title: CityOntheEdge:TheTransformationofMiami
author: Portes,Alejandro.;Stepick,Alex.publisher: UniversityofCaliforniaPress
isbn10|asin: 0520089324printisbn13: 9780520089327ebookisbn13: 9780585249841
language: English
subjectMiami(Fla.)--Racerelations,Miami(Fla.)--Ethnicrelations,Miami(Fla.)--Socialconditions,Minorities--Florida--Miami.
publicationdate: 1994lcc: F319.M6P681994ebddc: 305.8/009759/381
subject:Miami(Fla.)--Racerelations,Miami(Fla.)--Ethnicrelations,Miami(Fla.)--Social
conditions,Minorities--Florida--Miami.
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CityontheEdgeTheTransformationofMiami
AlejandroPortesand
AlexStepick
UniversityofCaliforniaPressBerkeleyLosAngelesLondon
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UniversityofCaliforniaPressBerkeleyandLosAngeles,California
UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Ltd.London,England
©1993byTheRegentsoftheUniversityofCalifornia
FirstPaperbackPrinting1994
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataPortes,Alejandro,1944Cityontheedge:thetransformationofMiami/AlejandroPortesandAlexStepick.p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN0-520-08932-4(alk.paper)1.Miami(Fla.)Racerelations.2.Miami(Fla.)Ethnicrelations.3.Miami(Fla.)Socialconditions.4.MinoritiesFloridaMiami.I.Stepick,Alex.II.Title.F319.M6P681993305.8´009759´381dc2092-39417 7CIP
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
98765432
ThepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsofAmericanNationalStandardforInformationSciences-PermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterials,ANSIZ39.48-1984.
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ForMariaPatriciaandCarol,withthanks
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Contents
ListofIllustrations viii
ListofTables x
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xv
1.ChangewithoutaBlueprint 1
2.AYeartoRemember:Mariel 18
3.AYeartoRemember:TheRiotandtheHaitians 38
4.TheEarlyYears 61
5.EntertheCubans 89
6.HowtheEnclaveWasBuilt 123
7.ARepeatPerformance?TheNicaraguanExodus 150
8.LostintheFray:Miami'sBlackMinorities 176
9.Reprise 203
Postscript:IntheEyeoftheStorm 223
Notes 229
Bibliography 259
Index 275
Pageviii
Illustrations
Photographs
Followingpage107
1.TheMiamiskyline
2.SigninMiami
3.ChapelofOurLadyofCharity,BiscayneBay
4.BayofPigsMemorial,WoodlawnCemetery
5.FlagsinWoodlawnCemetery
6.DominoplayersinLittleHavana
7.FuneralhomeinMiami
8.Streetscene,LittleHavana
9.BillboardinMiami
10.DowntownLittleHaiti,Miam i
12.Streetscene,LittleHaiti
13.Haitianboatandcaptain,MiamiRiver
14.Haitiandockworker,MiamiRiver
15.Haitianagriculturalworkers,southwestofMiami
16.Haitianbeanpicker,southwestDadeCount
17.HaitianshoppersinaCuban-ownedmarket
18.ReligiouscollegeinMiamiBeach
19.StudentsatTalmudicUniversity,MiamiBeach
20.HasidicJews,MiamiBeach
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21.MonumenttoCarlFisher,founderofMiamiBeach
22.MuralinnorthwestMiami
23.CubansprotestingNelsonMandela'svisittoMiami,1990
24.Anti-Mandelaprotester,1990
25.ProtesterarguingwithMandelasupporter,1990
26.TentcityforpeoplemadehomelessbyHurricaneAndrew
27.Storedestroyedbyhurricane
28.Homedestroyedbyhurricane
Figures
1.Extentofsubordinationandspeedofassimilation 7
2.PopulationoftheMiamimetropolitanarea,1980 20
3.WeeklyMarielarrivalsandnegativeMiamiHeraldarticlesontheinflow,1980
28
4.Professionals,executives,andlaborers,DadeCounty,1970and1980
42
5.Income,affluence,andpoverty,DadeCounty,1980 44
6.Unemploymentratesbyraceandorigin,DadeCounty,1980-90
45
7.BlackprofessionalsandadministratorsworkingforDadeCountygovernment,1982-90
181
Maps
1.TheMiamimetropolitanarea,1980 19
2.Blackpopulation,Miamimetropolitanarea,1990 186
3.Spanish-originpopulation,Miamimetropolitanarea,1990
187
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Tables
1.AttitudesTowardAmericanEthnicGroupsHeldbytheAmericanPublic,1982
31
2.PerceptionsandExperiencesofDiscriminationofMarielRefugees,1983and1986
33
3.EthnicGroups'EmploymentbySector,DadeCounty,1960-80
41
4.CharacteristicsofHaitianEntrantsinSouthFlorida,1983
57
5.GrowthofMiami'sBlackBusinesses,1977-87 180
6.Black-andCuban-ownedFirms,1987 182
7.EmploymentandBusinessEstablishmentsintheMiamiMetropolitanArea,1950-87
209
8.EthnicCompositionofMetropolitanMiami,1950-90 211
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PrefaceMiamiisnotamicrocosmoftheAmericancity.Itneverwas.Fromitsverybeginningsacenturyago,theBiscayneBaymetropolispossessedanairofunreality,aplaygrounddivorcedfromitsnaturalhabitatbythedeedsofYankeedevelopers.Forawhileitseemedthatnofantasy,nomatterhowfarfetched,couldnotbeenactedhere.ThethinstripoflandbetweenjungleandreefhencebecamelessanAmericanRivierathanacompendiumofthenation'sfoibles.DuringthelastthreedecadesorsoMiamihasevolved,sheddingitslight-heartedpasttobecomeaserious,somesaytragic,place.TheCubanRevolutionmarkedthebeginningofthischange,whichwaspushedalongbynewinfluxesofCaribbeanmigrantsandbynativereactionstothepresenceofsomanyoutsiders.Cubans,ofcourse,playedapivotalroleinthetransformation,fortheiractionsanddreams,whileinspiringtheCubancommunity,alsoaffectedthecharacterandidentityofothergroups.Andtherebytheentirecommunitychanged.
Ourinterestinthiscitydatesbacktotheearlyseventieswhenwebeganstudyingthearrivalandresettlementofnewimmigrantgroupsinthearea.Associologists,ourprincipalfocuswastheadaptationofforeign-bornminoritiestotheirnewenvironment.Astimepassed,however,itbecameclearthattheenvironmentitselfwaschanginginwaysthatwecouldnothaveanticipated.Theimmigrantsweretransformingnotonlythemselves,butalsothecityaroundthem.Unwittingly,Miamihadbecomethenation'sfirstfull-fledgedexperimentinbiculturallivinginthecontemporaryera.
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OtherU.S.cities,suchasNewYorkandLosAngeles,alsohavelargeSpanish-speakingandimmigrantpopulations,butnowherehasthesocialandeconomicweightofthenewcomersortheirpoliticalsignificancebeengreaterthaninSouthFlorida.InNewYork,newarrivalsarepromptlyabsorbedintotheimmensefabricofthecity;theverydiversityofnationalitiesinNewYorkconspiresagainstanysinglegroupbecomingtooprominent.InMiami,theregroupedCubanbourgeoisienotonlyredefinedthecharacterofthecity,butalsopromptedotherethniccommunitiesnativeBlacksandwhitesincludedtocasttheirownidentitiesinsharperrelief.
Otherbilingualandbiculturalcitiesandregionshaveofcourseexistedinthehistoryofthenation.MilwaukeeandSt.LouisattheturnofthetwentiethcenturywereGermantowns;northernWisconsinandMichiganwereheavilyScandinavian;inhabitantsofparishesintheLouisianalowlandsspokeAcadianFrench;andSanAntonio,SantaFe,andothertownsinthevastterritoriestakenfromMexicoretainedSpanishforalongwhile.ButthepassageoftimeandthegrowinghegemonyofAmericanculturedilutedtheseexperiencesandaccustomedustothespectacleofimmigrantswhohadbeenAmericanizedbeforereachingU.S.shoresorwhopromptlyshedtheirculturaltrappingsinquestofassimilation.Arisingfromauniquesetofhistoricalcircumstances,theMiamiexperimentisuniqueandunlikelytoberepeated.YetthepassionsthatitawokeandthesocialenergiesthatitreleasedmaycarrysignificantlessonsasAmericabecomesagain,undertheinfluenceofgrowingimmigration,amultiethnicsociety.
Theimmediatepredecessorofthisbookwasasix-yearpanelstudyoftheadaptationprocessofCubanandHaitianimmigrantsinSouthFlorida.Thatstudywaspromptedbythe1980Marielexodus,accompaniedbyarisingnumberofHaitian"boatpeople"arrivinginFloridaataboutthesametime.Ouroriginalintentionwastolearn
howtheseimmigrantsunwelcomebyalmosteverysectorofAmericansocietymanagedtocopeintheirnewsocialenvironment.ThesocialreceptionandeconomicsituationofMarielCubansandHaitianswaschronicledinaseriesofarticles,citedinthefollowingchapters.YettopursuethebroadergoalofanalyzingthetransformationofMiamiundertheinfluenceoftheseandearlierimmigrantwaves,wehadtoshiftmethodologicalgears.
Tolearnmoreaboutthecity,wesupplementedtheoriginal
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panelstudywithaseriesofinterviewswithleadersofthecommunitiesthatformitsethnicmosaic.First,leadersoftheoriginalrefugeegroupstargetedforstudyCubansandHaitianswerecontactedandinterviewedin1983.ThiswasfollowedbysystematiccanvassingofBlack,Jewish,Anglo(asnativewhitesarecalledtoday),Cuban,andNicaraguanleadersin1987-88andbysupplementaryinterviewswiththesameornewinformantsin1990-91.
Simultaneously,wehadtodelvedeeperintothehistoryoftheareaandgatherdataonpresentdevelopments.RichchroniclesoftheFloridapeninsulaandtheislandofCubawrittenbyhistorianssuchasMarjoryStonemanDouglas,AlvaMooreParks,HughThomas,andHerminioPortellVilahelpedusunderstandthelong-termtrendsthatgaverisetomodernMiami.Yetmostofthesehistoriesendedjustasthecity'suniquetransformationwasgettingunderway.Asweturnedtothepresent,thedata-gatheringroutinebecamelessroutine:scarcelyadaypassedwithoutsomenewdevelopmenttakingplaceinthecity.Thiswaschangenotonlywithoutablueprint,butatbreakneckspeed.
Bythemid-eighties,othershavebeguntonoticethesamething.LiteraryfigurestraveledfromNewYorkandothernortherncitiestorecordtheirimpressionsoftheplace.Theresultingbookswereusefultous,notmerelyfortheirinsights,butbecausetheyobviatedtheneedtojustifyaseriousstudyofwhat,untilthen,hadbeenregardedasafadingtouristresort.Forsomeoftheseauthors,likeT.D.Allman,eventsinSouthFloridaevenprefiguredthefutureofotherAmericancities.
Inwhatfollows,thestoryofMiamiistoldinasomewhatunconventionalwaythatdeservesexplanation.Thefirstchapterillustratestheoverlapofdiverseandcontradictorydiscoursesaboutthecitythataresomuchpartofitsevolutioninrecentyears.Welookthenattheproximatecausesoftheriseofthesecompetingdiscourses
intheeventsthattookplaceinthepivotalyearof1980theMarielexodus,thearrivaloftheHaitian''boatpeople,"andtheviolentriotintheBlacksectionsofthecity(chapters2and3).Nextweexplorethemoredistantoriginsofcontemporaryevents,bothinthehistoryofFlorida,fromcolonialdaystotheeveoftheCubanRevolution(chapter4),andinthepeculiarrelationshipbetweenCubaandthepeninsuladuringthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury(chapter5).ThisrelationshipledtotheoverwhelmingpreferenceforMiamishownbyCubansdisplacedfromtheir
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homelandandtothesubsequentconstructionofanethnicenclaveeconomyinthecity(chapter6).
FinallyweexaminehowthelatestimmigrantgrouptheNicaraguansaswellastheHaitiansandnativeBlackshavefaredinthisnewMiamiandtheirlikelyprospectsforthefuture(chapters7and8).Chapter9thenassessesthewholeintermsofbothpasttheoriesofurbanizationandethnicrelationsandpracticallessonsinurbanpolicy.
Miami'sstorydoesnotendwiththeclosureofthisnarrative.Evenaswebroughtittoatentativeconclusion,anunexpectedeventgavethisremarkabletransformationanewandtragicturn.HurricanesarenothingnewinSouthFlorida,butthefuryofHurricaneAndrewinAugust1992andthemagnitudeofthedestructionleftinitswakeamounttoanewhiatusinthehistoryofthearea.Wevisitedthecityagaininthestorm'saftermath,wenttothemostaffectedareas,andtalkedtobothvictimsofthedebacleandexpertsonnaturaldisasters.
Thissadinquiryinthemonthafterthedisasterofferedpersuasiveevidencethattheextentofthedamagewasnofleetingnewsitem,butwouldmarktheevolutionandcollectiveidentityoftheareaforyearstocome.ThePostscriptsummarizeswhatwelearnedinthepartiallydestroyedcityandthelikelyeffectstheeventwillhaveonitssocialanddemographicmakeup.Theirruptionofanaturalcataclysmintowhatalreadywasacomplexsituationmayleadtounexpectedoutcomes,butouroverallsenseisthatitsprimaryeffectwillbetoacceleratetheprocessofchangealreadyunderway,outlinedinthefollowingchapters.
Afinalwordonthetitle.Itwasdifficulttoarriveatadesignationthatwasneitherominousnorcelebratorybutthatcapturedtheobvioustensionintheunprecedentedeventsexperiencedbythiscity.Inourview,sucheventssignaltransformationandchallenge,notnecessarilydecline.Miamiisnot"intheabyss,"butonathreshold.Thecityis
severalthingsatonce:atthesouthernendofthelandandastridetwoculturalworlds;abouttocompleteitsfirstcenturyofexistence;and,aboveall,ontheedgeofafuturemarkedbyuncertainty,butalsobythepromiseofpathbreakinginnovationsinurbanlife.Themultilingual,multiculturalexperimentthatisMiamiholdsimportantlessonsforwhattheAmericancitywillbeaboutinachangedworld.
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AcknowledgmentsTheoriginallongitudinalstudyofMarielCubanandHaitianrefugeesinSouthFloridaonwhichthisbookispartiallybasedwassupportedbygrantsfromtheNationalScienceFoundation(SES8215567)andtheNationalInstituteofMentalHealth(MH41502).AdditionalsupportforfieldinterviewsanddatagatheringinMiamicamefromagrantfromtheFordFoundation.Wearegratefultoofficialsinallthreeinstitutions,andinparticulartoDr.WilliamA.DiazoftheFordFoundationforhistimelyassistanceandencouragement.
Theoriginalandthetwofollow-upsurveysofMarielrefugeesinMiamiwereconductedbyDr.JuanM.ClarkofMiami-DadeCommunityCollege.WeoweanimmensedebttoJuanforhisexpertiseanddedicationtotheproject.AsimilarstellarperformancewasdeliveredbyCarolStepick,fielddirectorofthethirdHaitianrefugeefollow-up,whichfocusedonissuesofmentalhealthandhelp-seekingamongthisgroup.
Thenationalityoftheauthors(Cubanand"Anglo"inlocalparlance)precludedthemfromconductingunbiasedfirst-personinterviewswithseveralkeyinformantsinthepolarizedMiamienvironment.ThebulkofthistaskfelltoDr.PatriciaFernandez-Kelly,asocialanthropologistbytraining,whosefieldskillsandrelatively"neutral"originsdidwonderstoopendoorsthatotherwisewouldhavebeenclosedtous.Withoutherhelpandthematerialsthatsheaccumulated,thisbookcouldnothavebeenwritten.
Wearegratefulaswelltoallourinformants,busypeoplewho
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gavegenerouslyoftheirtime,oftenonmorethanoneoccasion.Inkeepingwithourcovenantatthetimeoftheinterviews,theirnamesmustremainanonymous.Anumberofourcolleaguesweresimilarlygenerousinreadingearlyversionsofvariouschaptersandprovidingencouragementforwhat,forus,wasa"first"anattempttocombinetheanalysisofsurveydatawithfirst-persontestimoniesandanecdotalmaterial.OurNewYork-basedcolleaguesRichardSennett,AristideZolberg,andJanetAbu-Lughodmustbementionedinthisregard.Withouttheirsupportandinspiration,weprobablywouldhaverevertedtostandardmodesofdataanalysis.
WeacknowledgewithgratitudetheassistanceofDr.CharlesW.BlowersandMr.OliverKerroftheResearchDivision,Metro-DadePlanningDepartment,whomadeavailabletousvaluabledataandgraphicsontheMiamiarea.WewouldalsoliketothankSteveDoigoftheMiamiHerald,SandraDibbleofNationalGeographicandformerlytheMiamiHerald,MikeClaryoftheLosAngelesTimes,andRolandFischofFloridaKeysCommunityCollege,allofwhomprovideddatathatwefounduseful.
AttheUniversityofCaliforniaPress,oureditorNaomiSchneiderandthereviewersassignedtothemanuscriptgaveuswelcomeencouragementaswellaswell-targetedcriticisms.Wecanonlyhopethatthefinalversionreflects,atleastinpart,theireffortstoimprovethebook.AtJohnsHopkins,webenefitedfromthecommentsandadviceofMelvinL.Kohn,ChristopherChase-Dunn,andDavidKyle;atFloridaInternationalUniversity,fromthoseofLisandroPerez,A.DouglasKincaid,MaxCastro,GuillermoGrenier,andMarkRosenberg.ToMark,inparticular,weowetheideaofthetitle.Butnoneofthemandnoneoftheotherpersonsnamedabovebearsanyresponsibilityforthecontent,whichisexclusivelyours.
Lastbutnotleast,weoweagreatdebtofgratitudetoCristiana
CamardellaandDianeBerger,whotranscribedeachchapter,struggledwithillegiblelonghands,andproducedintheendahandsomemanuscript.Wecommendtheireffortsandhopethattheyarepleasedwiththefinalproduct.
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ChapterOneChangewithoutaBlueprintJ.MichaelQuinlan,federaldirectorofprisons,wasaworriedman.Eightdaysintoamajorriot,therewerenosignsthatthesituationwasabouttoeaseorthatmorethanonehundredhostageswouldbereleasedunharmed.Theprisoners'cause,meanwhile,wasgainingground.Theyhadriggedapublicaddresssystemontopoftheprisonwallstobroadcasttheirdemandsandtalktorelatives.Prisoners'wivesandmothershuddledintentsjustoutsidethepenitentiary,notfarfromthefamiliesofthehostages.Neithergroupwantedviolence.Abusloadofprisoners'relativeshadjustarrivedinWashington,D.C.,tointercedewiththeattorneygeneralonbehalfofthoseinside.
Morevexingtofederalofficialsweretherioters'demands.Everyoneagreedthatconditionsinsidetheprisonwereintolerableandthatmanyhadbeendetainedforyearswithoutdueprocess.Neitherofthesefacts,however,sparkedtherebellion.Rather,theprisonersrevoltedwhentheyheardtheywouldbereleased,inordertobesentoutofthecountry.Thereceivingnation'sgovernmenthadassuredU.S.authoritiesthatnoreprisalswouldbetakenagainstthedeportees,whichmadethelatter'sattitudeevenmoreextraordinary.
Quinlanhadatrumpcardinhisfavorshouldtheimpasseturntoarmedviolence,andthatwasthesolidsupportshownbythepublicforthegovernmentandagainsttherebelliousforeigners.Thatsupportwasapparenteverywhereeverywhere,thatis,butinonecity.Theretherioters'demandsnottobedeportedstruckaresponsivechord.Previouslydismissedas"scum,"theprisoners,
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withtheirsorrylivingconditionsandtheirendlesssentences,hadelicitedlittleconcerninthepast,butwhentheydeclaredthattheywouldratherdiethangohome,theircompatriotsinMiamiclaimedthemastheirown.Whiletherestofthecountryprayedforthesafetyofthehostages,inthisonecitythemassesandtherosarieswereperformedforthesakeofthecaptorsandtheirplight.
ForQuinlanandhismen,timewasrunningout.Publicpatiencewaswearingthinasdayafterfruitlessdayofnegotiationspassed,makingtheauthoritieslookevermoreimpotent.Thentheriotersvoicedanewdemand:theywantedtoseesomeonewhowouldvouchfortheirsafetyaftertheysurrendered.TheydidnotaskfortheattorneygeneraloftheUnitedStatesoranyotherimportantWashingtonofficial;rather,theyrequestedanobscurepriestfromtheplacewherethemasseswerebeingsaidintheirbehalf.
MonsignorAgustinRomán,auxiliarybishopofMiami,isanunpretentiouslittleman.White-haired,withaslightframe,hewasanincongruousfigurenexttotheburlyprisonofficials.Hispresence,however,accomplishedwhatthefederalauthoritieshadbeenunableto.Román'smessagetotherebellingMarielprisonersinOakdaleandinAtlantabegan"Dearbrothers,"andendedwithapleathattheydemonstratetotheworld"Christiangoodwill."Behindthepiousrhetoric,themessagesaidthis:Youbelongtousandwewillnotabandonyou.Afewhourslater,the1987Marielprisonriotswerehistory.
1
Appealsbythedowntroddentofellowethnicsarenotuncommon-ethnicgroupsympathies,afterall,oftenflowindirectionscontrarytothoseofthemainstream.Yeteventsafter1987demonstratedthatMiamiwasindeeduniqueintheextenttowhichcontrasting
worldviewsexistedandweresuperimposedoneachother.
OnJanuary24,1990,formerpolicemanWilliamLozanostoodbeforeapackedMiamicourtroomawaitingsentenceontwocountsofmanslaughter.Amonthearlier,hehadbeenconvictedofshootingandkillingBlackmotorcyclistClementLloydandhispassengerinadesolatestreetoftheOvertownghetto.Lloydhaddisobeyedanordertostopandracedinthedirectionoftheofficer,whofelledhimwithasingleshot.Theeventtriggeredtwonightsofarsonandlooting,putdownonlybymassivepoliceforceandthemayor'spromisethatjusticewouldbedone.WhenLozanoreceiveda
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seven-yearsentenceformanslaughter,thecommunitybreathedasighofreliefnoriotingthistime.BlackMiamiwasreassuredthatpolicekillingswouldnolongeroccurwithimpunity.ClementLloyd'srelativescomplainedaboutthelightsentencebutpronouncedthemselvessatisfiedabouttheverdict.Asoneofthemputit,"AtleastLozanoisaknowncriminalnow."
ToprotecthimselffromthevindictivemoodofBlackMiami,Lozanohiredoneofthecity'sbestcriminalattorneys.Ashislegaldebtsmounted,thenowunemployedpolicemanappearedtohavereachedtheendoftherope.Hehadoneadvantage,though.AmonghisfellowColombiansandmuchoftheLatinpopulationLozanowasseen,ifnotexactlyasahero,atleastasavictimandscapegoat.HisfirstpublicbroadcastoverMiamiCubanradionetted$150,000incontributions;subsequentappealsproducedsubstantialamountsaswell.ThefactthatLozanowas"aknowncriminal"didnotseemtolessenhimintheeyesofhisfellowLatins.Thankstotheircontributions,hewasabletoretainahighpowereddefenseteam.
OnJune25,1991,twoandahalfyearsaftertheshooting,theThirdFloridaDistrictCourtofAppealsthrewoutLozano'ssentenceandorderedanewtrial.Theoriginaljudgehaddismissedallmotionsforachangeofvenuewiththeargumentthatinthismetropolitanareaoftwomillionpeopleanimpartialjurycouldbefound.Theappellatecourtdisagreed.ThepeopleofMiamiwereinfacttoosharplydividedoverLozano'sfatesomereadytolynchhim,othersprovidingfinancialsupportforhiscausetoleavespaceforafairtrial.
2
Sinceitsbeginningsatthestartofthecentury,Americanurbansociologyhasfocusedonafewthemesthatrepeatthemselveswithuncannyregularity.Strippedoftheiracademicgarb,thesethemes
reflecttheperennialpreoccupationsoftheurbancitizenry:Whoreallyrules?Howcanlocalelitesbemademoreaccountabletotheirfellowcitizens?Whatexplainstheplightofethnicminorities?Howcanconflictberesolved?Studentsofurbanlifehaveattemptedtoprovideanswerstotheseandotherquestionsand,intheprocess,havecreatedarichimageryofwhattheAmericancityisallabout.Itisusefultoreviewsomeoftheseimages,fortheyformthebackdropagainstwhichtheaboveeventsandthosede-
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scribedinthefollowingpagescanbeunderstood.TheirsignificanceisnotthattheyhelpaccountforthecourseofeventsinMiami,butpreciselythattheyfitthestorysoawkwardly.
CommunityPower
Thequestion"Whorulesthecity.?"hasledtoanelaborateliteratureandtothedevelopmentofcomplexmethodsforunderstandingthetruecharacterofurbanpower.Spearheadedinthe1940sandintothe1960sbysuchscholarsasFloydHunter,RobertDahl,andC.WrightMills,thebasiccontroversycenteredonwhetherthe"businessclass"wasthesolearbiteroflocaldecision-makingorwhetherothergroupsalsohadasayinurbanaffairs.Crucialamongthelatterwerepublicofficials,oftenelectedonthevotingstrengthofethnicminority,blocks.Weresuchelectedofficialspartofthe"real"powerstructure,orweretheymerelywindowdressingtocovertheactionsofthetruemoversandshakers?"Pluralism"and"elitism''becametheacceptedlabelsinthislong-runningcontroversy.
3
Morerecently,theelitistpositionhasexpandedtoembraceanalysisoftheurban"growthmachine."Proponentsofthisview,notablyHarveyMolotchandJohnLogan,portraythegrowthmachineasaconfabulationofpropertycapitalistsbentonprofitingfromtheircontrolofurbanamenitiesandscarceurbanspace.Techniquesincludemanipulationofzoningordinancesandothertrickstorendereruptylandvaluableortoredefinetheuseofbuiltspaces.Henceitisnot"business"ingeneral,butthebusinessofcreatingprofitsoutoflocationaladvantage,thatdeterminesthepatternofurbangrowth.4
LocalsandCosmopolitans
Ina1946reporttotheU.S.Senate,C.WrightMillsraisedarelatedissue,namelywhethercitiessufferedwhentheireconomiesbecamedominatedbyoutsideinterests.Millsdenouncedfootloosecorporatecapitalismthatextractedresourcesbutprovidedlittletothecommunityinreturn.Inlieuof"branch"capitalism,MillsproposedtotheCongressaprogramtorevitalizelocalbusinessonthetheorythatcommunity-basedenterprisesweremoreegalitar-
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ianandmoreresponsivetolocalwelfare.CriticscalledMills'spositionretrograde;thegrowthoftheAmericaneconomy,theysaid,requiredtheemergenceofpowerfulmulticentriccorporations,andtheyproducedanarrayofstudiestodemonstratethatcorporateexecutivescouldbejustascivic-mindedaslocals,andoftenmoreeffectivelyso.
5Withvariations,thisdebatebetweenadvocatesof"cosmopolitan"versus"local"economiccontrolendurestoday.
EthnicityandAssimilation
Itwasethnicity,however,thatemergedasthefundamentalleitmotivofAmericanurbansociology.Indeed,itcouldnothavebeenotherwise,givenacitizenrymoldedbysuccessivewavesofimmigration,eachdifferentinmanywaysfromearlierones.ThethemesofsocialpowerandsocialclassonwhichHunter,Mills,andotherclassicsfocusedbecameincreasinglyintertwinedwiththoseofrace,language,andculture.Thefundamentalcontroversyaboutethnicitywaswhetherracialandculturalmarkersweretiedtoclasspositionandhencedisappearwithupwardmobilityorwhethertheyrepresentaseparateandautonomousdimensionofsocialstructure.ThefirstpositionwaseloquentlyarguedbyW.LloydWarnerandhisassociatesonthebasisoftheirmassivestudyof"YankeeCity"(Newburyport,Massachusetts).Writinginthe1940s,Warnercapturedthedifferencesthatheandhisstudentsobservedinsocialprestigeandsocialrecognitioninasixfoldclassificationof"class."ClassesinYankeeCityrangedfromthewhiteProtestant''upper-upper"eliteandmostlywhite"lower-upper"professionalstothelargelyethnic"upper-lower"strataoffactoryworkersandthe"lower-lower"skidrowpopulation.6
An"ethnic,"inWarner'stheory,wassomeonewhobyreasonofcultureorracewasoutsidethecommunity'smainstreamandconsideredhimselforherselforwasconsideredbyotherstobelongtoadistinctsubsociety.Ethnicsconcentratedinthebottomrungsofthesocialstructurethelowermiddleandlowerclassesdependingontheirworkskillsandlengthoflocalresidence.Climbingthesocialladderrequiredthatonejointheculturalmainstream,butevenfullyacculturatedminoritiesmightnotproveacceptabletothe"upper-upper"brahminswhocontrolledtheprestigehierar-
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chy.WarnerandLeoSroleidentifiedskincolor(race),language,andreligionasthefundamentalcriteriaofeliteacceptance:themoresimilarethnicgroupsare,alongthesedimensions,tothoseoccupyingpositionsofprestigeandpowerinthecommunity,thefastertheirassimilation.Racewasthemostimportantfactor,followedbylanguageandthenreligion.
7Thecombinedoperationofthesefactorswithintheurbanpopulationledtoanethnicclasshierarchythatalsopredictedtheexpectedspeedofassimilation.Figure1reproducesWarnerandSrole'shierarchyofethnicityandtheconsequentpeckingorderinYankeeCity.
Inthe1940sand1950s,itseemedreasonabletoassumethatall"ethnics"wishedtoandwouldfollowthepathofassimilation.Bythesixties,thatstoryhadbecomeopentodoubt.Severalauthorspointedtothepresenceof"unmeltableethnics,"forwhomnoamountofacculturationappearedsufficienttogainthemacceptanceintotheurbanmainstream.Othersnotedhowdistinctculturaltraitsenduredthroughthegenerationsthankstostronggroupinstitutionsandtheunwillingnessofcertainminoritiestolosetheiridentity.Oftensuchresilientethnicity,wasdisplayedevenafteragrouphadmovedsignificantlyupwardintheeconomichierarchy.Focusingontheseexceptions,NathanGlazer,DanielP.Moynihan,andAndrewGreeleyquestionedtheearlierassumptionsandsuggestedthattheAmericancitywasnotreallya"meltingpot"whereminoritieswouldsoonerorlaterlosetheiridentitiesandjointhemainstream,butrathera"socialmosaic"whereethnic-basedsolidaritiespersistedacrossgenerations.8
Withthepassageoftime,theintertwinedthemesofpower,class,race,andethnicity.andtheassociatedcontroversiescametodefinehowstudentsofurbanlifethoughtabouttheAmericancity.Althoughtheanswersgivenby"pluralists"and"elitists,""locals"and
"cosmopolitans,"and''meltingpot"versus"socialmosaic"advocatesdiffered,thequestionsremainedconsistent:Whoreallygoverns?Howdoesoutsidebusinesscontrolaffectcivicwelfare?Whyareethnicminoritiesoutsidethesocialmainstream?Whatwouldittaketochangetheirsituation?Thesearchforanswersgaveriseovertimetoamethodologicalrepertoireatoolkitthatresearcherscarriedfromcitytocityandappliedinamoreorlessstandardizedfashion.
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Figure1.Extentofsubordinationandspeedofassimilation.AdaptedfromW.LloydWarnerandLeoSrole,
TheSocialSystemsofAmericanEthnicGroups(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1945),288.
BypermissionofYaleUniversityPress.
Page8
ResearchersapproachingmodernMiamiwiththesametime-honoredideasandthesamemethodologicaltools,however,wouldbeinforashock.AlthoughthecityisintheUnitedStates,itdoesnotresembleintheslightestthemodelsofYankeeCityandotherurbanclassics.Nordoesitfitverywellmorerecentdescriptionsofa"socialmosaic"composedofestablishedethnicgroupsthatmaintaincertainelementsoftheircultureunderthehegemonicumbrellaofawhiteProtestantelite.InMiami,thefragmentsofthemosaicarelooseanddonotcometogetherinanyfamiliarpattern.Considerthefollowingreversalsvis-à-vistraditionalAmericanurbanlife:
1.Whilethe"businessclass"doesexerciseundisputablecontrolingoverningthecity,itiscomposedincreasinglyofrecentimmigrants,ratherthanexclusivelyof"old"familiesorcorporate"branch"executives.Thisisparticularlytrueinthecaseofthe"growthmachine''createdbyforeign-bornbuildersanddevelopers.
2.Theclashbetweenlocalandoutsidecorporatecontroloccurs,butinMiamitheproliferatinglocalsmallbusinessesareownedmostlybyimmigrants,whilethecorporate"branch"officesareAmerican-owned.Manyofthelatteraretherenottoproducegoodsforthedomesticmarketbuttosellservicestootherforeigners,oftenthroughthemediationofthelocalimmigrant-ownedfirms.
3.Thereisnomainstream.Thehegemonyoftheold"upperuppers"hasgivenwaytoparallelsocialstructures,eachcompletewithitsownstatushierarchy,civicinstitutions,andculturallife.Asaresult,economicmobilityandsocialstandinghaveceasedtodependonfullacculturationoronpleasingtheelitesoftheoldclassorder.
4.Theoverlapofparallelsocialsystemsinthesamephysicalspacehasgivenrisetoacculturationinreverseaprocessbywhichforeigncustoms,institutions,andlanguagearediffusedwithinthenativepopulation.Asaconsequence,biculturalismhasemergedasan
alternativeadaptiveprojecttofullassimilationintoAmericanculture.Opponentsofbiculturalism,immigrantsandnativesalike,musteitherwithdrawintotheirowndiminishedcirclesorexitthecommunity.
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TheexistenceoftheseparallelsocialstructuresiswhatunderlaytheMarielprisoners'callforBishopRománratherthanAttorneyGeneralMeesetoactasguarantoroftheirfate.
9TheirmovewouldhavebeeninconceivablehadtheircoethnicsinMiamioccupiedtheroleassignedtothembyWarnerandotherclassicauthorsoncommunitypower.Forthatmatter,theveryfactthatMarielrefugeeswereinAmericanprisonsatallisexplainableonlyintermsoftheunusualprocessofchangethathadovertakenSouthFloridabeforetheirarrival.
CompetingDiscourses
Socialfactsarenotself-intelligible.Theirinterpretationdependsonthecognitiveframesinwhichtheyareplaced,andtheseinturnareproductsofpriorsocialinteractions.Commonmeaningsarearrivedatwhenrelevantaudiencesagreetostresscertainaspectsofagivenphenomenonandinterpretthemonthebasisofsharedpastexperience.Existing"frames"ofwhatAmericanurbanlifeislike,includingthoseelaboratedinthesociologicalresearchliterature,provetobeoflimitedutilityforrenderingeventsinSouthFloridaunderstandable.Theseeventsrepresentsocialchangewithoutablueprint;becausetheyledpreciselytothefragmentationofpreviouslyheldconsensualviews,itisnotsurprisingthatseveralcompetingdiscoursesemergedtoexplainthem,eachwithitsowndistinctshadesofmeaningandmoraltone.OnlyinsuchacontextwoulditbeconceivableforWilliamLozano,convictedfelon,tosolicitandobtainsupportfromawidesegmentoftheverycitywherehisallegedcrimewascommitted.
ToapproachdevelopmentsinMiami,wefirstmakeuseofW.I.Thomas'sconceptof"definitionofthesituation,"atermthat
highlightshowsubjectiveperceptionsofrealitycaninfluencerealityitself.10Inourview,definitionsofthesituationcomprise(a)aframeofreferenceembodyingoneormoregeneralizedideasand(b)an"object"thatisinterpretedintermsofthoseideas.Differentobjectsareinterrelatedbyreferencetothecommonframe,givingrisetoaperspective,or"discourse,"inwhichapparentlydisparateaspectsofrealityareintegratedintoameaningfulinterpretivewhole.ThedifferencebetweenMiamiandmostcommunitiesstudiedbysociologistsinthepastisthatinMiamieveneveryday
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eventsnottomentionmoreexplosiveconflictsbetweensocialclassesandinterestgroupsarenotnecessarilyassessedwithinacommonframeofreference,butmaybeinsertedintodifferent,mutuallyunintelligible,interpretiveframeworks.
Atpresent,severalperspectivessufficientlybroadtoprovideacoherentaccountoflifeinthismetropolitanareaareidentifiable.Themostcommononesmaybelabeledthe"Angloculturalreaffirmation,"the"Cubanorpan-Latinsuccessstory,"andthe"Blackdoublemarginality"discourses.Bywayofillustration,thefollowingexcerptsofstatementsmadebycommunityleadersininterviews,addressingfourfrequent"objects"ofdebateinMiami,maybetakenastypicalofeachdiscourse.Thestatementsaredrawnfrominterviews,conductedbetween1983and1988,withapproximatelysixtyofthemostprominentbusiness,political,andreligiousleadersinthecityasacomplementtoalargesurveyoftherecentlyarrivedimmigrantpopulationinthearea.
11Threeofthese''objects"Miami's"majorproblem,"language,andinterethnicrelationswereposedasquestionstoallrespondents;thefourththeMiamiHeraldemergedspontaneouslyinseveralconversations.
Miami'sMajorProblem
Nativewhitebusinessexecutive,formerchairmanofalargelocalcorporation(interviewedin1987):
Youhavetwolevels,oneiswhatisgoingtohappentothenationasawholeoverthenextfiftyyearswhentheHispanicpopulationmaybecomeoverfiftypercentofthepopulation;andtheotherlevelistheshort-termimpactofHispanicsinacitylikethisone.Youdealwithperceptionsbecauseyoudon'treallyknowwhatpercentageofthepopulationismakingthenoise,butyouhearthenoise,themajornoise,thedominant
noise,andyouarebeginningtohearmoreandmorethattheCubansarenotinterestedinintegratingintoAmericansociety,andifthatisthecase,thenthathastobethenumber-oneprobleminMiami.
Thatisaproblembecausethereisn'tagreatdealinCaribbeanandLatinAmericanculturesthat'sgoingtoaddanythingtodemocracyatall.AndIthinkthereisagoodchancethatitwilldetractfromit.Cubansreallyvalueeconomicfreedom,butthereareotherfreedomstheydon'tvalue.
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Cubanbusinessman,ownerofalocalfactory,emigratedintheearly1960s(1986):
OurmostseriousprobleminMiamiisthedevaluationofSouthAmericancurrenciesbecauseinthiscitytherehasbeencreatedalargecurrentofbusinesswithCentralandSouthAmerica;manypropertieswerebuilt,manyapartmentsweresold,apartfromtheexports.ThedevaluationsinVenezuela,Mexico,andBrazilparalyzedeconomicactivityinMiami.Atthesametime,constructionofapartmentsforallthoseSouthAmericanswhowantedtoownsomethingherestopped.Thisisourmostseriousproblemtoday.Untilcurrenciesregaintheirvalueandeconomictranquillityreturnstothosecountries,MiamiwhichisthekeylinkbetweentheUnitedStatesandLatinAmericawillcontinuetosuffer.
Blackcommunityactivist,directorofasocialserviceagencyinLibertyCity,themajorBlackareaofSouthFlorida(1987):
Therealproblemin1987isthattheBlackshavenotconcludedthattheymusttakecontroloftheirdestiny.That'stherealproblemnow.Butthatwasnottherealproblemin1964.Then,theproblemwastoremovetheshacklesofsegregation.Youhadtogothroughthatprocessinordertogettowherewearein1987....Now,havinggonethroughthatprocess,thefinallapistoputeverythinginperspective,andtoaskourselveswhatarewegoingtodoaboutit,becausealltheyhavedonesince1619hasnotbeeninourinterest,buttheirs.Inordertotakechargeofitsowndestiny,thiscommunitymustsimply,selfishlybecomeunabatedlypro-Black.
Caseinpoint:thereissomethingspecialaboutBlacksandRevlonbeautycareproducts.WefindoutthatBlacksbuyoverfifty-onepercentofallthebeautycareproductsmadeinthecountry....Ifwearethemainconsumersinthatindustry,thentheappropriateresponseisforustobecomemajorproducersofthatwhichweconsume.
Language
Jewishlawyer,directoroftheregionalbranchofamajornationalJewishorganization(1986):
Thisisacommunitylikeavolcano....AmajorissueconcernsthetensionsbetweennativeAmericansandHispanics.Thefocalpointislanguage.Thereisaverystrong"EnglishOnly"movementorvariationsofit.Intwenty-fiveyears,closetothreehundredthousandCubanshavecomehere,andmanyhavedoneverywell.Thefactisthattheyhavetakenoverthecitybothintermsofnumbersandeconomicpresence.Thishas
Page12
createdalotofresentmentandbitternessinsomecircles.Ithinkthepopularizedstatementthattypifiedthetensionwasthebumperstickerthatread,"WhenthelastAmericanleavesMiami,pleasetaketheflag."Thatrepresentsthemiddle-andlower-middle-classfeelingaboutwhathappenedhere.
Nativewhitebusinessexecutive(quotedabovewithregardtoMiami'smajorproblem):
Whathappensisthatinanopenstoretherewillbetwoorthreewomentalkinginanincomprehensiblelanguage,andpeople,Ithink,sometimesjustgettiredofbeingsurroundedbySpanish.Moreimportantly,therearemany,manytimeswhentheCubansknowthatthepeopleintheroomwiththemdon'tunderstand.Likemywifeandherhairdresser:shespeaksSpanishentirelywhilesheisworkingonherhair.Mysonisanabsolutelinguist,hespeaksPortugueseandSpanishfluently.HelearnedwhilehewasinRochester,NewYork,notwhilehelivedinMiami,Florida.Itispopulartheretobebilingual;itisn'tpopularinMiami.
Cubancivicactivist,headofamultiethniccommunityorganization,emigratedintheearly1960s(1986):
LanguagehasgreatimportancebecauseifanindividualownsastorewhoseclientscomefromLatinAmerica,hewillneedbilingualemployees.DuringChristmastime,ninetypercentofthestoresadvertiseforbilingualemployees.Toapersonwhodoesnotknowthelanguage,thissituationrepresentsaneconomicproblembecauseheknowsthat,unlessheknowsSpanish,hewouldnotcompetesuccessfullyinthelabormarket.ThisproblemisespeciallyimportantintheBlackcommunity,whichhasthegreatestnumberofunemployed.TheyoungBlackknowsthatitwouldbemuchmoredifficulttosecureajobifhedoesnotspeakSpanish.
BlackownerofamajorbusinessinLibertyCity,activeinthelocalchamberofcommerce(1987):
ThereisalsoagrowingnumberofCuban-ownedbusinessesinBlackneighborhoodsbuttheydon'thireBlacks.Forexample,IwasinadrugstoreacoupleofweeksagoandtherewasablackCubanladyatone
ofthecashregisters.Iwenttoherandshedidn'tevenwanttotalktome.Ithoughttomyself,"Talktome,ifI'mgoingtoleavemymoneyhere,yououghttolearnhowtospeakEnglish."Theycomeinourareas,theytakeourjobs,theytakeourdollars,anddon'tevenhavethedecencytolearnthelanguage!
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InterethnicRelations
Nativewhiteattorney,partnerinalargelocallawfirm(1987):
TheproblemofBlacksinMiamiisveryserious.ButmyfeelingisthattheBlackpopulationissorelativelysmallinnumberthatIamnotsureit'sonanybody'sagenda....ThenumberofHispanicsissooverwhelmingthatthecontestisover.Imeanthereiscompetition,thereistension,thereisconcernintheBlackcommunity.ButCubansaresowellentrenched,solargeinnumbers,thatit'snotanissueanymore.
Now,thereisanotherbigproblemworthinvestigating:theconceptofgivingintheLatincommunity.OneoftheproblemsthatFIU[FloridaInternationalUniversity]hashadisthat[formerpresident]Wolfecouldn'traiseanymoney.Sowhatdidwedo?ThepowerstructureandtheCubanssaid,"Let'sgogetourselvesagoodoldCubanboy."Let'sseewhetheroldMaidique[Cuban-born,U.S.-educatedpresidentofFIU],PresidentMitch,candemonstratethathecanraisedollarsfromtheLatincommunity.Ifhecan'traisedollars,inmybookhe'sfailed.
ThereisalotofworkthatneedstobedoneinteachingtheconceptofphilanthropywithintheLatincommunity.TheCubanshavebeenhereovertwentyyears,theyhavemadegreateconomicstrides,thekidsplayfootballandbaseball,theygototheoperas,theydoallthesethings;whynotgivemoretothecommunity?
Cubanbusinessman(quotedabovewithregardtoMiami'smajorproblem):
RelationsbetweenthedifferentethniccommunitiesinMiamiarenormalasinanydemocraticcountry.Ethnicdifferencesdonotinterfereatallincommercialrelations.Astocommunityactivities,eachoneworksintheplaceheorsheprefers.TherearepersonswholiketoworkintheUnitedWay;andthereistheLigacontraelcancer[LeagueAgainstCancer,acharityfoundedinHavana],whicheveryonejoinstoworkforagoodcause.
Perhaps,themostaffectedrelationscouldbethosebetweenCubansand
Blacks,inthesensethatBlacksarelesstrainedasentrepreneurs,butIdonotbelievethatthereisanextraordinaryfriction.OurchiefaccountantwasBlack,agreatBlack,butrightnowtherearenoAmericanBlacksworkinginourcompany.WhenwearrivedfromCubaandopenedoursmallbusiness,thesituationwaslikethis:whenashipmentarrivedincustoms,wewouldgotoacornerandtherewouldbeten,fifteen,twentyBlacksstandingwaitingforwork.Wepickedthemupsothattheywould
Page14
unloadourboxes,paidthem,andreturnedthemtothesameplace.Today,youdon'tseeanythinglikethis.Isincerelybelievethat,inMiami,thepersonwhodoesn'tworkisbecauseheorshedoesnotwantto.Proof:whyaresomanyHaitiansnowsewinginourfactory?
Blackattorney,communityactivist(1987):
Initially,astheCubansbegantobeverycompetitive,asthenewbankstendedtobeCuban,astheCubansbegantocomeintotheinsuranceandtraditionalfinancialmarketswheretheJewshadplayedanimportantrole,theissuewasnolongerJewsagainstAnglosbutoneofthesurvivalofthestatusquo....
Blackswereleftbehind.MiamiistheonlycityI'veeverseenwhereBlacksdon'townaradiostation,oratelevisionstation,oracardealership,orasavingsandloan,oraninsurancecompanyanything!Blacksherehavenotonlybeenmanipulatedoutofthemainstreamofthepowerstructure,but,moreimportantly,theyhavebeenmanipulatedoutoftheeconomicmainstreamofMiami,andwhenyou'reoutoftheeconomicmainstream,you'reoutofthepoliticalarena.
Blackcommunityactivist(quotedabovewithregardtoMiami'smajorproblem):
Inthosedays,IsaidtoCubansinaspeechthattherewasgoingtobeatimewhenwhitefolksaregoingtotrytotreatyoualllikeniggers.They'regoingtoputyouagaininyourplaceastheydowithallminoritygroups.ButunlikeBlackAmericans,Cubanshadnohistoryofbeingkeptintheirplace,andasaresult,theyrespondeddifferently.WeBlackfolksweresayingtowhitefolks,"Letusin."Cubansweresayingtowhitefolks,"Letusinsothatwecantakeover."Now,in1987,youhearwhitestellingusthatweshouldformanalliancewiththemtokeepCubansintheirplace.Isay,"I'vehadmyexperiencewithyouall.Don'ttellmenowthatyouandIcanbuddy-buddybecauseyou'retryingtokeepCubansfromdoingwhatisrightfortheirown."
TheMiamiHerald
NativewhiteexecutiveofKnight-RidderCorporation,parentcompanyoftheMiamiHerald(1987):
Inourbusiness,whichisthepublishingbusiness,wemadeabetduringthe1960sthatthenormalpatternofimmigrationthatthiscountryhadseenovermanyyearswhenethnicminoritiescameininlargenumbers
Page15
andsettledindifferentsectionswouldnotbeverydifferenthere;thatwithinareasonablenumberofyears,Englishwouldbecomethedominantlanguage.Sowemadeabetin1960thatthatwouldoccurhereinMiamiasalargenumberofCubanrefugeescameinfollowingCastro'stakeover.Thatdidn'thappenasfastaswethoughtitwould.WebelatedlystartedinourbusinessaSpanisheditioncalledElMiamiHerald.It'saveryexpensivepropositionforus,butithashelpedusgainacceptanceandcirculationintheHispaniccommunity.WethinkthatitisimportanttousandimportanttothemthattheHeraldbeavailableinbothSpanishandEnglish.WecirculatethatSpanishsectioninconjunctionwiththeMiamiHerald,sothatwebelievethat,byvirtueofhavingthetwotogether,we'lleventuallymovebacktowardtheultimateutilizationofEnglishastheprimarylanguage.
Cubanbankdirector,memberoftheCubanAmericanNationalFoundation,emigratedintheearly1960s(1989):
TheconflictbetweentheCubancommunityandtheHeraldreacheditspeakwhen,aftertheresignationofoneofthedirectorsoftheCubanAmericanNationalFoundation,thenewspaperstartedspeculating,withoutbasisoffact,aboutinternaldivisionsintheorganization.Wedecidedtowriteanopenletter.JorgeMasCanosa[presidentofthefoundation]broughtawriterfromWashingtonwhowrotetheletterinanafternoon,anditwaspublished,asapaidannouncement,thefollowingday.TheHeraldneverexpectedthatweCubanswoulddosomethinglikethat!Therewasameetinginwhich,infact,weconsideredorganizingaboycottagainstthenewspaper.RichardCapen,theeditor,calledtocomplain,but,facedwiththethreatofamassiveboycott,thenewspaperrelentedandhaschangedcourseonehundredandeightydegreesinrecentmonths.
We'vetoldCapenthatitdoesnotmatterwhattheNuevoHerald[thenewrevampedSpanisheditionoftheMiamiHeraldcreatedin1988aftertheeditorsoftheearlierversion,ElMiamiHerald,resignedoverdisagreementswiththenewspaper'seditorialline]publishesbecausepraisestothecommunitywhichappearthereareforCubansofCalleOeho[SouthwestEighthStreet,themainthoroughfareofMiami'sLittleHavana
section].MuchmoreimportantiswhatispublishedinEnglish,whichisreadnationwide.TheHeraldsometimesplaysadoublegame,publishingarticlesinEnglishthatdonotappearinSpanishandviceversa.
Blackattorney(quotedabovewithreferencetointerethnicrelations):
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TheMiamiHeraldrunsalotofnegativestoriesaboutMiami.Initially,IthinkthatafewpersonalitiesoftheHerald'sseniormanagementsawthejobofthenewspaperastobetruthfulevenifitdestroyedthecity.Theyhavebeenextremelymisguided.Atthesametime,theyhavebeenaverypositiveforceinMiami.Aspositiveastheycanbe,theycanalsobewrong.Traditionally,likealltherestofthedowntownprimarilyoldAngloestablishment,theHeraldassumedthattheCubanswouldgoaway;iftheydidn'tassumeit,theyatleasthopedtheywould,andsotheyignoredthem.Theymusthavethought,"They'rehereandwehavetolivewiththem,butmaybetheCastrogovernmentwillbeoverthrownandwe'llsendthembackthere."Theydidn'tunderstandthatthehistoryofeverygroupthathascometoAmericaisthatnobodyevergoesbackhome.
Differentframes,differentdefinitionsofthesituation.Discoursesthatdonotclashdirectly,butratherslidepasteachotherasifmovingondifferentplanes.Clearly,thearrivalofthe"threehundredthousandCubans"overtwenty-fiveyearswasthekeyeventthatrupturedthetraditionalworldviewinthissouthernAmericancity.Butsuchaninterpretationdoesnotsuffice.TherearemoreLatinsinLosAngelesandNewYorkthaninMiami,yetthosecitiesneverexperiencedasimilartransformation.There,immigrants"knowtheirplace"anddonotchallengetheestablishedsocialhierarchyorthefundamentalshareddefinitions.AsforBlacks,African-Americancommunitiesinothercitiesareneitheraspowerlessnorasmilitantwhentheyrevolt.ItisasiftheparallelsocialstructuresanddefinitionsthatwerecreatedbythearrivaloftheCubanssimultaneouslypushedBlacksintodoublesubordinationandopenedspaceforthemtorevitalizethediscourseaboutcivilandhumanrights.
EverywhereoneturnsinMiami,thisfragmentationoftheoldstandardframeproducesoddities,mostlycomicbutattimespoignantandeventragic:theyoungBlackwaitressintheairportbarservingcafécubanotoCanadiantourists;theCarnivalofMiami,whichisreallytheoldHavanaCarnaval;thecitybracingitselfforthenext,fullyexpected
riotasajurydebatesthefateofapoliceofficer.TheseeverydayfactsoflifehavegainedtheattentionofoutsiderswhohavewritteninsightfullyaboutMiami'sparadoxes.WhileotherlargeLatincommunitiesinEastLosAngelesortheBronxgounsungandunnoticed,Miamihasattractedtheattention
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ofseveralprominentAmericanliterati.JoanDidion,forexample,hadthistosayaboutthenativewhiteestablishmentin1987:"Thissetofmind,inwhichthelocalCubancommunitywasseenasacivicchallengetobedeterminedlymet,wasnotuncommonamongAnglostowhomItalkedinMiami,manyofwhompersistedintherelatedillusionsthatthecitywassmall,manageable,prosperousinapredictablebroad-basedway,southerninaprogressivesunbeltway,American,andbelongedtothem."
12AndDavidRieffhighlightedoneofthemanylocalpeculiarities:"AttheedgeofCoralGables,Inoticedasignadvertising,'TheCaballeroFuneralHome,Founded1858.'Miami,ofcourse,didnotexistin1858andIrealizedwithastartthattheownersmeantfoundedinHavanain1858.ItisasifCubanMiamirecapitulatesalltheparticlesofprerevolutionaryHavanawith,ofcourse,theexceptionoftheleft."13
Drugrunning,theperiodicBlackriots,Mariel,thestarkbeautyofthecityallhavebeenextensivelychronicledinbooks,articles,films,and"MiamiVice."Butaftereachcolorfulsnippet,thequestionremains:Howdidithappen?HowcouldalargeAmericancitybetransformedsoquicklythatitsnativesoftenchosetoemigratenorthinsearchofamorefamiliarculturalsetting?Howcouldanimmigrantgroup,especiallyonecomingfromtheThirdWorld,reproduceitsinstitutionssothoroughlythataparallelsocialstructurewasestablished?Atwhatpointdidacculturationinreversebegin?And,perhapsmostimportant,wherewillthisprocessofchangewithoutablueprintlead?
Foranswers,onemustlookback,firstat1980,ayearstillfreshinpeople'sminds,andthenatthedeepandunappreciatedrootsofthecityintheCaribbean.
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ChapterTwoAYeartoRemember:MarielNineteeneightywassomeyear.Ifyouwereanoldnative,youprobablystillbelievedthatnothingmuchhadreallychangedinMiami,thatimmigrantswouldeventuallylearnEnglishandlifewouldgoonasusual.Yetaswithallmajorprocessesofchange,theforcesunderlyingthedramaticeventsofthatyearhadlongbeenatwork,unknownandunforeseenbythosewhoselivestheywereabouttotransform.Theyfinallyirruptedin1980.Asthecityreeledfromoneunexpectedeventafteranother,itsinhabitantsconfrontedheadontheprospectofafuturewithoutprecedentinAmericanurbanhistory.Forsome,thisprospectwasachallengetobe"determinedlymet";forothers,itwasaloomingthreattobeescaped.Propertyvaluescollapsedallovertownasthecityabandoned,onceandforall,theimageofasunnytouristdestinationandfacedthatofanuncertainbridgebetweentwoworlds.
TheMarielExodus
OnApril1,1980,JoseAntonioRodriguezGallegos,abusdriver,rammedhisminibusthroughthegatesofthePeruvianembassyinHavanainanefforttogainpoliticalasylum.Duringtheensuingmelee,aCubanguardwaskilled.FidelCastroangrilywithdrewpoliceprotectionfromtheembassy,amovethatbroughtovertenthousandCubansfromallpartsoftheislandtotheembassyinsearchofrefuge.ThispopulardemonstrationofayearningtoleaveCubawasamajorembarrassmenttotheCastroregime;itfeltcompelledtoopentheportofMariel,declaringthatanyonewishingtoleavecoulddoso.CastrothenproceededtoinviteCuban
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Map1.TheMiamimetropolitanarea,1980.
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Figure2.PopulationoftheMiamimetropolitanarea,1980.
Metro-DadePlanningDepartment,ResearchDivision,DadeCountyFacts(Miami:MetropolitanDadeCountyGovernment,1990),2,6.
exilesintheUnitedStatestocomepickuptheirrelatives.
1OnApril20,twolobsterboatscarryingaboutfortyCubansarrivedinKeyWest.Thefollowingday,RadioHavanareportedthatelevenmoreboatswereleavingMariel;meanwhile,twenty-fiveMiami-basedboatsweresaidtobeenroutetoMariel.The1980''FreedomFlotilla"wasunderway.2
TwoCubanresearcherswiththeCenterfortheStudyoftheAmericasinHavanalaterreportedtheirviewofthecompositionoftheoutflow:
Wecanaffirmwithcertaintythat45.25percentofallpersonsthat
abandonedCubathroughtheportofMarielhaddelinquentbackgroundsasfollows:
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1.Crimesagainstproperty(theft,etc.) 40.1%2.Dangerouscondition* 16.43.Fraudandfalsification 4.04.Crimesagainstthepublicadministration 1.75.Possessionandsaleofdrugs 5.56.Forbiddengames 4.37.Crimesagainstphysicalintegrity 4.48.Crimesagainstthenormaldevelopmentofsexualrelations
10.8
9.Crimesagainstthesecurityofthestate 5.210.Violationsofpublicorder 4.011.Others 3.7*Dangerousconditionisthespeciallikelihoodthatapersonwillcommitcrimesinthefuture,demonstratedbytheconductthatheorsheobserves(PenalCodeofCuba,Law21,Title11).
3
Thisaccountofthoseleavingtheislandin1980dressedinacademicgarbthemuchstrongerindictmentbytheSupremeLeaderoftheRevolutionhimself:"ThosethatareleavingfromMarielarethescumofthecountryantisocials,homosexuals,drugaddicts,andgamblers,whoarewelcometoleaveCubaifanycountrywillhavethem"(FidelCastro,MayDayCelebrationSpeech,1980).Foronce,Castro'senemiesinMiamididnotdisagree:"MarieldestroyedtheimageofCubansintheUnitedStatesand,inpassing,destroyedtheimageofMiamiitselffortourism.ThemarielitosaremostlyBlackandmulattoesofacolorthatIneversaworbelievedexistedinCuba.Theydon'thavesocialnetworks;theyroamthestreetsdesperatetoreturntoCuba.Therewillbetwohundredmoreairplanekidnappings"(Cuban-Americanofficial,CityofMiami,August1983).4
MarielwasauniqueepisodeinAmericanimmigrationhistory.Insteadofimmigrantscomingontheirown,theywereactuallybroughtintothecountry,notbygovernmentagencies,butinboatscharteredbyearlierimmigrants.5MarielwashighdramaintheStraitsofFlorida,performedbythetwowarringfactionsofCubansocietybeforetheastonishedeyesoftheUnitedStates.Intheend,noneoftheprincipalsinvolvedweretoachievetheirgoals.Marielturnedouttobealosinggameallaround.
Byreleasing125,000peopleinlessthansixmonths,theCubangovernmenthopedtodemonstratetotheworldhowliberalits
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exitpolicywasandsocounteractthebadpublicitycreatedwhententhousandCubansdesiroustoleaveoccupiedthePeruvianembassyinHavana.Thestrategybackfired.Thelargenumberofrefugees,thetestimonyofemigrants,thedeliberateplacementaboardtheboatsofex-convictsandmentalpatientsinordertonailtheimageofexilesas"scum"simplyconfirmedthetotalitariannatureoftheCastrogovernment.
Cubanexilesspentmillionsofdollarscharteringboatstorescuetheirrelativesfromtheisland.Somesucceeded,butmostendedupferryingacargoofunknownsacrosstheStraitsofFlorida.Althoughsubsequentresearchhasshownthathardenedcriminals,mentalpatients,andothertrueundesirablesrepresentedaminority,perhaps10percent,ofthenewarrivals,theirpresencestigmatizedtheentireexodusand,intheviewofmany,adverselyaffectednotonlythereputationofCubansintheUnitedStatesbutalsoMiami'sallureasatouristdestination.
TheCarteradministrationatfirstattemptedtocontroltheexodusbutthenbackeddown,apparentlyfearfulofalienatingCuban-Americanvoters.OnMay5,1980,thepresidentpledgedthattheUnitedStateswouldcontinuetoprovide"anopenheartandopenarms"forthoseleavingCubaandaskedCongressforsupplementalaid.OnMay14,Carteragainreversedhispolicy,proposinganairliftfromCubaandorderingboatscarryingrefugeestobestoppedandseized.Thispresidentialorderwaslargelyignored.Theadministration'sindecisiondidnotplaywellintheNovember1980presidentialelections:amongthosevotingagainstCarterwasasolidmajorityofCuban-Americans.
6
TheMarielrefugeeswhocametotheUnitedStatesinsearchofpoliticalfreedomandabetterlifefoundtheirpathblockedatevery
turnbygrowingdiscrimination.ThelabelsaffixedtotheexodusbytheCubangovernment"scum"and"lumpen"werepickedupbytheU.S.mediaandbeamednationwide.InNovember1982,afront-pagestoryintheColumbus[Ohio]Dispatchreportedthat''the'Marielistas,'asocietyofCubancriminalswhocametothiscountryonthe'FreedomFlotilla,'mightbeorganizinginColumbus.Thecriminalsyndicatewhosemembersadvertisetheirspecialtiesbytattoosbetweenthumbandforefingerhavebeenseenaroundtownbuyinghandguns."7Aslateas1987,theBostonHeraldreportedthecaptureofthe"South
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ShoreStalker,"describedasa"29year-oldMarielito...releasedfromjailtojointheMarielboatlift,alongwiththousandsofotherconvictsandmentallyillpatients."
8Withsuchimagesreachingacrossthecountry,itisnotsurprisingthattheyeventuallyalteredtheattitudesoftheverycommunity,thathadengineeredthenewrefugees'departure,theMiamiCuban-Americans.
TonativewhiteSouthFloridians,thenewwaveofexileswasathreattobedeterminedlyopposed.Theirorgan,theMiamiHerald,spearheadedacampaignthataimed,tobeginwith,atavoidingU.S.involvementpriortotheopeningoftheMarielharbor,andthenathavingtheflowofrefugeesdivertedelsewhere,preferablytootherLatinAmericancountries.TheHeraldrepeatedlycastigatedCuban-AmericansfortheireagernesstorescuerelativesleftinCubaandshrillyechoedCastro'scharacterizationofthenewrefugees.Thiseffort,too,backfired.TheexoduswasnotdivertedfromMiami;moreover,thestigmaofMarielsotarnishedthethusfarpristineimageofanti-Castroexilesthatanew,reactivediscoursearose.
MarielandtheHerald
TheMiamiHeraldcoverageofeventsrelatedtoMarielrevealsbothhowquicklythingsdevelopedandhowdeterminedthenewspaperwastostemthetide.Aday-by-dayaccountoftheseeventswasproducedaspartofourstudyofpost-1980immigrationtoSouthFlorida.9Thefollowingsummaryindicatesclearlythepositionsadoptedbythatnewsorganizationwithrespecttotheunfoldingevents.
April7.
TheMiamiHeraldreportsthatCubansinthePeruvianembassyin
HavanamostlikelywillendupintheUnitedStates.DadeCountyofficialsstatethattheywillbeunabletoaccepttheCubans,citingahousingshortageandadepressedlocaleconomy.MiamimayorMauriceFerreasksthat,ifrefugeesareadmitted,theybesenttootherpartsofthecountry.HialeahmayorDaleBennettpredictsthatrefugeeswillhaveamajorimpactandsaysthatimmediatefederalaidwillbeneeded.
April12.
Initseditorialpage,theHeraldtakesupthethemeof
Page24
hemisphericcooperationandcallsfora"multinationalsenseofresponsibility,"regardingtheresettlementofthetenthousandembassyrefugees.ProposalsaremadetotransportrefugeestoatemporarysiteonthewaytoPeru.
April24.
AMiamiHeraldeditorialcondemnstheboatlift,begunthreedaysearlier,callingithumiliatinganddangerousandassertingthatthe"would-berescuersfromFloridaarepawnsinCastro'sopendiplomaticwar."ThearticlepredictsthatCastrowillpermitonlyatrickleofrefugeestoleavefromMarielandcontinuetodenypermissionfortheairliftthatwouldtaketheentiretenthousandtowelcomingCostaRica.MayorFerreechoestheHeraldandcallsforashiptotakealltheasylumseekerstoCostaRica.
April29.
Inaforcefuleditorial,theHeraldstatesthat"CarteradministrationofficialsseemtobeafraidtoangerCuban-Americanvotersbydemandinganendtotheinflux,buttheydon'twanttolegitimizeitbymobilizingFederalassistance."Thepaperreportsthat3,200Cubanshavearrived,and1,500boatsarewaitinginMarieltobringmore."Localresourcesparticularlyhousingalreadyareexhausted,andapotentiallyuglybacklashisbuildingamongnon-Hispanics."
May1.
FloridagovernorBobGrahamauthorizes$100,000forbasicassistanceandopenstheNationalGuardArmoryinHomesteadasashelterbecauseofthegrowingprocessingbacklog.ThefirstarticleonpsychologicalproblemsamongMarielrefugeesappearsintheHerald;itreportsthatsomeoftherefugeeshaveapriorhistoryofseverepsychopathologyandquestionswhethertheyhadbeenpartofthePeruvianembassycrowd.Asecond,verynegativearticlereportsthat
5,000Cubanshadarrivedinover100boatsthepreviousday,and"thestridentexilecommunityintheUnitedStatesshowslittleinclinationofwindingthingsdown."Inwhatisdescribedasamoresinisterassessmentoftherefugees,theHeraldcommentsthatahigh-rankingU.S.officialsurveying"thesullen,seedylookingcontingentthatarrivedaboardtheOceanQueensaidprivately:'justlookatthatbunch.Awfullyfunnythattherearenowomenandchildreninthegroup.Somethingtellsmewemayhaveabunchofcriminalshere.'"
May6.
PresidentCarterdeclaresastateofemergencyinFlorida.U.S.marshalsandmarinesaresenttoSouthFloridato
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managetheinflow.TheCoastGuardcounts374boatsheadedforFloridaand74headedforMariel.Over3,500Cubansarriveonthisdayalone,bringingthetotaltoover16,000infifteendays.
May8.
TheprocessingcenteratFortChaffeeinArkansasisreadied.U.S.ImmigrationandNaturalizationServiceofficersinKeyWestclaim,accordingtotheHerald,that"asmanyasfouroutoffiveofthemostrecentarrivalshavecomefromCubanprisons,"butalsothatonly209refugeeslessthan1percentofarrivalstodatehadbeendetainedinDadeCountyaftertheirpreliminaryscreeningsuggestedacriminalrecord.
May11.
InextensivecoverageofthecrisisthisSunday,theMiamiHeraldreportsresultsofaninformalpollofMiamiresidents.Undertheheadline"DadeFearsRefugeeWave,"alongarticlereportssignificantnegativereactiontotheinflowbybothnativewhitesandBlacks,incontrasttogeneralacceptancebyDade'sHispanics,andconcludesthatthis"revealspotentiallydangerousdisagreementsamongDade'snon-Latinwhite,Latin,andblackpopulations."
May18.
TheprocessingcenteratFortIndiantownGapinPennsylvaniaopenstotaketheoverflowfromChaffee.
May31.
Duringtheprecedingfiveweeks,theboatliftisestimatedtohavebroughtoverninetythousandCubansintothecountry.AHeraldeditorialcallsforacoordinatedprogramtosettlethenewrefugeesandcontraststhe"new"Cubanswiththeold:"Thisisnottheentrepreneurialclassthatmovedin15yearsago....ACubanghetto
mightdevelop."
June4,5.
TheMiamiHeraldrunsaneditorialreviewingthenegativeimpactofMarielonDadeCountyandtheneedtosafeguardagainstsuch"floods."Acoupleofarticlesclaimthat,astheboatliftwanes,CastroissendinghundredsofcriminalstotheUnitedStates.
June17.
PresidentCarterrequeststhatCongressappropriate$385millionforCubanrefugeeprograms.
June20.
Apresidentialordergrantsaspecialsix-month"entrant"statustoHaitiansandCubanswhoarrivedbeforeJune20,allowingthemtoworkandqualifyforAidforFamilieswithDependentChildren(AFDC),SupplementalSecurityIncome(SSI),Medicaid,andotherassistanceprograms.
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June26,27.
LegalactionistakentoblockrefugeechildrenfromDadepublicschools.AMiamiHeraldeditorialstronglycriticizesPresidentCarterforyieldingtofearsofCubanexileviolenceiftheUnitedStatespreventedexilesfromgoingtoMariel:"ThePresidentconsciouslyletthethreatofmobreactionintimidatehimintoignoringthelawandallowinghisownpoliciestobetrampled.WhenthePresidentfinallyorderedtheboatlifthaltedonMay15,hedidsobecausetheCuban-AmericancommunityitselfhadbecomeunhappyoverthementalpatientsandcriminalsthatFidelCastrohadincludedamongtheMarielrefugees."
June30.
Over114,000Marielrefugeeshavearrived.
July7,8.
TheMiamiHeraldclaimsthatovertwentythousandhomosexualCubanrefugeesawaitsponsors;thenumberisdeniedthenextdaybygovernmentofficials.
July24,25.
AseriesofarticlesintheHeraldfocusesonthecrimeattributedtoMarielrefugees.Ajudgereportsacrimewavefromboatliftjuveniles;MiamiBeachreportsacrimeincreaseof34percentsincetherefugeesarrived;teenviolenceisalsoreportedtothriveinrefugeebarracks.
August16.
ThreepassengerjetsarehijackedtoCubabyMarielentrants,makingsixsuchhijackingsinoneweek.
August30.
CubanexilesinMiamirallydemandingthatPeruvianembassyrefugeesnowsettledinLimabeallowedtoentertheUnitedStates.
September5-8.
TheMiamiHeraldreportstwodeathsinagunbattleandprovidesdetailedaccountsofMarielrefugeesinvolvedincrimes.Storiesofcrimesbyrefugeesruneachdayforfourconsecutivedays.
September14.
TheHeraldreportsthathomesickrefugeesaretryingtostarta"reverseflotilla."
September18.
WhiteHouseofficialsannounceinMiamiaplantoalleviatethecrisiscausedbytheinfluxofimmigrants.AMiamiHeraldfront-pagearticlereportsacrimewaveinLittleHavana,theperpetratorsbeingMarielcriminals:775percentmorerobberiesthanin1979;284percentmorecarthefts;191percentmoreburglaries;110percentmoreassaults.
September26.
CubaofficiallyclosesMarielharbortoU.S.-boundemigrantsafter159daysandatotalof124,769newrefugees.
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TheAngloPerspective
ThepositionadoptedbytheMiamiHeraldwasunderstandable.AsthevoiceoftheAngloestablishment,itconsideredtheMarielexodusaseriousdoublethreat:first,asaneconomiccataclysm,giventhedepressedstateoflocalindustryandthenegativeimpactoftheinflowonMiami'sstatusasatouristdestination;andsecond,asadirectthreattotheestablishmentpowerstructure,giventheadditionofmanythousandstoanalreadyuncomfortablylargeCubanpopulation.Hence,througheditorials,letterstotheeditor,andthe"spin"itputonnewsstories,theHeraldsoughtinitiallytopreventthenewwaveofCubanimmigrationfromtakingplaceand,whenthatfailed,todiscreditthefresharrivals.
Thedevelopmentofthisdiscourseisquiterevealing.YohelCamayd-FreixasconductedasystematiccontentanalysisofstoriesaboutMarielprintedbytheMiamiHeraldduringthefirstfourteenweeksofthecrisis,beginningonSunday,April6,1980.AllarticlesthatdepictedtheMarielexodusincriticaltermsandMarielrefugeesasproblematicwereratedas"negative";thosethatweredescriptive,positive,neutral,orindifferentweregroupedas"positive."
10Figure3showsthat,astheexodustookshape,negativecoveragebytheHeraldincreasedfollowing,withashortlag,theupwardswingoftheinflow.Despitetheconservativebiasofthegraph,whichcountsas''positive"allneutralorpurelydescriptivearticles,negativecoveragereached90percentofallprinteditemspertainingtoMarielintheHeraldintheweekofMay26,andremainedatbetween40and60percentthereafter.
Inseekingtoadvanceitspolicygoals,Camayd-Freixasnotes,theMiamiHeraldidentifiedtheCubanexilecommunityasitsmajor
sourceofoppositionandactedaggressivelytocounterthisgroup'seffortstobringtheirrelativesandtheoriginalPeruvianembassyoccupantstotheUnitedStates.11Inthecourseofarticulatingthesegoals,theHeraldactedwithbothgreatenergyandnotableineffectiveness.
Until1980,Cubanexilepoliticshadfocusedontheideaofreturningtotheisland.OccasionalsalliesintolocalpoliticswerecriticizedbythecommunityitselfasdetractingfromthegoalofliberatingCubafromCastro'sregime.Despitethevauntedpower
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Figure3.WeeklyMarielarrivalsandnegativeMiamiHeraldarticlesontheinflow,1980.YohelCamayd-Freixas,CrisisinMiami(Boston:BostonUrbanResearchand
DevelopmentGroup,1988),III-42;JuanM.Clark,JoséI.Lasaga,andRoseS.
Reque,The1980MarielExodus:AnAssessmentandProspect(Washington,D.C.:CouncilforInter-AmericanSecurity,1981),5.
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ofCuban-Americanvoters,onlyahandfulofCubansheldelectiveofficein1980,andthosewhodidgenerallydownplayedtheirnationality.AfewsuccessfulCubanentrepreneursjoinedthelocalChamberofCommerceandotherAmericanbusinessorganizationsandtriedtomelt,asfaraspossible,intotheAnglomainstream.
12
AstheHeraldlauncheditscampaignagainstapossiblenewwaveofCubans,then,theexilecommunitywasdefenselesstoconfrontit.Sofar,exileorganizationshadbeenconcernedwitheventsintheisland,notlocalpoliticsinMiami.TherewasnoalternativeCuban"discourse"aboutthecity,andnoorgantoadvanceit.TheHeraldthushadthefieldtoitselfandcouldpresentthenewarrivalsinanylightitchosetointhisinstance,consistentlynegative.Yetthenewspaper'sarticulatepleas,directedmostlytothefederalgovernment,fellondeafears.WhatmostdisturbedtheHerald'seditorsandthenativewhiteestablishmentwashowanAmericanpresidentcouldsacrificethemtoaccommodatethewishesofaforeignminority.Asacolumnistbitterlycomplainedyearslater,"Castroalwaysseemstocalltheshotshere."13ThemostscathingeditorialsduringtheMarielcrisis,infact,werereservednotfortheCubans,butforPresidentCarter,whointhenewspaper'sviewhadallowedhimselfto''beintimidatedbymobreaction"andhisownpolicies"tobetrampled."
TheSouthFloridanativewhitecommunitywasconcernedlargelywithpreservingitsownlife-style;ithadlittleinclinationtogopokingintothecomplexitiesofforeignpolicyandthesingularlinkbetweenCubanexilesandthefederalgovernment.Yetfortwentyyears,theexilecommunityhadbeentheU.S.government'smostresolutepartnerinthestruggleagainstCastrocommunismandthatdictator's
attemptsatexpansioninLatinAmerica.ForWashington,theMiamiexileswerenotan"ethnic"group,butanimportantallyinthefightforCubaandLatinAmerica.Forcefullystoppingthesesupportersinthehighseasastheyattemptedto"liberate"theirkinwouldnotplaywellabroad,especiallyamongfriendsoftheUnitedStateselsewhereinthehemisphere.Hence,thebiggergoalofpreservingAmericanglobalhegemonyclashedwiththelocalgoalofpreservingAnglohegemonyinMiami.Thelatterhadtogiveway.Itwasthisalternativedefinitionofexilesascitizensofaninvadedneighboringnation,ratherthanasadomes-
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ticethnicminority,thatenabledthemtoactwithoutmuchconcernforlocalmatters,tothedismayoftheHeraldanditsallies.
InMiamiin1980,thetwomajorsegmentsofthelocalpopulationeachfeltbetrayedbythefederalgovernment,butfordifferentreasons.TheexileshadlongdeploredthefailureoftheKennedyadministrationtofollowthroughwiththeBayofPigsinvasion,andsubsequentU.S.administrationswerecondemnedfortheireffortstopreventexileraidsonCuba.LocalAnglos,inturn,feltabandonedwhenWashingtonfailedtobacktheirstruggletosaveMiamifromtheCubans.TheHerald'sarticlesandeditorialsduringtheMarielcrisisfaithfullyreflectedthelatterposition.
ReactiveEthnicity
Theperspectivearticulatedin1980bytheMiamiAngloestablishment,thoughultimatelyunfruitfulregardingitsgoals,didhaveseveralunintendedeffects.Twooftheseshapedthesubsequentevolutionofthatgroup'sprincipalcontenderduringtheMarielepisode,theCubans;athirdunintendedeffectchangedthe"mood"ofthecity,inparticularinthethirdmajorsegmentofitspopulation,theBlacks(seechapter3).ThefirstsucheffectwastostigmatizetheMarielrefugees,notonlynationwidebutwithintheCubancommunityitself.TheHeraldwasnotsolelyresponsibleforthereversaloftheexiles'originalsupportforMarielrefugees;thepresenceofmany"undesirables"deliberatelyplacedaboardtheboatsbytheCubangovernmentplayedasignificantroleaswell.Yetthenewspaper'sinsistenceonstoriesofcriminalsandmentalpatients,totheneglectofthemajorityofMarielrefugeeswhowerenotmisfits,advancedthehighprofileofthenewcomersasanundesirableadditiontoMiami'spopulation.
Uptothatpoint,theself-imageofCubanexileshadbeenahappy
mix:theywerenotonlyAmerica'salliesintheglobalanti-communiststrugglebutalsoa"model"minority.Severalarticlesinthenationalpressduringthe1960sand1970sdescribedtheCuban"successstory"inMiamiaswellasthecontributionsexileshadmadetotheeconomicrenaissanceofthecity.
14WithMariel,thispositiveimagefadedquickly;Cuban-Americansnowfoundthemselvesclassedwiththemostdowntroddenanddiscriminated-againstminorities.AnationalGalluppollconductedshortlyafter
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theexodusdescribedvividlytheextentoftheCubans'unpopularity:afterMariel,Cubansrankeddeadlastinthepublic'sviewofcontributionsmadebydifferentethnicgroupstothenationalwelfare(table1).Foraminoritylongaccustomedtopublicpraise,suchopinionscameasarudeawakening.
ThereactionofmanyolderCubanswastoblametheMarielarrivalsforthenewsituationandtocreatesocialdistancefromthem.BythetimeweinitiatedourstudyofimmigrantsinSouthFloridain1983,ahighlynegativestereotypeofthe"Mariels"hadcrystallizedintheestablishedCubancommunity.Thefollowingcommentsexemplifytheviewsheardin1983andrepeated,withnotableconsistency,insubsequentyears:
Cubanbusinessman,employeroftenMarielrefugeesinhisrestaurantandliquorstore(1983):
Table1.AttitudesTowardAmericanEthnicGroupsHeldbytheAmericanPublic,1982
HasBeenGoodfortheCountry
HasBeenBadfortheCountry
MixedFeelings/Don'tKnow
English 66% 6% 28%Irish 62 7 31Jews 59 9 32Germans 57 11 32Italians 56 10 34Poles 53 12 35Japanese 47 18 35Blacks 46 16 38Chinese 44 19 37Mexicans 25 34 41Koreans 24 30 46
Vietnamese 20 38 42PuertoRicans
17 43 40
Haitians 10 39 51Cubans 9 59 32Source:RoperOrganization,RoperReports(1982),84-4,2-27.
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ThemainproblemI'vehadwithMarielitosistheirinclinationtopettytheft.Theydon'tstealoutofneed,theyearnenoughforaliving.It'sahabitlearnedundercommunism.Thesepeopledon'tbehavelikeCubans.Idon'tbelievethattheywillbeabletomoveupeconomicallyliketheoldCubansbecausetheylackmannersandeducation.Alsotheyareviolent,theyareaccustomedtosolveeverythingwithshoutsandblows.SeveraltimesI'vehadtopackaguntodealwithdrunkenMarielemployees.
Cubansocialworker,headofaCityofMiamisocialserviceagency(1983):
ThequalityofCubanrefugeeswhoarrivedintheseventiesisverydifferentfromthosewhocamein1980.Aboutone-thirdofthe125,000Marielitosaretrash-delinquents,homosexuals.TheireffectsonMiamihavebeenterrible.Inouroffice,wetrytofindemploymentforthemandprovidethemwithtransportationtotheirnewjobs.However,manyemployersdon'twantMarielrefugees.ThereasonwhytheMarielitosaredifferentisthatmanycamealone,ratherthanaspartoffamilygroups.Eightypercentofthosewhocomehereaskingforjobsareloneindividuals....Andtheyhavehighexpectations:theydon'tacceptminimumwages.Theysay,"It'stoolittle,"andprefertocontinuelivingonwelfareandfoodstamps.
Marielrefugeesalsolearnedquicklyaboutthechangedviewsoftheircompatriots.In1983,wecompletedasurveyoftheMarielpopulationlivingintheprincipalareasofCubanconcentrationintheMiamimetropolitanarea(DadeCounty).Thesampleof520wasreinterviewedthreevearslater.Onbothoccasions,respondentswereaskediftheyperceiveddiscriminationagainsttheirowngroup(Marielrefugees)bynativewhites(Anglos)andby"old"Cubans;wealsoaskedthemiftheyhadpersonallyexperienceddiscriminationbyeithergroup(table2).
15In1983,afterthreeyearsofU.S.residence,onlyaminorityofMarielrefugees25percentreportedthatAnglo-Americans
discriminatedagainstthem,withroughlythesameproportionstatingthattheyhadsufferedsuchexperiencespersonally.Threetimesasmany,howeveralmost75percentreportedthatolderCubansdiscriminatedagainstthem,andover50percenthadbeendirectlyaffected.Threeyearslater,personalexperiencesofdiscriminationhaddeclinedsomewhat,buttheperceptionthatsuchdiscrimina-
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Table2.PerceptionsandExperiencesofDiscriminationofMarielRefugees,1983and1986
ThreeYearsafterArrival(1983)
SixYearsafterArrival(1986-87)
BelievethatMarielCubansarediscriminatedagainstbyAnglos
26% 32%
BelievethatMarielCubansarediscriminatedagainstbyolder-establishedCubans
75 80
HavepersonallyexperienceddiscriminationbyAnglos
23 20
Havepersonallyexperienceddiscriminationbyolder-establishedCubans
52 37
Source:AlejandroPortesandJuanM.Clark,"MarielRefugees:SixYearsAfter,"MigrationWorld15(1987):14-18.Note:Samplesizein1983was520drawnatrandomfromatwo-stageclusterdesignintheprincipalareasofCubanconcentrationinDadeCounty.Thesampledecreasedto400in1986becauseofrespondentattrition,butitwasstatisticallyunbiasedwithrespecttotheoriginal.
tionexistedhadincreased:nowclosetoone-thirdoftherefugeesfeltdiscriminatedagainstbyAnglos.Still,thisfigurewasbutafractionofthealmost80percentwhoreporteddiscriminationbyotherCubans.
Thesenumbers,impressiveastheyare,donotfullycapturethedepthofthefrustrationexpressedbymanyofourMarielrespondentsatbeingtreatedassecond-classcitizensbytheircompatriots.Aslateas
1987,aMarielinformantreported:"TheseolderCubansareverydifficult.Ifyouobjecttotheirverynarrowandreactionaryviewofthings,theymakeasceneandaccuseyouofbeingwithFidel.Theyareverydogmatic.Iamaneducatedpersonandhavearighttomyownideas.
16
TheaccusationsoftheCastrogovernment,echoedbytheNorthAmericanmedia,didsucceedinstigmatizingtheMarielinflowandcreatingadeepriftwithintheexilecommunity.Butasecondeffectarosealmostsimultaneously.Facedwitharapidlyspreadingreputationas"undesirables,"Cuban-Americanswereforcedtoturntheirattentioninwardandconfronttheirconditionasadomesticethnicminority.Likeotherethnicgroupsbeforethem,theexiles
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respondedtostrongoutsideprejudicebyundergoingaprocessofreactiveformation:theyworkedtoredefinethesituationintermsmorefavorabletotheirownself-imageandtheirroleinthecommunity.
17ThekeyfactorseparatingCubansfrommostotherethnicgroupsinthiseffortwasthearrayofresourcestheywereabletomuster.
Meanwhile,asadirectoutgrowthofMariel,agrass-rootsmovementofnativewhiteswasorganizedinMiami.ItsoverallgoalsparalleledthosepromotedbytheHerald,buttheimmediateobjectivewassomewhatdifferent:"MyparentswereimmigrantsandtheyhadtolearnEnglishpromptly;Cubansshoulddolikewise,"announcedoneoftheleaders.ThemovementgatheredenoughstrengthtoputthelanguageissuebeforethevotersintheelectionofNovember1980.TheCubancommunitywasstillunorganizedinlocalaffairs,andthe"antibilingual"referendumpassedoverwhelmingly.Fromthenon,DadeCounty,officialswereprohibitedfromfundingprogramsoractivities"otherthan[those]intheEnglishlanguage."18ThereferendumvictorymarkedthehighpointoftheAnglo-centeredefforttohangontohegemony.DavidRieffexplainsthefeelingsofMiami'snativewhites,manyofthemchildrenofimmigrants,thus:"Withinlivingmemory,theyhadgivenuplanguagesandhabitsofbeinginordertofeelthemselvesmoreAmerican.Moreover,theywerenotgivenachoice....ButtheItalians(andtheJewsandtherest)hadnotexpectedAmericatoadapttothem,sowhyweretheCubanssointransigent?"19
The1980electionmarkedthebeginningsoftheprocessofreactiveformationonthepartofCuban-Americansaswell.Thefollowingstatementsaretypicalofexilecommunityleaders'reactionsintheyearsfollowingMarielandthepassageofthe"antibilingual"
referendum:
Cuban-AmericanexecutiveofKnight-RidderCorporation,parentcompanyoftheMiamiHerald(1983):
TherewerethreereactionstoMariel.Thefirstreactionwaspositive:tohelpallthosewhocame.Thesecondreactionwasnegative,evenbyCubanexileleaders.Therewereobviousdifferencesofvalues,ofappearance,ofambitionbetweentheoldandthenewrefugees.Therewasgreatfearofthecriminalelement.Thethirdreactionwasthatofthepress.Itwasnot"FreedomFlotilla,"butboatlift;thenewcomerswerenot"escapeesfromcommunism,"buteconomicimmigrants....
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Atthattime,weCubansbegantoreceiveblowsfromeverywhere.Negativepressandstereotypesapplytoall,notonlytotheMariels.ThencameScarface,thereeditionofa1930movieaboutAlCapone,butthistimewithaMarielitoasadrugmafiaboss.TheseweretheeventsthatledtothecreationofFACE[FactsaboutCubanExiles].Theorganizationhastwoprograms:onetocounteractalltheanti-Cubanarticlesandstereotypes;asecondtopromotetheCubans'imagethrougharticlesandfilms.FACEstartedwiththirteenpeopleinMiami,butnowhaschaptersthroughoutthecountry.
Cuban-AmericanDadeCountyofficial(1981):
TheAnglopowerstructureisscaredtodeathabouttheCubanriseinthiscommunity.Ithastriedcooprationthroughan"interethnicrelationscommittee"oftheMiamiChamberofCommerce,whichisreallyasham.TherewerefourstagestoMarielanditsaftermath:
Inthefirst,therewasgreatsolidaritybyCuban-AmericanswiththeMarielrefugees.Onemilliondollarswerecontributedafteratelemarathon,andfifteenhundredvolunteersshowedupdailytoassistwiththeprocessing.Metro-DadeCountygovernmentwasinchargeofoperations.ThislastedfromApril21toMay9.
Inthesecond,theFedstookover.ThecampaignagainstMarielinthepressgottougher.Cuban-Americansbegantobelieveitandabandonedthenewarrivals.Therewereriotsinthecamps.Inall,adisasterorchestratedbypeopleatthehighestlevelofgovernment.
Inthethirdstage,therewastheantibilingualreferendum,whichwasaslapinourface.Peoplebegantofeel"moreCubanthananyone."Therewasangerattheinsult,butnoorganizationyet.Inthefourthstage,thereisembryonicorganizationpromotedbythebusinessleaders;theplantodayistotrytoelectaCubanmayorofthecity,andperhapsoneortwostatelegislators.
Followingtheeventsof1980,Cuban-AmericanbusinessmenwhohadbelievedthemselvesintegratedintothemainstreambegantowithdrawfromAngloorganizationsortocombineparticipationinthemwiththe
creationofparallelethnicassociations.FactsaboutCubanExiles(FACE)andtheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundation(CANF)werefoundedatthistime.Plansweremadetoruncandidatesforlocaloffice.Moreimportant,anewperspectivebegantoemerge,aresponsetothatadvancedbytheantibilingualmovement.Inthisalternativeperspective,theexilecommunityitselfrepresentedthesolutiontoMiami'sproblemsand
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thebuilderofitsfuture.LuisBotifoll,aleadingCuban-Americanbanker,becameoneoftheprincipalexponentsofthisview:
Beforethe"GreatChange,"Miamiwasatypicalsoutherncity,withanimportantpopulationofretireesandveterans,whoseonlyactivityconsistedintheexploitationoftourismduringthesunnywinters.NoonethoughtoftransformingMiamiintowhatitistoday.ItisnoexaggerationtosaythatthemotorofthisGreatChangewastheCubanmenandwomenwhoelectedfreedomandcametotheseshorestorebuildtheirhomesandfacewithcourageanuncertainfuture....TheselastdecadesofthetwentiethcenturyhavewitnessedthefoundationofadynamicandmultifacetedMiamioverthepastofaMiamithatwasmerelyprovincialandtourist-oriented.Today,thelevelofprogresshasreachedunanticipatedheights,beyondthelimitsofanyone'simagination.
20
EvenMarielrefugeesbecameintegratedintothisoptimisticframework,whichrescuedthemfromthegloomypurviewofthemainstreampressandredefinedthemascontributorstothecity'sfuture.TheCuban-Americanassistantcountymanagerdefendedthemasfollows:
Sofar,fromapopulationof120,000,wehave2,750potential"badapples"lessthan2.5percent.Thatleaves117,250immigrantswhoaregood,hardworkingpeopleseekingpoliticalandeconomicfreedom....Let'stalkaboutthesepeople.Let'stalkaboutthebenefitswewillderivefromthem....Cubanshave,forthepasttwodecades,madeatremendouscontributiontoDadeCounty.WeallknowthesuccessstoriesofCubanlawyersandbankers.Indeed,commercialliaisonswithLatinAmericanclientsandlanddevelopmentventureshaveestablishedCubansaseconomicleaders.Withthepassingoftime,upwardmobilityhascreatedopeningsatthesemiskilledlevels.Nowthelaborforceissuddenlyheretofillthegap.Ofcourse,thenewarrivalswillneedtimetoretrain,toadjusttolifeinanenvironmentofabundanceandfreedom....Sothey,and
thereforeweinthiscommunityarenowinastateofflux.Historyshowsusthatthistoowillpassandthatweareonourwaytogreaterprosperity.21
TheCuban-American"successstory"isalreadyevidentinthesestatements.Whatisoftenneglectedisitsreactivecharacter.TheAngloattempttoreasserthegemonywasinessenceanoffensiveagainsttwocentralgoalsoftheexilecommunity:familyreunificationthroughtheopeningprovidedbyMariel,andthepreservationoftheSpanishlanguage.Theestablishmentcampaigndidnot,
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however,yieldtheexpectedresults;indeed,itledtonovelconsequences,mostlytheoppositeofthoseintended.InsteadofsubduingtheCubans,thehegemonicdiscourseoftheHeraldanditsalliestransformedtheexilecommunityintoaself-consciousethnicgroupthatorganizedeffectivelyforlocalpoliticalcompetition.
Bymid-decade,themayorsofMiami,Hialeah,WestMiami,andseveralsmallermunicipalitiesinDadeCountywereCubanborn,andthereweretenCuban-Americansinthestatelegislaturequiteastepupfromtheoneortwoenvisionedinthe"embryonicorganization"planoutlinedbytheCuban-AmericanDadeCountyofficialin1981.Andsignificantly,thesechangestookplaceinthecontextofanaggressivealternativediscourse,onethatportrayednotoldMiamians,butformerrefugees,astheprimarybuildersofthecity'sfuture.LocalAngloeliteswerethereaftercompelledtobargaininatransformedenvironment,wheretheirviewhadceasedtobehegemonicandwheredefactopluralismbecamethenorm.
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ChapterThreeAYeartoRemember:TheRiotandtheHaitians
BlacksandRefugees
Thethirdconsequenceoftheanti-MarielcampaignspearheadedbytheMiamiHeraldwasanincreaseinthemoodoftensioninthecity.NotonlyMarielCubansbutalsoHaitianswerecoming(sometimeswashing)ashore,andthesenseofbeingunderinvasionbytheThirdWorldfusedwiththeunresolvedracialtensionsofthissoutherncity.EvenasthelocalestablishmentbattledtheCubansinitsefforttofendoffnewwavesofimmigrants,itpersistedinitsoldwayswithregardtothenativeethnicproletariattheBlacks.ThesewaysinvolvedrelegatingBlackstoapermanentlysubservientstatusandthen,whencivilrightslegislationmadethisimpossible,simplyignoringthem.
WhenthefirstCubanexilesbeganarrivingintheearlysixties,theyconfrontedtheunfamiliarspectacleofBlacksqueuinguptoseekandberefusedadmittanceintowhites-onlymovietheaters.Thiswasjustthetipoftheiceberg.Blackscouldnoteatatwhiterestaurants,theypaidtheirtaxesataseparatewindowintheDadeCounty,courthouse,andtheydidnotevenhaveaccesstoMiami'sfamousbeaches.BlackshadtotravelbyboattoVirginiaKeyorgoallthewaytoBrowardCounty"toswiminsaltwater."
1
Theearlymiddle-classexilesmayhavedeploredthesceneofNAACPactivistsbeingturnedawayatthemovieboxoffice,butwhenitcametojobsthey,too,brushedtheBlacksaside,taking
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overpostionsthatmighthavebeenthetickettoeconomicadvancementforthenativeminority.AsCubansbegantoconsolidatetheirholdincertainareasofMiamiandHialeah,theyforgotabouttheBlackcommunityaswell.LittleHavanaandLibertyCid,thelargestBlackareaofMiami,arescarcelytwomilesapart;sociallytheycouldbeindifferentcountries.
2
ForBlackMiami,the1960sand1970sweretoughyearsinwhichtheyhadtocontendnotonlywithaDeepSouthlegacy,butalsowiththeCuban-inspiredtransformationoftheircity.Duringthesixty-oddyearspriortothearrivalofthefirstCubans,BlackshadbeenthetraditionalsourceofmanuallaborinMiami,simultaneouslyneededandrejectedbythecitythattheywerebuilding.Asuccessionofwhitesheriffshadmadeittheirbusinesstokeepthe''Negroes"intheirplace,bothsociallyandphysically.TheirzealwasreinforcedbytheKuKluxKlan,whichtarredandfeathered,beatandbombed,anyuppityNegrowhotriedtoleavehiscrowdedghetto.AlthoughBlacksfoughtbackasbesttheycould,itwasonlyinthe1960swiththeupsurgeofthecivilrightsmovementthattheybegantomakesignificantheadwaytowardracialequality.ThesixtieswerealsotheyearsinwhichthefirstCubanexilesarrived.
In1966,MartinLutherKing,Jr.,notedMiami'semergingracialtriangleandwarnedagainstthepittingofrefugeesagainstBlacksincompetitionforjobs.3Bythemid-seventies,theCubanpresencehadbecometoolargeforanyonetoignore.IftheAngloestablishmentfounditdifficulttofathomwhatwashappeningtotheircity,forBlackstheCubanpresenceanditsconsequenceswasasocialcataclysm.
Thusfar,thestoryoftheeffecttheCubaninfluxhadonthenative
minorityhasbeentoldwithanemphasisontwothemes:first,competitionforjobsbetweenthetwogroups,andsecond,theconsequentdeteriorationofthelivingstandardsoftheBlackpopulation.OneBlackleaderbluntlyasserted:"ItisafactthatCubansdisplacedBlacks."4BrucePorterandMarvinDunn,comparingfiguresforBlackemploymentfortheperiod1968-78,observedthatitwaslikeeconomicprogresssuddenlythrownintoreversegear.5
Neitherassertionisentirelyaccurate.Althoughmiddle-classCubansinthe1960stookwhateverjobswereavailableandinthissense"displacedBlacks,"theirstayinthosejobswasrelatively
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brief.Subjectively,theexilesdidnotseethemselvescompetingwiththenativeminority;theyweresimplymakingdountiltheycouldreturntoCuba.Asthoseprospectsbecameprogressivelydimmer,manymovedrapidlyintoself-employmentinsuchareasasgarmentsubcontracting,landscaping,andresidentialconstruction.ThisevolutiondidnotsomuchdisplaceBlacksastransformthelocaleconomy.Indeed,figuresonethnicemploymentbyindustryindicatethattherisingrepresentationofLatins(overwhelminglyCuban)wasprimarilyattheexpenseofnativewhitesratherthanBlacks.
Table3illustratesthistrendwithCensusfiguresforthegarment,construction,hotel,andrestaurantindustries.AlthoughthesefiguresmustbeinterpretedwithcautionbecauseofchangingCensusdefinitions,theyindicatethatnativewhitesweretheprimarylosers,atleastinthesesectors.Thegarmentindustry,forexample,evolvedfrom94percentnativewhitein1960toonly10percentin1980,whenSpanish-originworkersrepresented83percentofthegarmentlaborforce.Blacksdidnotreducetheirrepresentationinthissector,butheldsteadyat5-7percent.Moretellingistheevolutionofthehotelindustry,commonlycitedasthecorelocusof"displacement."TheCubansdidmorethandoubletheirpresencebetween1970and1980from18to40percentbutagainthegainwasentirelyattheexpenseofnativewhiteworkers.Blacks,infact,increasedtheirrepresentationinthisindustryfrom14to23percentoverthesameperiod.
Avariantofthesamestoryistoldinfigure4,whichportraysemploymentinprofessional,executive,andlaborpositionsbyethniccategoryfor1970and1980.Ofthenewjobsgeneratedduringthedecade,Blacksgarneredabout20percent,afigurecommensuratewiththeirproportionoftheMiamipopulation.Asfigure4shows,Blacksincreasedtheirrepresentationacrosstheboard.TheproportionofBlacksintheprofessionsalonealmostdoubled,from7to13
percent.ItistruethattheCubanpresencegrewfaster,butonceagain,thisoccurredattheexpenseofAngloworkers.Between1970and1980,theSpanish-origingroupsecured65percentofallnewjobs,afigurewellabovetheirapproximate40percentrepresentationinthearea'spopulation.
Blackeconomicadvancementduringthedecadeisevidentinotherareasaswell.Forexample,themedianincomeoftheBlack
Page41TABLE3.EthnicGroups'EmploymentbySector,DadeCounty,1960-80
1960 1970 1980White Black White Black Spanishorigin White Black Spanishorigin
Garment(textiles) 94.4% 5.6%17.8% 3.7% 78.5%10.4% 7.0% 82.6%Construction 80.1 19.9 60.1 19.4 20.5 43.8 16.6 39.6Hotels 83.8 16.2 77.5 14.1 18.4 37.3 22.9 39.8Restaurants 90.7 9.3 61.7 12.9 25.4 60.5 9.3 30.2Source:U.S.BureauoftheCensus,Florida(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1960,1970,and1980).Note:The1960CensusdidnothaveacategoryforpersonsofSpanishorigin.Inthe1970and1980censuses,Spanish-originoverlapswiththeothercategories.However,in1970and1980DadeCountyhadrelativelyfewblackCubansorblackLatinAmericans,sothecategories"Black"and"Spanishorigin"maybetakenasmutuallyexclusive.Thefiguresforwhitesarethendeterminedbysubtraction.
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Figure4Professionals,executives,andlaborers,DadeCounty,1970and1980.
ProfileoftheBlackPopulation(Miami:Metro-DadeCountyPlanningDepartment,1984),tables25and26.
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populationofDadeCountyrose7percentbetween1970and1980;bythelatteryear,moreover,Blackmedianincomewas68percentofthenationalaverage,comparedto60percentforBlacksnationwide.AffluenceamongBlackfamiliesalsogrewrapidly;by1980,7percentofthearea'sBlackfamilieswereearning$50,000ormore.Indeed,fullyone-thirdofallBlackfamiliesinthisincomecategoryinthestateresidedintheMiamimetropolitanarea.
6
Therewasnoone-to-onesubstitutionofBlacksbyCubansinthelabormarket,norwastheredirectexploitationofoneminoritybytheother.Therewas,however,anewurbaneconomyinwhichtheimmigrantsracedpastothergroups,leavingthenativeminoritybehind.Hence,afterdecadesofstrivingforameasureofequalitywithwhites,MiamiBlacksfoundthatthegamehaddrasticallychanged.Angloswereleaving,andotherwhiteswhospokeaforeignlanguagewereoccupyingtheirpositions.Asaresult,mostBlackswereinasimilarpositionasbefore.Nowhereisthispartofthestoryclearerthanintheevolutionofincome,poverty,andunemployment.Figure5comparesrelativeincomesandpovertylevelsforthethreemajorethnicgroupsinMiamiin1980;figure6graphsunemploymentbetween1980and1990.Inbothdatasets,thereisawidegapbetweenBlacksandnativewhitesinfavorofthelatter.Thereisalso,however,asignificantgapbetweenBlacksandtheintermediateSpanish-origingroup.
Theseaggregatefiguresdonotconveythefullstorybecausetheypertaintoeveryone,employersandemployeesalike.Itwas,rather,inthedevelopmentofsmallenterprisesthatthedifferencesbecamemostvisible.PerhapsmostdevastatingtotheBlackcommunitywastheapparenteasewithwhichtheCubansensconcedthemselvesinthelocaleconomy,allthewhileclaimingthattheirstaywastemporaryfor
theywouldsoonreturntotheirisland.In1977,onlyeighteenyearsaftertheCubanRevolution,Cuban-ownedfirmsinDadeCountyexceededeightthousandinnumber,orfourtimesasmanyaswereownedbyBlacks;averagegrossreceiptsofCubanfirmsamountedtoalmost$84,000,ortwiceasmuchasthetypicalBlackenterprise.7By1980,approximatelyhalfofthelargestbanksandenterprisesownedbySpanish-origingroupsintheUnitedStateswereinMiami,eventhoughtheareaclaimedamere5percentofthecountry'sSpanish-originpopulation.Bycontrast,onlyoneMiamiBlackbusinessmadethelistofthethreehundredtopBlackenterprisesinthenation.8
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Figure5Income,affluence,andpoverty,DadeCounty,1980.
ProfileoftheBlackPopulation(Miami:Metro-DadeCountyPlanningDepartment,1984),tables29,32,and33.
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Figure6Unemploymentratesbyraceandorigin,DadeCounty,1980-90.
FloridaStatisticalAbstracts(Gainesville:UniversityofFloridaPress,1973-90),tablesonunemploymentbycounty.(Datafor1987notavailable.)
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TherapidentrepreneurialadvanceoftheCubanswasnotdueentirelytotheirbusinessacumenorcommunitysolidarity.U.S.governmentagenciesalsolookedwithsympathyontheexiles'fledglingbusinessesandfavoredthemdisproportionately.In1968,forexample,thefederalSmallBusinessAdministration(SBA)distributed$1,078,950inloanstoCuban-ownedsmallfirmsinDadeCountyand$82,600toBlackenterprises.Between1968and1980,46percent($47.7million)ofSBADadeCountyloanswenttoCubanandotherSpanish-originbusinesses,versusonly6percent($6.5million)toBlackfirms.Bythesametoken,theconstructionofMiami'srapidrailtransit(Metrorail)duringthelate1970semployedonly12percentBlackcontractors,comparedtoover50percentCuban.
9
SuchpatentinequalitiessharpenedthesenseofdoublesubordinationfeltbyMiamiBlacksastheseventiesprogressed.Afterall,itwastheywhohadfoughtthecivilrightsbattlestogainaccesstopublicandprivatefacilities.AffirmativeActionandotherprogramshadbeendesignedtorectifytheyearsofabusethattheyhadsuffered,nottohelparecentlyarrivedgroupofwhiteimmigrants.AsfarastheCubanswereconcerned,however,America'sraceproblemwasnottheirsandtheywerecertainlynotabouttomakeitso.Theirhistoryandconcernsweredifferent;hence,theytooknoresponsibilityfortheracialinequalitiesthattheyencounteredinMiami.
Duringthe1970s,thetwominoritiesneverclasheddirectly;eachremainedabsorbedinitsownsituationandproblems.Yettheimmigrants'presenceincreasinglyalteredthecharacterofthecity,addinganewtwisttotheperennialsubordinationofBlacksandtotheirrisingdiscontent.
TheRiot
Foroutsiders,Ithink,itwouldbeimpossibletoappreciatetheshockthatwentthroughtheBlackcommunity.Ithinkitissafetosaythatyou'dalmosthavetobeBlacktounderstand.Alltheirgrievances,alltheirdistrustofthesystem....Suddenly,itallturnedouttobetrue.
MajorClarenceDickson,highest-rankingBlackofficer,MiamiPoliceDepartment10
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By1980,thissituationofdoublemarginalizationhadnotyetbeenarticulatedintoacoherentBlackdiscourse,althoughtherealityofpowerlessnesswasthereforalltosee.Atthestreetlevel,powerlessnesswasreflectedinthetraditionalpolicepracticeoftreatingBlackswithrelativeimpunity.Seenbyrespectablewhitecitizensasthevice-ridden"bad"partsoftown,LibertyCityandotherBlackghettoareaswereplaceswherethepoliceweregivenafreerhand.Peoplelivingintheseareashadtofearnotonlyviolencefromcrime,butalsoviolencefromtheirwould-beprotectors.ThisadversarialculturebetweentheBlackcitizenryandthelocalpolicedepartmentsthenbecameexacerbatedinthewakeofthecivilrightsmovement,justasanincreasingnumberofofficerscametobearSpanishnames.
"McDuffie,"asthecasewasknownlocally,representedtheculminationofthishostiletrend.InMarch1980,athirty-three-year-oldBlackinsuranceagentnamedArthurMcDuffiediedinMiami'sJacksonMemorialHospitalfrominjuriessustainedafterbeingchasedbycityandcountypoliceunits.Thecauseofthechasewasarollingstopataredlightplusanobscenegesturetowardanearbyofficer.PoliceclaimedthatMcDuffiehaddiedastheresultofaccidentalinjuriesduringthechase.BlackMiamiknewbetter.OnMarch31,fourwhiteDadeCountyPublicSafetyDepartmentofficerswerechargedwithplayingsomeroleinthebeatingofMcDuffieandsubsequentattemptstocoverupthecauseofhisdeath.Sensingthemoodoftensioninthecity,alocaljudgegrantedachangeofvenuetoTampa.Asheputit,thecasewas"atimebomb."
11
MarielhadnotyetstartedatthetimeoftheMarchindictment,butbymid-May,whenthejury'sverdictcamein,somefiftythousandnew
refugeeswerecampedintheOrangeBowlandinpubliclandunder1-95,thecity'smainnorth-souththoroughfare.Theirvisibilitywascompoundedbydireforebodingsinthepressabouttheirpresence.Justaweekbefore,theMiamiHeraldhadpublisheditssurveyofsignificantnegativereactionstothenewrefugeesandthe"potentiallydangerousdisagreements"amongnativewhites,Blacks,andLatins.12Theanti-Marielcampaignonlyaddedtotherisingtensioninthecity.Hence,asCubanexilesandnativewhitesfocusedtheirattentiononthecomingsandgoingsintheStraitsofFlorida,BlackMiamiremainedfixedonthatTampa
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courtroom.ForMiaminativewhites,thecitywasundersiegefromtheoutside;asBlackssawthings,theircityhadlongbeenundersiegebytheforcesofthelocalestablishment.
Theverdict,reachedinlessthanthreehoursofdeliberationbyanall-whitejury,wasbroadcastbytheMiamimediaonaclearSaturdayafternoon.Allfourwhiteofficerswereacquittedofallcharges.IttooktheBlackcommunityaboutasmuchtimetoreacttothisverdictasithadtakenthewhitejurytoarriveatit.ThenewswasknowninMiamiat2:42P.M.;lessthanthreehourslaterthefirstrocksandbottleswereflyinginLibertyCity.
The1980Miamiriotwasdifferentfromsimilarurbanuprisingsinthreeways:first,itwasisolatedratherthanpartofanationaltrend;second,itwasunusuallyviolent;third,ittookplacewithatleastthetacitapprovalofmanyBlackleaders,whounderothercircumstancescouldhavebeentrustedtoopposeit.
IthadbeentwelveyearssincetheothergreatBlackMiamiuprising.Butunlikethe1968riot,whichwastimedtocoincidewiththeNationalDemocraticConventioninMiamiBeach,the1980civildisorderswerenotmatchedbysimilareventsinothercities.BlackMiamirosealone.Itsactionstoodasyetanothermanifestationofthesingularityofthecity,andasareflectionoftheuncommonlyharshconditionsenduredbyitsnonwhitecitizenry.
Theriotwasalsodifferentinitsviciousness.PorterandDunnestimatethattotalpropertylossreachedabout$80million.Allkindsofbusinesseswerehit,includingmanufacturingplantswherenoconsumergoodsweretobefound.White-,Cuban-,andBlack-ownedbusinessesweretorchedindiscriminately.Bytheendofthedisorders,commerciallifeinmanypartsofLibertyCityhadvirtually,ceasedtoexist.
13Nevertheless,thepent-upangerreflectedintherioters'drivenotjusttostealbuttodestroywasnothingincomparisonwiththewaytheywentafterrandomwhites,AngloandLatinalike.Therewasaneye-for-an-eyemoodwhichledhithertopowerlessBlackstoattackanyunfortunaterepresentativesoftheirperceivedoppressorswhohappenedby.Drivingdownthewrongstreetduringthosedayscouldleadtoanightmarishexperience,ifnotdeath.Whitesweredousedwithgasolineandsetafireintheirears;othersweredraggedoutandbeatenrepeatedly,withchunksofconcreteandbricks,runoverbyears,stabbedwithscrewdrivers,andshot.Onewasleftdyinginthestreet,ared
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roseinhismouth.Eightwhitesdiedinsuchterribleways,mostonthefirstdayoftheriot.
14
SimilaruprisingsinothercitieshavebroughtBlackleadersintothestreetstocalmdownthemasses,andolderBlackcitizenshavegenerallytriedtoreininghettoyouth.ThereweresuchattemptsinLibertyCityandotherBlackareasofMiami,buttheywerecountermandedbytheoppositetrend.ApeacefulrallycalledbythelocalbranchoftheNAACPthedaytheverdictwasannouncedturnedintoafull-scaleriotinvolvingbothghettoteenagersandBlackprofessionals.Duringtheincident,theseatofDadeCounty'sjusticesystem,thecourthouseitself,wasbrokenintoandtorched.Adultsonghettostreetcornerswereobservedeggingonyouthsastheystoppedandattackedcarsdrivenbywhites.15''Duringtheriot,wehiteverybody,Anglo,Cuban,itdidn'tmatter,"aBlackcommunityleadertoldusin1985thepronoun"we"speakingvolumes;"itwastheonlywayleftforthiscommunitytoshowitsire."16ThelocalheadoftheUrbanLeaguerefusedtogointothestreetsandcalmthecrowds,notingthat"anyonewhohadanyunderstandingsoftheramificationsofdehumanizationandsocialisolationcouldunderstandtheriots....Whitesthoughtitwasirresponsible...becausetheyassumedthatblackleadersweretheretoprotectthemandnottoleadblackfolks."17
The1980riotexpressedinactionswhatwordshadnotbeenableto.AmericanBlackshavealwaysdefinedtheirrealityinreactiontothesubordinationanddiscriminationlaidonthembywhites;indeed,thisisthecoreofanationwideBlackdiscourse.IntheirstudyofAmericanraceriots,forexample,StanleyLiebersonandArnoldSilvermannotedthatcitieswhereriotsoccurredasarulehad:(1)too
fewBlackpoliceofficersrelativetotheBlackpopulation;(2)toofewBlackentrepreneursandstoreowners;and(3)anelectoralsystemthatledtotoofewBlackrepresentativesinlocalgovernment.18Miamifulfilledallthreeconditionsamply,butinadditionthenativeminorityconfrontedtherealityofachangedcity,whereanewimmigrantgroupwaselbowingthemaside."McDuffie"was,withoutdoubt,thetriggerfortheriots,buttheresentmentofbeingalwaysleftout,ofremaininginvisibleandforgottenasothergroupsmarchedforward,wasthebackgroundagainstwhichtheextremelyviolentactionsofMaytookplace.
MarielandtheBlackriothadthisincommon:theygalvanized
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thetwoethniccommunitiesandprovidedthebasisforavigorouseffortatreinterpretion.ThestigmaofMarielcompelledtheCubanstoinventa"newMiami"inwhichtheirownrolewasbothcentralandpositive.Similarly,thedeathsanddeliberatedestructionduringtheMayuprisingforcedBlackleaderstorethinkthecityintermsnotboundedbythestandardurban-minorityframe.Themilitantdouble-subordinationperspectivethattookshapeduringthenextdecadewasbornoutoftheseevents.
19
TheBoatPeople
MynameisJeanandIcametotheUnitedStatesin1978.Well,whathappenedtomewasthataMacoute20cametorentabicyclefrommeforadollar.WhenIaskedforitback,hetoldme,"Don'tyouknowthatIboughtthisbicyclefromyouforadollar?"Iheldthebicycleandtookitawayfromhim.Rightawayhehitmewithaclub.AsIwastryingtogetaway,fourmorecameandstartedbeatingonme.Iranandhidinthewoods.
Acousincametotellmethattheyhadtakenoneofmybrothers.Whenhecouldn'ttellthemwhereIwastheytookhimtoaparkinfrontofeverybodyandkilledhim.Ispenttwoorthreemonthshiding,andthenIwenttotheNorthwesttofindaboat.Thatwasn'thard,butIhadtogetthe$1,500forthepassage.Isoldoneofmysmallplots.Anyway,Ithoughtthat,onceinMiami,Icouldearnenoughtobuyitbackandprobablymore.Otherfamiliesinthetownreceivedasmuchas$200amonthfromrelativesinMiami....That'smorethanmostcouldearninthreeyears.21
BetweenPort-de-PaixandCap-HaïtienonthenorthcoastoftheRepublicofHaiti,therewereatthestartofthe1980ssomesixtyboatscapableofcarryingpeopleonalongseavoyage.Chargingtwoorthreetimesthecommercialairfareandpackingdozensofpeopleineverytrip,thecaptainsofthoseboatscreatedoneofthemostlucrative
businessesinthecountry.ThedestinationwasMiami.
Peoplesoldeverythingtheyhad,includinglandthathadbeenintheirfamilysincetheHaitianRevolutionin1804,tobuypassageaboardthoseboats.Theirdesperationwasunderstandable.InMay1980,themilitarycommanderofHaiti'sNorthwestProvincecalledtogetherallthearea'spastorstoinformthemthatthegovernmentwantedtostoptheexodus.Heaskedthereligiouscommunityfor
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itsassistance.Infact,theflowdidstopforaboutaweek.Butafterthebriefembargo,thefirstboattoleavedepartedfromdirectlybelowthemilitarycommander'sheadquarters.Allalong,hisintenthadbeennottocontroloutmigrationbuttoobtainamonopolyonkickbacks.
22
Totrytoleavethepoorestcountrywithoneofthemostcorruptregimesinthehemisphereisarationalcourseofaction.Indeed,forseveraldecadesHaitiansofallclasseshadbeenstreamingout.Duringthe1960sand1970stheirmaindestinationwasNewYorkCity.Aswithotherimmigrants,NewYorksimplyabsorbedthenewcomers.Middle-classprofessionalsescapingtheDuvaliers'oppressionwerefollowedbyartisansandworkers,whosimplyoverstayedtheirtemporaryvisas.Nomatter:NewYorktookthemin,addingthemtoitsglobalmix.
Miami,however,wasdifferent.Between1977and1981,approximatelysixtythousandHaitiansarrivedbyboatinSouthFlorida.Thenumberwasonlyaboutone-fifththesizeofNewYork'sHaitianpopulation,buttheimpactthatthese"boatpeople"hadinthereceivingcitywasimmeasurablygreater.23
Morethannumbers,itwasthemanneroftheirarrivalthatgarneredattention,bothlocallyandnationwide.PhotographsofshirtlessblackrefugeeshuddledaboardbarelyseaworthycraftevokedimagesburieddeepintheAmericancollectivemind.Liketheslaveshipsofyore,theseboatsalsobroughtacargoofblacklaborers,exceptthatthistimetheycameontheirowninitiative,andthistimenobodywantedthem.StillmorepatheticwerethoseblackbodieswashingashoreFlorida'spristinebeacheswhentheircraftdidnotmakeit.Fornativewhites,thisnewimmigrantwavereinforcedthestate-of-siegementalitycreatedbyMariel.
In1980,theThirdWorldlaidclaimtoMiami.TheHaitianboatflowpeakedrightatthetimeoftheCubanflotilla,thetwobecomingoneinthepublicmind.Yetdespitethisconflation,thetworefugeestreamswereverydifferent.24Marielhadbeen,afterall,sponsoredfromMiami,thecreationofnostalgicCuban-Americans.ThemajorityofMarielentrantshadrelativesawaitingthemandastrongcommunitythatunderstoodtheirlanguageandculture.Cubans,moreover,hadbeenafamiliarpresenceinSouthFloridafortwodecades.
HaitianswerenotsponsoredbyMiami,nordidtheyhaveany
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solidethnicnetworksonwhichtorely.FewpeopleinSouthFloridaunderstoodeitherHaitianCreoleortheabysmalconditionsthatthewould-berefugeeswereleavingbehind.Notsurprisingly,thereactionofnativewhiteswastorejectthenewarrivalsandtotrytostoptheirentry.UnlikeMariel,thiseffortmetwithgreatersuccess.
InresponsetorepresentationsmadebyMiamileadersandlocalstaffoftheINS,federalofficialsinWashingtoninitiateda"HaitianProgram"in1979.ThecoreoftheprograminvolvedacceleratingdeportationproceedingsandmakingaconcertedefforttodiscourageHaitianboatpeoplefromapplyingforpoliticalasylum.Thosewhodidapplydidnothavemuchluck:"Fiveminuteanswerstosuchquestionsas'WhatdoyouthinkwouldhappentoyouifyoureturntoHaiti?'werereducedtoasinglesentenceintranslation.'WhydidyoucometotheUnitedStates?'wasvirtuallyalwaysansweredontheofficialformas'Icameheretofindwork,'asifeachoftheHaitianshadusedpreciselythesamewords."
25TheINSwouldeitherfailtoadviseHaitiansoftheirrighttoalawyerorelsetellthemthatalawyerwouldonlygetthemintotrouble.Afavoritetacticwastoschedulemultiplehearingssimultaneously.Attorneysforthewould-berefugeeswereexpectedtoarguefifteendifferentcasesinfivedifferentlocationsatthesametime.
Theculminationofthiscampaigncamenotingovernmentoffices,butonthehighseas.SoonaftertheinstallationoftheReaganadministration,CoastGuardcutterswereorderedtopatrolHaitianwatersaroundtheclocksothatMiami-boundboatscouldbeinterceptedatseabeforereachingU.S.jurisdiction.26Facedwithsuchdeterminedeffortstopreventtheirarrival,itisremarkablethatsomanyHaitiansmanagedtoslipthroughandremaininSouthFlorida.
Ironically,thereasonthe"HaitianProgram"didnotthoroughlysucceedwasitsvictims'owndefenselessness.Theirplightelicitedpubliccompassionandtheconcernofchurchesandphilanthropicorganizations.TheNationalCouncilofChurchessponsoredtheHaitianRefugeeCenter(HRC),ledbyanactivistHaitianpriestnamed,mostappropriately,GerardJean-Juste.Thethreeorfouryoungattorneyswhoworkedprobonoatthecenter,withsupportfromnationallawfirms,probablydidasmuchtosustainthefledglingHaitiancommunityastherefugeesthemselves.Theselawyers
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ineffectinterposedtheAmericanlegalsystembetweenthepowerlessnewcomersandthegovernment'seffortstoberidofthem.TheireffortsculminatedinaclassactionsuitheardinMiami'sFederalDistrictCourtthesameweekthatthefirstboatsfromMarielcamestreamingin.
27
Cuban-AmericansalsoprovidedunwittingsupportfortheHaitianrefugeesthroughtheireffortstobringtheirownkinfromMariel.Thecoincidenceofthetwoflowsonlyunderscoredtheglaringdisparitiesinthereceptionsaccordedtoeachgroup.NogovernmentofficialeverattemptedtosummarilydeportaMarielrefugee;U.S.CoastGuardcutterstowedandescortedboatscarryingCubanstoKeyWest,notbacktoCuba.NomatterhowdisparagedMarielentrantswerebythemedia,theywerestillCubanandthuseffectivelyinsulatedfromthefateawaitingtheboatsfromCap-HaïtienandPort-de-Paix.
TheU.S.government'sjustificationforthedifferentialtreatmenthingedonthedistinctionbetween"political"refugeesand"economic"migrants.Theargumentdidnotwash.ClearlymanyMarielrefugeeshadleftinsearchofbetteropportunities,whilemanyHaitianshadexperiencedgenuinepersecution.TheMiamiDistrictCourtrepeatedlyheardtestimonylikethatofMr.SoliveceRomet:
HeldbytheTontonMacoutesforfourdaysduringwhichhewasforcedtostandina2by3footcell.Beatenrepeatedlyasaconsequenceofwhichheshoweddeepscarsinhisskullanddevelopedaspeechimpediment.AfterescapingtoFloridainasailboat,hewasdetainedbytheImmigrationandNaturalizationService.INSwastryingtodeporthimonthegroundsthathewasaneconomicimmigrant.28
Infact,thedifferencebetweentheCubansandHaitiansstreamingintoMiamihadlesstodowithindividualmotivationsthanwiththe
countrytheyleftbehind,thecommunitythatreceivedthem,andtheircolor.ThislastrealizationmobilizedtheBlackpoliticalestablishmentindefenseoftheHaitians."Ifwecantakeintherefugeesofothercountries,wecantakeintherefugeesofHaiti,"declaredAndrewYounginaMarchvisittoMiami.29OnApril19,1980,JesseJacksonledamarchofonethousandpeopletoahotelinMiamiwherethegovernmentwasholdingsixtyHaitianwomenandchildrenwhohadarrivedbyboattheprecedingweek.In
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Washington,theCongressionalBlackCaucusledthepoliticalbattle.U.S.representativesShirleyChisholm,WalterFauntroy,andMickeyLelandallarguedontheHaitians'behalfinpersonalmeetingswiththeattorneygeneral,thesecretaryofstate,andthepresidenthimself.Shortlythereafter,SenatorEdwardKennedyattackedU.S.policyasraciallybiasedanddemandedtoknowifHaitianswouldbetreatedthesameasCubans.
30
Facedwiththiscombinedoffensive,thegovernmentrelented.ProcessingofthetwoflowswasassignedtoanewadministrativeentitytheCuban-HaitianTaskForce,housedintheStateDepartment.Thecreationofthistaskforceandtheappointmentofanew"Cuban-Haitianrefugeecoordinator"bytheCarteradministrationfurtherstigmatizedtheMarielarrivals,butprovedinvaluabletoHaitiansseekingstaysfromdeportation.Fromthenon,anygovernmentactiontowardthe"entrants"(asbothMarielCubansandHaitianswerenowofficiallylabeled)wouldhavetobeonanequalbasis.31
Haitiansgraduallywonenoughclassactionsuits,andsufficientnumbersgainedpermanentortemporaryreprievefromdeportation,toconsolidateasmallethniccommunity.TheFordFoundationandotherphilanthropicorganizationssteppedinwithsupportfortheHaitianRefugeeCenterandthenewlyfoundedHaitianTaskForce,createdtostimulatesmallbusinessesinthemodelofnearbyLittleHavana.Middle-classHaitianscamefromNewYorktojointheentrantsreleasedfromINScustodyandthosewhomanagedtoslipinundetected.TogethertheyforgedanewneighborhoodLittleHaitioccupyingaboutninecensustractsinMiami'snorthwest.Asmallstripofbrightlypaintedshopsemergedinthissection,"gypsy"cabsbegantomaketherounds,andtheslowcadencesofCreolecametobe
heardoverlocalradio.Cityandcountygovernmentseventuallythrewtheirsupportbehindaneworganization,theHaitianAmericanCommunityAgencyofDade(HACAD),establishedtoprovidesocialservicestothenewimmigrantneighborhood.32
HaitiansandMiamians
IfthecreationofLittleHaitiwasavictoryforthenationalBlackpoliticalestablishmentandfortherefugeesthemselves,itwasseen
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inaverydifferentlightbythelocalpopulation.EmbattledMiamiAnglos,seekingtopreservewhatremainedoftheirlife-style,vieweditasyetanotherharshblow.Itseemedthattheycouldnotwin,nomatterhowhardtheytried.TheirefforttostopMarielhadfizzledinthefaceoftheCubanexiles'cloutwithconservativeforcesinWashington;attemptstostoptheHaitianboatshadbeensimilarlyshort-circuited,thistimebyliberalactivists.Miami'soldresortwayoflifewasbeingrelentlesslyundercutbytheintrusionofnationalandinternationalforces.Notsurprisingly,therhetoricof"Paradiselost"andthepopularbumperstickerreading"WillthelastAmericanleavingMiamipleasetaketheflag"madetheirappearanceaboutthistime.
33
TheBlackcommunityalsohadreasontolookupontheHaitianswithambivalence.True,prominentBlackfigureshaddefendedthenewcomersagainstgovernmentdeportation,buttheyhaddonesointheinterestofracialequalitybecausetheywereblack,notbecausetheywereimmigrants.Oncesettled,however,thenewcomersproceededtocompetedirectlywithBlackAmericansformanuallaborjobs,acceptingalmostanywagesandworkconditions.ForLibertyCity,Overtown,andotherBlackghettoareasreelingundertheimpactofdoublemarginalization,theappearanceonthelaborsceneofyetanothercompetitorwasnotwelcome.BlackleadersneverpubliclyattackedtheHaitians,butconfrontationbetweenthetwogroupsmountednevertheless.TheCreole-speakingnewcomersweretoodocile,toosubservienttowhiteemployers,and,aboveall,tooforeigntotherealitiesofBlackAmerica.
DiscriminationonthepartofnativeBlacksdidnotgounreciprocated;Haitiansdidnotseethecommoncircumstanceofraceassufficient
reasontojoinasubjugatedminority.Insteadtheysettheirsightshigher,seekingtobecomeanentrepreneurialgroup.Theself-consciousattempttopatternLittleHaitiafterthebusinesscommunityofLittleHavanawaspartofthiseffort.TheHaitianquarterabutsLibertyCityontheeast,butcontactsbetweenthefledglingimmigrantneighborhoodandtheBlackghettowerescarceanduneasy.AHaitian-Americancommunityleaderdescribedthesituationintheearlyeightiesthus:"Haitiansrarelycross7thAvenueorI-95[thelocallyagreed-uponlimitsofLibertyCity].Theycallthearea'BlackPower'anddonotwanttolive
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closetoit.HaitianswillnotmeltintothelargerBlackcommunity.Thereisjusttoomuchanimositybetweenbothgroupsbothinschoolandatwork.Thecompetitionforjobsistremendous."
34
Thedifficultcircumstancesofarrivalandtheindifference,ifnothostility,ofthelocalpopulationcombinedtomaketheinitialyearsintheUnitedStatesatryingexperiencefortheboatpeople.In1983,aspartofourstudyofimmigrantsinSouthFlorida,weinterviewedfivehundredHaitianentrantswhohadsettledinMiami'sLittleHaitiand,insmallernumbers,inFortLauderdaleandthenearbytownofBelleGlade.35Theresultsofthissurveyofferaprofileofthebackgroundoftheseimmigrantsandtheirsituationduringthefirstseveralyearsofsettlement(table4).Predictably,most1980-81Haitianarrivalswereyoung,aprerequisiteifonewastowithstandthegruelingseajourney.AbouthalfcamebyboatdirectlytoSouthFlorida,butathirdmadeastopineitherCubaortheBahamas.Mostoftheseyoungimmigrantstraveledalone.
ThestoryoftheirreceptionintheUnitedStatesistoldinthebodyofthetable.ThetypicalHaitianhadfewornorelativesawaitingherorhiminthiscountry,theaveragebeing1.5.(Bycontrast,Marielrefugeesinterviewedinthesameyearhadthreetimesasmanyrelativesalreadylivinghere.)One-thirdofallHaitiansand42percentofthemaleswereinternedinINSdetentioncampsuponarrival.Whenfinallyreleased,theyandotherswenttoliveinareaswheretheirimmediateneighborswereeitherAmericanBlacksorotherHaitians.Theconcentrationofthenewcomersinthepoorestghettoareasisnotsurprising,giventheunwelcomeofficialreceptionandtheirownmodestbackgrounds.AlthoughHaitianentrantsweresomewhatbettereducated,morehighlyskilled,andmoreurbanthantheircompatriots
stillinHaiti,theyneverthelesscomparedpoorlywithAmericanBlacksorMarielCubans.Onaverage,nonehadadvancedbeyondthefifthorsixthgrade,andaboutfour-fifthsspokelittleornoEnglish.InHaiti,aboutathirdhadbeenjobless(unemployedornotlookingforwork)beforetheydecidedtoleave.
By1983,theHaitians'tribulationshadnotyetbeguntopayoff.True,overhalfwereenrolledinEnglishandothercoursesinordertoimprovetheirlabormarketchances,butfullytwo-thirds(and80percentofthewomen)werejobless.Bywayofcomparison,that
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Table4.CharacteristicsofHaitianEntrantsinSouthFlorida,1983
Males(N=205)
Females(N=294)
WholeGroup(N=499)
Medianage 30 29 29Percentsingle 53.6 48.5 49.8PercenttravelingalonetoU.S. 81.3 70.7 74.9Meansoftravel(percentage)Airplane 15.7 12.7 14.0Boat,directtoU.S. 46.1 52.8 50.3Boat,stopinCuba 21.2 16.2 18.2Boat,stopinBahamas 17.0 18.3 17.6Averagenumberofrelativespresentatarrival
1.6 1.5 1.5
PercentjailedbYINSuponarrival 41.8 33.1 34.6Ethnicityofneighbors(percentage)Haitian 61.2 67.2 64.8AmericanBlack 20.5 20.6 20.6Anglo/Latin/other 18.3 12.2 14.6Averageyearsofeducation 5.9 3.7 4.6PercentfluentinEnglish 30.1 11.9 19.2PercentpursuingEnglishorothercoursesintheU.S.
54.6 56.6 55.8
PercentjoblessInHaiti 28.2 33.0 31.0InU.S. 35.7 81.4 63.0Percentprofessionals/managersInHaiti 9.0 2.5 5.2InU.S. 1.0 0.0 0.4Sourceofhelpinsecuringfirstjob(percentage)Kinandfriends 75.2 66.4 70.7Self 23.0 27.9 25.5
Governmentagencies/other 1.8 5.7 3.8Currentindividualincome(dollarspermonth)
600 440 563
Currenthouseholdincome(dollarspermonth)
712 508 600
Percentinpovertya 46 71 59Percentreceivingwelfareaidb 12.7 40.3 29.2Source:AlexStepickandAlejandroPortes,"FlightintoDespair:AProfileofRecentHaitianRefugeesinSouthFlorida."InternationalMigrationReview20(1985):329-50.aPercentofhouseholdsbelowthefederalpovertylevelforahouseholdofthreein1982($7,963).bIncludescash,food,andallotherformsofaid,exceptmedical,fromprivateorpublicagencies.
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figureisabouttwicethejoblessrateamongMarielrefugeesand,formales,threetimesthejoblessratereportedbytheCensusforallpre-1980Haitianresidentsnationwide.
36Asaresult,theaveragehouseholdincomeforHaitianentrantswaslessthanhalfthatreportedforthepre-1980U.S.Haitianpopulation;indeed,closeto60percentofthenewhouseholdswerebelowthepovertyline.Despitetheirdiresituation,only29percentoftheimmigrantsreceivedanyformofpublicorprivateassistanceduringtheirinitialyearsintheUnitedStatesaclearindicatorofthesocialenvironmenttheyconfrontedhere.Ofthoseluckyenoughtohavefoundjobs,theoverwhelmingmajorityhaddonesowiththeaidofkinandfriendsorbythemselves;fewerthan4percenthadbeenhelpedbyanypublicorprivateagency.
ThepariahstatusofHaitianboatpeoplewasaconsequenceofboththeirraceandthehighlyvisiblemanneroftheirarrival,whichcontrastedwiththelowprofilethattheirco-nationalshadbeenkeepinginNewYorkforyears.Thetwofactorscombinedtoinsureanegativereceptionbyboththefederalgovernmentandthelocalpopulation.Forthelatter,thepatheticimageofthearrivingHaitianboatssuggestedthatnotonlyCuba,buttheentireCaribbean,wasabouttoemptyitselfinMiami.TheassociationinthepublicmindofincomingCubansandHaitiansbecameoneofthefewluckythingsgoingforthelatter.Yetdespitethiscoincidenceandthehelpofchurchesandprivatecharities,thesituationthreeyearsafterarrivalwasanythingbutenviable.
Haitianswerenotsomuchatthebottomofthelabormarketasoutsideit;theywereneglectedbypublicwelfareagenciesandlookeddownonbyallothersegmentsofthelocalcommunity,includingnativeBlacks.Reflectingthissituation,53percentofour1983Haitian
entrantrespondentsreportedthattheywerediscriminatedagainstbyBlackAmericans;65percentindicatedthatAnglo-Americansconsideredtheminferior;and86percenthadhadfewornocontactswithasinglenativewhite.
TheCityatMid-Year
Nowpicturethesituationbythelatesummerof1980:MarielhadaddedsomeninetythousandtoDadeCounty'sCubanpopulation.Theexilecommunityhadgottenawaywiththeboatlift,butFidel
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Castrohadsucceededinstigmatizingtherescueeffort.AlthoughmostMarielrefugeeshadintegratedthemselvesquietlyintothecommunity,avisibleminoritywascausingenoughtroubletogarnernationalattention.SeriouslydisturbedmentalpatientsroamedthestreetsofLittleHavana,overwhelmingthelocalmentalhealthsystem;
37formerconvictssurvivedbypreyingonJewishretireesinSouthMiamiBeach;Marieldruggangspepperedeachotherwithgunfireinanyneighborhoodshoppingcenter.
Meanwhile,muchoftheBlacknorthwestsectionofMiamilayinshamblesfollowingthelatestassaultbyitsowncitizens,arebellionagainstthecitythatimmigrantnewcomerswereovercomingallobstaclestoreach.TheMayriothadmadeabundantlyclearjusthowtallthebarrierswereseparatingnativewhites,Latins,andBlacks.NexttothewastedBlackghetto,immigrantsofthesamecolorbutadifferentmind-sethadstartedbuildingacommunityoftheirown.Forold-timeMiamians,thisactivitywasaharbingerofthingstocome.FrenchCreolewasnowaddedtoSpanishinwhatwasquicklybecomingapolyglotboardinghouse.
MonolingualAnglos,meanwhile,respondedbyvotingsolidlyfortheprimacyofEnglish.Cubanspaidnoattention.HaitiansenrolledinEnglishclasses,buttheylearnedSpanishonthejobtoo.Bynow,MiamiHeraldcolumnistshadrunoutofexpressionstodescribethenewevents,eachoneablowtothecityastheyhadknownit.Theircriesofanguishalsowentunheeded.Miamiwasaverydifferentplaceeightmonthsintotheyearbecausetheremarkablehappeningsbeforehandhadfundamentallyaltereditsethnicmakeupand,intheprocess,subvertedanentiresocialorder.
Thecity,hadneverbeenaplaceconducivetoself-reflection.Forits
once-dominantAnglomajority,itwasessentiallyavacationspotturnedpermanentresidence.Whatwastheretocontemplateinacitybarelyeightyyearsofage?Transplantedwhitespaidmoreattentiontotheweather,especiallyincontrasttothefrigidnorththattheyhadleftbehindthantopoliticalrevolutionsintheCaribbean.MiamiBlackswerenotmuchforintrospectiveanalysiseither.Thecity'sracerelationsweresolidlycastinaDeepSouthmold,onethatwasbothfamiliarandoppressive.ThelocalBlacks'situationwasnottoodifferentfromthatoftheirbrethreninGeorgiaorAlabama,anditscauseshadalreadybeenwrittenabout
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atgreatlength.AsforthegrowingLatinpopulation,Cubansreservedtheircapacityforself-reflectiontopondereventsintheislandandtheirprospectsforreturn.Thecitywheretheyresided''temporarily"wastakenlargelyforgranted.
Nineteeneightychangedallthat,forcingeachgrouptolookinwardanddeviseanoveldefinitionofthemselvesandtheircity.AttackedbyAnglosanddenouncedbyBlacks,CubansreactedtothethreatofapariahstatuswithanoveldiscoursethatplacedtheirroleinandtheircontributiontoMiamiinastronglypositivelight.Thisreactiveframedidnotstopatself-defense;itwentallthewaytolayingclaimtothecity.Andtheconsiderableresourcesoftheexilecommunitymadethisaimaseriouschallenge.
Blacksdidnotgothatroute;rather,pressuredfromallsides,theyexpressedtheirsentimentsinthedesperateviolenceofMay.Theseactionshadtobeexplained,however,andinsodoingBlackleaderspiecedtogetheranoveldiscoursenotheardanywhereelseintheSouth.Inconfrontationwithnativewhites,Cubans,andHaitians,BlackMiamiansfoundtheirvoice.Fromthatpointon,itwastobeheardenergetically,stakingouttheclaimsofthenativeminority.
EvensucharecentimmigrantgroupastheHaitiansfoundthatlifeinMiamimeantmorethanhardworkandsendingmoneyhome.Theprocessofrapidchangethattheythemselveshadhelpedtocreatealsocompelledtheirfledglingcommunitytoreinventitself,astheysoughtalegitimacythatotherswereonlytooquicktodeny.
ForMiamiAnglos,thissuddenethnicconflagrationwastoomuch,andmanyjustflednorth.Thosewhoremainedalsohadtorethinktheircity,nolongerasatouristdestinationbutasaninternationalcrossroads.Itbecamealessrelaxed,butmorecomplexandinterestingplace.Injockeyingwitheachotherandbringingdowntheoldorder,Miami'sethnicgroupsproducedauniqueurbanexperiment.
Althoughtheeventsof1980weretheimmediatedeterminantsofthecurrentprofileofMiami,theythemselveshadmoreprofoundroots.Thesearetobefoundinthehistoryoftheareaandinitslong-neglectedCaribbeannexus.ThosegroupsthatcrossedtheStraitsofFloridainthatyearandthosethatresistedtheirarrivalwereunwittinglyreenactingandbringingfullcircleahistoricalsagabegunfourandahalfcenturiesearlier.
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ChapterFourTheEarlyYearsCivicspiritmaybesaidtoexistinacitywherethereiswidespreadparticipationincivicaffairsonthepartofthoseabletobenefitthecommunitybyvoluntarymanagementofitscivicenterprises.
C.WrightMillsandMelvilleJ.Ulmer,"SmallBusinessandCivicWelfare"
SippingadrinkonaterracedownbythemouthoftheMiamiRiver,thevisitormayfancythattheHyattandDupontPlazahotelstherearethefirstcivilizedtenantsofthisarea,itexudessuchanauraofnewness.Yettheimpressionisdeceiving.WhilethecityofMiamiislessthanacenturyold,thesitewheretheriveremptiesintoBiscayneBayhashostedsuccessivevisitorsforoverfourhundredyears.AstrandedBasquesailorgavethebayitsnameintheearlysixteenthcentury.ItwasherethatSpanishmissionaries,complainingbitterlyaboutthemosquitoes,settledin1568.Almostthreehundredyearslater,in1836,AmericansoldierserectedFortDallasonthesamesiteasthatfirstmissionduringtheSeminoleWar.Andsixtyyearsorsolater,Henry,MorrisonFlaglerbuilttheRoyalPalm,thefirstgrandhotelofMiami,wheretheDupontPlazastandstoday.
Throughoutthesefourhundredyears,thesuccessiveoccupantsoftheplaceIndians,Spanishfriars,Americansoldiers,southerncolonists,andblackslavesleftsuchtenuousimprintsthatbytheendofthenineteenthcenturytheareawasthoughttobeaswildandemptyasithadbeeninthesixteenth.ThefirstwhitemendidnotsettleonthereefislandeventuallyknownasMiamiBeachuntil1870,whenanadventurernamedHenryB.Lumconceivedtheideaofputtingthesandtouseasacoconutplantation.Theenterprisefailed,butMr.Lum'scoconuttreesstillgracethebeach.Onthemainland,afew
scatteredplantationssurvivedbyshipping
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theirproductstoKeyWest,wheretheyweretransshippedtoplacesnorth.
1Aslateas1890therewasnocityatall,butonlyasmallagriculturalcommunityintheareaknownasCocoanutGrove.
StandingsomethreemilestothesouthofthefirstSpanishmission,anearlyYankeepioneerrecordedhisimpressionsoftheplace:"Fancyyourselfonabroadpiazzafacingsoutheast.Thewind,almostconstantlyfromthatdirection,bringswithittherefreshingsmellofsaltwater,whichisasclearasthatoftheMediterranean,beddedasitiswithapurewhitesandandcoralrock."2Yetsuchimpressionsofunspoilednaturalbeauty,concealedaturbulentpast,fortheareahadbeencrisscrossedandfoughtoverbyIndiansandEuropeansforoverthreehundredyears.Withinviewofourcharmedobserver,notthreemilesaway,wasthelighthouseofCapeFlorida,sackedandburnedbyadesperateSeminolepartysomesixtyyearsearlier.Inretribution,LieutenantColonelHarveyoftheU.S.ArmyhuntedandhangedtheSeminolechiefandforcedtheotherstoscatterintotheEverglades.TheemptinessthatwasSouthFlorida,readyforthewhitecolonist'shand,wasmoldedbyahistoryofstruggle.3
ThecityofMiamiwasfoundednotbyaEuropeanempire,anarmy,oragroupofplanters,butbyahandfulofbrashmillionairesbentonturningtheMediterraneandreamsofearlyBiscayneBaysettlersintoreality.AnenterprisingClevelandwidow,JuliaTuttle,whoownedlandbythemouthoftheriver,madeuphermindtoturnthewildernessintoanorderlymetropolis.Accordingtolocallore,thehighpointofthisventurecameduringthehardfreezeof1894-95when,withcitrusdyingsouthofOrlando,Mrs.TuttledispatchedabouquetoforangeblossomstorailroadmagnateHenryM.Flagler,provingthatSouthFloridaremainedfrostfree.Whetherthestoryis
trueorapocryphal,thefactisthatMr.Flaglerwasintheareashortlythereafter,withaspurofhisFloridaEastCoastRailwayfollowingfromWestPalmBeach.Thefirsttrainarrivedin1896,andwithitMiamicameintobeing.4"Commodore"RalphMunroe,aCocoanutGroveplanterandyachtsmanthussaidhisnostalgicfarewelltothepast:"TherearemanyadvantagesinthenewlifewhichhasflowedsoirresistiblysincetherailroadcametotheBay,butletnoonethinkthatthisgreatchangedidnotbringdisadvantageas
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well.Thecharmofwidespacesandthesimplelifearegoneandtheyareblessingsnottobedespised."
5
FloridaandCuba
Foralmostfivehundredyears,thehistoryoftheFloridapeninsulahasbeenmarkedbyaseriesofsuddenjoltsthattieditscoursenowtomenandplacesofthesouth,nowtothoseofthenorth.Early-sixteenth-centurynavigationalchartsportrayedFloridaandCubaasasinglelandmass.Althoughtheerrorwassooncorrected,theSpanishCrownlostnotimeinclaimingthenewterritoryasitsown.Forthenextthreecenturies,thedestinyofthepeninsulawastobeintertwinedwiththatoftheislandtothesouth,andespeciallytoitscapital,Havana,fromwhichFloridawasgoverned.
JuanPoncedeLeónhadsailedwithColumbusonhissecondvoyageandwaslatersenttopacifytheislandofPuertoRico.Hesucceededinthistask,butfailedinhiscourtbattleagainstDiegoColumbus,whoclaimedthegovernorshipashisown.Poncewasfifty-threewhen,asadelantadooftheunknownnorthernpeninsula,hesailedthreeshallow-draftshipsfromPuertoRicoinearly1513.Theexpeditionmadelandfallatlatitude29°32'northonEasterSundayorPascuaFlorida,whichgavethelanditsname.Contrarytolocallore,theFountainofEternalYouthdidnotrankhighintheoldsailor'spriorities,forheneverwroteaboutit.Instead,PonceandhismensoughtwhatSpaniardseverywhereinthenewcontinentthirstedfor:goldandnativeempirestosubdue.Nothingofthatsortmetthemalongtheinterminablelowcoast.TheFountainofYouthendured,however,asthefirstofFlorida'smanymyths.6
Sailingsouth,theexpeditionroundedtheislandofSantaMarta,today
KeyBiscayne,andcameintosightofthegreatemeraldbay.TheIndiansbythemouthoftheMiamiRiverwerefriendlyenough;PoncenamedthemChequescha,ashethoughttheycalledthemselves.Theadelantadowentontoexplorethewestcoastofthepeninsula,enduredahurricane,andeventuallyreturnedhome.7Eightyearspassedbeforeheventuredagainintothesedomains.SpurredbytheincredibleachievementsofHernánCortésinMexico,PoncefinallyboardedfivehundredmenintwoshipsandsailedagainforthewestcoastofFlorida.Againneither
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goldnoreternalyouthmettheSpaniards.Indeed,thistimetheyweregreetedbyhostileIndiansandahailoffire-hardenedarrows.Mortallywounded,PoncewastakenbacktoCubawherehedied.Heleftlittlebehind,exceptanunshakablemythandthemysteryofaforbiddingland.
8
ThenextSpanishattempttoclaimthelandwasmadein1528whenPánfilodeNarváez,humiliatedbyamisfiredattempttosubdueCortésinthenameofCuba'sgovernor,triedtoredressthatfailurewithaconquestofhisown.Bannersflying,heagaintookpossessionofFloridainthenameoftheking.Butthelandwasunyielding:itjustswallowedNarváezandhisexpedition,allofwhosefourhundredmenperishedexceptfour.Oneofthesesurvivors,CabezadeVaca,returnedtoSpaintowarnfuturewould-beconquerorsagainstthefutilityoftheenterprise.9
Buthiseffortwasinvain.HernandodeSotohadbeenwithFranciscoPizarroduringtheconquestofPeru,whereheacquiredgreatwealthandareputationforbravery.AppointedgovernorofCubaandadelantadoofFloridabyEmperorCharlesI,DeSotoorganizedandfinancedtheexpeditionfromSpainhimselfinhopesofreplicatingPizarro'sgreatfeat.In1538,afleetoftenshipswithathousandmenand350horsesarrivedinCuba.Afterayear'spreparation,DeSotoappointedhiswifetemporarygovernoroftheislandandsailedtotheGulfCoastofFlorida.ThattearfulfarewellintheHavanaharborwasthelastseenofhim.TheexpeditionhopedtoencounteranadvancedcivilizationliketheAztecsortheIncasthatwouldguideittogreatwealth.Insteaditencounteredprimitivevillagesandaforbiddingswampland.AftermarchingalongtheGulfCoast,DeSotoestablishedhiswinterquartersinthenorthofthepeninsula,nearpresent-day
Tallahassee.FromtheretheSpaniardshackedtheirwayintoGeorgia,venturingasfarnorthasthemountainsofTennessee.Thentheyturnedwest,discoveringtheMississippiRiverandreachingtheArkansas.10
DeSotoalternativelymadetreatieswithlocalchieftainsandfoughtfiercebattleswiththem.Exhaustedbythestrugglesandthemarch,hediedoffeveratthemouthoftheArkansasRiver.ThefewsurvivorsfromthedoomedexpeditionbuiltbrigantinesandsaileddowntheMississippi,arrivinginTampico,Mexico,threeyearsaftertheiroriginaldeparture.11ForthenextquarterofacenturyFloridawasleftalone,theSpanishCrownnowbeing
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convincedthatnothingwastobegainedfromsettlingthisbarrenandhostileland.
Butalthoughthepeninsulaitselfhadnothingtooffer,itdidsitontherouteoftheFlotadelaPlata,afleetofshipstakingthesilverandgoldoftheNewWorldtotheking'scoffers.Piratesandhurricanesmadeinnumerablevictimsoftheslowandoverloadedcargoships.ParticularlyfearedwerethemanyFrench,English,andDutchpirateswhobasedthemselvesinthesmallislandsoftheCaribbeanandtheBahamas;andnow,tomakemattersworsefortheSpanish,aFrenchHuguenotexpeditionwasdispatchedtotakepossessionofFloridainthenameoftheirking.TocombattheseevilsKingPhilipIIturnedtohisbestcaptain,DonPedroMenéndezdeAvilés,whomheappointedthethirdadelantadoofFlorida.
12DonPedropromptlymountedafive-galleonexpeditiontothepeninsula'seastcoastinordertodestroytheFrenchsettlementofFortCaroline,atthemouthoftheSt.JohnsRiver.OnAugust28,1565,SaintAugustine'sDay,heenteredthedeep,easilydefendedbaythatwastoharborSpain'sfirstsettlementinFlorida.TheinletatthesoutherntipofthebaybecameknownasMatanzas(lit.,Slaughters),anamewellearnedduringthefollowingdays.13
Afterseveralindecisiveencounters,theSpaniardssucceededincapturingFortCaroline,andindefeatingtheHuguenotfleetthatcametoitsrescue."AreyouCatholicorLutheran?"eachprisonerwasasked.UpondeclaringtheirProtestantfaith,thecaptivesweretakeningroupsoftenbehindasandduneandputtotheknife.SeventyFrenchmenwerethusexecutedatMatanzas,includingtheircommander,JeanRibault.WiththeHuguenotperiloutoftheway,Menéndezconcentratedonconsolidatinghisholdonthisslipperyland.Hetraveledupanddownthecoastestablishingfortsandsigning
peacetreatieswithlocalchieftains,suchasthepowerfulCarlos,headoftheCalusas.Butwherevertheadelantadowasnotpresent,thingsrevertedtotheiroriginalstate.Soldiersmutiniedandlefttheirgarrisons;tribescapturedshipwreckedsailorsandburnedtheminhonoroftheirgods.Thewildlandresistedineverypossiblewaytheholdoftheempire.14
Andsoitwouldcontinuefor250years.Everyattemptatcolonizingtheinteriorofthepeninsulawithfortsandmissionswaseventuallyrepelled,firstbytheIndiansandtheelements,andlateronbymaraudersfromtherivalcoloniestothenorth.OnlyinSt.
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AugustinedidSpanishFloridamaintainanenduringexistence,andthisthanksonlytoitsenviablenaturaldefensesandtoacontinuousstreamofsettlersandsuppliesfromCuba.Capturedandburnedonseveraloccasions,thesettlementwaseachtimerebuilt.FrancisDrakestrodecontemptuouslyintothepunylittlefortbeforeputtingittothetorchin1586,butonhisdepartureastrongeronewaserected.
Finally,thediscoveryofthewhiteshellrock"coquina"andthearrivalofSpanishengineersfromCubamadepossiblethecompletionofthecastleofSanMarcosintheearlyeighteenthcentury.
15Surroundedbyadeepmoat,thehighwallsofSanMarcosprovedunassailable.Severaltimesduringthenextdecades,thepopulationofthetowntookrefugeinSanMarcosaspiratesandEnglishtroopsfromGeorgiaandtheCarolinascamecalling,onlytobebeatenback.Thecastleandthetownwerefinallysurrenderedin1763,notbecauseofmilitarydefeat,butastheoutcomeofthevagariesofEuropeanpolitics.Onthatoccasion,HavanaandFlorida,bothoutpostsofempire,weretradedforeachother.LordAlbemarlehadtakenHavanafromSpainin1762duringtheSevenYears'War(theFrenchandIndianWarinNorthAmerica).Thenextyear,theTreatyofParissealedBritain'scompletevictoryoverbothFranceandSpain.
ForSpain,thelossofHavana,thekeytohercolonialempire,wasirreparable.Inexchangeforthecity,theBourbonkingagreedtosurrenderallofFlorida.Hewascompensatedinturn,byhiscousinandallytheKingofFrance,withthevastbutunsettledterritoryofLouisiana.ASpanishgovernortookoverinNewOrleansatthesametimethatthedejectedtownspeopleofSt.AugustineembarkedforHavana.TheEnglishwerefinallyabletoentertheunconquerablecastle,whichtheyrenamedFortSt.Marks.16
Floridawasnowdividedintotwocolonies,EastandWestFlorida,withcapitalsinSt.AugustineandPensacola.TheEnglishmovedquicklytoconsolidatetheirholdontheregion,establishingplantations,addingincongruouschimneystoopenSpanishcourtyards,andotherwiseanglicizingthelandscape.Thiseffortprovedshort-lived,however.TherevoltofAmericancolonists,eagerlysupportedbyFranceandSpain,deprivedEnglandnotonlyofitsoriginalthirteencolonies,butofitsfourteenthandfifteenthaswell.MarchingfromNewOrleans,GovernorBernardodeGálvez
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retookPensacolafortheSpanishCrownin1781.InHavana,societyladiesgaveuptheirjewelsinsupportoftheAmericantroopsduringthatbitterwinter.
17
BytheTreatyofVersaillesin1783,theAmericancoloniesgainedtheirindependenceandSpainregainedFlorida.BritishroyalistswhohadtakenrefugefromtherebelliousAmericansinSt.Augustinelearnedthattheywouldhavetomoveyetagain.18AlthoughthereturningexilesfromHavanafoundtheirdwellingsstrangelychangedbyEnglishadditions,otherwisethetownwasthesame.FloridaoncemorefounditselfSpanishanddependentontheCaptaincyGeneralofCuba.Thedestiniesoftheislandandthepeninsulawereprovinginextricablyboundtogether.
TheEmptyLand
IftheloyalsubjectsofGeorgeIIIhadbeenforcedintoasecondexilebythereturnoftheSpaniardstoSt.Augustine,othersfoundinFloridaarefugefromoppressioninthenewlyliberatedcolonies.SlavesrunningawayfromtheirmastersinGeorgiaandAlabamacouldgaintheirfreedombysimplydisappearingintothepeninsula'swilderness.Theretheyjoinedapopulationofhalf-HispanicizedIndiantribes,half-breeds,andevenafewdescendantsofwhitesettlers.ThisoddmixthatformedFlorida'snativepopulationatthebeginningofthenineteenthcenturywascalledtheSeminoles.TheworddidnotcorrespondtothenameofanyIndiantribe;rather,itapparentlyevolvedfromtheSpanishwordforrunawayslaves,cimarrones,pronouncednowas"seminolies."19Seminole"Indians"werethusfarmorefamiliarwiththewaysofwhitemenandfarmoreincontactwiththeirculturesthantheimagesofscalpingsavagesdiffusedby
booksandfilmsacenturylater.
AndrewJacksonsawanopportunity.American"property"wasescapingbythedrovesintoFlorida,arepugnantstateofaffairstothemindoftheplanterclass,ofwhichtheTennesseangeneralwasaprominentmember.Life,liberty,andthepursuitofhappinesswerefineforwhitecitizens,buttheydidnotapplytoothers.ThedisorderlystatesouthoftheGeorgiaborderwhereformerslaveswerebeginningtoenjoyjustsuchfreedomsarousedconcernandalarminthesouthernstatesreasonenoughtoannexthepenin-
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sula.Floridawas"apistolpointedattheheadofLouisiana,"remarkedPresidentMonroe,thoughthishardlyseemedasignificantthreat.
20RecoveringfromtheNapoleonicinvasionofherownterritory,Spainwasinnopositiontobebelligerent,ortoresistanAmericaninvasionofFlorida.
JacksonenteredFloridaandroamedatwill,despiterepeatedprotestsbytheSpanishministerinWashington.Ononeoccasion,hekidnappedthehaplessSpanishgovernorandstoletheroyalarchives;onanother,hehad250Blacksmassacredwiththejustificationthattheywereafterall"Americanproperty."IntheSuwanneeRiver,hetookprisoneranoldBritishtradersaidtobefriendlywiththeIndiansandhadhimshotfor"conspiringwiththeenemy."21Publicly,PresidentMonroedisclaimedanyresponsibilityforthesedeeds;hisgovernment,however,secretlyencouragedthem.TheundeclaredwarinFloridaputmuchpressureontheSpanishCrowntocedethepeninsula,astheAmericansrepeatedlyrequested.Unabletoresistbyforceofarms,theSpanishgovernmentstalled,hopingthatdiplomaticeffortwouldsaveitFlorida.InternationallawwasfullyonSpain'sside,butJacksonheldtheground.
InFebruary1821,afterthreeyearsofhaggling,thekingfinallyratifiedthetreatyofcession.MosthistoriesreportthatSpainreceived$5millionincompensation.Infact,theU.S.governmentagreedonlytosettleclaimsofAmericancitizensagainstSpainuptothatamount.Spainneversawapenny.AtabrilliantceremonyonJuly15,1821,JacksonandhismenstoodatattentioninthemainplazaofPensacolaastheSpanishflagcamedown,markingtheendofthreecenturiesofdomination.22Somuchsuffering,andonlytoendinthisignominioussurrenderinalittlePanhandletown.Nolongerwouldmen,weapons,andideascomeupfromtheislandofCuba.Nowtheywouldcome
fromthenorth,andquickly,inthewakeofJackson'svictory.
Beforethenewconquerorscouldimposetheirownbrandofcolonialism,though,thelandhadtoberidofitsold-timeoccupants.Theremnantsofcenturies-longIberianrulewererapidlyclearedoutasthefewSpanishsettlersreturnedtoCubaandasBlackrunawayswerecapturedandsoldbackintoslavery.NativeSeminoleswereinformed,innouncertainterms,thattheyhadtovacatetheland.In1830,theU.S.CongresspassedtheRemoval
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Act,thepurposeofwhichwasnothinglessthantheforceddisplacementofFlorida'sentirenativepopulationintothebarrenlandswestoftheMississippi.Today,aswevisittheelegantbeachresortsandthemanicuredthemeparksofDisneyWorld,itisdifficulttoimaginethatforallthistocomeabout,weepingIndianmen,women,andchildrenweremarchedatriflepointdowntheTrailofTears.Manymen,BlackandIndianalike,committedsuicideratherthanbesoldbackintoslaveryorremovedfromtheirland.
23
TheSeminoles,beingpushedeverdeeperintotheEverglades,resisted.TwoarmycompaniesunderMajorFrancisDadewerewipedoutastheymarchedeastfromTampa.ChiefsAlligatorandOsceolamettheremainingtroopsshortlyafterattheWithlacoocheeRiver,inflictingmanycasualties.LikeotherSeminoles,OsceolawasnotafullnativebutthesonofawhitefatherandaCreekIndianmother.InMarjoryStonemanDouglas'swords,"Hefoughtsavagely,yetherefusedtomakewaronwomenandchildrenorpermittorture.HewasunquestionablythegreatestFloridianofhisday."24Unabletodefeathiminbattle,GeneralThomasS.JesuptrickedtheSeminolechiefbysendinghimaflagoftruce.AsOsceolaandhisretinueenteredSt.Augustinefortheparley,theywerepromptlyenchainedandremittedtoCharleston,where,in1838,thechiefdiedofillnessandgrief.Hisheadwasthencutoffandexhibitedforawhileincircusshows.25
Thusthewhitesmovedrelentlesslyforwardwiththeiroccupationofthelongterritory.TheattackonthelighthouseatCapeFloridabythelastofthe"SpanishIndians"intheMiamiRiverwasafinaldesperateactofresistance.By1843,however,itwasallover.The"RedPeril"hadbeenputtoanendandthelandmadesafeforwhitesettlementandcottonplanting.Toachievethisend,theU.S.Armyhad
conductedascorched-earthpolicythatledtoFlorida'sdemographiccollapse.BytheendoftheSeminoleWar,thetotalpopulationhadfallentoanestimatedthirty-fivethousand,andthepeninsulaacquiredthatemptylookthatwastoendurewellintothetwentiethcentury.26
Inthemiddleyearsofthenineteenthcentury,Floridawaslargelyvacant,havingbeenmadesobythelogicofAmerica'simperialistexpansion.Beforetherewerebeachresorts,FortMyers,FortPierce,andFortLauderdaleweremilitary,outpostsof
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thatempire;MiamiatthetimewasknownasFortDallas.
27Visitingthepresent-dayMiccosukeereservationtwenty-fivemileswestofMiami,onewonderswhethertheseimpoverisheddescendantsofthefightingtribesareawareoftheirhistoricallinkwiththedescendantsofSpanishcolonistswhonowinhabitthecity.ForitwasunderthetenuousruleofSpainthattheSeminolesemergedasapeopleandprospered,havinglittletofearfromtheindifferentcolonialismoftheirneighborstothesouth.Thesuddenendofthatrulemarkedthenatives'nearextinctionunderafarmorelethalformofempire-making.
ShallowDixie
NowFloridacameundertheinfluenceofitsnorthernneighborsasitwasdiscoveredthatcottoncouldbegrowninthenewlyclearedlands.Demandforthefiber,andexhaustedsoilsonolderplantations,ledtoawaveofmigrationandinvestmentfromGeorgia,Virginia,andtheCarolinas.Anewplanterclassemerged,securingafirmgripontheterritorialgovernmentinPensacolaandlaterinTallahassee.ThenortherncountiesLeon,Jackson,Gadsden,Jefferson-acquiredthatpeculiarOldSouthcolorationasgracefulmansionswithclassicalGreekporticoesroseinthecountrysideandassocietycametorelyonslavesforallmanuallabor.Ownershipofslavesandlandwasthekeytowealthintheterritory,andthosewhohadthemweredeterminedthatthingsstaythatway.In1845,FloridaenteredtheUnionasaslavestate;in1861itseceded,brieflybecominganindependentrepublic.Americandomination,whichkilledoffsomanynativeFloridians,hadlastedjustfiftyyears.28
ThenewlyindependentrepublicthenjoinedandfoughtalongwiththerestoftheOldSouth,andwasdefeatedwithit.ButunlikeinGeorgia
orAlabama,plantationsocietydidnotreturntothepeninsula.ForFlorida,theendoftheCivilWaralsospelledtheendofthatpeculiarorder.BecauseithadbeenmerelyanoutpostoftheSpanishempire,FloridahadescapedthedestinyofaCaribbeansugarcolony.AndbecauseithadremainedinSpanishhandswellintothenineteenthcentury,italsomanagedtoescapethe''curseofcotton."29Despitedominanceinstategovernmentoftheyoungplanterclass,thatcoterieneversucceededinconsolidating
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itsholdontheterritoryasawhole.ThesparselysettledlandsleftinthewakeoftheSeminoleWarsencouragedamoredemocraticfrontierstyleoflife.Southandeastofthecotton-growingcounties,whereslaveswerefew,sentimentfortheUnionremainedstrongthroughoutthewar.
30
UnlikeitsDixieneighbors,then,Floridaescapedtheunenviablefateofaone-cropeconomy,tenancyandsharecropping,anddemagogicruralbosses.Instead,avastsocialvacuumemerged.Lackingadominantplanterclass,statepoliticsbecamefundamentallyatomized.NeitherSpanishnorsouthern,notyetfirmlyunderYankeerule,thestatedevelopedanamorphouspoliticalsystem.Thissystempersistedwellintothetwentiethcentury,whenthepoliticalscientistV.O.Keydescribedthesituationthus:"Floridaisnotonlyunbossed,itisalsounled....FactionallinesintheTennesseefashionsimplydonotexist.Nordoesthereseemtobeanyclear-cutfundamentalcleavagewithinthestatethatrevealsitselfstarklyintimesofpoliticaltensionasinAlabama."31
Centuriesofmarginalcolonizationfollowedbyawarofexterminationandanotherofsecessionhadfailedtoproduceasocialorderworthyofthename.ThetwoconflictssuccessivelyloppedoffthebottomandtopofFloridasocietysothat,bythelastquarterofthenineteenthcentury,thestatehadrevertedtoavacantlandawaitingresettlement.SouthofLakeOkeechobee,inparticular,thelandscapewasmuchasithadbeenatthetimeofPonce'svisitatangleofswampandmangrovewherethesaltwatercrocodilesandalligatorsvastlyoutnumberedthefewhumanresidents.
LikeJuanPoncedeLeón,HenryM.Flaglerwasfifty-threewhenhelandedinSt.Augustinein1883.ClosetowheretheSpaniardhad
plantedhisflag370yearsearlier,claimingtheterritoryforEmperorCharlesI,Flaglererecteda$1.25millionresorthotel.Withafinehistoricalsense,henameditafterPonce.Flaglerhadnodoubtwhothenewconquerorswouldbe.32
AnAmericanRiviera
BythetimeJuliaTuttlesentherbouquetoforangeblossomstwelveyearslater,thefutureofFlorida'snorthernAtlanticcoastwascertain.Flagler'selaboratechainofhotelsnowextendedallthewaydowntoLakeWorthfromthePoncedeLeonandthe
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AlcazarinSt.AugustinetotheBreakersinnewlyfashionablePalmBeach.Theywereimpressivestructures,capableofattractingtheNewEnglandandNewYorkgentrywhoarrivedaboardtheirprivaterailroadearsonFlagler'sJacksonville,St.Augustine,andIndianRiverRailway.Thelatenineteenthcenturywasnotthetimeofthecommonman,norwasMr.Flaglerabouttomakeitso.Hisestablishmentswerestrictlyfortherich;aftertheballseasonendedaroundmid-Marchandthemagnatesreturnedhome,theyclosedfortheyear.
33
YettherewassomedoubtaboutthelandwestofBiscayneBay.Itsfamewasdue,afterall,tothefactthatorangesdidnotfreezethereinwinter.TheweatherplusthefewgrovesaroundCocoanutGroveauguredfortheareaatranquilruralfutureasacitrusshipper.Buttherailroadthatwassupposedtotransportthefruitnorthbroughtinsteadamixedbagofhuckstersandvisionarieswho,innotime,changedforgoodthefortunesoftheplace.Miamiwasliterallybuiltupfromswampandmangrovetobecomeanassortmentofthemeparksfeaturing"sunandsand,bathingbeauties,glamoroushotels,palatialhomes,nightclubs,racetracks,andacertaindashofsin."34
FirstoffthetrainwasMr.Flaglerhimself,whoseRoyalPalmHotel,builtoveraTequestaburialgroundbytheMiamiRiver,continuedthetraditionofextendingawinterwelcometothewell-bornandpowerful.Flagler'sbaronialstyleisperhapsbestcapturedintheveryfoundingofthecityinJuly1896.Miamiwasincorporatedatameetingattendedby368persons,162ofthemBlacklaborersfromFlagler'srailroad.This"blackartillery,"broughttotheassemblybyJohnSewellonFlagler'sorders,votedasitwastoldto,thusinsuringthattheinterestsoftheFloridaEastCoastRailwayhadpriority.Aftertheelection,theBlackswerepromptlysentbackoverthetracksand
forgotten.EvenMrs.Tuttleandherdreamsofaliquor-free,genteelcitywerepushedasideasmoredaringadventurerspouredfromFlagler'straincars.Theygavethecity,fromitsbeginnings,amoreextravagant,unruly,anddemocraticflavorthanthesecondPalmBeachcontemplatedbytheladypioneerandthebaron.35
Oftheseearlyentrepreneurs,nonewasmoreimportanttothenewcity'sfuturethanaQuakerhorticulturistfromNewJerseynamedJohnS.Collins.HecametoMiamiwhentheideaoftropical
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fruitproductiontherestillhadcurrency,andimmediatelyboughtthebarrierislandbetweentheAtlanticOceanandBiscayneBaywiththenotionofturningitintoanavocadoplantation.Thelandresistedthiscrop,asithadresistedLum'scoconutstwodecadesearlier.Astheavocadofarmwentbust,oldCollinsyieldedtohischildren'sentreatiestoselltheplaceinlotstotourists.Butinordertogetthefruitoutandthepeoplein,communicationtothemainlandwasnecessary.CollinsstrainedhiscreditinNewJerseyandMiamitobuildawoodenbridgeacrossBiscayneBayonlytoseeconstructionstop,forlackofmoney,halfamileshort.
36
Sinkingonehundredthousand1912dollarsintoabridgeleadingnowherewasheartbreaking,especiallysincedemandforoceanfrontlotswasontherise.ReliefcameintheformofanIndianahucksterandself-mademillionairebythenameofCarlJ.Fisher,builderoftheIndianapolisSpeedway,inventorofPrest-o-lite,andpromoterofthefirstcross-countryhighway.Withthesameirrepressibleenergy,FishersetouttofinishwhatFlaglerandCollinshadstarted.Hecompletedthebridgeandclearedtheland,actuallymakingmoreofitbythesimpleexpedientofdredgingsandfromtheshallowbay.Ontopofthisnewlandheputgolfcourses,baroque-stylehotels,andgrandmansions.37
AshisvisionofMiamiBeachtookshape,oneofFisher'sfewconcernssharedbymostofhisfellowdeveloperswastopreventtheplacefrombeingturnedintoanotherAtlanticCity,bythenvirtuallyaJewishcolony.Signsspecifying"GentilesOnly"blossomedasFisherandCollinsmovedtokeepmoneyedJewishshopkeepersoutoftheirnewresort.Lotsintheirdevelopmentsweredeededwithprovisosthatread:"Saidproperty,shallnotbesold,leasedorrentedinanyformor
manner,byanytitleeitherlegalorequitable,toanypersonorpersonsotherthanoftheCaucasianrace."38AtthesoutherntipofMiamiBeach,meanwhile,theLummusbrothersdeveloperswithlesscapitalandfewerprejudiceswerenotabouttoletgoodmoneypassthemby.ItwasontheirlandthattheoriginalMiamiJewishcommunitygainedafoothold.
Backonthemainland,SalomonMerrick'scitrusplantationhadalsogonebust,leavingtheformerNewYorkpastorwithalotofidleland.LikethesonsoffarmerCollins,thoseofMerrickquicklysawthelightand,withsomeoutsidebacking,begantoimprovethe
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area.TheexclusiveresidentialcityofCoralGablesnetteditsdevelopersaprofitestimatedatmorethan$20millionduringitsfirstfiveyearsalone.
39
Thetycoons,hucksters,andvisionarieswhoweremininggoldoutofthesandsofMiamihadsomethingincommonmorepeculiarthanasimpleloveofmoney.Northernersall,itmighthaveseemedreasonableforthemtoconceiveofaseasideresortonthemodelofNewportorCapeMay.Yetthisdidnothappenbecause,almosttoaman,theseYankeedeveloperswereobsessedwiththeMediterranean,andinparticularwithSpain.HenryFlaglersetthetonewithhotelsthatreproduced,inminutedetail,thehuesandarabesquesofAndalusianarchitecture.St.Augustinetoourdayisacounterpointbetweenthemajesticfake-baroquestructuresofthePoncedeLeonandtheAlcazarandtheunpretentiousremnantsoftheoriginalsettlement.The"nation'soldestcity"becamefarmoreSpanishundertheYankeetycoonthanithadeverbeenduringthreecenturiesofSpanishdomination.40
Nottobeoutdone,HenryM.Plantspentthreemillion1890dollarsonhisTampaBayHotel,whosethirteenMoorishtowersandminarets,itsshiningcrescentsandpiazzas,madeit,inthemindofitsowner,"thegreatesthotelintheworld."PlantevenbuiltarailroadfromcentralFloridatotransportvisitorstohishotel.41Downsouth,BiscayneBaydrewaswarmofvisitorswhosawinitsmagnificentvistasthebeginningsofanAmericanRiviera.OneofthesewasJamesDeering,ofInternationalHarvesterfortune,whodecidedtobuildhimselfawintervillasouthoftheMiamiRiver.Completedin1916,thismagnificentstructurefeaturesacoralrockpierintheshapeofaVenetiangondola,abroadpiazzaoverlookingthebay,andavast
collectionofobjetsd'artimportedfromEurope.DespiteitsVenetianstyle,thevillawasnamedVizcayaconfirmingDavidRieff'sobservationthatinSouthFlorida,SpainandItalywerealwaysgettingconfused.42
HispanophiliawastakentoanextremebytheyoungerMerricks,whoconceivedCoralGablesonascaleandatanexpensethatbogglesthemind.Itwastobenotmerelyapleasantresidentialarea,butthebestresortintheworld;itwouldboast,amongotherthings,thegrandesthotelandthemostprestigiousuniversityinthecountrytoday'sBiltmoreHotelandtheUniversity,ofMiami.
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MetropolitanMiami,indeed,isprobablytheonlycityintheworldwithtwocopiesofSeville'sGiraldaTower.OneistheBiltmore;theother,builtatthebayfront,washomeoftheMiamiNewsuntilitcametohousetheCubanRefugeeCenterandwasrebaptizedFreedomTower.
43
TheleitmotivoftheMerricks'grandioseprojectwas,astheBiltmorearchitecturesymbolizes,Andalusian.Eventoday,oneentersCoralGablesthroughfakeSpanishfortgatestofaceshadedstreetsnamedGranada,Giralda,Galiano,Oviedo,andPoncedeLeon.UnliketheplaceandstreetnamesofsouthernCalifornia,oftenincomicallyanglicizedSpanish,thoseinsouthernFloridaarealwayscorrect.TheMerrickskepttheirdictionarycloseby.TheirAndalusianthemeparkcamecompletewithMoorishminarets,abaroquefrontispiecefortheCongregationalchurch,"Spanish"mosseverywhere,andacoralrockswimmingplacenamed(perhapsinanswerto"VillaVizcaya")the"Venetian"pool.44
Theleadofthesepioneerswasfollowedbymyriadothersduringtheboomofthetwenties.EveryonewantedaSpanishvillabythewater.PlacescalledMar-a-Lago,Miramar,andBuenRetirohousedtheluckyentouragesoftheFishersandtheFirestones.Aself-appointedarchitectnamedAddisonMiznerdottedtheFloridacoastwithastylethatmixed,inastonishingproportions,everythingMediterraneanthatmoneycouldbuy.45SouthFlorida'sdemandforSpanishgrillwork,Italianterraces,andMoorishtilebecamesogreatthatartisansfromalloverEuropecametoMiamitohelpturnthismixoffadandobsessionintoreality:"By1930...MiamiBeach'soceanfrontwascoveredwithCasasdePlayawhoseredtiledroofsandstuccoedwallslookedasifPoncedeLeonhadreallycolonizedFloridaafterall."46
ForthefirstthreehundredyearsofitshistoryFloridawassettledfromthesouth;forthelasthundred,theprocessshifteddirectiontocomefromthenorth.Evenso,thepeninsulacouldnotshakeoffSpain.HerdistantinfluencecamefirstinthegalleonsofvisionaryconquerorsandsoldiersfromCubaandtheninthebriefcasesanddreamsofYankeeentrepreneurs.Thenotionthathistoryrepeatsitself,thesecondtimebeingaparodyofthefirst,couldfindnobetterevidencethanintheornateminarets,baroquehotels,andSpanish-stylevillasbuiltbytheMerricksandMizners.47Al-
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thoughfewresidentsofCoralGablescouldpronouncethenamesoftheirstreetscorrectly,itdidnotmatter:theplacestoodasapeculiarlinktoFlorida'spastandapremonitionofthingstocome.
TheBlacks
Beneaththedreamlandsbuiltbynortherndevelopers,arealcitywastakingshape,anditwassubstantiallyBlack.By1910,fully42percentofMiami'sfivethousand-oddinhabitantswereBlack.Yetfewtouristsormoneyedresidentshadcontactwiththispopulation,exceptinthelatter'scapacityasservantsandmanualworkers;thecityfatherstookgoodcaretokeepthemisolatedinremotequarters.Thelandwithincityboundaries,originallyownedbyJuliaTuttleandMaryBrickell,anotherearlysettler,wasdeededinsuchafashionthatwhitesreceivedallthebayfrontpropertyandthatonbothsidesoftheMiamiRiver.Blackswereconfinedtoanorthwestquarteracrosstherailroadtracks,whichbecameknownas"ColoredTown,"laterOvertown.
48
TheMiamiBlackpopulationwasuniqueinthatitcontained,inadditiontomigrantsfromGeorgiaandtheCarolinas,asizablenumberofBahamians,whohadbeenbroughttoworkonagriculturalplantationsandsubsequentlyinrailroadandhotelconstruction.ManysettledinCocoanutGrove,givingtheareaadistinct"island"atmospherethatlaststoourday.UnlikeBlacksfromtheDeepSouthaccustomedtoservilestatusandheavydiscrimination,theBahamiansarrivedwithoutastrongsenseofstigma.In1908,JudgeJohnGramblingoftheMiamiMunicipalCourtnotedthat,untiltheyweretaughtalessoninmannersbytheMiamipolice,"ThegreatnumberofNassauNegroes...upontheirarrivalhereconsideredthemselvesthesocialequalofwhitepeople."49
PuttingBahamiansintheirplacewasimportant,butbynomeanswasitthewhiteestablishment'sonlyworryvis-à-vistheBlacks.Asthetouristboomtookoff,largenumbersofreliablemanuallaborerswereneeded,andthoseworkerswereoverwhelminglyBlack.Theybuilttherailroad,thevillas,andthehotelsandlaterstaffedthemwithporters,maids,waiters,andgardeners.YetevenasBlackworkersbuiltMiami,theirgrowingnumbersposedaproblemtohoteliersanddeveloperswhohadtomakesurethattheirpresencedidnotsullytheimageofanunspoiledMedi-
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terraneanparadise.ThesolutionwastoconfineBlackstorestrictedresidentialquartersandtocontrolthemwithvariousformsofintimidation,mostlyentrustedtothepolice.
In1898,soldiersofCampMiami,builtbytheU.S.ArmyduringtheSpanish-AmericanWar,amusedthemselvesbyharassingthehaplessresidentsofColoredTown.Ononeoccasion,theykilledaBlackandinjuredseveralothersfornoapparentreason.Onanother,theyinvadedinforcewhenarumorspreadthataBlackhadkilledasoldier,forcingtheresidentstofleeinterror.Notasinglesoldierwaseverarrestedforthesedeeds.Regular"necktieparties"werevisiteduponBlacksaccusedofattackingwhites,especiallyiftheallegeddeedinvolvedrape.ThefirstcitynewspaperoptimisticallynamedtheMetropolismadeaspecialtyofarousinganti-Blackfeelingsonsuchoccasions,suggestingmeasuresforthewholesaledisposalofthe"blackfiends."Epithetssuchas"darky"and"coon"appearedregularlyinthepagesofboththeMetropolisanditsrisingcompetitor,theMiamiHerald.
50
ThecampaignofintimidationagainsttheBlackminoritywasnotaimless;indeed,ithadtwoverycleargoals.ThefirstwastopreventBlackexpansionintoadjacentneighborhoods.Thesecondwastopreventtheminority'senfranchisementthroughtheelectoralsystem.Untilthe1930s,everyattemptbyBlackfamiliestomoveoutofthecrowdedandunhealthylivingconditionsinColoredTownwasmetwithviolence.A1911MiamiHeraldarticledeclaredthat"theadvanceoftheNegropopulationislikeaplagueandcarriesdevastationwithittoallsurroundingproperty."51ThefewBlackswhohadmanagedtoleaveColoredTownby1915hadtoabandontheirhomesinahurry,afterbeingvisitedbymaskedmenwho
threatenedtheirlives.Thispatternofintimidationpersistedformorethanfiftyyears.Aslateas1951,BlackfamiliesattemptingtomoveintoanapartmentbuildingoutsideOvertownweregreetedbyaseriesofdynamiteexplosions.InthatsecondyearofrenewedAmericaninvolvementinAsia,theseblastswerelargeandfrequentenoughtoearnfortheareathenickname"LittleKorea."52
ForcefulattemptstoexcludeBlacksfromthepollswerelessfrequent,thoughnolessviolent.TheydatedbacktothedaysofworkonFlagler'srailroad,butbeganinearnestwiththearrivaloftheKuKluxKlaninMiamiin1921.TheKlan,foundedinGeorgia
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in1915onthemodelofitsReconstructionerapredecessor,madeaspecialtyofrunningoutoftownministersandleadersoftheBlackcommunitywhoadvocatedracialequalityorgreaterBlackparticipationinthepoliticalprocess.In1939,theKlanattemptedtopreventBlackvotinginaprimaryelectionbyholdingaparadethroughColoredTownwithhoodedmenaboarddozensofcars.Klansmenburnedcrossesatone-blockintervals.Adummyhangingbyanoosefromapowerpoleboreared-letteredsign:"Thisniggervoted."
53
Upto1960,BlackMiamicloselyresembledsimilarareasinotherSoutherncities,despitethecity'sprojectedimageofacosmopolitanworld-classplayground.Aslateas1982,theEconomistobservedthat"MiamiisnotagoodcityinwhichtobeBlack."54Fromthestart,avastriftdevelopedbetweenthewhitefantasylandminglingItalianandAndalusiandreamsandthestarkrealityoftheBlackproletariat.ForBlackswereMiami'strueworkingclass,eventhoughtheireconomicsubordinationwasbothconcealedandcompoundedbyraciallinesandofficiallysponsoreddiscrimination.Theywere,morethanwhiteworkerswouldhavebeen,cutofffromthebenefitsofthecitytheywerebuildingtosuchanextentthat,to"swiminsaltwater,"theyhadtoleaveDadeCounty.55
Despitepovertyandmeagerresources,theBlackpopulationfoughtback.Churches,businessorganizations,andpublishingconcernsemerged,providingleadershipforthecommunity'sdevelopmentandforthestruggleagainstoppression.By1905,abusinessdistricthaddevelopedonahalf-milestripalongAvenueGinColoredTown.Black-ownedbusinessesinthedistrictincludedgrocerystores,anicecreamparlor,apharmacy,afuneralhome,andanewspaper.Later,and
farthernorth,aseriesofjazzandbluesnightclubsemergedinthesamestreet(nowrenamedNorthwestSecondAvenue),earningitthesobriquet"LittleBroadway."MarianAnderson,NatKingCole,andmanyotherBlackstarsofthethirtiesandfortiesperformedthere.56
AsincoloredsectionsofotherAmericancities,theconfinementoftheentireBlackpopulationintotightquartersledtosocialdifferentiationandtheemergenceofasmallbutactivemiddleclass.DavidA.Dorsey,ColoredTown'sfirstandonlymillionaireinthe1910s,builtthearea'sfirstpark,library,andschool.Henry
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ReevespublishedtheMiamiTimes,thelargestBlacknewspaper,whichprovidedaminorityalternativetotheviewsairedintheMetropolis.TheseleadersandotherprominentcitizensfoundedtheCivicLeagueofColoredTown,theNegroUpliftAssociationofDadeCounty,andtheColoredBoardofTrade,organizationsthattooktheleadinfightingdiscriminationandtheKlan.
57
Althoughfailureswerecommoninthefaceofwhatamountedtoofficialsupportforracism,thereweresomescatteredsuccesses.LibertyCity,forexample,todayMiami'smainBlackneighborhood,wasbornoutofonesucheffortspearheadedbyaBlackEpiscopalministerandtheGreaterMiamiNegroCivicLeagueintheearly1930s.TheypersuadedtheMiamiHerald'seditortorunaseriesofexposésonthedeplorablelivingconditionsinOvertownandtheconsequentproliferationofcontagiousdiseases.Atthattime,theinfantmortalityrateintheareawastwicethatofwhiteMiami,andthereweresporadicoutbreaksofinfluenza,yellowfever,andsmallpox.ThenewsreachedWashingtonandcontributedtothedecisionofRoosevelt'sPublicWorksAdministration(PWA)tobuildthefirsthousingprojectinthesoutheasternstates.LocatedbetweenN.W.62dand67thstreets,theprojectconsistedinitiallyofthirty-fourapartmentunitsandwasbaptized"LibertySquare."58
Thereisevidence,however,thattheBlackleaders'petitionstotheNewDealersweresuccessfulonlybecausetheycoincidedwiththeinterestsoftheMiamiestablishment.TheformalapplicationforLibertySquaretothePWA'shousingdivisionwassubmittedbytheSouthernHousingCorporation,organizedbyleadingmembersofthewhitebusinesselite.TheirpointmanwasJohnGrambling,thesameformerjudgewhohadpraisedtheMiamipoliceforputtingBahamian
immigrantsintheirplace.Hiseffortsin1933togetthePWAtoeradicateColoredTown's"slum"stemmedlessfromachangeofheartthanfromthedesiretopushBlacksevenfartherawayfromanexpandingcentralbusinessdistrict.59Norwasthechoiceoftheproject'slocationentirelycasual.GramblingwasatthetimethepersonalattorneyofFloydW.Davis,adeveloperwhoownedmuchoftheemptylandaroundLibertySquareandwhostoodtoprofitenormouslyfromtheexplodingBlackdemandforhousing.Inshort,ashistorianR.Mohl,putsit,"The
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availabilityoffederalhousingfundsmobilizedthecivicelite,whosawinslumclearanceagoldenopportunitytopushtheBlacksoutofthedowntownarea.''
60
Hence,eventhesmallvictoriesofBlackleadersdidnotoccurwithoutthesupportofthedowntownestablishment.Betterhousingandpoliticalrepresentationwerethelong-termgoalsoftheBlackcommunitythatorganizationsliketheKKKattemptedtothwart.However,themainconfrontations,thoseinwhichtheminoritypopulationpouredoutintothestreets,hadlesstodowithlong-termimprovementeffortsthanwithproximateincidentsofviolence.Soldiers,Klansmen,andpolicefeltfreetoattackindividualBlackswithcompleteimpunity.TheabsenceoflegalredressinsuchcaseswastheprincipalmotiveformostspontaneousmobilizationsandnearriotsinOvertownandtheninLibertyCity.Notuntil1928,afteraseeminglyendlessseriesofviolentattacksonColoredTown'scitizens,werethefirstwhitepoliceofficersindictedforbeatingaBlackmantodeath.Butthen,afterdeliberatingforthreehours,theall-whitejuryacquittedtheofficers.61
Similareventstookplacewithalmostmonotonousregularityduringthenextfortyyears.Morethanhousingorpoliticalrepresentation,whatdroveBlacksintothestreetswastheneedtodefendthemostbasicrightofall,lifeitself.Thispatternofconfrontation,firmlyimplantedintheBlackcollectiveconsciousnessafterdecadesofoppression,createdthebackdropagainstwhichthe"McDuffie"riotandotherviolentuprisingsduringthe1980smustbeunderstood.
TheCities
Before1949,thelawsofthestateofFloridaallowedtwenty-fiveor
morepersonsofanyhamlet,village,ortownwhowerefreeholdersandregisteredvoterstoestablishamunicipalcorporation.If,afterlegalpublicnotice,two-thirdsoftheinhabitants,butnofewerthantwenty-fivepersons,metandagreedtoformamunicipality,theycoulddoso,earningforthemselvesallthepowersoftaxationandregulationgrantedbythestatetomunicipalcorporations.
ThedeveloperswhoinventedMiamifounditconvenienttogivetheircreationslegalstandingsoastogainforthemselvesallthepowersgrantedbythestate.Undertheeasyincorporationlaws,
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theyquicklymovedtoturntheirorangegrovesandfailedplantationsintofull-fledgedcities.Miamimadeitsdebutin1896,followedinDadeCountybyHomestead,incorporatedin1913,andFloridaCityin1914.AllthreeplaceswerestationsalongthenewbranchofHenryFlagler'sFloridaEastCoastRailway.Subsequently,CollinsandhisfollowersincorporatedMiamiBeach(1915),andtheMerricksdidthesamewithCoralGables(1925).Opa-LockadeveloperGlenCurtiss'sdreamofthe"BaghdadofAmerica,"withstreetsnamedSheherazadeandAliBababecameacityin1926.MiamiSprings,SouthMiami,andNorthMiamifollowedduringthenexttwoyears.
62
TheproliferationoflocalgovernmentunitsslowedsomewhatintheaftermathoftheGreatDepression,thoughfivemorecitieswerecreatedduringthe1930s:MiamiShores(1931),BiscaynePark(1931),andElPortal(1937)onthemainland,andtwotinybarrierislandsacrossBiscayneBay,Surfside(1935)andIndianCreekVillage(1939).Thepaceacceleratedinthe1940swiththeincorporationofSweetwater(1941),BalHarbour(1946),BayHarborIslands(1947),VirginiaGardens(1947),HialeahGardens(1948),Medley(1949),andPennsuco(1949).In1949,thestatelegislaturefinallypassedameasurethatpreventedfurthermunicipalincorporations.Thelawwasreinforcedbyaninformallegislativeagreementin1953prohibitingthecreationofnewcitiesbyspecialacts.63
Butthedamagewasdone.Laxregulationhadledtoahodgepodgeoftwenty-six"cities"that,in1990,rangedinsizefrom358,548(Miami)to13(Islandia).Areasthatinothercitieswouldbesmallormidsizeneighborhoods,inDadearefull-fledgedmunicipalities.Theproliferationoflocalauthorities,pettyrivalries,andoverlappingjurisdictionsresultedininefficientprovisionofbasicservicestothe
true"city"thatencompassedalmosttheentirecounty.Inaddition,after1949manyresidentsmovedtothe"unincorporated"areaofDadeCounty,servicedbycountyagenciesbutuntaxedbyanymunicipalauthority.Theobviousneedtoprovidecountywideservicesandtheequallyobviousinequityofservicecostsforcityversuscountyresidentswastoshapethelocalpoliticalagendaforyearstocome.Thestruggletocreateabadlyneededmetropolitanformofgovernmentinthefaceofdeterminedmunicipalresistanceandtheparadoxofan"unincorporated"areatwo
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andahalftimeslargerthanthelargestcity(1,036,925vs.358,548,in1990)wasthelegacyofthedevelopers'chaoticdreams.
64
FloridaPolitics
Politicsinpre-1960Miamiwasnotsomuchastrugglebetweenwell-definedpartyforcesasabeautycontestamongmembersofasingleparty.TheDemocratsreignedsupreme.TheRepublicanparty,turnedbytheReconstructioneraintoapermanentminorityforce,wasriddledwithfactionalism.TounderstandthecharacterofMiamipoliticsinthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,onemustfirstlookatthesingularstatecontextinwhichitwasembedded.
Florida,thatlong-vacantland,wasbeingresettled.TheOldSouth,tooweaktodominatethenewterritory,becameapassagewayforthosecomingfromfarthernorth.FarmersvictimizedbybollweevilanddroughtintheirhomestatessettledbytheIndianRiver;hordesofretireesdiscoveredSt.PetersburgandTampa;andwell-heeledeasternfamilieswereseducedbythemanicuredplaygroundsthatFlaglerplantedalonghisrailroad.Bythemidtwentiethcentury,48percentofFlorida'spopulationhadbeenbornelsewhere,comparedto11percentinGeorgiaand10percentintheCarolinas.65
Thesettlementprofileofthepeninsulaalsocontrastedinmultiplewayswiththeneighboringstates.By1940,only16percentofFlorida'spopulationlivedinruralareas,comparedto48percentinSouthCarolina,57percentinArkansas,and64percentinMississippi.Floridaagriculturebecameincreasinglydiversifiedandtechnology-driven.Itsweightinthestate'seconomywasbalanced,however,bylumberingandfishinginterests,construction,and,aboveall,tourism.Thisdiversificationgavethestatethehighestincomepercapitainthe
South,withtheexceptionofoil-richTexas,andaparadoxicalpoliticalsystemdominatedbyasinglepartyyetfreeofthehegemonyofanyinterestblock.66
InFlorida,candidatesforCongressandforthestatelegislatureoftenranasindividuals,ratherthanaspartofa"ticket"asintherestoftheSouth;localofficialsfrequentlyrefusedtoendorsecandidatesforstateoffice,lesttheyantagonizelocalopponentsofthosecandidates;andformergovernorsseldomhadenoughclouttogetthemselveselectedtotheU.S.Senateoreventootherstateoffices.
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Theoutcomeofelectionsdependedonshiftingcoalitionsinwhichthefarmers,thedevelopers,theinsuranceindustry,andotherspecial-interestgroupsparticipatedbutwhichnoonedominated.ThisgavetoFloridapoliticsthatatomized,amorphousqualityuniqueintheSouth.
67
ThesystemisbestreflectedbythepeculiarcharacteroftheFloridaexecutivebranch,establishedbytheconstitutionof1885.Thisdocumentprovidedforacollegialexecutiveinwhichnotonlythegovernor,butalsothesecretaryofstate,attorneygeneral,comptroller,superintendentofpublicinstruction,statetreasurer,andagriculturecommissionerwereelectedstatewide.Thegovernorcouldnotserveinasecondfour-yearterm,butcabinetofficialscouldbereelectedindefinitely.Manyactuallydiedinoffice.Duringtheirtenure,theyservedexofficioandwiththerighttovoteinallkeystateboardsandcommissions.Thisanachronistic"cabinetsystem,"whichseverelyrestrictedthepowerofthechiefexecutiveanddilutedresponsibilityforgovernmentdecisions,wasactuallydefendedbymanyasprovidingtheonlymeasureofstabilityinashiftingpoliticalorder.InV.O.Key'sopinion,"Itmaynotbemerecoincidencethatsuchaninstitutiondevelopedinthesouthernstatewiththemostdisintegratedstructureofpoliticalorganization."68
Ittakestimetoputdownrootsinaplace,tocultivatestableloyalties,andtoidentifyreliableenemies.Factionsconsolidatedelsewhereoverthecourseofgenerationshadbutafeeblebaseinapopulationofsun-seekingretirees,part-timetourists,andnewlyarrivedfarmers.TheradicalindividualismdisplayedinFloridaelectionswasbutthepoliticalreflectionofastill-unsettledsocialorder.Bythemid-twentiethcentury,Florida,thoughnolongeravacantfrontierland,wasstillinsearchofanidentityandfarmorepermeabletooutside
influencesthantheoldersocietiesofitserstwhileConfederatepartners.
TheFightforMetropolis
Whatwastrueofthestateasawholewasmoresoatitssoutherntip.DadeCounty'spopulationwasevennewerandmoreunsettledthanthatoftherestofthestate.CrispBostonianaccentsmixedwiththenasaltwangofmidwesterners,theslowcadencesofGeorgians,andtheharshNewYorkintonations.Thispopulationhad
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littleconnectionwiththearea'spastandlittleincommonamongthemselves,exceptperhapstheloveofsunandsandandofthemoneythatcouldbemadefromthem.WiththeexceptionofBlacks,whoseconditiondidnotdiffermuchfromthatoftheirbrethreninothersoutherncities,Dade'spopulacecouldhavebeenfoundanywhereinthecountry.Developerstookfulladvantageofthisfragmentationtoquicklyandeasilytransformnewlydrainedswampsintopoliticaljurisdictions.
TheloyaltiesthateventuallyemergedinDadeCountydidnotencompasstheentiremetropolitanarea,butwentonlyasfarasthemunicipalborders.ResidentsofCoralGables,thebest-laid-outresortinthearea,developedanimageasaprivilegedenclave,jealousofitsmunicipalprerogativesandwearyofanycloseintercoursewiththelessfortunatecitizensofothersubdivisions.Incontrast,Hialeahdeterioratedfromthestylishneighborhood-bythe-racetrackadvertisedbyGlenCurtissintoajumbleofcheapbungalowsandtrailerparks,becomingprogressivelypoorandfallingundertheinfluenceofaseriesofnotoriouspoliticalbosses.Tothenorth,Curtiss'sArabianstyleOpaLockacityhallpeeledandfadedasfastastheinhabitants'socialstanding;thecitybecameincreasinglyBlackandpoor,housingrefugeesfromLibertyCityandOvertown.
69
InthatavocadoplantationcumtropicalresortcalledMiamiBeach,themostinterestingdevelopmentoccurredastheoneethnicgroupexplicitlybarredbyFisherandCollinssettledenmasse,displacingtheoriginalgentileproprietors.NewYorkJewishtouristshadstartedcomingforshortvacations,settlinginthemodesthotelsandhousesoftheLummusbrothers'subdivisionsouthofFifthStreet.Astheboomofthe1920scametoanendandwealthyvacationersstarted
bypassingMiamiBeachformoreexoticdestinations,localrealtorsquicklybecamelesssqueamishabouttheethnicbackgroundoftheircustomers.Whenitcamerightdowntoit,aJewishmillionairewasbetterthannomillionaireatall.70
ThedepressionyearswerehardonMiamiBeach,butwealthyJewsarrivedtopickuptheslackbothascustomersandasbuyersofproperty.WiththemcameYiddishandsynagogues,delicatessens,andevenHebrewprivateacademiesanduniversities,transformingtheresortintoanextensionoftheirJewishNewYorkenclave.WhereCarlFisherhaddreamedofanexclusiveplay
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groundforwealthyAngloSaxons,thehithertodiscriminatedagainstminorityerectedacityinitsownimagethatobliteratedtheresort'searlysocialambiance.Jewswerecitypeople,andtheyconceivedoftheirplaygroundinurbanterms-aWarsawbythesea.TheirinfluencewasmostmarkedsouthofLincolnRoad,wherethequaintlittlehotelsandnumeroussmallshopsexudedanunmistakableethnicflavor.Thehumandimensionsoftheplace,infact,weretosaveMiamiBeachfromruinhalfacenturylater,whenthis"ArtDeco"districtwasrediscovered.
71
NostablepoliticalcoalitiongainedhegemonyoverMiamiitself,however.Duringthe1930s,DanielJ.Mahoney,publisheroftheMiamiNews,andFloridasenatorErnestG.Grahamforgedapoliticalcoalitionthattookcontrolofpoliticalpatronage,functioningforawhileasa"LittleTammany."Afteritsdissolutionanduntilthe1950s,thefamiliarpoliticalvacuumreemerged,filledonlyinpartbythegrowinginflueneeoftheMiamiHeraldanditsassociateeditorJohnPennekamp.Intheabsenceofawellarticulatedpowerelite,thenewspaperassumedthisrolebydefault,becomingapowerbrokerinitsownright.72
Lackofatruebipartisansystemandofaconsolidatedelitewasnowheremoreevidentthaninthefighttoestablishametropolitansystemofgovernment.Thecomplexitiesofmanagingagrowingcitysqueezedintoanarrowstripbetweenoceanandswamplandhadbecomepainfullyobvious.Apatchworkofadhocsolutionshademerged,suchasthearrangementsbywhichthecityofMiamisoldwatertoHialeah,MiamiSprings,andMiamiBeachandprovidedtheuseoftheMiamipolicecommunicationssystemtosmallermunicipalities.Areawideagencieshadbeencreatedbythestate
legislaturetoattendtothemosturgentneeds.In1945,forexample,anactofthelegislaturedidawaywiththeGreaterMiamiPortAuthorityandreplaceditwiththeDadeCountyPortAuthority.undercontroloftheCountyCommissionandwithjurisdictionover"allharborsandairports,tunnels,causeways,andbridges."73
Buttheseshort-termsolutionswerenotenough.Thetruecity,growinginalldirections,requiredunifiedgovernance.Themyriadincorporated"cities,"ledbyCoralGables,however,orchestratedafierceoppositiontoallproposalsformetropolitangovernment.Thefightpitteddowntownbusinessandcivicleaders,whosawapressingneedforcoordinatedauthority,againstlocalresidents
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bentonprotectingtheirownparticularlife-styles.Theindependent"cities"werebackedbytheirownemployeeunionsandtheirsuppliers;opposingthemwasaloosecoalitionledbytheMiamiHeraldandincludingtheDadeCountylegislativedelegation,theDadeCountyResearchFoundation,andtheMiami-DadeChamberofCommerce.
74
Despitetheirimpressiveroster,thepro-Metroforcessufferedaseriesofdefeatsatthehandsofthemunicipalities.MiamiBeachcomplainedtirelesslythatitcontributedfarmoreinsalestaxesfromtourismthanitreceivedfromthecountyinservices.Otherlocalitieshadgripesoftheirown.Beneaththeseprotestsandtheeffectiveresistancetheyarticulatedwasthefactthatsocialstructureandcommunitysolidaritybarelytranscendedlocalboundaries.Residentsidentifiedwiththeirimmediatesurroundings,betheyinCoralGables,MiamiBeach,orHialeah.Inthiscontext,thevoicescallingforacitywidediscoursefacedanuphillbattle,despitethepressingneedsonwhichtheygroundedtheirposition.
MetropolitangovernmentultimatelycametoMiamiinatwostageprocessthatrequiredapprovalofaHomeRuleAmendmentforDadeCountybytheFloridaelectorateandthenpassageofametropolitancharterbycountyvoters.Homerulegarneredafull70percentofthestatevoteintheelectionsofNovember1956.Passageofthemetropolitancharterwouldseemaneasylaststep.Themunicipalities,however,hadotherideasandbitterlycontestedthereform.TheMetroCharterpassedinthespecialelectionofMay1957byamere1,784votes44,404forversus42,620against.NotasingleprecinctinMiamiBeachandHialeahvotedinfavor,andmostsmallercitiesalsoturnedthereformdown.Onlyamassivevoteinthecentralcityenabled
Metrotobecomelaw.75
TheclashbetweenthecityofMiamiandthesurroundingmunicipalitieswasnottheclassicalconfrontationbetweenalowincomecentralcityanditsaffluentsuburbs,for,withtheexceptionofLibertyCityandOvertown,mostofthemetropolitanareawasinfact"agiantsuburb."76Theconflicthadtodoinsteadwiththepettyloyaltiesbuiltovertheshortspanofthearea'sexistenceasacityandwiththevestedinterestscreatedduringtheearlyfeverofincorporation.ForalargepartofthispopulationofNewYorkretirees,transplantedNewEnglanders,andChicagobusinessmen,theideaof"metropolitanMiami"wasstillanabstraction.Downtownleaderswhohadbeguntothinkinthesetermsscoredtheir
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firsttangiblevictorywiththepassageoftheMetroCharter.Itpavedthewayforacceptanceofthecityasarealplaceandfortheexpansionofacivicspiritconfinedthusfartonarrowlocalboundaries.Thisvictory,however,occurredin1957,justtwoyearsbeforethetriumphoftherevolutionariesledbyFidelCastroinCuba.
OntheThresholdoftheSixties
ThemostprominentpoliticalfigureinFloridaintheearlyyearsofthetwentiethcenturywasNapoleonBonaparteBroward.Acommittedpopulist,BrowardwastheantithesisofHenryFlagler,whosebaronialstyleheopposed.Asgovernor,hebeganthedrainingoftheEverglades,aprojecthebelievedtobeinthepublicinterest,whilesimultaneouslyfightingthe"wildcapitalism"hesawgrowingeverywherearoundhim.HisroughbrandofpopulismcameasclosetodividingFloridapoliticsintoentrenchedfactionsasanythingbeforeorafter.
77BrowardhadmadeanameforhimselfsmugglingarmstotheCubaninsurrectionaryarmyfightingSpaininthe1890s.Hisinterestintheislandahundredmilestothesouthwas,likehispolitics,exceptionalforthetime.MostFloridapoliticiansdirectedtheirsightsexclusivelynorthward,totheplacesfromwhichpeopleandmoneywereflowinginaseeminglyendlessstream.Inthismentallandscape,Havana,andforthatmattertheentireCaribbean,were,atbest,aremotepresence.
Thisviewofthingswaswidelysharedinthefast-growingcitybythebay.Miami's"Spanishness"didnotcomefromCuba,butfromNewYork.Duringitsfirsthalf-centuryofexistence,Miamihadevolvedintoatouristresort,aplayground,evenaJewishenclaveanythingbutthe"CapitaloftheCaribbean."Thatdesignationwhichtodayisoneof
thecity'sclaimstofamewouldhavebeenincomprehensibletoapopulationarrivedrecentlyfromthenorthwhohadbutthefaintestideaofFlorida'sSpanishpast.Onthethresholdofthesixties,Miamireveledinitsnewlygainedmetropolitanstatusandtookthefirsthesitantstepstowardanurbanidentitythatwouldtranscenditspunysubdivisions.Thepoliticalconcernsofitscitizenrycontinuedtofocus,however,ontheendlessbickeringbetweenMetroandthe"cities,"andonthethreatposedbythecontinuousinflowofnorthernmigrantsseekingthesamelife-stylethatthelocalsalreadyenjoyed.78
Thosewhoinveighedatthetimeaboutthedireconsequencesof
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thisinfluxofnorthernerscouldnothavedreamedthatthebulkofthecity'spopulationinthenextdecadeswouldcomefromtheoppositedirection.Onceagain,thedestiniesoftheislandandthepeninsulaweretobeintertwined,thistimeinamostunexpectedway.TherisingflowofexilesfromCuba'ssocialistrevolutiondidnotgotoTampaandKeyWest,placesofCubansettlementatthetimeoftheisland'searlierwarofindependence.Rather,andoverwhelmingly,theychosetheglitteringBiscayneBaymetropolis,thengropingforsomesenseofurbanidentity.Thefirstexilesencounteredasocialandpoliticalorderthat,ifnotentirelyamorphous,wasafarcryfromtheconsolidatedpowerstructuresinplacefarthernorth,andthereforefarmorepermeable.AstheMiamiHeraldanditsalliesstruggledtobuildaseriouscityoutofanassemblageofthemeparks,theentireCubanbourgeoisiearrivedonthedoorstep.TheAndalusiansettingssoprescientlybuiltbyGeorgeMerrickhalfacenturyearliernowbecamepopulatedbypeoplewhoknewtheiroriginsandcouldpronouncethestreetnamescorrectly.Afterfourhundredyears,historyhadcomefullcircle.
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ChapterFiveEntertheCubansTuckedamongtheroyalpalmsandfrangipaniofSouthStreetinKeyWest,thesouthernmosturbanwayintheUnitedStates,istheJohnDeweyHouse.ThebungalowwasthewinterhomeofthefamousAmericanphilosopher,whofoundinthiscommunityanditsweatherabalmyrespitefromtherigorsofthenorth.ItisawhitewoodenstructurebuiltinastylefamiliarthroughouttheCaribbean;itlookssouthtowardCuba.
Lessthantwoblocksaway,asoneturnsnorthontoDuvalStreet,ElBalcóndeMartí,thesecond-storybalconyfromwhichtheCubanrevolutionaryJoséMartíaddressedthrongsofexiledcigarworkerscommandsthesidewalk.Thehumblemonetarycontributionsofthoseworkers,plussimilarcollectionsinTampaandJacksonville,armedaseriesofexpeditionsagainsttheSpanishcolonialregimeintheislandduringthe1890s.TodaythebuildinggracedbyElBalcónhousesaninnandafancyrestaurant.
OneblocknorthalongDuvalistheSanCarlosClub,astructurereminiscentofthearchitectureofoldHavanabutactuallybuiltinthe1920storeplaceanineteenth-centurygatheringplaceofCubanrevolutionaries.ThenewSanCarloswasdedicatedonOctober10,1924,theanniversaryofthebeginningofthefirstCubanwarofindependence.Thebuilding'sfoundingstonewasbroughtfromLaDemajagua,thesugarmillwherethatrebellionstarted.
1
BeforetherewasaMiami,thecityofKeyWestwasawell-
establishedandthrivingcenterofCaribbeancommerce.ThesuppliesandmenwhocarvedHenryLum'scoconutplantationoutofthejunglethatwasthenMiamiBeachcamefromthere.Mailalso
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camefromtheKeyaboardtheschoonerFlora,whichsailedregularlytotheBrickelltradingpostbytheMiamiRiverandtothetinysettlementofCocoanutGrove.
2InKeyWest,thetwooddlymixedcurrentsthatweretoshapeMiami'shistoryinthetwentiethcenturywerealreadypresentinthefinaldecadesofthenineteenth.
TheDeweyHouseistodayalingeringsymbolofwhatnorthernersofallstripescamesouthfor:theseabreezes,thesunlight,theoceaninmultiplehuesofemerald.TheSanCarlosandElBalcóndeMartístandfortheother,earlierSouthFlorida,inhabitedbypeopletowhomsandandseameantlittle,sincetheywerebornwiththem.Thislastgroupdedicateditsenergiestootherpursuits,usuallyofapoliticalnature.InKeyWestattheendofthe1800s,paleYankeetouristsintermingledwitholive-skinnedexiledworkersandveteransofpastinsurrectionarywars.Heavilyarmedexpeditionssetsailrightnexttobeachresortspackedwithnorthernvacationers.
TheTwoFloridas
Thiscounterpointwasnotjustacolorfulhistoricaloddity;itpreparedthewayfortheforcesthatweretotransformSouthFloridaandMiamiaftertheCubanRevolution.ThecommonhistoryoftheislandandthepeninsulaunderSpanishruleconstitutedthebackdropagainstwhichtheeventsofthe1970sand1980sweretounfold.Themoreimmediatesocialexplanationforthoseevents,however,layinthatpeculiarjuxtapositionoftourist-orienteddevelopmentandrevolutionaryexpeditions,theconstructionofbeachresortsandthearmingofmen,thatmarkedthelatenineteenthcentury.Floridameantverydifferentthingstopeoplecomingfromthenorthandthosecomingfromthesouth,andthecombinationtookanumberof
dramaticturns.
Inlate1894theCubanRevolutionaryparty,foundedbyMartí,readiedtorekindletheinsurrectionintheisland,organizingawell-armedexpeditionofthreeshipstosetsailfromFernandinaBeachnearSt.Augustine.Owingtothecarelessnessortreacheryofitscommander,however,theexpeditionwasdiscoveredandthevesselsseizedbyU.S.authoritiesonJanuary14,1895.Itwasamajorblow.ThemoniesaccumulatedafterendlessralliesandspeechesinTampaandtheKeywerelostwiththeships.3
Meanwhile,theheartbreakofthearrestedrevolutionarieswas
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echoedacrossCentralFlorida,butforverydifferentreasons.ArecordfrostthatwinterhadruinedcountlesscitrusgrowersandcompromisedthefinancesofFlagler'sEastFloridaRailroad.Theyearwaschillingallaround.Insurrectionists,growers,andrailroadworkersstruggledmightilythatwinterinclosephysicalproximity,eveniftheirworrieswerenotatallthesame.
OnFebruary24,1895,MartífinallysucceededintakingthewartoCuba,wherehehimselflandedattheheadofanewexpedition.TheconfiscationsofJanuaryhadinfactenergizedtheCubancausebyprovingtherevolutionaries'seriousnessofpurpose.
4Thatsamemonth,thefrostpeakedinFlorida,triggeringasimilarlyenergeticresponse.Flagler'srailroadorganizedthedistributionoffreebagsoffertilizerandcheaploansforthegrowers,whereasinMiami,JuliaTuttlesawhergoldenopportunity.5
ThefollowingyearsweremarkedbyfeverishactivitybothinSouthFloridaandacrosstheFloridaStraits,asonegroupofnewcomerssunktheirenergiesintobuildingnewresortsandanotherintoachievingnationalindependence.Yetacuriousmutualindifferencewasapparentthroughoutthisentireperiod.ItseemedasifthereweretwoFloridasonebeingbuiltoutoftheswampwiththedreamsandambitionsofYankeeentrepreneurs;theotherlookingevertoCubaandtoSpainthankstocenturiesoftradeandpoliticaltradition.In1896,MiamibecameacityandconstructionofFlagler'sluxuriousRoyalPalmHotelwasproceedingatfullsteam.Inthesameyear,expeditionaryboatsplayedcat-and-mousewithU.S.revenuecuttersupanddowntheFloridacoast,takingvitalsuppliestotherebelsinCuba.6
Oftheseexpeditions,noneweremorecolorfulthanthoseorganized
byNapoleonBonaparteBrowardandtheCubanRevolutionaryCouncilofJacksonville.Broward'spowerful,fasttugboattheThreeFriendswasidealforoutrunningtheU.S.cuttersandtheSpanishgunboatsthatblockadedtheisland.Aftersomevacillation,Browardsignedasecretagreementwiththecouncilandhimselfcaptainedthefirstexpedition.OnMarch15,1896,theThreeFriendsdeliveredtothenorthcoastofMatanzasProvincesomesixtyCubansoldiersandacargoconsistingoftwofieldcannons,fivehundredRemingtonrifles,threehundredWinchesterrifles,fivehundredmachetes,fivehundredpoundsofdynamite,andthreehundredthousandroundsofammunition.7
Althoughthetripwassuccessful,thetugboatwasdiscoveredby
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theSpaniards,whonearlycapturedit.Onlyitssuperiorspeedallowedittoescape.ButtheSpanishministerinWashingtonprotested,and,aftertheadventurebecameknown,theThreeFriendscameunderclosescrutinybyU.S.TreasuryofficialsandSpanishgovernmentspies.Browardandhismenwerequiteadroitateludingthisvigilance.Morethanonceheexplainedhisboat'sactivitiesbysayingthathewastowingFlagler'sbargesordoingotherworkfortheresortdevelopersinSouthFlorida.TotheSpanishconsulinJacksonville,SeñordeMariátegui,heretortedononeoccasion,''I'vegotonehundredtwentytonsofcoalandawholeboatloadofarmsandammunitionforKeyWest."
8HetheninvitedtheSpaniardtobeaguestonhisnexttrip.
TheCubanRevolutionaryCouncilinJacksonvillecouldneverhavegottenawaywiththistraffickingofmenandarmswereitnotfortheopensympathyofmanyAmericanstotherebelcause.FreightcarsloadedwithgunsandammunitionfortheCubanarmyarrivedinJacksonville'syardsfromthenorth,whilerecruitscamefromTampabythedozensandneitherMariáteguinortheU.S.authoritiescoulddoanythingaboutit.TheThreeFriendstookthreemoreexpeditionstoCuba,thethird,whichdeliveredseventy-fivemenandathousandrifles,landingonlyafewhundredyardsfromGeneralMaceo'srebelarmyinPinardelRíoProvince.9Duringitsfourthincursion,theThreeFriendswasdiscoveredandchasedbyaSpanishgunboatsouthofPinardelRíoProvince.Answeringitsfire,thetug'srapid-firecannonscoredadirecthitthatcrippledtheSpaniard.Another,largergunboatgavechase,butthetugmanagedtoescapeinthefog.Theepisodebecameknownas"Cuba'sfirstnavalbattle."10IttookplaceinDecember1896,ataboutthesametimethattheRoyalPalmHotelwasbeingreadiedforitsNewYeargalaopeningandthesteamerCity
ofKeyWestdelivereditsfirstboatloadofwintertouriststoCocoanutGrove.11
In1897,aSupremeCourtdecisionreaffirmedU.S.neutralityintheCubanwarandorderedallfilibusteringboatstobeimpounded.FortunatelyforBrowardandotherpro-Cubanowners,theU.S.battleshipMainewassenttoHavanaharbor,whereitmysteriouslyexploded,leadingPresidentMcKinleytodeclarewaronSpain.TheSupremeCourtrulingonFlorida'sCubansupporterswasneverimplemented.12
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FloridaasaStage
Miamiinthelate1890swasasyettooinsignificanttoserveasabaseforconspiraciesandwasthussparedtherevolutionaryfever.Miami'sconfrontationwasnotbetweenCubanrebels,theirAmericansympathizers,andacorneredSpanishgovernment,butbetweenFlagler'srailroadandthoseold-timerswho,liketheMunroesandtheBrickells,weretryingtopreservewhattheycouldofthebay'soldcharm.Justahundredmilestothesouth,meanwhile,CaptainGeneralValerianoWeylerofSpainwasstarvingtheCubanpeasantrybyrelocatingpeopleawayfromtheland;atnight,theskieswerelitbythebrightlyburningcanefields.
13
TheSpanish-AmericanWarwasthefirstmajoreventtounitethedestiniesoftheyoungFloridacityandtheislandcolony.Shortlyafterthehostilitiesbegan,theU.S.ArmymovedtroopstoCampMiamiinpreparationforinvadingtheisland.Asitturnedout,noinvasiontookplacebecausetheSpanishresistancecrumbledquickly;insteadtheidletroopsamusedthemselvesbyharassingtheinhabitantsofColoredTown.14ItwouldnotbethelasttimethataffairsinCubawouldendupwiththevictimizationofBlacksinMiami.
ThedefeatofSpainwasabittersweetvictoryfortheCubans.AstheexilecoloniesofTampaandKeyWestbegantoemptyout,thereturningrevolutionariescarriedtotheislandambivalentfeelingstowardthecountrythathadgiventhemrefuge.True,theAmericaninterventionhadbroughtabloodywartoaswiftend,butthefavorhadcomeatacost:Cubawasnowapoliticalprotectorate.Americangeneralsgovernedtheislandfrom1898to1902,andwhentheyfinallyleft,thenewrepublicfoundthatitwasanythingbutfully
independent.SenatorOrvilleH.Plattproposed,andtheU.S.Congressapproved,anamendmenttotheCubanconstitutiongivingWashingtontherighttointerveneintheeountrv'sinternalaffairs.15UnderthePlattAmendment,theAmericanambassadorbecameinpointoffactthecolonialoverseerofCuba.
Withsuchpoliticalassurancesinplace,U.S.capitalstartedpouringintotheisland.ThepatternofinvestmentwasnottoodifferentfromthattakingplaceinFloridaatthesametime:moneywentintoagriculture,primarilysugarcane,andtouristventures.In1902,themostplausiblefutureforthenascentrepublicwasasa
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southernextensionofFlorida,formallyindependentbutsubjecttotheeconomicandculturalhegemonyofthenorth.Hadthisoccurred,theremarkablecounterpointofYankeedevelopersandCubanrevolutionariesthatwassoapparentinSouthFloridaduringthe1890swouldnothaverepeateditself.Insteadthehomogenizinglogicofcapital,bentonextractingprofitfromwarmerweatherandfertilelandonbothsidesoftheStraitsofFlorida,wouldhaveprevailed.
ThatthingsdidnotturnoutthatwayisaconsequenceprimarilyofthekindofcountryCubawas.Weakeconomically,itneverthelesspossessedastrongnationalidentity.TheanthropologistSidneyW.Mintz,inattemptingtoexplainCubannationalcharacter,contrastedthecolonialhistoryoftheislandwiththatofherCaribbeanneighbors.Theplantationsystem,soinimicaltonationhoodasitfilledonecolonyafteranotherwithmassesofslavelaborersruledbyafewoverseers,madeitsappearancelateinthehistoryofCuba.ForthefirsttwocenturiesofSpanishrule,theislandhadbeenleftalonetodevelopanindependentsocietyofCreolecommercialfarmersandsmallsubsistencecultivators.Therewerefewslaves;evenafterthelarge-scaleintroductionofsugarcaneinthesecondhalfoftheeighteenthcentury,theproportionofslavestothetotalpopulationremainedmuchlowerthanintheotherAntilles:
BythetimetheplantationsystembegantoexpandinCuba,thatsocietyhadapeopleandacultureofitsown....Cubansocietygraduallytookaspecialquality:ruralinemphasis,anti-Spanishbutpro-Hispanic,folkCatholic,Creole....ItwasCuba'ssubsequentstruggleforpoliticalandculturalautonomyfromSpainthatgaveherthefocussheneededtobecomeacohesivenation.CubaasaSpanishcolonyhadmorenationhoodthanthecoloniesofotherEuropeanpowersintheAntillesmighthavehadassovereignstates.
16
ThispeculiarityofthesubordinatenewrepublicnowcameintoplayasacounterweighttoAmericaneconomicandpoliticalinfluence.ThesuccessorsofFlaglerandFishercouldnotsimplypushsouthintomore"openspace,"astheyhadatBiscayneBay.Althoughweakereconomically,Cubawasaverydifferentplacefromthesemivacantpeninsula.Insteadofbecomingitsappendage,CubagraduallyconvertedFloridaintoherownpoliticalbackstage,
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wherethedramas,andsometimescomedies,ofexilewereregularlyenacted.Thecounterpointofthelate1890swashencerepeated,buteachtimewithadifferentcastofcharactersandaslightalterationofplace.Now,asMiamicontinuedtodevelopalongthelinesenvisionedbyitsfounders,theupheavalsofCubanpoliticsregularlydepositedanewwaveofexilesonitsshores.
Formanyyears,theresort-boundvacationersandpoliticalconspiratorscoexistedinthecitywiththesamemutualindifferencetheyhadexhibitedinKeyWestduringtheSpanish-AmericanWar.PollyRedford'shistorvofMiami,whichendsbeforetheCubanRevolution,containsonlytworeferencestoCubans,bothashiredhelpinMiamiBeachhotels.
17Inturn,HughThomas'svoluminoushistoryofCubadoesnothaveasingleindexentryforMiami,eventhoughmuchpoliticalmaneuveringwentonthereinthetwentiethcentury.18ForMiamihotelownersanddevelopers,Cubansrepresentedlittlemorethananoccasionalsourceoflow-wagelabor.Fortheexiles,thecitywasbutarearbasefororganizingoffensivesagainstthegovernmentinHavana.
SeveralfactorscontributedtothiscasualattitudeofCubanstowardacitythatwas,afterall,inadifferentcountry.Weatherandgeographyplayedapart,nodoubt,butsodidthebuiltenvironment.OldKeyWesthadbeenbuiltbyCubans,anditsarchitecturenaturallyreflectedstylesfamiliarintheisland.MiamiwasbuiltbyYankeedevelopers,buttheirblueprintswerealsodominatedbyAndalusianandMediterraneanthemes.Upanddownthebeach,wroughtiron,redtile,andvillaswithSpanishnamesabounded.Anarchitecturedesignedtoattracttouristscametoprovide,unwittingly,areceptivesettingforformerSpanishcolonials.
WhenGeneralGerardoMaehado,democraticallyelectedpresidentofCuba,decidedtochangetheconstitutioninthelate1920ssothathecouldstayindefinitelyinpower,hetriggeredanewflowofexilesgoingtobothMiamiandNewYork.19ThePlattAmendment,stillinforce,enabledtheU.S.ambassadorstoCubatoplayakeyroleintheensuingstruggle.Americaneconomicinterestsintheisland,moreover,supportedthedictator,justastheyhadsupportedthecolonialregimeduringthewarofindependence.20"Indeed,"Thomasobserves,"itwasalltooeasyforbothgovernmentandoppositiontoslipintotherolesofSpaniardsandNationalists
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withtheU.S.playingasimilarifmoreambiguousrolethaninthe1890s:itshometerritoryactingasabaseforrebels,itscitizensinCubabeingasupportfortheCubangovernment,bothhelpingtoprovidespecificfinancialassistance."
21
TheAmericanambassador,SumnerWelles,wasatfirstfriendlytowardMachado,butsoontheincreasingviolenceandpoliticalinstabilityinCubapersuadedhimthatthegeneralhadtogo.Thus,throughWelles'sefforts,thefirstCubandictatorshipcametoanend:onAugust12,1933,MachadoflewtoNassauwithafewfriendssomestillintheirpajamasandsevenbagsofgold.22ManyofhisclosestsupportersendedupinMiami,whereMachadowaseventuallyburied.HistombisintheWoodlawnCemetery,todayintheheartofLittleHavana.
TheintenseparticipationoftheAmericanambassadorintheeventsof1933,aswellasthecomingsandgoingsbetweenWashingtonandHavanaunderthePlattAmendment,gaveCubansanobjectlessoninthepoliticsofempire.Theunfortunatestatusofbeingasemicolonyhadtheunintendedeffectofgivingtheislandersathoroughapprenticeshipinthepoliticalwaysofthenorth.TheCubanupperclasslearnedhenceforthtomonitorthegovernmentinWashingtonascarefullyastheydidtheirowninHavana.
InMiami,thoseAugustdaysof1933hadwitnessedthedepartureofexultantrevolutionaries,theirplacestakenbycrestfallenincomingmachadistas.Thecity,however,wasinnomoodtopaymuchattentiontothischangeoftheguard:itwasinbigtrouble.Thelandboomofthenineteentwentieshadturnedintoacompletebust,andthepopulationhaddeclinedbymorethanhalfinlessthantenyears.TheRoyalPalmHotelwasboardedup,andmanyotherbusinesses
hadclosed.Withnopayingjobsanywhere,localsrediscoveredthenaturalbountyofthetropics,nearlyforgottensincethearrivalofFlagler'srailroad.Avocadoes,mangoes,andguavaswerestillplentifulinMiamibackyards,andfishstillswamingreatnumbersinthebay;thesubsistencethattheyprovidedcametosubstituteforstore-boughtprovisions.23AsthedespondentMachadoexilesmadetheirappearance,theyfoundacitywhereagoodpartoftheeconomyhadrevertedtowhatithadbeenhalfacenturyearlier,replacingthatrunontouristdollarsandrampantlandspeculation.
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TheLeaderCometh
Onasunnydaytwenty-threeyearslater,theauthoritiesofDaytonaBeachgatheredtohonorafamouslocalresident.Themaninquestion,GeneralFulgencioBatistayZaldívar,hadleftDaytonaafewyearsearliertoorganizeoppositiontothedemocraticallyelectedpresidentofCuba,CarlosPríoySocarrás.OnMarch10,1952,BatistaengineeredamilitarycoupthatsentPríopackingtoMexicoandeventuallytoMiami.ThenewregimewasveryfavorablydisposedtoAmericans,betheylegitimatebusinessmenorgamblingracketeers,andthesugar-ledprosperity,oftheislandinsuredhappyreturnstoall.Accordingly,theDaytonacityfatherssawnothingwronginproclaimingMarch24,1956,"BatistaDay"inhonorofthenewCubandictator,inaceremonyheldonlyafewhundredmilesawayfromMiami,wherethedeposedlegitimatepresidentsulkedinimpotence.
24
Príowasdownbutnotout.HenowdedicatedallhisenergiesandhisconsiderablepersonalfortunetotheoverthrowofBatista.AndalthoughPríowasnotuptoleadinganexpeditionhimself,hesupportedalmostanyonewhodid.FirsttheLuzerneHotelinMiamiBeachandthenPrío'sownCasaReposadainSouthMiamibecamehubsofconspiracywherepoliticiansandadventurersofallstripescametoavailthemselvesoftheformerpresident'slargesse.MiamionceagainbecamethecenterofoppositiontotheregimeinHavana.25
ItwasthustoMiamithat,inlate1955,ayoungexilecamewhocouldboastofhavingledtheonlymajorarmedattackonBatista'sdictatorship.Theattackfailed,andmanyoftheparticipantswere
killed,butFidelCastrosurvivedandwasamnestiedtwoyearslater.AlthoughCastrohadbeenanactivepoliticalopponentofformerPresidentPrío,allwasforgottennowinthetwomen'scommonstruggleagainsttheBatistadictatorship.FromMiami,therefore,FidelwasabletotakebacktohisheadquartersinMexicoaheftyfinancialcontributionandthepromiseofmoretocome.26Oneyearlater,Fidelandhisbandofrevolutionariesembarkedonthefifty-eight-footyachtGranma,boughtwith$15,000ofPrío'smoney,andlandedinOrienteProvince,Cuba,onDecember2,1956.27
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FromthatdayuntiltheoverthrowofBatistain1959,thecenterofrevolutionaryactionshiftedtotheSierraMaestraMountains,wheretherebelshadestablishedtheirheadquarters.Miamibecameasupportbase.ThenceforthatacitstrugglebrokeoutbetweenCastrosupporters,whosemissionwastosendarmsandsuppliestotherebels.andtherestoftheanti-Batistafactions,whofeltincreasinglyupstaged.Prío'splanhadsucceededonlytoowellincreatinganarmedchallengetothedictatorship,butintheprocessthedeposedpresidenthadlostcontrolofthesituation.
AnattempttobringtherevolutionbackintothehandsofthosewhowerepayingforitwasmadeinMiamiintheearlywinterof1957.AtameetingattendedbyrepresentativesofCastro'sTwenty-sixthofJulyMovement,Prío'sAutenticoparty,andotherexilefactions,aCouncilofNationalLiberationwasestablished,withPrío'sformerprimeminister,ManuelAntoniodeVarona,namedhead.ThecouncilimmediatelyissuedamanifestodesignedtoreassurebothWashingtonandtheCubaneliteabouttherevolution'sprocapitalistleanings.Prío,whohelpedorganizethemeetingandwhofinancedmostofthegroupspresent,emergedastheclearwinner.
28
Therewasonehitch,however,andthatwasthatFidelCastrohadneverbeenconsulted.Helearnedaboutthe"MiamiPact"intheNewYorkTimesandimmediatelydenouncedit.Hisprotestlettertothecouncilexemplifiesthelanguagehewouldusetosilencealloppositionafterhisarrivalinpower:"Forthosewhoarefightingagainstanarmyincomparablygreaterinnumberandarms,withnosupportforawholeyearapartfromthedignitywithwhichwearefighting...bitterlyforgottenbyfellowcountrymenwho,inspiteofbeingwellprovidedfor,havesvstematically...deniedustheirhelp,
theMiamiPactwasanoutrage."29
WiththewithdrawalofCastro'sTwenty-sixthofJulyMovementandlaterofotherforces,thecouncildisintegrated.TheexilecommunityinMiamiwasthereaftertorninadoublestruggle:againstBatistaandbetweentheincreasinglydominantfidelistasandotherrevolutionarygroups,Príohelpedorganizeandfinanceseveralsubsequentexpeditions,aimedatbalancingtheincreasinghegemonyoftheSierraMaestrarebels.30Butitwastoolate.FidelCastrohadcapturedboththeimaginationofCubansandthefancyoftheU.S.press,andwhenBatistafinallyfledonDecember31,1958,
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powerfellrightintothehandsoftheSierraMaestraleader.Otherrevolutionarygroupswerecompelledtofallintolineorwereeliminated.
InthewakeofFidel'striumph,manyMiamiCubansreturnedtotheirhomeland.Likethereturningexilesof1895,theyharboreddecidedlymixedfeelingsaboutthecountryleftbehind.True,theUnitedStateshadgiventhemrefuge,andinfluentialAmericanvoiceshadsupportedtheircause,buttheU.S.governmenthadalsowaiteduntilthelastminutetoreverseitsactivesupportofBatista.LiketheDaytonaBeachcitycouncil,StateDepartmentofficialsputNorthAmericaneconomicconcernsfirstandhumanrightsanddemocracyinCubaadefinitivesecond.AfamousremarkbytheCubandeskofficerattheStateDepartment,WilliamWieland,waskeptwellinmindbythereturningexiles:"IknowBatistaisconsideredbymanyasasonofabitch...butAmericaninterestscomefirst....Atleastheisoursonofabitch,heisnotplayingballwiththeCommunists....Ontheotherhand,FidelCastroissurroundedbycommies."
31
Asforex-presidentPrío,theearlypatronofCastro'srebelmovement,hewascourtedatfirstbythenewregime,whichsenthimonaseriesofdiplomaticsortiesabroad.Deprivedofanyrealpowerandconfrontedwitharadicalizingrevolution,though,hesoughtasylumduringonesuchtriptoBrazil.Afewdayslater,hewasbackinMiami.Yearslater,hisfortuneandinfluencegone,hecommittedsuicideathishomeinCoralGables.LikeGerardoMachado,heisburiedintheWoodlawnCemetery,inthemiddleofLittleHavana.
Off-SeasonTourists
AnotherfacetoftherelationshipbetweenCubaandFloridabecame
apparentduringthePrío/Batistadecade(1948-58).Miamiinthe1950swasnotjustaplacewherepoliticalmanifestoswereissuedandrevolutionarypactssigned;forthegrowingCubanmiddleclass,itwasalsoapopularvacationspot.Theislandsoldsugar,nickel,andtobaccoandimportedalmosteverythingelse,mostlyfromtheUnitedStates.Itmadesense,then,togoshoppingforthelatestfashionsandconsumergoodsonthemainlandand,intheprocess,partakeoftheglitterofMiamiBeach's"GoldCoast"
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alongLincolnRoadandCollinsAvenue.PanAmericanAirlineswasbornwhenitbeganservicetoCuba,andtheMiami-basedhydroplanesthattookthrill-seekingtouriststoHavanaalsobroughtbackloadsofCubanshoppers.CubanaAirlines,originallyaPanAmsubsidiary,addedseveraldailyflights,turningtheMiamirunintoaroutineevent.
Formanymiddle-classCubans,aSouthFloridavacationwasayearlyritual;forthewealthy,itcouldbeadailyexcursion.Businessmenandwell-heeledgovernmentofficialscouldflytoMiamiinthemorning,shoponLincolnRoadandhavelunchattheFontainebleauHotel,andbebackinHavanabyevening.Forthosewithaccesstogovernmentorprivateplanes,itwasapopulartripindeed.
32Miamihoteliers,whohadignoredtherevolutionariesexceptperhapsasasourceofcasuallabor,welcomedtheCubantourists,fornowtheycouldkeeptheirestablishmentsopenyearround.Northernerscamefleeingthecoldandsnowinwinter,atimewhennoself-respectingCuban,orSouthFloridianforthatmatter,woulddreamofgoingnearthewater.Cubans,however,cameinthesummer,the"off-season";afterall,itwasnotweatherthatattractedthemtoMiami.TheysimplyenjoyedpartakingofAmericancultureinafamiliarenvironment.Thetemperature,thefaunaandflora,eventhearchitecturewerecommon;thethrillconsistedmainlyinseeingthemlabeledinadifferentlanguageandarrangedsomewhatdifferentlyintheflatFloridalandscape.
Bythemid-1950s,theMiamitouristindustryandthesemipermanentcolonyofCubanvisitorshadsettledintoacomfortablerelationship.ExpelledpoliticianscametoMiamitoliveinleisure,iftheyhadtheeconomicmeans,ortoworkforlowhotelwagesiftheydidnot.Touristaccommodationswerediscountedinthesummermonths,andtheCubanmiddleclasstookadvantageofthecheapratesforits
pilgrimagesnorth.Noneofthesetouristsimaginedthattheywouldwalkthesamestreetsaspennilessrefugeesonlyafewmonthslater.
CubanpoliticalmilitantsremainednearlyinvisibleinMiamiatleastuntiltheearly1960s;atthatpoint,though,theerstwhilesummervacationersbegantojointheirranksinincreasinglylargenumbers.WhentheCubanmiddleclassdidstarttoexittheisland,itwenttoasocialenvironmentmadeutterlyfamiliarbyyearsofpriortravel.Nocultureshockhere.Unlikelaterrefugeesfrom
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othercommunistregimesVietnamese,Cambodians,EthiopiansCuba'sexilesdidnotreallymovetoaforeignland.
33SouthernFloridawasknownterritory.Thisperceptualframeallowedearlyescapeesfromtherevolutionmembersoftheoldelitewhocametoawaitthe"inevitable"downfallofCastrotodefinetheirsojourntoSouthFloridasimplyasanextendedvacation.
TheExodus
InJuly1960,ayoungstudentleaderrecentlyescapedfromCubawascollectedathisMiamihotelandtakentoasecretmeetingoftheCubanMovementforRevolutionaryRecuperation(MRR).Thepurposeofthemeetingwastoexpelthreeofthefourfoundersofthemovementsoastoputitunderthesolecontrolofthefourth,aCIA-backedformerlieutenantinCastro'srebelarmy,ManuelArtime.Thoseatthemeetingweremadetosignaformaldocumentof"expulsion";subsequentlytheyoungexilewasescortedtoahousewherehewouldresidewithothermembersofthemovementuntilhisdeparturefortheclandestinetrainingcampssetupbytheCIA.ThehotelwheretheyouthwaslivingwasinMiamiBeach,thehousewherethesecretmeetingtookplacewasinCoralGables,andthewould-befreedomfighters'dormitorywasinSouthMiami.34
Evenatthisearlydateintheexodus,therewereCubansalloverthecity.MeetingslikethisoneinCoralGablesproliferatedasself-proclaimedleadersofpost-CastroCubajockeyedforpower;attheairports,trafficwasheavyasplaneloadsofnewrefugeesarrivedfromtheislandandsecretCIAflightsdepartedfortrainingcampsinCentralAmerica.Allthewhile,Miami'swhiteestablishmentignoredalltheactivity,confidentthat,asintimespast,itwouldeventuallygoaway.
OnJanuary1,1959,theforcesthathadbeenbuildingforsolongoneithersideoftheStraitsofFloridahadbeguntoconverge.ThisfirstdayoftheyearmarkedthebeginningoftherevolutionaryregimeinCuba,aswellasthebirthofanewsocialorderinMiami.Assooftenhappensinhistory,theoldorderlookedontheeventthatmarkeditsdemisewithindifference.ThestruggleinCubadidnotevenmakethefrontpageoftheMiamiHeraldonthatfatefulNewYear'sDay.Insteadthenewspaperinformeditsreaders
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abouttheKingOrangeparadeandtheendoftheEasternAirlinesstrike.WhileCubanexilesinMiamitooktothestreetstocelebrate,nativeMiamianspaidscantattentiontothenewsthatGeneralFulgencioBatistahadfledtheisland.
35
Thefirstwaveofthepost-CastroexodusconsistedofofficialsfromthedeposedBatistaregime.Thefamiliarchangingoftheguardtookplace,withexultantfidelistasleaving,tobereplacedbydefeatedbatistianos.ScufflesbrokeoutintheMiamiairportbetweenpassengersarrivingfromanddepartingforHavana,causinglocalpolicereinforcementstobesentin.Otherwise,thingswerenormal.Asexpected,thenewexilescreatedtheirownorganizationsandnewspapersandsetabouttheimprobabletaskofwrestlingpowerawayfromtherevolutionariestheyhadbeenunabletodefeatwhiletheystillcontrolledthegovernmentinHavana.
Thisfirstbatchofexileswasnumericallyinsignificant,andgiventhemassreturntotheislandfollowingBatista'sdownfall,theCubanpopulationofMiamiprobablydiminishedforawhile.Hadtherevolutionaryregimecarriedoutthepromisedreturntoelectedgovernment,thesituationmighthavestabilizedatthatpoint.Instead,Castrooptedto''deepen"therevolution,movingitsteadilyleftward.Inreaction,aslowbutgrowingtrickleofbusinesspeopleandformerlandowners,whohadatfirsttriedtonegotiatewiththenewauthoritiesonlytoseetheirpropertiesandlandconfiscated,begantoleavetheislandaswell.InMiami,theBatistafollowersawaitedthemwithan"Itoldyouso"smirk.ThefirsttwoyearsoftheCubanRevolutionthussawthegradualreturntoMiamiintheguiseofpoliticalexilesoftheverygroupswhohadknownthecityasaplayground:first,theprivilegedforwhomMiamiwasadaytrip,andthenthosewhocould
affordtocomeeverysummer.Approximately135,000CubansarrivedduringthisearlyperiodbetweenJanuary1959andApril1961.36
Implausibleasitmayseem,regularHavana-MiamiflightscontinuedaftertheBayofPigsinvasionof1961,ferryingagrowingnumberofescapees.Thenewcomerscameincreasinglyfromthelowermiddleclassandweremuchlesslikelythantheirpredecessorstoholdtheillusionofexileasan"extendedvacation."CommercialflightstoMiamiceasedduringtheMissileCrisisofNovember1962.Fromthattimeon,escapefromCubabecamepossibleonlybysecuringavisatoathirdcountry,adifficultprocessatbest,
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orbycrossingtheFloridaStraitonaclandestineboatorraft.By1965,annualCubanrefugeemigrationtotheUnitedStateshaddwindledtoonly16,447;thecumulativetotalsincetherevolutionstoodat210,000.
37
ThesuperpowerconfrontationovertheRussianmissilesinCubain1962wasresolvedattheeleventhhourwhentheSovietUnionagreedtoremoveitsweapons;inturn,theKennedyadministrationagreedthattherewouldbenonewarmedactionsagainstCastro'sgovernmentincludinganyinitiatedbyCubansinMiami.WiththeSovietUnionbackingFidelandWashingtonpreventingraidsontheisland,theMiamiCubancommunitywaseffectivelyreducedtoimpotence.Thisstateofaffairswasnotlostonthecity'scivicleaders,whodidnotrelishtheprospectofapermanentpopulationoftwohundredthousandimpoverishedrefugees.By1965,thepresenceoftheCubanswasnolongeramatterofpublicindifferenceinMiami.ElectedSouthFloridaofficialsnowpetitionedWashingtonforfederalhelpinsolvingthe"refugeecrisis."
Inresponse,theU.S.governmentorganizedalarge-scaleinitiativetoresettleanti-CastroexilesawayfromMiami.ThenewCubanRefugeeProgram,createdbytheKennedyadministrationtoaidtheexilesduringtheir"temporary"stay,focusedalmostimmediatelyonresettlingthemacrossthecountry.Cubanprofessionalswereretrainedashighschoolteachersanddispatchedtoremotenorthernlocations;governmentaidtoindividualsandfamilies,infact,wasmadecontingentonacceptanceofresettlement.By1967,theprogram'shead,JohnThomas,couldproudlyproclaimthattheresettlementofCubanrefugeesintheUnitedStateshadbeenacompletesuccess.38Withimmigrationfromtheislandreducedtoatrickleandavigorous
resettlementprograminplace,Miamiofficialsbreathedfreelyagain.Miamiwouldcontinuetobewhatithadalwaysbeenapurveyorofsunandsandtonortherntourists,itspoliticsdominatedbytheperennialstrugglebetweenMetroandthemunicipalities.
Alas,itwasnottobe.InSeptember1965,theCubangovernmentopenedthefishingportofCamariocatoallexileswantingtotaketheirrelativesfromtheisland.InarehearsalofMarielfifteenyearslater,fivethousandCubanswereferriedacrosstoMiami.Inresponsetothisincident,theJohnsonadministrationsigneda"MemorandumofUnderstanding"withHavanaallowingtwo
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dailyflightsofrefugeesfromVaraderoBeachtoMiami.BetweenDecember1965andApril1973,whentheywereunilaterallyterminatedbyCastro,these"freedomflights"broughtapproximately340,000newrefugees.
39
ItisunclearwhyWashingtonagreedtosuchamassiveairliftperhapstoavoidanotherCamarioca,butthenagain,thedailyspectacleoftheserefugeeshadpoliticalvalue:whatbetterindictmentofCaribbean-stylecommunism?Cuba'sescapeesmayalsohavebeenregardedasanassetbecauseoftheireducationalandoccupationalcredentials,particularlyduringthisperiodofsustainedeconomicgrowthintheUnitedStates.Inreality,however,therefugees'educationalqualificationswerecontinuouslyfallingastheeliteexodusgavewaytoamorerepresentativecross-sectionoftheCubanpopulation.Before1970,theproportionofprofessionalsamongtheexileshoveredaround15percent;butinarepresentativesampleof1973arrivals,professionalsrepresentedonly4.8percent.Evenso,averageeducationalattainmentofthenewrefugeeswasstillabovetheaverageofthepopulationontheisland.Theexileswerealsodisproportionatelyurbaninorigin,andtheproportionofblacksandmulattoesremainedmuchlowerthaninCuba.40
AllthetimethatthefreedomflightswerecomingintoMiami,resettlementflightswereleavingitinanattempttodistributemoreevenlytheburdenofrefugeeresettlement.By1978,469,435CubanshadbeensettledawayfromMiami.Tofederalandlocalbureaucrats,thiswasampleevidencethatthe"problem"ofrefugeeconcentrationinSouthFloridahadbeenresolved.41Inthelate1960s,however,adiscreetcountertrendstartedthatsawresettledCubanfamiliestrekbacktoMiamiontheirown.In1973,asurveyestimatedthat27
percentoftheCubansresidingintheMiamimetropolitanareahadreturnedtherefromotherU.S.locations.AsurveyconductedbytheMiamiHeraldin1978raisedthatvaluationtoabout40percent.42Asaconsequenceofthisacceleratingreturnmigration,by1979,ontheeveofMariel,closeto80percentofCubansintheUnitedStateswerelivinginMiami,makingit,ineffect,Cuba'ssecond-largestcityandtherefugeesthemostconcentratedforeign-bornminorityinthecountry.43
ThereisevidencethatreturningCubanexilefamiliesregardedtheirsojourninthenorthmuchasimmigrantsoftenviewtheir
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staysabroad,namelyasanopportunity.toaccumulatesavingswithwhichtostartabusinessathome.
44Oncetheyhadaccumulatedasubstantialsum,theyheadedbacktoFlorida.Butnottojustanyplace.JacksonvilleandTallahasseewereasalientotherefugeesasthefrigidcitiestheyhadleftbehind.Miami,ontheotherhand,waswarmandfamiliar.Itwasrelativelyeasytolearntheropesofbusinessthere;Cubansknewthecity,andmosthadkintherewhohadremaineddespitetheentreatiesoftheCubanRefugeeCenter.Thetiesbuiltoverhalfacenturynowworkedtopromoteamassreturnmigrationtothissinglecity.AsasubstituteforlostHavana,onlyMiamiwoulddo.
BythetimethecharteredboatsbegantocrosstheStraitsofFloridaforMariel,alargeanddiversifiedexilecommunityhademergedinSouthFlorida,actingasamagnetforallCubanselsewhere.Anestimated80percentofthe125,000-oddMarielentrantssettledthere,45atonceexpandingthecommunityinsizeandpromptingitstransformationfromapoliticalexilegroupintoaself-consciousethnicminority.
UneasyNeighbors
TheflightfromVaraderoBeachhadalreadyarrived.Mostpassengershadbeengreetedwiththeusualtearsandembracesandwhiskedawaytothehomesoftheirkin.Sittingaloneinthereceptionareawasamiddle-agedmanreflectivelypuffingonhiscigar.TheinterviewerapproachedhimandaconversationinSpanishbegan:
Whyareyoustillhere?
I'mawaitingaflighttoNewJersey.
Doyouhaverelativesthere?
Yes,afew.
Andtheywillsurelyhelpyou.
Idon'texpectso.
DoyouspeakEnglish?
Notaword.
Butlook,NewJerseyisnotMiami.Ifyou'regoingtherewithoutknowingEnglishandwithnoonetohelpyou,howdoyouexpecttosurvive?
Acondescendingsmile."That'swhat'they'alwaystoldme.The
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fidelistaswhereIworkedwerealwayssayingthatIcouldnevergetasgoodajob,couldprobablygetnojobatallhere.AndIreplied:Chico,inNorthAmerica,howdothedeaf-mutessurvive?Becausethat'swhatI'mgoingtobetheredeafandmute.Andiftheycansurvive,sowillI."
46
ItwasMarch1973.Evenatthislatedate,withthefreedomflightsabouttoendandalargeexilecommunityresidentinMiami,newarrivalswerestillwillingtotrytheirluckinnortherncities.Itwasdifficult,however,toremaindeafandmuteandataculturaldisadvantagewhenabetteroptionexisted.Sixyearsaftertheaboveexchangetookplace,ourconfidentrespondentcamebacktoMiami.Manyothershadprecededhim.
Afterthe1962MissileCrisis,theCubanexilecommunityresigneditselftoalongperiodofwaitingbeforeareturntoCubawouldbepossible.Bytheendofthedecade,manyhadbecomeconvincedthattheir"temporary"movehadturnedpermanent.Forthosearrivingaboardthefreedomflights,comingfromprogressivelylowerstrataofCubansociety,therewasnodoubtingthatfact.Theyhadlefttoescapecommunism,nottoengineeritsdemise.AstheyjoinedolderCubansinSouthFlorida,theywereconfrontedwithanovelproblem:howtocoexistwiththeirAngloneighbors.
JustasithadinfluencedtheselectionofMiamiasthechoiceplaceofexilesettlement,thehistoryofCubaU.S.relationsalsoaffectedtherefugees'approachtocommunity.ResistancetoYankeehegemony,soprevalentamongtherevolutionaryleadersinHavana,wasnotentirelyabsentinMiami.Asagroup,therefugeesregardedthenationthathadreceivedthemwithamixofgratitudeandsuspicion.HadnotNorthAmericans,afterall,alwaysputtheirowninterestsfirst?Hadtheynot,afterhelpingtoliberateCubafromSpain,thenimposedthePlatt
Amendment?Hadtheynotsupportedvariousdictators,evenwhiletheyhostedsuccessivegroupsofexilesworkingtooverthrowthosesamedictators?Hadtheynot,tenyearsearlier,armedtheexpeditionaryforceagainstCastroandthenabandonedthemenintheBayofPigs?Finally,hadnotWashingtontradedawaytheexiles'abilitytoconfrontCastrodirectlyinexchangeforitsownsecurity?Allinall,averyspottyrecord.
Hence,whenMiaminativewhitesabandonedtheirtraditional
Page107
indifferencetowardtherefugeestospeakinincreasinglyurgenttermsabouttheneedforassimilation,theCubansbalked.TheAngloelitediscourse,whichurgedthenewcomerstogiveuptheirculture,learnEnglish,andtaketheirturnintheethnicqueue,inspiredlittleenthusiasm.Instead,despiteitsownmyriadsocialandpoliticalcleavages,theexilecommunitysetaboutpursuinganalternativeproject.Tacitly,almostunconsciously,itattemptedtorecreateasfaraspossiblethecountryleftbehind.Thiswastobenomereimmigrantneighborhood,buta"moralcommunity"standingforthevaluesofoldCubansocietyandagainsttheneworderimposedbyCastroism.
47Throughouttheseventies,thistacitprojectcontinuedatarapidpace.Therhetoricwasthatofreturn,buttherealitywasoneofconsolidation.Theloudprotestsofthenativeeliteswentunheededas,gradually,Miami,tookonthehuesofa"secondHavana"48givingtotheAndalusianplaygroundsandtheSpanish-namedboulevardsanewmeaning.
Page108
1.TheMiamiskyline,1992.PhotobySueChaffee.
2.SignatS.W.8thStreetand27thAvenue,Miami.
PhotobySueChaffee.
Page109
3.ChapelofOurLadyofCharity,patronsaintofCuba,builtonBiscayne
Bay.ItfacessouthtowardCuba.PhotobySueChaffee.
4.BayofPigsMemorial,WoodlawnCemetery,Miami.Theinscriptionunderthe
mapofCubareads:"Inmemoriam,mayGodgranteternalresttothosewho,fortheirloveofGod,Cuba,andfamily,precededusinsacrificeanddenyittousuntilwe
winvictoryforCuba."
PhotobyPeggyNolan.
Page110
5.CubanandU.S.flagsinWoodlawnCemetery.TwoCubanandone
Nicaraguanpresidentareburiedthere.PhotobyPeggyNolan.
6.DominoplayersinLittleHavana.
PhotobySueChaffee.
Page111
7.FuneralhomeinMiami.Thecitydidnotexistin1857;thesign
referstothehome'sfoundinginHavana.PhotobyPeggyNolan.
8.Streetscene,LittleHavana.
PhotobySueChaffee.
Page112
9.BillboardpaidforbytheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundationaspartofitscontroversywiththelocalnewspaperinearly1992.Thesignreads,''Idonot
believeintheHerald."PhotobySueChaffee.
10.DowntownLittleHaiti,Miami.
PhotobySueChaffee.
Page113
11.Haitianstreetvendors,LittleHaiti.
PhotobySueChaffee.
12.Streetscene,LittleHaiti.PhotobySueChaffee.
Page114
13.HaitianboatandcaptainintheMiamiRiver.Theboat'sname,in
Creolemeans"GodIsNotLikeUs."PhotobySueChaffee.
14.Haitiandockworker,MiamiRiver.
PhotobySueChaffee.
Page115
15.Haitianwomenatworkinagriculture,southwestofMiami.
PhotobyPeggyNolan.
16.Haitianbeanpicker,southwestDadeCounty.
PhotobyPeggyNolan.
Page116
17.HaitianwomenshoppinginaCuban-ownedmarket.
PhotobySueChaffee.
18.ReligiouscollegeinMiamiBeach.
PhotobySueChaffee.
Page117
19.StudentsatTalmudicUniversity,MiamiBeach.
PhotobySueChaffee.
20.HasidicJewsunderthepalmtrees,MiamiBeach.
PhotobyPeggyNolan.
Page118
21.MonumenttoCarlFisher,founderofMiamiBeach.Itssmallsizemaybedueto
hisanti-SemiticviewsinwhatbecameapredominantlyJewishcity.
PhotobySueChaffee.
Page119
22.MuralinnorthwestMiami.Itmarksthedividinglinebetween
LittleHaitiandLibertyCity.PhotobySueChaffee.
Page120
23.CubansprotestingNelsonMandela'svisittoMiami,1990.
PhotobyDezsoSzusi,MiamiHerald.Reproducedbypermission.
24.Anti-Mandelaprotester,1990.PhotobyJonKral,MiamiHerald.
Reproducedbypermission.
Page121
25.CubanprotesterarguingwithMandelasupporter,1990.
PhotobyDezsoSzusi,MiamiHerald.Reproducedbypermission.
26.Tentcityprovidingtemporaryshelterforpeoplemade
homelessbyHurricaneAndrew.PhotobySueChaffee.
Page122
27.StoredestroyedbyHurricaneAndrew.
PhotobySueChaffee.
28.HomedestroyedbyHurricaneAndrew.
PhotobySueChaffee.
Page123
ChapterSixHowtheEnclaveWasBuilt
TheRecareyCase
Themaninthesoberdarksuitappearedquiteconfident.''Letthemcomplain,"hesaid."Ourprofitsarelegitimateandtheycomefrombulkbuyingofgenericdrugsandfrompreventivemedicine."Themanhadreasontobeself-assured.InlessthanfiveyearshehadparlayedatinyhospitalinMiamiintoachainofhealthmaintenanceorganization(HMO)clinicsgrossing$30millionamonth.Thechain,InternationalMedicalCenters(IMC),hadrisenfromnowheretobecomethesecondlargestHispanicbusinessinthecountry,rightafterBacardi.Theowner,MiguelRecarey,wascatapultedintoprominenceasaleaderoftheLatinbusinesscommunityandastheultimateexampleoftheself-mademan.Headoptedalife-styleinaccordwithhissuccess:a$1.2millionoceanfronthouseinCoralGablesEstates,aMaseratiatthedoor,tripstoaprivateislandintheBahamasaboardhisforty-seven-footyacht.BillboardsinLittleHavanaproclaimedIMCasthelargestCubanfirminthenationandencouragedelderlyCubanstoenroll.
1
ThesplendidsuccessofIMCwastheproduct,however,notofcompetitiveservicesandcustomersatisfaction,butofbehind-thesceneslobbying.The$30milliondidnotcomefromindividualpayments,butfromthefederalgovernment,mailedtoRecareyeverymonthinasinglecheck.ThroughpoliticalcontactsinMiami,rangingfromCongressmanClaudePeppertothethenvicepresident'ssonJebBush,RecareyhadsecuredforIMCanexclusivecontractforapilot
programunderthesponsorshipoftheDepart-
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mentofHealthandHumanServices(HHS).TheprogramwasdesignedtoreduceMedicarecostsbypayingHMOs95percentofaverageMedicarepaymentsforelderlypatients,regardlessofthepatient'shealth.IftheHMOcouldmaintainthepatient'shealthforlessthanthisfigure,itwouldpocketthedifference;ifnot,itwouldabsorbtheloss.
RecareystartedbyenrollingenmassetheelderlyCubansofMiami,butsoonmovedbeyondthiscoregrouptoeyethelargepopulationsofAmericanretireesinBrowardCounty,PalmBeach,andTampaBay.Therewasacatch,however.Toinsurequalityhealthcare,HHShadstipulatedthatatleasthalfofIMC'spatientsbefromoutsideofthepilotprogram,thetheorybeingthatmarketcompetitionwouldmaketheorganizationmoreefficientandguaranteeitsabilitytodeliverthebestpossibleservices.ForthefirstthreeyearsoftheprogramRecareyhadbeenexemptedfromthisrequirement,butas1984rolledaroundhebegantoworry.TheproblemwasthattheIMC'srollswereheavilytiltedtowardprogramparticipantsanditwasdifficulttoattractoutsidepatients.Butinsteadofgoingafternewclients,Recareywentafterthepoliticians.AloyalaidetoPepperpromisedthecongressman'ssupport.OntheRepublicanside,RecareyhiredtwoformerReaganaidesLynNofzigerandJohnSearsaslobbyistsforastronomicalfees(reportedly$400,000and$300,000,respectively).
Theeffortpaidoff.JebBushtelephonedkeyHHSofficialswithassurancesthatRecareywas"solid"andwouldnotproveanembarrassment.HHSsecretaryMargaretHecklerfoundtheserepresentations"persuasive."AletterdenyingthecontinuationoftheexemptiontoIMCwasreplacedbyoneextendingitforanotherthreeyears.Recareywasinthemoney.Withinayear,twohundredthousandnewpatientswereenrolledinhisclinics,almost80percentofthemelderlyMedicarepatients.HHSofficialswhohadplayedaroleinextendingtheexemptionquitthedepartmenttocomeworkfor
IMCatmuchhighersalaries.JuandelReal,thegovernment'sattorneyduringthenegotiations,tradedhis$70,000a-yeargovernmentjobfora$325,000annualsalaryatIMC.C.McClainHaddow,theHHSofficialwhoactuallysignedtheexemption,waspaid$38,000in1986asa''consultant"toIMC.
Soon,however,complaintsandlawsuitsstartedpouringin.WhileRecareypaidhimself,hisfamily,andhisbusinessassociates
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fabuloussalaries,hewassqueezingtheactualhealthproviders.Theaimwasnothinglessthantoreducecostsperpatientwellbelowthe95percentofaveragecostsbudgetedbythegovernment.EarlyattemptstoinvestigateRecareylednowhere.A1984-85investigationbytheStateofFlorida'sInsuranceCommissionconcludedthatIMCwasfinanciallyhealthyandfoundnoevidenceofwrongdoing.AfederaldistrictattorneyinMiamiwhoopenedaninquirywasadvisedtoabandonit:Recareywasjusttoopowerful.
Buttheavalancheofcomplaintsandlawsuitscontinued.ThescandalofelderlycareinIMCclinicswasjusttoobigtocoverup.InApril1987,Recareyandthreeassociateswereindictedbythefederalgovernmentforbribery,andtheIMCcontractwasrevoked.InOctoberRecarey,afterquietlysecuringpassportsforhisyoungchildren,leftthecountry.Heisstillafugitive.TheremnantsofIMCwereacquiredbytheHumanaCorporationofKentucky,andwiththemerger,the"largestCubanfirm"intheUnitedStatesceasedtoexist.
AlthoughnotrepresentativeofthebulkofexilefirmsinMiami,theRecareystoryillustrateswellseveralaspectsoftheCubanenclave.First,IMCwasnotthetypicalsmallethnicbusinessportrayedinthesociologicaloreconomicliterature.Thiswasnocornergrocerystoreorloftgarmentshop,butamultimillion-dollarbusinesswithconnectionsatthehighestlevelsofgovernment.AlthoughIMCwasthelargestandfastest-growingexileenterprise,otherCubanfirmsreached,withlessalacritybutbetterpractices,acomparablesize.Second,Recareywastheprototypicalambitiousimmigrantentrepreneurwhogoestoofartoofast,payinglittleattentiontotherules.Hecarriedbrashnesstoanextreme;nevertheless,thesameorientationisfoundamongotherfirst-generationbusinessmenandpoliticianswhobelievethattosucceed,onemustnotbetooboundbylegalnicetiesandformalprocedures.Asthesepeople'sdeedsareregularlyuncoveredandtheyarehauledbeforethecourts,they
provideeffectiveammunitionforthoseintheAngloestablishmentwhochargethattheseLatinnewcomerscannotbetrustedwiththemanagementofAmericaninstitutions.Notsurprisingly,Recarey'sstorywasextensivelyreportedonthefrontpageoftheMiamiHerald.
2
Third,thescandalrockedbutinnowaycompromisedtheeco-
Page126
nomicstrengthortherapidgrowthoftheCubanbusinessenclave.OtherunscrupulousentrepreneurslikeRecareyjustshruggedtheirshoulders:hewascaught,perhapstheywouldescape.ThemajorityofCubanfirmsandbusinessmen,thosewhoplayedbytherules,lamentedtheincidentasanotherepisodegivingthecommunityabadname.Theymadeeveryefforttoputtheincidentbehindthem,althoughtheHeraldwouldnoteasilyletthemforget.Intheend,however,thenumberofentrepreneurialventuresandthesheerdensityofbusinessnetworksweresuchthattheRecareyscouldcomeandgowithoutmakingadentinthelocaleconomy.BythetimeIMCenteredthescene,theCubanbusinessenclavehadlefttheconfinesofLittleHavanabehind;itnowencompassedtheentireMiamimetropolitanarea.Howthisphenomenondevelopedasifoutoftheblue,liftingpennilessrefugeestonationalprominence,isthestoryofthischapter.ThisprogressionsetthestagefortheprocessofreactiveformationthatwastofollowMarielandthe1980antibilingualreferendum.
TheBeginnings
Backin1962,therewerefewifanyCubanbusinessesinMiami.Thescatteredrestaurantsweremostlyfromtheprevious,anti-Batistaexile.Byforceofhabit,theyhadmadeofnostalgiaaspecialty.EveryoneexpectedtobebackinHavanasoon.DespitetheBayofPigsfiascotheprecedingyear,theCIAcontinuedtobeveryactiveinMiami.Itslocalstation,locatedattheUniversityofMiamiandknownasJM-Wave,wastheagency'ssecondlargestnexttoheadquartersinLangley,Virginia.Exileswhohadbeenunabletobringenoughfundstobeself-supportinginFloridamilitatedinanti-CastroorganizationssupportedbytheCIA.Theagency,indeed,hadbecomeoneofMiami'slargestemployers.TheofficesoftheCubanRevolutionaryCouncil,theexileumbrellaorganizationinBiscayneBoulevard,wereknownas"theMinistry"becauseofthemanyapplicantsbothfor
currentpositionsandforfutureonesinCuba.
3
TheU.S.-SovietdealthatresolvedtheCubanMissileCrisisin1962putanendtothemilitantperiodofexilepolitics,buttheCIAdidnotabandonSouthFloridaimmediately.OnlygraduallydiditdawnontheCubanactiviststhattheagency'sgoalhadchanged:
Page127
fromoverthrowingCastrotoeasingtheexilesoutofMiami."Don'tforgetthatwehaveadisposalproblem,"AllenDulleswassaidtohavetoldKennedyontheeveoftheBayofPigsbywayofwarningabouttheconsequencesofabortingtheinvasion.
4TheproblembecameurgentaftertheMissileCrisisconcluded.Tosolvethe"disposalproblem,"wordwaspasseddownfromJM-Wavethatthenextstepintheanti-CastrostruggleconsistedinjoiningtheU.S.Army,which,induecourse,wouldinvadeCuba.ScoresofyoungexilesenrolledandwerepromptlytakenawayfromMiami.Onthecivilianside,thenewfederalCubanRefugeeCenterstrengthenedthedispersaleffortbymakingresettlementawayfromSouthFloridaacommonrequisiteforassistance.
Thedevelopmentofanethniceconomyofanysubstantialscalehasthreeprerequisites:first,astablemarketthatsmallfirmscancontrolbyofferingtotheimmigrantcommunityculturallydefinedgoodsandservicesnotavailableontheoutside;second,privilegedaccesstoapoolofcheaplaborthroughnetworkswithinthecommunity;andthird,accesstocapital.Theavailabilityofaprotectedmarketandofcheaplaborgivesincipientethnicenterprisesan"edge"overfirmsinthemainstreameconomy.Accesstocapital,however,isthebiggeststumblingblock,sincenativebankersseldomlendtounknownnewcomers.5InMiamiintheearly1960s,prospectsfortheriseofaCubanethniceconomylookeddimastheprotectedmarketandlaborpoolwereconstantlyerodedbytheresettlementflightsoutofthecityandasmajorlocalbanksprovedunwillingtoadvancemoneyforexilebusinessstart-ups.
Nonetheless,severalcountertrendswereinevidenceaswell.JewishgarmentmanufacturersinNewYorksoondiscoveredthatthemiddle-classCubanwomenofMiamimadeexcellentworkers.Desperateto
maintainthelivingstandardoftheirfamiliesduringthe"temporary"exile,thesewomenwouldacceptlowwagesandhardworkingconditionswithoutprotest.Thus,confrontedwithuniontroubleinNewYork,manufacturersmovedtheiroperationsdowntoMiamiandHialeahindroves.Thelocalgarmentindustrythrived.AformerpresidentoftheFloridaNeedletradeAssociationdescribedthemovethisway:
YouhavetounderstandthatCubanworkerswerewillingtodoanythingtosurvive....Atthesametime,NewYorkwasexperiencingaresurgence
Page128
ofunionfervor.ManufacturersfromNewYorkwhohadhomesinMiamiBeachsawtheadvantagesofopeningnewbusinessesandhavingthelargenumberoffreshimmigrantscomingfromCuba.AsaresulttheSouthFloridaneedletradeindustrywentfromaboutseventhousandworkersin1964totwenty-fourthousandin1973.
6
Atypicalmid-sixtiesCubanhouseholdinMiamifeaturedahusbandwhohadbeenamemberofananti-CastroorganizationandnowstrainedtofindemploymentandawifewhohadneverworkedoutsidethehomebeforebutnowsewedfulltimeinaHialeahfactory.Thelarge-scaleemploymentofCubanwomenintheneedletradehadtwoimportantconsequences.First,itallowedfamiliestostayinMiamiandboughttimeforhusbandstolearnEnglishandfindsomelocalbusinessniche.Andsecond,ititselfcreatedsomeofthesenichesthroughindependentsubcontracting.ManyCubans,seeingwhattheJewishjobbersweredoing,decidedtoimitatethem.ThesameNeedletradeAssociationofficialreports:"Inthebeginning,allthefactorieswereJewish-owned,butbythemid-seventiestherewasadivisionoflabor.ThemanufacturerswerestillJewish,butmostcontractorswereCuban.Cubangarment'factories'usuallystartedintheowner'sgarage,withthewife,themother,andotherwomeninthefamilyastheoperators."7
Othermarketforceswerealsoatplay.ThelargenumberofformerCubanprofessionalsandwhite-collarworkers,whoofcoursespokefluentSpanish,begantoattracttheattentionofcompaniesoperatinginLatinAmerica.ExecutivesofNorthAmericancompaniesthathadhadbranchesinCubapointedouttotheiremployerstheadvantagesofestablishingtheirLatinheadquartersinMiami.OneenterprisingemployeeofCoralGableswentsofarasprintingbrochureshighlightingtheopportunitiesofferedbythecity,distributingthemto
allcompanieswithLatinAmericanoperations.Theresult,inthewordsofaCuban-Americanbanker,wasthat"CoralGablestookonanunexpecteddimensionandsoonconsolidatedintoaworldcenterofactivityforthelargestfirms....Cubanswerethenemployedbythesesamemultinationalcompaniestotravelanddobusinessforthemoverseas."8
CapitaliststhroughoutSouthAmericaalsobecameawareofthenewlabormarketcreatedinMiamibytheCubanRevolution.
Page129
Alongwiththedrugtradethatwastogiverisetothe"MiamiVice"image,manylegitimateVenezuelan,Ecuadorean,andotherLatincompaniessoughtinthecityarefugefromtheeconomicvagariesandpoliticalinstabilityoftheirowncountries.SouthAmericanflightcapitalplusCubanmanagementthusbecameaformulaforthecreationandgrowthofmanybanksandconstructioncompanies.
9TheirpresencewastohaveadecisiveimpactonthesubsequentdevelopmentoftheCubanbusinessenclave,aswewillseebelow.
AstheCIAabandonedMiami,itsmissionunfulfilled,itleftbehindalargenumberofformermilitantsreluctanttoresettleinthenorthandreadytoavailthemselvesoftheemergingbusinessopportunities.Contrarytosomescholarlyaccounts,therewasapparentlynodirectconnectionbetweenCIAinvolvementwiththeexilecommunityandtheriseofCubanentrepreneurship.10Fewoftheagency's"front"operationsprosperedaslegitimateenterprises,andthereislittleevidencethatCIAsalariesandsecretaccountsfunctionedasamajorsourceofcapitalforexilefirms.Instead,themainaccomplishmentoftheagency'smassiveinterventioninMiamiwastosupportasubstantialnumberofmiddle-classCubansatareasonablestandardofliving,allowingthemtimetomonitoropportunitiesofferedbythelocaleconomyandtofindasuitablebusinessniche.Painfulasitwasfromapoliticalpointofview,thetransitionfrommilitantexodustoentrepreneurialcommunitywasremarkablysmooth.FewimmigrantgroupshavecommencedtheireconomicadaptationtoAmericanlifefromapositionofsuchrelativeadvantage.
ThreeStories
In1966,SantiagoAlvarezhadhadenoughoftheclandestinewaranddecidedtosettledown.Hewastwenty-fiveand,forthelastfewyears,
hadworkedasaboatcaptainfortheCIAinfiltratingmenandarmsintoCuba.AsidefromanintimateknowledgeoftheCubancoast,hehadfewskills."Ididn'thavemuchofaneducation...Ihadtofightsinceaveryyoungage,"hesaid.InMiami,Santiagoworkedasawaiter,truckdriver,andconcretesalesman.Finally,in1971,heopenedhisownconstructionfirm,beginningwithjusthimself,hispickup,andhisconnections.Such"back-of-
Page130
the-truck"enterprisesproliferatedduringtheearlyseventies,butdidnotyetchallengethedominanceofestablishedAnglo-ownedcompanies.Alvarez'soperation,however,neverceasedgrowing.By1985hewasoneofSouthFlorida'smostactiverealestatedevelopers,havingtakenoverfromoldercompaniesthebuildingofshoppingcentersanddepartmentcomplexesinHialeah.
11
Afterspendingelevendaysinjailforantigovernmentactivities,RemediosDiaz-Oliverandherhusband,Fausto,leftCubain1961.AgraduateoftwoHavanabusinessschools,shewenttoworkasabookkeeperforRichfordIndustries,acontainerdistributor.FaustofoundworkatBertramYacht,locatednearby;thatmeantthecouplecouldmanagewithasingleoldcar.Withinayear,RemedioshadbeenmovedtoRichford'sinternationaldivision.Faustotookhistwoweeks'vacation,andthecoupletraveledtoCentralAmericawithabagofRichford'ssamples.Theyreturnedwith$300,000inordersfrompharmaceuticalcompaniesinHondurasandCostaRica.By1965,Diaz-OliverhadbeenappointedRichford'svicepresidentofdomesticsales,inadditiontoherdutiesaspresidentoftheLatinAmericandivision.
Theseweretheyearsinwhichformermilitantexileswerelookingforpermanentemployment.FromherHavanadays,Remediosknewmanypeoplewiththeskillstomakeabusinesssucceed.In1966,shepersuadedRichfordtoadvance$30,000incredittoonesuchperson,withthepromisethatifhedefaultedshewouldcoverthedebtwithherownsalary.Themanpaid,theaccountgrew,andsodidhercommission.Followingthisexperienceandatherprodding,Richfordagreedtoadvancecredittonumerousexileclients.Asthesefirmsdeveloped,thecompany'sownbusinessgrewrapidly.
In1976,however,RichfordwassoldtoadivisionofAlcoStandardCorp.ofOmaha,Nebraska.ThenewemployerrequiredRemediostosignacontractguaranteeingthatshewouldnotcompetewithAlcoStandardifsheleftthecompany.Insteadofsigning,Diaz-Oliverdecidedtoquitandformherowncompany.TheconstructiontrailerinwhichAmericanInternationalContaineropeneddidnotlooklikemuch,exceptthatitsownerhadfarmoresolidconnectionsinthelocalmarketthanthebuttondownmid-westerncompanydid.By1978,AmericanInternationalhadtaken
Page131
overtheinventoryofAlcoStandardafterdrivingitoutofMiami.Diaz-OliverbecameexclusiveFloridadistributorforsomeofthebiggestnamesinpackaging,includingOwens-IllinoisandStandardContainer.HercompanyhadwarehousesinMiami,Orlando,andTampaandannualsalesofover$60million.
RemedioshasbeenpresidentofDadeCounty'sAmericanCancerSociety,theHispanicdivisionoftheRedCross,andthesocialcommitteeoftheBigFivetheprivateclubcreatedinMiamiinnostalgicremembranceoftheHavanaYachtClubanditsfourextinctpeersinCuba.
12
AllthatDiegoR.Suarezhasdoneinhislifeisdesignandmanufactureagriculturalequipment,especiallyforthesugarcaneindustry.AgraduateoftheVocationalSchoolofHavanaandoftheCivic-MilitaryInstituteofCeibadelAgua,SuarezfoundedandoperatedacompanycalledVanguardNationalEquipmentpriortotherevolution.AfterFidelCastrocametopower,SuarezstartedmovinghiscapitaloutofCuba,andhehimselfleftin1961.WiththemoniessmuggledoutandaloanfromasmallPuertoRicanbank,heestablishedinMiamitheInter-AmericanTransportEquipmentCompany,amanufacturerandsupplierofharvest,transport,andfieldmachineryforthesugarindustry.ThecompanybeganbyexportinglightequipmenttoPuertoRico,thenexpandedtoallLatinAmericancountriesexceptBrazil.Atpresent,over90percentoftheequipmentmanufacturedisexportedtomorethanfortycountriesworldwide.InSuarez'sestimate,thelargemajorityoffieldequipmentusedtodayinFlorida'ssugarindustrycomesfromhisfactories.
Thecompany'sheadquartersandmainfactoryarelocatedinthevicinityofHialeah,whereitemploysbetweenthreehundredandfour
hundredworkers.TradenamesincludeVanguardandThomson(tractors,transportequipment,andothermachinery)andClaas(harvesters).By1986,mostofthisequipmentwasdesignedandmanufacturedatthesefacilities,excepttheharvesters,whichweremadeinWestGermany.Inter-American'sengineersareCuban,Mexican,American,andBritish.Throughouttheyears,Suarezhasmaintainedgoodrelationswithhisworkersandissatisfiedwiththestrongbondsthatexistwithhisclosecollaborators.
In1980,SuarezinitiatedtheInter-AmericanSugarCaneSemi-
Page132
nars,whichbringengineers,technologists,andsugarmillownersfromallovertheworldtoMiamitodiscussscientificandtechnicalissuesrangingfromsugarcanediseasestocomputerautomationofsugarmills.TheseminarsarefinancedbyInter-AmericanTransportincooperationwiththecityofMiami.SixU.S.universities,theuniversitiesofPuertoRicoandtheWestIndies,andtheU.S.DepartmentofAgriculturearethecosponsoringinstitutions.SuarezalsopresidesovercompaniesaffiliatedwithInter-AmericanTransportandisoneofthefoundersanddirectorsoftheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundation.
13
CharacterLoans
DiegoSuarezwasfortunatetohavebroughtmoneyandcontactsfromCuba.Ingeneral,thelargestandbest-capitalizedfirmsoftheemergingenclavewerecreatedbyexilesexperiencedinbusinessandhavingaccesstotheseresources.Manywould-beentrepreneursseekinganicheinMiami'seconomyduringtheearlysixtieswerenotsofortunate,however.UnlikeAsianimmigrantcommunitiesthatmakeextensiveuseoftherotatingcreditassociationasaninstrumentforpoolingsavings,Cubansdidnothavethisculturalpractice.14Initsabsence,itseemedthatbusinessstartswouldhavetorelyonpaltryfamilyloansorsmallsavingsfromwagelabor.
Therewasanotherway.WhatRemediosDiaz-OliverwasdoingatRichfordextendingcreditonthebasisofpersonalreputationbecameinstitutionalizedasCubanmanagersgraduallytookovertheloanportfoliosoflocalbanks.Tobesure,thesewerenotthedominantAnglo-ownedbanksforwhomtheexileswerejustanotherdowntroddenminority,butsmallbankscreatedwithLatinAmerican
capital.SouthAmericanownershaddeemeditwisetoputthemanagementoftheirfirmsinthehandsofexperienced,butthenunemployed,Cubanbankers.Oncetheirownpositionsbecamesecure,theseofficersinitiatedaprogramoflending$10,000to$30,000tootherCubansforbusinessstart-ups.
Accesstothiscreditwasnotbasedontheapplicant'sbalancesheetorcollateral,butonhisorherbusinessreputationinCuba.Thisuniquepracticebecameknownas"character"lendingandallowednumerousexileswhospokelittleEnglishandhadnostandingintheAmericanbankingworldtogetafootholdinthelocal
Page133
economy.AleadingCuban-Americanbankerwhotookpartinthisoperationdescribeditasfollows:
Atthestart,mostCubanenterprisesweregasstations;thencamegroceryshopsandrestaurants.NoAmericanbankwouldlendtothem.Bythemid-sixties,westartedapolicyatourbankofmakingsmallloanstoCubanswhowantedtostarttheirownbusinessesbutdidnothaveanycapital.Theseloansoftenorfifteenthousanddollarsweremadebecausethepersonwasknowntousbyhisreputationandintegrity.Allofthempaidback;therewerezerolosses.Withsomeexceptions,theyhavecontinuedbeingclientsofthebank.Peoplewhousedtoborrowfifteenthousanddollarsonaone-timebasisnowtakeoutfiftythousandinaweek.In1973,thepolicywasdiscontinued.Thereasonwasthatthenewexilescomingatthattimewereunknowntous.
15
Anearlyclient,nowalargefactoryowner,describeshisimpressionsofdifferingbankingstyles:
TheAmericanbankerlooksonlyatthestatement,thebalancesheetofthecompany.Ifhedoesn'tlikeit,hedoesn'tgiveyoutheloan.TheCubanbankerhasadifferenttechnique:helooksforsignsofyourcharacter.Ifheknowsyou,knowsthatyoumeetyourobligations,helendsyouwithoutlookingatthebalancesheet.Heknowsyouarenotgoingtofailhim.Americanbankshavethehabitofchangingcreditmanagersveryoften.TheyhirefreshcollegegraduateswhocomeheretoMiami,knownoone,andhavetobeginanalyzingstatements.TheretheCubanbankshavetheadvantage.Theirloanofficersknowtheirclientele,theyoftenevenknewtheirfamiliesinCubatwenty,thirtyyears.It'sasmalltechnicaldetail,butimportant.16
Meanwhile,intheconstructionindustry,Cubanswithexperienceandwhosoughtjobsascarpenters,plumbers,andbricklayerswerebeingblackballedbylocalunionsdominatedbynativewhites.Undeterred,theCubanscreatedtheirownhomerepairbusinessesbybuyinga
truckandgoingdoor-to-doorseekingwork.Eventually,someofthemgainedaccesstocharacterloans,SmallBusinessAdministrationloans,orpooledfamilysavingstoestablishmoresubstantialfirms.By1979,about50percentofmajorconstructioncompaniesinDadewereCuban-owned,andtheyaccountedforover90percentofresidentialandcommercialconstructioninthesouthwestzoneofthecounty.
DeveloperslikeSantiagoAlvarezgraduallydisplacedolderun-
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ionizedcompanies.By1985,sixofthetenlargesthomebuildersinDadewereCuban-owned,includingWestMillerHeights(P.Adrian),AtriumHomes(A.Sotolongo),H.G.Enterprises(H.Garcia),andInteramBuilders(E.Pereira).Thesecompaniesareuniformlynonunion.Astheygraduallyexpanded,unionizednewconstructioninMiamiplummetedfromover90percentin1960tolessthan10percentin1980.ACarpenter'sUnionorganizergloomilysummarizedthesituationin1984:''WepaiddearlyfornotlettingtheCubansin.Theycametoseeusastheenemy,andworkersintheircompanieswouldnottouchus.NowevenAnglofirmsare'double-breasting':theykeeptheirunionizeddivisionsasafaçade,butalltheworkgoestonewnonuniondivisions."
17
GroupedintheLatinBuildersAssociation,theCubancompaniescametoexertgrowinginfluencenotonlyintheconstructionindustry,butinlocalpoliticsaswell.Predictably,oneofthegoalsoftheassociationistoinsurethattheinfluenceoftheconstructiontradesinDaderemainsataminimum.
Therewereothermeansofcapitalizingnewfirms,bothorthodoxandunconventional.EstablishedCubanJewishcompaniesinHavanasimplymovedtoMiamiandcontinuedtheirlong-standingrelationshipwithsuppliersandcreditors.ThisisthecaseoftheSuaveShoeCompany,afootwearmanufacturerandoneofthelargestfirmsoftheMiamienclave.Suaveandsimilarmanufacturerswereabletosecurecreditfrom"factors"bankerswhospecializeinadvancingcapitalonthebasisofworkorders,bypassingtheusual90-to-120-daysrepaymentperiod.Factorbankingisnotavailabletojustanybusinessnewcomer,however;itisbasedonestablishednetworksandasolidcommercialreputation.Thankstothisdecidedadvantage,
SuavebecamesosuccessfulthatitwentpublicandqualifiedtobelistedontheNewYorkStockExchange.18
Verysmallbusinesseswithoutaccesstobusinessnetworksorcharacterloanshadtofallbackonfamilysavings.AsurprisinglycommonwayofcapitalizingsuchfirmswastocollectthecashvalueofinsurancepoliciesboughtfromanAmericancompanyinCubabytheentrepreneurorhisorherparents.Manysmallbusinesses,fromgasstationstobookstores,wereestablishedinLittleHavanabycashingintheseoldandnearlyforgottenpolicies.19
ButitwascapitaladvancedbyCubanofficialsatthesmallSouthAmerican-ownedbanksthatplayedthedecisiveroleduringthe
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sixties,fuelingthedevelopmentofathickmidlevellayerofenterprisesbetweentransplantedlargefirmsandthesmallfamilybusinesses.By1977,theCensusofMinority-OwnedEnterprisescounted30,366Cuban-ownedfirmsintheUnitedStates,mostoftheminMiami.TheareawashometohalfofthefortylargestHispanicfirmsinthenationandtothelargestbank.Therewasonefirmforeverytwenty-sevenCuban-bornpersons.
20
NetworksandSocialCapital
Clearly,socialnetworkswereessentialineffectingtherapidtransformationofpoliticalmilitantsintoethnicentrepreneurs.Yetitisimportanttodelvedeeperintothesocialcontextinwhichtheseeventstookplace.LanguageandacommoncultureprovidedCubanswithabasisforsolidaritybutbythemselveswerenotenoughtocreatealevelofmutualsupportstrongerthanthattypicalofmanyotherimmigrantcommunities.Rather,thecommoncircumstanceofexileandthecommonexperienceofsuccessivepoliticaldefeatshadcementedastrongsenseof"we-ness"amongtheserefugees.Expelledanddespisedbythegovernmentoftheircountry,abandonedattheBayofPigsbyasupposedlyfriendlygovernment,tradedoffduringtheMissileCrisis,ridiculedbyLatinAmericanintellectualswhoconfinedthemtothedustbinofhistory,theexileshadlittletofallbackonbutthemselves.Boundedsolidarity,wastheoutcome,amechanismthatledtheCubansdespitediverseclassoriginsandviewstopatronizeotherCuban-ownedbusinessesandtopreferco-nationalsasbusinessassociates.
Sharingacommonpoliticalfate,andanunenviableoneatthat,hadtheunexpectedconsequenceofpromotingeconomicprogressby
cementingtiesbuiltoriginallyonacommonculture.The"discrimination"thatCubanssufferedwasnottheusualtypeinvolvinglabormarketopportunitiesorsocialacceptance.Instead,itconcernedthefailureoftheiroverallpoliticalprojectandtheirinabilitytopersuadeothersofitsmerit.LatinaswellasNorthAmericanintellectualsderidedCubanexilesasjustabunchofpoliticallosersstrandedbetweentwonations.Thisisolationdefinedthecommunitvandstrengtheneditsinternalsolidarityinawaythatevenlanguageorawell-definednationalculturecouldnot.
ThephysicalboundariesoftheMiamienclavearenotclearly
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demarcatedbecauseCubanbusinessesmaybefoundthroughoutthemetropolitanarea.Thesocialboundariesare,however,extremelyclear;theydefinetheoperationandthelimitsofboundedsolidarity,aswellasofasecondmechanismthatcontributeddecisivelytobusinessdevelopment.UnderlyingtheeasewithwhichCubanbankofficialsmadecharacterloanswasthecertaintythattheirclientswouldpay.Anyonedefaultingorotherwiseviolatingtheimplicittrustbuiltintosuchdealscouldkissgood-byehisorherchancesforbusinesssuccess;theentireCubancommunitywouldknow,andtherewaspreciouslittleopportunityoutsideofit.Hence,bankerswerenotsimplybeingloyaltotheirfriends,butdisplayinggoodbusinessacumen.Morethanbyawrittenpromise,theirloanswerebackedbyakindofenforceabletrustinherentinthesocialnetworksoftheenclave.The"zerolosses"reportedbyourCubanbanksourceswereentirelypredictable.
21
Normsofsolidaritywithinanethniccommunityraisethereverseproblemofsocialsupportexpectationsthatareincompatiblewiththelogicofcapitalaccumulation.InhisstudyofcommercialenterprisesinBali,CliffordGeertzobservedhowsuccessfulentrepreneurswereassaultedbyjob-andloan-seekingkinsmen.Thepetitioners'claimswerebuttressedbystrongnormsenjoiningmutualassistancewithintheextendedfamilyandamongallcommunitymembers.Theresultwastoturnpromisingbusinessesintorelieforganizationslanguishingatthemarginsofsolvency.22
FamilyandethnicobligationssurelyexistedamongMiamiCubans,buttheydidnotgosofarastocompromisetheviabilityofmostbusinessventures.Onthecontrary,suchtiesworkedintheentrepreneurs'favor,assourcesoflow-costfamilylaborandstart-up
capital.Thereareseveralreasonsforthissituation.FirstisthefactthatprerevolutionaryCubansocietyneverenjoinedthewealthytosupporttheirlessfortunatecompatriots.Boundedsolidarityemergedinexileoutofthecontingentcircumstancesdescribedabove,butithadclearlimitsintermsofmutualassistance.
Second,theprecariousbeginningsofmanyCubanenterprisesandtheobviousfactthat,tosurvive,theyneededtomaximizeefficiencyrestrictedtheirroleassourcesofemployment.Earlyexileentrepreneurs,engagedinwhatamountedtoeconomicguerrillawarfareagainstmuchlargerfirms,wereinnopositiontohonorotherCubans'welfareclaims.Onlykinandworkerswilling
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toworklonghoursforminimalremunerationcouldbeemployedbythesefledglingbusinesses.
Third,largerenclaveenterprisesfrequentlyshiftedtomoremodernmanagementpracticesthatprecludedparticularisticobligations.Astheethniceconomygrewandfirmsbecamebettercapitalized,theyadoptedmoreconventionalformsoflabormanagement.Tobesure,Cubanswerestillpreferredasworkersandsupervisors,andCuban-ownedcompaniesdidmuchoftheirbusinesswitheachother,butthetransactionsacquiredamoreuniversalisticcharacterthatprecludedexclusivelyethniccriteriaforhiringandcontractingdecisions.
23
Mostenclavefirmscouldthusprosperwithoutbeingturnedintowelfarehotels.Thesocialmechanismsofboundedsolidarityandenforceabletrustproducedentrepreneurialsuccessthatwascelebratedbytheentirecommunityandpresentedasamodeltofollow.Inpoliticaldefeat,successinbusinessgraduallyemergedasasourceofcollectiveself-esteemandasproofofthecorrectnessoftherefugees'ideologicalstance:whileCubawentdowneconomicallyandregimesfriendlytoCastroalsofoundered,theMiamienclaveflourishedontheenergiesofexileentrepreneursandthesocialcapitalcreatedbytheirsolidarity.
TheMoralCommunity
"Miami:TheWorldinBlackandWhite,"readthetitleofaneditorialbyafamousCubanpoetafterspendingafewmonthsinthecity.Hesummarizedhisimpressionsinafewpoignantwords:"YouhavetoliveinMiami,sleepiniteachday,toreallyknowhowitisandhowithasforged[the]profile[ithas].Itisn'teasywithoutalonghistoricalrecountingtounderstandtherootsofsomuchincomprehension."24
HislastwordreferredtothepeculiarpoliticalintolerancethataccompaniedtherapideconomicgrowthoftheCubanenclave.InMiami,anappearancebyJaneFondahadledtoaboycottandaseriesofthreateningcallstoBurdines,thesponsorofhervisitandtheregion'slargestdepartmentstore.LatinAmericanartistswhohadvisitedCubaatsomepointoranotherwerebarredfromperformingattheannualCalleOchoCarnival.AndtheMiamiCityCommissionpermittedtheHaitiancommunitytocelebratethe
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investitureofHaitianpresidentFatherJean-BertrandAristideonlyprovidedFidelCastrowasnotinvitedtothehome-countryceremonyinPort-au-Prince.
AstheCubancommunitygainedpoliticalpoweritimposedamonolithicoutlookonthecity,oftenwithlittleregardfortheconcernsandinterestsofothersegmentsofthepopulation.
25AplaybyaNewYork-basedCubanwritersuspectedofbeingsympathetictotheregimeintheislandhadtoberemovedfromtheprogramoftheMiamiTheaterFestivalaftertheorganizersreceivednumerouslocalthreats.ACubanbusinessmandefendedtheprotesters'pointofview:
Whensomanypersonshavebeenaffectedbycommunism,whensomanyhadtoabandonthelandinwhichtheywereborn,whenpeoplecouldnotvisitthecemeterieswheretheirlovedonesrest,wedohavetoprotestthiskindofthing.Whynot?Whydotheyhavetoimposeonussuchapainfulthing?Apersonwhohasnotsuffered,whohasnothadrelativeskilled,cansaycoollythattheremustbefreedomofexpression.Weknowbetter.Itistoohardthattheycomehere,toourcenter,totellusthesethings.26
TheplayinquestiondidnothavemuchtodowithconditionsinCuba,nordiditdefendtheregime.Theexiles'objectionswereexclusivelytotheassumedpoliticalsympathiesoftheauthor.Theexpression"ourcenter"intheabovetestimonyencapsulatedthebeliefthatMiamiwas,aboveall,thecapitaloftheOtherCuba.Butothersegmentsofthecityresentedtheexiles'politicalintolerance.TheMiamiHerald,inparticular,wagedarelentlesscampaignagainstwhatitsawastherisingpoweroftheCubansandthethreatthattheyposedtocivicfreedoms.EvenbeforetheMarielconfrontation,thepapercastigatedonnumerousoccasionstheexilecommunity'sextremism.
Duringthe1970s,suchattackscouldbemadewithimpunity,butafter
theexilecommunitybecameorganizedfordomesticpoliticalactionintheaftermathofMarielthestorychanged.ThisiswhattheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundationhadtosayabouttheHerald'scampaigninafull-pagepaidadvertisement,publishedintheHeraldin1987:
Allourachievementshavebeenaccomplishedwithanationalpresscoveragethathasoftenportrayedusasextremists.ThishasbeenthemostunfairandprejudicedperceptionwehaveexperiencedinAmerica....
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TheMiamiHeraldbearstremendousresponsibility.forthisinjustice....TheMiamiHeraldisaggressiveinitsignoranceofourpeople.ItrefusestounderstandthatCubanAmericansseethestrugglebetweentotalitarianismanddemocracyasapersonal,ever-presentstruggle.WelivethestruggledailybecauseourfriendsandfamiliesenslavedinCommunistCubahiveitdaily.
27
Astheenclaveeconomygrew,sodidthereachofthisdistinctpoliticalperspective,onethatsettherefugeessharplyapartfromthefairlyliberalviewsofAmericanjournalism.TheCubanssawthemselvesasmoremilitantintheirdefenseofAmericanvalues,moreawareoftheperilssurroundingthem,thanthelaid-backnatives.ThepopularradiostationWQBA,LaCubanisima(The"Cubanest"),forexample,greetsitslistenerseverydaywiththisrefrain:"It'snoontime.LetusgivethankstoGodforlivinginacountryoffulllibertyanddemocracy."28
AngloMiamianswhocaredtolistenreactedtosuchfervorwithalarm,ifnotscorn.Theeffectwastosharpenthecontoursoftherefugeecommunityandincreaseitsinternalsolidarity.LittleHavanaisnomereimmigrantneighborhood,notevenalivelybusinesshub,butamoralcommunitywithitsowndistinctoutlookontheworld.Iffromtheoutsidetheexiles'politicaldiscourseappearedasravingintolerance,fromtheinsideithelpeddefinewhowasandwasnotatruememberofthecommunity.TobeaMiamiCuban,itdoesnotsufficetohaveescapedfromtheisland;onemustalsoespousepointsofviewrepeatedceaselesslybyeditorialistsinMiami'sSpanishradioandpressthesamevoicesthattakecareofdenouncinganymemberofthecommunitywhostraystoofarfromthefold.29
Thepoliticalfalloutofthisferociousright-wingframehasbeen
generallynegativewithregardtotheexiles'outsideimage,butitseconomicconsequencesareenviable.Theconsolidationofamoralcommunitypermeatedimperceptiblytherelationshipsbetweenbuyerandseller,lenderandborrower,employerandworkerintheethnicenclave.Aheightenedsenseof"we-ness"clarifiedthelimitstowhichboundedsolidaritywouldapply,whileintensifyingitshold.Cubanrefugeesboughtfromeachotherandsponsoredeachother'sbusinessestoanextentseldomseenamongLatinimmigrantgroups.Membershipinthiscommunitydefined,toalargeextent,
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whowaseligibleforbusinessloansandwhowasnot."Cubanness"byitselfdidnotsuffice.
30
UnionorganizerssimilarlyreportedthatwhereasCubanworkersinmainstreamfirmswouldjoinunions,thesameworkersinCuban-ownedfirmswouldbenexttoimpossibletoorganize.Theadversarialunion-managementrelationshipappearedinimicaltothebondbetweenworkersandownerscreatedbyacommonpastandcommonpoliticaloutlook.Forthisreason,firmslikeDiegoSuarez'sInter-AmericanTransportcouldremainindefinitelyunion-free.
Iftheexiles'politicaldiscoursehadbeenmoretolerantandlessmilitant,itprobablywouldnothavebeenaseffectiveinreinforcingthesocialcapitalonwhichtheircollectivebusinessadvancementwascemented.Thesenseofhavingthetruthbutfewallieswithwhomtoshareitstrengthenedconsiderablythemoralbondsandself-relianceofthiscommunity:CubanswereinAmerica,butnotreallyofit,evenafterbecomingU.S.citizens.Manyfearedthattheirsituationandcurrentwell-beingwouldbejeopardizedbythemorallaxitywithwhichthenation'sleaderswereconductingthefightagainstcommunism.ThefollowingexcerptfromaquerybyaHialeahresidentwaspublishedinElNuevoHerald,theMiamiHerald'sSpanish-languageedition,in1988:
HundredsofCubansliveinfearafterthechangesintheImmigrationLawfollowingthePactbetweenMikhailGorbachevandthegovernmentoftheUnitedStateswithregardtoFidelCastro.
IhavebeenintheU.S.for25years.Iammarriedandhavechildren.MywifeandIhavebeenAmericancitizensfor15years.Myquestionisthis:IfweweredeportedtoCubaasaconsequenceofthisPact,wouldwestillhavearighttooursocialsecuritypensions?Ourchildrenwereborninthis
country,couldwestillhavesomerightsasretireeswiththeirconsent?31
IthadneveroccurredtothisoldCubanthatU.S.citizenshipwouldprotecthimfromdeportation,eveniftheU.S.governmentcametoanunderstandingwithCastroandtheSoviets.
OriginsoftheMoralCommunity
ThereisaBlack-CubanelementinthisdisputeandtherehasbeensinceJune26.That'sthedaythatMayorsGildaOliverosofHialeahGardens,
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JoséRiveroofSweetwater,PedroReboredoofWestMiami,JulioMartinezofHialeah,andXavierSuárezofMiamisignedaletterunwelcomingNelsonMandela."We,Cuban-Americans..."itsaid.Withthesewords,thefivemayorsmadethisinpartaCubanissue.
32
Theepisodeinquestionoccurredinthesummerof1990,afewdaysbeforeNelsonMandela'sarrivalinMiami.Thehero'swelcomeplannedfortheSouthAfricanleaderquicklyturnedintoindifferenceandthenoppositionfollowingacknowledgmentofhisfriendshipwithFidelCastroduringanABCtelevisioninterview.OverthestrenuousobjectionsofBlackcommunityleaders,theCuban-Americanmayors"uninvited"Mandela.AlthoughtheSouthAfricancametoMiamionlyforabriefspeechataunionconventionandneveracceptedanylocalinvitation,themayors'actionprofoundlyhurtthesensitivitiesofMiami'sBlackcommunity.Blackleadersrespondedbydeclaringaboycottoftheirowncity,askingoutsideconventioneersnottocometoMiamiuntilthemayorsformallyapologizedtoMandela.33
Noneofthemdid.Tohavedonesowouldhavebeentantamounttolosingthenextelection.PoliticalpowerinthesecitiesrestedwithCuban,notBlackvoters,andtheexilecommunitywasmonolithicinitsrepudiationofanyonehavinganythingtodowithFidelCastro.AlthoughtheBlackboycottcouldeasilyhavebeenpreventedwithaminorgestureofconciliation,electedCuban-Americanpoliticianswereunabletotakethatstep.AnysignofanapologywouldhavebeenimmediatelydenouncedbytheSpanishradiostationsasun-Cubanandasignofweaknessinthefaceoftheenemy.
Wheredidthisfiercerightismcomefrom?ItwasnotaforegoneconclusionthatescapeesfromCastro'sleftistregimewouldmovetotheoppositeendofthepoliticalspectrum.Indeed,thedominant
politicalviewpointamongexilesduringthedaysofactivemilitarystruggleintheearlysixtieswasverydifferent:therevolution,embodyingthelegitimateaspirationsoftheCubanpeople,hadbeenbetrayedbyCastroandhishenchmen;thefight,therefore,wastogetthemoutinordertorestorethecountry'sconstitution,organizefreeelections,andpromoteeconomicgrowthwithsocialequalityinall,asocialdemocraticoratleastmildlycentriststance.34
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Threesuccessiveeventsunderminedthispositionandopenedthewayforthehegemonyofextremeright-wingpolitics.First,theexiles'AssaultBrigade2506wastrainedandfinancedbytheCIAonlytobeabandonedtoitsfateattheBayofPigs.Thedecisiontoleavethemenstranded,whichdirectlycontradictedearlierguaranteesmadebytheU.S.government,wastakenbytheliberalKennedyadministration.Theexiledleadersdupedbythesepromiseswerealso,byandlarge,membersoftheoldliberalandcentristwingofCubanpolitics.
EvenaftertheBayofPigs,theseleadersstillheededthepromisesoftheWhiteHouse;oneyearlater,however,theKennedy-KhrushchevaccordduringtheMissileCrisisputanendtoallhopes.ThemilitarydeactivationoftheCubancommunitywasaliberalDemocraticfeat,andtheexileleaderswhohadtolerateditwereofasimilarpoliticalpersuasion.ShortlyaftertheMissileCrisis,theheadoftheCubanRevolutionaryCouncil,JoséMiroCardona,resignedinprotest,andthecouncil,theexiles'umbrellaorganization,wasdisbanded.
35
TherewasonemorechanceforCubanprogressivestoprevailasthemoralwatchdogsoftheexilecommunity.Ittooktheformofanorganizationbuiltbyformerrevolutionaryleadersandmilitantsandledbyanex-ministerofoneofCastro'sfirstcabinets,ManuelRayRivero.TheycalledthemselvesthePeople'sRevolutionaryMovement(MovimientoRevolucionariodelPueblo,orMRP)andforalongtimemaintainedtheirdistancefromtheCIA-supportedCubanRevolutionaryCouncil,whichtheysawasexcessivelycentristandpro-American.TheMRPreaffirmedthethemeofthe"revolutionbetrayed"andsoughttheoverthrowoftheregimethroughinternalmobilizationandthesupportoffriendlyLatinAmericangovernments.Intheend,however,financialneedforcedRayandhisfollowersto
acceptcovertU.S.supportfortheirplanstolaunchanewinvasionoftheisland.AswiththeBayofPigsthreeyearsbefore,politicalexpediencyagainprevailedandthecivilwingofLyndonJohnson'sDemocraticadministrationbetrayeditsnewclients.Britishauthoritieswerenotifiedastothelocationofthewould-beinvadersinaBahamiankey,andRayandhisgroupwereeasilyapprehended.36
TheignominiousendoftheMRPandtherepeatedbetrayalsofexileaspirationsbyDemocraticpartyleadersinWashingtonpaved
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thewayforextreme-rightelementstooccupycenterstageinMiami.FormerlydiscreditedBatistasupportersreemergedfromtheshadowswithaclaimtopoliticalforesight."Wetoldyouso,"theyproclaimed;"Fidelhasalwaysbeenacommunist,andhiscomradesofyesterdaylikeRayarenotmuchbetter."Alongwithotherconservatives,theyforgedacoherentinterpretationoftheexiles'plight.Forthem,therevolutionarytriumphintheislandhadnotbeentheresultofsocialinequality.orpoliticaloppression,becauseCubabeforeCastrowasalreadyaquasi-developedcountrywithenviablestandardsoflivingandeconomicopportunitiesforall.Rather,Castro'striumphwastheresultofaninternationalcommunistconspiracy.TheCubanpeoplehadbeendeceivedbyCastroandhiscliqueandthenbetrayedagainbyfellowtravelerswhohadinfiltratedtheliberalDemocraticestablishmentintheUnitedStates.
37
Liberalism,accordingtothisview,wasnothingmorethanaconvenientdisguise,afrontforcommunistobjectives.Accordingly,leftistsofallstripeshadtoberesolutelyopposed;intransigentanticommunismwastheonlyvalidpositionfortheexilecommunity.Thisdiscoursehadtwosignificantadvantages.First,itabsolvedearlierCubangovernments,includingBatista's,ofallresponsibilityfortheascentofFidelCastrotopower.Second,itprovidedacoherentinterpretationfortheimmenselydepressingfactthattheU.S.governmenthadrepeatedlyabandoneditsferventCaribbeanalliesatkeymomentsintheirstruggle.Communistinfluencewaseverywhere,evenatthehighestlevelsoftheAmericangovernment.Cubans,whohadsufferedintheirownfleshtheconsequencesofsuchdeceit,hadthemissionofopposingiteverywhereandalertingothersastoitsterribleconsequences.
TheCubanliberaldiscourse,labeledbytheconservatives"FidelismwithoutFidel,"simplydisappearedfromview.38IthadalwayshadadifficulttimereconcilingitsprogressiveclaimswithmilitantoppositiontotheCubanRevolution.Forleft-leaningintellectualsandpoliticiansinLatinAmericaandforliberalacademicsintheUnitedStates,FidelCastrosymbolizedtheanti-imperialiststruggle.HisdefianceinthefaceofYankeehostilitygainedhimmuchsympathy,whichexiledliberalswerehardputtocounteract.Incontrast,theconservativediscoursewasexceedinglycoherent:sincealltheseliberalacademicsandpoliticianswerecommunist
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sympathizersanyway,therewasnopointintryingtopersuadethemontheappallingfactsofthematter.Instead,Cubansshouldlineupwithmilitantanticommunistforcesandseektheirsupporttoliberatetheisland.
Thehegemonyofextremeconservatismdidnotemergeallofasuddenbutevolvedgradually,growingintandemwiththebusinessenclave.Thetwodevelopmentsthusbecameintertwined,withmilitantrightismcomingtodefinethevocabularyinwhichexileentrepreneursexpressedtheirviewsandwithwhichtheysignaledmembershipintheboundedCubancommunity.Eventhosewhotookexceptiontotheextremistviewsairedceaselesslyonlocalradiohadtokeeptheirdoubtstothemselvesforfearoftheconsequences.Themoralcommunityhadtakenfirmhold,anditsideologicaltrappingswereunmistakablythoseofthefarright,adirectoutgrowthofthefailedliberalpromisesoftheearlysixties.
BuildingonaFeebleBase
MonsignorBryanD.Walsh,alongtimeMiamicivicleaderwhohadwitnessedthearrivalofthefirstCubanrefugees,describedtheeconomicsituationofMiamiinthe1960sasfollows:
TwothingshappenedinthenextyearsthatcausedallmoneyfordevelopmentoftourisminSouthFloridatodryup.One,DisneyWorldstartedoperating,andeverybodywithbigmoneyinNewYorkknewit,theyknewthat80percentofthetouristswhocametoFloridacamebycarandDisneyWorldwouldbelikeaChineseWallnobodywoulddrivefurthersouth.ThestateofFloridaputalow'priorityonbuildingmajorhighwaysintoSouthFlorida.Thesecondfactorwasthejetplane.ItbecamejustascheaptoflytoJamaicaorPuertoRico,whereyoucangettwoweeksofsunshineguaranteed,thantoflytoMiami,whereyoumaygettwoweeksofrainifyou'reunlucky.
HaditnotbeenfortheCubans,Miamiwouldhavebeenadeadduck.We
hadaneconomicdepressionin1959;1960wasatotaldisaster.TheUnitedWayfailed,itdidnotraiseone-thirdofitsgoal....TheCubansmovedintoavacuum;theplacewasfullofemptystores.SouthwestEighthStreetwasboardedupfromoneendtotheother.Verysoontheywentintotheexport-importbusiness,theywentintobanksandeverythingelse;theybecametheliaisonbetweentheUnitedStatesandLatinAmerica.
39
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Fromminimalcharacterloanstobecoming''theliaisonbetweentheU.S.andLatinAmerica"wasalongroad.Ittooktwodecadesforenclavefirmstomovefrombeingameremeansofpersonalsurvivaltoachievingapositionofinfluenceinthelocaleconomy.Asidefromthecohesivenessgeneratedbyacommonpoliticaldestinyandamonolithicideology,theconsolidationoftheenclavebenefitedfromthewaytheexodusfromCubawaspaced.Aswehaveseen,thearrivalofCubansinMiamididnotoccurallatonce,norwasitasteadytrickle;rather,Cubanscameinaseriesofwavescreatedbysuccessivepoliticalcrises.Eachwavebroughtamassofrefugeeswithanaverageeducationandoccupationalstatusbelowthoseoftheprecedingwave.
Forearlyenclaveenterprises,accesstocapitalwasacrucialbutbynomeanssufficientconditionforsurvival.Tomaintainthemselvesandexpand,theyneededgrowingmarketsandareadysupplyofcheap,hard-workinglabor.Thesuccessiverefugeewavesalongadecliningsocialgradientfulfilledbothneedsadmirably.Asconsumers,newrefugeescreatedagrowingdemandforculturallydefinedgoodsandSpanish-languageservicesthatonlyenclavefirmscouldprovide.Asworkers,theyreadilyacceptedthemodestjobsprovidedbyCuban-ownedfirmsasamodeofentryintotheAmericaneconomy.
Themoralcommunitythatdevelopedamongtherefugeesintroducedanewelementintowhatotherwisewouldhavebeenpuremarketrelations.Earlyenclaveownerswereexpectedtohirefellowexilesinpreferencetoothers,whileworkerswereexpectedtolabordiligentlyattheavailablejobswithoutmakingexcessivedemands.LowwageswereacceptedinexchangeforpreferentialaccesstoemploymentevenintheabsenceofEnglishorformalcertification.Modestenclavejobsalsoprovidedaninformalapprenticeshipinhowtoestablishandrunanindependentbusinesslateron.
EvidenceregardingthesedevelopmentscomesfromsuccessivesurveysofCubanrefugeesinSouthFloridathatweconductedduringthe1970s.In1979,forexample,63percentofasampleof450refugeeswhohadarrivedsixyearsearlierreportedbuyingeverydaygoodsfromCubanstores.Evenpurchasesofmajoritemssuchascarsandapplianceswereoftenmadeinthesameway(32percentofthesample),despitethescarcity,ofCubanretailersof
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majorappliancesatthetime.Bycontrast,inthesameyearacomparablesampleofMexicanimmigrantsthathadalsoarrivedintheUnitedStatesin1973reportedproportionsofcoethnicpurchasesthatwereapproximatelyhalfthosedetectedamongCubans32percentforeverydayitemsand19percentfordurables.
40
In1976,39percentoftherefugeesinoursamplewereemployedinCuban-ownedfirms(includingtheself-employed).By1979,thefigurehadincreasedto49percent,almosthalfofthetotal,whereasthefigureamongtheMexicanimmigrantswasonly15percent.Indirectevidenceofhowemploymentintheethniceconomyencouragedsmallentrepreneurshipcomesfromfiguresonself-employment.SixyearsafterarrivalanddespitelowaveragelevelsofeducationandknowledgeofEnglish,21.2percentoftheCubansampleinMiamihadbecomeself-employed,ascontrastedwith5.5percentoftheMexicangroup.Self-employedCubansearnedmuchmorethantherestofrespondentsinbothsamples.Thiswasespeciallytrueofthosewhosefirmshadgrownenoughtohiresalariedworkers.Averagemonthlyearningsfortheseentrepreneurswere$1,924in1979dollars,comparedto$974forCubanswhoremainedasemployeesand$914forallMexicans.41
Furtherevidenceoftheroleofenclaveapprenticeshipinbusinesscreationamongnewarrivalscomesfromananalysisofthedeterminantsofself-employmentinourMiamiCubansample.Itwasfoundthatthesinglemostsignificantpredictorofself-employmentin1979wasemploymentinaCuban-ownedfirmthreeyearsearlier.42Asanoutgrowthofalltheseprocesses,Cubanexileenterprisesexpandedfromanestimated919in1967,toabout36,000nationwidein1982,andto61,500in1987.FirmsintheMiamienclavegrewnot
onlyinnumber,butalsoinsize.AggregatereceiptsofHispanicfirmsinMiamiwere$3.8billionin1987,afigurethatexceededbyover$400millionthatofsecond-rankingLosAngelesandwasthreetimesthatofNewYork,despitethesecitieshavingmuchlargerHispanicpopulations.Cuban-ownedfirmsaveragedannualsalesof$89,181,afigurethat,thoughmodestbynationalstandards,exceededbyover$30,000theaverageforallminority-ownedfirmsnationwide.43
OntheeveofMariel,then,theexilecommunityfeaturedamonolithicpoliticaloutlook,sustainedbothbyconvictionandthe
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silencingofdissidentsandbyarapidlyimprovingeconomicsituation.ThestaggeredpatternofrefugeemigrationhadcontributedtothelatterstatebyfurnishingCubanfirmswithgrowingmarketsandreliablelaborpoolsatopportunemoments.Unwittingly,thesuccessivewavesofrefugeemigrationreproducedinMiamithesocialpeckingorderofprerevolutionaryCuba:early-arriving,higher-statusrefugeescreatedthefirstenterprisesandtookovercommandpositionsintheethniceconomy;subsequentarrivalscamefrommoremodestclassoriginsandwereemployedbythesefirmsinvarioussubordinateroles.Thegrowthoftheenclaveofferedtotheselaterarrivalsthechancebothtoremainwithintheirowncommunityandtolearntheropesofatradeforlatersalliesintoself-employment.
Conclusion
InMay1981,afewmonthsafterMariel,aleadingexileeducatorinMiamicomplainedinthesetermsabouttherecentevents:
Themostimportantthingwastheanti-Spanishreferendum.ThisshowedtoCubanshowtheirAngloneighborsinDadereallyfelt.ItmadeCubansseethemselvesforthefirsttime,asadiscriminatedminority.Thelocalpowerstructuretookanambiguousstance:theydidn'tpromotethereferendum,butdidn'topposeiteither.Deepdown,theysharedthefundamentalhostilityoftheAnglocitizenrytowardtherefugees.ThereactionoftheCubancommunitywaspitiful.Therewasbarelyoppositionormobilization.Everyonewastoobusywithhisownaffairs.Cubanscametorealizewhatwashappeningthedayofthevote.
44
Theoverwhelmingvoteinfavoroftheantibilingualordinanceinlate1980conveyedtheimpressionthattherefugeeswouldbeeasilyputbackintheirplace,withcontrolofthecitythusrevertingtoitsold-timeelite.Cubansweremadetofeelatthistimethefullweightof
Anglodiscrimination.Notsurprisingly,severallocalorganizations,suchastheSpanish-AmericanLeagueAgainstDiscrimination(SALAD),startedrehearsingthevocabularycommontoalldowntroddenminorities:complaintsaboutdiscrimination,demandstobeincludedandnotmarginalizedfromlocaldecisionmaking,supportofaffirmativeactionprograms.45
Appearancesweredeceiving,forbehindtheapparentvulnera-
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bilityoftherefugeeswasanethniceconomythathadnotceasedgrowingfortwentyyears.Obsessedwiththedreamofreturn,Cubanssofarhadhadlittletimeforlocalpolitics.WhentheunexpectedandfiercehostilityofMiaminativewhitesburstforth,theexileswereinitiallydisoriented.Ittooktimetofashionaresponsecongruentwiththeirpastideologicalstance.Thatresponse,whenitfinallycame,stunnedopponentsbothbyitsnoveltyandbyitsrevolutionaryimplications.
TheMiamiHeraldanditssupportershadonlywantedtorestorenormalcytothecitywhentheyinformedCubansabouthowthepoliticalgamewasplayedinAmericaandoftheirtruepositionintheethnicqueue.Theexilesrespondedbylayingclaimtothecity.Theyputoldelitesintheirplacebyportrayingthemasrepresentativesofaprovincialpast.Oneofthemostrespectedexileleadersarticulatedhiscommunity'sresponsethus:
TheCubans'presenceinMiamihasanextraordinaryimportance.Therapiddevelopmentachievedbythecityisafeatthathasnoprecedentinthehistoryofthecountryandhasbeencalled,inmultipleoccasions,"theGreatCubanMiracle."Forthisreason,theexileswhocamefromtheislandafter1959andotherswhoarrivedlaterwiththesamefaithandhopemustbeproudofwhattheyhaveachievedforthemselvesandforthecommunityingeneral.
InordertoappreciatetheCubans'contributiontoMiami'sdevelopment,itisconvenienttogobacktowhatthecitywasin1959.MiamicouldbedefinedasatypicalSoutherntownwithapopulationofveteransandretirees.Thesoleactivitywastheexploitationoftourisminthesunnywinters.Commercialactivitieswerelimitedandindustrialdevelopmentincipient....ItwasanunderdevelopedareawithintheAmericaneconomy,withoutanygreatperspective.
46
Themoralandmaterialresourcesoftheexilecommunity,longpreventedfromconfrontingFidelCastrodirectly,werenowredeployedtochecktheloominglocalchallengewithintheframeworkofAmericanpolitics.ThetermCubanAmericanseldomusedbefore1980becamethestandardself-designation.TheCubanAmericanNationalFoundation(CANF)wasfounded,eachofitsmanydirectorscontributingfreetimeforpoliticallobbyingplus$10,000peryear.Unlikeotherminorityorganizations,CANFdidnotaskpoliticiansformoney,butactuallygaveittothemthroughitspoliticalactionbranch,theFreeCubaCommittee.47Theexiles
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naturalizedenmasseandlinedupatthepollstovotefortheirowncandidates.Iftherewasameasureofexaggerationintherefugees'claimtohavingengineeredMiami'seconomic"miracle,"therewaspreciouslittlehyperboleinthepoliticalconsequencesofthisclaim.Asonemayoraltyandlegislativeseatafteranothercameintothehandsoftheformerexiles,theirmessageaboutwhatMiamiwasandcouldbecomegainedincreasingcredibility.
Theextreme-rightideologyoftheexilecommunityhadgreatdifficultyreconcilingitselfwiththevocabularyinwhichdowntroddenminoritiescustomarilyexpresstheirgrievances.Forthisreason,the"minority"perspectiveneverprosperedinCubanMiamiaftertheearlyeighties.Insteadthe"successstory"discoursegainedprecedence.Giventheissuesconfrontingthecommunity,ithadtwosignificantadvantages.First,itofferedconcreteproofofthesuperiorityofthesystemadvocatedbytheexilesoverCaribbean-stylecommunism.Theimplicitpromisewasthat,afterCastro'sregimeended,theentrepreneurialsuccessesachievedinMiamiwouldbereproducedinCuba.Second,the"successstory"discourseconveyedamoreoptimisticmessageaboutthepresentandfutureofthecitythanthatputforthbythenatives.WhereaslocalwhitesdeploredwhatMiamihadbecome,theCubansextolleditandpromisedastillbettertomorrow.Thispositiveframeofminddisplacedbothassimilationistand"minority''discoursesamongMiami'sLatinpopulation.Theoldhegemonicorderwasrupturedandthewaypavedforanovelsetofdefinitionsaboutwhatthecitywasandshouldbecome.
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ChapterSevenARepeatPerformance?:TheNicaraguanExodusForthoseresidentsofSouthFloridawhostillthoughtoftheareaasaresort,1989beganbadly,verybadly.Theworstseemedtobehappeningalloveragain.Immigrants,moreSpanish-speakingones,wererollingintothearea.Attheendof1988,theU.S.supportedContrawarwaswindingdown,andthousandsofNicaraguansbeganflowingupthroughGuatemalaandMexicotoTexasandontoMiami.Thestreamofnewimmigrantsswelledthroughthelastmonthsof1988until,atthebeginningof1989,itbecameaflood.U.S.ImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS)officialsestimatedthatasmanyasthreehundredrefugeesaweekhadbeensettlinginDadeCountysincethesummerof1988.
1Atthebeginningof1989,GreyhoundassignedspecialbusestoruncontinuouslybetweentheTexas-MexicoborderandSouthFlorida.InthesecondweekofJanuary1989,tenbusesarrivedinMiamiononedayalone.2
WhilethebusloadsmaynothavebeenasdramaticorasnumerousastheboatloadsarrivinginKeyWestduringthe1980Marielinflux,theNicaraguanrefugeesbecameaconcretepartofthepublicconsciousnessafterINSattemptedtointerceptanddetainthemattheTexas-Mexicoborder.ThenewlyincarceratedNicaraguans,whohadbeendriftingalmostinvisiblyintoMiamifortenyears,nowappearedonnationaltelevision,standingbehindfencesandlookingmuchlikethedetainedMarielrefugeesof1980.Theywerealsosaying,againliketheMarielentrants,thattheywould
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headforSouthFloridaassoonastheycould.ThenafederaljudgeruledINS'sdetentionpolicyunconstitutional;therefugeeswerereleased,andnearlyeveryoneinMiamibracedfor"anotherMariel."
3
TheNicaraguanflowdidindeedappearsimilartothatfromCuba.Nicaraguans,likeCubans,werefleeingaradical,left-wingregime.TheNicaraguanexodus,liketheCuban,convergedinsuccessivestagesonMiami,beginningwiththeelites,thenincorporatingtheprofessionalandmiddleclasses,andlastlytheworkingclass.
ButtherewerealsoimportantdifferencesfromtheearlierCubanexodus.Mostnotably,WashingtondidnotwelcometheNicaraguansasithadtheCubans.CubanshadtheirpassagefromCubapaidfor,wereautomaticallygrantedpermanentresidenceintheUnitedStates,andreceivednumerousotherbenefits.ThefederalgovernmentclassifiedmostNicaraguansinsteadasillegalaliensandactivelytriedtokeepthemout.Thenewrefugeesdidhavethebenefit,however,ofcomingaftertheCubanenclavehadbeenconsolidated,andsohadinitapowerfulally."Latin-ness"alonewasnotthereasonfortheCubans'supportoftheNicaraguans.Rather,politicalideologycementedthealliancethecommoncircumstancesofmilitantoppositiontoanextreme-leftregime.
PhasesofNicaraguanMigration
ThegrowthandconsolidationofMiami'sNicaraguancommunityroughlyfollowedthepatternestablishedbytheCubans.Bothbeganinresponsetoamajorrevolutionaryupheaval.Bothcameinsuccessivewaves,eachdistinctintermsoftimeofarrival,socialcomposition,andgeographicalconcentrationinMiami.Inbothcases,thefirsttoarriveweretheonesmostimmediatelyanddirectlyaffectedbythe
revolutionarygovernmentlargelandholders,industrialists,andmanagersofNorthAmericanenterprises.ManyoftheNicaraguanupper-classexilesalsohadeconomicrootsintheUnitedStatesandMiamibeforetheupheaval.Inbothmigrations,asecondwaveofprofessionalsandwhite-collarworkersfollowedthedepartureoftheupperclass.ForNicaraguans,thissecondwavecommencedduringtheearly1980s.The
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finalwave,consistingprimarilyofurbanblue-collarworkers,peakedforNicaraguansinthedramaticexodusofearly1989,theequivalentoftheCubans'Mariel.
TheWealthy
In1978,NicaraguandictatorAnastasioSomozaDebaylesecretlyboughtabaysideestateinMiamiBeach,paying$575,000throughaVirginIslandscorporationtotheowner,Miami'sRomanCatholicarchdiocese.In1979,twodaysbeforeManaguafell,SomozasteppedoffaplaneatHomesteadAirForceBasejustsouthofMiamiandwaswhiskedtohissprawlingnewseven-bedroomhouse.
4Evenafterhis1980death,hisrelativescontinuedtheiropulentlife-style.HopeSomoza,wifeoftheousteddictator,andMatildaDebayle,Somoza'sauntbymarriage,wereamongtherichestpeopleinFlorida.Buttheymaintainedalowprofile,notattendingpoliticalralliesandmakingprivatevisitstothegraveofAnastasioSomozawho,likeCubanpresidentsCarlosPríoandGerardoMachado,isburiedinWoodlawnCemetery.5
TheSomozafamilyisthemostfamousNicaraguanclanlivinginMiami,butapproximatelyfifteenthousandotherrichexilestransferredtheirassetstoMiamibanksinthelate1970s,movedtheirfurnitureintofashionableresidencesinKeyBiscayneandBrickellAvenue,andinvestedoncondominiumsinthesuburbanwesternedgeofthecity.6
TheMiddleClass
Theearly-arrivingelitewassoonabletorentandsellthosecondominiumstootherNicaraguanstheprofessionalsandbusinesspeoplewhomadeupthesecondwaveoftheexodus.TheserefugeesestablishedforthefirsttimeavisibleNicaraguanpresenceinMiami,
clusteringinthewesternsuburbofSweetwater,rightnexttotheEverglades.Manyofthesemiddle-classNicaraguansarrivedontouristvisas,andsometimestheymovedbackandforthbetweenManaguaandMiami,eventuallysettlinginthelatter.Likeothereducatedrefugees,theyinitiallyexperienceddownwardmobilityastheyretooledfortheirnewenvironment.Asurveyconductedintheearlyeightiesestimatedthat70percentofskilled
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Nicaraguanswereworkingbelowtheirtraininglevel.
7Anotherstudyfoundthat,ofonethousandrefugeessurveyed,34percentwereprofessionalsinNicaragua,butintheiradoptivecountry"manyareworkingoutsidetheirfieldsaslaborersbecausetheyaresouncertainoftheirfuture."8
Thoseprofessionalswhoendedupstayingdidnotusuallyremainlaborersforlong.Beforetherevolution,JorgeSavanyheldacabinet-levelpostastheexecutivesecretaryoftheNationalCottonCommission.HefledManaguaforMiamiinJuly1979,justastheSandinistasoustedSomoza.Withayoungerbrotherhestartedsellinghotdogsfromacartandeventuallypurchasedeightsuchstands.Afewyearslater,however,hewasworkingasasalesmanandassistantmanagerforaCuban-ownedfurniturestoreonLittleHavana'sCalleOcho,whilehisbrotherwentontobecomearealestatebroker.9
SomeoftheserefugeesalreadyhadsomeworkexperienceinNorthAmerica,whichtheynowputtouse.ThefirstpresidentoftheNicaraguan-AmericanBankersAssociationofMiami,RobertoArguello,wasaNotreDamegraduatewhobecamevicepresidentofaMiamibankwithinafewyearsofhisarrivalinMiami.10ThefirstNicaraguaneardealershipinMiamiwassimilarlystartedbyanindividualwhohadattendedtheUniversityofMiamiinthe1970s.Toobtainfinancing,hemobilizedthefriendshipsdevelopedinschool,especiallywithCuban-Americanstudents.11StillothersbenefitedfromtheheavyNorthAmericanpresenceinNicaraguabeforetheSandinistarevolution.AnotherpresidentoftheNicaraguan-AmericanBankersAssociation,RobertoZamora,wasaformertraineeattheCitibankofficeinManaguawhoquicklymadeafortunebrokeringLatinAmericanloansindebt-equityswaps.AndLeoSolorzanohadattendedtheHarvard-affiliatedCentralAmericanInstitutefor
BusinessManagement;in1989,heheadedthelendingdivisionofMiami'sCapitalBank.12
TheWorkers
Thethirdwave,comprisingNicaragua'sworkersandpeasants,beganinthemid-1980s,whentheU.S.-sponsoredContrawardisruptedthecountry'seconomy.13Asearlyas1984,nearly20percentofNicaraguanmigrantscamefromthesemodestback-
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grounds;
14bythelate1980s,anestimated50percentofallNicaraguansinMiamiworkedaslaborers.15MuchlikeMarielCubansin1980,thenewlyarrivedrefugeescouldnotaffordtoliveinmiddle-classsuburbs.InsteadtheyoccupiedthepoorestsectionsofLittleHavanawheremanyMarielCubanshadpreviouslysettledcreatingasecondNicaraguanneighborhood.16UnlikeSweetwater,EastLittleHavanaispooranddeteriorated.Despiteitsname,itisnowmostlyanareawhereNicaraguansandotherCentralAmericanslive.17
Thesenewrefugeeshadmoredifficultyfindingjobsthantheirpredecessors.Miami'sinformaleconomyofoddjobsandoff-the-booksemploymentforminimalpaybecametheNicaraguanworkers'mainmeansofsurvival.Flowervendors,acommonsightafterMariel,reappearedineverybusyintersection.Otherstookjobsashousepainters,unskilledfactoryhands,andseamstresses.LidiaCano,asinglemotherwhofledNicaraguawithtwoyounggrandchildrenandadraft-dodgingson,workedasaseamstress.InNicaraguasheownedasmallgarmentfactory.InMiami,shestartedsewingathomeonamachineloanedbyaCubansubcontractor.Withhersavings,sheboughtausedSingerandlatertwootherspecializedsewingmachines.ThroughexpandedhomeworkforCubancontractors,shewasabletoearnenoughtosupportherfamily.18
OtherNicaraguanwomenwenttoworkdirectlyforMiami'snumerousapparelfactories,replacingtheshrinkingCubanlaborsupply.ForJewishandCubanfactoryowners,thearrivaloftheNicaraguanswasablessing,astherapidwithdrawalofCubanwomenfromthegarmentlaborforcehadalreadyforcedtheclosureofseveralfactories.Ethnicsuccessioninthegarmentindustryneatlyreflectedthesuccessiveimmigrantwavesshapingthearea'seconomy:frommiddle-class
Cubanwomeninthesixtiesandearlyseventies,toMarielandHaitianentrantsintheearlyeighties,topoorCentralAmericans,primarilyNicaraguans,bytheendofthedecade.19
NicaraguanmenhadasimilarroleinMiami'sconstructionindustry.TheLatinBuildersAssociationCuban-ownedfirmsfoundedinthelatesixtiesandseventiesandgroupedinastrongguildconfrontedaseriouslaborproblembythemid-eighties.CubanimmigrationhadvirtuallystoppedafterMariel,andthe
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builderswerereluctanttoemployunion-pronenativelabor.Again,afewMarielitosandHaitiansprovidedarespite,butitwasreallytheCentralAmericanswhofilledthegap.TheNicaraguans'urgentneedforworkwasobvious,aswastheirideologicalaffinitywiththeirCubanemployers.Increasingly,NicaraguansbecamethepreferredworkersintheMiamibuildingtrades.
20
Othersreliedoncasualwork.Between6:00and7:30a.m.everyweekdayfromthemid-1980son,aboutahundredmenwouldgatheroutsideacoffeeshoponCalleOcho,downingCubancoffee,waitingandhopingforaday'sworkfrompassingcarsandpick-uptrucks.Sometimesnearlyeveryonewashired,butatothertimessomethirtymenwerestillwaitingat11:00.Joboffersrangedfromgardeningtowashingdishes.Thenormalday'swagewas$40,paidincashattheendofthedaywhentheemployerdroppedthembackatthecoffeeshop.21Asoneworkerstated,"Sometimestheemployerisconscientiousandpaysadecentwage,butsometimesyouworkeighthoursandtheypayyou$20."22InDecember1988,thecityofMiamiemploymentofficebeganreceivingcallsfrompeoplelookingforlive-inmaids.Payhoveredaround$100amonthplusroomandboard.AlthoughcityemployeeswhowerehelpingtheNicaraguanslabeledthesejobs"slavery,"manyNicaraguanswillinglyacceptedtheoffers.23
NicaraguansalsofollowedtheHaitiansonthetrailtowardstooplaborinFloridaagriculture.AnaSolishadworkedasacookinalittleeaterynearManagua'sairport,butsheleftin1983whenshewassummonedtotrainforthelocalmilitia.Marriedwithfourchildren,SolislefthercrampedLittleHavanaapartmentat3:00a.m.everydayforathree-hourbusridetoImmokalee,wheresheworkedfora
producepackerfor$4anhour.HerthoughtsonsurvivingintheUnitedStateswerelimitedtotheimmediateconcernsofearninganincome."Ithurtmetoseethetomatoesend,becausetherewasnomorework.Thelemonsarecoming,butthecontractorcan'ttakemorepeople."24
ThearrivaloftheNicaraguanworkingclasshencehadasignificanteffectonMiami'seconomy.Allemployersofunskilledlaborbenefited,especiallygarmentcontractors,homebuilders,farmers,andmiddle-classfamiliesinsearchofdomestichelp.Morespecifically,thenewimmigrantshelpedtheCubanenclaveavertaseriousproblem.Somelocaleconomistshadworriedthattherapid
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increaseofLatinfirmswouldsoonsaturatetheethnicmarkettowhichtheycatered.TheNicaraguans,togetherwithotherLatinimmigrants,expandedthatmarketaswellasthelaborpoolforethnicfirms.
Thesecontributionswentunappreciated,however,byothersegmentsofthelocalpopulation.TheNicaraguansswelledthelocalinformaleconomyinbothlow-payingjobsandpettyentrepreneurship.TheproliferationofstreetvendorsgavetopartsofthecityaThirdWorldflavorthatmanynativesfounddistasteful.Toovercomethisandotherconsequencesoftheinflux,nativistgroupslaboredmightilytogetridofthenewrefugees.LikeHaitiansafewyearsbefore,theNicaraguansfoundthemselvesthetargetofmilitanthostilitybymuchofthelocalpopulation.Theirweaklegalstatusmadethemdependentonafewkeyalliestobalancebothgovernmenthostilityandwidespreadlocalrejection.
FederalPolicy:NicaraguansBelonginNicaragua
InJune1983,PresidentReaganassertedthatiftheUnitedStatesfailedtoprevailinCentralAmericaitwouldbeinvadedbyrefugees."Theresult,"Reagansaid,"couldbeatidalwaveofrefugeesandthistimethey'llbefeetpeopleandnotboatpeopleswarmingintoourcountryseekingasafehavenfromCommunistrepression."
25Inmanyrespects,Reaganwascorrect.ThefederalgovernmentatthetimewasprimarilypreoccupiedwiththeContrawaragainsttheSandinistas.BecauseContraleadersresidedinMiami,high-levelU.S.policymakersfrequentedthecity.Thispresence,however,didnothelptheresettlementofordinaryNicaraguans.Rather,federalofficialsappearedtoencouragetheserefugeestogobacktoNicaraguatobattletheSandinistas.TheReaganandsubsequentlytheBushadministrationsthusfocusedexclusivelyontheContrawar,ignoringtheconcernsoftherefugeecommunity.
NowhereisthecontrastbetweenCubanandNicaraguanexilesmorestarkthanintheU.S.government'sdifferingresponsestoeach.AllarrivingCubans,untilthe1980Marielflow,wereautomaticallyextendedtherighttoremaininthecountry.Asagroup,
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theyreceivedoneofthemostgenerousbenefitspackageseverofferedtoarrivingforeigners.SecureintheUnitedStates,theycouldplananddebatetheirdesignsforoverthrowingtheCastroregime.ButwithrespecttotheContrawar,adifferentlogicwasfollowedasWashingtonvirtuallydemandedthattheNicaraguansaccepttheopportunitytoconfronttheSandinistasontheirownterrain.Therebels'baseofoperationswastobeascloseaspossibletotheSandinistasinneighboringHonduras,notinMiami.IntheeyesoftheReaganadministration,NicaraguansintheUnitedStatesweretoofarfromtheactionandwerenotputtingenoughpressureontheSandinistas.FederalofficialsthusdidalltheycouldtodeterthearrivalandsettlementofnewNicaraguanrefugees.
Through1985,onlyabout10percentofNicaraguanapplicantsweregrantedpoliticalasylumafiguresignificantlyhigherthantheapproximately3percentforSalvadoransandHaitians,butfarlessthantheaveragesforCubans(almost100percent)orforothernationalitiessuchasIranians(60percent).
26Nicaraguansnotgrantedpoliticalasylumweredeclaredillegalaliens,andsonotentitledtorefugeeassistance,resettlementaid,welfare,orgovernmentloans.In1981,theywereevenkickedoutoffreeEnglishclassesforMarielandHaitianentrants.27
Untillate1983,whenprofessionalsandothermiddle-classrefugeeswerearriving,Nicaraguanasylumapplicantswereatleastgrantedworkpermitsthatremainedvaliduntiltheircasesweredecided.Butthenthisbenefit,too,waswithdrawn.28Atthatpoint,would-berefugeeswereaddedtothefederalgovernment'sOperationSave,whichattemptedtocheektheimmigrationstatusofeveryalienwhoappliedforstate-administeredbenefits.29Ifanalienwasnotproperlydocumented,INSwastoinitiatedeportationproceedings.
UnlikeSalvadoransalsounsuccessfulasylum-seekerstheNicaraguansfoundthatsomeaspectsoftheirplighteventuallyplayedintheirfavor.Inthemid-1980s,astheContrawarbegantoprovemoreintractablethanfirstimagined,StateDepartmentofficialstouredthecountrytodrumupsupport.OneoftheirmostfrequentstopswasMiami,wheretheycouldbeassuredofasupportivereception.Bythistime,theinitialwavesofNicaraguanbusinesseliteandprofessionalshadbecomeestablishedandhadcementedtheirtieswiththeCuban-Americancommunity.When
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ElliotAbrams,thetopLatinAmericanaffairsofficialintheReaganadministration,journeyedtoMiamiforacelebrationofthe165thanniversaryofNicaragua'sindependencefromSpain,healsometwiththeNicaraguanBusinessCouncilandattendedadinnerforonethousandpeoplesponsoredbytheNicaraguan-AmericanBankersAssociation.
30
WhenagroupofCuban-Americanbusinessmenorganizeda$35-a-platefund-raisertolobbyformoreU.S.supporttotheContrarebels,guestspeakersincludedRobertReilly,thespecialassistanttoPresidentReagan,whosejobitwastotravelaroundthecountryexplainingtheadministration'spoliciesinCentralAmerica.AsidefromthemoneycontributedtotheContracause,Washingtonhadgoodpoliticalreasonstopayattentiontosuchevents.ThefocalpointofthedinnerwasatestimonialtoMiami'sINSdistrictdirector,PerryRivkind,whojustbeforethe1984presidentialelectionhadorganizedaceremonyinwhichoverninethousandCubansreceivedU.S.citizenshipandsimultaneouslyregisteredasRepublicans.31
MiamiundertheCuban-AmericanshadbecomeaRepublicanbastion,andadministrationofficialsdidnotwanttoalienateit.ThestrongWashingtonvoiceoftheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundationandsimilarorganizationswasnowheardinsupportoftheNicaraguans'cause.ThisefforthelpedproducetheonlysignificantturninfederalpolicyduringtheentireNicaraguanexodus.InApril1986Rivkind,stillINSdistrictdirector,announcedthathehadstoppeddeportingNicaraguanaliensfromMiami.Instatinghisreasonshesaid,"I'vealwayshaddifficultyviscerallywithsendingbackpeopletoacowardlyCommunistgovernment.TheSandinistasareexactlythat."32
BackinWashington,thingsmovedmoreslowly.TheadministrationappearedtoagreeimplicitlywithRivkind;inanycase,hisrulingwasneithercondemnednorreversed.NicaraguansinMiamiwereallowedtostay.ButneitherdidtheadministrationwelcomeallNicaraguans.Federalpolicybecameutterlyambivalent,allowingNicaraguansinMiamitoremainbutdeportingotherslivingelsewhereinthecountry.OnlyaftermorethanayeardidtheDepartmentofJusticeofficiallyendorseMiami'snewpolicy.InJuly1987,AttorneyGeneralMeesedeclared:"NoNicaraguanwhohasawell-foundedfearofpersecutionwillbedeportedintheabsenceofafindingbytheJusticeDepartmentthattheindividual
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haseitherengagedinseriouscriminalactivityorposesadangertothenationalsecurity.''HefurtherruledthateveryqualifiedNicaraguanwouldbeentitledtoaworkpermitandencouragedthosewhohadbeendeniedasylumstatustoreapply.
33
ThismajorpolicyshiftwasreminiscentofPresidentJimmyCarter'sinvitationtoCubanstoseekfreedominAmericaduringtheMarielepisode.TheMeesememorandumrepresentedavictoryfortheNicaraguanrefugeecommunityanditsCuban-AmericanalliesevenasitdirectlycontradictedthelogicoftheContrawar.Theruling,afterall,encouragedNicaraguanstofleetheircountry,whereasContraaidtacitlyreliedonNicaraguansstayingputtoincreasepopularpressureontheSandinistas.Notsurprisingly,Meese'sinvitationprovokedanunprecedentedrushthatswampedtheMiamiINSoffice,promptingittoestablishspecialweekendhours,outreachcenters,andrulesthatdictatedwhenpeoplecouldapplyonthebasisoftheirbirthmonth.Inthecourseofsixweekendsmorethanthirty,thousandNicaraguansappliedforasyluminMiami.Atapproximatelythesametime,theapprovalrateforNicaraguanasylumrequestsclimbedfromaround10percenttoover50percent.34
NicaraguanswerestillnottreatedasfavorablyasCubanshadbeen.TheUnitedStates,initspursuitoftheContrawar,stillneededsomeNicaraguanstoremaininCentralAmericatofighttheSandinistas.Moreover,growingsectorsoftheSouthFloridacommunityincludingsomeCuban-AmericanshadbecomealarmedattherapidlygrowingNicaraguaninflow.Finally,afederalgovernmentseekingtoreduceagapingdeficitwasinnomoodtoassumethecostfornewforeignclients.ThefirstresponsetothesecontradictoryforceswastoprocesstheNicaraguans'asylumapplicationsbutdenythemaccesstoany
specialassistanceprogram,suchasthatorganizedforCubansintheearlysixtiesoreventhattowhichMarielandHaitianentrantseventuallybecameentitled.ThesameMiamiINSofficialwhohadclaimedhehad"visceral"difficultysendingpeoplebacktoNicaraguanowassertedthatMiami'sNicaraguanstudentsdidnotdeservescholarshipsbecause"theymaybelookingforsomethingthey'renotentitledto.Whyshouldthepublicfootthebill?"35Offtherecord,otherofficialsadmittedthattheyfearedthatprovidingbenefitstoNicaraguanswouldattractevenmore.
Federalpolicyfinallyshiftedagaintowardrepressioninthe
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summerof1988.InthewakeofthecongressionalfreezeonmilitarysupportfortheContrasearlythatyear,theflowofNicaraguansacrosstheTexas-Mexicoborderincreasednotably.ToomanywerecomingnearlythirtythousandappliedforasylumbetweenJulyandDecember1988aloneandtheJusticeDepartmentwentbacktotreatingNicaraguansasharshlyasotherillegalaliens.Inthefall,NicaraguanswerestrippedoftheirrighttoworkpermitsandlumpedwithSalvadoranasylum-seekers.Washington'sINSspokesman,VerneJervis,claimedthat"peoplewhomakefrivolousapplicationsshouldnotwintherighttoworkhere."
36ThestrategyadoptedbytheINSatthispointwasremarkablysimilartoitsvariousattemptstoexpelHaitiansduringtheearlyeighties.Asthe1988-89Nicaraguanrefugeecrisisunfolded,immigrationauthoritiesspeededupthereviewofasylumapplicants,therebyacceleratingtheprocessbywhichtheycouldbedeported.37
TheJusticeDepartmentdiverted$28milliontowardborderenforcementinadetain-and-deportpolicyforCentralAmericansthatincludedaveritablesouthTexasblockadeofpatrols,detentioncamps,andimmigrationcourtsinstalledattheborder.Thepolicyworked.Fromapeakof2,400CentralAmericansaweekcrossingintosouthTexasinJuly-December1988,thenumberdroppedtoabout150inJanuary1989.38Afewmonthslater,aftertheSandinistasscheduledopenelections,PresidentBushcalledforContradirectorsandotherNicaraguansinMiamitogohomeandtestthedemocraticopeningintheircountry.TheStateDepartmentfollowedwithaprodinthepocketbook:itannouncedthatitwouldcuttheContras'monthly$400,000administrationbudgetbyhalf,whichinturnforcedadrasticcutbackinstaffsinMiami.39
FederalpolicythusrevertedtothelogicofReagan'sstatementatthe
beginningofthedecade.TheContrawarhadachieveditsgoals.TheSandinistaswereforcedintoelectionsthattheylost,andhenceallNicaraguansshouldreturntoNicaragua.Astheadministrationsawthings,thosewhohadbeenlivingandworkinginMiamiforseveralyearswerestillnotapermanentpartofanyAmericancommunity.InsteadofaresettlementprogramlikethatextendedtoCubansandotherofficiallyrecognizedrefugeegroups,theNicaraguansgotakickinthepants.Thisofficial"unwelcoming"was,ofcourse,heartilyapprovedbythosesectorsof
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Miami'spopulationthathadsoughtfromthestarttherefugees'removal.
TheNativeResponse
TheAnglos
In1980,CitizensofDadeUnited,agrass-rootsAngloorganization,placedontheballotanordinancethatprohibited"theexpenditureofanycountyfundsforthepurposeofutilizinganylanguageotherthanEnglishoranycultureotherthanthatoftheUnitedStates."
40PassageofthisordinancesimultaneouslygalvanizedtheCubancommunity,andinauguratedtheU.S.Englishmovementnationwide.In1988,themovementreturnedtoMiamiwhenCitizensofDadeUnitedpushedanEnglishOnlyamendmenttotheFloridaStateconstitution.Eighty-fourpercentofFloridavotersapprovedtheamendmentintheNovemberelection.SupportforEnglishOnlywasnotlimitedtoAnglos,butalsoincludedmuchofDadeCounty'ssubstantialandgenerallypoliticallyliberalJewishpopulation.Inthe1989DemocraticprimarytoreplaceClaudePepperintheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives,theJewishcandidatefirmlysupportedEnglishOnly,advocatinglanguagetestsforU.S.citizenship.
Bythetimeofthe1988-89Nicaraguanrefugeecrisis,old-timeliberalandconservativepoliticalpositionsinMiamiseemedtodissolveintoeithernon-Latinanti-immigrantorLatinpro-immigrantviews.ThefirstpositionisillustratedbyalettertotheMiamiHerald:
Mostgreatcivilizationsinhistorywerebroughtdownbythe"barbarians"oftheirdays,whosemilitaryconquestoftheirwealthyneighborswasprecededbyinsidiousinvasioninsuchnumbersthatitdestroyedthefiberofsocietyoftheirhosts.ThisnewestwaveofimmigrantstoMiamiisjustthebeginning;thereare400millionLatinAmericanswhoarejustas
desperateastheNicaraguans.41
Formostlocalpublicofficials,theescalatingcostsofprogramsforarapidlyincreasingpopulationwastheconcreteissuebehindanti-immigrantsentiment.Inthemid-1980s,afterthelarge-scaleimmigrationofworking-classNicaraguanshadcommenced,publicofficialsbegantonotetheextrastrainandcostinpublicservices,
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especiallyinhealthandeducation,createdbythenewrefugees.In1987,attheDowntownClinicrunbyDade'sPublicHealthUnit,Niearaguansbecamethesinglelargestgroupofpatients,accountingfor60percentofeases.
42Inthesameyear,NicaraguanchildrenovertookCubanchildrenasthelargestforeignminority,inDadeCountypublicschools,andarticlesaddressingtheproblemoflackofresourcestomeetthenewdemandbeganappearingwithincreasingfrequencyintheHerald.43
Duringthe1989Nicaraguanexodus,ameetingofDadeCounty'sadvisorygrouponthehomelessbecameanangryforumontheimpactofMiami-boundimmigrants."ThiscountryshouldopenitsdoorstoreceiveanybodyandeverybodywhowantstocomeherefromacountryunderCommunistruleordictatorship,"saidMetrocommissionerShermanWinn,amemberofDade'sImmigrationAdvisoryCommittee."Recall,recall,"shoutedahalfdozenmembersofCitizensofDadeUnited.44Sportingabuttonthatstated,"DeportIllegals,''PatKeller,amemberofCitizensofDade,assertedthat"illegalaliensareencouragedtocomehere."Anotherdeclaredthat"wecannotaffordtotakeintheThirdWorldexcesspopulation."45Subsequently,theheadoftheImmigrationAdvisoryCommittee,CommissionerBarbaraCarey,urgedDadeCountytoabandonplanstobuildatrailer-parkshelterforNicaraguanrefugeesonthegroundsthatitwouldonlyenticemoretocome.
MostlocallyelectedfederalrepresentativesviewedthearrivingNicaraguansinasimilarlight.SenatorBobGraham,aMiaminativewhohadbeengovernorduringtheMarielcrisis,sentalettertoU.S.AttorneyGeneralRichardThornburghonbehalfofthelocalgovernments.HeassertedthatAmericamust"regaincontrolofitsborders.Thosewhodon'tdeserveasylumshouldnotbeallowedto
violateourborders."Florida'sothersenator,ConnieMack,declared:"Weneedchangesinthelawthatwon'tsendamessagethatyoucanjustcrosstheborder,applyforasylumandcometoworkhere."46
CongressmanDanteFascell,chairoftheHouseForeignAffairsCommitteeandakeyfigureinobtainingfederalfundingduringtheMarielcrisis,stated:"Whatarewegoingtodo?MarchsixabreastwithagunandshoottheINScommissioner?You'relookingatmorefrustrationthancanbehandled."47Intheend,theyneither
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hadtoshootthecommissionernoropenanewtrailerparkforarrivingrefugees.TheINS'senergeticpolicyattheTexasborderdeterrednewarrivals,andtheNicaraguansalreadyinMiamifendedforthemselvesaswelltheycouldasanewsourceofcheaplaborforthelocaleconomy.
TheBlacks
BlackAmericansdidnotleadthefightagainstNicaraguanmigration,buttheydidrepeatedlyexpresstheirfrustration.Whenthe1988NicaraguanrefugeecrisishitMiami,FrankWilliams,aMiami-bornBlackworkerwhohadalreadyspentoverayearshiftingfromoneday-laborjobtoanother,claimed:"I'lltakeanything,anyjobatall.Fivedollarsanhour?Somepeoplesaythat'slow,butI'lltakeit."HedirectlyblamedthenewlyarrivedNicaraguans,usuallyhiredat$5anhour,forhisnotbeingabletofindasteadyjob."Thebossesshouldbelookingoutforthepeoplewhohavelivedhereforyears.Theyshouldn'tallowtheseforeignerstocomehereandtakeourwork,"hesaid.
48
MostBlackAmericans,however,didnotblametheNicaraguansfortheriotsthatagainconvulsedOvertownjustbeforetheMiamiSuperBowlofJanuary1989.Insteadtheypointedtothesameissuesthathadalwaystormentedtheircommunity:policebrutality,acriminaljusticesystemthatrepeatedlyfailedthem,andapoliticalsysteminwhichnobodylistenedtothem.49Nicaraguansdidnotcauseallofthis;theyweremerelythelatestmanifestationsandremindersofwhereBlackAmericansstood.Miami'sBlackleaderscompareddespairinglytheirowncommunity'ssituationwiththatoftheNicaraguans.Fordespiteallthenewrefugees'sufferingandalltheforcesarrayedagainstthem,theyhadasignificantadvantagethat
allowedthemtosurviveandevenprosperinMiami,whileBlackAmericanscontinuedtostruggle.
Comrades-in-Arms:TheEnclaveatWork
WhentheNicaraguanrefugeecrisissurfacedinlate1988,CubanborncityofMiamimanagerCesarOdiocriticized"inhuman"con-
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ditionsataprivateshelterforhomelessNicaraguans,ordereditshutdown,andbusedmorethan150refugeestoBobbyMaduroStadiumafacilitybuiltbywealthyCubansinthe1950sandthespringtrainingsitefortheBaltimoreOrioles.OdioassuredtherefugeesthattheywouldreceivethesameconsiderationgivenCubanMarielrefugeesin1980andtoldreporters:"Nowtheyunderstandtheyhavethefullsupportofthecity."
50
Theactionmobilizedsquadsofcityrescueworkers,busdrivers,andsanitationemployees.Weldersfencedoffentrancestothebaseballfield,carpentersbuiltpartitions.Cotswereplacedunderthestands,rowafterrowofthemalongtherampsandthecorridors.Outsideincenterfield,theU.S.flagfluttered.Inthevisitors'on-deckcircle,theNicaraguanflagwavedtoo,fromapoleplantedbytherefugees.51
Miami'sauxiliarybishopAgustinRomán,thesamemanwhohadbeensodecisiveduringthe1987Marielprisonriots,droppedbytotalkwiththenewrefugees.DoctorsfromMiami'sPasteurClinicrunandstaffedmostlybyCuban-Americandoctorssetupanexaminationroomunderastairway.City,aidesHiramGomezandEdgarSoporacedfromatelephonetotheparkinglotcallingnamesinrapidSpanish:"CentroVaseo,CentroAsturiano,IslasCanarias."Theywerefieldingpledgesfromrestaurants,nearlyallCuban-American,todonatefood.IgnacioMartinez,aCubanexileandretiredgrocer,showedupwithacigarinhismouthandasackofclothesinhishand."Wehadourtimeofneed,andnowit'stheirturn,"heexplained.Cuban-AmericanWQBAAMnewsdirectorTomasGarciaFusteraised$9,000inonedaybycallinguplocalbusinessesandaskingeachfora$1,000donation.52
Underneaththestadiumseats,twoformerCubanpoliticalprisoners,
AlfredoMenocalandAntonioCandales,mannedagreentelephonethatrangincessantly.AscityofMiamiemployees,theyassumedthetaskoftryingtofindjobsfortheNicaraguanrefugees.AhotelrepresentativeinquiredabouttheavailabilityofNicaraguanmaids.Aconstructionforemanaskedaboutrefugeedaylaborers.Somecallers,apparentlyignorantofthestadium'snewestresidents,wantedtoknowwhentheBaltimoreOrioleswouldbehavingbattingpractice.53
TwodaysafterOdiopromisedMiami's"fullsupport"forthehomelessNicaraguans,theCuban-AmericanmanagerofDade
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County,JoaquinAviño,unveiledtheplantobuildatemporarytrailercamptohouse350to400newarrivals.Althoughtheplanwaseventuallyshelved,Aviñopersistedindemonstratingunwaveringsupportfortherefugees:"We'repullingoutallthestops.TherearealotofpeopleinthiscommunitywhoareclosetothePresident.Ithinkit'simportantforthosepeopletobemessengersforus."
54
Those"closetothePresident"werenotthetraditionalAngloestablishmentofMiami,butCubancommunityleaders.Withinaweek,OdiohadflowntoWashingtontomeetwithINScommissionerAlanNelson.OdiorequestedthatINStemporarilyreverseitspolicyofdenyingworkpermitstothenewNicaraguans.DespitethepleasofFloridasenatorsto"regaincontroloftheborders,"NelsonaccededtoOdio'srequest,promisingtoprocesstheasylumapplicationsofallNicaraguansinthebaseballstadiuminthreetofivedays.Thoseapprovedweretobeissuedpermanentworkpermits,andeventhoserejectedweretogettemporaryworkpermitswhiletheyappealedtheircases.UponreturningfromWashington,Odiowentdirectlytothestadiumtoaddresstheescapees,wherehewascheeredandhadbestoweduponhimthetitle''FatheroftheNicaraguanRefugees."55
Thisattitudeofthecityandcountygovernmentsdidnotgounresisted.Asidefromtheusualnativistcriesofanguish,themosteffectivechallengetolocalrefugeepolicycamefromanunexpectedquarter.Advocatesofthehomelesspointedtotheobviousparadoxthatwhilethecitywasstretchingitselftoprovidesheltertonewlyarrivedforeigners,nativeAmericanslivinginthestreetsofMiamicontinuedtobewoefullyneglected.Thelogicoftheargumentwasunimpeachable,andOdioandhisaideshadtoconcede.Thecity'sresponsewasremarkablysimilartothepolicyadoptedbytheCarter
administrationtenyearsearlierafterbeingchallengedfordiscriminatinginfavorofMarielCubansandagainstHaitians.Inbothcases,theSolomonicofficialanswerwastotreatbothgroupsalike,atleastonthesurface.
BobbyMaduroStadiumbecamepartitioned:theNicaraguansoccupiedrightfieldand,quiteappropriately,thevisitors'dugout;thehomelesswerehousedinthehome-teamdugout.UponarrivinginMiamiandseeinghowtheirspringtrainingcamphadbeentransformed,theOriolespromptlymadearrangementstomoveto
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Sarasota.
56OnefirmbuildingprefabricatedhousesforrecenthurricanevictimsinJamaicahiredfromthestadiumsomehundredNicaraguansandanotherhundredhomelessAmericans.Amonthlater,abouteightyoftheNicaraguanswerestillworkingforthecompany,butfewofthehomelessremained.57Cityofficialsusedthisandsimilarpiecesofevidencetocementtheirobviousbiasinfavoroftherefugees.
Inamatterofweeks,NicaraguanrefugeessettlinginMiamiaspartofanapparentlyuncontrollableflowhadsecuredspaceontheagendasoflocalgovernmentsthathadlongarguedthattherefugeeswereafederalconcern.Therefugeesachievedthisrecognitionnotsimplybecauseofthemagnitudeofthemigrationproblem,butbecausetheCubanAmericancommunityhadorganizedagenerouswelcome.Miamiattheendof1988wasnotthesamecityithadbeenjusteightyearsearlierduringMariel.CubanAmericans,nowinpositionsofpoliticalpower,sawtheNicaraguansasfellowvictimsofcommunism.Theyextendedtothenewarrivalswhatisprobablythemostuniquereceptionforanyimmigrantgroupinrecenthistory:notwelcomedbythegovernmentandthesocietyatlarge,thenewentrantswerestillgrantedaccesstolocalresourcesbydintofpoliticalkinshipwithanestablishedrefugeecommunity.
Ashadhappenednumeroustimesinthepast,eventsinMiamiwerethemirrorimageofthosetakingplaceinHavana.FidelCastrohadhailedthearrivaltopoweroftheSandinistasin1979andwelcomedthemascomradesandallies.Inreaction,CubanAmericanpoliticiansbeganreferringtothenewrefugeesas"ourNicaraguanbrothers."58ThemoretheCubangovernmentcametotheaidofthebeleagueredSandinistas,themoretheCubanexilecommunitypumpedresourcesintotheContrastruggle.In1983,Cubansand
NicaraguansinMiamicreatedtheCentralAmericaPro-RefugeeCommission,whosegoalwastoassistbothNicaraguanrefugeesandtheContrasfightinginCentralAmerica.Withinamonththeyamassed1,000boxesofclothes,475offood,and350ofmedicine,worth$800,000altogether.WhilesixCubanandNicaraguanphysiciansvolunteeredtoclassifythemedicines,airtransportationforthegoodswasarrangedbytheCubanAmericanpresidentoftheHialeahChamberofCommerce.59
Spanish-languageradiostationsinMiami,incooperationwithcommunityorganizations,arrangedmarathonstoraisemoneyfortheContras.Onesuchevent,in1983,mobilizedaboutonethou-
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sandCubansandNicaraguanstomantablesthroughoutDadeCounty.TheCuban-managedRepublicNationalBankandGeneralFederalSavingsAssociationopenedtheirdrive-inwindowstoacceptdonations.
60In1985,whentheoutspokencriticoftheSandinistasCardinalMiguelObandoyBravovisitedMiami,CubanAmericanradiostationsbroadcastnewsofthecardinal'svisitforanentireweek,exhortingallopponentsofcommunismtoattendthemasshewoulddeliver.Thedaythecardinalspoke,threestationsannouncedanotherradiomarathontoraisefundsfortheContras.61Speakersonlocalradioandtelevisionrepeatedlyassertedthat"theroadtoHavanarunsthroughManagua."62
Beginninginthemid-1980s,CubanAmericanrepresentativestothestatelegislaturealsolobbiedforsupportfortheContrasaswellaslowertuitionforNicaraguansatstateuniversities.TheyalsosucceededinpassingabilltohelpNicaraguandoctorsquicklygetU.S.licenses.Meanwhile,thecityofWestMiami,ledbyitsCubanAmericanmayor,dissolvedtieswithitssistercity,León,NicaraguathefirsttimeaU.S.cityhadbrokensistercitytiesforanyreason.Miami-DadeCommunityCollege,atthesuggestionofitsCubanAmericanvicepresident,setaside$100,000inprivatedonationstopaythetuitioncostsofsomehundredNicaraguanrefugeeswhowerenotentitledtoU.S.governmentaid.63
TheincorporationofNicaraguansintotheexilemoralcommunityinturnopenedthewayfortheirincorporationintothegrowingbusinessenclave.Inbothcases,thelarger,moreestablishedCubanAmericancommunityextendeditselftoabsorbtheNicaraguans,neutralizingtheeffectsofbothfederalpolicyandnativistreaction.Thepartnershipwasneverthelessone-sided,forCubanswereincompletecontrol.As
theNicaraguancommunitydiversifiedandtheContrawardraggedon,fracturesdevelopedinwhathadsofarbeenamonolithicalliance.Despitetheirprecariousposition,Nicaraguansbegantochafeundertheall-embracingtutelageoftheiroldercousins.Forthenewrefugees,CubanAmericanshadbecomethemainstreaminMiami.
InSearchofVoice
ThefirstvisibleNicaraguanneighborhoodinMiamiemergedduringtheearly1980swhenmiddle-classrefugeesofthesecondwavepurchasedcondominiumsownedbyearlier-arrivingmembersof
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theeliteinthesuburbofSweetwater.
64Twenty-fiveyearsbefore,Sweetwaterhadbeenanenclaveofthenativewhiteworkingclass-self-styled"rednecks."Atthattime,onewasmorelikelytohearGreek(fromthefewGreekimmigrants)thanSpanish.TheEvergladesswampsabuttedthetownonthewest,whilehundredsofacresofundevelopedlandtotheeastseparateditfromMiami.Duringthe1970s,however,metropolitangrowthrapidlyenvelopedSweetwaterastheCuban-AmericanpopulationspreadwestalongSouthwestEighthStreet(CalleOcho)fromitsLittleHavanahub.TherednecksabandonedSweetwater,andbythetimemiddle-classNicaraguansbegantoarriveintheearly1980stheareawasalreadyLatin,withtwolargeCubangrocerystores,anumberofCubancafeterias,andassortedotherLatinbusinesses.
AsNicaraguansbegantoconcentrateinSweetwater,someboughtbusinessesfromCuban-Americansandconvertedthemtotheneedsoftheircommunity.AfocalpointbecameLosRanchosRestaurant,modeledonaManaguafavorite.WiththeSandinistarevolution,theownersoftheoriginalhadfledandopenedarestaurantinLittleHavana.AsaNicaraguanneighborhoodbegantoemergeinSweetwater,co-ownerJuanWongmovedtherestaurantthereandreassumedthenameLosRanchos.HegraduallyrecruitedthestaffoftheoldManagua-basedestablishment,andtherestaurantsteadilyassumedthesocialimportanceithadhadbeforetheexodus,becomingthemostvisiblegatheringplaceoftherefugeecommunity.65
Theupper-andmiddle-classNicaraguansinMiamifollowedaneconomicpaththatcloselyresembledthatoftheirCubanbrethren.By1983,whenthefederalgovernmentstoppedgrantingworkpermitstoNicaraguanasylumapplicants,about100to150NicaraguanbusinesseshadsproutedinDadeCounty,includingseveral
restaurants,asprinklingofclothingstores,constructioncompanies,realestatebrokers,andflorists.66Fouryearslater,aftertheinflowofNicaraguanworking-classimmigrantshadcommenced,thenumberofNicaraguan-ownedbusinessessurpassed600.Ashoppingcenter,CentroComercialManagua,hadopenedinSweetwater;therewerealsomarkets,pharmacies,bakeries,clothingstores,restaurants,photostudios,insuranceagencies,doctors,anddentists.WealthyexilesgainedamajorityinterestinthePopularBank.Tractoamerica,adistributoroftractorpartstoLatinAmerica,had
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grosssalesestimatedat$7million.LosRanchosRestauranthadsproutedfivebranchesinDadeCounty,employingtwohundredNicaraguansandgrossingover$5millionannually.
67
LikeCubans,Nicaraguanbusinesspeoplemaintainedhighethnicsolidarity:"WhereverIgo,toafurniturestoreora(car)dealershiporinsurancecompany,Ialwaysask,'Where'stheNicaraguanwhoworkshere?'Iwanttogivethecommissiontoacountryman,"claimedMariaCerna,aNicaraguanwhoworkedasabusinessdevelopmentrepresentativeforamajorMiamisavingsandloanassociation.TheNicaraguan-AmericanBankersAssociation,withfourhundredmembersin1987,helpedaboutahundredfellowNicaraguansfindworkandvouchedforexileswhosegoodcreditwasbynowonlyamemoryfrombeforetheSandinistarevolution.68
TheNicaraguanrefugeecommunitydidnotconsist,ofcourse,simplyofbusinessesandjobassistancenetworks.Ithadmanyculturalcomponents,includingonesthathadbeendormantbackhomebutassumedanewsymbolicsignificanceinexile.ThesesymbolsservedtodistinguishtheNicaraguansnotonlyfrom"Americans"butalsofromtheCubans.NicaraguanstoresinSweetwatersoldtypicalNicaraguanproductssuchascotonas(cottonshirtsusuallywornonlybyIndians)topeoplewhoneverwouldhaveboughtthembackhome.AsoneNicaraguanstoreownerputit,"ThepeoplewhoalwaysworeAmericanbrandsandEuropeanclothesnowcomeshoppingforacotonatoweartoparties."69
OtherculturaltraditionsnothighlyprizedathomefoundnewdevoteesinMiamiaswell.AuxiliadoraSorianocametoMiamifromManaguain1982.Althoughshehadneverbeenadancerherself,sheimmediatelybeganrecruitingNicaraguansbetweentheagesofsixteen
andtwenty-twotoformafolkloricballettroupe.By1989,whatstartedwithonlyfivedancershadgrownintointothenonprofitBalletFolkóricoNicaragüensewithtwenty-fourmembers.70
AllthesignspointedtoarepeatperformanceoftheCubanexperienceandtheeventualemergenceofastrongNicaraguan-Americanvoiceinlocalaffairs.Thisdidnothappen,however,forotherforcesconspiredagainstthisplausibleoutcome.First,theNicaraguanexodusoccurredoverafarmorecompressedperiodoftimethantheCuban.Thelatterhadtakenplaceinseveralwell-
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spacedwavesovertwodecades,allowingtheearlier-arrivingentrepreneursandprofessionalstoconsolidatepositionsintheemergingbusinessenclave.BythetimeofMarieltwentyyearsafterthefirstarrivalstherewasaneconomicallyaffluentandsociallywellestablishedcommunitytoabsorbthenewworking-classrefugees.Bycontrast,theNicaraguaninflowtooklessthantenyears,withthefirstworking-classwavesarrivingbarelyfiveyearsaftertheoriginalelites.In1988-89,whenthemovementacceleratedtoaMariel-likeflood,themiddle-classSweetwaterethniceconomywasstilltoorecentandtoofeebletoabsorballthearrivals.TheimpoverishednewrefugeesthushadtorelyonthecharityoftheMiamiandDadeCountygovernmentsandonthelocalinformaleconomyforsurvival.Withtheinfluxofworking-classimmigrants,theimageofNicaraguan-Americanspromptlyshiftedfromagroupofwell-to-doexpatriatestothatofanotherimpoverishedThirdWorldminorityputtingpressureonlocalresources.
Second,thehostilityofthefederalgovernmenttowardpermanentresettlementofNicaraguansintheUnitedStatesweakenedthegroup'svoiceinlocalaffairs.Federalpolicyrenderedthesituationoftheworking-classarrivalsstillmoreprecarious,forcingthemintominimallypaidandinformaljobs.ThestruggletobeallowedtoremainintheUnitedStatesalsoconsumedmuchoftheenergyofthecommunity,preventingitfromarticulatingadistinctpoliticaldiscourse.TheNicaraguanswerejusttoobusytryingtofendofftheINStodevelopacoherentlocalprofile.
Third,theNicaraguanexoduslackedfinality,withtheoptionofreturnremainingopentomany,evenifthatmeantjoiningtheContras.AftertheSandinistasannouncedtheirwillingnesstoholdelections,theoptionexpandedsignificantly,especiallyundertheproddingofBushadministrationofficials.Nicaraguanrefugeesneverhadthedoorfirmlyandpermanentlyclosedbehindthem;thustheywereineffect
tornbetweengoalstobepursuedeitherintheUnitedStatesorintheirhomecountry.AmythicalNicaraguacouldnotbeconstructedinexile,astheCubanshaddonewiththeirisland,becausetherealNicaraguawastooaccessible.
Despiteallthesedifficulties,Nicaraguanexileorganizationsstruggledgamelytobeheard.In1988,theCasaComunidadorganizedaNicaraguanCommunityDaythatattractedfourthousand
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people.SixmonthslaterthesameorganizationsponsoredacelebrationofNicaraguancultureintheDadeCountyAuditorium.StampedonthebackoftheprogramwasComunidad'smotto:"Unityisourgoal."
71InDecember1986,theCentroComercialManaguahelditsfirstexilegritería.Nicaraguansfilledtheparkinglottoprayandsinghymns.Littlebasketsbrimmingwithcandywerepassedaround,andthefaithfulyelledtherefrainsthatgivethereligiouscelebrationitsname"TheShouting."72Bythelate1980s,NicaraguanfanspackedvariouspublicparkseachSundaytowatchtheNicaraguannationalpastime,baseball.Theirleague'steamshadthesamenamesasthosebackhomeBoer,Esteli,Zelayaandthefierceallegiancesremainedthesame."InNicaragua,firstyouhavebreadandthenyouhavebaseball,"saidleagueorganizerCarlosGarcia.''Itpromotespatriotismandunity."73
Bythistime,NicaraguanimmigrationtoMiamiwasdominatedbytheworkingclasses,whoweremuchmorevisiblethantheearlierwaves.Miami'sinformalsectorwasburgeoning,andthestereotypeofNicaraguanshadclearlyshiftedtoadefinitionfocusingonpoorandunemployedworkers.UnitedNicaraguanArtistswasformedin1989specificallytoimprovetheimageofNicaraguansinMiami.Asoneofitsfoundersstated,"Peoplethinkwe'realluneducated,poorpeoplewithwork-permitproblems."74
TheRubénDaríoInstitute,runbyadescendantofNicaragua'smostfamouspoet,concentratedongarneringpublicrecognitionofNicaragua'scontributionstoSouthFlorida.HeconvincedtheCountyCommissiontorenamepartofastreetthatrunsthroughSweetwaterRubénDaríoAvenue.HethenpersuadedtheDadeCountySchoolBoardtonameanewschoolintheneighborhoodtheRubénDarío
MiddleSchool.Toembellishtherecognition,theinstitutecommissionedasculptortoproduceabustofthepoetandaNicaraguanartisttodonatealife-sizeoilpaintingofDarío.ItalsoplannedtodonateacollectionoftheworksofDaríoandotherLatinAmericanwriterstotheschool'slibrary.75
Despitetheseefforts,thelegalandeconomicprecariousnessoftherefugeecommunityanditscontradictorygoalsconspiredagainstmakingalastinglocalimpression.AmongtheNicaraguans,noclearleaderorpositionemergedasmultipleagendasarosethatmixedexileconcernsofoustingtheSandinistasinNicaraguawithimmigrantconcernsofgainingworkpermitsintheUnitedStates.
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FromtheMiami-ManaguaLionsClubtoNicaraguanDemocraticYouth,adozenlocalgroupsspokeup,demandingsuchthingsasmedicalsuppliesfortherebelsandlegalimmigrationstatus.
76Politicalissuesdividedthecommunitymoreoftenthanimmigrationproblemscausedittocoalesce.RogerBlandon,whoheadedtheMinistryoftheEconomyduringthelasteighteenmonthsofAnastasioSomoza'sregimeandthenfledtobecomeacarsalesmaninMiami,declared:"Iparticipatedinvariousgroupsthatwerestartedtounifytheexodusbutweneverarriveatanything.Everybodywantstheirownideastopredominate.SomesaytheSomocistasaretoblame.Otherssay,'Noit'stheoneswhosupportedtheSandinistaswhoaretoblameforwhathappenedinNicaragua.'"77
AfewmonthsaftercallingonSenatorConnieMacktoallowNicaraguanrefugeestoremaininthecountry,thenewlyformedElectoralCounciloftheNicaraguanExodusaskedmorethanfiftyexilegroupstonominatecandidatesandparticipateinanelectionscheduledforearly1990,because"itisimportantforMiami'scommunitytogetbehindaleaderwhowilladdressproblemsliketheneedforworkpermits,refugeesdetainedbytheImmigrationService,andthefutureofContraslivinginHonduras."78Inshort,nosinglepoliticalvoicehademerged,norcouldit.ThecontradictorygoalsofremainingintheUnitedStatesanddefeatingtheSandinistaspulledateachotheratthesametimethatdiscorddividedtheanti-Sandinistamilitants.
Asdivisiveaspoliticaldifferences,butmoreinsidious,werethelatentclassdivisionsseparatingearlyandlaterefugees.Thefloodofworking-classarrivalshaderasedtherelativelypositiveimageofeliteexiles,andmanyrespondedbydistancingthemselvesfromthenewcomers:"It'snotjustalanguageproblemanymore,"saidLillian
Rios,anelementaryschoolteacher."Manyofthestudents,liketheirparents,arebarelyliterate."OscarMayorga,aU.S.educatedNicaraguanexilewhoranaplasticsplantinPompanoBeach,describedthecontrastbetweenearlyandlaterarrivalsinblunterterms."FromwhatIunderstand,they'repeoplewhoare20yearsbehindincivilization.It'stheeffectoftheenvironmentandalackofeducationandreligioustraining.WehavebeenabletoidentifywithAnglo-Saxonculture,whereorderanddedicationtoworkhasmadethiscountrygreat."Despiteashortageofworkersathisfactory,Mayorgasaidhewouldbereluctanttohire
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refugeesfromhiscountryuntiltheywereschooledinEnglishandhadlearnedAmericanculture.
79
Caughtupbythesecontradictionsmilitantexilegroupversusstrugglingimmigrantminority,freedomfightersinNicaraguaversusinformalworkersinMiamitheNicaraguanexoduscouldnotarticulateadistinctvoice,muchlesscompetewiththediscourseoftheirCuban-Americanallies.TheCubans'three-decadeplightbroughtaboutbyafirmlyentrenchedregimeintheislandandtheimpossibilityofreturngavetheirpresenceinMiamiafinalitythathelpedconsolidatetheirethniceconomy.TheNicaraguans,incontrast,confrontedafeeblerandlessmonolithicadversary,andtheoptionofreturntotheircountryconfusedtheirlocalpriorities.AseconddistinctLatinvoiceinMiamididnotemergeintheend.
The"New"Herald
Asithaddonethroughoutthe1980Marielcrisis,theMiamiHeraldinitiallyopposedtheNicaraguaninflowandcastigatedthefederalgovernmentforcreatinganotherimmigrationmessforwhichDadeCountyhadtopay.Duringtheearly1980s,thenewspaperadvocatedrigidcontrolovertheU.S.borders,preventingnewrefugeesfromenteringanddeportingthosewhodidnotmeetexactingrequirementsforpoliticalasylum.80Allofthis,however,camebeforetheopenconfrontationbetweenthepaperandCuban-Americanleadersthatculminatedinthefull-pagepaidannouncementbytheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundationinOctober1987proclaiming,"TheHeraldHasFailedUs."81
Followingthisandotherrelatedevents,theHerald'spositionbegantochangerapidly.AngloswereleavingMiami,andCubanswerenot
buyingthenewspaper.Market"penetration"thepercentageofhouseholdsingreaterMiamireceivingtheHeraldwasdecliningcontinuously,aswereadvertisingrevenues.Belatedly,HeraldeditorsrecognizedthattheirtownwasnotjustlikeanyotherintheUnitedStates.ContinuingtospouttheoldAnglohegemonicmessagewasasurewayofgoingoutofbusiness.
NowherewasthechangeoftackmoreevidentthanintheeditorialpositionsadoptedtowardtheNicaraguanexodusinthelate1980s.When,in1987,AttorneyGeneralMeeseannouncedthatNicaraguanswouldnotbedeportedandthattheywouldreceive
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workpermits,theHeraldendorsedthemeasure.
82Ayearlater,itadvocatedamorestable,permanentstatusforNicaraguans.83Andbylate1988thenewspaper'seditorialwriters,havingapparentlyforgottenallabouttheirattacksonMariel,contendedthattheacceleratingNicaraguaninflowwouldundoubtedlybenefitthecommunity,ashadearlierCubanimmigration.84
EvenmoreastonishingwastheHerald'sreactionwhenBobbyMaduroStadiumopenedtoshelterthenewrefugees.ThisactionbytheMiamicitymanagerwouldhavetriggeredhowlsofprotestinthenewspaper'seditorialsonlyafewyearsbefore.Inlate1988,however,therecentlyappointedHeraldeditorcongratulatedmanagerCesarOdio,assertingthat"theUnitedStateshasamoralobligationtotaketheserefugeesinandletthemwork."85InaChristmasDayeditorial,theHeralddrewaparallelbetweentheplightofthehomelessNicaraguansinMiamiandthatofMaryandJosephinBethlehem.Itdeclaredthatpolitics,economics,andstingytownspeoplehadcausedbothsituationsandcalledoneveryonebutespeciallythefederalgovernmenttoliveuptothenation'scommitmenttolife,liberty,andthepursuitofhappiness.86
Miamiwasverydifferentin1989fromwhatithadbeentenyearsearlier.The180-degreeturnintheHerald'spositiontowardsupportingtheNicaraguanarrivalssignalednolessthanadecisiveshiftinthewaylocalelitesthoughtabouttheircity.Althoughmiddle-andworking-classAnglogroupscontinuedtoembracetheassimilationistdiscourseandtoopposeLatinimmigrantsasferventlyasever,theyhadlosttheirprimechannelofexpression.Thereafter,CitizensofDadeUnitedandotherpronativistgroupswouldbejustanotherminorityvoiceastheAnglobusinessclassdistanceditselffromthem.Thissingularsplitcameaboutbecausecorporateleaders
realizedthatthecitywasnot"intransition"tosomething,buthadconsolidatedadistinctprofile,uniqueinthecountry.BilingualMiamiwasprofitable,monolingualMiamiwasnot;asalways,thebottomlinewaswhatdefinedcorporatepolicy.
Ironically,theCubancommunitywasabletodofortheNicaraguanswhatithadbeenunabletodoforitsownco-nationalsduringtheMarielepisode.AdecadeofinvestmentsinU.S.-orientedpoliticalorganizingmadeallthedifference.OtherchangesintheMiamiHeraldanditsparentKnight-RidderCorporation,moreover,indicatedthattheNicaraguans'suddenwelcomewasnotanisolated
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event.WhentheneweditorofthenewspapercametoMiamiin1990,hetooklessonsinSpanishandwastutoredintheculturalnuancesoftheLatincommunitybyaCuban-Americanprofessor.Similarly,thesameHeraldcolumnistwhohadafewyearsearliercomplainedthatCastroalwayscalledtheshotsinMiamididnotsuggestsendingthenewrefugeesback.Indeed,hedeclaredthatitwas"insane"thattheNicaraguanswerenotbeingtreatedaswellastheCubanshadbeen.
87
MoreimportantstillwasthechangeintheSpanisheditionofthenewspaper.Theoriginalversion,ElHerald,hadremainedunderthecompleteeditorialcontroloftheEnglish-languageeditorandreliedalmostexclusivelyontranslatedmaterial.Althoughcostly,theeffortdidnotwork;circulationratesamongCuban-Americanhouseholdsonlydeclined.Thenin1988,Knight-Riddertookanunprecedentedstep:itcreatedabrand-newSpanish-languagenewspaperElNuevoHeraldthatwasvirtuallyindependentoftheEnglishedition.Ithaditsownbuilding,itsownreportingstaff,and,mostimportant,itsowneditors,overwhelminglyCuban-Americans.Notsurprisingly,ElNuevoHerald'seditorialstancecametoreflectmorecloselytheconservativediscourseoftheexilecommunitythantheoftenliberaloutlookofitssisterEnglishpublication.Thecoexistenceoftwodifferentversionsofthenewspaper,eachinadifferentlanguageandwithitsowneditoriallinebutsimultaneouslydistributed,wasaclearevocationofhowMiamihadbeentransformed.
TheAngloestablishmentyieldedgroundtotheCubandiscourseaboutthecityinexchangeforsocialpeaceandcontinuingcorporateprofitability.Nomatterwhatthe1980EnglishOnlyordinanceand1988amendmenttothestateconstitutionhadmandated,Miamiwasinfactbilingualandbicultural.Theassimilationistdiscoursereceded
notonlybecausethebusinesselitetoneditdown,butalsobecausemanyofitsmostferventnativewhitesupportersleftthearea.BlackAmericans,ontheotherhand,stoodtheirground,andtheirowninterpretationofeventsbecamemorearticulateandurgent.Theywerewellawarethatthequestionoftheirroleandstatusinthisnewcity,liketheroleandstatusofthesurgingHaitian-Americancommunity,remainedunresolved.
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ChapterEightLostintheFray:Miami'sBlackMinoritiesSomethreehundredanticommunists,mostlyCuban-Americans,werebunchedatoneendoftheesplanadeinfrontoftheMiamiBeachConventionCenter.Amidplacardsthatproclaimed,"Arafat,Gadhafi,andCastroareTerrorists"and"Mr.Mandela,doyouknowhowmanypeopleyourfriendCastrohaskilledjustforaskingtherighttospeakasyoudohere?"amiddle-agedCubantilesetterasserted,"I'mherebecauseMandelaisafriendofCastroandnofriendofCastroiswelcomeinMiami."
1OpposingtheanticommunistsonlyfiftyyardsawaywerethreethousandNelsonMandelasupporters,mostlyBlack,whoseplacardsdeclared:"Mandela,WelcometoMiami,HomeofApartheid,"and''MiamiCity,Council=Pretoria."Atallmanwavedacardboardsign:"Anticommunismisnoexcusetosupportracism.WelcomeNelson-WinnieMandela."Amiddle-agedBlackAmericanwomanproclaimed,"I'mherebecausethis[NelsonMandela]isagreatman."2
Bothsideshadbeenthereforaboutfivehoursunderasearingsun.Planescontinuouslycircledafewthousandfeetabove,alternatelydraggingpro-andanti-Mandelabanners.JewsagainstMandelaparadeddownthestreet,followedafewminuteslaterbyJewsforMandela.Afewwhitesupremacistscarriedracistsigns.Themainfocusofattention,though,wastheconfrontationbetweenMiami'stwolargestethnicgroups:Cuban-AmericansandBlackAmericans.3Mandela,inthemidstofhistriumphaltouroftheUnitedStates,wasintowntodeliveraspeechattheMiamiBeachConventionCenterbeforetheinternationalconventionoftheAmericanFederationof
State,County,andMunicipalEmploy-
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ees(AFSCME).HehadalreadybeentoNewYorkCity,Washington,D.C.,andAtlanta,wherehehadbeengreetedandwarmlywelcomedbythosecitiesandbythenation'stopelectedofficialsandcelebrities.
ButthingsweredifferentinMiami.ThecityhadpointedlyrefusedtohonorMandelabecauseCubanpoliticiansfearedalienatingright-wingCubanradiotalkshowhostsbywelcomingasupporterofFidelCastro.EventheoneBlackmemberoftheCityCommissionhadclaimedhewouldnotforgothecommissionmeetingtoattendMandela'sspeech.
4NeitherhenortheoneBlackAmericanontheCountyCommissionpubliclydefendedMandela.5
IntothevoidsteppedotherBlackleadersmorewillingtoconfronttheCubans."MiamimaygodownininfamyastheonlycityinAmericathatdenounced,criticized,castigatedandthrewits'welcomemat'inthefaceofNelsonMandela,"H.T.Smith,chairmanoftheMiamiCoalitionforaFreeSouthAfrica,wrotetoMiami'sCubanmayorXavierSuárez.6AndPatriciaDue,oneofthefounders,threedecadesearlier,oftheTallahasseechapteroftheCongressofRacialEquality,complained:"Ifeelsick.Howdaretheydothistous?Mr.Mandelaisasymbol.Heisalinktoourmotherland.Afteralltheblood,sweat,andtearsofBlackAmericans,andpeoplearestilltryingtotelluswhowecanhear."7
InthewakeofMandela'svisit,SmithandtheBlackLawyersAssociationbroughtBlackfrustrationintofocusbyorganizingaboycottoftheirowncity.Overthenextfourmonths,atleastthirteennationalorganizations,includingtheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnion(ACLU)andtheNationalOrganizationofWomen(NOW),canceledtheirconventionsinMiami.
InJuly1990,justaweekafterMandela'sMiamivisit,aHaitiancustomergotintoanargumentwithaclerkinaCuban-ownedclothingstoreintheheartofLittleHaiti.Afistfightensued.ThefollowingdayaHaitianradioannouncerrelatedthestoryandsummonedfellowimmigrantsand"BlacksinOvertown,LibertyCityandOpa-Lockatojoininprotest."Anotherannouncerproclaimed,"WearegoingtomaketheCubanspayforthewaytheytreatedMandela."8Onethousandprotestersblockedaccesstothestoreduringanine-hourconfrontation,punctuatedbystreetdancingtoHaitianmerengue,occasionaleruptionsofrocksandbottlesaimedattheshutteredstore,andscreamedepithetsatradiore-
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portersfromaSpanish-languageradiostationwhovisitedthescene.
Whenthemerchantreopenedhisstore,aHaitiancrowdgatheredspontaneouslytoprotest.Themerchantspokepeacefullywithsmallgroupsofprotesters,andaHaitianmusicalgroupentertainedthecrowd.Abouthalfleftthesceneduringanafternoondownpour,butintheearlyeveningahundredhelmetedpolicecarryingshieldssurroundedtheremainingprotestersandbeganclosingin,nightsticksflailing.Withtelevisionstationsbroadcastingthemelee,policeknockedtheprotesterstothegroundandcontinuedtohitmanywhiletheyweredown.Protesterstryingtoescapeweretackled,jabbedwithnightsticks,andhandcuffed.Bylateevening,sixty-threewhohadnoimmediateproofoftheirimmigrationstatushadbeenarrested.
9
ThestoryofBlacksinMiamihasalwaysbeenoneofpowerlessness,suffering,andfrustratedattemptsatresistance.Experiencesduringthe1980sstiffenedthecommunity'sresolvetoimproveitslot,whileatthesametimeextendingitsnewdouble-subordinationdiscoursetoHaitians.YetracialsolidarityisnotthewholestoryforeitherBlackAmericansorHaitians.Atangleofconflictingandoftencontradictoryperceptions,attitudes,andinteractionsyieldedaconfusingscenewhereracialsolidarityalternatedwithclassandethnicfactionalismaswellaseconomiccompetition.Duringthedecade,BlackAmericansbecameincreasinglydividedbyclass,asdidHaitians;andbothimmigrantandnativeBlacksbecameincreasinglyambivalenttowardeachother.Thesecontradictorytendenciesweakenedtheircommonvoice,makingitalltheeasierforthesegroupstobelostinthefray.
ColorVersusClass
Thecommonrealityofcolorconcealedagrowingprocessof
differentiationintheBlackpopulationofMiami.AsinotherAmericancities,theendofsegregationandadventofthecivilrightseraacceleratedthegrowthofamiddleclassthattranslatedeconomicsuccessintoescapefromtheghetto.10UnlikeinotherAmericancities,thisprocesstookplaceastheminorityasawholewasbeingelbowedasidebyanimmigrantgroup.Whilemiddle-classBlackswaxedindignantaboutthesymbolicslightsmetedouttothemby
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theLatins,inner-cityghettosexplodedrepeatedlyformorebasicreasons.Miamiwastheonlycityduringthe1980storegisterthreeurbanriots.EachfollowedthekillingofaBlackbypolice,andeachwasspontaneousandleaderless,adesperateexpressionofanger.
11
ThesuburbanBlackprofessionalsdidnotleadtheseriots,nordidtheyparticipateinthem,butthelocalestablishmenttreatedthemasiftheyhad,addressingthemasvalidinterlocutorsintheireffortstopreventthenextoutburst.Hence,apeculiardynamicdevelopedinwhichregularexplosionsintheghettofueledprogramsthatmainlybenefitededucatedBlacks,therebyaccentuatingtheriftbetweenthetwosegmentsofthenativeminority.Theprocess,inauguratedafterthe1980riot,wasdescribedexplicitlybyaLibertyCityleader:
Thewhitepowerstructureonceagaintooktheeasywayout....Onceagaintheylistenedtothewrongpeople.Theyinvitedthemiddle-classBlackpeopledowntownwhodidnotparticipateintheriotandaskedthem,"Whydidyouallriot?"Theydidn'tknow,sowhattheydidwasarticulatetheirownfrustrations,whichwere"We'renotinbusiness,soifyouputusinbusinesswewillnotriot."Andsothewhitecommunitywentoutandraisedsevenmilliondollarstoputusinbusiness...buttheriotsdidn'toccurbecauseBlacksarenotinbusinessandthefolkswhoriotedcouldn'tgointobusinesstomorrowiftheywanted.12
Theeffortstopreventnewurbanexplosionsdidproduceresultsthatseemedimpressiveintheaggregate.The$7millionputtogetherbytheGreaterMiamiChamberofCommercespawnedtheBusinessAssistanceCenter,whichhelpedlaunchanumberofBlackenterprises.In1989,thecenterraised$8.3milliononitsown.ThenumberofsmallBlackfirmsinMiamimorethantripledbetween1977and1987,reachingalmostseventhousandinthelatteryear(table5).In1980,DadeCountydidnotawardasingleconstruction
programorpurchaseordertoaBlackfirm;afterestablishinganewset-asideprogram,however,countyprojectsgaveworkto158Blackcontractorsbetween1982and1990.Blackparticipationpeakedin1985-86when$12.7millionworthofcontracts,or6.6percentofthecountytotal,wasawardedtothesefirms.13
Similarly,Blackparticipationinthecityandcountybureaucraciesincreasedsteadily(fig.7).Bytheendofthe1980sBlackofficialsincludedoneDadeCountycommissioner,oneMiamicom-
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TABLE5.GrowthofMiami'sBlackBusinesses,1977-87
1977 1987NumberofBlackfirms 2,1846,747NumberofBlackfirmswithpaidemployees 380 961TotalnumberofemployeesinBlackfirms 1,5792,891TotalreceiptsforBlackfirms(millionsofdollars)
95 276
TotalpayrollforBlackfirms(millionsofdollars)
10 34
Sources:U.S.BureauoftheCensus,SurveyofMinority-ownedBusinessEnterprises,1977/Blacks(Washington.D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1980);idem,1987/Blacks(1990).Note:Therewerealterationsintheproceduresusedtoidentifyminorityfirmsbetweenthetwoyears.Thesechangesintroduceanunknownelementoferrorintothecomparison.Fordetails,seetheintroductorysectiontothe1990Survey.
missioner,themayorofonemunicipality,(Opa-Locka),theMiamipolicechief,thechairmanoftheboardofthearea'slargesthospital,andnumerouslesserfunctionaries.
EffortswereevenmadetoimproveconditionsinthepoorerBlackneighborhoods.In1981,communitydevelopersandthecity.governmentsoughttoattractfirmstoanewindustrialparkinLibertyCity.Aspecialtaxincrementdistrictwascreatedtochannelnewpublicfundsintoinner-cityareas,andtheCitybegantopurchaselandforredevelopmentinOvertown.In1984,citygovernmenteffortsfocusedonthecreationofanewOvertownshoppingcenter,andthefollowingyearaBlackcommunity-basedorganizationopenedanothershoppingcenterintheborderbetweenLibertyCityandLittleHaiti.Finally,anenterprisezonewascreatedgrantingnewbusinessesin
Overtown,LibertyCity,andotherBlackneighborhoodstaxholidaysandrebates.
14
Althoughhelpingtoexpandpublicpayrollsandgivingworktoprivatefirms,theseinitiativesseldomattainedtheirintendedpurposes.Deteriorationofhousingintheinnercityoutpacedconstructionofnewunitsandrehabilitationofexistingdwellings.High-riseapartmentbuildingsbuiltrightnexttothesparklingnewMiamiArenawerenotaffordabletomostOvertownresidents.Despitelegalprovisionsreserving20percentoftheseunitsforlow-incometenants,managersofthepropertiesreadilyadmittedthattheymadelittleefforttorenttolocals.15
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Figure7BlackprofessionalsandadministratorsworkingforDadeCounty
government,1982-90.Metro-DadeAffirmativeActionReports,1982-90.
TheLibertyCityIndustrialParkhadnotenantsin1989,andtheOvertownShoppingCenterhadonlytwostoresinninespaces.Thecounty'sset-asideprogramwasentangledindifficultiesstemmingfromtheuseofBlacksas"fronts"forwhiteAngloandLatincontractors.By1989,Blackparticipationinpublicconstructionhadplummetedto1.9percent,andinApril1990,DadeCountydiscontinueditsset-asideprogram.
16
ThelonesuccesswastheLibertyCity/LittleHaitiShoppingCenter,
whoseBlackdeveloper,OtisPitts,becamesomethingofacelebrityinphilanthropiccircles.17Buteventhissuccesscreated
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only130-oddnewjobs.Moreimportant,whateveradvancesBlackentrepreneursandprofessionalsmadeoccurredinthecontextofarapidCubaneconomicandpoliticaladvancethatthreatenedtoconfineBlacksuccessestoamostlysymbolicstatus.In1987,stilllessthan2percentofDadeCounty'sBlackpopulationownedbusinesses,ascomparedtoover10percentfortheCubans.Latinfirmsweremuchbiggerintermsofbothsalesandemployment.Table6comparestherelativebusinesspresenceofthetwoethnicminorities.Thetableunderstatesthedifferencesbecausethedataarelimitedtosmallunincorporatedenterprises,excludingmid-sizeandlargeindustries,banks,andservicesfirms,asectoroverwhelminglyconcentratedintheCubanenclave.
Fueledbythecloutoftheirenterprisesandbytheirsheernumbers,Cuban-Americansmovedintolocalpoliticsandgovernment.Whetherornotbyintention,theseadvanceswereoftenaccomplishedbyelbowingBlacksasidefrompositionsofrealpower.Forexample,theBlackMiamicitymanager,HowardGary,wasfiredin1984andreplacedbyCuban-AmericanCesarOdio.Blackmay-
Table6.Black-andCuban-ownedFirms,1987UnitedStates DadeCounty
andMiamiMetropolitan
AreaCuban Black Cuban Black
Numberoffirms 61,470424,16534,771 6,747Numberoffirmsper1000populationa
76.3 16.2 85.4 24.1
Firmswithpaidemployees 10,768 70,815 5,205 961Numberoffirmswithpaidemployeesper1000populationa
13.3 2.7 12.8 3.4
Averageannualsales(dollars) 89,182 46,59290,50640,934Sources:U.S.BureauoftheCensus,SurveyofMinority-owned
BusinessEnterprises,MB87-1and-2(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1991);idem,1980CensusofPopulation,GeneralSocialandEconomicCharacteristics-U.S.Summary(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1983);Metro-DadePlanningDepartment,DemographicProfileofDadeCounty,1960-1980(Miami:DadeCountyResearchDivision,1985).a1980Population.
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oralcandidateswererepeatedlydefeated,firstbyPuertoRican-bornMauriceFerréandthenbyCuban-AmericanXavierSuárez.
18In1990,aCuban-American,OsvaldoVisiedo,againbestedaBlackAmerican,T.S.Greer,forthejobofsuperintendentofDadeCountyschools.Greerhadbeenwiththesystemforthirtyyears,andheservedasinterimsuperintendentduringtheselectionprocess.Manyconsideredhimthenaturalchoiceforthejob.Inreactiontohisdefeat,Blackleaderscalledaone-dayboycottofpublicschools.Overtwothousandattendedarallyinfrontofthesystem'sheadquarterstoprotestthedecision,70percentofschoolbusdriversstayedawaythatday,andattendancedroppedtoaslowas20percentinsomeinner-cityschools.19
Cuban-Americanelectedofficialsmadeanumberofgestures,suchasappointingBlackstothepostofMiamipolicechiefonthreeconsecutiveoccasions.Yetthesegestureswerenotenoughtoappeasethewaryleadersofthenativeminority.TheBlack-orientednewspaperMiamiNewsflatlyassertedthata"CubanMafia"controlledMiami,"bullyingandthreateningallthosewhodonottoetheline."20AdebateensuedamongBlackleadersastowhetherCubanshadalwaysbeenasracistaswhiteAmericansoriftheyhadbecomesoalongtheirwaytosocialprominence.ThelatterviewwasadvancedforcefullybyoneLibertyCityactivist:
CubansareafraidofBlacks.TheirexperienceintheUnitedStateshasmadethemmoreracistthantheywere,andthisgetstranslatedintofear....Astheygoupthetotempoletryingtobecomesuccessful,manyCubansfindoutthatthesewhiteAnglosdon'tlikecoloredfolks,soifI'mgoingtoprogress,ImusttakeonsomeofthesamebehaviorsoftheAnglos.Youdon'tdiscriminate,butasawayofdoingbusinessyoubegintolaughatracistjokes,youtalkaboutthoseniggersoverthereinOvertown...becauseyou'resurroundedbyracistpeopleandbecauseitismore
importantinthismomentofyourlifetopursueyourownagenda.21
ThisdebateranroughlyparallelwithanotherwithintheBlackleadership.BlackleaderswhothoughttheirLatinneighborshadbroughttheirracismtoAmericaweregenerallymoreradicalintheiroppositiontotheexiles'risinghegemony;thosewhoarguedthatCubanracismwasmoreanadaptiveresponseappearedmoreinclinedtocompromise.Hence,thegrowingclassdivisionsamong
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MiamiBlackswerecompoundedbyincreasingdisagreementamongtheirleaders.WhenlawyerH.T.SmithandNAACPlocalleaderJohnnieMcMilliancalledforaboycottofMiamiaftertheMandelaincident,UrbanLeaguepresidentT.WillardFaircriticizedthemoveascounterproductive.NoneofMiami'selectedBlackofficialsendorsedeithertheconventionorschoolboycotts,nordidtheoneBlackcountycommissioner,theoneBlackSchoolBoardmember,oranyofthesevenBlacklegislators.
22TheMiamiHerald'sBlackcolumnistcomplainedthat"theboycottisdraggingonpainfullywithlittleindicationthatresolutionisinsight,"andheattackedtheMiamiNewsforits"CubanMafia"comment.23
Inshort,therelativelossofpoliticalinfluenceandthegrowingdesperationintheinnercitydidnotproduceaunifiedstancewithintheBlackleadership.Moreestablishedauthority,figuressawthefutureintermsofnegotiationandcompromise.Newerleaderschoseopenconfrontation,believingthatitbestinterpretedthespontaneousexplosionsofangerinthestreets.Ineithercase,theinfluenceofmiddle-classleaderswasweakenedbythewideninggulfbetweentheirownmaterialsituationandthatoftheirbrethrenleftbehindintheinnercity.
ThisriftisreflectedinthespatialsegmentationofBlackMiami.Asseeninmap2,theBlackinnercityLibertyCityandOvertowniscompletelyseparatefromBlackCoconutGroveandtheBlackmiddle-classareaslocatedmostlyinthesouthofDadeCounty.Itisinfactimpossibletodrivefromoneoftheseareastoanotherwithoutcrossinglargestretchesofnon-Blackpopulation.Bycontrast,acomparablemap(map3)ofLatinMiamidepictsitasavirtuallyseamlessweb.WiththeexceptionofaconcentrationofMexicanrural
workersinHomestead,atthesouthernmosttipofthecounty,therestoftheareaswithover50percentLatinpopulationfromthepoorerneighborhoodsofEastLittleHavanatoworking-classHialeahandthewealthierareasofWestchesterandCoralGablesarespatiallycontiguous.
ColorversusCulture
MynameisHerbandI'mnotpoor...I'mtheHerbiethatyou'relookingfor,
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likePepsi,anewgenerationofHaitiandetermination...I'mtheHerbiethatyou'relookingfor.
24
Abeattappedwithbarehands,afewdancesteps,andtheHaitiankidwasrapping.Hissong,titled"StraightOutofHaiti,"wasbeingperformedatEdisonHigh,aschoolthatsitsastridetheLibertyCity-LittleHaitiborder.Hislyricscapturedwellthedistinctoutlookofhisimmigrantcommunity.ThepanoramaofLittleHaitiindeedcontrastssosharplywiththeBlackinnercitythat,bytheendofthe1980s,atleastoneprominentBlackleaderproclaimedthatHaitianshadalreadysurpassedBlackAmericans.25InMiami'sLittleHaiti,thestorefrontsleapoutatthepasserby.Brightblues,reds,andorangesvibratetoHaitianmerengue,blaringfromsidewalkspeakers.ThemultilingualsignsadvertiseethnicproductsandservicesthelatestHaitianrecords,custom-tailored"French-styled"fashions,culinarydelightslikelambiandgriot,andrapidmoneytransferstoanyvillageinHaiti.UnlikeOver-town,thestreetsarefilledwithpedestrians.26
Fromverymodestbeginningsinthe1970s,theHaitianethniceconomygrewtoabout120firmsin1985,andtonearly300bytheendofthedecade.ItisstillafarcryfromLittleHavana,especiallysincemostenterprisesaresmall,butithasgivenHaitiansadefinitebusinesspresence.Underneaththelayerofvisiblefirmsthereisavastinformaleconomycomposedofmicrobusinessesthatbypassofficialregulation:gipsycabs,homechildcare,informalrestaurants,unlicensedautoandelectricrepairs,no-permitresidentialimprovementsallproliferateinLittleHaitiandbeyondastheblackimmigrantsseekanicheinthelocaleconomy.27
ThenumberofHaitianprofessionalsincreasedsignificantlyafterthe1960s,whenmanywhohadoriginallymigratedtoNewYorkcametoFlorida.Majorhealthandsocialorganizationshiredtheseprofessionalstoservetheexpandingimmigrantcommunity.DadeCommunityCollegeandthepublicadulthighschoolbothcreatedclassesandprofessionalpositionsforHaitians.By1990therewereseventyHaitianteachersandfiveadministratorsintheDadeschoolsystemandfourteenHaitianofficersinMiami'spoliceforce.AnewpublicelementaryschoolinLittleHaitiwas
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Map2.Blackpopulation,Miamimetropolitanarea,1990.
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Map3.Spanish-originpopulation,Miamimetropolitanarea,1990.
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renamedinhonorofthecountry'srevolutionaryheroToussaintL'Ouverture.
28Professionalsandbusinesspeopleexhibitedgreatenergyandoptimism,consciouslypatterningtheircommunityonthemodelofLittleHavana.TheysawLittleHaitiasbecomingaculturalandtouristattractionbasedontheirowndriveandonHaiti'suniqueculturalattributesworld-renownedpainting,woodcrafts,French-inspiredcuisine,andnumerousskilledtrades.29
AllthesesignspointedtowardasuccessfulrepeatoftheCuban,oratleasttheNicaraguan,experience.LikeHerbie,manyyoungHaitianssawthemselvesas''anewgeneration,filledwithdetermination."Unfortunately,theirreceptionwasfardifferentfromthatwhichtheLatinrefugeegroupsencountered.UnlikeCubans,Haitianscouldnotcountongovernmentsympathyorsupport;unlikeNicaraguans,theycouldnotcountonalarger,well-establishedethniccommunitytoprotectthem.Insteadtheymethostilityateveryturn.U.S.CoastGuardcuttersinterceptedHaitianboatsonthehighseasandreturnedthemtotheircountry.ThosewhomanagedtomakeitashorewereharassedbytheImmigrationandNaturalizationService.Proportionally,nootherwould-berefugeegrouphashadsomanyclaimsforasylumdeniedasHaitians.Publichealthofficialsrepeatedlyidentifiedthenewrefugeesasahealththreat:inthelate1970s,tuberculosiswasdeclaredendemicamongHaitians;andintheearly1980s,theCentersforDiseaseControl(CDC)inAtlantaidentifiedthemasaprimarygroupatriskforAIDS.30
TheseandotherinstancesofoutsidehostilityledtothegradualriseofreactiveethnicityamongHaitiansduringthe1980s.True,theCDClaterremovedthemfromtheAIDSrisklist,buttheFoodandDrugAdministration(FDA)continuedtorefusetoacceptbloodfrom
Haitiandonors.Inresponse,fivethousandHaitianprotestersralliedinfrontoftheFDAofficesinaMiamisuburb.Shortlythereafter,thecommunityfocusedontheINSKromeDetentioncenteronthefarwestofDadeCounty,wheredetainedHaitianarrivalsareincarceratedandfromwhichmanyhavebeendeported.Thistime,twenty-fivehundredmassedtoprotest.
ThepolicebeatingofHaitiansinfrontoftheCubanclothingstorewasseenbymanyastheculminationofadecadeofgrowingtension.AHaitianaccountantinterpretedthepoliceattackas"the
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resultofyearsofbeingdescribedasignorant,asilliterates,ofnotknowinganything,ofnothavinganyskills,ofsmellingbad,andsince1980ofhavingimportedAIDShere."
31
TherealitiesofraceinAmericagraduallybecamecleartotheHaitians,forcingmanytorevisetheiroptimisticforecasts.Inthissoutherncity,whereEnglish-andSpanish-speakingwhitescontrolledbusinessandpolitics,Creole-speakingblackshadfewalliesandevenfeweravenuesforeconomicmobility.Theirplightbroughtthemmuchclosertothedomesticminority,withwhichtheysharedacommonpastofslaveryandacommonpresentofdiscrimination.The"Mandelaincident"andtheHaitianbeatingsoccurredinquicksuccessionandhelpedcementanalliancebasedoncolor.Atapressconferencecalledsoonaftertheseeventsandthatincludedmembersofbothminorities,aBlackAmericanleaderdenouncedthepoliceattackagainsthis"brothers,"claimingthatitwouldneverhavehappenedagainstCubanimmigrants.Insteadoftheworld-classcityitclaimedtobe,MiamiwasinhisviewmorelikeSelma,Alabama;Jackson,Mississippi;andSouthAfrica.32Haitianssharedhisopinion.Inthewordsofoneoftheirleaders:''Wehaveahistoryofabuse,especiallybypoliceofficers.IthinkBlacksandHaitiansrealizetheyareinthesameboat.Thecolorofourskinalllooksthesame."33
Thisemergentsolidarityledtoaseriesofjointdeclarationsandprotests.HaitiansfeltthatCubansupportforthemerchantwhohadallegedlyattackedhisHaitiancustomerwasakintoCubanrejectionofMandela.BlackAmericansagreedandmadecommoncausewiththeimmigrantsfightingdeportationsfromKromeandsummaryinterdictionsatsea.ForBlackleaders,thefactthatCubansrescuedintheFloridaStraitswerebroughttoMiami,butHaitiansinthesame
situationwerereturnedtoHaiti,wastheclearestevidenceofracism.34Reactiveethnicitypromptedbyoutsidediscriminationhencebroughtthetwogroupstogether,temporarilyreducingthesalienceofculturetohighlighttheircommoncolor.
Still,culturaldifferencesdidnotremainsubmergedforlong.ThevastgapinthehistoryandworldviewsofimmigrantsfromanimpoverishedThirdWorldcountryandlong-termcitizensofaFirstWorldnationcouldnotbeentirelypaperedover.BlackAmericansdidnotgenerallyappreciateHaitians'businesssuccessesorother
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manifestationsoftheimmigrantdrivetogetaheadatanycost.Fortheirpart,HaitiansacceptedBlackAmericansupportintheirstrugglesagainstracism,buttheydidnotwishtobeidentifiedwithwhattheysawasthepoorestandmostdowntroddengroupinthehostsociety.Eachgroupfearedandresistedtheprospectoftriplesubordination:thedoublehegemonyofAnglosandLatinsplustheascentofanotherblack-skinnedgroup.BlackAmericansareprofoundlyambivalentaboutHaitiansinMiami,who,though"brothers"incolor,areregardedasacompetitivethreatinthelabormarketandthebusinessworld.Haitians,bythesametoken,resistbeingpulleddowntotheeconomiclevelofnativeBlacksandofhavingtheirdistinctimmigrantidentitysubmergedintothatoftheurbanunderclass.
Theresultinggameofmirrorsischaracterizedbyeachgroupseeingitselfaspartlysolidarybutsomehow"above"theother.Haitiansviewtheirculture,thrift,andambitionsasgivingthemaclearadvantageovertheirimpoverishedneighbors.HaitianbusinessleadersconsciouslyseektofollowthemodeloftheCubanenclaveandtoleavetheinnercitybehind.Butthepoliticalandeconomicweaknessoftheircommunityissuchthatthisprojectisconstantlyblocked,throwingthembackintotheless-than-welcomeembraceofthedomesticminority.
BlackAmericans,fortheirpart,donotextendtheiracceptanceunconditionally.Intheirview,Haitiansarenewcomerswhomustlearnabouttheirnewsocietyandadapttoitsculture.JustaswhiteAnglosrepeatedlypreachedassimilationtowhiteCubans,BlackAmericanspushHaitianrefugeesinthesamedirection.ABlackAmericanstudentinterviewedatEdisonHighputthematterbluntly:"Icanunderstandpeoplecomingoverherefromothercountries...Ijustdon'tunderstandwhytheydon'twanttobeAmerican....Theyhavetheirprivileges.What'sthecountrygonnabecalled?Youhaveamilliondifferentnationalities.RussiaiscalledRussia.Theyare
Russianpeople.JamaicaiscalledJamaica.Hey,ifyoudon'twanttobecalledAmerican...getout."
35
BlackAmericanleadersincludedwhattheyconsideredtobeHaitianissuesintheconventionboycottwithoutconsultingtheirHaitiancounterparts.AndnoHaitianrepresentativewasincludedonthesteeringcommitteeofeithertheconventionortheschool
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boycott.ElectedBlackleaders,infact,tookanotoriouslydistantstancetowardHaitianproblems.OnthedaywhencommunityleaderssoughttoeasetensionsafterthearrestofmorethanfiftyHaitiandemonstratorsbythepolice,Miami'sonlyBlackcommissionercaughtaflighttoJamaica.
36
Blackderisionoftheimmigrants'cultureisnowheremoreevidentthanintheschools.Intheearly1980s,whenCreole-speakingstudentsstartedtoappearinsignificantnumbersinpredominantlyBlackcityschools,thewordHaitianbecameanepithet,standingforforeign,backward,dirty,unintelligible,andignorant.Onseveraloccasions,schoolofficialshadtoclosedownEdisonHighbecauseofBlackstudentviolenceagainsttheHaitians.37
Inresponse,outnumberedHaitianstudentslearnedapatternofadaptationthatwasbaptized"thecover-up."TheylearnedBlackAmericanslang,dressstyles,andbodylanguage;theypubliclydeniedthattheywerefromHaitiandneverspokeCreoleatschool.This"pressurecooker"assimilation,however,nevererasedtheirownconcealedsenseofidentity.Bythelate1980s,afewacademicallyoutstandingHaitianstudents,''Herbie"amongthem,daredtoreassertprideintheirownheritagebutonlyinAmericanizedterms.RapandsimilarBlackculturalexpressionsthusbecamethechannelsthroughwhichdisparagedimmigrantidentitiescouldresurface.38
ThisevolutionwasclearlyseenatMiami'sEdisonHighSchool.Inthemid-1980s,studentsridiculedHaitianculturalpresentations,suchasHaitiandance.Withinafewyears,however,elementsofHaitianculturehadinfiltratedsomeschoolactivities.Evenso,theywereacceptedonlyonBlackAmericanterms.ThepeprallieswerethusforAmericanfootballandbasketball,notforsoccer,atwhichEdison
excelledbecauseoftheHaitians.Similarly,BlackAmericanstudentsenthusiasticallyreceivedCreolerapsongs,butstilldidnotcarefortraditionalHaitiandance.39
AssimilationpressuresatschoolalsocreatedapainfulgenerationalcleavageintheHaitiancommunity.Adultimmigrants'prideofcultureandhopesformobilityonthebasisofHaitiansolidaritywereshatteredbytherapidtransformationoftheiroffspring.UnlikeCubanparentsacrosstown,whocouldsheltertheirchildreninCatholic,Latin-orientedschools,poorHaitianswerefinanciallyunabletosendtheirchildrentoprivateschools,andinanycase,
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therewerenonethattaughtinFrenchorpromotedHaitianculture.
40Theinner-citypublicschoolsweretheonlyoption.Hence,"assimilation"wasnottotheAmericanmainstream,buttoBlacksubculture.ThispressuredlearningofBlackAmericanwaysbroughtyouthfromthetwominoritiestogether,butonlyatthecostofgivinguptheimmigrantdreamofeconomicmobilityandadistinctculturalidentity.ForHaitiankidsinpublicschools,thefuturebecameinextricablytiedwiththatoftheirpeersfromtheimpoverishedBlackinnercity.
ClassVersusCulture
TheunwelcomingreceptionreceivedbyHaitiansinMiamiandtheconsequentpoliticalandeconomicweaknessoftheLittleHaiticommunityalsoledtoapeculiarreproductionamongthisminorityoftheclassfragmentationthatalreadycharacterizedMiamiBlacks.JustasHaitiankidsintheinnercityweretryingto"coverup"theirimmigrantidentity,morefortunatemiddle-classHaitianprofessionalsweredoingthesameinthesuburbs.Manycamefromthelighter-skinnedmulattoeliteofthecountry,anattributethatfacilitated"passing"amongLatinsandevennativewhites.41These"invisible"HaitianslivefarfromLittleHaiti,speakEnglishwell,andgenerallytrytofindjobsoutsidetheinnercity.ThelossofthiseducatedelementfurtherunderminesHaitianattemptstocreateaviableethniceconomy.
Therootsofthissegmentationresideinthecountryoforigin.Haitiisanationofsuchvastclassdifferencesthatithasbeenlikenedtoacastesociety.42Thelighter-skinnedmulattoesspeakFrenchandtrytoliveasphysicallyapartaspossiblefromtheCreole-speakingblackmasses.BothgroupswererepresentedintheU.S.-boundinflowand
arenowpartoftheMiamiHaitiancommunity.Recentlyarrived"boatpeople"tendtocomefromtheimpoverishedpeasantryandlaboringclasses;theyareuniformlyblackandgenerallyhaveverylowaveragelevelsofeducationandoccupationaltraining.Middle-classHaitians,whooriginallywenttoNewYorktoescapetheFrançoisDuvalierregime,startedmigratingtoSouthFloridainthelateseventies.InMiami,theystaffedalltheprofessionalandmanagerialpositionsavailabletoHaitians.Theyarealsoresponsibleforcreatingmostoftheformalbusinessesinthefledglingethniceconomy.
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Americanracismmadenodistinctionbetweenpoorandmiddle-classHaitians.Inthissituation,theeducatedsegmentadoptedoneofthreealternativestrategies.Somethetruly"invisibleHaitians"escapedthecommunityaltogether,findingjobsoutsideofitandtryingto"pass"asLatinsorevennativewhites.OthersrunbusinessesorprofessionalservicesinLittleHaitibutreturnatnighttothesuburbs.TheyadmitthattheyareHaitian,buttheyspeakFrenchandcarefullydifferentiatethemselvesfromthedarker,Creole-speaking"boatpeople."Finally,thethirdgrouphaschosentobecomeleadersofthecommunity,andidentifythemselvesmilitantlywithitsgoals.Ministersofreligion,liketheactivistpriestGerardJean-Juste,areinthiscategory,asarebusinessandprofessionalpeoplewhostruggletoconsolidateaviableethnicenclave.
43
Intheend,however,therearejusttoomany"invisibleHaitians,"toomuchleakagefromthecommunityofvaluablehumanresources,toallowtheethniceconomytotakeoff.TrashandpeelingstorefrontsarecommoninLittleHaiti.Manybusinessesarebarelysurviving,andtheincomestheygenerateindicatethattheyareonlysecond-bestalternativestodestitution.AlloftheHaitianenterprisesaresmall:littlegrocerystores,autorepairshops,andvariouspersonalservicespredominate.In1985,HaitianbusinessesinMiamihadanaverageof1.5employees,mostlyfamilymembers;nearly60percenthadtotalsalesoflessthan$2,000amonth.TherewerenoHaitianmanufacturersorwholesalers.AlthoughsomelargeHaitianimport-exportbusinessesexist,theyarelocatedmostlyoutsideofLittleHaitiandareentirelydivorcedfromthecommunity.44
IncontrasttothethemonolithicpoliticaloutlookunderlyingtheCubanenclave,amongHaitianspoliticalandclassdivisionsoverlap,
Thismeansthatthereisnotight,ideologicallyimbuedcommunitytosustainboundedsolidarityandenforceabletrust.Inthe1990s,HaitianimmigrantpoliticaldivisionshavebecomefocusedonthefigureofJean-BertrandAristide,electedandthendeposedpresidentofthecountry.HisMiamicampaignappearanceralliedsomeseventhousandwildlyenthusiasticHaitians.WhenhereturnedtoMiamiin1991aselectedpresident,thirteenthousandwelcomedhim.Andinthefirsttwomonthsafterhewasdeposed,fivethousandHaitiansmarchedonfourseparateoccasionsdemandinghisreinstatement.45
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Manymiddle-classHaitianimmigrants,however,especiallyentrepreneursandbusinessmanagers,justasvehementlyopposedAristide.Onemiddle-classwomaninterviewedshortlyafterthecoupassertedthatAristideintendedto"kill"allthebetter-offHaitians.
46Theownerofamajorimport-exportbusinessclaimedthatAristidehadusedtheshantytownmobstosilencethemiddleclassandanyonewhoopposedhim.Thesegroupsralliedtoo,carryingplacardssupportingthecoupandarguingthatHaiticouldbesavedonlyifAristidewaskeptout.47Althoughmuchsmaller,theseralliesinvolvedthemoreinfluentialandwealthiermembersofthecommunity.
LittleHaitihasitsbusinessclass,but,unlikethatrunningtheCubanenclave,thisright-wingelitehasnotbeenabletopersuadeitsfellowimmigrantsastothemeritsofitsposition.Working-classHaitianscametoMiami,afterall,toescapepovertyandoppression,notacommunistdictatorship.Theabsenceofasolidarymoraloutlookcompoundedpremigrationclasscleavagesandacceleratedtheflightofthebetter-offimmigrantstothesuburbs.Weakenedbythesedivisions,havingonlyanuncertainalliancewithBlackAmericans,andsubjectedtopervasiveracism,HaitiansinMiamilooktoafuturethatisdubiousatbest.Inthiscontext,apartialreproductionoftheBlackpatternofclasssegmentationHaitiankids"coveringup"intheinnercity,Haitianprofessionalsdoinglikewiseinthesuburbsisanunftatteringbutrealisticalternativetothedreamsofavibrantethniceconomy.
DoubleSubordination
Miamiisathree-leggedstool,ifonelegisshorter,itwillnotstand.LibertyCitybusinessman,1987
TheAnglo-BlackRelationship
DespitearapidlygrowingHaitiancomponent,thebulkofMiami'sblackpopulationstillcomprisesthenative-born.Thisgroup,roughly20percentofthemetropolitanpopulation,mostofitdeeplyimpoverished,continuestoposethegreatestchallengetothecity'ssocialstabilityandeconomicfuture.Blackleaderswhoarticulatedthedouble-subordinationperspectiveintheearlyeight-
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iescontinuetoblamepervasiveracismonthepartofbothAnglosandCubansfortheplightoftheirpeople.Beneaththismilitantrhetoric,however,somesignsofconvergencehaveappearedbetweentheirviewsandthosevoicedbynativewhites.Native-bornBlacksandwhitesshare,afterall,alonghistorythat,despitenumerousconfrontations,hasgivenrisetocertaincommonoutlooks.Undertheimpactofarapidlychangingsituationinwhichanimmigrantgroupchallengestheestablishedorder,someofthesecommonalitieshavecometothefore.
ThreesuchareasofagreementareapparentintheattitudesofBlackandAngloleadersinMiami:theacknowledgmentofthevastgapseparatingtheeconomicconditionoflocalBlacksfromthatoftherestofthepopulation;theassignmentofresponsibilityforthissituationtotheexperienceofslavery,whichunderminedthebasesforBlacksolidarity;andtherecognitionthatnative-borngroups,regardlessofcolor,shouldresisttheinroadsofaforeigncultureandcompeltheimmigrants'assimilation.Thefollowingexcerptsdrawnfrominterviewsconductedduringthelate1980sillustrateeachoftheseareasofagreement.
OntheBlackConditioninMiami
Blackexecutive,formercityofficial,andleaderofabusinesspromotionassociation(1988):
It'snotsomuchthattheearningsofBlacksaresolowbutthatincomparisontotheopportunitiesforHispanicsandAnglosinthistownthereisagulf....Incomparisonwiththesecommunitiesweareadevelopingnation.IfIsaidthatinpublic,theGovernorwouldwanttoshootmebut,inreality,allIdonowisdevelopmenteconomics.
48
WhiteCatholicprelateandcommunityleader(1987):
Basically,BlacksinMiamiareanunderdevelopednation.ItisasituationexactlythesameasanislandintheCaribbean,andthereforeweshouldbeapplyingthesameprinciplesofeconomicdevelopmentthatwewouldapplythere.TherelationshipofLibertyCitytoGreaterMiamiisthesameastherelationshipofanoldcolonytothemetropolitanpower.
OntheCausesofBlackDisadvantage
BlackbusinessmanandformerleaderoftheBlack-orientedMiamiChamberofCommerce(1987):
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We'veacceptedtheideathatwe'reinferior,wecan'tlearn,wecan'tsucceed.AlotofBlacksbelievethat,theyacceptitandpassitalongtothenextgenerations.Suchisthelegacyofslavery....Imaybebiased,butIthinkthatBahamiansandotherforeignblacksaresmarterandmorehardworking....Theycomefromall-blacknationswheretherewaslesscontrastonthebasisofskincolor.
Blackformercityofficialandbusinesspromoter(quotedabovewithregardtotheBlackcondition):
ThereusedtobeastrongBlackbusinessinthiscountry,butintegrationanddiminishingreinvestmentdestroyedtheBlackentrepreneur....Priortointegrationweweren'tallowedtogooutside.Whenyoutellpeopletheycan'tdosomethingandtheylivewiththat,andthenallofasuddenyoucan,whatdoyouthinktheydo?Theydothatwhichtheycouldn'tdobeforeevenifitcostsmore.Overthecourseofthreegenerationswehavelostthecommonsenseandacumenrequiredforbusinesssuccess.
Whiteformerchairmanofamajorlocalretailcorporation(1988):
Iguessitisprobablylowself-esteemamongBlackAmericans.ABahamiancomesoverhereanddoesgood,theWestIndians,theHaitians.ThereisaverysuccessfulJamaicangirlinouraccountingdepartment,blackascouldbe.
Whiteexecutiveofamajorconstructioncompany(1987):
WeusedtohaveaverygoodBlackbusinessclusterinwhatisnowOvertown,andtheBlackswouldgototheBlackhotel,orstore,orwhateverandtheywouldbepatronstoBlackbusinessfriends.Whenweintegratedoursociety,theBlacksstartedpurchasinginshoppingcenterswheretheyweren'tevenallowedbefore....We'vehadseveralofourBlackleaderssay,"Look,thetruthofthematteristhatourpeopleshouldbebuyingfromBlackbusinesses."Isay,"Absolutely,noquestionaboutit."
OnAmericanismandtheCuban"Problem"
BlackbusinessmanandChamberofCommerceleader(quotedabovewithregardtothecausesofBlackdisadvantage):
There'sthefearthattheyaretakingover;there'sstilltheconcernthatthisisAmericaandthatalotoftheolderCubansdoandsaythingsthat
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areoppositetowhatAmericastandsfor.Someofthethingsthosepeoplesayanddoturnmeoff.Itturnsmeofftohavethesesmall-mindedzealotstellmewhattothink.Iresentanyonetryingtotakeawaymyrightoffreespeech.Theyjustgothere!Wewereherebefore.Idon'tthinktheyunderstandthesystem.
Whiteformerchairmanofalargeretailcorporation(quotedabovewithregardtothecausesofBlackdisadvantage):
Wehavetopreserveusasacountry.I'mafraid,I'lltellyou,I'mveryafraidthattheLatininfluenceinthiscountryismorenegativethanpositivebecausetheyarenotreallyfundamentalsupportersofpluralismandtheyarenotfundamentalsupportersofourinstitutions....Theyabsolutelyareaneffectivegroup,actuallywillingtoshutoffthedemocraticsystemanytimeit'sconvenienttothem.PluralismisforeigntoCubansregardlesswhattheysay.
Anti-Cubanaffinity,infact,wassostrongthatoneBlackinformantclaimedthatnativewhites,althoughracist,weremoreacceptablebecauseatleastthey"areracistbytraditionandtheyatleastknowthatwhatthey'redoingisnotquiteright....Cubansdon'teventhinkthereisanythingwrongwithit.Thatisthewaythey'vealwaysrelated,period."
Thisapparentsenseofsolidaritybetweennativesofbothcolorshadoneimportantexception,however.WhereasBlackleadersblamedthecontinuouslydeterioratingconditionoftheinnercityondoublesubordinationandthepaucityofresourcesmadeavailablebytheestablishmenttoovercomedecadesofoppression,whiteleadersstatedbaldlythattheyhaddonealltheycouldtoatoneforpastsins,andnowitwastheBlacks'turntoshoulderalargershareofresponsibility.Inapointedmessage,thepublisheroftheMiamiHeraldremindedreadersthat"aftereachriotinthepast,thiscommunity'sbusinessandcivicleadershipraisedbigdollarsforvariousworthwhileprojectsintheBlackcommunity."
49Oneofourinformants,awhitebusinessexecutive,putthemattermorebluntly:"MostofthesuccessfulBlacksignorethepoorBlacks.YoufindasmanywhitepeoplethattrytohelptheBlackasyouwillseeBlackpeople....Blacksintheeconomicworldarenotcomingbackandhelping."
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NowhereistheriftmoreobviousthaninthehistoryoftheBusinessAssistanceCenter(BAC),createdintheaftermathofthe1980riots.ThebrainchildofAlvahChapman,chiefexecutiveofficerofKnight-RidderCorporation,andotherwhitebrahmins,itaimedatencouragingthegrowthofBlackbusinesses,whichinturnwouldprovidejobsforinner-cityresidents.BACdescribeditselfasa"one-stoptechnicalassistancecenterservicingestablishedandnewBlackentrepreneurs."
50Itpromotedtrainingcourses,consultantassistance,andaseedcapitalprojectfundedwith$6.9millionmadeavailablebytheMiamibusinesscommunity.
Tenyearsafterthe1980riot,resultsofthiseffortweremixedatbest.BAChadcertainlyprovidedemploymentforanumberofmiddle-classBlacksandhadstimulatedthecreationofsomebusinesses,buttherecordwasnotoutstanding.Inthewordsofadetractor:"Anautomatedfactorywhichprovidedthreejobsopened,anditwasconsideredsuchasignificanteventthattheGovernorcamedowntoopenit."51Althoughthecriticismisexaggerated,therealityisthatthecenterwascaughtinadoublebind:whiletryingtoadministeritslimitedresourcesina"businesslike"manner,itwasstymiedbytheenormousneedsandlackofbusinessexperienceofthepopulationitwasintendedtoserve.AsaformerBACstaffmemberreported:
Ofthetwomilliondollarswelost,halfofthatshouldn'tbelost.Itwaslosttopoorinvestments,meaningfourhundredthousandofitwaslostinonedeal,anofficesuppliescompany.Iknewitwasabaddeal.Buttheboardwasundersomuchpressureinthiscommunitytomakethatfourhundredthousanddollarloan,theycouldn'trefuse....ItwasaBlack-ownedbusiness,butitisnowdefunct.52
FormostBACcritics,however,thekeyproblemwasthemeager
resourcesinvestedinthisventurerelativetoitsmomentoustask.Whiteleadersdisagreed.Theynotedthatnowhereelseinthecountryhadalocalchamberofcommerceraisedsuchalargesumforminorityeconomicdevelopment.Theyhadwalkedtheextramileandhadneithernewideasnornewresourcestocommittothecause.Blacksmuststarthelpingthemselves.53ItwasuptothatelusivemiddleclasscreatedbyAffirmativeActiontostarttakingtheinitiativeintheinnercity.IfBACbyitselfcouldnotmakelocal
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entrepreneurshipflourish,perhapssomecollege-educatedBlackscouldbepersuadedtoleavethesuburbsandprovidethehands-onleadershiprequiredforentrepreneurialgrowthinLibertyCity,andOvertown.
TheBlack-CubanRelationship
By1989,theCubanaveragefamilyincomehadreached$38,497,closetoparitywiththewhitenon-Hispanicpopulation.TheadvanceduringthatdecadewasfueledbyanentrepreneurialdrivethatledoneoutofeverysixteenCubanstobeself-employedandthatbroughtinover$5.4billioninannualsalesbysmallbusinessesalone.
54ThecontrastwiththeconditionofMiami'sBlackcommunitycouldnotbestarker,andthegapbecamethesourceofgrowingtension.Asillustratedbyremarksabove,theCubanpresencewasdoublyoffensivetomanyBlacks,bothbecauseitwassosuccessfulandbecauseitwassoforeign.The"un-Americanness"oftheexilesemergedasarallyingpointfornativeAnglosandBlacksalike.
Fortheirpart,Cubansalwaysdisclaimedanyintentionalracism,andtoacertainextenttheyweresincere.Cubandiscriminationoperatedmorebyneglectthanbydeliberateaction.PreoccupiedwiththeirowneconomicprogressandwiththepoliticalstrugglewithCastro,CubanshadlittletimeforthecomplaintsofBlacks.Formany,thenativeminority'sralliesandriotsweresimplyanuisance.Olderexilessawthemasanuncomfortableintrusionintotheirlife-styleinthe"secondHavana";youngerCuban-AmericansreactedvehementlyatthethoughtthattheyortheirparentshadanythingtodowiththeBlacks'plight.DavidRivera,twentyyearsoldandafirst-yearlawstudent,declaredtotheHerald:"We'vepulledourselvesup,whyshouldwerestrainourselves?Idon'tthinktheCubancommunity,inMiamiowes
anythingpoliticallyoreconomicallytoanyone.TheCubancommunitysucceededbecauseit'sbeenloyaltoitself."55
Suchyouthfuloutburstsgavewayduringthe1980stoamorebalancedunderstandingthatBlackswereapermanentpartofMiamiandthattherewasnoshyingawayfromtheirproblems.CubansalsobecameawareofattemptsbyAngloandsometimes
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JewishpoliticianstowintheBlackvoteonananti-Cubanplatform.TheytooknotethatwhileAngloelitescomplainedloudlyabouttheexiles'lackofcivicspiritandtheir"clannishness,"thesameleadersalsokeptthedoorsoftopcorporateofficessecurelylocked.
56
In1987,onlytwoofthetoptwenty-fiveDadecorporationswererunbyCuban-Americans.Ataboutthesametime,Cuban-Americanmanagersalsobegantoconfrontaserious"glassceiling"toadvanceinsuchlocalgiantsasSouthernBell,FloridaPowerandLight,Knight-Ridder,RyderSystems,andBarnettandSoutheastBanks.AndCubanmembershipinlocalestablishmentcirclessuchastheNon-GroupandtheOrangeBowlCommitteewasminimal.57Hence,farfromhaving"takenover,"theexileswerestillasubordinategroupafactthatcreatedalogicalbasisforalliancewithBlackAmericans.
Cubanleadersinthelateeightieshammeredatthistheme.TheystressedthatCubawas,toalargeextent,ablacknationandthatracismthere,ifitexisted,wasmuchmoreattenuatedthanitsAmericancounterpart.Theyalsonotedthat,despiteitssubordinateposition,theLatincommunitywasalreadydoingproportionallymoreforBlacksthantheAngloelite.AformermemberofDadeCounty'sCommunityRelationsBoardmadethepointforcefully:
TheBlackmustlearnthatheneedstheCuban,andviceversa.Increasingly,Cubansofferjobs,personalloans,commercialloans,mortgages.Studiesshowthat,inthelasttwoyears,therehavebeenmorecommercialandpersonalloanstotheBlackcommunitybyLatinbanksthanbythoseownedbyAnglos.Thatis,theCubanbankshavebeenasourceofeconomicdevelopmentforBlacks....ThereisalsogrowingLatininvestmentinBlackareas,andthereasonisthatCubansdonotobjectatalltolivingorworkingnearBlacks.Inourowncountrywehadthissortofcoexistence,whichneverexistedintheU.S.Racismwasnever
partofournationalcharacter.58
Blackleaders,however,atleastbytheearly1990s,hadnotboughttheargument.TheynotedthatCubansinvestedinBlackareasonlytoexploittheminoritymarket,justasJewishandotherwhitemerchantshaddonebefore.CubanshopswerenotemployingBlacksorprovidinganyspecialbenefitstotheirBlackcustom-
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ers.Inthecourseoffieldworkforthisstudy,weencounteredbutonenotableexceptiontothispatternofskepticismanddistrust:RaulMasvidal,formerbankerandmayoralcandidate,wasmentionedrepeatedlyasafriendoftheBlackcommunityandasdeservingofsupport.AloneamongCubanleaders,MasvidalvisitedtheBlackareas,talkedtocommunityrepresentatives,andextendedtheservicesofhisbankonafavorablebasis.Whenheranformayorin1986,Blackvoterslinedupsolidlybehindhim.OneLibertyCityactivistputitthisway:
TheBlackcommunitysupportedMasvidalwhichmayhavebeenaverybigmistakebutinpoliticaltermstheyhadeveryreasontosupporthim.Heisanactivecommunityleader.Therewasasensethat,giventhechoices,hewouldbemuchmoresensitivetothetotalcommunity....Also,MasvidalcampaignedinBlackneighborhoods....RaulmadeaconcentratedefforttospendtimeandmoneyintheBlackcommunity.Heearnedthatsupport.HeearneditattheexpenseofCubansupport.
59
TheMasvidalcampaignrepresentedasortofCubancounterparttotheBusinessAssistanceCenteraseriousinitiativetoreachacrossethniclinesandhelpthepoor.AsinthecaseoftheBAC,thisinitiativedidnotsucceed.Inbothinstances,supportfromthe''donor"communitywaslacking:notenoughmoneydonatedbyAnglobusinessmentofuelrealentrepreneurialdevelopmentintheinnercity;notenoughvotesamongCubanstopromotetheoneleaderwhohadtakenthehigherroad.Asthefinalstatementfromtheaboveinformantindicates,theLatinvoteoptedforthemore"Cuban"ofthetwocandidates,MayorXavierSuárez.Forthepoliticallyempoweredformerexiles,preservingthe"secondHavana"turnedouttobemoreimportantthanbuildinganewmultiethniccommunity.
Onthethresholdofanewcentury,Miami'sBlackpopulationconfrontsasituationreminiscentofthatahundredyearsearlier.JustasFlagler's"blackartillery"wasmarchedintothatfoundingmeetingin1896todoitsmaster'sbiddingandthenbeshuntedaside,Blackscontinuetobeamajorfactorinthecitybutnotthebuildersoftheirowndestiny.Rivenbycleavagesofclassandculture,placedfirmlyatthebottomofthelocalhierarchy,Blacksstilldependonoutsideinitiativestodeterminethefutureoftheir
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community.ColoredTownisstillthere,perhapsmoreforlornthaneverdespiteitsnamechangeandthelegalendofsegregation.Itsperiodicexplosionsofdiscontentsparksufficientoutsideconcerntocreateprogramsthatexpandtheminoritymiddleclass,butthedestitutearealwaysleftinthesameconditionasbefore.Doublesubordinationtakesonincreasinglyominoushuesastheplightofthoselostinthefraybecomesmoreintractable.
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ChapterNineRepriseItmaybestatedwithcertainconfidencethat...theprevailinginfluenceindeterminingthelocationofcitiesarefacilitiesfortransportation....Thefactorofchiefimportanceinthelocationofcitiesisabreakintransportation....Thegreatestcenterswillbethosewherethephysicaltransferofgoodsisaccompaniedwithachangeofownership.
AdnaF.Weber,TheGrowthofCitiesintheNineteenthCentury(1899)(emphasisinoriginal)
Sincetheiroriginsinthenineteenthcentury,theoriesaboutthegrowthofcitieshaveemphasizedeconomiccauses.Citiesariseoutoftheimperativesofeconomiclifeanddevelopaccordingtotheirimportanceinthelargereconomy.Theirlocationcanbeanalyzedbymeansofthesamelogic:urbanconcentrationsemergeasmarketplacesforsettledhinterlands,asplaceswheresourcesofenergyconvergewithsourcesoflabor,andas"breaks"intransportationroutesrequiringthephysicaltransferofcommodities.
1
ThiseconomicemphasisissufficientlybroadtoencompassbothmainstreamandMarxisttheoriesofthecity.TheMarxistschoolfollowsthethemeofeconomicdeterminismandendowsitwithgreaterintentionalitythandomoreconventionaltheoriesinsociologyandeconomics.ForMarxists,itisnotaccidentsofgeographyandpriorpopulationsettlement,butthedeliberatehandofcapitalseekingtoorganizethevariousfactorsofproduction,thataccountsforurbangrowth.Thus,whiletheGermansociologistMaxWeberreferredtothecityasa"marketplace"andtheAmericaneconomistAdnaWeber
portrayeditasatransportationhub,Marxistshaveconsistentlydefineditasthesitewhereindustriallaborpower
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issoldandcommoditiesareproducedforprofit.AsFrançoisLamarchestates:
Ifthecityisconsideredtostartwithasamarketwherelabourpower,capital,andproductsareexchanged,itmustequallybeacceptedthatthegeographicalconfigurationofthemarketisnottheresultofchance....Themainhypothesisunderlyingourargumentcanbesummarizedasfollows:theurbanquestionisfirstandforemosttheproductofthecapitalistmodeofproductionwhichrequiresaspatialorganizationwhichfacilitatesthecirculationofcapital,commodities,andinformation.
2
Giventhevastbodyoftheoreticalliteraturecomingfrombothsidesoftheideologicalspectrum,thestoryofMiamiisremarkableindeed.Itisnotastorythatfits"centralplace"theoryverywell,becauseMiamiatitsbeginningswasnotthecenterofanything;itdidnotserveasa"marketplace"forasettledhinterland,ofwhichtherewasverylittle,anditdidnotsitatthe"break"betweenalternativetransportationroutes,becausethesedidnotexistatthetime.Certainly,thecitywasaproductofnineteenth-centurycapitalism,butinawaythatdeviatedsignificantlyfromclassicorthodoxandMarxisttheoriesontheoriginsofcities.Miamididnotattractindustrialcapitalorindustriallabor,anditdidnotproduceanythingofsignificance.Nordiditserveasacommercialhubforagriculturalproducts,orforanyothergoodexceptone.Itssoleassetsweresunandbeach,soldbythesquarefoot.SincetheFloridapeninsulaboastshundredsofmilesofsimilarlyendowedshoreline,thelocationofthecitywasaccidental.ThemetropolisthatgrewbyBiscayneBaycouldequallywellhavebeenlocatedinPalmBeach,bythemouthoftheNewRiverintoday'sFt.Lauderdale,orevenintheFloridaKeys.
Theoriginsofthecitywerehenceeconomicallyunderdetermined,
moretheresultofchanceandindividualwillsthanofanygeographicorcommercialimperative.Thisaccidentalbirth,addedtothepeculiarassetthatwasthelifebloodofthecity,accountedforMiami'ssenseofsuspensionabovereallifeandthefeeblenessofitscivicorganizations.Theexoticthemeparksdreamedupfortheplacebynorthernentrepreneurspseudo-Arabminarets,mock-Andalusiantowers,"Venetian"palacesdidnothingtoreducethefeelingofseparationfromthesurroundinglandscapeordiminishthecity'spoliticalfragmentation.ComparedtoChicago,
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Cincinnati,Cleveland,orPittsburgh"real"citiesgrowingatthebreakpointsofrailroadandwaterroutesandattractingindustrialcapitalMiami'ssocialorganizationandcivicleadershipseemedatbestapoorimitation.Peoplecameheretoretire,enjoytheweather,andplay.Apartfromtherealestatebusiness,fewseriouseconomicandcivicpursuitscouldattracttheirattention.
Thepoorfitwitheconomictheoriesabouttheoriginsofcities,however,isonlythefirsthalfofMiami'sexceptionality.TheflowsofmenandmaterialsthatcrisscrossedtheFloridapeninsulaattheturnofthecenturylefttheirmarkonthecity,butindifferentmannersandatdifferenttimes.TheFlagler-ledfeverishbuildingofrailroadandhotelsgaveMiamiadistinctprofilethat,duringthefirsthalf-centuryofitsexistence,separateditfromcitiesupnorth.TheequallybusyferryingofarmstotherebelliousSpanishcolonyofCubaprefigureditscharacterduringthesecondhalf.Geographyisdestiny,butinMiami'scaseitwasnotsomucheconomicaspoliticalgeographythatplayedthedeterminingrole.
AmericaintheCaribbean:TheOriginsofContemporaryImmigration
Ifthenineteenth-centurycreationofMiamiwasduetochanceandindividualinitiativeratherthaneconomicimperatives,itslate-twentieth-centurytransformationundertheimpactofsuccessivewavesofmigrationwaswithoutquestionpoliticallyoverdetermined.Miamiwasachoicetargetfortworeasons:first,itsgeographicproximityandconnectionstotheCaribbeanbyairandsearoutesmadethecityalogicalentrypointintotheUnitedStates;andsecond,itsclosetiestoCubagaveitamajorroleasbackstageinCubanpolitics.
AmorerefinedunderstandingofwhyCaribbeanmigrationaroseinthefirstplaceandwhyitcametotheUnitedStates,however,requires
abriefexcursusintoanotherbodyoftheory.Explanationsofinternationalmigrationarecommonlybasedona"push-pull"mechanismthatdepictsmigrantsaspeopleencouragedtoleavebyunfavorablecircumstancesintheirowncountriesandattractedbyconditionsinthereceivingones.Althoughplausibleonthesurface,thesetheoriesdonotexplainwhymigrantflows
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emergefromsomecountriesandnotfromothersatsimilarlevelsofdisadvantage,orwhytheseflowsaredirectedtowardcertainreceivingcountriesbutnotothers.
3Inshort,thetheoryfailstorecognizethatdecisionstomigratearenotmadeinasocialvacuum.IndividualsdonotsimplysitathomeandponderthecostsandbenefitsofgoingtocountryXversuscountryY.Insteadtheyareguidedbyprecedent,bytheexperienceoffriendsandrelatives,andbythealternativecoursesofactionheldtobeacceptableandrealisticintheirownsocieties.
Thesocialenvironmentofmigrationismolded,inturn,bythehistoryofpriorrelationshipsbetweenthecountryoforiginandthoseofpotentialdestination.Peopleseldommovetocompletelyunfamiliarplaces;rather,theyseekoutthosemadeaccessiblebypastcontacts.ThisiswhyagreatdealofmigrationfromformerThirdWorldcoloniesisdirectedtodaytotheoriginalmétropolesAlgeriansandTunisiansgotoFrance;Indians,Pakistanis,andWestIndiansmovetoBritain;SouthAmericansfrequentlymigratetoSpain;andKoreansgotoJapan.4
NootherregionoftheworldhasexperiencedgreaterAmericaneconomicandpoliticalpenetrationthantheCaribbean.AlthoughtheUnitedStatesdidnotbecomeacolonialpowerinthemoldofolderEuropeannations,theheavyhandofNorthAmericaninterventionhasmadeitselfparticularlyfeltinthesmallercountriesofitssouthernfringe.Duringthelastcentury,U.S.militaryoccupationshavebeenafactoflifethroughouttheregion:Mexico,PuertoRico,Cuba,theDominicanRepublic,Haiti,Nicaragua,Panama,andGrenadahaveallbeen,atonetimeoranother,underdirectU.S.militaryrule.Inaddition,theUnitedStateshasexercisedoverwhelmingeconomicdominanceintheregionandhassaturateditwithitsvalues,diffused
throughthemedia.5ConsequencesofthishistoricalrelationshiphavebeenthemassadoptionofAmericanconsumptionpatternsandthecreationofeconomicelitesthatareprofoundly"Americanized"intheiroutlook.Ofthese,nonewasmoretypicalthantheprerevolutionaryCubanbourgeoisie,moldedbythehegemonyofNorthAmericaninterestsintheisland.
AseriesofgraveeconomicandpoliticalcrisesduringthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcenturyledtoenhancedoutmigrationfromanumberofCaribbeancountries.Migrationtookplacenotonthebasisofdetachedcalculationsofcostsandbenefits,butalongthe
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linesofleastresistanceopenedbythepriorhistoryoftheregion.Hence,whenconfrontedwithoverwhelmingthreatstotheirwell-being,CubanandNicaraguanelitesdidnotthinkofgoingtoJapan,Germany,orCanada,butrathertothecountrywhoseinfluencehadshapedtheirownpositionandmentaloutlook.Lesswell-to-dogroupsfollowedsuit.
TherecentwavesofCaribbeanmigrationdemonstratehowpastpenetrationandmoldingofweakperipheralsocietiesbyadominantpowercanturnuponitself.Toalargeextent,CubansandNicaraguans,HaitiansandDominicans,camedirectlytotheUnitedStatesbecausetheyhadbeensocializedinthatdirection.Thesameexplanationcoverstheparticulardestinationsofeachmigrantflow:CaribbeanrefugeesdidnotdistributethemselvesevenlyacrosstheUnitedStates,butconcentratedinafewspots.Theseweretheplacesmostsalientinthenewcomers'mentalmapascentersofNorthAmericaninfluenceandpowerandaslogicalentrypointsintothecountry.ForCaribbeanimmigrants,"America"didnotmeanArkansasorNorthDakota,but,almostexclusively,NewYorkandMiami.
The1959CubanRevolutionwas,ofcourse,thedecisiveeventthatinitiatedMiami'spoliticallyledtransformation.AsentirelayersoftheformerlyprivilegedwereforcedtoleaveCuba,theywenttotheonlycountryandtheonlycitywhere,giventheirhistory,itmadesensetogo.AndoncethedefeatedCubanbourgeoisiereestablisheditselfinMiami,thecitybecamethealmostinevitabledestinationofallmajorrefugeestreamsfleeingpoliticalinstability.NicaraguanscrossingtheMexicanbordercaughtthebusnottonearbyHoustonorNewOrleans,buttoMiami;leavingtheirdesperatelypoorandrepressivecountrybehind,Haitianspointedtheirboatsinthesamedirection;andlessnumerousflowsfromPanama,Colombia,andHondurasfollowedthesamecourse.
PoliticalmigrationsthenproducedanoveleconomicphenomenonastheriseoftheCubanenclaveandtheavailabilityoflargepoolsofbilinguallaborturnedMiamiintoamajortradeentrepôt.Thecitysheditsroleasaseasonalresorttowntobecome,asDavidRieffputit,a"real"place.
6Realinthesensethatitsneweconomicdiversificationoccurrednotbyaccident,butonthebasisofresourcesthatonlythatcityhad.WhileOrlandoandothernorthernlocaleschippedawayatMiami'straditionaltouristtrade,noother
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citycouldoutcompeteitintheroleof"CapitaloftheCaribbean."
Table7illustratesthiseconomicchangebyshowingthedeclineintheproportionofDadeCounty'seconomicallyactivepopulationemployedinhotelsandrestaurants,mainstaysofthetouristindustry,andtheriseintheproportionemployedinbankingandFIRE(finance,insurance,andrealestate)sectors,elementsofthecity'sneweconomicprofile.Alsoshownistheparallelsurgeofsmallbusinesses,manystartedbyrecentimmigrants."Verysmall"establishments,definedasthoseemployingfewerthantenpeople,grewmorerapidlyduringthe1970sand1980sthandidbusinessestablishmentsoverall,reversingthetrendobservedintheprecedingtwodecades.
TraversingtheMiamiRiverinthedirectionofBiscayneBayisawayofgainingfirsthandevidenceaboutMiami'sCaribbeannexus.FreightersfromHonduras,Haiti,Colombia,andtheDominicanRepubliccrowdthisworkingriver,loadingdiversecargoesfortheircountries.Attheriver'smouth,onesuddenlyleavesThirdWorldtradebehindtoadmirethegleamingsilhouettesoftheRoyalCaribbeanpleasureboatsanchoredinBiscayneBay.Formerlyatouristdestinationitself,Miamiisnowtheworld'smainportofembarkationforvacationcruises,mostofthemtotheCaribbean.Hence,aninterestingdynamicsetsinaswell-heeledtouristsdepartMiamiforenchantedandromanticCaribbeanislands,whichthenativepeopleareoftendesperatelytryingtoleave...forMiami.ThefreightersintheriveralsodotheirpartastheyhaulfromMiamitheluxuriesandconveniencestowhichtouristsareaccustomedandwhichtheywillconsumeintheir"exotic"Caribbeandestinations.
WhatmakesMiamiauniqueexperimentisitspeculiarreversalofestablishedpatternsofurbangrowth.Here,politicsdetermineseconomicsratherthanviceversa.Almostaloneamongmajor
Americancities,Miamididnotoriginallygrowoutofeconomiclocationaladvantages,butacquiredthemonlyafterwardasanoutgrowthofitsunplannedpoliticalrole.Thelatterdidnotinvolvedomesticforces,butrathertheinternationaldynamicsunleashedbytheUnitedStates'dominationofitsimmediateperiphery.
Thissingularitydoesnot,however,meanthatMiami'sexperiencesarenotreplicable.Inthissense,its"uniqueness"mayholdimportantlessonsforothercities.Theinternationalforcesthat
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Table7.EmploymentandBusinessEstablishmentsintheMiamiMetropolitanArea,1950-87
1950 1960 1970 1980 1987Economicallyactivepopulation(EAP) 157,321282,774467,992788,249712,568PercentEAPinservices 21.3 25.9 24.8 27.0PercentEAPinhotelsandrestaurants 17.4 13.6 11.0PercentEAPinbanking 1.4 2.4 2.3 2.9PercentEAPinfinance,insurance,andrealestate
6.2 7.6 8.7 7.5
Totalbusinessestablishments 14,894 23,051 27,140 42,817 58,036Percentgrowthduringprecedingdecade 54.8 17.7 57.8Businessestablishmentswithfewerthan10employees
11,566 17,178 18,840 32,368 45,617
Percentgrowthduringprecedingdecade 48.5 7.6 75.2Banksandfinanceagencies 141 309 398 671Percentgrowthduringprecedingdecade 119.1 28.8 68.6Sources:U.S.BureauoftheCensus,CountyBusinessPatterns(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,indicatedyears);idem,CountyandCityDataBook(WashingtonD.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,indicatedyears).
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transformedMiamiarestillatplay,andhave,ifanything,grownstronger:peopleworldwideareincreasinglyboundtogetherbyexpandingtradeandinformationnetworks;consumptionexpectationsdiffusedfromthedevelopedworldtranslateintoimmigrantflowsseekingtosatisfythoseexpectations;thedialecticswherebypastcolonialismbegetsrefugeemovementstotheolddominantpowersisstillverymuchalive.
Foritssize,Miamiiseasilythemost"internationalized"ofAmericancities,butothersmayfollowsuitastheyrespondtoglobalsocialandpoliticaldynamics.Today,BostonplayshosttoarapidlyacceleratingIrishimmigration,whileLosAngeles,SanDiego,andSanFranciscodothesameforthevastMexicaninflow,augmentedbyrefugeesfromtheCentralAmericanconflicts.
7Miami'sexperiencemaynotrevealtoothercitiestheimageoftheirownfuture,buttheforcesthatledtoitstransformationwillsurelymanifestthemselveselsewhere,leadingtosignificantsocialandpoliticaloutcomes.
EthnicDiscourses
Whataresomeoftheseoutcomes?Thearrivalofsizableforeigngroupsnecessarilyproducesaresurgenceofethnicityand,alongwithit,atransformationinthefabricoflocalsociety.Dependingonthestrengthofpreexistingelitesandthecharacterofthemigrantcommunity,newcomersmaytaketheirplaceintheethnicqueue,awaitingtheirturntomoveslowlyupward;theymayremainentirelyoutsidetheplayingfieldasmarginalworkers;ortheymayactuallytransformtherulesofthegame.InMiami,thepoliticallyledtransformationofthesocialstructuregaverisetotheemergenceofalternativediscoursesaboutthecityandtoarapidshiftinlocalpower.
Table8presentstheevolutionofMiami'smetropolitanpopulation,providingthebackgroundagainstwhichthetransformationofitspoliticalstructuremustbeunderstood.Thetableillustratesthedramaticchangesintheethniccompositionofthepopulationthatledtotheshiftinelectedleadership.WhereasHispanic(thatis,Cuban)politicalrepresentationwasnonexistentin1950and1960,in1990itaccountedforfourmayoralpostsinDadeCounty(includingthoseofthetwolargestmunicipalities,MiamiandHialeah)
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Table8.EthnicCompositionofMetropolitanMiami,1950-901950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Populationtotal 495,000935,0001,268,0001,626,0001,937,000U.S.ranka 19 17 12Percentincreaseinprecedingdecade 88.9 35.6 28.2White,non-Hispanic 410,000748,000 779,000 776,000 586,000Percentoftotal 82.8 80.0 61.4 47.7Percentincrease/decreaseinprecedingdecade
82.4 4.1 0.4
Hispanicb 20,000 50,000 299,000 581,000 953,000Percentoftotal 4.0 5.3 23.6 35.7Percentincreaseinprecedingdecade 150.0 498.0 94.3Blackc 65,000137,000 190,000 280,000 369,000Percentoftotal 13.1 14.7 15.0 17.2Percentincreaseinprecedingdecade 110.8 38.7 47.4Sources:Metro-DadePlanningDepartment,ResearchDivision,DadeCountyFacts(Miami:MetropolitanDadeCountyGovernment,1990);idem,PersonsofHispanicOriginbyRace,City,andCensusTract(Miami:MetropolitanDadeCountyGovernment,1990).aAmongstandardmetropolitanstatisticalareas.bHispanicscanbeofanyrace.cThereissomeoverlapbetweentheHispanicandBlackcategoriesowingtothepresenceofblackHispanics.In1980,theMetro-DadeResearchDivisionreported11,000blacksofHispanicorigin;in1990,therewere28,372suchpersons.Thetableincludesthemas''Black"forthesakeofcongruencewithearlierfigureswherethisseparationwasnotmade.
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themajorityofthecouncilsofthesetwocitiesandseveralsmallerones,theMiamiCityandDadeCountymanagers,sevenstatedelegatesandtwostatesenators(one-thirdoftheentirecounty'sdelegation),andaU.S.congressionalrepresentative.Cubanrepresentationamongelectedofficialswillonlygrowfurtherinthecomingyears.Redistrictingrequiredbythe1990VotingRightActswillincreasethenumberof"Hispanic"seatsinthestateHousetoasmanyaselevenoutofeighteentotal;fourofthesixstatesenatorsarelikelytobeCuban-American,aswellastwooutoffourmembersofDade'scongressionaldelegation."Politically,we'llhardlyrecognizetheplace,"writestheMiamiHerald'spoliticaleditor.
8
Thistransformationofthepoliticalorderistakingplaceinacontextwheretheruptureoftheoldhegemonicdiscoursehasnotyetgivenrisetoanewone.Indeed,thedistinctethnicframesofreferenceoutlinedinchapter1continuetoholdsway,eachhavingitsowncogentreadingoftheprincipalfeaturesofthecityanditsmainproblems.Thissituationhastwonoteworthyaspects.First,thevariousframesseldomincorporatepointssalienttotheothersbutratherslide,asitwere,ondifferentplanes.Theresultisthatseveralmutuallyunintelligibleperceptual"maps"coexistinthesamephysicalspace.Second,theexistenceoftheseseparate"maps"playsbackoneverydayreality,leadingtomorestereotypedbehaviorbymembersofthedifferentcommunities.Anglos,Blacks,andLatinsleadtheirlivesinseparateworlds,butwhenmeetingeachotherinpublicplacestheytendtoadoptaritualizedstance,influencedbytheirownparticulardiscourse.
"Thismicrophonehasanaccent,"saystheCubanbusinessmanaddressingameetingoftheMiamiChamberofCommerce.Butthis
concessiontotheculturalsensibilitiesofhisAnglohostsisfollowedbyavigoroustellingofthefamiliar"successstory."9Ininterethnicpublicgatherings,MiamiCubansarelikelytobehaveas''upandcoming,in-chargeCubans,"Anglosas"onthedefensive,holding-the-fortAnglos,"andBlacksas"entitledanddoublyaggrievedcitizensofcolor."Thisritualizedballetisguidedlessbythespecificsituationoftheindividualthanbyhisorherperceptionofthegeneralcontext,guidedbytherespectiveframeofreference.
Everylargecitypossessesacoterieofcivicfigureswhoattempttoriseabovecurrentproblemsinordertopresenttheplaceinthe
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bestpossiblelight.Theresultmaybecalleda"normalizing"narrativethatlinksthecitywithfamiliarandvaluedfeaturesofthenationalculture.Despiteitsfragmentation,Miamialsohasaversionofthisnarrative;thoughitsauthorshipstillfallstotheeditorsoftheMiamiHeraldandasmallgroupofAnglobusinessleaders,thecontentofthemessagehaschangedsignificantlyoverthelastdecade.Inthe1960sand1970s,Miamiwasportrayedasanall-Americancity,theplaygroundofthenationaffectedbythe"problem"ofimmigrationbutultimatelyverymuchinthemainstream.Thispicturecoincidedwiththethen-hegemonicAnglodiscourse.
Duringtheeighties,however,thenativewhitepopulationplummetedtojustone-thirdofDadeCounty'stotalpopulation.InthecityofMiamiproper,Anglosshrankinnumberfromanabsolutemajorityinthe1960stojust10percentin1990;inthelatteryear,meanwhile,Hialeahwasover88percentLatin.
10Accompanyingthisdemographicrevolutionweremajorchangesinlocalculture.CubanandtoalesserextentotherLatinfestivities,music,andcuisinebecameintegraltothecity'slore.ItwasnowincreasinglycommonforAnglosandBlackstolearnSpanish,justasLatinsweretryingtolearnEnglish.Inresponse,Miami's"normalizing"narrativeshiftedtoencompassaverydifferentmessage.ComparetheremarksoftheKnight-RidderAngloexecutivecitedinchapter1withthoseofthenewCEOofthesamecompany,JamesK.Batten,ontheoccasionoftheOctober1991visitofPresidentGeorgeBushtothecity:
ThoseofuswholiveandworkandraiseourchildreninMiamihavebigaspirationsforthisvibrantyoungcity.Weareonly95yearsold,butthose95yearshavebeenjammedwithendlesschange,especiallyoverthelasttumultuousthreedecades....Atthebeginningof1959,onlyafewthousandpeopleofHispanicdescentlivedinDadeCounty.Todaythe
numberofHispanicsherehasjumpedtoclosetoonemillionorroughlyhalfthepopulationofthiscommunity.TheirpresenceherehastransformedMiami,andenrichedlifehereinprofoundandcountlessways.11
AndconsiderthispredictionbypresidentialsonJebBush,citedbyBatten:"Bytheturnofthecentury,Miamiwillhavecompleteditsevolutionintoamajorworldcityacenterofinternationaltrade,culture,education,healthcare,andrecreation,providingadesirablequalityoflifeforourresidentsandvisitors."12
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ThecontentoftheAngloelite'sportraitoftheircitythusevolvedfromoneembodyingmainstreamAmericancustomsandtraditionstooneinwhichMiamiwasnothingshortofaharbingerofthenationalfuture.Immigrantsandtheirforeignlanguagesweretransformedfroma"problem"intoan"enrichment."Inaremarkablearticleentitled"GetontheBall...LearnaLanguage,"MiamiHeraldpublisherDavidLawrence,Jr.,setmulticulturalMiamiasanexampletotheentirenationandatthe''cuttingedge"oftheAmericatocome.HethenurgedhisfellowMiamiansto"geton"andenrollinaforeignlanguageclass.
13
ThenewerCuban-Americanpoliticalleadershipchimedinwithitsowntentativeattemptata"normalizing"narrative.MayorXavierSuárezregularlyraisedthe"CityoftheFuture"theme,thoughhetempereditwithjabsatthecountyandstategovernmentsfornothelpingMiamifulfillitsdestiny.AttheCityCommissioninaugurationceremonyin1989,forexample,Suárezdeclared:
Ourowngovernmenthasbeendrasticallystreamlinedbyourreform-mindedcitymanager.Ourownpolicedepartmenthasbeendecentralizedunderaforward-thinkingchief.WhenarewegoingtoseethesameefficienciesintheCountywhichnowpaysitsattorney50percentmorethanwepayours?AndwhenarewegoingtoseeStatelegislationtoprovidesubstantialhelptopoverty-strickenareassothatcommercialgrowthisfosteredandpolicepresencelessneeded?Howlongcanweremainahigh-taxedcityinalow-taxedstate?14
Pursuingthesamethemeofnormalization,aCuban-AmericanHeraldcolumnistwentsofarastochidehiscompatriotsfortheirexcessively"Cuban"child-rearingmethods.Inhisview,althoughtheoriginalexilesmightremaincontentedlywithintheirenclave,theirAmerican-
bornoffspringcouldnotaffordtodoso:"NomatterhowLatinizedMiamicontinuestobecome,itisstillandalwayswillbeintheUnitedStates.ThusourchildrenarefirstgenerationAmericans.Thatisanimportantdistinctiontomakeifwearetoavoidburdeningthemwithidentityproblemsinthefuture."15
EthnicityinMiamiisstillparamount,andthefragmentationbroughtaboutbythebreakupoftheoldhegemonicdiscourseremainsthecity'sdominantreality.Anglos,Blacks,andJews,Nicaraguans,Haitians,andCubans,tendtostaywithintheirethnic
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circlesandtogreetcallsforinterminglingwithskepticism,ifnothostility.
16Yetattheedgesandinthebetter-educatedsectors,therearevisiblesignsofconvergence.ThistrendfitsathusfarneglectedbutfundamentallessoninthehistoryofpastimmigrationandethnicadaptationinAmericancities.Thestoryisworthreviewing,fornomatterhowdistinctMiamiisatpresent,itislikelyintimetofollowapathsimilartothattakenbeforebyothercommunities.
WhoRules?
InWhoGoverns?(1961),hisclassicbookonAmericanurbanpolitics,politicalscientistRobertA.DahltracedthetransformationofNewHaven,Connecticut,fromacityruledbyitsoldwhiteProtestantelitetooneinwhichimmigrantsinthiscaseIrish,Jews,andItaliansgraduallygainedtheupperhand.HeforcefullyarguedthatpowerhadindeedcometobesharedbetweenoldandnewelitesratherthanbeingretainedbyoldWASPsbehindafaçadeofethnicpoliticians.Notsurprisingly,thebookbecamethestandardreferenceforthepluralistperspectiveonurbancommunitypower.
Thepluralist-elitistcontroversyoverwho"really"rulesobscuredanimportantaspectofthebook,however,namelyitsanalysisofhowtheimmigrantsbecameintegratedintoAmericanculturethroughtheirparticipationinpoliticsandmanagementoflocalinstitutions.NomatterthatthefirstimpulseofnewlyelectedIrishmayorswastodistributepatronageamongtheirown,theimportantlong-termconsequenceofinstitutionalparticipationwastointegrateeachgroupfirmlyintolocalsociety:
HencethepoliticsofNewHavenbecameakindofethnicpolitics;itwasapoliticsofassimilationratherthanapoliticsofreform,apoliticsthat
simultaneouslyemphasizedthedivisiveratherthantheunifyingcharacteristicsofvotersandyetplayedupontheiryearningsofassimilationandacceptance.Theverysuccessofpoliticianswhousetheethnicapproachleadstotheobsolescenceoftheirstrategy.17
ThepointofDahl'sanalysis,inshort,isthatethnicpoliticsprovidesaneffectivevehicleforconvergencebecausetheachievementofpoliticalpowersocializesimmigrantsintothefunctioningofmainstreaminstitutionsandgivesthemthenecessary"voice"to
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feelthattheyarepartofthoseinstitutions.Immigrantsdonotfirstlearntobe"Americans,"andonlythenarefreelyadmittedintothemainstream.Rather,theybecomeAmericansbyelbowingtheirwayintocentersoflocalpowerthroughthepoliticalmobilizationofethnicsolidarity.Theverysuccessofthatstrategyinturnleadstoitsgradualdissolution.
Thecommonviewoftheprocessofassimilation,unfortunately,tendstoreversethissequence,withacculturationcomingbeforesocialacceptance.Fromthatperspective,ethnicpoliticsisseenasaloomingthreat,afearonwhichnativistemotionsthrive.InabooktitledTheImmigrationTimeBomb,formerColoradogovernorRichardD.Lammexpressedthethemewithnotableclarity:
ThepoliticalpowerofmorethanfifteenmillionHispanicsisbeingusednottosupportassimilationbuttoadvance"ethnicpride"inbelongingtoadifferentculture.Themultiplicationofoutsidersisnotamodelforaviablesociety....Ifimmigrantsdonotfeelthattheyarefullypartofthissociety,asAmericanaseveryoneelse,thenwearefailing.
18
First-generationimmigrantshaveseldomfelt"asAmericanasanyoneelse"becausenativeshaverepeatedlyremindedthemoftheirculturalandlinguisticdifferences.TheerrorinLamm'sformulationistobelievethatculturaldiversityandethnicpridemustdisappearbeforeimmigrantscantakepartintheinstitutionsofsociety.AsDahl'sstudysuggests,theoppositehasoftenbeenthecase.TheprocessisexemplifiednotonlyinNewHaven,butinlargecitiesthathavebeenmajorrecipientsofimmigration.TheIrishofBoston,theItaliansandJewsofNewYork,thePolesofChicagofirstmobilizedaroundthesymbolsofacommonethnicitypreciselybecausethatwashowtheyhadbeendefinedandoftenostracizedintheirplacesofsettlement.
Hence"ethnicpride"arisingoutofreactiveformationisthefirstandnaturalrallyingpointforimmigrantgroupsenteringthepoliticalsystem.Throughthedefenseofparticularisticgoals,theyaresocializedintonationalpoliticalvalues.BeforepoliticiansofIrish,Greek,andItalianoriginlearnedhowtointerpretmainstreamsentimentandtorepresentbroadconstituencies,theirpredecessorshadspentconsiderabletimeinwardpoliticsfightingforthenarrowinterestsoftheirgroup.19Inpreviouschaptersweexaminedthereactiveformationpro-
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cessofCubanrefugeesintheaftermathofMariel,aprocessthatgaverisebothtoanoveldiscourseandtostrongparticipationinlocalpolitics.TheabovequotesfromtheCuban-AmericanmayorofMiamiandtheCuban-AmericancolumnistoftheHeraldresemblehundredsthatcouldbeusedtoillustratehowfartheprocessofintegrationhasadvancedinadecade.Concernsaboutamoreequitabletaxdistributionforthecityandhowtoavoidtheghettoizationofthenextgenerationarehardlytheworriesofarefractoryminority.Gradualconvergencetowardtheculturalmainstream,however,isattributablemoretotheentryofformerexilesintolocalpoliticalinstitutionsthantotheassimilationistsermonsofthepast.
TheextraordinarydivisionofMiamialongethniclinescontinuestodefineitsreality,butthereareatpresentanumberofAngloandCubanleaderswhoprefertoadvancethe"CapitaloftheCaribbean"and"CityoftheFuture"themesoversegmentedethnicperspectives.Leftoutofthisendeavor,however,areMiami'sblackminorities.Thedouble-subordinationdiscourseforgedbyBlackleadersduringthelastdecaderepresentsbothanoriginalformofreactiveethnicityandanattempttogainentryintothecity'spowerstructure.Sofartheattempthasbeenunsuccessful.
ThecontinuingexclusionofBlacksfromtruepoliticalparticipationvirtuallyguaranteesnewepisodesofethnicstrifeinMiami'sfuture.FromtheperspectiveofDahl'sanalysis,theirpositionisthepreciseoppositeoftheCubans'.Blacksarethoroughlyacculturated,"asAmericanaseveryoneelse"yetthisachievementhasyieldednothingnearpoliticaloreconomicparity.Indeed,thesituationhasbecomesobadinrecentyearsthatmanyBlackleadersrecallalmostwistfullythedaysofsegregation.AprincipalBlackcommunityleader,interviewedin1987andwhoseviewswerereportedinchapter1,hadthistosayaboutBlackMiamifiveyearslater:
Thechangeshavebeenfortheworse,notforthebetter;violenceisrampantanduncontrollable....Whatoppressiondoesisthatitmakestheoppressedgroupalsoaspiretobeliketheoppressor.AndifIamabletobeliketheoppressor,thenthethingsthatIwasforcedtodevelopbyvirtueofmyoppressionarenolongervalued....It'saquestionofemulationhavingtodowithassimilation.Withoutadoubt,BlacksarethemostAmericanpeopleinAmerica....
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Whenthingswerecolored,whenthingswerecolored,thenthesamekindofbusinessenclavethatexistsintheCubancommunity,intheJewishcommunity,alsoexistedintheBlackcommunity,becausetheconsumerbasewascontained.
20
Lackinganethniceconomyandsufficientpoliticalpowerforeffectiverepresentation,BlackMiamiremainsmarginaltotheprocessofintegration-through-participationdescribedbyDahl.Dauntedbutnotbeaten,Haitiansneverthelesscontinuestrivingtobuildtheirenclave,andBlackleadersstillseekavoiceinlocalpowercircles.Iftheireffortsarenotsuccessful,the"CapitaloftheCaribbean"isinforsometoughtimesnomatterhowmuchithasmovedtowardconvergencebetweenitsothermajorgroups.
PoliticsduringtheDeathwatch
InFebruary1990,GovernorBobMartinezappointedatwelve-membercommissiontostudythepotentialeffectsthatachangeingovernmentinCubawouldhaveonthestateofFlorida.TheideaforthecommissioncamefromtheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundation,whosepresident,JorgeMasCanosa,wassubsequentlyappointedchairofthepanel.Meetingforthefirsttimeonthetwenty-ninthfloorontheMiami-Metrobuilding,thecommissiondiscussedsuchthingsaspreventingwidespreadabsenteeismamongCuban-AmericanworkerscelebratingthefallofFidel,controllingthefestivitiesinSouthFlorida,andcopingwiththeinfluxofCubansfromelsewhereintheUnitedStateswhowoulduseMiamiasa"stagingarea"toreachCuba.21
Thegapbetweentheimportant-soundingcommissionandtheshallowtopicsitdiscussedreflectsthefactthatneithertheparticipantsnor
anyoneelsehadtheslightestideaofwhatwouldhappenwereCastro'sregimetofall.Thecreationofthepanelwas,inotherwords,largelysymbolic;itsignaledthecloutthatright-wingexileshadwiththeRepublicangovernorandtheirsensethatthelong-awaiteddownfallwasimminent.ThatsensepermeatedtheCubanenclave,beingreflectedbothinthepublicutterancesofitsleadersandinstreetculture.TheCuban-AmericanFoundation,forexample,announcedwithmuchfanfareaplanfor"thefuturegovernanceofCuba."22Sodidalmosteveryotherexilepoliticalgroup.
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SalsasingerWillyChirino'shitsongof1990proclaimed,"Yavienellegando"(It'sjustaroundthecorner);anotherpopularrapsinger,perhapswithakeenerinstinctaboutthefuture,announcedthat"sooninCuba,Englishwillbespoken."
In1990,CubanMiamiembarkedonthedeathwatchforitsenemy.EventsinEuropehadconvertedCubaintothesingleWesterncountrystillgovernedbyorthodoxcommunism.ThefallofEastEuropeanregimesandtheendoftheSovietUnionlefttheislandnationbereftofalliesandprotectors,andthedefeatoftheSandinistaregimeinNicaraguaandtheendoftheSalvadoraninsurgencyentirelyisolatedCubaintheWesternHemisphere.Widespreaddomesticscarcitiesandrisingpopulardiscontentmadeitcleartomanythattheendwasnear.
23Afterthreedecades,therevolutionaryepisodethathadtransformedMiamiappearedtobenearanend,andnotonlyCubans,buttheentirecity,watchedwithbothanticipationandforeboding.Whatnewsurprisesdidtheconvulsedislandholdinstore?Wouldthe"CityoftheFuture"besuddenlyabandonedbyhalfitspopulation,asmilitantexileleaderspromised?Orwouldit,onthecontrary,beinundatedbyastilllargerinflowofpost-Castrorefugees?
Bothscenariosareprobablyoverdrawn.AmassivereturntoCubaisunlikelybecauseoftherootsestablishedduringthreedecadesofsettlementandthegrowingprocessofsocialconvergence.Fewwell-establishedformerexilesarelikelytopackupandleavealltheyhaveaccomplishedbehind.ArecentsurveyonthetopicbyresearchersatFloridaInternationalUniversityshowsthatonlyathirdofadultCubanresidents(38percent)inDadeCountywouldconsiderreturningtotheislandtoliveintheeventofCastro'sdownfall.SuchamoveisevenlessprobableamongU.S.-bornCuban-Americans.Onlythemostrecentrefugees,thosewiththeleastsocialrootsandsmallest
economicassets,arelikelytofindthereturnoptionattractive.24
AndalthoughanewrefugeeinfluxismorelikelybecauseofwidespreadmaterialscarcitiesinCuba,itwouldprobablybecheckedbytheendoftheisland'sspecialstatusasAmerica'smainadversaryintheWesternHemisphere.WiththeconversionofCubaintojustanotherCaribbeancountry,newarrivalswouldnecessarilybelabeledconventionalimmigrantsratherthanpoliticalrefugees.
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IfthedownfallofCastroismwouldnotleadtoamajordemographicmovement,itcouldhaveasubtlerbutstillfar-reachingeffect,namely,theendofthemonolithicideologicaloutlookthatundergirdstheCubanethniceconomy.Formorethanthreedecades,ideologicalfervorandtightsocialcontrolshavebeenmaintainedonthestrengthofasingletheme:irreconcilableoppositiontoCastroandcommunism.ThishasbeenthemessagehammeredoutdailybytheCubanexilemedia,andithasfurnishedtheframeaccordingtowhichallotherdomesticandworldeventsareinterpreted.
25Castro'sendwouldremovetheraisond'êtreofthisfiercepreachingandputthebellicoseradiocommentatorsandmilitantactivistsonthespot:eithertheymovebacktoCubaasannouncedforsolong,ortheyaccepttheirroleasregularimmigrantsand,hence,theinevitablerealityofassimilation.
Thesameistrue,infact,fortheentirecommunity.AmongthoseformerexileswhochoosetoremaininMiamieasilythemajoritytheclaimofauniquestatusbasedonprincipledoppositiontoadictatorialregimewoulddissolve.Thesocialmechanismsthatunderliebusinesssuccessintheenclavemayremain,onthestrengthofhabitandpastpractice,butwouldweakenovertimebecauseofthelossofsocialcontrolsrootedinexileideology.Inthesecircumstances,themostlikelyprognosisisthegradualendoftheethniceconomyandtheaccelerationoftheprocessofculturalconvergence,alreadyunderway.
YetMiamiwillneverreturntowhatitwasbeforeitstransformation.Theformerexileswillstillbethere,andnewCaribbeanandSouthAmericaninflowswillreplacetheminnumber,ifnotinideologicalfervor.Eventoday,inthemidstofthedeathwatch,theprocessofacculturation-in-reversecontinues.Everyyear,newpartsofMiami
becomemorelikeHavana,oratleastlikethenostalgicimagethatCubanshaveoftheircapitalcity.Inanarticleentitled"Miami'sCrossroadsoftheVanities,"HeraldcolumnistHowardKleinberglamentedthatthestreetsinthe"Latinquarter"werebeingnamedfor"LatinAmericanmilitaristsandromanticswhoneverhadbeentoMiamiandwhosenamesbarelymadeitintoanyencyclopedia."26HeproposedinsteadthattheCityCommissionnameastreetforJohnReilly,thecity'sfirstmayor,andanotherforFranciscoVillareal,theSpanishfriarwhoin1567establishedthefirstCatholicmissiononthesiteoftoday'sHyattRegency.
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Despitehisotherwisekeenobservations,Kleinbergfailedtounderstandthedrivingforcebehindallthisnamechanging.TheintentionwasnottomemorializeMiamiasithadbeenuntil1959,butrathertocelebratepre-CastroHavana.Intheirsymbolicreenactmentofalostpast,CubansandtheirelectedleaderscouldnotbecountedontoknowmuchabouttheMerricks,theReillys,andtheDeerings,thoughthesewereprominentmeninthecity'smodesthistory.Insteadamucholderpastwasimported,sothatthefriars,scholars,andsoldierswhosenamesnowadornedthestreetsofMiamiwerealsothosewhogavetheirnamestostreetsandschoolsinCuba.
WithorwithoutCastro'sdownfall,along-termtrendtowardintegrationandculturalconvergenceappearsinevitable.Intheshorttomediumterm,however,Miamiwillcontinuetobecharacterizedbyethnicfragmentation,strife,lackofahegemonicdiscourse,andthenostalgicreproductionofaforeignpast.ForKarlMarx,greathistoricaldramasareoftenenactedtwice,thesecondtimeasfarce.Thereareindeedtragicomicaspectstotheexiles'single-mindedattempttoreenactpastlivesinSouthFlorida.Thereisnothingfarcical,however,inthedepthsofthetransformationthattheyhavewroughtandintheuniqueurbanexperimentthattheirpresence,alongwiththatofnativesandnewerimmigrants,haveforgedintheiradoptedcity.
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PostscriptIntheEyeoftheStormWaitingforapoliticalcataclysm,anddisasterofaverydifferentkindstruck.NottheendofCastroism,butahugestormthatsweptawayeverythinginitspath.Thesamefearfulnaturaleventthathasbeenthecurseoftheselandsforcenturiesmadeitsreappearancetoremindeveryoneofthebanalityofhumanconflictsandthefrailtyoftheiroutcomes.Forcenturies,stormshavewreakedhavoconcivilizationinthetropics.Theyhavedonesowithnotableimpartialitytothecontendersoftheday,scatteringandsinkingSpanishgoldgalleonsandtheirFrenchandEnglishpursuers;tramplingwithequalfuryonthecolonizingventuresofcompetingEuropeanpowers.Thegreatwindof1992behavedinthistime-honoredway,impartiallyspreadingdestructionamongpeoplesofdifferentcolor,language,andpoliticalcreed.
ItisnotthefirsttimeastormhasbroughtMiamitoitsknees.Forty-seventhousandresidentswerelefthomelessbythehurricaneof1926.Itkilled113peopleandflattenedfivethousandMiamidwellings.
1ThatstormblewawaynotonlythepalmtreesplantedwithsomuchcarebyCollinsandhissuccessors,butalsothereputationofthecityasacarefreeplayground.Forthenextfewyears,itwasnotpossibletogiveawaythesamelandthat,untilthen,hadsoldformillions.Buteverytime,ascalmreturnedandanewgenerationcameofage,Miamireneweditsillusionthatdisastersofsuchamagnitudecouldnothappenthere.
ThefirstthingthatstrikestheobserverintheaftermathoftheAugust1992stormishowpsychologicallyunpreparedthecityandits
inhabitantswere.Worriedbyeverydayconcerns,manypeople
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couldnotconceivethatacatastropheofanaltogetherdifferentmagnitudewouldhitthem.Boatsandhouseswereleftunattended,utterlyexposedtothewind'sfury.DadeCountydidnotevenhaveanemergencyevacuationplanforthehundredsofsmallcraftinitsdocksandmarinas.Asaresult,agoodnumberendedupinthestreets.TaughtalessonbyHurricaneHugothreeyearsearlier,theCharleston,SouthCarolina,policedepartmentcamebarrelingdownInterstate95hoursbeforethestormandmanagedtobeinplaceintheworst-hitareasaheadofDadeCounty'sowndazedofficers.
2
Thevastdestructionwasnotmediahype.Itwasreal.Eightythousandhomesdestroyedorrendereduninhabitable;160,000peoplelefthomeless;82,000businessesdestroyedordamaged;$20billioninpropertylosses.Themilesandmilesofwreckedpropertiesandinstantpovertyaddeduptoadefiningmomentinthehistoryofthecity.Thereafter,beingaMiamianwouldmeanhavinglivedthroughthe"worstwind."3Consequenceswillnotbeshort-livedoreasilyforgotten.Yet,aswithnaturaldisasterselsewhere,theywillnotreversebutmostlikelywillacceleratethesocialanddemographictrendsunderway.Disastersofthisorderdonotseemtostopsocialchange;instead,theythrowitintohighgear.4
InthecaseofMiami,severalsuchtrendsareapparentandhavebeennotedintheprecedingchapters.Themostimportantistheincipientprogresstowardaconvergenceofsomesortbetweenthecity'spolarizedethniccommunities.Culturalandlinguisticfragmentationisstilldominant,but,asnotedabove(chapter9),therearesignsofanarrowingdistance.Theaftermathofthestormcanacceleratethisprocess.Twotypesofpoststormconvergencesmustbecarefullydistinguished,however.Thefirstisthewell-publicizedoutburstof
compassion,solidarity,andneighborlinessintheimmediatewakeofthedisaster.ArticlesintheMiamiHeraldhavemademuchofhowclassandracebarrierscametumblingdownintherushtorebuildhalf-destroyedneighborhoodsandhelphundredsofvictims.5
Thenewblue-ribbonlocalcommitteeputtogetherattheinitiativeofPresidentBushhasbeenbaptizedWeWillRebuildandhasalsofocusedonthethemesofunityandcommunitysolidarity.6Thetemporarysuspensionofethnicanimositiesandheightenedcom-
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munityspiritisanaturalresponse,giventhemagnitudeofthecalamity.Itwouldberiskytobet,however,thatsuchaltruisticbehaviorwillbelonglived.Asthingsreturntonormal,establishedpatternsinvariablyreassertthemselves,andwiththemthesocialfragmentationandcompetingoutlooksthathavebeendominantinthepast.
Thereis,however,amoreprofoundprocessofconvergence.Itislinkedtothe''defining"characterofthecataclysm,thefactthathereaftertheidentityoftheareawillincorporatethisexperience.AsSanFranciscowasmarkedbyshakingearthandfireinthecentury'sfirstdecade,sohavethewindsimprintedMiamiinitslast.Tolocalidentitiesbuiltonthesuccessiveandcompetingimagesdescribedintheprecedingchaptersmustnowbeaddedthatofalandregularlyravagedbyoneofthemostfearsomenaturalforces.Thepeoplewhoinhabitthelandwillincorporatethiselementintotheiroutlook,whethertheycameoriginallyfromNewYorkorHavana,orwereborninSouthFloridaitself.Asinotherplacessimilarlyafflicted,thesenseofidentityderivedfromdisastercutsacrossethniclines.
Itisthisnaturalintrojectionoftheexperienceintopeople'sself-image,ratherthananydisplayofimmediatesolidarity,thatcanhavethegreatereffectonlong-termcommunitybuilding.Thisisbecausethenewsharedidentityofformerlysegmentedgroupscancreateabasisforforgingamoreunifieddiscourse.Thequestionremains,however,ofwhatdirectionsuchaconvergencewilltake,sincetheprocesscanincorporate,tovaryingdegrees,elementsfromthecompetingdefinitionsofthesituationprevalentinthepast.
Heretheevidenceismixed.InanarticlepublishedintheMiamiHeraldshortlyafterthedisaster,aFloridaInternationalUniversitysociologistarguesthatitsdemographicconsequenceswillbesignificant:
SouthDade(theareahardesthitbyhurricaneAndrew)hasbeenoneofthefewremainingareasofthecountywithan"Anglo"populationmajority.IthasalsobeenoneofthefewareaswithinDadewithaffordablesuburbanhousing.Otherareashaveexperiencedfastsuburbangrowth....ButthosearepredominantlyHispanic....For"Anglos"choosingtoleavethehurricane-strickenzones,theareasthatwillproveattractive,intermsofhousingpricesandethnicity,arenotinDade.
7
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Ifthisanalysisiscorrect,itwouldmeantheaccelerationoftheprocessofLatinizationofthearea,astheoutflowoftheAnglopopulationtoFt.LauderdaleandpointsnorthisaugmentedbytheSouthDadevictimsofAndrew.ThistrendwouldconsolidatethepoliticalpoweroftheCuban-Americancommunity.Atthetimeofthiswriting,somechangesinthisdirection,anticipatedastheoutcomeofelectoralreapportionment,havealreadymaterialized:LincolnDiaz-Balart,aformerstatesenator,hasbecomethesecondCuban-AmericanelectedtoCongress;theexpectedincreasesinCubanrepresentationtothestatelegislaturehavealsooccurred,tothedetrimentofAnglopoliticians.
SuchatrendsuggeststhattheprocessofconvergencewillhaveastrongLatinundertone.Acculturation-in-reversemayspearheadthetransitiontoadiscoursefocusedonthecity'suniqueCaribbeanroots.AlthoughparticipationinthepoliticalsystemwillinevitablysocializeCubansintotheinstitutionsoftheAmericanmainstream,theirlocaldominancecaninfluencedecisivelythepaceandcharacteroftheconvergenceprocess.
HurricaneAndrewalsocreatedapowerfulcountertrend,however.ItisperhapsbestsymbolizedbythoseCharlestonpolicemendirectingtrafficindevastatedSouthDade:theaidpouringintoMiamicamefromtherestofthecountry,notfromtheCaribbean.Baptistsectssetupinstantsoupkitchens,theU.S.RedCrossandtheSalvationArmydistributeddesperatelyneededwaterandclothing,caravansofvolunteerscamefromasfarnorthasPhiladelphiaandNewYork,and,afewdaysafterthestorm,theU.S.Armywassettingupemergencytentsforthousands.
8ThisoutpouringofnationalsolidaritytookMiamiasbyasecondstorm.Itmadeevidentthat,whateveritsquirksandfoibles,itremainedfirmlyanAmericantown."Miami,U.S.A.,"not"Capitalof
theCaribbean,"wasthethemeunderwhichreconstructionwaslaunched.
Reenergized,theoldAngloleadershiptookchargeofdirectingthetask.Thatperenniallocalbrahmin,AlvahChapman,wasappointedchairmanoftheWeWillRebuildCommittee,withotherAngloleadersoccupyingkeyposts.Ethnicfigureswererelegatedtosecondarypositions,afactthatpromptedBlackattorneyH.T.Smith,leaderoftheBlackboycott,toremark,"WemusthavethefaceofMiami,whichisculturallydiverse,makingandexecutingthedecisions."9Tobesure,theCuban-AmericanNationalFoun-
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dationlaunchedavigorousreliefeffort,andthousandsofMiamiCubansandotherLatinscontributedfundsandworkedasvolunteersintheaffectedareas.Buttherewasnothinginthe"successstory"discoursethatcouldeffectivelyintegratethetragedyanditsaftermath.Instead,thethemesofvoluntarismandsolidarity-incrisis,soclosetothecoreofAmericancultureandsothoroughlypracticedovermanysimilarexperiences,becamedominant.TheflattenedMiamilandscapewasanAmerican,notapan-Caribbean,reality.
Thestormmadethecityevenmoreunique,ifthatwaspossible,andsimultaneouslybroughtitbackintothenationalmainstream.CubansandLatinswillbecomeincreasinglyinfluential,butinthestorm'saftermath,itseemedevidentthattheirlocalhegemonywouldbesecurelyensconcedinabroaderAmericanframework.Undoubtedly,thecadencesofSpanish,thesightsandsoundsoftheCaribbean,andtheritualdenunciationsofCastroandhishenchmenwillbeheardforalongtimetocome.Butnoneofthiswillpreventaprocessofconvergence,givenrenewedimpulseandastrongnationalfocusbythenaturalcatastrophe.
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Notes
1ChangewithoutaBlueprint
1.ChristopherMarquisandAndresViglucci,"SomeCubanExilesDecryPlantoDeportDetainees,"MiamiHerald,November21,1987;DougStruck,"HostagesSetFree,OakdaleInmatesYield,"BaltimoreSun,November30,1987;"AgreementSignedAfterCubansHearPleafromBishop,"BaltimoreSun,November30,1987;DiannaSolísandJosédeCórdoba,"MarielFirestorm,''WallStreetJournal,December1,1987.
2.JacobV.Lamar,"ABrightlyColoredTinderbox,"Time,January30,1989;RobertL.Steinback,"ForBlackMiami,aSenseofJustice,"MiamiHerald,December8,1989;SandraDibbleandKarenBranch,"ColombiansAngeredbyConviction,"MiamiHerald,December8,1989;ChristineEvansandPeggyRogers,"LozanoGets7Years,"MiamiHerald,January25,1990;RachelL.Swarns,"LozanoWinsaManslaughterRetrial,"MiamiHerald,June26,1991.
3.FloydHunter,CommunityPowerStructure(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1953);RobertA.Dahl,WhoGoverns?DemocracyandPowerinanAmericanCity(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1961);C.WrightMills,ThePowerElite(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1956);idem,"TheMiddleClassesinMiddle-sizedCities,"AmericanSociologicalReview11(October1946):520-29.ForasuccinctreviewoftheliteratureonAmericancommunitypower,seeCharlesM.BonjeanandDavidM.Olson,"CommunityLeadership:DirectionsofResearch,"AdministrativeScienceQuarterly9(December1964):278-300.
4.HarveyMolotch,"TheCityasaGrowthMachine,"AmericanJournalofSociology82(1976):309-30;JohnLoganandHarveyMolotch
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UrbanFortunes:ThePoliticalEconomyofPlace(BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1987).
5.C.WrightMillsandMelvilleJ.Ulmer,"SmallBusinessandCivicWelfare,"inU.S.Congress,Senate,ReportoftheSmallerWarPlantsCorporationtotheSpecialCommitteetoStudyProblemsofAmericanSmallBusiness,79thCong.,1946,S.Rept.135.ForacritiqueofMills'sposition,seeIrvinA.Fowler,"LocalIndustrialStructures,EconomicPower,andCommunityWelfare,"SocialProblems6(Summer1958):41-51.
6.W.LloydWarnerandPaulS.Lunt,TheStatusSystemofaModernCommunity(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1942).
7.W.LloydWarnerandLeoSrole,TheSocialSystemsofAmericanEthnicGroups(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1945).
8.NathanGlazerandDanielP.Moynihan,BeyondtheMeltingPot:TheNegroes,PuertoRicans,Jews,Italians,andIrishofNewYorkCity(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1970);AndrewGreeley,WhyCan'tTheyBeLikeUs?America'sWhiteEthnicGroups(NewYork:E.P.Dutton,1971).
9.Followingtheprisontakeover,RománledacoalitionofCubanAmericanpoliticalleadersandclergythatlobbiedthefederalgovernmentforleniencyaswellascarefulreviewofindividualappeals.ThesubsequentslowpaceofdeportationstoCubaandthereleaseofanumberofformerprisonerstotheirfamiliesareduetoRomán'sactivism.
10.M.Janowitz,ed.,W.I.ThomasonSocialOrganizationandSocialPersonality(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1969);seealsoLeonFestinger,ATheoryofCognitiveDissonance(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1957).
11.Thestatementsaredrawnfrominterviews,conductedbetween1983and1988,withapproximatelysixtyofMiami'smostprominentbusiness,political,andreligiousleadersasacomplementtoalargesurveyoftherecentlyarrivedimmigrantpopulationinthearea.Resultsfromthissurveyhavebeenpublishedinseveralarticles,includingAlejandroPortesandAlexStepick,"UnwelcomeImmigrants:TheLaborMarketExperiencesof1980(Mariel)CubanandHaitianRefugeesinSouthFlorida,"AmericanSociologicalReview50(August1985):493-514;andAlejandroPortes,JuanM.Clark,andRobertD.Manning,"AfterMariel:ASurveyoftheResettlementExperiencesof1980CubanRefugeesinMiami,"CubanStudies15(Summer1985):35-59.
12.JoanDidion,Miami(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1987),51.
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13.DavidRieff,GoingtoMiami:Exiles,Tourists,andRefugeesintheNewAmerica(Boston:Little,Brown,1987),164-65.
2AYeartoRemember:Mariel
1.DiannaSolísandJosédeCórdoba,"CubanPrisonRiotsFollowedSevenYearsofU.S.Ambivalence,"WallStreetJournal,December1,1987.
2.Florida,DepartmentofHealthandRehabilitativeServices(DHRS),RefugeesandEntrantsinFlorida:BackgroundandCurrentIssues(Tallahassee:DHRS,March1982);J.Franklin,CubanForeignRelations:AChronology,1959-1982(NewYork:CenterforCubanStudies,1983).
3.RafaelHernandezandRediGomis,"RetratodelMariel:elángulosocio-económico,"CuadernosdenuestraAmerica3(January-June1986):138-39.
4.ThisandotherstatementspresentedinthischapterareexcerptsfrominterviewswithcommunityleadersconductedduringapanelstudyofMarielandHaitianrefugeesinSouthFloridabetween1983and1988.Sixtyinterviewswithgovernmentofficials,entrepreneurs,andreligiousleaderswerecompletedduringthisperiod.
5.RobertL.Bach,JenniferB.Bach,andTimothyTriplett,"TheFlotilla'Entrants':LatestandMostControversial,"CubanStudies11(1981):29-48;Portes,Clark,andManning,"AfterMariel."
6.AlejandroPortesandRafaelMozo,"ThePoliticalAdaptationProcessofImmigrantsandOtherRefugeeMinoritiesintheUnitedStates:APreliminaryAnalysis,"InternationalMigrationReview19(Spring1985):35-63.
7.CitedinGuillermoMartínez,"MarielMythsFeedVenomAcrossNation,"MiamiHerald,November18,1982,31A.
8.EricFehrnstrom,"ConfessionofaKiller,"BostonHerald,April17,1987,1,20.
9.Aday-by-dayaccountoftheseeventswasproducedaspartofourstudyofpost-1980immigrationtoSouthFlorida;seeYohelCamayd-Freixas,CrisisinMiami,ReporttotheProjecton"Help-SeekingandServicesUseAmongRecentLatinAmericanRefugees,"conductedbytheSociologyDepartmentandSchoolofPublicHealth,JohnsHopkinsUniversity(Boston:BostonUrbanResearchandDevelopmentGroup,1988).
10.Ibid.,111-33-48.
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11.Ibid.,III-37.
12.Thevastmajorityofthesebusinessmenandelectedofficials,includingmanyoftherichestCubans,wereunknowntoMiami'sAnglos,forwhomCubansgenerallyweresimplyamassofforeigners,speakinganunintelligiblelanguageandobsessedwiththeirhomelandpolitics.SeeAlejandroPortes,"TheRiseofEthnicity:DeterminantsofEthnicPerceptionsAmongCubanExilesinMiami,"AmericanSociologicalReview49(June1984):383-97.
13.CharlesWhited,"CastroAlwaysSeemstoCalltheShotsHere,"MiamiHerald,November24,1987.
14."CubanSuccessStory:IntheUnitedStates,"U.S.News&WorldReport,March20,1967,104-6;"FlightfromCubaCastro'sLossisU.S.Gain,"U.S.News&WorldReport,May31,1971,74.Similarreportswerepublishedinthe1980s,thoughlessfrequentlythanbefore;see,forexample,"Florida'sLatinBoom:HispanicsAretheOnlySparkinaSomnolentEconomy,"Newsweek,November11,1985,55-56;andSoniaL.Nazario,"AfteraLongHoldout,CubansinMiamiTakeaRoleinMiamiPolitics;EconomicSuccessSpursStepstoAssimilate,"WallStreetJournal,June7,1983,1,23.
15.Fordescriptionsofthebroaderstudyanditsresults,seePortesandStepick,"UnwelcomeImmigrants";Portes,Clark,andManning,"AfterMariel."
16.Camayd-Freixas,CrisisinMiami,III-33.
17.NathanGlazer,"EthnicGroupsinAmerica:FromNationalCulturetoIdeology,"inFreedomandControlinModernSociety,ed.M.Berger,T.Abel,andC.Page(NewYork:VanNostrand,1954),158-73;Greeley,WhyCan'tTheyBeLikeUs?;Portes,"RiseofEthnicity."
18.FredericTasker,"Anti-BilingualismMeasureApprovedbyDadeCounty,"MiamiHerald,November5,1980,1A,11A.
19.Rieff,GoingtoMiami,71.
20.LuisJ.Botifoll,IntroducciónalfuturodeMiami(Miami:Laurenty,1988),3,10.
21.SergioPereira(AssistantCountyManager,DadeCounty),PresentationatconferencesponsoredbyStrategyResearch,Miami,May1981.
3AYeartoRemember:TheRiotandtheHaitians
1.CitedinBrucePorterandMarvinDunn,TheMiamiRiotof1980:CrossingtheBounds(Lexington,Mass.:D.C.Heath,1984),193.
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2.Communityleaders,bothLatinandBlack,commentedonthistousduringfieldworkinMiamibetween1983and1989.SeealsoPortes,"RiseofEthnicity."
3.J.E.Buchanan,Miami:AChronologicalandDocumentaryHistory,1513-1977(NewYork:Oceana,1977),53-57.
4.FieldInterview,January1987.
5.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,195.
6.Metro-DadeCountyPlanningDepartment,ProfileoftheBlackPopulation(Miami:ResearchDivision,Metro-DadeCountyPlanningDepartment,1984),84.
7.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,195-96.AlejandroPortes,"TheSocialOriginsoftheCubanEnclaveEconomyofMiami,"SociologicalPerspectives30(October1987):340-72.
8.Portes,"SocialOriginsoftheCubanEnclaveEconomy";MarvinDunnandAlexStepick,"BlacksinMiami,"inMiamiNow!Immigration,Ethnicity,andSocialChange,ed.G.J.GrenierandA.Stepick(Gainesville:UniversityPressofFlorida,1992),41-56.
9.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,196-97.Only1.4percentofMiami'sBlackpopulationownedbusinessesin1982.Ofthe3,385Blackbusinessesinthearea,only450hadpaidemployees.SeeMaxCastroandTimothyYeaney,DocumentingDade'sDiversity:AnEthnicAuditofDadeCounty(Miami:GreaterMiamiUnited,January1989).
10.CitedinPorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,48.
11.Didion,Miami,41.
12."DadeFearsRefugeeWave,"MiamiHerald,May11,1980.
13.Ibid.,129-30.
14.Ibid.,47-60;Didion,Miami,45.
15.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,60-68.
16.FieldinterviewwithheadofamajorsocialservicesagencyinLibertyCity,1985.
17.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,68.
18.StanleyLiebersonandArnoldR.Silverman,"ThePrecipitantsandUnderlyingConditionsofRaceRiots,"AmericanSociologicalReview30(December1965):887-98.
Page234
19.Seefieldinterviewsexcerptedinchapter1.BythetimeoftheOvertownuprisingofJanuary1989,thedistinctpositionsoftheMiamiBlackcommunityhadbecomewellarticulated.See,forexample,DorothyGaiter,"LozanoVerdictBroughtReliefandLong-delayedJustice,"MiamiHerald,December8,1989,31A.
20.TontonmacoutesisthenamegivenbyHaitianstothebandsofthugshiredbythesuccessiveDuvalierregimestointimidatethepopulation.
21.ThisstoryisanamalgamationofaffidavitsofHaitianrefugeeswhotestifiedinHaitianRefugeeCenterv.Civiletti,503F.Supp.442(S.D.Fla1980),modifiedSubnom.HaitianRefugeeCenterv.Smith,676F.2d1023(5thCir.1982),includingespeciallythecaseofOdiliusJean.PartswerealsoderivedfromStevanPetrow,"WhatDidtheHaitiansDo?"St.PetersburgTimes,November11,1979,8ff.;andBruceKeldan,"TalesoftheTontonMacoutesfromHaitiansWhoFled,"PhiladelphiaInquirer,October8,1979,A1,10A.
22.AlexStepick,HaitianRefugeesintheU.S.,MinorityRightsGroup(MRG)no.52(London:MRG,1986),11.
23.AlexStepickandAlejandroPortes,"FlightintoDespair:AProfileofRecentHaitianRefugeesinSouthFlorida,"InternationalMigrationReview20(Summer1986):329-50.
24.ThecombinationwassanctionedofficiallybythecreationofthefederalCuban-HaitianInteragencyTaskForceinmid-1980.Thisagencyisdescribedbelow.
25.Stepick,HaitianRefugees,14.
26.TaskForceonImmigrationandRefugeePolicy,"IssuePaperSubject:WhatPolicyShouldtheUnitedStatesAdoptwithRegardtoForeignPersonsWhoEnterSouthFloridaWithoutVisas?"
(June26,1981),MemorandumtoPresidentReaganfromtaskforceestablishedbyhimMarch6,1981.Subsequently,thepolicybecameformalandlegalviaU.S.DepartmentofState,"Migrants-Interdiction,"AgreementBetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandHaiti,EffectedbyExchangeofNotes,SignedatPort-au-Prince,September23,1981,TreatiesandOtherInternationalActsSeries,10241,pursuanttoPL89-497,approvedJuly8,1966(80Sta.271;1U.S.C.113).
27.Stepick,HaitianRefugees,14-15.
28.JohnSilva,"CourtToldofLivingDeathinHaitianPrison,"MiamiNews,April9,1980,4A.
29.FredGrimmandEllenBartlett,"PoliticalHeavyweightsBringBoutHere,"MiamiHerald,March9,1980,lB,7B.
30.KathySawyer,"RefugeePolicyDrawsFireinHearing,"WashingtonPost,May13,1980,A6.
Page235
31.InDecember1980,thetaskforcewasmovedtotheDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices.ItsfirstcoordinatorwasAmbassadorVictorPalmieri.SeeWhiteHouse,"NewCuban-HaitianPlan,"FactSheet#114(Washington,D.C.,July1980).
32.TheaboveinformationcomesfromfieldobservationandinterviewsconductedwithHaitiancommunityleadersaspartoftheCuban/Haitianimmigrationproject,June-August1983.InformantsincludedMr.YvesSavain,thenheadoftheHaitianTaskForce;theReverendGerardJean-Juste,directoroftheHaitianRefugeeCenter;andofficialsofHACAD.
33.SeeFredricTasker,"DadeNeighborhoodsStaySegregatedasResidentsSeekAmericanDream,"MiamiHerald,November1,1982,D1;"Miami:America'sCasablanca,"Newsweek,January25,1988.
34.FieldinterviewconductedaspartoftheCuban/Haitianimmigrationproject,August1983.
35.ThissampleisstatisticallyrepresentativeofadultHaitiansarrivingbetween1980and1982andsettlingintheprincipalareasofHaitianconcentrationinSouthFlorida.ThemethodologyandinitialresultsofthesurveyaresummarizedinStepickandPortes,"FlightintoDespair";andinPortesandStepick,"UnwelcomeImmigrants."
36.StepickandPortes,"FlightintoDespair";PortesandStepick,"UnwelcomeImmigrants."
37.Camayd-Freixas,CrisisinMiami,chaps.5and6.
4TheEarlyYears
1.PollyRedford,Billion-DollarSandbar:ABiographyofMiamiBeach(NewYork:E.P.Dutton,1970),chap.2.
2.CitedinHowardKleinberg,"AWistfulEyeBacktoYoungCoconutGrove,"MiamiHerald,March6,1990.
3.MarjoryS.Douglas,Florida,theLongFrontier(NewYork:Harper&Row,1967),147-49.
4.HelenMuir,Miami,U.S.A.(Miami:PickeringPress,1990),47-53.
5.CitedinKleinberg,"AWistfulEye."
6.Douglas,Florida,47-48;WilliamR.Gillaspie,"PoncedeLeon,"inEncyclopediaofWorldBiography,vol.8(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,1973),521-22.
7.HowardKleinberg,"PoncedeLeon'sLandinginChequescha(Miami),Fla.,"MiamiHerald,March22,1990.
Page236
8.Douglas,Florida,49-50.
9.Ibid.,51-53.
10.WilliamR.Gillaspic,"DeSoto,"inEncyclopediaofWorldBiography,vol.3(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,1973),352-53;"Soto,Hernandode,"NewEncyclopaediaBritannica,15thed.(Chicago:EncyclopaediaBritannica,1989),11:23;EmilLudwig,Biografíadeunaisla(i.e.,Cuba)(MexicoCity:EditorialCentauro,1948),75-78.
11.Gillaspie,"DeSoto."
12.Oneothercolonizingeffortoccurredin1558-61,ledbyDonTristándeLunayArellanowho,withapartyof1,500,establishedasmallsettlementonPensacolaBayintheFloridapanhandle.Itfailed,however,andonSeptember23,1561,PhilipIIissuedacedulabarringfurthercolonizingeffortsinForida.SeeRichardB.Morris,ed.,EncyclopediaofAmericanHistory(NewYork:Harper&Row,1976),59.
13."St.Augustine,"inTheColumbiaLippincottGazetteeroftheWorld,ed.L.E.Seltzer(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1962),1627;Douglas,Florida,69-70.
14.Douglas,Florida,75-80.
15.Ibid.,86-90;"St.Augustine."
16."St.Augustine";T.WalterWallbankandAlastairM.Taylor,Civilization,PastandPresent,4thed.,vol.2(Chicago:Scott,Foresman,1961),36-37;A.MaletandJ.Isaac,Lostiemposmodernos(MexicoCity:EditoraNacional,1961),278-79.
17.Douglas,Florida,100-103;LuisJ.Botifoll,TheConspiracyofSilence:Hispanics'VitalRoleintheAmericanRevolution(Miami:Laurenty,1986),4-5.
18.WallbankandTaylor,Civilization,105-11;MaletandIsaac,Lostiemposmodernos,283-86.
19.Douglas,Florida,105.DouglastracesthewordcimarróntoJamaica,althoughitisaSpanishtermimportedoriginallyfromCuba.
20.Ibid.,129.GloriaJahoda,Florida:ABicentennialHistory(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1976),47.
21.T.D.Allman,Miami:CityoftheFuture(NewYork:AtlanticMonthlyPress,1987),148;Jahoda,Florida,54.
22.Douglas,Florida,130-32.
23.Allman,Miami,152-53.Jahoda,Florida.
Page237
24.Douglas,Florida,146.
25.Ibid.,146-47.
26.Allman,Miami,153;Jahoda,Florida,143,158.
27.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,15.
28.Douglas,Florida,148,165.
29.V.O.Key,SouthernPolitics(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1950),86.
30.Douglas,Florida,143-69.
31.Key,SouthernPolitics,82-83.
32.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,27.
33.Ibid.,chap.2;Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,55-65.
34.EdwardSofen,TheMiamiMetropolitanExperiment(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1963),11.
35.PaulS.George,"ColoredTown:Miami'sBlackCommunity,1896-1930,"FloridaHistoricalQuarterly16(April1978):432-47;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,chaps.4,5,8;Douglas,Florida,251.
36.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,chap.4;Rieff,GoingtoMiami,6.
37.Rieff,GoingtoMiami;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,chaps.5-8,20.
38.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,95.
39.Rieff,GoingtoMiami,10-11;Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,13.
40.Allman,Miami,170;Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,47-65;Douglas,Florida,244.
41.Douglas,Florida,244-45.
42.Rieff,GoingtoMiami,10.
43.Allman,Miami,207-10;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,149-50.
44.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar;Allman,Miami,219-21.
45.Rieff,GoingtoMiami,chap.1;Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,131-42.
46.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,148.
47.KarlMarx,TheEighteenthBrumaireofNapoleonBonaparte(NewYork:InternationalPublishers,1963).
48.PaulS.George,"PolicingMiami'sBlackCommunity,1896-1930,"FloridaHistoricalQuarterly17(April1979):434-50.
Page238
49.George,"ColoredTown,"444.
50.Ibid.
51.Quotedinibid.,441
52.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,12.
53.Ibid.,10.
54.CitedinAllman,Miami,156.
55.StatementofaBlackEpiscopalpastor,citedinPorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,193.
56.George,"ColoredTown,"440.
57.Ibid.,pp.438-40.
58.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,9-13.
59.RaymondA.Mohl,"TroubleinParadise:RaceandHousinginMiamiDuringtheNewDealEra,"Prologue8(Spring1987):7-20.
60.Ibid.,13.
61.George,"PolicingMiami'sBlackCommunity."
62.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,chap.14;Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,14-15;Allman,Miami,211.
63.Allman,Miami,224-26;Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment.
64.Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,16;Metro-DadePlanningDepartment,selectedtabulationsfromthe1990Censusmadeavailabletotheauthors.
65.Key,SouthernPolitics,87.
66.Ibid.,85.
67.Ibid.;Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,3-10.
68.Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,99.
69.Allman,Miami,210-15;Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,127,218.
70.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,214.
71.Ibid.;Rieff,GoingtoMiami,26;MiamiDesignandPreservationLeague,"MiamiBeachArchitecture"(1989).
72.Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,8-10,216-17.
73.Ibid.,23.
74.Ibid.,34-35.
75.Ibid.,chaps.4,7.
Page239
76.Ibid.,71;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,chap.1.
77.Key,SouthernPolitics,103-4;SamuelProctor,NapoleonBonaparteBroward,Florida'sFightingDemocrat(Gainesville:UniversityofFloridaPress,1950).
78.Allman,Miami,223-27;Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,216-17.
5EntertheCubans
1.Theforegoinginformationisbasedontheauthors'fieldwork.InformationontheconstructionoftheSanCarloswasobtainedonsite.
2.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,27.
3.HughThomas,Cuba:ThePursuitofFreedom(NewYork:Harper&Row,1971),305.
4.Ibid.
5.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,47-49.
6.Proctor,NapoleonBonaparteBroward,97-99.
7.Ibid.,103-11.
8.Ibid.,114.
9.Ibid.,124.
10.Ibid.,131-32.
11.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,59-62;Proctor,NapoleonBonaparteBroward,117.
12.Thomas,Cuba,356-66;Proctor,NapoleonBonaparteBroward,
135-37.
13.Thomas,Cuba,328-37;Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,61;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,30.
14.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,67-69;George,''PolicingMiami'sBlackCommunity,1896-1930,"435.
15.Thomas,Cuba,453-54.
16.SidneyW.Mintz,"TheIndustrializationofSugarProductionandItsRelationshiptoSocialandEconomicChange,"inBackgroundtoRevolution:TheDevelopmentofModernCuba,ed.R.F.Smith(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1966),178.
17.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,249,269.
Page240
18.Thomas,Cuba.
19.JorgeGarciaMontesandAntonioAlansoDávila,HistoriadelPartidoComunistadeCuba(Miami:EdicionesUniversal,1970),chap.6;JustoCarrillo,Cuba1933:estudiantes,yankisysoldados(Miami:InstituteofIbero-AmericanStudies,UniversityofMiami,1985),37-50.
20.Carrillo,Cuba1933,587.
21.Thomas,Cuba,625.
22.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,173-75;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,183-91;Mohl,"TroubleinParadise."
23.FulgencioBatista,Respuesta(MexicoCity:ImpresoraManuelLeonSánchez,1960),43.
24.NotonlyPríobutmanyothermajorCubanpoliticalfiguresaswellresidedinMiamiduringthestruggleagainstBatista.JoseMiróCardona,primeminister-designateofthefirstrevolutionarygovernment,wasawakenedinhisMiamihomeonJanuary1,1959,withthenewsofBatista'sfallandhadtobeflowntoOrienteProvincefortheswear-inceremony.SeeAndrésSuarez,Cuba:CastroismandCommunism,1959-1966(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1967),30.
25.Thomas,Cuba,876.
26.Suarez,Cuba,23;Thomas,Cuba,891.
27.Thomas,Cuba,968-69.
28.Suarez,Cuba,25,31;Thomas,Cuba,978-79.
29.FidelCastro,ManifestooftheSierraMaestra,citedinibid.,969.
30.InJanuary1958,theU.S.yachtCorinthialeftMiamiandlandedrevolutionariesonthenorthcoastofCamagueyProvince;they
eventuallysucceededinestablishinga"secondfront"ofguerrillawarfare.SeeThomas,Cuba,978-79.
31.WilliamWieland,citedinibid.,977.
32.FieldinterviewswithformerCubangovernmentofficialsin1983-84.Theirstatementsagreedindependentlyonthefrequencyandhabitualcharacterofthesetrips.
33.Forcomparisononthedifficultiesofadaptationconfrontedbyotherrecentrefugeegroups,seeAlejandroPortesandRubénG.Rumbaut,"AForeignWorld:Immigration,MentalHealth,andAcculturation,"inImmigrantAmerica:APortrait(BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1990).
34.Fieldinterviews,Miamiimmigrationproject,1984.
Page241
35.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,239-40.
36.AlejandroPortesandRobertL.Bach,LatinJourney:CubanandMexicanImmigrantsintheUnitedStates(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985),84-90.
37.Ibid.
38.JohnF.ThomasandEarlE.Huyck,"ResettlementofCubanRefugeesintheUnitedStates"(PaperpresentedatthemeetingsoftheAmericanSociologicalAssociation,SanFrancisco,August1967).
39.PortesandBach,LatinJourney,86.
40.AlejandroPortes,JuanM.Clark,andRobertL.Bach,"TheNewWave:AStatisticalProfileofRecentCubanExilestotheUnitedStates,"CubanStudies7(January1977):tables4-7.
41.ThomasandHuyck,"ResettlementofCubanRefugees."
42.SergioDiaz-BriquetsandLisandroPerez,"Cuba:TheDemographyofRevolution,"PopulationBulletin36(April1981):2-41.
43.Ibid.
44.SeeMichaelPiore,BirdsofPassage:MigrantLaborandIndustrialSocieties(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1979);andPortesandBach,LatinJourney,7-10.
45.JuanM.Clark,JoseI.Lasage,andRoseS.Reque,The1980MarielExodus:AnAssessmentandProspect(Washington,D.C.:CouncilforInter-AmericanSecurity,1981);andPortesandStepick,"UnwelcomeImmigrants."
46.Theepisode,atruestory,tookplaceduringpreliminaryfieldworkforastudyonpost-1970CubanemigrationanditsadaptationtoU.S.
society.FinalresultsofthisstudyarepresentedinPortesandBach,LatinJourney.
47.CarlosForment,"PoliticalPracticeandtheRiseofanEthnicEnclave:TheCuban-AmericanCase,1959-1979,"TheoryandSociety18(1989):47-81.
48.TheexpressionwasfirstusedbyDavidRieff;seehisGoingtoMiami.
6HowtheEnclavewasBuilt
1."AscensodeIMCdespertócontroversia,"ElMiamiHerald,March28,1986,9;"Recareypagómillonesacabilderos,"ElNuevoHerald,December20,1987,6A.Thepresentsectionisbasedonthesetwosources.
Page242
2.MiamiHerald,December20,1987.
3.Didion,Miami,90-91.
4.Ibid.,83,86-98.
5.IvanLight,"ImmigrantandEthnicEnterpriseinNorthAmerica,"EthnicandRacialStudies7(April1984):195-216;Portes,"SocialOriginsoftheCubanEnclaveEconomy."
6.Fieldinterview,January15,1986.
7.Ibid.
8.LuisJ.Botifoll,"HowMiami'sNewImageWasCreated,"OccasionalPaperno.1985-1,InstituteofInter-AmericanStudies,UniversityofMiami,1985,13.
9.Ibid.;andfieldinterviewwithofficialsoftheLatinBuildersAssociationinMiami,January21,1986.
10.SeeForment,"PoliticalPracticeandtheRiseofanEthnicEnclave,"47.ThisarticlemaintainsthatCIAtiesplayedapivotalroleintheriseofthefirstCubanenterprisesinMiami.
11."Florida'sLatinBoom."
12.DoryOwens,"HerFaithinHispanicsPaidOffBig,"MiamiHerald,"Profile"sec.,October1,1988.
13.FieldinterviewwithDiegoR.Suarez,January30,1986;citedwithpermission.
14.IvanLight,"AsianEnterpriseinAmerica:Chinese,Japanese,andKoreansinSmallBusiness,"inSelf-HelpinUrbanAmerica,ed.S.Cummings(NewYork:KennikatPress,1980),33-57.
15.FieldinterviewinMiami,February7,1989.
16.FieldinterviewinMiami,January14,1987.
17.FieldinterviewinHialeah,August15,1984.
18.Fieldinterview,January14,1987.
19.FieldinterviewsinMiami,January30,1986,andJanuary22,1991;Portes,"SocialOriginsoftheCubanEnclaveEconomy."
20.Portes,"SocialOriginsoftheCubanEnclaveEconomy";U.S.BureauoftheCensus,SurveyofMinority-ownedBusinessEnterprises,1977/Hispanic(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1980).
21.FieldinterviewswithCuban-Americanbankers,January2,21,1986;February7,1989;February12,1991;alsoOwens,"HerFaithinHispanicsPaidOff."
Page243
22.CliffordGeertz,PeddlersandPrinces(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1963),123.
23.Fieldinterviewswithgarmentmanufacturer,January14,1987;ownerofrestaurantsandliquorshops,January9,1986;executivesofInter-AmericanTransport,January30,1986;andlocalunionorganizer,August15,1984.
24.HebertoPadilla,"Miami:elmundoenblancoynegro,"ElMiamiHerald,January18,1986,5.
25.JoannaWragg,"TheBoycott,Blacks,andCubans,"MiamiHerald,December30,1990,2C;SergioLopez-Miro,"Wherethe'Cuban'Endsandthe'American'Begins,"MiamiHerald,February1,1990.
26.Fieldinterview,January14,1987.
27."TheCuban-AmericanCommunityandtheMiamiHerald"(paidpoliticalannouncement),MiamiHerald,October19,1987,11A.
28.ThestatementinSpanishisusuallyreadbyWQBAnewsdirectorTomasGarciaFusté;fieldvisits,1989-90.
29.Forment,"PoliticalPracticeandtheRiseofanEthnicEnclave."
30.Ibid.AlsofieldinterviewswithCuban-Americanindustrialist,January14,1987;banker,February7,1987;andcommunityorganizer,December22,1987.
31."Deportaraunciudadanonoexiste,"ElNuevoHerald,January10,1988,2A.
32.Wragg,"TheBoycott,Blacks,andCubans."
33."TheQuietRiot,"NewTimes,September26-October2,1990,12-22.
34.SeeRichardF.Fagen,RichardA.Brody,andThomasJ.O'Leary,CubansinExile:DisaffectionandtheRevolution(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1968),chaps.3,7.
35.HerbertMatthews,RevolutioninCuba(NewYork:CharlesScribner'sSons,1975),195-200;HerminioPortell-Vila,NuevahistoriadelaRepúblicadeCuba(Miami:LaModernaPoesia,1989),793-806.
36.RichardE.Welch,ResponsetoRevolution:TheUnitedStatesandtheCubanRevolution,1959-1961(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1985),81-84;Forment,"PoliticalPracticeandtheRiseofanEthnicEnclave."
37.SeeAllman,Miami,chap.14;Didion,Miami,chap.7.
38.Forment,"PoliticalPracticeandtheRiseofanEthnicEnclave,"65.
Page244
39.InterviewwithMonsignorWalsh,DirectorofCatholicCommunityServicesoftheArchdioceseofMiami,January,12,1987;citedwithpermission.
40.PortesandBach,LatinJourney,tables61,65.
41.Ibid.,tables59,60,63,64,68.
42.Ibid.,table70.
43.U.S.BureauoftheCensus,SurveyofMinority-ownedBusinessEnterprises,1987/Hispanics(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1991),tablesC,D,and6.
44.FieldinterviewinMiami,May3,1981.
45.FieldinterviewswithSALADleaders,May3andJune16,1981.
46.LuisJ.Botifoll,ChairmanoftheRepublicNationalBank,manuscript,1990.
47.FieldinterviewwithJosé(Pepe)Hernandez,PresidentofCANF,February14,1991;citedwithpermission.
7ARepeatPerformance?TheNicaraguanExodus
1.ChristopherMarquis,"MiamiGrappleswithInfluxofNicaraguans,"MiamiHerald,December15,1988,1A.
2.ChristopherMarquisandFrankCerabino,"DadeonEdgeoverNicaraguans,"MiamiHerald,January14,1989,1A.
3.DaveVonDrehleandChristopherMarquis,"NicaraguanStreamintoMiami;ManyFindTheyMustFendforThemselves,"MiamiHerald,January13,1989,1A.
4.ChristopherMarquis,"NicaraguanExileCommunityForgesNew
LifeinS.Florida,"MiamiHerald,July16,1989,1A.
5.ChristopherMarquis,"RefugeesFindExilesThriving,"MiamiHerald,January22,1989,1B.
6.AnaVeciana-SuarezandSandraDibble,"Miami'sNicaraguans:RemakingTheirLives"(pt.1of2pts.),MiamiHerald,September13,1987,1G.
7.Marquis,"NicaraguanExileCommunityForgesNewLife."
8.BarbaraGutierrez,"We're'Invisible'Exiles,NicaraguansSay,"MiamiHerald,February5,1984,1B.
Page245
9.Veciana-SuarezandDibble,"Miami'sNicaraguans."
10.Ibid.
11.AnaVeciana-Suarez,"NicaraguanExilesBegintoClimbtheLadder,"MiamiHerald,March28,1983,10BM.
12."ExiledNicaraguansReflect,"MiamiHerald,July16,1989,11A.
13.CarlosBriceno,"NicaraguanPleafor'Sanctuary'DoublesinYear,"MiamiHerald,February5,1985,1D.
14.Gutierrez,"We're'Invisible.'"
15.JaimeSuchlickiandArturoCruz,"TheImpactofNicaraguansinMiami:TheNicaraguanExodustoMiamiUndertheSandinistas,andtheFutureOutlookFollowingTheirElectoralDefeat,"StudyfortheCityManagerofMiamipreparedbytheInstituteofInteramericanStudies,UniversityofMiami,March1990.
16.SandraDibble,"NicaraguanExilesFindHomesinLittleHavana,"MiamiHerald,February10,1986,2B;Gutierrez,"We're'Invisible.'"
17.Gutierrez,"We're'Invisible'";Dibble,"NicaraguanExilesFindHomes";Veciana-SuarezandDibble,''Miami'sNicaraguans";RodrigoLazo,"ThereIsSoLittleMoney,butThereIsPeaceofMind,"MiamiHerald,December25,1989,2D.
18.Veciana-SuarezandDibble,"Miami'sNicaraguans."
19.Increasedinternationalcompetitioninthe1980salsoaffectedtheindustryasitbegantocontractforthefirsttime,lesseningdemandforworkers.
20.InterviewwithCarpenters'Unionorganizer,Miami,June9,1988.
21.KarenBranch,"ImmigrantsJamStreetCorner,HopingforaJob,"MiamiHerald,March15,1989,1B.
22.RodrigoLazo,"WithoutWorkPermit,DayJobsSustainHim,"MiamiHerald,December25,1989,2D.
23.RodrigoLazo,"AYearLater,PanaceaTurnstoStruggleforNicaraguans,"MiamiHerald,December25,1989,1D.
24."ExiledNicaraguansReflect."
25.QuotedinAlfonsoChardy,"MuchofBlameforInfluxPutonFailedReaganPolicy,"MiamiHerald,January22,1989,16A.
26.SandiWisenberg,"AnUnlikelyChampion,"MiamiHerald,April26,1985,1C.Atthesametime,barelyoverfiftyNicaraguanswere
Page246
deportedandfewerthanfivehundredwhofaceddeportationleftvoluntarily;seeBriceno,"NicaraguanPleaforSanctuary."
27.FabiolaSantiagoandBarbaraGutierrez,"Dade'sLittleManagua:BastionofUncertainty.,"MiamiHerald,July19,1984,16A.
28.SandraDibble,"NicaraguansinMiami:LivinginLimbo,MostRefugeesDeniedWorkPermits,Welfare,"MiamiHerald,December23,1985,1A.
29.YvesColon,"State-INSPlanAimstoTakeawayAliens'IncentivestoStay,"MiamiHerald,December26,1984,1D.
30."U.S.OfficialJoinsCelebrationofNicaragua'sIndependence,"MiamiHerald,September10,1986,2B.
31.FabiolaSantiago,"DinnerforINSChieftoFundContraLobby,"MiamiHerald,June27,1985,1D.
32.SandraDibble,"INSHaltsDeportationofNicaraguanAliens,"MiamiHerald,April11,1986,1A.
33."AtLast,WorkPermits,"MiamiHerald,July10,1987,24A.Meese'sdirectivewasbasedona1986SupremeCourtrulingthatloosenedstandardsforgrantingpoliticalasylum,itselfbasedonaprovisionoftheRefugeeActof1980,whichstatesthatarefugeemustshowa"wellfoundedfearofpersecution"tobegrantedasylum.Administrationofficialshadinterpretedthatclausetomeanthatrefugeesmustprove"aclearprobability"ofpersecutioniftheyreturnedtotheirhomecountry.ButtheSupremeCourtrulingrelaxedthestandardbyrulingthatasylumclaimsarevalidif"persecutionisareasonablepossibility"(INSv.Cardoza-Fonseca).Eventhoughthecourtdecisiononasylumappliedtoallrefugees,MeesespecificallyorderedINStohaltdeportationofNicaraguansfromtheUnitedStates.Hemadenomentionofothergroups,however,suchas
SalvadoransandHaitians.SeeTinaMontalvo,"NicaraguansAreOnlyImmigrantsBenefittingfromNewAsylumAid,''MiamiHerald,September11,1987.6C.
34.R.A.Zaldívar,"VagueLawsSpurRefugeeMovements,"MiamiHerald,January15,1989,1A;RichardWallace,"NicaraguansJamINSOfficesforWorkPapers,"MiamiHerald,August23,1987,1B;TinaMontalvo,"JobPermitsGoingFastatINSOffices;10,200NicaraguansProcessedin4Days,"MiamiHerald,September6,1987,1B.
35.RodrigoLazo,"LackingAid,ImmigrantsWaittoLearn,"MiamiHerald,October12,1988,1B.
Page247
36.ChristopherMarquis,"InMiami,ConfusionReignsforApplicants,"MiamiHerald,December17,1988,1A.
37.DavidHancock,"U.S.DeniesPolicyShiftonHandlingNicaraguans,"MiamiHerald,December15,1988,1D.
38.Zaldívar,"VagueLawsSpurRefugeeMovements";Chardy,"MuchofBlameforInfluxPutonFailedReaganPolicy";Marquis,"NicaraguanExileCommunityForgesNewLife.''
39.ChristopherMarquis,"ManyNicaraguansRejectCalltoGoHome,"MiamiHerald,April3,1989,1B.
40.MichaelBrowning,"AntibilingualBackersCelebrateEarly,"MiamiHerald,November5,1980,1B.
41."NicaraguanRefugees:HowtheCommunityFeels,"MiamiHerald,January20,1989,24A.
42.LuisFeldsteinSoto,"NicaraguanInfluxStrainsSchools,Services,"MiamiHerald,July5,1987,2B.
43.Ibid.;RichardJ.Feinstein,"WhyPublicHospitalsAreAiling,"MiamiHerald,February10,1985,3E;ChristopherMarquis,"DadeUnpreparedforRefugeeInflux,"MiamiHerald,October23,1988,1A;CharlesWhited,"WashingtonIsGuiltyofBig,FatBlunderoverRefugees,"MiamiHerald,January14,1989,1B;Marquis,"NicaraguanExileCommunityForgesNewLife."
44.QuotedinSandraDibble,"ImmigrationDebateErupts,"MiamiHerald,December22,1988,1C.
45.Ibid.Ofcourse,thereweresomewhostillignoredthenewestarrivalsintheircity.Duringthe1988-89NicaraguanrefugeecrisisandjustbeforeMiami'shostingoftheSuperBowl,TomFerguson,presidentoftheBeaconCouncil,agroupofbusinessmendevotedto
promotingMiami'simage,declared:"Ihatetosayit,butbecauseoftheSuperBowl,people'senergiesarefocusedinanotherdirectionnow."
46.Ibid.
47."HowtheCommunityIsResponding,"MiamiHerald,January13,1989,19A.
48.GeoffreyBiddulph,"BlacksFeelLeftOutasRefugeesGetJobs,"MiamiHerald,January20,1989,1D.
49.BeaHines,"OvertownFeelsPain,Frustration,"MiamiHerald,January18,1989,1A.
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50.Marquis,"MiamiGrappleswithInflux."
51.Ibid.
52.Ibid.
53.JoeStarita,"NicaraguansStreamintoMiamiStadium,anUnlikelyRefuge,"MiamiHerald,January13,1989,1A.
54."HowtheCommunityIsResponding."
55.RodrigoLazo,"MassOffersRayofHopeforRefugees,"MiamiHerald,December26,1988,1B.
56.RichardCapen,"HandIsOuttotheTempest-tossed,"MiamiHerald,January1,1989,3C;LizBalmaseda,"TheNewNicaragua,"MiamiHerald,February5,1989,1-6G.
57.Biddulph,"BlacksFeelLeftOut."
58.FredStrasser,"NicaraguansShareFightforFreedomatCubans'Rally,"MiamiHerald,May21,1984,1B.
59.BarbaraGutierrez,"SuppliestoBeFerriedtoRefugees,"MiamiHerald,June26,1983,4B.
60.BarbaraGutierrez,"CubansHoldMarathontoRaiseMoneyforNicaraguanGuerrillas,"MiamiHerald,August1,1983,3B.Overfourmonthslatertheaid,however,wasstillundelivered;see"AidforRebelsUndelivered,"MiamiHerald,April29,1984,6B.
61.SandraDibble,"NicaraguanCardinalBringsPeaceMessage,"MiamiHerald,June14,1985,1A;LourdesMeluza,"SpanishRadioMarathontoRaiseNicaraguanAidFunds,"MiamiHerald,June14,1985,2C.TheCubanAmericanradiostationsconductmarathonsforavarietyofcauses,mostrelatedtotheLatincommunityandagoodnumberconcernedspecificallywithanticommunism;seeSandra
Dibble,''LatinListenersOpenHeartstoAirwaveAppeals,"MiamiHerald,December15,1985,1A.
62.Strasser,"NicaraguansShareFightforFreedom."
63.FabiolaSantiago,"$100,000FundtoPayTuitionfor100Exiles,"MiamiHerald,January9,1985,6B.
64.Veciana-Suarez,"NicaraguanExilesBegintoClimbtheLadder";BenBarber,"OpenThree:EnclaveforExiles,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsS.E."sec.,December29,1983,14.
65.LawrenceJosephs,"RanchosCarriesonTradition,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsS.E."sec.,July7,1983,31.
Page249
66.Veciana-Suarez,"NicaraguanExilesBegintoClimbtheLadder."
67.Veciana-SuarezandDibble,"Miami'sNicaraguans."
68.Ibid.
69.Ibid.
70.KarenBranch,"NicaraguanCulture:AliveandGrowinginDade,"MiamiHerald,"Neighbors"sec.,May25,1989,20.
71.KarenBranch,"NicaraguansTrytoHelpTheirOwn,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsKendall"sec.,June4,1989,10.
72.Veciana-SuarezandDibble,"Miami'sNicaraguans."
73.Ibid.
74.Branch,"NicaraguanCulture."
75.Ibid.
76.SantiagoandGutierrez,"Dade'sLittleManagua,"16A;SandraDibble,"NicaraguansLobbyingtoStayinU.S.Legally,MiamiHerald,August15,1985,2D;JayGayoso,"NicaraguanFlightsforRefugees'Aid,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsS.E."sec.,January18,1987,16;idem,"BattleUnitesNicaraguanRefugees,''MiamiHerald,"NeighborsS.E."sec.,February8,1987,3;KarenBranch,"NicaraguanExileGroupsUniteinAppealtoMack,"MiamiHerald,July1,1989,3B.
77.SantiagoandGutierrez,"Dade'sLittleManagua."
78."NicaraguanExilesSeekOverallLeader,"MiamiHerald,September12,1989,3B.
79.Marquis,"RefugeesFindExilesThriving."
80."Immigration:HowtoControlIt;ALegalLimbo"(5thofa
series),MiamiHerald,December30,1983,28A.
81."TheCuban-AmericanCommunityandtheMiamiHerald,"MiamiHerald,October19,1987,11A.
82."AtLast,WorkPermits."
83."MercyforRefugees,"MiamiHerald,June26,1988,2C.
84."NicaraguanExodus,"MiamiHerald,October20,1988,24A.
85."ImmoralPolicy,"MiamiHerald,December17,1988,34A.
86."RoomattheInfield,"MiamiHerald,December25,1988,2C.
87.Whited,"WashingtonIsGuiltyofBig,FatBlunder."
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8LostintheFray:Miami'sBlackMinorities
1.ScottKraftandBarryBearak,"AfterMiami,MandelaFindsHero'sWelcomeinDetroit,"LosAngelesTimes,June29,1990,A18-19.
2.ElinorBurkettandSharonyAndrews,"RhythmsofAfricanPridePulsateinMiamiStreets,"MiamiHerald,June29,1990,13A.
3.KraftandBearak,"AfterMiami,MandelaFindsHero'sWelcome."
4.KimberlyCrockett,ElinorBurkett,andKarenBranch,"GrassrootsWelcomeCountersOfficialSnub,"MiamiHerald,June29,1990,1A,12A.TheBlackcommissionersubsequentlydidgototheconventiontogreetMandela.Unfortunately,Mandelawaslate,andthecommissionerhadtoleavebeforeMandelaarrived.
5.CarlGoldfarb,"Mandela'sVisitPromptsRerunofOldEthnicBattles,"MiamiHerald,July1,1990,lB,4B.
6.CarlGoldfarb,"MandelaBackers,CriticsBraceforMomentousVisit,"MiamiHerald,June28,1990,4A,4B.
7.MargariaFichtner,"StillFartoGo,SistersWhoLedSit-insinSixtiesStillSeekDignity.'Isn'tThatRidiculous?'"MiamiHerald,July3,1990,1C,2C.
8.CharlesStrouseandDavidHancock,"1,000HaitiansTrapStoreowner,"MiamiHerald,July1,1990,lB,2B.Itisimpossibletoassignresponsibilityinthisincident.TheHaitiancustomerapparentlyhadapolicerecordforviolence,whiletheCubanemployeehadareputationforbeingsurlyandattimesverballyabusiveofcustomers.
9.KimberlyCrockett,DavidHancock,andCarlosHarrison,"PoliceCrushHaitianProtest,"MiamiHerald,July6,1990,1A,12A.
10.WilliamJ.Wilson,"TheUnderclass:Issues,Perspectives,and
PublicPolicy,"AnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialSciences516(January1989):182-92;CaroleMarks,"TheUrbanUnderclass,"AnnualReviewofSociology17(1991):445-66.
11.See.MartinM.Marger,RaceandEthnicRelations(Belmont,Calif.:Wadsworth,1991),5.Margerstartshistextbookwiththestoryoftheserepeatedincidents.
12.Fieldinterview,January8,1987.
13.GailEpstein,"ContractsStillScarceforBlacks,"MiamiHerald,September29,1991,1B,3B.
Page251
14.JointCenterforEnvironmentalandUrbanProblems,AnEvaluationofRedevelopmentinOvertown(Miami:FloridaInternationalUniversity,October1991),3and9(table1).
15.InterviewswithProfessorRickTardanicoandKevinYelvingtonofFloridaInternationalUniversity,whoconductedresearchfortheJointCenterforEnvironmentalandUrbanProblems;seeibid.
16.Epstein,"ContractsStillScarce."
17.AndresViglucci,"LibertyCityRiseslikethePhoenix;GroupAccomplishesChangeFewEnvisioned,"MiamiHerald,July22,1990,lB,7B.
18.HeatherDewarandMikeWard,"Teele:JobsWouldHealMiami'sWoes,"MiamiNews,October16,1987,1A,7A.
19.KimberlyCrockettandPatrickMay,"BlackProtestsDrawonPast,LooktoFuture,"MiamiHerald,November12,1990,lB,2B.
20."PageOneComment-MiamiRunbyCubanMafia,"MiamiTimes,December20,1990,1.
21.Fieldinterview,January8,1987.
22.Goldfarb,"MandelaVisitPromptsRerun."
23.RobertL.Steinback,"TensionsPushMiamitoBrinkofItsOwnWar,"MiamiHerald,December28,1990,lB.
24.TheresearchfromwhichthisquotecomesisreportedinAlexStepick,MaxCastro,MarvinDunn,andGuillermoGrenier,"NewcomersandEstablishedResidents:TheCaseofMiami,"FinalReporttotheFordFoundationfortheChangingRelationsProject(Miami:CenterforLaborResearchandStudy,FloridaInternationalUniversity,1989).
25.Fieldinterview,January1987.
26.SeeAlexStepick,"TheBusinessCommunityofLittleHaiti,"Dialogueno.32,OccasionalPaperSeries,LatinAmericanandCaribbeanCenter(Miami:FloridaInternationalUniversity,February1984),1-45;idem,"LittleHaiti,"inMiami:InsightCityGuides,ed.JoannBiondi(London:APAPublications,1991),209-16;andIntegratedAdvertising,S&RHaitianTelephoneDirectory,1987(Miami:IntegratedManagementGroup,1987).
27.AlexStepick,"TheHaitianInformalSectorinMiami,"CityandSociety5(June1991):10-22;idem,"Miami'sTwoInformalSectors,"inTheInformalEconomy:StudiesinAdvancedandLessDevelopedCoun-
Page252
tries,ed.A.Portes,M.Castells,andL.Benton(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1989),111-31.
28.DavidHancock,SandraDibble,andKimberlyCrockett,"Haitians:WeWantRespectinS.Florida,"MiamiHerald,July22,1990,1A,17A;NancySanMartin,"HaitiansStruggleforUnityinNewLand,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsNorth"sec.,September23,1990,16-17.
29.See,forexample,1983-87issuesofPótparól,publishedbytheHaitianTaskForce,Miami.
30.ThomasMonnay,"HaitiansAreStillSmartingfromtheEffectsofBloodBanStigma,"MiamiTimes,January3,1991,1A.
31.KimberlyCrockettandSandraDibble,"NewTensionsSeizingDade:HaitiansVentLongstillAnger,"MiamiHerald,July3,1990,lB,2B.
32.AnaSantiagoandIvanRomán,"Haitianosdenuncianbrutalidadpolicial,"ElNuevoHerald,July7,1990,1A,6A.
33.NancySanMartin,AndresViglucci,andDavidHancock,"PeacefulRallyEndsDaysofDivisiveness,"MiamiHerald,July8,1990,lB,2B.
34.MarjorieValburnandSharonyAndrews,"AristideSawHaitians,U.S.BlacksasOne,"MiamiHerald,September28,1991,lB,4B;BarryBearak,"EthnicRelationsinMiamiUnravel,"LosAngelesTimes,July8,1990,A21.
35.Stepick,Castro,Dunn,andGrenier,"NewcomersandEstablishedResidents."
36.CarlGoldfarb,"DawkinsLeavesTown,TurmoilBehind,"MiamiHerald,July7,1990,lB.
37.MarvinDunn,FloridaInternationalUniversity,personalcommunication.
38.Stepick,Castro,Dunn,andGrenier,"NewcomersandEstablishedResidents."
39.Ibid.
40.ResultsofpreliminaryfieldworkinMiamiforaprojectentitled"ChildrenofImmigrants,theAdaptationProcessoftheSecondGeneration,"supportedbytheSpencerFoundationandNationalScienceFoundation;AlejandroPortesandLisandroPerez,principalinvestigators,1990.
41.NancySanMartinandXoseAlvarez-Alfonso,"HaitianFamiliesAreMovingouttotheSuburbs,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsNorth-
Page253
west"sec.,October14,1990,20,21.ForsimilarprocesseswithHaitiansinothercities,seeTekleWoldemikael,BecomingBlackAmerican:HaitiansandAmericanInstitutionsinEvanston,Illinois(NewYork:AMSPress,1989);SusanBuchanan,"ScatteredSeeds:TheMeaningofMigrationforHaitiansinNewYorkCity"(Ph.D.diss.,NewYorkUniversity,1980);idem,"TheCulturalMeaningofSocialClassforHaitiansinNewYorkCity,"EthnicGroups5(1983):7-30;andLorettaJ.P.Saint-Louis,"MigrationEvolves:ThePoliticalEconomyofNetworkProcessandForminHaiti,theU.S.,andCanada"(Ph.D.diss.,BostonUniversity,1988).
42.AllanalysesofHaitiansocietyemphasizeitsclassandcolordivisions.AmongthemostinsightfulisMichel-RolphTrouillot,Haiti,StateAgainstNation:TheOriginsandLegacyofDuvalierism(NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress,1990).
43.AlexStepick,"TheRefugeesNobodyWants:HaitiansinMiami,"inGrenierandStepick(eds.),MiamiNow!,57-82.
44.Stepick,"BusinessCommunityofLittleHaiti";idem,"LittleHaiti."
45.NancySanMartinandKarenBranch,"MiamiHaitiansMarch,"MiamiHerald,October3,1991,18A;HaroldMaass,"'We'reNotGoingtoStop,'HaitiansCryin6thProtest,"MiamiHerald,October6,1991,lB,2B;DavidHancockandJonO'Neill,"5,000toU.S.:BackAristide,TakeRefugees,"MiamiHerald,November17,1991,lB,2B.
46.Fieldinterviewbyauthors,October1991.
47.NancySanMartin,"Miami'sHaitiansNotAllofOneMindontheAristidePresidency,"MiamiHerald,October5,1991,2B.
48.Inthisandthefollowingcitations,italicsareusedtoindicatecommonthemesexpressedbyBlackandwhiteinformants.
49.DavidLawrence,Jr.,"FindaWaytotheFutureforEveryone,"MiamiHerald,December2,1990,3G.
50.Miami'sBusinessAssistanceCenter,promotionalbrochure,1987;courtesyofN.Daughtrey,BAC'sformerexecutivedirector.
51.Fieldinterview,January12,1987.
52.Fieldinterview,January8,1992.
53.FieldinterviewswithwhitebusinessleadersinMiami,January1987andJanuary1992.
54.U.S.BureauoftheCensus,TheHispanicPopulationoftheUnited
Page254
States,1989(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1990);idem,SurveyofMinority-ownedBusinessEnterprises,1987/Hispanics.
55.CitedduringinterviewwithGuillermoMartinez,thenLatinaffairscolumnistoftheMiamiHerald,January13,1987.
56.FieldinterviewswithCubancommunityandbusinessleadersinMiami,JanuaryandDecember1987.
57.Ibid.;dataonCubanbusinessandcivicparticipationwereprovidedbyourinformants.
58.Fieldinterview,December22,1987.
59.Fieldinterview,January8,1987.
9Reprise
1.AdnaF.Weber,TheGrowthofCitiesintheNineteenthCentury:AStudyinStatistics(Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1967),172.SeealsotheclassicessayontheoriginsofEuropeanurbanizationbyHenriPirenne,MedievalCities:TheirOriginsandtheRevivalofTrade(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,[1925]1970);andMaxWeber,TheCity(NewYork:FreePress,[1921]1966),chap.1.
2.FrançoisLamarche,"PropertyDevelopmentandtheEconomicFoundationsoftheUrbanQuestion,"inUrbanSociology:CriticalEssays,ed.C.G.Pickvance(NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,1976),86.
3.AmoredetailedcritiqueofthisargumentispresentedinAlejandroPortes,"UnauthorizedImmigrationandImmigrationReform:PresentTrendsandProspects,"inDeterminantsofEmigrationfromMexico,CentralAmerica,andtheCaribbean,ed.S.Diaz-BriquetsandS.Weintraub(Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress,1991),76-97.
4.Ibid.;AristideZolberg,"TheNextWaves:MigrationTheoryforaChangingWorld,"InternationalMigrationReview23(Fall1989):403-30;AbdelmalekSayad,"ImmigrationinFrance:An'Exotic'FormofPoverty"(PaperpresentedattheconferenceonUrbanPoverty,Migration,andMarginality,MaisonSuger,Paris,May1991).
5.J.H.Parry,PhilipSherlock,andAnthonyMaingot,AShortHistoryoftheWestIndies,4thed.(NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,1987);FranklinW.KnightandColinA.Palmer,TheModernCaribbean(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1989),chaps.1,4,6,7,8,12;SidneyW.MintzandSallyPrice,CaribbeanContours(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1985),chaps.1,7;AndréCorten,CarlosM.Vilas,MercedesAcosta,andIsisDuarte,AzucarypoliticaenlaRepúblicaDominicana(SantoDomingo:Taller,1976).
Page255
6.Rieff,GoingtoMiami.
7.ForadescriptionoftheplacesofdestinationofmajorU.S.-boundimmigrantandrefugeeflows,seePortesandRumbaut,ImmigrantAmerica,chap.2.
8.TomFielder,"Politically,We'llHardlyRecognizethePlace,"MiamiHerald,October6,1991,5C.
9.Fieldobservationsbytheauthors,Miami,1989.ThespeakerwentontobecomeaprominentmemberoftheMiamiChamberofCommerce.
10.RichardWallace,"SouthFloridaGrowstoaLatinBeat,"MiamiHerald,March6,1991,1-2Z;CarlGoldfarb,"AlienationKeepsMiami'sAnglosawayfromPolls,"MiamiHerald,November19,1989,1-2B.
11.JamesK.Batten,"Miami'sCan-DoSpiritRemainsStrongEveninToughTimes,"MiamiHerald,October10,1991.
12.Ibid.
13.DavidLawrence,Jr.,"GetontheBall...LearnaLanguage,"MiamiHerald,March24,1991,2C.
14.XavierL.Suárez,"MiamiIsPoisedtoFulfill'CityoftheFuture'Role,"MiamiHerald,December6,1989.
15.Lopez-Miró,"Wherethe'Cuban'Ends."
16.Aseven-year-oldgirlalludedtointheabovecolumnrepliedtoLopez-Mirósaying,"IperfectlyknowwhereIcomefromandwhoIam.Myidentityandmyimageareveryclear:IamfromtheUnitedStatesandIknowit.ButmyCubanheritageIcannotignore."SeeRoxanneValdés,"AmericanWithCubanBlood,"MiamiHerald,February15,1990,26A.
17.Dahl,WhoGoverns?,33-34.
18.RichardD.LammandGaryImhoff,TheImmigrationTime-Bomb:TheFragmentingofAmerica(NewYork:E.P.Dutton,1985),123-24.
19.TheclassicstatementabouttheenduringsignificanceofethnicityforurbanpoliticsisNathanGlazerandDanielP.Moynihan,BeyondtheMeltingPot:TheNegroes,PuertoRicans,Jews,Italians,andIrishofNewYorkCity(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1970).SeealsoAndrewGreeley,WhyCan'tTheyBeLikeUs?America'sWhiteEthnicGroups(NewYork:E.P.Dutton,1971);andRichardD.Alba,ItalianAmericans:IntotheTwilightofEthnicity(EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:PrenticeHall,1985).
20.Fieldinterview.January7and8,1992.
Page256
21.SandraDibble,"ThinkTankSeeksWide-rangingPlanforLifeAfterCastro,"MiamiHerald,February23,1990,1-3B.
22.PabloAlfonso,"PanelOffersaPlanforGoverningNewCuba,"MiamiHerald,March3,1990.
23.SeeCarmeloMesa-Lago,"Cuba'sEconomicCounter-Reform:Causes,Policies,andEffects,"JournalofCommunistStudies5(December1989):98-139;andPeterT.White,"CubaataCrossroads,"NationalGeographic,August1991,94-121.Forananalysisoftheinternalcontradictionsunderminingtherevolutionaryregime,seeArielHidalgo,Cuba:elestadomarxistaylanuevaclase(Miami:GeneralPrinting,1988).
24.GuillermoJ.Grenier,HughGladwin,andDouglasMcLaughen,ViewsonPolicyOptionsTowardCubaHeldbyCuban-AmericanResidentsofDadeCounty,Florida:TheResultsoftheSecond1991CubaPoll(Miami:CubanResearchInstitute,FloridaInternationalUniversity,1991).
25.Anillustrationcanbefoundincoverageofthe1991GulfWar.SaddamHusseinwasconsistentlylikenedtoFidelCastrointheCubanexilemedia.Onecommentatorafteranothersuggestedthat,afterHussein'sdefeat,thelogicalthingtodowastotransportthemobilizedtroopstotheCaribbeanandthusdoawaywiththeremainingthreattonationalsecurity.
26.HowardKleinberg,"GreaterMiami'sCrossroadsoftheVanities;CityRenamesHistoryStreetsattheWhimofPoliticians,"MiamiHerald,July31,1990.
Postscript
1.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,149-50.
2.SeanRowe,"Hugo'sHomeboys,"NewTimes,September2-8,1992,13-14.
3."TheWorstWind,"NewTimes,September2-8,1992(specialissue).
4.Thiscommonpatternhasbeennotedbyspecialistsonthefieldinthepast;seeFrederickL.BatesandWalterG.Peacock,"DisastersandSocialChange,"inTheSociologyofDisasters,ed.R.R.DynesandC.Pelanda(Gorizia,It.:FrancoAngeliPress,1987),291-330.
5.Thesearticlesconsistentlyfocusedonthethemethatpeoplewhobarelyspoketoeachotherbeforecametogethertosharewhatlittletheyhadinthedaysafterthehurricane.Onesucharticleannouncedinits
Page257
headline:"AtLongLast,Neighbors:TheStormThatToreSouthDadeApartHasBroughtManyofItsPeopleTogether"(byCurtisMorgan,intheMiamiHerald,September5,1992,1-2F).
6.DavidSatterfield,"WeWillRebuildHits$11Million,"MiamiHerald,September19,1992,1A,20A.
7.LisandroPerez,"HurricaneHasSeverelyTiltedCommunityDemographics,"MiamiHerald,September27,1992,4M.
8."WorstWind."
9.Satterfield,"WeWillRebuild,"20A.
Page259
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Struck,Doug."HostagesSetFree,OakdaleInmatesYield."BaltimoreSun,November30,1987,1A.
Suarez,Andrés.Cuba:CastroismandCommunism,1959-1966.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1967.
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Page275
Index
A
Abrams,Elliot,158
Acculturation-in-reverse,8,17,220,225
African-Americans.SeeBlacks
AIDSamongHaitianimmigrants,188,189
AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion(ACLU),177
AmericanFederationofState,County,andMunicipalEmployees(AFSCME),176
AmericanInternationalContainer,130-131
Anglos.SeeWhites
AnticommunismamongCubanimmigrants,143,176
Aristide,Jean-Bertrand,138,193-194
Artime,Manuel,101
Assimilation:biculturalismand,8
ethnicityand,5-7
ethnicpoliticsand,215-218
speedof,6,7
Auténticoparty,98
Aviño,Joaquin,165
B
Bahamians,76
BalletFolklóricoNicaragüense,169
Batista,Fulgencio,97-99,102
Batten,JamesK.,213
BayofPigsinvasion,30,102,106,126,127
Biculturalism,175
andassimilation,8
BigFiveClub,131
Bilingualism:employmentand,12
oppositionto,34,35,147,161
socialrelationsand,12.
SeealsoEnglishOnlymovement;Language
BiscayneBay,74
BlackLawyersAssociation,177
Blacks:Black-ownedbusinessesand,43,78,179-180,182,196,197-199,233n.9
boycottofMiamiand,141,177,184,190
boycottofpublicschoolsand,183,184,190
comparedtoforeignblacks,196
discriminationagainst,77-78
divisionsamongleaders,183-184
doublesubordinationof,10,47,50,194-195,197,202,217
inearlyFlorida,72,76-80
economicdevelopmentand,195
employmentof,39-46,179-181
incomeof,40-42,44
localeconomyand,14
localpoliticsand,182-184,199
Lozanocaseand,2-3
middleclass,40,42,78,178-180,181-184
NewDealand,78
policeviolenceagainst,2-3,47-48,50,178,179,189
relationswithCubanimmigrants,12,13,14,16,38-39,140-141,176-177,182-184,196-197,199-202
relationswithHaitianimmigrants,177-178,185,189-192
relationswithwhites,14,195-199
residencepatternsof,184,186
residentialsegregationof,77,79-80
segregationand,38
self-employmentof,199
violenceagainst,77-78,80
visitofMandelaand,141,176-177
Boatpeople.SeeHaitianimmigrants
BobbyMaduroStadium,164-166
Botifoll,Luis,36
Boundedsolidarity:amongCubanimmigrants,135,136,137,139
amongHaitianimmigrants,193
amongNicaraguanimmigrants,169
Broward,NapoleonBonaparte,87,91
Bush,George,213,224
Bush,Jeb,123,124,213
BusinessAssistanceCenter(BAC),179,198-199,201
C
Camarioca,Cuba,103-104
Camayd-Freixas,Yohel,27
Carey,Barbara,162
Page276
CaribbeanmigrationtoU.S.,206-207
Carter,Jimmy,24,25,26,29,159
Carteradministration:Cuban-Americanvotersand,22,24
policytowardHaitianimmigrants,54
policytowardMarielboatlift,22,24
CasaComunidad,170
Castro,Fidel,18
anticipateddemiseof,218-221
asanti-imperialistsymbol,143
descriptionofMarielrefugees,21
movementagainstBatistaand,97-99
supportforSandinistas,166
visitofMandelaand,141,176
CenterforStudyoftheAmericas,20
CentersforDiseaseControl,188
CentralAmericaPro-RefugeeCommission,166
CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA):Cubanbusinessesand,129,242n.10
JM-Waveand,126,127
supportofanti-Castroexiles,101,126-127,129,142
ChamberofCommerce,GreaterMiami,35,179,212
Chapman,Alvah,198,226
Characterloans,132-135
CharlesI(HolyRomanEmperor),64
Chisholm,Shirley,54
CitizensofDadeUnited,161,162,174
CivicLeagueofColoredTown,79
Class:divisionsamongBlacks,178-184,197
divisionsamongHaitianimmigrants,178,192-194
divisionsamongNicaraguanimmigrants,172-173
in"YankeeCity,"5
CoastGuard,U.S.:Haitianimmigrantsand,52,188
Marielboatliftand,24,53
CocoanutGrove,62,72,76,90
CoconutGrove,184
Collins,JohnS.,72-73
ColoredBoardofTrade,79
"ColoredTown,"76-80,93,202
Communitypower,theoriesof,4
CongressionalBlackCaucus,Haitianimmigrantsand,54
CongressofRacialEquality(CORE),177
Constructionindustry:Cubanimmigrantsin,133-134
ethnicgroupsin,40-41
Nicaraguanimmigrantsin,154
Convergenceofethniccommunities,221,224-225,227
CoralGables,Fla.,74-75,84,128
incorporationof,81
Corporatecontrol:ofcities,4-5
inMiami,8
CouncilofNationalLiberation,98
Creole(language),52,54,59,189,191,193
Cuba:anticipateddemiseofCastroand,218-221
independencemovementin,89-94
Kennedyadministrationpolicytoward,103
nationalidentityof,94
newmigrationfrom,218
relationswithU.S.,93-96,106
Cuban-American:useofterm,148.SeeCubanimmigrants
Cuban-AmericanNationalFoundation(CANF),132
foundingof,35,148
futureofCubaand,218
HurricaneAndrewreliefand,226
influenceinWashington,158
MiamiHeraldand,15,138,173
politicalactionbranchof,148
Cubanethniceconomy:apprenticeshipin,145-146
characterloansand,132-135
creditin,132-135
developmentof,126,144-147
futureof,220
hegemonyofconservatismand,144
originsof,127-129
roleofsocialcapitalin,135-137
self-employmentin,146
socialnetworksin,135-137
Cuban-HaitianInteragencyTaskForce,54,234n.24
Cubanimmigrants:conflictwithMiamiHerald,15-16
Cuban-ownedbusinessesand,43,46,182
discriminationagainst,135,147,200
electoralpowerof,141
involvementinlocalpolitics,29-30,35,37,148-149,182-183,201,210-211,225
Johnsonadministrationpolicytoward,103,142
Kennedyadministrationand,30,142
middleclass,40-42,100
asmoralcommunity,137-144,145
aspoliticalexilesinU.S.,63-67,89-99,101-102
politicalintoleranceof,137-144
prospectofreturningtoCubaand,218-219
publicopiniontoward,31
asrefugeesfromCastroregime,102-105,106-107,126-127
relationswithBlacks,12,13,14,16,38-39,140-141,176-177,182-184,196-197,199-202
relationswithHaitianimmigrants,177-178
relationswithwhites,17
resettlementof,103-105
residencepatternsof,184,187
responsetoMarielrefugees,21,29,30-37
self-employmentof,40
Page277
199
assuccessstory,30-36
upperclass,207
womenworkers,127-128.
SeealsoMarielrefugees
Cubanimmigration:comparedtoHaitianimmigration,51-54,188
comparedtoNicaraguanimmigration,151-152,156-157,159,169-170,173
politicalasylumand,157.
SeealsoMarielboatlift
CubanMissileCrisis,102,106,126,142
CubanRefugeeCenter,75,105,127
CubanRefugeeProgram,103
CubanRevolutionaryCouncil,91-92,126,142
CubanRevolutionaryParty,90
D
DadeCounty:Blackofficialsin,179-180,181
contractswithBlackfirms,179,181
economicallyactivepopulationof,208-209
electedofficialsin,210-211
hurricanepreparednessof,224
impactofredistrictingon,212
Dahl,RobertA.:ethnicpoliticsand,215-216
pluralisttheoryand,4,215,216,217,218
Dale,Bennett,23
DaytonaBeach,Fla.,97
"Definitionofthesituation":conceptdefined,9
varietiesof,inMiami,10-16
DeSoto,Hernando,64
Diaz-Balart,Lincoln,225
Diaz-Oliver,Remedios,130-131,132
Dickson,Clarence,46
Didion,Joan,17
Discourse:ofAngloculturalreaffirmation,10
ofanticommunism,143
assimilationist,149
ofBlackdoublesubordination,10,47,50,194-195,197,217
ofBlacks,49
ofCubanconservatives,143-144
ofCubanliberals,143
ofCubansuccessstory,10,149,212,226
defined,9
minority,149
newAnglo,213-214
unificationof,225
varietiesof,inMiami,9-17
"Disposalproblem,"127
Dorsey,DavidA.,78
Due,Patricia,177
Dulles,Allen,126
Dunn,Marvin,39,48
E
EdisonHighSchool,185,189,191
ElectoralCounciloftheNicaraguanExodus,172
Employment:ofBlacks,39-46
ofCubanimmigrants,39-46
ofHaitians,56-58
ofnativewhites,39-46
ofNicaraguans,152-156
Enforceabletrust:amongCubanimmigrants,136,137
amongHaitianimmigrants,193
EnglishOnlymovement:amendmenttoFloridaconstitutionand,161
campaignissuesof,161
inMiami,11
EnterprisezoneinBlackneighborhoods,180
Ethnicity:assimilationand,5-8
inMiami,210-215.
Seealsospecificnationalities
Ethnicpolitics,215-216.Seealsospecificnationalities
Ethnics:defined,5.Seealsospecificnationalities
F
Factorbanking,134
FactsaboutCubanExiles(FACE),35
Fair,T.willard,184
Fascell,Dante,162
Fauntroy,Walter,54
Ferré,Maurice,23,24,183
Fisher,CarlJ.,73
Flagler,HenryM.,61,62,71-74
Florida:Americanconquestof,67-70
economicdevelopmentof,61-63,71-76
Englishcolonizationof,66
Frenchcolonizationof,65
historicalconnectionstoCuba,63-67,90-101
asindependentrepublic,70
Indiansin,63-64,65,68-69,70
legacyofCivilWarin,70-71
proliferationoflocalgovernmentsin,80-81
settlementpatternof,74,82
slavesin,67,70
Spanishcolonizationof,63-68
statepoliticsin,71,82-83
FloridaEastCoastRailway,62,72,81,91
FloridaInternationalUniversity(FIU),13,219
FloridaNeedletradeAssociation,127,128
Fonda,Jane,137
FoodandDrugAdministration(FDA),Haitianimmigrantsand,188
FordFoundation,54
FortChaffee,Ark.,25
FortIndiantownGap,Pa.,25
FortLauderdale,Fla.,56,69
FortMyers,Fla.,69
FortPierce,Fla.,69
Page278
Frames,cognitive:defined,9
inMiami,10-16,212
FreeCubaCommittee,148
"Freedomflights,"104,106
FreedomFlotilla,20,22
G
Gálvez,Bernardode,66,67
Garmentindustry:Blacksin,40-41
Cubanimmigrantsin,40-41,127-128
Haitianimmigrantsin,154
Jewsin,127-128
Nicaraguanimmigrantsin,154
whitesin,40-41
Gary,Howard,182
Geertz,Clifford,136
Glazer,Nathan,6
Graham,Bob,24,162
Graham,ErnestG.,85
Grambling,John,79
Granma,97
GreaterMiamiNegroCivicLeague,79
Greeley,Andrew,6
Greer,TeeS.,183
H
Haitian-AmericanCommunityAgencyofDade(HACAD),54
Haitianethniceconomy,185,192-193
Haitianimmigrants:Blackresponseto,55-56
Carteradministrationpolicytoward,54
characteristicsof,56-58
classdivisionsamong,193-194
discriminationagainst,58
Haitian-ownedbusinessesand,193
middleclass,51,54,192-194
policeviolenceagainst,178,181,188-189
politicaldivisionsamong,193-194
inpublicschools,191-192
relationswithBlacks,177-178,185,189-192
relationswithCubanimmigrants,177-178
residencepatternsof,56
whiteresponseto,51,55
workingclass,51,194
Haitianimmigration:comparedtoCubanimmigration,51-54,188
phasesof,51
politicalasylumand,53-54
Reaganadministrationpolicytoward,52,53
responseofwhitesto,51,55
HaitianRefugeeCenter,52,54
HaitianTaskForce,54
Havana,Cuba,18,23,100
Herald,El,15,175
Herald,ElNuevo,15,140,175
Hialeah,Fla.,37,39,84
Hispanics.Seespecificnationalities
HomeRuleAmendment,86
Hotelindustry:Blacksin,40-41
Cubanimmigrantsin,40-41
Hunter,Floyd,4,5
HurricaneAndrew:destructionby,223-224
impactonsocialchange,224-227
I
ImmigrationAdvisoryCommittee,162
ImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS):Cubanimmigrantsand,158
Haitianimmigrantsand,188
Marielrefugeesand,25
Nicaraguanimmigrantsand,150,157,161,163,246n.33
Informaleconomy:casualworkin,155
Haitianimmigrantsin,185
inMiami,154
Nicaraguansin,154,155,165,171
Inter-AmericanTransportEquipmentCompany,131-132
Interethnicrelations:changesin,59-60
asprobleminMiami,13-14.
Seealsospecificnationalities
InternationalMedicalCenters(IMC),123-126
Internationalmigration,theoriesof,205-206
J
Jackson,Andrew,67-68
Jackson,Jesse,53
Jacksonville,Fla.,105
Jean-Juste,Gerard,52,193
Jews:communityof,73
Cubanimmigrantsand,14
discriminationagainst,73
EnglishOnlyand,161
ingarmentindustry,127-128
asresidents,84-85
astourists,84
visitofMandelaand,141,176-177
K
Kennedy,Edward,54
KeyWest,Fla.,89-90,93,95
King,MartinLuther,Jr.,39
Knight-RidderCorporation,14,34,198,200,213.SeealsoHerald,El;Herald,ElNuevo;MiamiHerald
KuKluxKlan,39,77-78,79,80
L
Laborunions,inconstruction,133-134
Lamarche,François,204
Lamm,RichardD.,216
Language:assimilationand,6-7
asprobleminMiami,11-12,59.SeealsoBilingualism;EnglishOnlymovement
LatinBuildersAssociation,134
Lawrence,David,Jr.,214
Leland,Mickey,54
Page279
LibertyCity,Fla.,39,55,84,86,177,184
enterprisezonein,180
industrialparkin,180,181
1980riotand,47,48,49
originsof,79
Lieberson,Stanley,49
LittleHaiti,54,55,177,185-188,193
LittleHavana,39,99
asmodelforLittleHaiti,54,55
Nicaraguanimmigrantsin,154
Lloyd,Clement,2-3
Logan,John,4
LosRanchosRestaurant,168,169
Lozano,William,2-3,9
Lum,HenryB.,61
M
MeDuffie,Arthur,47,48
Maceo,Antonio,92
Machado,Gerardo,95-96
Mack,Connie,162,172
McKinley,William,92
McMillian,Johnnie,184
Mahoney,DanielJ.,85
Maine,92
Mandela,Nelson,visittoMiami,141,176-177
Mariátegui,Señorde,92
Marielboatlift:Carteradministrationpolicytoward,22,24,26
Cubangovernmentpolicytoward,18-22,26
originsof,18-20
Marielrefugees:Blackreactionto,25,38
Carteradministrationpolicytoward,24,25
criminalsamong,20-21,22-23,24,25,2630,32,59
Cuban-Americanresponseto,21,29,30-37
homosexualsamong,26,32
immigrationstatusof,25
INSand,25
mentalpatientsamong,22,24,26,30,59
officialCubandescriptionof,20-21
perceptionsofdiscriminationof,32-33
prisonriotsof,1-2,9
publicopinionand,30-31
publicschoolsand,25-26
whiteresponseto,23,27-30,34
Martí,José,89-90,91
Martinez,Bob,218
Martinez,Julio,141
MasCanosa,Jorge,15,218
Masvidal,Raul,201
Meese,Edwin,158,246n.33
MenéndezdeAvilés,DonPedro,65
MetroCharter,82-87
Metropolis,77,79
Metrorail,constructionof,46
Miami,Fla.:airlinkstoHavana,100,102,104
boycottof,141,177,184,190
CalleOcho,15,137,168
ascenterforCubanexiles,63-67,90-101,104,106-107
changesin1980,58-60
incorporationof,72,81
mapof,19
originsof,61-63,70,204-205
originsofmetropolitangovernmentin,85-87
politicalgeographyof,205-210,226
populationof,20,186,187,210-211
socialstructureof,8
astouristcenter,99-101,144,148,207,208
MiamiBeach,Fla.,81,84
MiamiCoalitionforaFreeSouthAfrica,177
Miami-DadeCommunityCollege:
Haitianstudentsand,185
Nicaraguanstudentsand,167
MiamiHerald:Blackviewsof,16
boycottofMiamiand,184
conflictwithCubanimmigrantcommunityand,15,16,27,138,173
creationofnewSpanisheditionof,175
discriminationagainstBlacksand,77
Marielrefugeesand,23-30
asobjectofdiscourse,10,14-16
positiononNicaraguanimmigration,173-175
aspowerbroker,85
Recareycaseand,125-126
Spanisheditionof,15.SeealsoHerald,ElHerald,El;Nuevo;Knight-RidderCorporation
Miami-ManaguaLionsClub,172
MiamiNews,85,183
MiamiPact,98
MiamiTheaterFestival,138
MiamiTimes,79
Mills,C.Wright,4-5
Mintz,SidneyW.,94
MiróCardona,José,142,240n.24
Mohl,Raymond,79
Molotch,Harvey,4
Monroe,James,68
MovementforRevolutionaryRecuperation(MRR),101
Moynihan,DanielP.,6
Munroe,Ralph,62
N
NAACP(NationalAssociationfortheAdvancementofColoredPeople),38,184
1980riotand,49
Narváez,Pánfilode,64
NationalCouncilofChurches(NCC),Haitianimmigrantsand,52
NationalOrganizationofWomen(NOW),177
NegroUpliftAssociationofDadeCounty,79
Page280
Nelson,Alan,165
Nicaragua,Contrawarin.150,153,156,157,159,166
Nicaraguan-AmericanBankersAssociation,153,158,169
NicaraguanBusinessCouncil,158
NicaraguanCommunityDay,170
NicaraguanDemocraticYouth,172
Nicaraguanimmigrants:inagriculture,155
Blackresponseto,163
classdivisionsamong,172-173
culturaltraditionsof,169,171
middleclass,151,152-153,157,168-169
politicaldifferencesamong,171-172
residencepatternsof,167-168
responseofCuban-Americancommunityto,163-167,174-175
upperclass,151,152,157,168
whiteresponseto,161-163
workingclass,152,153-156,170,171
Nicaraguanimmigration:comparedtoCubanimmigration,151-152,156-157,159,169-170,173
phasesof,151-156
politicalasylumand,157,159,160,168
responseofwhitesto,161-163
U.S.governmentpolicytoward,150-151,156,158-161,165,170
Nofziger,Lyn,124
O
ObandoyBravo,Miguel,167
Odio,Cesar,163-165,182
Oliveros,Gilda,140
Opa-Locka,Fla.,81,84,177
OperationSave,157
Osceola(Seminolechief),69
Overtown,Fla.,2,55,163,184
earlyhistoryof,70,77,70-80,89,93
enterprisezonein,180
redevelopmentin,180,181.
Seealso"ColoredTown"
P
Pennekamp,John,85
Pensacola,Fla.,66,67,70
People'sRevolutionaryMovement(MovimientoRevolucionariodelPueblo,MRP),142
Pepper,Claude,123,161
PhilipII(KingofSpain),65,236n.12
Pitts,Otis,181
Plant,HenryM.,74
Platt,OrvilleH.,93
PlattAmendment,93,95,96,106
Police:Lozanocaseand,2-3,9
McDuffiecaseand,47-48
violenceagainstBlacks,2-3,80,178,179,189
violenceagainstHaitians,178,181,188-189
PoncedeLeón,Juan,63-64,71
Porter,Bruce,39,48
PríoSocarrás,Carlos,97-99,152
Publicschools,DadeCounty:boycottof,183,184,190
Haitianimmigrantsin,185-186
Nicaraguanchildrenin,162
Q
Quinlan,MichaelJ.,1-2
R
Race,assimilationand,6-7
Racism:againstBlacks,195
inCuba,200
ofCubanimmigrants,183,195,197,199
againstHaitianimmigrants,189,193
ofwhites,195,197
Radio,MiamiCuban:philantropyof,248n.61
supportforNicaraguanimmigrants,164,166-167
visitofMandelaand,177.
SeealsoWQBALaCubanisima
RayRivero,Manuel,142
Reactiveethnicity:amongBlacks,189,217
amongCubanimmigrants,30-37
amongHaitianimmigrants,188,189
Reboredo,Pedro,Mandelavisitand,141
Recarey,Miguel,123-126
Redford,Polly,95
Reeves,Henry,79
Reilly,Robert,158
Religion,assimilationand,6-7
RemovalAct,68-69
Rieff,David,17,34,74
RiotsinMiami:in1968,48
in1980,48-50,59,179
Rivero,José,141
Rivkind,Perry,158
Román,Agustin,2,9,164
RubénDaríoInstitute,171
S
SaintAugustine,Fla.,65-66,67,71,74
Sears,John,124
Self-employment:ofBlacks,199
ofCubanimmigrants,40,199
Seminoles:attacksagainstcolonistsby,62
originofname,67
removalfromFloridaof,68-69
riseanddeclineof,70
SeminoleWar,69,71
Silverman,Arnold,49
SmallBusinessAdministration(SBA):loanstoBlacks,46
loanstoCubanimmigrants,46,133
Smith,H.T.,177,184,226
Socialcapital,amongCubanimmigrants,137,140
Page281
Socialnetworks,inCubanethniceconomy,135-137
Socialstructure,parallel,8,9,16,17
SomozaDebayle,Anastasio,152
SouthernHousingCorporation,79
SovietUnion,Cubaand,103,140
Spanish-AmericanLeagueAgainstDiscrimination(SALAD),147
Spanish-AmericanWar,93,95
Spanishlanguage,36
Srole,Leo,6-7
Suarez,DiegoR.,131,132
Suárez,Xavier,177,183,201,214
Mandetavisitand,141
SupremeCourt,92
Sweetwater,Fla.,81,152,154,168,169,170
T
Tallahassee,Fla.,105
Tampa,Fla.,93
Thomas,Hugh,95
Thomas,John,103
Thomas,W.I.,9
Thornburgh,Richard,162
ThreeFriends,91-92
TreatyofParis,66
TreatyofVersailles,67
Tuttle,Julia,62
Twenty-sixthofJulyMovement,98
U
Unemploymentratesbyraceandorigin,45
UnitedNicaraguanArtists,171
UnitedStates:relationswithCaribbean,206
relationswithCuba,93-96,106
UniversityofMiami,74
UrbanLeague,184
1980riotand,49
Urbansociology,3-4
theoriesofcommunitypower,4-5
theoriesofethnicityandassimilation,5-9
theoriesofurbanization,203-205
U.S.English,161
V
Varona,ManuelAntoniode,98
Visiedo,Osvaldo,183
VotingRightsActof1990,212
W
Walsh,BryanD.,144
Warner,W.Lloyd,5-7
Weber,Adna,203
Weber,Max,203
Welles,Sumner,96
WestMiami,Fla.,37
WeWillRebuildCommittee,224,226
Whites:discourseof10,213-214
relationswithBlacks,14,195-199
relationswithCubanimmigrants,17
responsetoHaitianimmigration,51,55
responsetoMarielrefugees,23,27-30,34
responsetoNicaraguanimmigration,161-163
Wieland,William,99
WoodlawnCemetery,96,99,152
WQBA-LaCubanisima,139,164
Y
''YankeeCity"(Newburyport,Mass.),5-8
Young,Andrew,53