond to the

inevitable changes in the composition of the House of Representatives; it would open

opportunities for the broadest people's representation in the House of Representatives;

and more importantly, it would not violate the Constitution.

Thus, with respect to the fixed threshold vote of 2% in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, I join

the Court in declaring it unconstitutional, since all enactments inconsistent with the

Constitution should be invalidated. 12

CASE 4:

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY vs COMELEC. [G.R. No. 147589. June 26,

2001.]

Ponente: Panganiban

Facts:

COMELEC issued Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 on March 26, 2001. It approved

the participation of 154 organizations and parties, Six of these groups were established

political parties, namely PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP,

NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, AKSYON

DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP-LABAN., and other

organizations accused of being “pseudo party-list organizations” which are actually

satellites of the major political parties and of big businesses.

"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that

this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage

multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral

parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window.

"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a

'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of

representatives to the House of Representatives from national,

regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof

registered with the Commission on Elections.

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must

recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral

parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level,

keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules andregulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the

Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or

Oppositions."

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a

Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the

'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating

in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be

accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said

respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be

proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition

for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.







16

Issue:

(1) May political parties participate in the party-list elections?

(2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and

underrepresented'sectors and organizations.

Held:

(1)

Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the

party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:

"xxx xxx xxx

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the

basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth

Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

"xxx xxx xxx"

Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even the major ones — may participate in the

party-list elections.

(2)

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:

“(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number

of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after

the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list

representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,

peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such othersectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."

RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:

"SEC. 2.Declaration of Policy. — The State shall promote proportional representation in

the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list

system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions

thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and

underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political

constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of

appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the

House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,

free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of

party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their

chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest

scheme possible."

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional

representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the

election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,

1.who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties;

and

2.who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3.who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that

will benefit the nation as a whole.

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular

district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to

numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the

representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the

enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,

indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,

overseas workers, and professionals."

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel

dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of

these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them

similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty.

Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers,

industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives

of their respective sectors.

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny

minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is

that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical

limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of

one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and

amount of one's bank accounts.

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it

demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the

party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words

employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning isascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or



17

related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized

by those in immediate association.

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the

congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested

groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the

party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent

of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the

congressional district elections and the party-list elections.

Guidelines for Screening

Party-List Participants

xxx

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and

underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA

7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and

underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youthcannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the

working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give

genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.

DISSENTS:

Vitug:

The party-list system is limited to four groups — 1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties,

3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an organized group of

citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general

conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing theiradoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as

candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging

to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987

Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities and women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly,

handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a

group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics,

employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered

national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.

And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains — "effect must be

given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it." Thelaw, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for construction.

Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of

constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have been

considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as

compensated by countervailing advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may

unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters

of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the

lament of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but

with the people themselves through an amendment of their work as and when bettercounsel prevails.

WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my colleagues in their judgment. I am

thus constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petitions.

Mendoza: (Other purpose is to give those who cannot win the winner-take-all

district elections to have a chance at proportional representation)

With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of §2 of R.A. No. 7941.

The provision reads:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. — The State shall promote proportionalrepresentation in the election of representatives to the House of

Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and

sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable

Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,

organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies

but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate

legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the

House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and

guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest

possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of

Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the

legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list system is to

promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of

Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full, free and open party system in order

to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the

House of Representatives" shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, §2

does not say that the party-list system is intended "to enable Filipino citizens belonging

to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack

well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and

enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House of Representatives. What

it says is that the policy of the law is "to promote proportional representation through a

party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or



18

coalitions thereof,which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and

underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political

constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of

appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House. For while the representation of

"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its

only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to enable

those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning.

These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5,i.e., labor,peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the

handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These

groups can possibly include other sectors.

Indeed, how can there be a "full, free and open party system" if the election for the party

list system is to be limited to the sectors which are enumerated in §5 of the law, i.e.,

labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly,

handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals? After all,

what is provided for is "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral

parties or organizations" each of which is separately defined in §3 of the law.

CASE 5:G.R. No. 203766 | April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., v COMELEC

Note: This case is the prevailing jurisprudence on the interpretation of Sec. 5, Art VI of the

Constitution, abandoning the Ang Bagong Bayani (2001) and BANAT (2009) decisions. The

SC ruled that the party-list system is no longer reserved for the“marginali zed and underrepresented” sectors and that nominees don't have to belong to the sector that the

groups represent. You may want to check the full-text to understand the extensive

discussion on the issues.

FACTS:

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and

Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions

issued by the COMELEC disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-

list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

Approximately 280 groups and organizations registered 13 May 2013 party-list

elections. Through a Resolution, the COMELEC excluded the names of the 13 petitioners

in the printing of the official ballot because they failed to establish their track record as

organizations that seek to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented." A

Resolution was also passed by the COMELEC disqualifying the remaining 39 petitioners.

These 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Supreme

Court, directing the COMELEC to their names in the printing of the official ballot for the13 May 2013 party-list elections.

All 54 petitioners prayed for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Injunction. The SC

issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-

list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list

organizations. –No

(2) WON the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Banat v.

COMELEC should be applied 13 May 2013 party-list elections. –No.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE

The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions

of the SC in applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT decisions in disqualifyingpetitioners from participating in 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of

national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning

the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we

remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who arequalified to register under the party-list system under the new parameters prescribed in

this Decision.

The Party-List System

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system toinclude not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended thesectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As

explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in

the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the

different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."

In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral

parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system

exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his

Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:

“The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-

list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1),Article VI of the Constitution, which states:



19

Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two

hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from

legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila

area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a

uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected

through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or

organizations.

The commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and regionalparties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national

and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national

and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their

intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be

any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral

parties belong to only one of the three groups:(1) national parties or organizations; (2)

regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the

first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,

"one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by

law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except

the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not

exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First , the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would

naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives. Second , the reservation of

one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three

consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list

system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that,

after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that

qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in

Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the

party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list

system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition

of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an

ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of

government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their

adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and

members as candidates for public office.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to

any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal

advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations torepresent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national

and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and

underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-

oriented parties from the party-list system.

There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must

represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political

party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same

governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,

urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,

youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." The sectors mentioned in

Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure,

"professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the

elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the

youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves

into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective

sectors.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law

does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section

5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or

organizations after due notice and hearing. None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel

registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented."

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941,

in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No.

7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and

parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require

that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented."

On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are

"marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.



20

How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941

with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of

the 1987 Constitution on the matter?

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in

Section 5 that are,by their nature, economically "marginalized and

underrepresented."These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,

indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other

similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral partymust belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the

sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of

advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and

underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or

infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More

specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall inthe low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of

professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and

underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack

"well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House. On the other

hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectoral parties for labor,peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,

overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins

of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise

win seats in the House of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give

rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in

economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members

to the House.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district

elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since theyneither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and

underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-

list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This

automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to

those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to

have members in the House of Representatives.

To recall, BANAT expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly

allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they

must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to

marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of

Representatives.’ "However, the requirement in BANAT , in its second guideline, that "thepolitical party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,"

automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list

system. This inherent inconsistency has been compounded by the COMELEC’s refusal

to register sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely

formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties

from participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political

parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start

of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. Thus,major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the

prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However,

major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their

sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a

majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in

"well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized andunderrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as

members of the House. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is

linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3

of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition

may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which

they form part does not participate in the party-list system."

SECOND ISSUE

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. A party-

list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she

seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list

nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record

of advocacy for such sector.

In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong

Bayani and BANAT . Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who

desire to participate in the party-list system:

“First , the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent

the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of

RA 7941.

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent

marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees.”

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling

further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from

participating in party-list elections, abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong

Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941 that major political parties can

participate in party-list elections.



21

For the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the

party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and

R.A. No. 7941.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may

participate in the 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall

adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) nationalparties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral

parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do

not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any

"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register

under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in

legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through

its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. Thesectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a

political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and

underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is

enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and

concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and

underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous

cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The

sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals,

the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized

and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the

members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political

constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of

sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and

underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political

constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a

track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national

and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such

parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be

disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have

at least one nominee who remains qualified.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those

that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or

organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2)

all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they

represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as politicalor regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to

the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track

record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may

have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may

have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if theparty has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the

disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary

to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

The present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC

committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners

may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list electionsunder the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

CASE 6:

LIGOT VS. MATHAY

FACTS: Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the

Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from

December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965),

RA 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the

national government” was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on

July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were

increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly

provided that said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the

Constitution.” Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for

retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which

provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with

a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on

the basis therein provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate received and



22

in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.” HOR granted his

petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification.

The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligot’s appeal

is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of

P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during

his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs.Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress

elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been

disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of

Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per

annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of

office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot

be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term

of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a

retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the

Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other emoluments” to their

salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose

terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of

P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving

during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect

increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive

during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the

similar case of petitioner’s colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, “(S)uch a scheme would

contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling

administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”

CASE 7: SAMPAYAN vs. DAZA

GR NO. 103903, SEPT.11, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza, then incumbent congressman of

their congressional district in Makati, from continuing to exercise the functions of his

office on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent

resident of the United States. They also alleged that Mr. Daza has not by any act or

declaration renounced his status as permanent resident thereby violating the

Omnibus Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987 Constitution (section 18, Article III).

Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying the fact that he is a permanent

resident of the United States as evidenced by a letter order of the US Immigration and

Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long waived his status when he

returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of

the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the

Omnibus Election Code

RULING:

The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case, first, the case is moot and academic

for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that they

seek to unseat the respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his

term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly,

jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section

17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be

the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of its

members.

The petitioner’s appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel

respondent Daza’s certificate ofcandidacy before the election or a quo warranto case

with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten days after Daza’s proclamation.



23

HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over election contests and qualifications

of members of Congress

Remedies against a disqualified House of Representative candidate: (1)

cancellation of certificate of candidacy filed with COMELEC before election; (2)quo warranto case filed with HRET after proclamation

CASE 8. ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCIALLA, petitioners, vs.

SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,

AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor

PADILLA, J p:

Petition for prohibition by petitioners who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, to enjoin Salvador

Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of

Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of

Budget, from disbursements of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that

Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by

reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid

HELD: YES

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:

"The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or

naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this

Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be

authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other

officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the

departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the

Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective

only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next

adjournment of the Congress."

Under this provision of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom

the President shall appoint:

1. heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,

officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers

whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

2. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided

for by law;

3. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

4. officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the

President alone.

The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the

nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

The second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the

consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, as can be determined

through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission. In the case at bar, it

would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first

group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. A

constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light

and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them.

HISTORY:



24

1935 Constitution: almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

1973 Constitution: placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.

framers of 1987 Constitution struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of

appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the

appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well

as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.

It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be

made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on

Appointments.

The word “also” could mean “in addition; as well; besides, too” besides “in like manner”

which meanings could stress that the word “also” in said second sentence means that the

President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint

(without such consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence,

contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in

said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first

sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the

word “also” as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to

derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the

President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the

President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other

underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established.

The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character.

Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such

limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.

In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments

by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the

Commission on Appointments. After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use of the word “alone” after the word

“President” in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip

in draftsmanship.

In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude

presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,

except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently,

there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word “alone” after the word

“President” in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower -ranked

officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because

the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is

already vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on

*NOTE: MAY BE DISREGARDED (DISCUSSIONS OF CONSTI COMMISSION)

The original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the 1986 Constitutional

Commission:

"Section 16.The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on

Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the

rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be

authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior

officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments"

In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two major changes

proposed and approved by the Commission. On motion of COMMISIONER FOZ:

1. delete the phrase "and bureaus" to exclude the appointments of heads of

bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments on the ground that this position is low and to require

confirmation would subject bureau directors to political influence.

2. place a period (.) after the word "captain" and substitute the phrase "and all"

w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY." intended to subject to

confirmation only those mentioned in the first sentence The heads of the exec.

depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed

forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose

appointments are vested in him in the Constitution

Discussions on the debate regarding section 16:



25

Appointments, in the second sentence. The word “alone” in the third sentence, as a literal

import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution,

appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot

prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that

presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject

to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The position of Commissioner of

the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of

appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from

appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of

the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section

601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972). RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved

during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate

and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus,

like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987

Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art.VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of

Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by

law to make, such appointment.

CASE 9 - THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, et al, petitioners, vs. HON. PETE

PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and

Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and

the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J:

FACTS:

Section 35 of R.A. No.7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through

its Circular No. 9228 withdrew the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court

of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial

Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with

certain other government offices.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

SECTION 35.Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders,

executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts

thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are

repealed or modified accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby

repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth

Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087

and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking

privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and

that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and

conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use

thereof.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not it violated Article VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution providing that

"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be

expressed in the title thereof."

2.) Whether or not Sec. 35 of R.A. 7354 violated Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the

Constitution providing that “(2)No bill passed by either House shall become a law

unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in

its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,

except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to

meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment

thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediatelythereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

3.) Whether or not the withdrawal of franking privileges violates equal protection

clause.

HELD:

1.) NO. The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling"

legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of

provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore

be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise

the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made,

of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have

opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as

comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that

if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the



26

provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,

there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.The details of a

legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the

subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in

view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same

act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for

its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters

are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary

that they should also have special mention in the title.2.) NO. The petitioners invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,

requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have

differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.

They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both

Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an

amendment. While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for

compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its

jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:

A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be

limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where

the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative

custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted

into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee producesunexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where

the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is

symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee. It is a matter of

record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned

to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.

Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having

been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and

approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

3.) YES. There is violation of equal protection. All persons similarly situated should be

treated alike both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It does not require

universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might

in fact result in unequal protection. What the law requires is equality among equals

according to valid classification. The postal service office claims that the expense from

judiciary with regards frank mails amounts to 73,574,864 as compared to 90,424, 175

total. The respondents are in effect saying that franking privilege should be extended

only to those who do not need it much at all but not to those who need it badly. The

problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others especially

where there’s no substantial distinction. The distinction made is superficial. It is not

based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the judiciary and

the grantees of the franking privilege.

* R.A. 7354 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

CASE 10:

Comelec vs. Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla

The case at bar provides us with another occasion to stress that with respect togovernment contracts, statutes take precedence over the public officers’ freedom to

contract.

Facts: Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended, alleging that respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City, committed grave abuse of discretion in

issuing the (a) Resolution

In 1996, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the

"Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization and computerization

of the voters' registration list and the appropriate of funds therefor "in order to establish

a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters."

Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution No.

00-0315 approving in principle the Voter's Registration and Identification System

Project (VRIS) Project for brevity). After the public bidding was conducted,

PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total

weighted score and was declared the winning bidder. Thus, on September 28, 2000, theCOMELEC issued Resolution No. 3252approving the Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA,

which, in turn, immediately accepted the same.

However, under Republic Act No. 8760the budget appropriated by Congress for the

COMELEC’s modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual

available funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief

Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.



27

Meanwhile, PHOTOKINA, as the winning bidder, wrote several letters to the COMELEC

requesting the formal execution of the contract, but to no avail.

Then Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public statements,

announced that the VRIS Project has been “scrapped, dropped, junked, or set aside.” He

further announced his plan to “re-engineer” the entire modernization program of the

COMELEC, emphasizing his intention to replace the VRIS Project with his own version,

the “Triple E Vision”.

In support of its application for writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory

injunction, PHOTOKINA adopted the evidence it adduced during the hearing of its

application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

On December 19, 2001, respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla issued the first

assailed Resolution granting PHOTOKINA’s application for a writ o f preliminary

prohibitory injunction

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)

in behalf of then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners

Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr..

Petitioners contend that: (1) a petition for mandamus and prohibition does not lie to

enforce contractual obligations, hence, PHOTOKINA’s proper recourse before the

Regional Trial Court should have been an action for specific performance; (2) respondent

judge, by issuing the injunctive writs, already assumed that the VRIS Project was lawfullyawarded by the COMELEC to PHOTOKINA, and that there is a valid perfected contract

between them, thus, manifesting her prejudgment; and (3) injunctive writs should not be

issued when an action for damages can adequately compensate for the injuries.

We now resolve the following substantive issues:

1) Is a petition for mandamus the appropriate remedy to enforce contractual

obligations?

2) May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it

notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for theproject?

Ruling

1. No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the

performance of contractual obligations.

2. To spare PHOTOKINA the drudgery of a fruitless pursuit, we deem it appropriate tolay down the principles governing government contracts and to apply them to the

instant case. Meanwhile, as PHOTOKINA will later on deduce from the discussion,the contract subject of this controversy is one that can be slain in sight for being

patently void and unenforceable.

Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no money shall be

paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of

appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or

conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts.

CASE 11:

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ET. AL. vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

Facts:

the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil

Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin

"Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and

damages.

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the

Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5 Thereafter,

the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners

and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on

"what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to

Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the

Lopa Group of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by

the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft



28

and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5.

The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the

court issued this petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order

and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear

before them.

Issues:Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative

purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation;

Ruling:

The Supreme court granted the petition. the contemplated inquiry by respondent

Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within

the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or

not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019,

the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the

province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicialnotice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. Therefore is violative

of the separation of powers between the Senate or Congress and that Judiciary.

Also the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is

not absolute or without limitation.

CASE 12:

ABAYON PALPARAN VS THE HRET

These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups

that won seats in the lower house of Congress.

FACTS:

In G.R. 189466, Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives

of AAngat Tayo and Bantay respectively. , that won a seat in the House of

Representatives during the 2007 elections.

A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the jusridiction of HRET over

the Party list..and its representatives. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for

a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the

marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon

herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not

belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an

incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list

representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately

preceding elections of May 10, 2004.

Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already

confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization

representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged

to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of

An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as

having lost a bid for an elective office.

HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the nominated

representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC.

Issue: W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners..

HELD: Yes, The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as

they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon

and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective

organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and

adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.Although it is the party-list organization that

is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member

of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who

the “members” of that House are representatives of districts and party list Once elected,

both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated inlike

manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party- list nominees as “members of

the House of Representatives,” a party



29

- list representative is in every sense “an elected member of the House of

Representat ives.”

Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,

would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the

House of Representatives. Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the

qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A.

7941, echoing the Constitution. It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this

particular qualification of a nominee the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or

a representative of his party-list organization

in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to

Aangat Tayoa nd Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented

interests thatthey presumably embody.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution 9 provides that the

HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the

qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out

above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no

less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass

upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the

party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has

taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the

COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the

HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it

dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay

party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners

Abayon and Palparan.

Date post:	14-Apr-2018
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