C:itoolsWMSKCG-MacMilan … · The waves of public management reform in developed countries ......

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Contents

List of Figures and Tables xi

Acknowledgements xiii

Introduction 1

1 Mapping the Changing Landscape of Public ServiceDelivery 5The evolution of non-governmental service

provision 6Service delivery, implementation and achieving

outcomes 8Terminological confusion 8Types of external providers 10Distribution of roles 15Modes of coordination 17A qualifying factor: the duration of the relationship 19Defining terms 20Taxonomy 22Conclusion 25

2 Benefits and Costs: What GovernmentOrganizations Seek from External Providers 27Benefits and costs to whom? 30Different types of benefits and costs 30Service benefits and costs from externalization 31Relationship costs and benefits 40Strategic benefits and costs of externalization 44Military contracting revisited 49Conclusion 52

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viii Contents

3 Motivations and Mechanisms: What ExternalProviders Seek from Government Organizations 56Why consider motivation? 58Homo economicus, self-interest and extrinsic

motivation 59Three critiques 60A schema of motivation 64Motivators: transforming motivations into effort

and action 65Matching motivators with motivations 68Effects on other motivations 74Framing 77Motivation at the organizational level 79Ability 80Conclusion 81

4 Outsourcing and Contracting to OtherOrganizations 83The meanings of outsourcing and contracting 84Contracting forms 85Understanding contracting parties 92When to contract out 94Eliciting provider effort: structuring incentives 107Conclusion 109

5 Partnering and Collaboration with OtherOrganizations 111The meaning of partnering and collaboration 113Key types of partnership 116Partnering as an alternative to outsourcing 122Collaboration as an alternative to contracting 123The meaning of trust 124Trust and relationship costs 126Developing trust 128The delegate’s dilemma 132Conclusion 134

6 Calling on Volunteers 137The nature and scope of public sector

volunteering 138

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Contents ix

Benefits and costs of using volunteers ingovernment work 140

Attracting and retaining volunteers 145Staff resistance 152Conclusion 154

7 Regulatees as Contributors to Social Outcomes 155The meaning of regulation 157How voluntary compliance contributes to social

outcomes 159Eliciting regulatees’ contributions 161Alternative perspectives 169When regulatees’ contributions are useful 171Conclusion 173

8 Clients as Co-producers 174Defining public sector clients 176The necessity of client co-production 178What induces clients to co-produce? 182Conclusion 191

9 Managing in Multiparty Networks of Providers 193How networks differ from one-to-one relationships 195When networks are useful for service delivery 198Managing in networks 202

10 A Contingency Framework for Decisions aboutExternalization 206Understanding purposes 206Who should be involved? 210Weighing up costs and benefits 216A contingency framework 223

11 Organizational Capabilities for Managing ExternalProvision 227The tasks in managing externalization 227Governmental obstacles to managing

externalization 230A capabilities framework for managing

externalization 238Individual competencies 239

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x Contents

Organizational capabilities 244Enabling environment 251Conclusion 252

Conclusion: The New World of Public Service Delivery 254

Notes and References 257

Bibliography 271

Index of Names 304

Index of Subjects 306

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Chapter 1

Mapping the ChangingLandscape of Public ServiceDelivery

The waves of public management reform in developed countriesover the last three decades have led to government playing both asmaller and a larger role in our society. It is smaller in that it isnow an established truth that public services can be delivered bya wide array of parties external to a given public sector organiza-tion as well as by in-house production. Public utilities for servicessuch as electricity, gas, water and transport have been sold off tothe private sector. Public sector organizations have contracted out awide variety of functions, from garbage collection and cleaning tosecurity and employment services. Government agencies establishcollaborative arrangements with other government agencies to real-ize purposes that they cannot achieve on their own. Departmentsin areas such as human services and conservation enlist volun-tary organizations and volunteers in helping deliver some of theirservices. Agencies responsible for services such as mail or publichousing rely on co-productive effort from their clients. And evenregulatory organizations seek to call forth voluntary compliancefrom those they regulate, in the form of positive actions that con-tribute to organizational purposes. All of these developments havemeant that some of the work of delivering public services has beentransferred from public sector organizations to non-governmentalorganizations and individuals – a phenomenon we shall refer tothroughout this book as ‘externalization’.

But paradoxically, the more government surrenders the role ofproducing public services to external parties, the more its roleexpands in other respects. This is because public agencies needto interact with those external entities to elicit their productivecontributions. This interaction occurs through a wide variety of

5

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6 Rethinking Public Service Delivery

mechanisms – including contracting, partnering, education, per-suasion, incentives, subsidies, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ regulation, andenhancing service information and convenience – which togetherhave important implications for policy making and management.They both alter and expand the work of government organizationsand their staff. Not only are they engaged in their own produc-tion tasks such as policy advice, service delivery and regulation, butalso they are engaged in inducing others outside their organizationsto contribute to those tasks through various mechanisms. Theseadditional roles and mechanisms, which pose complex policy andmanagement challenges, are the subject of this book.

The evolution of non-governmentalservice provision

Historically speaking, the public sector’s major role in producingservices is a relatively recent phenomenon. It was not until the latenineteenth century that government’s functions began to expandbeyond a historical norm.

In ancient times, rulers made extensive use of private actors toperform governmental functions. Ancient Egypt and RepublicanRome utilized tax farming, in which private individuals shoulderedthe burden of tax collection in return for a share of the proceeds.Ancient Rome also contracted out nearly all the state’s economicrequirements, including construction and army provisioning, whilein classical Greece the government owned forests, land and mines,but contracted out the work on them to firms and individuals (Levi1988; Sobel 1999; Megginson and Netter 2003).

For much of the period since then, government’s role has typi-cally been confined to the basic functions of defence, foreign affairs,postal services and the making of laws regulating private actors ina patchwork variety of areas of economic and social life. Manyactivities, widely seen today as core government functions, wereundertaken in whole or in part by private interests, including lawenforcement, imprisonment, criminal prosecution, and overseasexploration and colonisation (Grabosky 1995a; Sturgess 1996). Forinstance, 163 of the 197 ships in the English fleet that defeatedthe Spanish Armada in 1588 were privately owned (Wettenhall2000). Often the handing out by the ruler of licences and fran-chises to private parties blurred the line between the public andprivate spheres. However, in gradual steps from at least the Magna

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The Changing Landscape of Public Service Delivery 7

Carta and through the Age of Enlightenment, notions of the ruleof law and of natural rights began to shape and modify the extentto which particularist interests could crowd out the public interest(May 1997).

This had implications for how government dealt with the indus-trial revolution and its social effects. In the nineteenth century,two factors began to lead to pressures for greater governmentinvolvement. One was the expansion of commerce in the IndustrialRevolution and in New World frontier expansion. This called forgreater government involvement in the provision of infrastructure,such as transport (see Madrick 2009). The other was the reorder-ing of class structures with the expansion of the urban workingclass and also a lesser increase in the middle classes, which calledfor government to engage in measures to ameliorate burgeoningsocial problems, such as poverty, hunger, homelessness and dis-ease (May 1997). The rise of mass working-class parties towardsthe end of that century generated pressures for government provi-sion of social services such as education, health care, housing andincome security – pressures that continued until late in the twentiethcentury. In OECD nations between 1880 and 1995, for example,the median proportion of GDP spent on state welfare increasedfrom 0.29 per cent to 22.52 per cent (Gough 1979; Lindert 2004).This trend gained added impetus from the aftermath of the GreatDepression of the 1930s and expansion of national governments inthe Second World War, many of which retained their war powers totax and spend. The long boom from the 1950s to the 1970s enabledgovernments to garner revenue without taxing the private sectorunduly, while the expectations it unleashed reinforced a populardesire for governments to provide a variety of services to citizens,as well as playing an economic stabilization role in order to avoida recurrence of the Great Depression.

But as the 1970s proceeded, counter-trends emerged. The com-bined effects of a growing antipathy to big government, the ‘taxrevolt’, opposition to perceived excessive regulation and tighten-ing fiscal circumstances resulted in a search for non-governmentalways to deliver public services. This manifested itself in a globalmovement to privatize government functions (Salamon 1981; Savas1983; Kristensen 1987; Wolf 1988; Hughes 2003). Alongside this,in a lower key, were some initiatives to enlist co-production by cit-izens, volunteers or clients, together with the hiring of non-profitorganizations (Whitaker 1980; Brudney and England 1983; Smith

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and Lipsky 1993; Alford 2009). By 2000, the types of arrangementsinvolving external providers had proliferated to an extent thatwould have been unrecognizable forty years before.

Service delivery, implementationand achieving outcomes

Making sense of this proliferation has been a challenge for schol-ars in the field. For a start, there are different ways of framingexactly what is being externalized. Here it is described as ‘servicedelivery’, for the simple reason that this term is widely used in pub-lic management. But it should be recognized that service deliveryis a subset (albeit the most substantial one) of a larger body ofactivities the policy literature describes as ‘implementation’, thatis, putting policy into effect (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Par-sons 1995; Bridgman and Davis 2004; Weimer and Vining 2004).Service delivery is therefore not quite the same thing as implemen-tation. It is typically used to describe the provision of outputs, suchas welfare benefits, school classes, or roads, rather than of out-comes, such as mitigation of poverty, improved literacy or roadsafety. Moreover, it implies (but doesn’t necessarily entail) provi-sion of services to the clients of the government agency, rather thanto the agency itself. However, ‘service delivery’ sits awkwardly withsome kinds of instruments, for instance, with applying regulatoryconstraints or broadcasting advertisements to encourage changes inpublic behaviour (for example, to use less water) – both of whichcould reasonably be described as implementation, directed towardsachieving particular social outcomes.

In this vein, therefore, we will mainly employ the term ‘ser-vice delivery’, conceived as the ‘production’ of outputs, whichincludes provision of services to government agencies as well asto their clients. But where the focus is on bringing about out-comes, or on the imposition of obligations, we will instead referto ‘implementation’, and in some cases to ‘achieving outcomes’.

Terminological confusion

There is a plethora of terms for the act or process of externalization,used in differing ways, such as partnering, partnership, strategicalliance, collaboration, cooperation, network, network governance,joined-up government, whole-of-government, privatization, com-missioning, contracting and outsourcing. While there is no such

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thing as a ‘correct’ definition of these terms, we need to be clearabout what we mean by the words we use in the present analysis.

There are also numerous typologies organized along a wide vari-ety of dimensions, each of them partial in its comprehension of thefield. One early attempt was by the former Reagan Administrationofficial, Emanuel Savas (1983, 1987). He put forward a typologyof different forms of privatization based on the delineation of threerole dimensions: who specifies and arranges what is to be pro-duced, who produces, and who pays. Each of these roles can beplayed by alternative actors – for example, the role of specifyingand arranging can be performed either by an individual consumer,a political authority (for example, an elected government) or a gov-ernment agency. From these elements, Savas constructed a typologyof alternative service arrangements.

But not surprisingly for one who was a crusader for privatizationunder Reagan, Savas tended to start from the assumption that mar-ket solutions are preferable, that is, that government-as-producer is‘guilty until proven innocent’. This mindset meant that his modelwas prone to a number of shortcomings, such as ignoring the pos-sibility that each of the roles can be shared between two or moreparties, or assuming that all dealings between parties are either hier-archical or contractual. But classical contracting and hierarchicalsupervision are not the only types of relationship; others includecoercion, negotiation or collaboration (deHoog 1990).

Subsequent typologies classify arrangements in a wide variety ofways. Some of them categorize relationships in terms of the numberand sectoral location of the parties involved (Alter and Hage 1993;Mariotti 1996; Exworthy et al. 1999; Bovaird 2004; Selsky andParker 2005). Many of them take the form of continua, in whicharrangements vary, for example, in the extent to which they entailcloseness between the parties (Lorange et al. 1992; Alter and Hage1993; Huxham 1996; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002; Mandell andSteelman 2003; Agranoff 2007; Sandfort and Milward 2008), orcontractual specificity or formality (Hall et al. 1977; deHoog 1990;Ring and Van de Ven 1992; Lyons and Mehta 1997; Beinecke andDeFillippi 1999; Bovaird 2004; Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011).Some focus on the level at which interaction occurs – Sandfortand Milward (2008), for example, consider collaborative effortsat the level of policy, organization, programme and client. Somecombine two or more of these dimensions into selected ideal-types (Oliver 1990). Skelcher (2005), for instance, identifies public

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leverage, contracting out, franchising, joint ventures and strategicpartnering as specific forms, varying along several dimensions.

Each of these typologies makes sense for the topic or issue towhich it is applied. But none of them on its own suits the purposesof this analysis. What is necessary is a framework encompassing allof the phenomena under consideration, but, at the same time, suf-ficiently discriminating to enable realistic consideration of specificcases. By drawing on the partial insights offered by the existingtypologies, we propose a framework that covers the field whileenabling useful distinctions to be drawn within it, by addressingthree questions:

1 What types of external providers are involved?2 What are the alternative distributions of roles – such as deciding

what to do, funding, or service-delivery – between these externalproviders and government organizations?

3 What types of relationship are there between these externalproviders and government organizations? By what alternativemodes – such as compulsion, contracts, or collaboration – dogovernment organizations prompt external providers to deliverthe desired services?

On the basis of this analysis, we will offer some definitions of keyterms, which we argue are clarified by the framework.

Types of external providers

Almost all of the existing typologies conceive of the entitiesinvolved as organizations, mainly formal ones, such as governmentagencies, business firms or non-profit/voluntary organizations, andgive scant consideration to individuals as external providers. Herewe include external providers who are not organizations, such asvolunteers, clients and regulatees, in addition to organizations asproviders. Table 1.1 sets them all out.

The most well-known type of external provider is the pri-vate for-profit firm, usually engaged on a contractual basis. Theytake a variety of forms, ranging from large corporations, such asIT suppliers or defence contractors, through private partnershipssuch as management consulting or accountancy firms, to smallbusinesses. Almost as well-known is the voluntary/non-profit/third

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sector organization, also engaged on a contractual basis, usually inareas such as human services or environmental conservation. Thesealso entail a variety of forms, from fully incorporated non-profitcompanies to less formal associations of volunteer members, suchas Neighbourhood Watch or community environment groups. (Forthe sake of brevity, we will call these entities ‘non-profits’ through-out this book.) Also commonly known are individual volunteers,who donate their time and effort to government agencies in fieldssuch as rural fire-fighting, environmental conservation and commu-nity safety, sometimes under the auspices of non-profit/third sectororganizations.

Also prominent as external providers, especially in recentyears, have been other government agencies. In a world whereinter-organizational collaboration, ‘joined-up government’ and‘whole-of-government’ initiatives have become commonplace, anyparticular government organization looks to other governmentagencies as actual or potential partners. At first sight, it mightseem that the lateral relationships typical with the private/non-profit sector partners are less relevant here, since each governmentagency has the option of going to a political superior to resolveconflicts. But for many inter-agency relationships, this option isnot so clear-cut. Often the other agency will be part of a differ-ent governmental jurisdiction. Thus a national government agencymight find itself dealing with a state or local government organiza-tion over which the national government has little formal authority(even though it might have informal power). In a federal sys-tem such as that of Australia, Canada or the United States, stateor provincial governments are effectively sovereign in respect ofthose functions and powers guaranteed to them in constitutions.In these circumstances there is no official who has formal author-ity over the contending parties; they must resolve issues laterally,or take them to a supreme or high court (which can be costlyand time-consuming). Even where two or more partnering agen-cies are within the same government, the lowest level official whohas authority over both or all of them is likely to be the politi-cal chief executive, such as the president, governor, prime ministeror premier. Unless the issue is of great significance, these offi-cials are unlikely to have the time or inclination to get involvedin inter-agency dealings. Even more challenging is where the rela-tionship crosses national boundaries, such as those within themultinational military peacekeeping force that intervened in East

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Timor to deal with rampaging Indonesian-backed militia follow-ing the referendum in 1999, or between national agencies andsupranational bodies such as the United Nations. In short, toachieve their purposes, government agencies often need to enlistand engage other government agencies as external providers orpartners.

These types are consistent with our commonsense understandingof the term ‘providers’. They contribute inputs to the government’sproduction process. By analogy with a private sector productionprocess, they are suppliers rather than buyers. However, we arguethat there are other types of external provider who do not conformso readily with this image.

One is the clients of public sector organizations – those whoreceive private value at the ‘business end’ of the agency’s oper-ations, such as welfare recipients, pupils in government schools,road users, public hospital patients or employment programmeparticipants. To the extent that they receive private value, clientsdiffer from citizens, who collectively ‘consume’ public value, whichincludes, inter alia: law and order and other pre-requisites for thefunctioning both of the market and of society; remedies to vari-ous forms of market failure, such as inability to provide publicgoods, externalities, or natural monopoly; promoting procedu-ral and distributional equity; and economic stabilization, throughmacroeconomic management (Moore 1995; Alford 2002; Hughes2003: 78–80). Public sector clients also differ from the private sec-tor customers who receive private value from firms, with whomthey have direct, voluntary economic exchanges. Many of them,such as school pupils, welfare recipients or road users, are benefi-ciaries, who receive a service for which they do not pay any moneydirectly (although they may pay indirectly through taxes, in a differ-ent capacity). Unlike the private firm, the agency is not concernedto maximize sales but rather to ration them, according to somenotion of equity, through devices such as eligibility rules or waitinglists.

Other members of the public, such as prisoners or those sub-ject to regulatory obligations, do not wish to receive a service,but instead are at least to some extent compelled to do so. Theseobligatees are not engaged in an economic exchange with theagency, so it makes no sense to call them customers. But they have aclient-like relationship with the agency to the extent that it seeks toprompt rehabilitation and greater voluntary compliance from them

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by providing fair, responsive and helpful service to them (Alfordand Speed 2006).

Both ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘obligatees’ are roles rather than cate-gories. Typically, an individual client will constitute some mix ofthese roles, as well as being a citizen.1 For example, an unemployedwelfare recipient receives income support and job search assistance,but is also obliged to look actively for work and to report changesof income, address or other circumstances.

However, for the purposes of this book, we will distinguishbetween clients and obligatees, and indeed refer to the latter asregulatees, for three reasons. First, there are many regulatees,and nearly all of them turn out to be contributing to agencypurposes when they comply with their legal obligations. Second,many regulatees are companies rather than individuals, and to thatextent are not as comfortably encompassed by the term ‘client’.Third, regulatees have a rather different relationship to regulatoryagencies than client/beneficiaries do to other government organiza-tions. Accordingly, we devote a separate chapter to regulatees asproviders.

The essential point here is that clients and regulatees can – andquite often must – constitute external providers to the extent thatthe agency relies on their contributions of time and effort to achieveits purposes. This phenomenon, sometimes called ‘co-production’,is more prevalent than appears at first sight. For example, employ-ment services need their unemployed clients to actively seek workor engage in job-relevant training. Schools cannot educate unlessstudents engage actively with learning processes. Doctors cannotbring about a more healthy population unless patients follow pre-scribed medical therapies and more broadly undertake preventivemeasures such as better diets and more exercise. In many areasof social life, the success of government programmes dependson the clients doing some work to facilitate it. On the regu-latory side, tax authorities find it difficult to ensure the rightamount of tax is being paid unless taxpayers comply with theirobligations to file tax returns accurately and promptly. Healthand safety inspectors seek to prompt voluntary compliance fromcompanies.

Thus, we can identify a considerable range of types of exter-nal provider with which a government agency can interact,as set out in Table 1.1. Thinking more broadly in this way

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enables public managers to imagine alternative means of achievingoutcomes.

Distribution of roles

For any service to be delivered, certain things have to happen. Deci-sions need to be made about what is to be done and who is to doit. Resources need to be devoted to its execution. And someone hasto do the actual work. For present purposes, we can group theseactivities into two broad categories:

• The deciding role. This is the set of activities directed towardsdetermining what is to be produced, arranging for someone toproduce it, and providing resources to enable it to be done.It is similar to, but we hope slightly broader in its scope, thanthe ‘principal’ role in principal–agent theory; the ‘purchaser’role in purchaser–provider splits; the ‘policy’ role in the separa-tion of policy from implementation; or the ‘commissioning’ role,which has emerged in UK parlance in recent years. These rolestend to entail a more precise form of ‘deciding’ – namely, the‘specifying of services’ – whereas we also include cases where ser-vices are not so much precisely specified as broadly determined,and/or fine-tuned or adapted as circumstances evolve, especiallyin collaborative relationships.

Related to this is the funding role. The funder is usually butnot always the same as the decider. In some circumstances,such as franchising, at least part of the funding role is per-formed by clients (for example, public transport passengers,postal customers), who pay the purchase price for the ser-vice. Another exception is where a private firm provides someof the funding, as happens in many public–private partner-ships. The motivation for the private firm in these cases isusually the opportunity to receive a future stream of incomeor some assets from the project (English 2005; Shaoul 2005).For the purposes of this book, we will generally subsumefunding under deciding, but point out exceptions where theyarise.

• The producing role. This is the set of activities directed towardsconverting resources into valuable results. It is similar to the roles

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of, respectively, agent, provider or implementer in the binary dis-tinctions made. It should be stressed that ‘production’ is heredefined very broadly. Although in some minds it conjures upfactory production lines churning out material goods, here itrefers to any activity that converts resources of any kind intotangible or intangible things of value. Thus it might refer not onlyto outputs such as public housing construction or postal deliver-ies but also to outcomes such as improved literacy or reducedcrime. The provider is the person or organization who carriesout the task that has been decided upon, and can be any of anumber of types.

Conceivably, each of these roles could be performed either solelyby the government organization itself, or solely by the externalparty, or by some mix of the two, as set out in all six cells inFigure 1.1. But for the present analysis, we focus on only four ofthe cells (shaded in grey), since our concern is only with arrange-ments where the deciding role is at least partly the responsibilityof the government organization, and the producing role is at leastpartly the responsibility of the external party. We therefore excludecells 3 and 4 from consideration, and focus on the relationshipsbetween cells 1 and 2 on the one hand and 5 and 6 on the other.This gives us four permutations, represented by the arrows inthe figure:

Deciding Producing

Performed solely bygovernment organization

14

Shared betweengovernment organization and external party 2 5

Performed solely by external party

3 6

FIGURE 1.1 Possible allocations of roles

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1 Government decides, production shared (cells 1 and 5). Thisis the kind of arrangement seen in some public–private part-nerships, where both the public agency and the privatefirm contribute effort, but the arrangement is subject to agovernment-imposed contract. It is also common in regulatoryrelationships.

2 Government decides, external party produces (cells 1 and 6).This is the archetypal form of outsourcing (or ‘contracting out’),in which government is clearly the principal and the externalparty is clearly the agent, but also applies to the relationship withvolunteers.

3 Deciding role shared, production shared (cells 2 and 5). This isthe archetypal form of collaborative partnership, where the gov-ernment organization and the external party jointly govern theservice and jointly deliver it. It is essentially the arrangementseen in some public–private partnerships (different from thosementioned in point 1 above), in partnerships with non-profitorganizations, in joined-up government, and also co-productionwith clients.

4 Deciding role shared, external party produces (cells 2 and 6).This is where an external party delivers a service under ajoint governance arrangement where both it and the govern-ment organization are represented. It is a relatively uncommonarrangement, but observable in some settings such as primarycare partnerships.

However, while this schema is inclusive of all the conceivablearrangements, it does not allow important distinctions to be drawnbetween certain types that appear to be similar within it but in factare different. For example, contracting out can be conducted in var-ious ways ranging from transactional to collaborative. This bringsus to the third factor in our taxonomy.

Modes of coordination

Identifying the respective roles of entities is a necessary but nota sufficient consideration in understanding a productive relation-ship. To enable the entities to perform these roles in a useful way,some type of mechanism is needed to ensure that the behaviours oractions by those producing are consistent with what the deciding

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party wants. Writers such as Savas (1987) and others imply that theonly possible types of relationship are either ones based on contractor ones based on formal authority, that is, markets or hierarchies(See for example, Coase 1937; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Milgromand Roberts 1992). But as discussed above, there is a substantial lit-erature pointing to other modes of coordination between entities.Many put forward a spectrum, which at one end has contractualmechanisms such as precise service-specification, competitive ten-dering, incentives and penalties, and at the other has collaborativerelationships, involving trust, shared goals and mutual commit-ment, as the means by which the parties coordinate their activities(Ring and Van de Ven 1992; Lyons and Mehta 1997; Beineckeand De Fillippi 1999; Bovaird 2004). Indeed, some of those whofocus on the collaborative end of the range propose a contin-uum of collaboration sub-categories ranging from something likeloose coordination through to strong collaboration (for example,Himmelmann 1996). Another mode which attracts less attention isdirective supervision2 – simply put, where a superior gives instruc-tions to someone who acts as a subordinate, as occurs inside ahierarchy, for example, in an employment contract. This receiveslimited attention in the inter-organizational literature because it isseen as being more common inside organizations. But it can be seenin some relationships with external providers – for example, wherean organization engages a legal adviser or an IT expert to provideservices as required, with specific requests framed as circumstancesarise, rather than the work being specified in advance in a contract.

DeHoog points out that even in outsourcing, there can be othermodes of coordination besides classical contracting. One is col-laboration, as discussed above, but another is a mode that sitssomewhere between contracting and collaboration – namely, nego-tiation or ‘relational contracting’, where ‘a form of consensual andincremental decision making is the norm’ (deHoog 1990: 325).Unlike contracting, it does not involve open competitive tendering,but rather invitations to selected bidders, and specific details arethen agreed on through negotiation.

The literature on modes of coordination can credibly also beapplied to non-organizational external providers such as volun-teers or clients. Their contributions to organizational purposescan be elicited not only through incentives and sanctions but alsothrough the building of good relationships, manifested as collab-oration. However, this literature has little to say about relationswith regulatees, who are also part of our set of potential external

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Compulsion CollaborationSupervision Classical contracting

Negotiation

(Threat of) sanctions

Episodic instructions

Incentives andcompetition

Trust, shared purposes

Flexible agreements

FIGURE 1.2 Continuum of modes of coordination

providers. In this book we take the view that regulatees can be sub-ject to a variety of modes of coordination just as all the other typesof external providers can. Nevertheless, compulsion or sanctionsloom large in this particular type.

In order to encompass all these aspects, we put forward acontinuum traversing five nodal points, as shown in Figure 1.2.At one end is the application of compulsion and at the other endcollaborative relationships. In between are directive supervision,transactional contracts, and negotiated agreements. This enables usto distinguish, for instance, between different types of outsourcingarrangements – those based on tightly specified contracts backedup by incentives and penalties, those entailing episodic instructionsfrom the principal, and those that rely on cooperative relationships.

A qualifying factor: the duration of the relationship

One factor to consider is that arrangements can vary in their dura-tion. At one end of the scale would be ‘once-off’ single transactionswhich are almost certain not to be repeated – for example, thepurchase of banners and bunting for the staging of the OlympicGames in a particular city. At the other end would be interactionsof indefinite length such as that between two government depart-ments which work jointly on certain issues – for example, betweenthe police and the mental health service on dealing with psychi-atric clients who reside in the community. In between these twoextremes, at the shorter end of the scale would be contracts for lim-ited terms such as one year, while towards the longer end would bemulti-year franchises, such as those in public transport in the UK,which can run for 12 or 15 years, or public–private infrastructurepartnerships, which can be of even longer duration. Also affectingthe perceived duration is whether these engagements are repeated.

What makes this factor important is that it affects the expec-tations of the parties as they establish and maintain their work-ing relationships. If they see the relationship as long-term, it isworth them investing more time and energy in maintaining shared

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commitment and trust. If, however, they see it as ‘once-off’ orshort-term, they will tend to place less weight on these issues. How-ever, in the interests of parsimony, we will not add this factor as afourth dimension in our framework, but rather take note of it whereit is relevant in the forthcoming pages.

Defining terms

As we noted, there has been a proliferation of terms in this fieldand, moreover, they are used in many different ways. This meansthat there is no ‘correct’ definition of each of the terms under con-sideration. Instead, all we can do here is put forward what we meanby particular terms, and use them consistently throughout the book.The foregoing analysis provides a basis for this. Our key meaningsare therefore as follows (see also Table 1.2).

TABLE 1.2 Glossary of terms

General terms

External providers: any entities outside the governmentorganization in question that produce all or some of the service.Externalization: any arrangement in which one or more externalproviders produce all or some of the service.

Terms relating to the distribution of roles

Outsourcing: any arrangement in which the whole of theproduction of a given service is handed to an external entity.Another term for outsourcing is ‘contracting out’ (with theword ‘out’).Partnership: any arrangement in which the production of a givenservice is shared between two or more organizations.

Terms relating to the mode of coordination

Collaboration: where the coordination between two or moreentities is primarily through the mechanisms of trust, mutualcommitment and shared goals.Contracting: where coordination occurs through transactionalmechanisms such as tight specification, financial incentives,penalties and competitive tendering. Note that this is not thesame as ‘contracting out’.

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External providers are any entities outside the government orga-nization in question that produce all or some of the service.Externalization is accordingly any arrangement in which one ormore external providers produce all or some of the service. This isthe umbrella term for the processes considered in this book; it cancover either situations where the whole of the production of a ser-vice is handed over to an external entity, or where it is shared withan external entity.

Outsourcing will be defined as a particular subset of external-ization. It refers to any arrangement in which the whole of theproduction of a given service is handed to an external entity.

Partnership is a term which has had an especial confusion ofmeanings. One usage refers to the mode of coordination, whichconfuses it with collaboration. Thus a partnership is said to bea relationship in which the parties interact collaboratively. Theother usage, which is the one we use here, is more structural, andrefers to the role relationship. It covers any arrangement in whichthe production of a given service is shared between two or moreorganizations (in this case, one of the organizations would be thegovernment agency in question). Two of the leading authors onpartnerships, Klijn and Teisman (2000: 85–6), contrast the termssimilarly:

Contracting-out is characterized by a principal–agent relation-ship in which the public actor defines the problem and providesthe specification of the solution... Partnership, on the other hand,is based on joint decision-making and production in order toachieve effectiveness for both partners.

Thus partnership is contrasted with outsourcing, and is a differentsubset of externalization. In this definition, a partnership can oper-ate either in a more collaborative fashion or a more transactionalfashion.

In a different dimension, collaboration and contracting (minusthe word ‘out’) will be taken to refer not to whether the productionis shared between the parties but rather to modes of coordination.Collaboration is where the coordination between two or more enti-ties is primarily through the mechanisms of trust, mutual commit-ment and shared goals. In this context, trust is both an antecedentand a consequence of collaboration. As an antecedent, it is anal-ogous to (and an alternative to) the other modes of coordination

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such as contracts or compulsion. But trust is also a consequence ofcollaboration, in that successful cooperation contributes to a ‘vir-tuous spiral’ of increasing trust. (This will be explained in detail inChapter 5.)

By contrast, contracting is where coordination occurs throughtransactional mechanisms such as tight specification, financialincentives, penalties and competitive tendering. It refers to exter-nalization, which is conducted on a transactional or contractualbasis rather than through collaborative mechanisms. This is differ-ent from contracting out (with the word ‘out’ added) which is hereseen in terms of role relationships, as a subset of outsourcing. Eachof these terms can be applied to either an outsourcing arrangementor a partnership.

Taxonomy

On the basis of the forgoing discussion, it is now possible to putforward a taxonomy of alternative arrangements between govern-ment organizations and external providers, as set out in Table 1.3,which encompasses our three key dimensions. It should be pointedout, at the outset, that this taxonomy does not cover all the pos-sible arrangements conceivable. Rather it is confined only to thosecases relevant to the scope of this book: namely where a govern-ment organization is at least partly the decider, and an externalentity carries out at least some of the provision of the service.

Thus we do not cover arrangements in which government solelyperforms all three roles, nor those in which an external entitysuch as a private firm or a voluntary agency or some combina-tion of them performs all of the roles. Nor does it cover situ-ations where government shares the deciding role (for example,through consultation with community organizations) but performsthe service-delivery role by itself.

The taxonomy delineates a variety of conceivable types, eachrepresenting a different mix of public and private. Some of themare familiar and widespread, such as the several varieties of classicalcontracting, including commissioning and franchising, and of part-nering, such as public–private partnerships and collaborative part-nerships. Also increasingly familiar are ‘joined-up’ arrangementsbetween two or more government agencies.

The classification scheme also allows us to distinguish betweendifferent types of public–private partnerships. As will be explained

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PROOF



in Chapters 4 and 5, some are truly ‘partnerships’ in substantiveterms, but others are only so in rhetorical terms, in that the produc-ing role is performed solely by the private firm, with varying typesof financing arrangements. They are thus more like outsourcingarrangements than partnerships.

Other notions – such as seeing regulatees as external providers –are less commonly framed in this way. But to the extent thatregulatees contribute to the achievement of organizational pur-poses and therefore to creating value for the public, they fitsquarely within the logic of this analysis. Consider the notion ofco-regulation, in which the agency sets the broad parameters ofregulatory obligations, and the regulatee translates these parame-ters into specific obligations and a plan for meeting them, as wellas implementing the plan. The regulatee thus performs some of thework of the regulator, whose role is streamlined to giving expertadvice, approving the plan and (infrequent) periodic audits of itsimplementation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: ch. 4; Baldwin andCave 1999: 39–41).

Similarly, to see clients as co-producers of public services is atodds with the usual way we conceive of clients: as recipients ratherthan providers. But they fit within this typology as sharing the workof the public sector agency, typically in a collaborative mode.

These are only some of the possible arrangements. In fact, amoment’s reflection on the various dimensions and the range ofalternatives within each of them would disclose that there are lit-erally hundreds of possible arrangements. The basic point is thatthere is no simple divide between ‘public’ and ‘private’, but rather avast field of possible intermediate structures in between a notionallypurely public and a notionally purely private arrangement. Whilstthis is more complex, it is also more useful. It enables considerationof the full range of possible external providers on a comparablebasis. It also enables identification of more imaginative alternativesfor service arrangements than everyday thinking might allow.

Conclusion

From the 1970s, a long run trend of government assuming increas-ing responsibility for economic and social activities began to bereversed. But this change of direction did not entail simply hand-ing functions back to businesses across a simple divide betweenthe public and private sectors. Instead, the reallocation of roles is

PROOF



more complex, in that it involves a broader range of parties. Ser-vices for the public do not have to be performed only by publicsector organizations; they can also be produced by a wide array ofother entities, such as private firms, voluntary agencies, clients, vol-unteers, regulatees and even other government departments. It isalso more complex in the variety of relationships these externalactors have with government. Not only the mechanisms of mar-kets and hierarchies, but also those of networks and others, play asignificant role.

This chapter has sought to map this domain in a frame-work which aims to make sense of the breadth of possibili-ties. The remainder of this book will delve into this framework.Chapters 2 and 3 explore what government organizations andexternal providers seek from each other, considering the bene-fits and costs to public agencies, and the motivations of externalproviders and the mechanisms which resonate with those moti-vations. Chapters 4 to 9 then take each of the main categoriesof external providers in turn. Chapters 4 and 5 consider organi-zations (private firms, voluntary agencies and other governmentdepartments) as external providers, whereas Chapters 6 to 8look at individuals (volunteers, regulatees and clients) as externalproviders or co-producers. Chapter 9 considers multiparty net-works of providers, and Chapter 10 brings it all together in acontingency framework, setting out the circumstances in whicheach type of arrangement is most suitable and the choices that needto be made in managing external providers. Chapter 11 examineshow government organizations can best equip themselves to man-age external providers, considering, structure, culture and skills.Finally, Chapter 12 provides the conclusion.

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April 21, 2012 7:49 MAC/VERY Page-304 9780230237957_17_ind01

Index of Names

Agranoff, Robert 3, 9, 239Alford, John 7, 14, 30, 36, 63,

72, 81, 88, 95, 99, 177, 187,200, 231, 247

Arnstein, Sherry 115, 204Ayres, Ian 25, 65, 92, 159, 162,

164, 168, 169, 170, 184, 185,252

Baier, Annette 125Bardach, Eugene 3, 36, 124, 125,

128, 162, 163, 251Behn, Robert 97, 232Bingham, Lisa Blomgren 12, 240Boston, Jonathan 45Bovaird, Tony 9, 18, 174, 175Braithwaite, John 25, 65, 92,

159, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167,168, 169, 179, 184, 185, 252

Braithwaite, Valerie 166Brudney, Jeffrey 7, 32, 138, 139,

140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 147,148, 150, 151, 152

Bryson, John 3, 211Bunker, Barbara 124, 125

Clarke, Michael 47, 237Clary, Gil 146, 150Coase, Ronald 18, 41Crosby, Barbara 3

DeHoog, Ruth 9, 18, 98Domberger, Simon 31, 32, 36,

37, 87, 100Donahue, John 3, 9, 42, 43, 46,

88, 98, 101, 104

Eggers, William 3, 229, 239, 248,249, 250

French, John 56, 57, 68Frey, Bruno 58, 60, 61, 69, 75,

184

Gaebler, Ted 3, 48, 49, 100, 116,190, 192

Gaskin, Katherine 144, 150, 152,153, 154

Goldsmith, Stephen 3, 229, 239,248, 249, 250

Gouldner, Alvin 129, 130Greve, Carsten 89, 96Grönroos, Christian 34, 35

Hamel, Gary 45Herzberg, Frederick 151, 185Hilmer, Frederick 45, 49, 100Hodge, Graeme 32, 36, 87, 89,

90Huxham, Chris 9, 43, 200, 202

Inglis, Loretta 149

Kagan, Robert 161, 162, 163,164, 165, 166, 185, 251

Kahneman, Amos 58, 77, 78Kant, Peter 97Kettl, Donald 3, 40, 84, 96, 100Klijn, Erik-Hans 13, 21, 89, 112,

117, 123, 124, 126, 127, 194Koppenjan, Joop 194

Lewicki, Roy 124, 125Lipsky, Michael 8, 71, 119Lowndes, Vivien 116Luhmann, Niklas 127

Milward, H. Brinton 9Minahan, Stella 149

304

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Index of Names 305

Moore, Mark 13, 30, 92, 93,176, 177, 231, 233

Mulgan, Richard 46, 88, 101

Obama, Barack 79, 111, 202O’Flynn, Janine 39, 43, 74, 86,

88, 95, 99Osborne, David 3, 48, 49, 100,

116, 190, 192

Parasuraman, A., ‘Parsu’ 34, 35Prahalad, Coimbatore 45

Quinn, James 45, 49, 100

Ramarajan, Lakshmi 196, 239Raven, Bertram 56, 57, 68Rawls, John 30Regan, Ronald 9, 131Rumsfeld, Donald 27, 28, 29

Salamon, Lester 7, 139Sandfort, Jodi 9Savas, Emanuel 7, 9, 17, 31, 37,

86, 88, 89Scholz, John 161, 162, 163, 164,

165, 166, 168, 185

Simon, Herbert 57Skelcher, Chris 3, 9, 40, 112,

116, 120, 239Smith, Adam 59Smith, Steven Rathgeb 8, 71, 119Stewart, John 47, 199, 177, 237Stone, Deborah 33Sullivan, Helen 3, 9, 40, 112,

116, 120, 239Sundeen, Richard 146, 147, 148Sunstein, Cass 58, 77, 79

Talbot, Colin 59, 63, 65Teisman, Geert 21, 80, 117, 123,

124Thaler, Richard 58, 77, 79Thomas, John Clayton 115, 204,

300Titmuss, Richard 76, 129Tversky, Daniel 58, 77, 78Tyler, Tom 165, 204

Vangen, Siv 43, 44, 200, 202Van Slyke, David 38, 86, 102

Williams, Paul 229, 240, 244Williamson, Oliver 40, 41, 98

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Index of Subjects

accountability 46, 132, 231–2authorizing environment 231co-production 231red tape 231responsive regulation 231trust 231

Al Qaeda 27, 111

boundary spanneractivity 80competencies of 240–3human resource management

practices 245–6matrix hopping 248organizational structures 246skills and knowledge 239–44tasks of externalisation 239–44

clients 174–92ability to co-produce 189client focus of government

189–91as co-producers 25, 174defined 176–7different roles 177examples 174, 178–9, 180explained 175importance of 178interdependence 180material rewards 185–7motivators 182, 183–9non-material motivators 187–9responsive regulation 185sanctions 182–5willingness to co-produce

182–8

collaboration 111–36as alternative to contracting

123challenges for delegates 132continuum 115costs of 42definition 21, 113–14life cycles 116as mode of coordination 113when to use 135

competencescore competences 45, 100strategic costs of externalizing

45complexity (intra-governmental)

132differing purposes 233operational arrangements 233portfolio management 248structures 233

co-production 7, 174–92with clients 14, 25, 17, 34, 97,

191cost savings, substitute 178examples 14, 174, 179interdependence 180key constructs 57material rewards 185–7necessity of 178non-material motivators 187–8sanctions 182–5value 175

Congressional Commission onWartime Contracting 28, 48,51, 52

coordinationcontinuum of 19modes of 17–19

306

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contingency approach/framework4, 206–26, 254

clarifying purpose 206–10, 225in contracting 102decision rules 225identifying providers 210–11in partnering 134public value chain 210, 211,

212, 213, 216relationship costs and benefits

217–18service costs and benefits

216–17strategic costs and benefits 217

contracting 83–110accountability 101, 105asset specificity 98classical 91classical versus relational 85competition 98, 107the contract 85definition 22, 84–5government by proxy 84information asymmetry 96,

221interdependency 97logic of 94, 95military example 49–52as mode of coordination 83monitoring 96specification 96uncertainty 96

contracting out 22, 86cost savings 87defined 86monitoring 106patterns of 86privatization 86purchaser–provider separation

87, 88, 95, 98–9structuring incentives 107when to contract out 94, 101,

102

weighing up the costs of benefitsof 103, 104–7

costs and benefits 3, 27–55,53–4, 133

different types 30–1relationship costs and benefits

40–4, 94–9, 100–1, 126–8,143–5, 171–2, 200–2,217–18

service costs and benefits31–40, 140–2, 198, 200,200–2, 216–17

strategic costs and benefits44–9, 100, 142–43, 172

weighing up costs and benefits3, 53–4, 94, 101–7, 133,173, 217–23, 226

to whom 30culture 132

mismatches 236partnerships 237professional cultures 236public service ethic 237

delegatedelegate’s dilemma 132–4explained 229in partnerships 132–4

extended examplesDutch Food and Consumer

Safety Authority 155, 165,167, 170,

Japan earthquake and tsunami1, 2

La Alianza Hispana 217, 218,219, 220, 221, 222

Meals on Wheels 137, 138,140

military contracting 27–8,49–52

Moscow weather bureau 56,61, 62, 65, 70

Sure Start 174, 175, 178, 187,189

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308 Index of Subjects

extended examples – continuedText4baby 193, 194, 198, 201,

202, 203Turkish Ministry of Finance

catering services 104, 105,106, 107

United States intelligence services111, 112, 113

Western Australia court securityand custodial services 83,85, 96, 97, 100, 104, 105,106, 107, 108, 109

externalization 5, 8and complementarity 39contingency framework for

206–22decision rules 225–6definition 5, 21and economies of scale 36and economies of scope 37and flexibility 39and increased value 32–6and interdependence 39and innovation 40and learning 40managing externalization

227–30organizational structures

247–8political benefits 49and reduced costs 31–2relationship costs and benefits

40–4, 94–9,126–8, 143–5,171–2, 200–2, 217–18

service benefits and costs31–40, 140–2, 198–200,200–2, 216–17

and service quality 36and specialization 38strategic benefits and costs

44–9, 100–1, 141–3, 172,202, 217

structural and operationalimperatives of government132–4

weighing benefits and costs53–4, 94, 101–7, 133, 173,217–23, 226

external providersability of 80–1allocation of roles 16clients 13–14, 174contribution to public purpose

1, 2, 3, 5, 82definition 20deciding role 15distribution of roles 15examples, varieties 23–4multi-party networks 193other government agencies 12,

93, 120–2private, for-profit 10, 92, 99producing role 15regulates 155taxonomy 22–3types of 10–14voluntary, non-profit 10–11,

79, 92, 119–20volunteers 137

framingand motivators 77, 78and prospect theory 78Daniel Tversky and Amos

Kahneman 58

governmentrole of 5, 6size of 7see also other government

departmentsgovernment obstacles to managing

externalization 132, 230–7accountability 132, 231–2cultural differences 132, 236–7the delegate’s dilemma 132

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intra-governmental complexity132, 233–4

the representative’s dilemma132, 237

turbulence 132–3, 234–6

homo economicusas basis of motivation 59critiques of 60–4, 82

information asymmetryin performance 71in specification 96

managing externalization 227–53capabilities framework 238cultural mapping and matching

248–9enabling environment 251–3government obstacles to

managing 230–7human resource management

245–6individual competencies

239–44organizational capabilities

243–51organizational structures

246–8representative’s dilemma 237portfolio management 249–50tasks involved in 227–30

motivation 56–82altruism 62, 63complexity of 58crowding effect 75, 76definition of 58extrinsic motivation 59, 60homo economicus as basis of

59homo sociologicus as basis of

62importance of 58intrinsic motivation 61

matching with motivators68–74

mixes of 58, 65, 82peer approval and pressure

61–2, 72, 73public service motivation 73purposive values 62relationship with motivators

69schema of 64–5sociality 64, 76

motivators 56–82in contracting 108contribution to social good,

legitimacy 67, 73, 74defined 65intrinsic rewards 66, 72matching with motivation

68–74material rewards 61, 65, 68,

69, 70, 71, 76punishment 72sanctions 65, 68, 69, 76self-interest 59, 60, 62, 64, 68social motivators 66, 72

multi-party networks 193–205challenges of using 198communication 197clusters of providers 196description of 194, 195examples 193, 199interests within 196, 203leadership 205managing 202–5motivation 204motivations 196motivators 203power 197relationship costs 200–1service benefits and costs

198–200strategic costs and benefits 202trust 197wicked problems 200

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non-profit organizationscommunity partnerships

118–20negative effects of contracting on

119nudge

choice architecture 78citizens 57effectiveness of 79examples of 78, 79in France 79and link to public policy 78Richard Thaler and Cass

Sunstein 58, 79in the United Kingdom 79in the United States 79

other government departmentschallenges of working with 121joined-up government 120,

121reasons for working together

121outsourcing 83–110

accountability 100definition 21, 84distribution of roles 83forms of 18military activities 28, 49–52strategic benefits and costs of

100

partnering 111–36, 112and accountability 132as alternative to outsourcing

122, 127challenges of 112and complexity 132and contracting 118, 119, 123,

136costs and benefits of 133and culture 132definition 113–14with non-profits 118–20

with other governmentorganizations 120–2

as reaction to contractualism112

as response to complexity 123as response to wicked problem

112as role relationship 113and trust 124–32and turbulence 132types of partners 114

partnershipsas alternative to outsourcing

122complementarity 122definition 21delegate’s dilemma 132–4and gift giving 131partnership fatigue 202and trust 126–32types of 116

performanceencouraging 43monitoring 42, 70, 71

powerbases of social power 56–7distribution within organizations

80public power 46

principal-agent theoryexplained 84–5multiple principal problem 70

privatisation 7, 9ideology of 28, 29, 52, 101preference for 28

public–private partnershipsattractiveness of 91as contracting 89, 90critiques of 91definition 88explained 90examples of 90, 117infrastructure partnerships 88as language game 89

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substantive versus rhetorical24–5, 90, 117–18

public value 13, 30, 33, 34,176, 182, 188, 192, 232,233, 253

chain 210, 211, 212, 213, 216,225, 255, 256

regulation 155–73co-regulation 25compliance 156, 159, 160,

161definition 155eliciting compliance 161,

164–6motivations 161, 164, 165motivators 161, 162, 164, 167recalcitrance 166regulatory postures 166–7relationship costs 171–2responsive regulation 159,

168–9, 170sanctions 161–4strategic costs 172

relationshipsbenefits of 44costs and benefits 40–4costs of relationship tasks 43duration of 19tasks 41–3

roles in externalization 9, 15–17,20

client co-production 176multi-party networks 195outsourcing 84partnering 113regulation 157volunteers 140

servicescosts and benefits of

externalizing 31–40defining, specifying 41–2, 94,

96, 220

delivery of 8determining who will produce

42, 219monitoring 43, 96, 220non-government provision 6quality 34–6

taxonomy of arrangements withexternal providers 22–5

trust 18and adaptation 126–7barriers to 133clients 184, 185, 187, 190collaboration and partnership

20, 21, 22, 40, 41, 43, 77,113, 114, 117, 135

components of 125contingency framework 221in contracting 106, 109definition 124development of 128–32exchange theory 129, 165,

187and information sharing,

learning and knowledge127

monitoring 136and motivations 126multi-party networks 196, 197,

201in networks 197norm of reciprocity 129–30organizational capabilities for

managing externalization230, 232, 234, 235, 236,243, 249

public trust, trust in government48, 173

regulatees 165and relationship costs 126rewards and punishment 66,

73and transaction costs 126

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turbulence 132–3, 234–6contracting 234–5partnerships 235political environment 234trust 235

valuesof public servants 47embedded in public services

233volunteers 137–54

advantages of 138cost effectiveness of 141management of 144–5, 150–1mission alignment 148–9motivation to volunteer 47, 73,

145–6motivators 148–52paid staff resistance to 152–4

popular areas for volunteering139

recruitment and retention of138, 144

relationship benefits and costs143–5

resistance to change, missionrigidity 143

scale of volunteering 139service benefits and costs

140–2strategic benefits and costs

142–3

warAfghanistan and Iraq 27,

49–52, 197cost of war 51forms of contract 109

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