Civil-Military Coordination in the Transitional Phase of Multidimensional Peace

Operations: BRABAT 18 experience in Haiti1

Bruno Soares de Cerqueira

Almost ten years after the creation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

(MINUSTAH), its Transitional Phase started, having a gradual transference of the

responsibilities, until then carried out by MINUSTAH, to the Haitian Government. As a

consequence, kinetic operations aimed at maintaining a secure and stable environment, carried

out by the military component, decreased slowly. This created the opportunity, why not say,

the necessity, to increase nonkinetic operations, to facilitate the transition and empower the

Haitian population so they can go on developing without the presence of a peace mission. In

this context and within nonkinetic operations’ scope, the Civil-Military Coordination

(CIMIC) actions have grown in figures and importance.

This article intends to present the CIMIC actions carried out the Brazilian Battalion

(BRABAT 18) while the contingent was active in Haiti, as well as to show the contribution

and importance of CIMIC to the transitional phase of peace operations.

Therefore, to start, there will be a brief explanation of what a Transitional Phase of a

peace operation is. Afterwards, the doctrinal framework that guided and limited BRABAT

actions, more specifically its CIMIC actions, will be presented. Later, there will be a brief

address on MINUSTAH and on BRABAT, to finally reach the explanation of the CIMIC

activities carried out, as well as their objectives and results achieved. During the conclusion,

CIMIC contributions to the Transitional Phase of MINUSTAH and the possibilities of this

form of nonkinetic operation for the Transitional Phase of peace operations in a broader

spectrum will be presented.

THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The deployment of UN Peace Missions goes through 3 different phases1, which can

sometimes overlap, as seen in the picture below. These phases are:

a) Rapid Deployment and Mission Start-Up;

b) Mandate Implementation, and

c) Transition/Hand-over and withdrawal/liquidation.

1 Translated by Ana Paula de Almeida Cardoso – Captain/Brazilian Army.

Deployment Phases of the Peace Missions2

The Transitional Phase itself must be planned during the initial planning of the

mission, with the definition of specific references and benchmarks which mark out the

beginning, so that the Transitional Phase do not jeopardize the ongoing efforts to consolidate

peace, conquered during the Implementation Phase. There are no general benchmarks that

can be used by all the missions; therefore, the participation of the UN System and of local

actors in its definition is of great relevance.

In MINUSTAH`s case, the planning that marked the beginning of the Transitional

Phase was called "Consolidation Plan", and was published as an annex of the Secretary-

General’s report of 08 March 20133. This Consolidation Plan, added in the beginning of the

MINUSTAH military and police components` downsizing, marked the beginning of the

Transitional Phase of the Mission.

DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK

The Civil-Military Coordination, in a broader sense, is guided by different legislations,

publications and doctrines. As an example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

has its own doctrine. The countries that make up this alliance also have their own national

doctrines, which mirror NATO`s doctrine. Many Humanitarian Organizations also have their

own publication on the subject, and the UN does not have only one, but two doctrines which

guide the coordination between civilian and military actors. They are all different according

to the type of operations in which the organizations, or the countries, usually take part.

CIMIC Course at the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB),

mandatory for military personnel to be deployed in certain functions in Peace Missions.

Specifically under the UN's scope in Haiti, the relations between these actors are

guided by UN-CIMIC4 and UN-CMCoord5doctrines. Besides these, two other publications

provide the formal base for the execution of the Civil-Military Coordination activities in the

country: Operations Order 001-12, of MINUSTAH – Operation Demen Miyò (A Better

Tomorrow, in Creole); and the Directives for Civil-Military Coordination in Haiti, of the

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The first guides the military

component in the execution of CIMIC activities and the second presents specific procedures,

structures and mechanisms of UN-CMCoord for Haiti.

The Guidelines for the Civil-Military Coordination in Haiti, updated by OCHA and

confirmed by the leaders of MINUSTAH civil, police and military components, besides the

UN Country Team6(UNCT), and the Haitian Interior Ministry, bring important evolutions

before its previous edition. The main evolution was the fact of having the participation and

the consent of the Haitian Government. These specific guidelines for Haiti are based in the

pre-existing international structure expressed in the Oslo Guidelines 7, but with the necessary

adaptations to the singularities of an "unique operational environment of natural disasters in

times of peace, in an environment occasionally insecure8" which characterizes Haiti. Besides

what is in the Oslo Guidelines, the specific guidelines for Haiti detail the existing mechanisms

at MINUSTAH to request Military Resources and Civil Defense (MCDA9) and the platforms

of Civil-Military Coordination used by MINUSTAH.

However the UN-CIMIC doctrine, which addresses the Civil-Military Coordination in

UN Integrated Peace Operations10, aims at the coordination of the military component

activities with the civil component of the mission, and also with civilian actors present in the

mission area and which are not in the peace operation, such as the UNCT, the local

government at all levels, international organizations, non-government organizations and the

population. CIMIC policy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations11specifies as

CIMIC key activities: Civil-Military liaison and Information Sharing; and Civil Assistance.

The first supports the efforts of the Force Commander12to implement the mission mandate,

while the second is a support function that:

provides support to guarantee a coordinated response of the mission to the assistance

requests from humanitarian and development actors, and

facilitates the interaction between the mission, the population and civil authorities, in

relation to the community assistance projects carried out by the military component.

The same policy establishes two reasons to conduct CIMIC activities: support the

management of interactions, at operational and tactical levels, between civil and military

actors in all the mission's phases; support the creation of a favorable environment to

implement the mission mandate, by maximizing the comparative advantages of all the actors

operating in the mission area.

Therefore, the aforementioned policy provides the concepts and principles to carry out

CIMIC activities in Peace Operations, having been used as the guiding principle of CIMIC

activities of BRABAT. However, since it is a very concise document, NATO CIMIC

doctrine13and CIMIC Field Manual 14published by NATO's CIMIC Center of Excellence were

also used, always taking into consideration that the information present in these documents

should be interpreted and adapted to the reality of Peace Operations, which is very different

from the operations usually carried out by that Alliance.

Besides these doctrines, as mentioned before, MINUSTAH Military Component was

also led by Operations Order 001-12. This Operations Order is a comprehensive document

which determined the maintenance of security in critical areas in our AOR, such as Cité

Soleil, Bel-Air, Bois-Neuf, Drouillard, Delmas, La Saline and Fort National, as one of the

BRABAT’s specific tasks. The use of CIMIC activities in these areas, to support BRABAT's

mission, will be addressed later. Operations Order 001-12 also put as the focus to the military

component the perception of the value of MINUSTAH to the Haitian population.

Specifically for CIMIC, this Operations Order correctly identified CIMIC operations

as "the most visible side of MINUSTAH", and a facilitator so that the Military Component

could conquer the help and the trust of the population.

The understanding of the doctrinal framework that led and regulated BRABAT

activities is fundamental to understand the direction given to CIMIC activities in the

beginning of MINUSTAH's Transitional Phase.

MINUSTAH

There were several relevant changes in MINUSTAH immediately before and during

the period when the 18th Contingent was deployed in Haiti, such as the issuing of the new

mission mandate - which once again downsized its strength - the upcoming of elections and

BRABAT's change of the Area of Responsibility (AOR).

The UN Secretary-General’s report, of 31 August 2012, outlined the so-called

"MINUSTAH’s consolidation plan15", which intended to reduce the strength that had been

increased after the earthquake in 2010. The goal of the plan was to reduce MINUSTAH's

activities into a core set of mandatory tasks within a period of 4 to 5 years, according to the

conditions of stability in the country. These evolutions in the stability of Haiti, still according

to the referred plan, would show that "the presence of a big peace operation would not be

necessary anymore16". That is, MINUSTAH’s consolidation plan was in fact the landmark to

the end of the implementation phase of the mission mandate and the beginning of the

Transitional Phase, which had, in a certain way, started after the Resolution 2012 of the UN

Security Council, October 2011, which decreased, for the first time, the strength of

MINUSTAH since the earthquake in 2010. One of the clearest signs to the military

component, that MINUSTAH was entering its transitional phase, was the definition of the end

state17foreseen by the Force Commander, which was "the transference of security

responsibilities to the Haitian Government... allowing the downsizing and the withdrawal of

the Military Component18".

On 12 October 2012, Resolution 2070 recognized the relative improvement of the

security situation in Haiti, which allowed the continuity of MINUSTAH's downsizing. Due to

this downsizing, two Engineering Companies - Japan and the Republic of Korea - and one

Argentinean Infantry Company had already been withdrawn from MINUSTAH, and the

withdrawal of 2 Infantry Companies from BRABAT 2 in July 2013 was already predicted.

This fact led to the liquidation of BRABAT 2 and the expansion of BRABAT 1, which

received the remaining company from that battalion, in addition to their 03 Companies and 01

Squadron. All these modifications in strength and the change from the implementation phase

of the mandate to the transitional phase of the mission had as a consequence the change of the

areas of responsibility of MINUSTAH's battalions, which created consequences to the CIMIC

activities, as it will be seen later.

As to the political situation, besides the usual changes of strategic functions, such as

the presidency of the Parliament (Deputies and Senators), maybe the fact of higher relevance

has been the evolution of the electoral process which was already very delayed, and

threatened the stability and even the functioning of the political structure in Haiti, since the

Legislative would be without quorum to work properly, with only one-third of its strength

with valid mandates. The uncertainty towards the election dates and the struggle of the

politicians to control the votes in certain areas inside the new BRABAT’s AOR created

negative consequences to the Battalion's activities, including CIMIC activities.

As to the security situation, one of the main consequences of the Consolidation Plan

was the adoption of a more selective security posture, which focused the security activities of

MINUSTAH on the support to the Haitian National Police (HNP), making it responsible for

the rapid response to security incidents. The second level of intervention would be the UN

Police’s (UNPOL) responsibility and only the third level of intervention would be the military

contingents' responsibility.

As to the humanitarian situation, there were still around 347,000 internally dislocated

people (IDPs) living in 450 camps in Haiti. These camps were mainly located in Port-au-

Prince, in BRABAT's AOR. However, although it is still a high number, it represents the

reduction of 77% in the number of IDPs since the earthquake in 2010. Haiti was also going

through a cholera epidemic and a severe food insecurity which hit the population.

As MINUSTAH, the UNCT and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)19 were also

starting the transitional phase of leadership of the coordination mechanisms to the Haitian

authorities, as several publications from members of these teams prove.

During 2012, different political goals were achieved, which highlighted the

progression of the stabilization process in Haiti. And the Transitional Phase, or consolidation,

as called by MINUSTAH, went on.

BRABAT

Based on the facts presented and the documents which led BRABAT's participation in

MINUSTAH, the guidelines of the 18th Brazilian Contingent command for CIMIC activities

were issued. BRABAT should not start projects that would not realistically meet the deadline

during BRABAT’s deployment, that is, in a maximum period of 6 months. Moreover, only

the UN contracts in which BRABAT was part of the deal, as a unity belonging to

MINUSTAH military component, and not the present contingent, could be signed. This

determination aimed at reducing the juridical insecurity to which BRABAT 18 and their

members would be exposed even after the end of the contingent.

With the downsizing of MINUSTAH, the Brazilian contingent was not composed of 2

battalions anymore. From now on, it would be composed of only 1, having around 1,200

military personnel divided into 4 Infantry Companies, 1 Squadron, only 01 Support Company,

supporting a doubled strength, besides the Staff. Thereat, General Bacellar Base where we

were stationed, which had already many years of use, had its infrastructure overloaded, for

receiving a quantity of military personnel much higher than the previous contingents, as a

consequence of the end of BRABAT 2, which made the Brazilian contingent be composed of

only one Battalion with a strength of almost 2 battalions. That encumbered the engineering

platoon of the Support Company. Therefore, there was not enough availability of qualified

personnel and of engineering equipment, inside BRABAT, to support bigger CIMIC

activities.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION AND CIMIC ACTIONS CARRIED OUT

The Civil Affairs Section (G9) of BRABAT 18 was made up of 3 officers, two

Brazilians and one Canadian, one warrant officer and two assistant sergeants. There were also

a Brazilian Navy Lieutenant Commander and a Canadian Army Lieutenant directly

responsible for G9 finances.

From the analysis of the local situation in Haiti and of the phase in which the mission

was, from the observance of the doctrinal framework and of BRABAT Commander’s

guidelines, which led G9 performance, the following goals for our deployment period were

defined:

1. Change the culture of the Brazilian Army military personnel that CIMIC and

ACISO are synonyms;

2. Develop a data base of the Human Terrain of our AOR, trying to facilitate future

operations;

3. Decrease the quantity of ACISO activities carried out for the population and

increase the quantity of projects that would involve the transference of knowledge and

capacities to the Haitian people;

4. Increase liaison and information sharing between BRABAT and civil actors,

specially UN agencies, international organizations, Haitian government agencies and NGOs

present in our AOR, and

5. Empower the subunits’ (SU) command and transfer the leadership of CIMIC

activities to these commands.

The change in the culture that the Brazilian Army had on CIMIC started in the

preparation phase in Cuiabá and the main point that would define or not the success of the

other objectives. In the Brazilian Army, CIMIC is usually interpreted as being the same thing

as a Civic-social Action20, which is not correct. This change in culture would increase and put

in the right direction the necessary support of BRABAT’s command to execute G9 activities.

As mentioned, during the preparation phase, a campaign to revise the concepts of the military

personnel in the contingent was initiated. First, by CCOPAB, during the Civil-Military

Coordination Course for military personnel assigned to carry out functions directly linked to

CIMIC activities in Haiti. From then on, an informal campaign through personal dialogues

with military personnel involved directly or indirectly in CIMIC activities was done, which

lasted during the whole deployment of the contingent. Even making all this effort, it was

noticed during the whole mission that, despite the correct knowledge on the purpose and UN-

CIMIC doctrine, many military personnel still had difficulties to translate this knowledge into

CIMIC practical actions. They were still stuck to the types of activities used in ACISO.

However, in general, this effort for change in culture had a considerable success. By the end

of the mission, basically all BRABAT Staff military personnel already showed the correct

conceptual and purpose knowledge of CIMIC.

During the preparation phase, the difficulty to execute plannings for future G9

activities, when we were deployed in Haiti, was also noticed. This difficulty was due to the

lack of the centralization of the updated information on the situation of the country and,

mainly, on the "human terrain" where we would perform. The information on our AOR were

related to kinetic or intelligence operational activities, and not specific to the performance of

CIMIC activities. There was not a single document having all the information we would need

to base our planning on. The documents previously produced specifically for CIMIC

activities, due to the constant change of BRABAT's Area of Responsibility (AOR) and to the

different challenges faced by previous contingents, needed this updating. Therefore, still in

Cuiabá, a new Area Strategic Study (LEA, acronym in Portuguese) to our new AOR was

started.

The format, the content and the execution of LEA were based on 2 main documents:

The CIMIC Field Manual21 of NATO's CIMIC Center of Excellence and the Doctrinal

Coordination Note nr 02/2012, of the Brazilian Army Doctrine Center22. The study was

organized in 6 main fields: Political, Security, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and

Information. The data of each of these fields were collected and analyzed through the process

known as ASCOPE (Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events). The

necessary information was collected by BRABAT subunits (SUs) and analyzed and compiled

by G9. LEA also includes information on the mission mandate, Haiti's History, its geography

and climate, as well as the humanitarian situation and the main humanitarian agencies and

their performance in the country. As annexes, data as an analysis of stakeholders, mechanisms

and platforms of MINUSTAH civil-military coordination, ways to finance CIMIC activities

and best practices were included. After knowing BRABAT's LEA, the Civil Affairs Section

of the Military Component of MINUSTAH (U9), determined the whole military component

carried out the strategic study of their AORs, using BRABAT's study as a model. The

execution of a broad and standardized LEA grows more in importance due to the changes in

the AOR of the MINUSTAH military component battalions. This must continue happening at

each downsizing of the mission, until its end, facilitating the adaptation of the military

contingents to their new AORs.

G9 military personnel follow patrols as part of their efforts to the Area Strategic Study

of the new BRABAT’s AOR.

As to the type of activities carried out, despite the necessity to decrease activities of

ACISO in favor of an increase in CIMIC activities, per se, their extinction was not

recommended. ACISO is characterized by activities of short duration, usually of one day, that

are very simple to be planned and executed. This allows BRABAT to quickly act, or react, to

any military necessity, besides providing direct contact of the soldier with the population in a

less formal or stressing situation, as during the patrols. It also allows the battalion to carry

out an immediate support to community leaders, always in consonance with a military goal.

Besides, they give visibility to MINUSTAH and to BRABAT and increase the perception, by

the Haitian population, of MINUSTAH's values, increasing the support of the population

towards the mission. These ACISO activities have immediate impact, since the population

takes advantage of the donation of food and potable water, of medical and dental treatment

etc. However, it has a short term result, since on the next day, the population will need food

and water again, and there are not enough means to give this support on a daily basis.

G9 Military Personnel Talk to Community Leaders

However, with the beginning of the transitional phase and with the mission coming to

an end, it was necessary to intensify the execution of projects that would transfer knowledge

and capabilities to the Haitian people, so that it could follow its social and economic evolution

without the presence of a UN peace mission. Differently from ACISO activities, these

projects are of more complex planning and execution, involving several sections of the

battalion's staff and, many times, even civil organizations. Moreover, its impact is not

immediate, but has long term effects. Many of these ideas for these projects were created by

the population itself. Many times, community leaders who expressed the population's interest

for professionalizing courses to facilitate entering the labor market looked for the command of

the subunits. Therefore, several courses were carried out, prioritizing areas where the violence

rate was higher, as well as the areas prioritized by Operations Order 001-12 of MINUSTAH,

previously mentioned. The students of the courses were selected by the community leaders or

by the Haitian authorities since many of the students came from the Haitian National Police

(HNP). Before coming back to Brazil, we realized that some students of our courses were

already working, some were even hired by international organizations.

Opening Ceremony of Community First Responder Course, organized by BRABAT at

the Base of the 2nd Company.

As to the increase of liaison and information sharing between BRABAT and civilian

actors, still at the preparation in Cuiabá, we established contact with the official of

Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) from OCHA, with whom I had

already worked with. Due to that, our interaction with humanitarian organizations in Haiti was

easier, since she was our main - and in terms of doctrine, the correct23 - liaison source with

these organizations. From the establishment of this direct relation between BRABAT and

OCHA, our liaison and information sharing with civil organizations, especially with UN

agencies and humanitarian agencies, was broadened and strengthened. We immediately

started the planning to carry out a project together with OCHA, UNICEF and CVR24, to

distribute water filters in Cité Soleil, in support to international effort of combat against

cholera in Haiti. The project - which evolved later, including several other partners and

serving as a model for distributions of water filters all over Haiti - allowed us to interact and

share information with UN agencies, national and international humanitarian NGOs and

Haitian government agencies. These interactions were crucial so we could access and use

resources that we did not have or could not acquire, and allowed the humanitarian actors to

have access to areas where they did not usually develop projects due to fears towards security

of their employees. It was an experience where all the participants had benefits, especially, the

Haitian population.

We also established partnership with a Brazilian religious humanitarian organization

that had already been in Haiti for some time. We supported a project led by them, but carried

out in coordination with the leading organization of the CCCM (Camp Coordination and

Camp Management) Cluster25, for the total relocation of an IDP camp which included the

construction of houses and taking professionalizing courses and educational lectures. The

purpose of this partnership was to support the international community in the efforts to

decrease the population that still lived in IDP camps. They were characterized by lack of

sanitation, hygiene and by criminality. The military objective was to decrease the quantity of

IDP camps inside BRABAT's AOR, thus, decreasing the possibility of breakout of diseases

and the violence rate.

As to the empowerment of SUs command, requests for support done by community

leaderships straight to G9, via phone calls or non scheduled visits to General Bacellar Base,

were eliminated. We noticed that these facts brought up too much confusion and got in the

way of coordination and the prioritization of CIMIC activities. They also made that the SU

responsible for the AOR became only an executing team of CIMIC activities, which made

difficult the coordination itself of the SU's activities and alienated them from the decisive

process to prioritize these activities. The solution came through the decentralization and the

empowerment of the SU in all matters related to CIMIC. All community leaders who tried to

make requests directly to G9 were not attended, but they were directed to the command of the

SU responsible. Therefore, we created a straight liaison and encouraged the establishment of

trust relations between the leaders and the SU command. Moreover, the prioritization of

activities and its planning were the SU command's responsibility. G9 members were

facilitators, coordinators and mentors of the activities carried out by the SUs. During the 18th

Contingent, few activities were imposed to the SUs by the Civil Affairs Section, which was

done only in case there were projects executed directly by the Section or in case of broader

activities, carried out in coordination with kinetic operations. Even the professionalizing

courses carried out by BRABAT had a high degree of decentralization, especially in the

choice of the beneficiaries, which was done by the SU in coordination with community

leaderships. The main results reached were: the increase in the interaction between the SU

command and the community leaderships, enhancing the trust of these leaderships towards the

SU commander; the simplification of the coordination and prioritization of activities; and the

empowerment of the SU, which increased the speed with which the demands of the

population were met, in accordance with military interests of BRABAT.

A G9 military person (R) and the SU deputy commander responsible for the AOR (L)

observe the beginning of the blockade of a street in protest against the conditions of

hygiene in the area, and get ready for negotiation.

One of the biggest, or maybe the greatest difficulties we face in Haiti, was the lack of

resources for CIMIC activities. In direct military interventions in foreign countries, as the

interventions of coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a total political commitment of the

countries with the military operation and with the situation of the population. This

commitment comes, in part, from the obligations related to the situation of occupation of

countries and territories, regulated by Articles 42 to 56 of Hague Conventions26and by

Articles 27 to 34 and 47 to 78 of the Fourth Convention of Geneva, but also from the interest

of the occupying forces in "conquering hearts and minds" of the population, aiming at

facilitating the operation and increasing the security of the troops. However, in peace

missions there is not this total political commitment from the countries who contribute with

their troops to the UN. Although international laws can be applied in Peace Operations, the

organization responsible and representative of troop contributing countries is the UN itself.

The contributing countries, then, do not see themselves as responsible for activities which aim

at guaranteeing enough patterns of hygiene and public health, as well as the provision of food

and health care to the population. It is not the case going into details as to the validity and

applicability of international law in Peace Operations, since there are different opinions and

interpretations of the subject, and this is not the object of this article. What interests is that

there is not, necessarily, the interest and the commitment of the governments of the troop

contributing countries with activities aiming at supporting the local population and at

conquering "hearts and minds", since they will not be the direct beneficiaries of these

conquers.

Not having resources from the Brazilian government, through BRABAT, for CIMIC

activities, we had to look for other ways of financing. The possibilities we found were

through the establishment of partnerships with international civil organizations, which had

resources, and through the request of financial resources through the presentation of projects

to MINUSTAH. Between them, two types of projects were possible: Quick Impact Projects

(QIP)27, financed by MINUSTAH's Civil Affairs Section, which had the capacity to finance

projects of up to 100 thousand dollars; and Sensitization Projects28, financed by CVR29, which

had the capacity to finance projects of up to 2,500 dollars. We could not execute QIPs, since

the cycle of these projects varies from 04 to 10 months, and we were not supposed to hand

over any project to the next contingent. We were, then, limited to the release of small amount

of money to carry out sensitization projects. This was basically our only source of financial

resources for CIMIC activities.

Still, although they were a trustful source of resources, the sensitization projects added

another factor that made our work difficult: bureaucracy. A study done during the contingent

by the Canadian first lieutenant, responsible for G9 finances, revealed that in these projects,

which lasted between 08 and 14 weeks, only 15% of the time was related to the primary

activities that would benefit directly the Haitian population. The rest of the time was used in

bureaucratic activities related to the project. In summary, much time was used in relation to

the benefits delivered to the population.

Another difficulty met was the lack of functional experts and of female military

personnel in G9. The functional experts provided great knowledge and due advisory and

guidance in their respective fields. Specifically in Haiti, it would be of great importance to

have functional experts in the areas of water, sanitation and hygiene, civil engineering and

child education, which were the areas we acted the most. And the importance of having a

female military person in G9 is due to the necessity of the opportunity to interact with Haitian

women, since they are either community leaders or only people in need. There was some fear,

from Haitian women, to go to Brazilian bases or even to talk with our military personnel in

public. The presence of a female military person would facilitate this approach and a bigger

inclusion of women in BRABAT's CIMIC activities.

However, other aspects made our performance easier. First, we did not inherit any

projects from the previous contingent, which ended them before the rotation of the

contingents. That gave us great freedom to develop our own projects, with no restrictions.

However, maybe the most important part was the work developed by all the previous

contingents, not only in CIMIC, but in the broadest possible sense. We could enjoy total trust

and sympathy from the Haitian population. All our initiatives were seen in a positive way and

were well received by the population. This facilitated the approach of our soldiers towards the

Haitians and established a mutual relation of trust and respect. We were always the first, and

many times the only military contingent searched by the population for requests related to

civil affairs not related to security. When we could not help because the requesting institution

was outside our AOR, the community leaders would simply give up, instead of looking for

support from the one responsible for the AOR, due to the trust they had on BRABAT. In

summary, their hearts and minds had already been conquered by the continuous effort of 17

contingents which came before us.

CONCLUSION

From the above, we can conclude that the nonkinetic operations, especially Civil-

Military Coordination, grow in importance in the Transitional Phase of Peace Operations.

That happens due to the fact that, with the downsizing of military personnel and the

progressive transition of the responsibilities of security to the local government, the work of

the military component to carry out large scale operations is decreased in its capacity and

progressively withdrawn. Bigger and bigger areas of responsibility to smaller and smaller

contingents demand the adoption of passive measures of security maintenance, as a

complement to the active measures. Among these passive measures, we can include the

economic and social local development, which can, in small scale and locally, be encouraged

by the military contingent. Conquering the support of the population also increases security of

the troop involved directly in activities of patrolling.

In the Transitional Phase, the focus of CIMIC operations must be the transference of

knowledge and abilities to the population, so they can carry on their social and economic

development without the presence of the peace mission. The transference of leadership of the

projects and activities to the local population, or to governmental institutions, such as city

halls and specialized agencies, must also be a priority. They do have the long term obligation

to care for their people and their community, and must be committed towards the interests and

necessities of local communities. Only this transference of leadership and responsibility will

enable the military component to be withdrawn from the mission with tranquility and security,

and decrease the possibility of the reappearance of conflict and local dependency of the peace

mission.

So this happens in a smooth and controlled way, it is necessary, first, to know the

terrain where you are operating in detail, especially the "human terrain". It is also necessary

that there is coordination with the other components of the peace mission and with civilian

actors in general, since all the ones involved somehow with the transition of the mission, and

many are planning and carrying out their own strategies to leave the country. With the

increase of liaison and information sharing, it is possible to integrate and coordinate the

activities of the actors present in the AOR, aiming at facilitating and potentializing the

activities of each one.

In the case of Haiti, BRABAT's contribution to the transitional phase of the mission,

through CIMIC activities, were:

The creation, or the updating, of mechanisms, processes and documents to

develop knowledge of the "human terrain" by MINUSTAH;

The increase and encouragement of liaisons and information sharing with

civilian actors, which enabled the coordination of activities and the correct and

efficient execution of supporting projects towards the population, and

The transference of knowledge and abilities to the Haitian population, aiming

at their economic and social development, and the decrease of its dependency

towards MINUSTAH.

Moreover, CIMIC activities contributed to the maintenance of the image of the troop

before the Haitians, which was sometimes tarnished due to restrictions imposed to our

performance, which could only happen after the intervention of HNP and UNPOL. To the

population, it was difficult to understand why our troops did not intervene immediately in

certain situations. This could create misunderstandings and mistrust. But this was all

mitigated through CIMIC actions and through the increasing trust and interaction between the

community leaders, the population in general, and the Brazilian contingent.

Photo taken of one of the Community First Responder Course carried out by BRABAT

18

Despite the difficulties, we were always motivated by the conquests we inherited from

previous contingents and constantly motivated by the will and the dedication to the

stabilization cause in Haiti. The possibility of taking part in international efforts to improve

the life conditions of the Haitian population, and the deep feeling of accomplishment, gave us

the energy whenever weariness fell upon us.

At the end of the mission, the objectives proposed had been met, within the

possibilities and limitations - especially time - which marked out our performance. Much was

done by few in little time. By the end of our deployment, we had modified and increased the

knowledge on CIMIC by BRABAT 18 military personnel, ended our new Area Strategic

Study, decreased the quantity of ACISO activities and increased the number of CIMIC

activities, increased and encouraged liaison and information sharing with civilian actors, and

empowered and transferred leadership of CIMIC activities to the SUs command. That is, we

had accomplished all the G9 defined objectives before the mission.

1 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Department of Field Support,

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), 2008, p.61. 2 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Department of Field Support

2008, Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,

New York. 3 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (S/2013/139*). 4 UN-CIMIC definition: "... a military function that contributes to facilitate the interface of the military

component and the civil component of an integrated mission, as well as humanitarian and development actors in

the mission area to support UN Mission goals". (Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping

Missions (UN-CIMIC), Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010). 5 UN-CMCoord definition: "The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in

humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition,

minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals". Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military

and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines), Revision 1.1, November 2007. 6 UNCT is composed of all UN agencies (plus the International Organization for Migration - IOM) present and

operating in a certain country. 7 Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines),

Revision 1.1, November 2007. 8 Guidelines for Civil-Military Coordination in Haiti, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, July

2013. 9 MCDA (Military and Civil Defense Assets). 10 Characterizes a UN Integrated Mission when in the country or region, a UN Multidimensional peace mission

(made up by a military component, a police component (UNPOL) and one or more civil components), besides a

United Nations Country Team (which is made up of UN agencies that are not part of the peace mission). 11 "Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions", October 2010. 12 Head of Military Component-HOMC. 13 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation (AJP-3.4.9), Edition A Version 1, February 2013. 14 CIMIC Field Handbook, Civil Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence, 3rd Edition. 15 The plan established key-goals in the following areas: HNP development, Construction of Electoral Capacity,

Rule of Law and Human Rights, and Governance. 16 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (S/2012/678), August

2012. 17 End State. 18 Operations Order 001-12, Operation Demen Miyò (Operation Better Tomorrow), May 2013. 19 Humanitarian Country Team. Made up by relevant UN agencies and by humanitarian organizations operating

in the country, which submit themselves to a coordination by the UN. 20 "Set of activities of temporary, episodical or programmed character of assistance and support to communities

promoting the civic and community spirit of the citizens, in the country or abroad, developed by the military

organizations of the Armed Forces, in the different levels of command, making the most of the resources in

personnel, materiel and techniques available to solve immediate and urgent problems. Besides the assistance

character, it is also inserted as civil affairs and collaborates in psychological operations". Manual de Campanha,

Operações em Ambiente Interagências (EB20-MC-10.201). Brazilian Army. 21 CIMIC Field Handbook, Civil Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence, 3rd Edition. 22 Civilian Considerations in the Situational Study of the Tactical Commander, 20 December 2012. 23 OCHA has the mandate to coordinate the efforts of the humanitarian community all over the world, including

the humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination. 24 Community Violence Reduction, MINUSTAH's section for the Reduction of Violence in the Communities,

considered the 2nd generation of DDR.

25 Cluster is the representative term for a group of humanitarian organizations linked by a common activity. They

are volunteers to take part in a centralized coordination. Eg.: All the organizations that work with water,

sanitation and hygiene are grouped (if voluntary) in the Water, sanitation and Hygiene Cluster, also known as

WASH Cluster.. 26 Annex to the Hague Convention (IV), Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907. 27 Quick Impact Project. 28 Proposition de Sensibilisation, in MINUSTAH's official term in French. 29 Same as 21.

BIO

Currently, Captain Bruno Soares de Cerqueira is Chief of the Civil Affairs Cell at the

Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB). He was G9 Assistant of

BRABAT 18 in MINUSTAH. He holds a Master's in International Humanitarian Action from

Ruhr Universität-Bochum, in Germany. He also has the UN Humanitarian Civil-Military

Coordination Course (UN-CMCoord), the UN-CMCoord Officer's Field Course and UN-

CIMIC. He worked in the Civil-Military Coordination Section of the Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in Geneva, and was a guest lecturer at CCOPAB in

2012 and 2013.