Civil Procedure Cases (Judgements; Remedies and Execution)

8/12/2019 Civil Procedure Cases (Judgements; Remedies and Execution)

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ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK, INC., petitioner,vs.HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. and/or COURT O IRST INSTANCE ORI!AL "#$e%on Cit&, RE'INO CLEOAS, and LUCIA (E LACRU!, respondents.

'.R. No. L)*++- Mar 01, 1+2-

3ANCO ILIPINO SA4IN'S 5 MORT'A'E 3ANK, petitioner,vs.HON. JOSE CAMPOS, RE'INO CLEOAS, and LUCIA (E LA CRU!,respondents.

Feliciano C. Tumale for petitioner St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc.

Tan Law Office for petitioner Banco Filipino Savings an MortgageBank.

!uan T. "#uino for responents.

FERNANDEZ,J.:+.wph!1

The Court decided to dispose of these two cases in a consolidated decision,considering that the facts in both are the same and the issues areintertwined.

n the Court of First nstance of Ri!al, the spouses Regino Cleofas and "uciade la Cru! filed suit against #t. $eter %emorial $ar&, nc. 'or %emorial $ar&for short(, Araceli )i*angco del Rosario, National n+estment andDe+elopment Corporation 'or NDC(, anco Filipino #a+ings and %ortgagean& 'or anco Filipino for short(, the Register of Deeds of Ri!al, theRegister of Deeds of -ue!on Cit and the #heriff of -ue!on Cit 'Ci+il CaseNo. -/01220(. n their amended complaint, the spouses praed that the bedeclared the rightful owners of "ot No. 304 of the $iedad Estate, that theTorrens Title to said lot be reconstituted, the title thereto of their deceasedpredecessor, Antonio Cleofas, ha+ing been burned in a fire in 04556 that thecertificates of title o+er said lot in the name of the %emorial $ar&, and that inthe name of )i*angco del Rosario, and all the certificates of title from whichthese certificates were deri+ed be declared null and +oid6 that the mortgageso+er said, lot constituted in fa+or of anco Filipino and the NDC be declarednull and +oid6 and that the %emorial $ar& be ordered to pa plaintiffs

damages. The amended complaint li&ewise sought issuance of preliminarin*unction and the appointment of a recei+er. The lower court ordered

appointment of a recei+er, but upon filing of a bond b the %emorial $ar&, therecei+ership was lifted.

After trial, the lower court, on %a 7, 0435, rendered a decision in fa+or ofthe plaintiffs and against the defendants. The %emorial $ar& and ancoFilipino, on 8une 75, 0435, filed their *oint motion for reconsideration of thedecision. 9n 8une 52, 0435, the filed a *oint motion for new trial. 9n 8ul 4,0435, the %emorial $ar& filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration

with praer for new trial. $laintiffs opposed the motion for reconsiderationand:or new trial. 9n 8anuar 02, 043;, the plaintiffs mo+ed for issuance ofwrit of preliminar in*unction and restoration of recei+ership. 9n Februar 1,043;, the trial court denied new trial. 9n Februar 70, 043;, anco Filipinoand the %emorial $ar& filed their notice of appeal from the decision of %a 7,0435, and filed their cash bond. )ithin the reglementar period the filedtheir *oint record on appeal.

9n Februar 7


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?owe+er, on 8ul


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'-ue!on Cit(, the disco+ered that the lot was alread co+ered b TCT No.70


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from TCT No. 01G22 up to TCT No. 01G44 to disco+er theremaining two digits and finall, the missing lin&.

T/G5 at the boo& of I was a +ital clue. t turned out to be a+olume in the Register of Deeds of Ri!al containing 722TCTs 'from No. 01120 to 01G44(, and as con*ectured,included the 01G22 series. And defendant #t. $eterdisco+ered TCT No. 01G4;>

0( in the name of Antonio Cleofas, et als.

7( co+ering "ot No. G;2 'not 304( of the $iedad Estate.

5( transferred from 9CT No. G0;.

;( and referring to #heet 01 of 9CT No. G0;.

1( issued on 8ul 01, 0474.

The hunch of defendant #t. $eter became a realit. Theentr on sheet or page 01 of 9CT no. G0; refers to anotherlot 'not 304( and another title 'TCT No. 01G4; co+ering "otNo. G;2 of the $iedad Estate(.

t is important to state as the Register of Deeds of Ri!al willtestif, that there is no otherTCT in the series from No.01G20 to 01G44 'ecept for No. 01G4;( in the name ofAntonio Cleofas, alleged processor of plaintiff.

Defendant #t. $eter still had another clue> Bicente Harcia,the notar whose name &ept cropping up in the +arious

documents in+ol+ed in the case at bar.

Another search was conducted in the must record of theand files of Notar $ublic Bicente Harcia were found to beintact The disclosed>t.hqw

0( Entr No. 0433 in the Notar=s boo&referring to Deed No. 0


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Makalintal .J. an" #ntonio J. concur.1$wph%1.&t

#quino J. is on lea'e.

#eparate 9pinions

ARRED9,J. concurring>

would li&e to ma&e clear that m reason for concurring in the holding in themain opinion thatcertiorari

is the proper remed in relation to the trial court=sdenial of petitioners= motion for new trial notwithstanding that the hadalread filed their respecti+e notices of appeal, appeal bonds and motions foretension to file their records on appeal is that such special ci+il action mabe resorted to when it is patent from the nature of the purported newldisco+ered e+idence that mo+ant can more or less conclusi+el show that the

factual issue to which such e+idence relates would ha+e to be decideddifferentl if the same were to be admitted b the court. n such a situation, itis ob+ious to me that to gi+e due course to the appeal and merel allow thedenial of the motion for new trial to be assigned as an error in appellant=sbrief would onl result in unnecessar dela of the final disposition of thecontro+ers between the parties. #ince it is more li&el that the decisionwould ha+e to be changed or modified after the new e+idence is presented, see no sense in lea+ing the uestion of its admission for resolution in theappeal, when after all the alread e+ident ultimate result would be to returnthe case to the trial court for its reception.

The other aspect of respondents= contention that the e+idence in+ol+ed in

these cases is not newl disco+ered is to m mind secondar. Assumingthere is some plausibilit in respondents= pose in this respect, ampersuaded ne+ertheless that substantial *ustice would be better attained badmitting the preferred e+idence, which as alread obser+ed, appears to beindubitable. The main opinion prefers to reser+e *udgment on this point, but feel it is more honest to sa that if new trial must be granted in these in spiteof the fact that petitioners ha+e alread ta&en their appeal within thereglementar period, it is onl because the facts anone can infer or deducefrom the e+idence being offered, which is documentar and official, areapparentl more proimate to the truth, in the light of common eperience.

As see it, the net result of 9ur decision cannot pre*udice the respondents. t

is uite ob+ious that it is "ot G;2 and not "ot 304 that belongs to them, andthe do not pretend that the ha+e acuired more than one lot in $iedad

Estate, so as to entitle them to both "ots G;2 and 304. The accident thatcaused the loss of their title, TCT 01G4; is no reason at all for courts toun*ustl enrich them b ad*udicating to them "ot 304, when all the ha+e todo is assert their right o+er "ot G;2 which is the one that appears recorded intheir name in the official records which up to now stand unchallenged, muchless impugned.

(ernan"o J. concurs.

#eparate 9pinions

ARRED9,J. concurring>

would li&e to ma&e clear that m reason for concurring in the holding in themain opinion thatcertiorari

is the proper remed in relation to the trial court=sdenial of petitioners= motion for new trial notwithstanding that the hadalread filed their respecti+e notices of appeal, appeal bonds and motions foretension to file their records on appeal is that such special ci+il action mabe resorted to when it is patent from the nature of the purported newldisco+ered e+idence that mo+ant can more or less conclusi+el show that thefactual issue to which such e+idence relates would ha+e to be decideddifferentl if the same were to be admitted b the court. n such a situation, itis ob+ious to me that to gi+e due course to the appeal and merel allow thedenial of the motion for new trial to be assigned as an error in appellant=sbrief would onl result in unnecessar dela of the final disposition of thecontro+ers between the parties. #ince it is more li&el that the decisionwould ha+e to be changed or modified after the new e+idence is presented, see no sense in lea+ing the uestion of its admission for resolution in theappeal, when after all the alread e+ident ultimate result would be to returnthe case to the trial court for its reception.

The other aspect of respondents= contention that the e+idence in+ol+ed inthese cases is not newl disco+ered is to m mind secondar. Assumingthere is some plausibilit in respondents= pose in this respect, ampersuaded ne+ertheless that substantial *ustice would be better attained badmitting the preferred e+idence, which as alread obser+ed, appears to beindubitable. The main opinion prefers to reser+e *udgment on this point, but feel it is more honest to sa that if new trial must be granted in these in spiteof the fact that petitioners ha+e alread ta&en their appeal within thereglementar period, it is onl because the facts anone can infer or deducefrom the e+idence being offered, which is documentar and official, are

apparentl more proimate to the truth, in the light of common eperience.


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As see it, the net result of 9ur decision cannot pre*udice the respondents. tis uite ob+ious that it is "ot G;2 and not "ot 304 that belongs to them, andthe do not pretend that the ha+e acuired more than one lot in $iedadEstate, so as to entitle them to both "ots G;2 and 304. The accident thatcaused the loss of their title, TCT 01G4; is no reason at all for courts toun*ustl enrich them b ad*udicating to them "ot 304, when all the ha+e todo is assert their right o+er "ot G;2 which is the one that appears recorded intheir name in the official records which up to now stand unchallenged, muchless impugned.

(ernan"o J. concurs.

EMILIO TUASON,petitioner, vs. COURT O APPEALS and MARIA

4ICTORIA L. TUASON, responents.

#@""A#

0. RE%EDA" "A)6 CB" $R9CEDRE6 RE"EF FR9% 8DH%ENT6

A""9)ED 9N"@ N ELCE$T9NA" CA#E# )?ERE T?ERE # N9

9T?ER ABA"A"E 9R ADE-ATE RE%ED@. / A petition for relief from

*udgment is an euitable remed6 it is allowed onl in eceptional cases

where there is no other a+ailable or adeuate remed. )hen a part has

another remed a+ailable to him, which ma be either a motion for new trial

or appeal from an ad+erse decision of the trial court, and he was not

pre+ented b fraud, accident, mista&e or ecusable negligence from filing

such motion or ta&ing such appeal, he cannot a+ail himself of this

petition. ndeed, relief will not be granted to a part who see&s a+oidance

from the effects of the *udgment when the loss of the remed at law was due

to his own negligence6 otherwise the petition for relief can be used to re+i+e

the right to appeal which ha+e been lost thru inecusable negligence.

7. D.6 D.6 D.6 )?EN ABA"ED %#T E A#ED 9N T?E HR9ND 9F

FRAD, ACCDENT, %#TAE 9R ELC#A"E NEH"HENCE AND

T?AT T # #?9)N T?AT $ETT9NER ?A# A H99D, ##TANTA"

AND %ERT9R9# DEFEN#E 9R CA#E 9F ACT9N. / A petition for

relief from *udgment is go+erned b Rule 5


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his opposition to pri+ate respondents motion for dissolution of the con*ugal

partnership of gains.

3. CB" "A)6 FA%"@ C9DE6 ANN"%ENT, DEC"ARAT9N 9F

N""T@ AND "EHA" #E$ARAT9N6 $R9#ECTNH ATT9RNE@ 9R

F#CA" %A@ E 9RDERED @ T?E C9RT T9 NTERBENE 9N E?A"F

9F T?E #TATE T9 $REBENT C9""#9N ET)EEN T?E $ARTE#. / A

grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation b default is fraught with

the danger of collusion. ?ence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of

nullit of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorne or fiscal is

ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of pre+enting an

collusion between the parties and to ta&e care that their e+idence is not

fabricated or suppressed. f the defendant spouse fails to answer the

complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should

order the prosecuting attorne to determine if collusion eists between the

parties. The prosecuting attorne or fiscal ma oppose the application for

legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own e+idence,

if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.

This petition for re+iew on certiorari see&s to annul and set aside the decision

dated 8ul 74, 044; of the Court of Appeals in CA/H.R. CB No. 53471

dening petitioners appeal from an order of the Regional Trial Court, ranch

0;4, %a&ati in Ci+il Case No. 53G4.

This case arose from the following facts>

n 04


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who had been ta&ing prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another

man6 that petitioners wor& as owner and operator of a radio and tele+ision

station eposed him to malicious gossip lin&ing him to +arious women in

media and the entertainment world6 and that since 04


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Q#ection 7. $etition to Court of First nstance for relief from *udgment or other

proceedings thereof. / )hen a *udgment or order is entered, or an other

proceeding is ta&en, against a part in a court of first instance through fraud,

accident, mista&e, or ecusable negligence, he ma file a petition in such

court and in the same cause praing that the *udgment, order or proceeding

be set aside.

nder the rules, a final and eecutor *udgment or order of the Regional Trial

Court ma be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mista&e or

ecusable negligence. n addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing

that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action.O00Pf the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the

case as if a timel motion for new trial had been granted therein. O07P

n the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioners marriage to pri+ate

respondent had alread become final and eecutor when petitioner failed to

appeal during the reglementar period. $etitioner howe+er claims that the

decision of the trial court was null and +oid for +iolation of his right to due

process. ?e contends he was denied due process when, after failing to

appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to ha+e

wai+ed his right to present e+idence and rendered *udgment on the basis of

the e+idence for pri+ate respondent. $etitioner *ustifies his absence at the

hearings on the ground that he was then Qconfined for medical and:or

rehabilitation reasons.O05Pn his affida+it of merit before the trial court, he

attached a certification b "t. Col. $laridel F. Bidal, Director of the Narcotics

Command, Drug Rehabilitation Center which states that on %arch 73, 0442

petitioner was admitted for treatment of drug dependenc at the Drug

Rehabilitation Center at Camp agong Diwa, icutan, Taguig, %etro %anila

of the $hilippine Constabular/ntegrated National $olice. O0;PThe records,

howe+er, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trialcourt of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the

same counsel was out of the countr for which reason the decision became

final and eecutor as no appeal was ta&en therefrom.O01P

The failure of petitioners counsel to notif him on time of the ad+erse

*udgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not

ecusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the

neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an ad+erse *udgment resulting in

the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a *udgment

+alid and regular on its face.O0GP

#imilarl inecusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial

court of petitioners confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his

non/appearance at the scheduled hearings. $etitioner has not gi+en an

reason wh his former counsel, intentionall or unintentionall, did not inform

the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed

submitted for decision on the basis of the e+idence presented b the pri+ate

respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioners counsel, the

order of the trial court was ne+er assailed +ia a motion for reconsideration.

Clearl, petitioner cannot now claim that he was depri+ed of due

process. ?e ma ha+e lost his right to present e+idence but he was not

denied his da in court. As the records show, petitioner, through counsel,

acti+el participated in the proceedings below. ?e filed his answer to the

petition, cross/eamined pri+ate respondents witnesses and e+en submitted

his opposition to pri+ate respondents motion for dissolution of the con*ugal

partnership of gains.O03P

A petition for relief from *udgment is an euitable remed6 it is allowed onl in

eceptional cases where there is no other a+ailable or adeuate remed.

)hen a part has another remed a+ailable to him, which ma be either a

motion for new trial or appeal from an ad+erse decision of the trial court, and

he was not pre+ented b fraud, accident, mista&e or ecusable negligence

from filing such motion or ta&ing such appeal, he cannot a+ail himself of this

petition.O0

QArt. ;


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it to appear on behalf of the #tate to ta&e steps to pre+ent collusion between

the parties and to ta&e care that e+idence is not fabricated or suppressed.

n the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no *udgment shall be

based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of *udgment.

QArt. G2. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation offacts or a confession of *udgment.

n an case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorne or fiscal assigned

to it to ta&e steps to pre+ent collusion between the parties and to ta&e care

that the e+idence is not fabricated or suppressed.O70P

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation b default is fraught with

the danger of collusion.O77P?ence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of

nullit of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorne or fiscal is

ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of pre+enting an

collusion between the parties and to ta&e care that their e+idence is notfabricated or suppressed. f the defendant spouse fails to answer the

complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should

order the prosecuting attorne to determine if collusion eists between the

parties.O75PThe prosecuting attorne or fiscal ma oppose the application for

legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own e+idence,

if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.O7;P9ur

Constitution is committed to the polic of strengthening the famil as a basic

social institution.O71P9ur famil law is based on the polic that marriage is not

a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is +itall

interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and

happ families. The brea& up of families wea&ens our social and moral fabric

and, hence, their preser+ation is not the concern alone of the famil

members.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles ; '0( submission of the progressbilling to E#?Rs Engineering Department6 '7( following/up of the

preparation of the $rogress $ament Certificate with the ?ead of the

-uantit #ur+eing Department6 and '5( following/up of the release of the

pament with one E+eln #an $ascual. F adhered to the procedures

agreed upon in all its billings for the period from %a 0, 0440 to 8une 52,

0447, submitting for the purpose the reuired uilders )or& #ummar, the

monthl progress billings, including an e+aluation of the wor& in accordance

with the $ro*ect %anagers nstructions '$%s( and the detailed +aluations

contained in the )or& Bariation 9rders ')B9s( for final re/measurement

under the $%s. F said that the +alues of the )B9s were contained in the

progress billings under the section QChange 9rders.OGP

From %a 0, 0440 to 8une 52, 0447, F submitted a total of 04 progress

billings following the procedure agreed upon. ased on $rogress illing Nos.

0 to 05, E#?R paid F $h$


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n its defense, E#?R claimed ha+ing o+erpaid F for $rogress illing Nos. 0

to 05 and, b wa of counterclaim with damages, as&ed that F be ordered

to refund the ecess paments. E#?R also charged F with incurring dela

and turning up with inferior wor& accomplishment.

Te RTC 9o$nd 9or 3

9n #eptember 75, 044G, the RTC, on the main finding that F, as

plaintiff a quo, is entitled to the pament of its claim co+ered b $rogress

illing Nos. 0; to 04 and to the retention mone corresponding to $rogress

illing Nos. 0 to 00, with interest in both instances, rendered *udgment for

F. The 7alloof the RTC Decision reads>

)?EREF9RE, defendants OE?#RP, RuOfPo . Colaco, Rufino ".

#amaniego, Cnthia del Castillo, uo& hoon Chen, and uo& hoon Tsen,

are *ointl and se+erall hereb ordered to>

0. $a plaintiff the sum of $7;,3


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';( Aggrie+ed, F filed before this Court a petition for re+iew of the CA

Decision, doc&eted as '.R. No. 1*0:--.O02P9n August 00, 044


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. )hether or not the OCAP committed gra+e abuse of discretion in not

holding respondent guilt of dela in the performance of its obligations and,

hence, liable for liuidated damages Oin +iew that respondent is guilt of

dela and that its wor&s were defecti+eP.

. )hether or not the OCAP committed gra+e abuse of discretion in finding

petitioners guilt of malice and e+idence bad faith, and in awarding moral andeemplar damages and attornes fees to respondent.

B. )hether or not the OCAP erred in setting aside its Resolution

dated August 05, 7222.O0;P

The petition has no merit.

$refatoril, it should be stressed that the second and third issues tendered

relate to the correctness of the CAs factual determinations, specificall on

whether or not F was in dela and had come up with defecti+e wor&s, and

whether or not petitioners were guilt of malice and bad faith. t is basic that

in an appeal b certiorari under Rule ;1, onl uestions of law ma be

presented b the parties and re+iewed b the Court.O01P 8ust as basic is the

rule that factual findings of the CA, affirmator of that of the trial court, are

final and conclusi+e on the Court and ma not be re+iewed on appeal, ecept

for the most compelling of reasons, such as when> '0( the conclusion is

grounded on speculations, surmises, or con*ectures6 '7( the inference is

manifestl mista&en, absurd, or impossible6 '5( there is gra+e abuse of

discretion6 ';( the *udgment is based on a misapprehension of facts6 '1( the

findings of fact are conflicting6 'G( such findings are contrar to the

admissions of both parties6 and '3( the CA manifestl o+erloo&ed certain

rele+ant e+idence and undisputed facts, that, if properl considered, would

*ustif a different conclusion.O0GP

n our re+iew of this case, we find that none of the abo+e eceptions obtains.

Accordingl, the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed b the CA, that

there was dela on the part of E#?R, that there was no proof that Fs wor&

was defecti+e, and that petitioners were guilt of malice and bad faith, ought

to be affirmed.

Ad;issiress 3i==in> Nos. 17 to 1+,

PMIs and ?4Os

$etitioners fault the CA, and necessaril the trial court, on the matter of the

admission in e+idence of the photocopies of $rogress illing Nos. 0; to 04

and the complementing $%s and the )B9s. According to petitioners, F,

before being allowed to adduce in e+idence the photocopies ad+erted to,

ought to ha+e laid the basis for the presentation of the photocopies as

secondar e+idence, conformabl to the best e+idence rule.

Respondent F, on the other hand, a+ers ha+ing complied with the

laing/the/basis reuirement. Defending the action of the courts below in

admitting into e+idence the photocopies of the documents

aforementioned, F eplained that it could not present the original of the

documents since the were in the possession of E#?R which refused to

hand them o+er to F despite reuests.

)e agree with F. The onl actual rule that the term Qbest e+idence

denotes is the rule reuiring that the original of a writing must, as a general

proposition, be producedO03Pand secondar e+idence of its contents is not

admissible ecept where the original cannot be had. Rule 052, #ection 5 of

the Rules of Court enunciates the best e+idence rule:

#EC. 5. /riinal "ocu4ent 4ust @e pro"uce"2 e9ceptions. M )hen the

sub*ect of inuir is the contents of a document, no e+idence shall be

admissible other than the original document itself, ecept in the following

cases>
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn18


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'a( )hen the original has been lost or destroed, or cannot be produced in

court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror6

"ina= is in te $stod& or $nder te ontro= o9 te part&

a>ainst o; te evidene is o99ered, and te =atter 9ai=s to prod$e ita9ter reasona


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Clearl, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the eception

under #ec. 5'b( of Rule 052. n other words, the conditions sine qua nonfor

the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document

as secondar e+idence ha+e been met. These are> '0( there is proof of the

original documents eecution or eistence6 '7( there is proof of the cause of

the original documents una+ailabilit6 and '5( the offeror is in good faith.O04P)hile perhaps not on all fours because it in+ol+ed a chec&, what the Court

said inMa"a-ao '. >eople, is +er much apt, thus>

To warrant the admissibilit of secondar e+idence when the original of

a writing is in the custod or control of the ad+erse part, #ection G of Rule

052 pro+ides that the ad+erse part must be gi+en reasonable notice, that he

fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers

satisfactor proof of its eistence.

The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custod or control of the

part against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondar

e+idence. The offeror must pro+e that he has done all in his power to secure

the best e+idence b gi+ing notice to the said part to produce the document.

The notice ma be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or

made in open court in the presence of the ad+erse part or 'iaa su@poena

"uces tecu4, pro+ided that the part in custod of the original has sufficient

time to produce the same. ?en s$ part& as te ori>ina= o9 te

ritin> and does not vo=$ntari=& o99er to prod$e it or re9$ses to

prod$e it, seondar& evidene ;a&


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as ma be recalled further, the appellate court nullified its August 05,

0444 Resolution on the basis of #ec. 1, Rule 54, which pro+ides>

#ec. 1. 877ect o7 re'ersal o7 e9ecute" ?u"4ent. M )here the

eecuted *udgment is re+ersed totall or partiall, or annulled, on appeal or

otherwise, the trial court ma, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or

reparation of damages as euit and *ustice ma warrant under the

circumstances.

9n the strength of the aforeuoted pro+ision, the appellate court

correctl dismissed E#?Rs claim for restitution of its garnished deposits,

the eecuted appealed RTC Decision in Ci+il Case No. G5;51 ha+ing in fact

been upheld in toto.

t is true that the Courts Decision of August 00, 044< in H.R. No. 057G11

recogni!ed the +alidit of the issuance of the desired restitution order. tbears to emphasi!e, howe+er, that the CA had since then decided CA/H.R.

CB No. 13544, the main case,on the merits when it affirmed the underling

RTC Decision in Ci+il Case No. G5;51. This CA Decision on the original and

main case effecti+el rendered our decision on the incidental procedural

matter on restitution moot and academic. Allowing restitution at this point

would not ser+e an purpose, but onl prolong an alread protracted

litigation.

'.R. No. 17-82*

$etitioner Roas/del Castillo, in her separate petition, ecepts from the CA

Decision affirming, in its entiret, the RTC Decision holding her, with the

other indi+idual petitioners in H.R. No. 0;1

. T?E OCAP ERRED N N9T DEC"ARNH T?AT T?E

DEC#9N 9F T?E TRA" C9RT AD8DHNH $ETT9NER

$ER#9NA""@ "A"E T9 RE#$9NDENT B9D F9R N9T #TATNH T?E

FACTA" AND "EHA" A## F9R #C? A)ARD.

. T?E OCAP ERRED N N9T R"NH T?AT A# F9R%ER

DRECT9R, $ETT9NER CANN9T E ?E"D $ER#9NA""@ "A"E F9RAN@ A""EHED REAC? 9F A C9NTRACT ENTERED NT9 @ T?E

C9R$9RAT9N.

. T?E OCAP ERRED N N9T R"NH T?AT RE#$9NDENT #

N9T ENTT"ED T9 AN A)ARD 9F %9RA" DA%AHE#.

B. T?E OCAP ERRED N ?9"DNH $ETT9NER $ER#9NA""@

"A"E T9 RE#$9NDENT F9R ELE%$"AR@ DA%AHE#.

B. T?E OCAP ERRED N N9T R"NH T?AT RE#$9NDENT #

N9T ENTT"ED T9 AN@ A)ARD 9F ATT9RNE@# FEE#.O77P

First off, Roas/del Castillo submits that the RTC decision in uestion+iolated the reuirements of due process and of #ec. 0;, Article B of the

Constitution that states, QNo decision shall be rendered b an court without

epressing therein clearl and distinctl the facts and the law on which it is

based.

Roas/del Castillos threshold posture is correct. ndeed, the RTC decision in

uestion, as couched, does not pro+ide the factual or legal basis for holding

her personall liable under the premises. n fact, onl in the dispositi+e

portion of the decision did her solidar liabilit crop up. And sa+e for her
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inclusion as part defendant in the underling complaint, no reference is

made in other pleadings thus filed as to her liabilit.

The Court notes that the appellate court, b its affirmator ruling, effecti+el

recogni!ed the applicabilit of the doctrine on piercing the +eil of the separate

corporate identit. nder the circumstances of this case, we cannot allow

such application. A corporation, upon coming to eistence, is in+ested b lawwith a personalit separate and distinct from those of the persons composing

it. 9wnership b a single or a small group of stoc&holders of nearl all of the

capital stoc& of the corporation is not, without more, sufficient to disregard

the fiction of separate corporate personalit.O75PThus, obligations incurred b

corporate officers, acting as corporate agents, are not theirs but direct

accountabilities of the corporation the represent. #olidar liabilit on the part

of corporate officers ma at times attach, but onl under eceptional

circumstances, such as when the act with malice or in bad faith. O7;PAlso, in

appropriate cases, the +eil of corporate fiction shall be disregarded when the

separate *uridical personalit of a corporation is abused or used to commit

fraud and perpetrate a social in*ustice, or used as a +ehicle to e+ade

obligations.O71Pn this case, no act of malice or li&e dishonest purpose is

ascribed on petitioner Roas/del Castillo as to warrant the lifting of the

corporate +eil.

The abo+e conclusion would still hold e+en if petitioner Roas/del Castillo, at

the time E#?R defaulted in paing Fs monthl progress bill, was still a

director, for, before she could be held personall liable as corporate director,

it must be shown that she acted in a manner and under the circumstances

contemplated in #ec. 50 of the Corporation Code, which reads>

#ection 50. Directors or trustees whoi==9$==& or Gnoin>=& vote 9or or

assent to patent=& $n=a9$= ats o9 te orporation or a$ire an&

pe$niar& interest in on9=itwith their dut as such directors or trustees

shall be liable *ointl and se+erall for all damages resulting therefrom

suffered b the corporation, its stoc&holders or members and other persons.

'Emphasis ours.(

)e do not find anthing in the testimon of one Crispin alingit to indicate

that Roas/del Castillo made an misrepresentation respecting the pament

of the bills in uestion. alingit, in fact, testified that the submitted but unpaid

billings were still being e+aluated. Further, in the said testimon, in no

instance was bad faith imputed on Roas/del Castillo.

Not lost on the Court are some material dates. As it were, the contro+ers

between the principal parties started in 8ul 0447 when Roas/del Castillo no

longer sat in the E#?R oard, a realit F does not appear to dispute. n

fine, she no longer had an participation in E#?Rs corporate affairs when

what basicall is the E#?R/F dispute erupted. Familiar and fundamental is

the rule that contracts are binding onl among parties to an agreement. Art.

0500 of the Ci+il Code is clear on this point>

Article 0500. Contracts ta&e effect onl between the parties, their assigns

and heirs, ecept in cases where the rights and obligations are not

transmissible b their nature, or b stipulation or b pro+ision of law.

n the instant case, Roas/del Castillo could not plausibl be held liable for

breaches of contract committed b E#?R nor for the alleged wrongdoings ofits go+erning board or corporate officers occurring after she se+ered official

ties with the hotel management.

Hi+en the foregoing perspecti+e, the other issues raised b Roas/del

Castillo as to her liabilit for moral and eemplar damages and attornes

fees are now moot and academic.
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And her other arguments insofar the indirectl impact on the liabilit of

E#?R need not detain us an longer for we ha+e sufficientl passed upon

those concerns in our re+iew of H.R. No. 0;1


21/32

decisions cannot be eecuted where the period of time for the defendant to

perfect his appeal has not et epired. Thus>

#ec. 77. '$ 074( I#ppellate ?uris"iction. B Regional Trial Courts shall

eercise appellate *urisdiction o+er all cases decided b %etropolitan Trial

Courts, %unicipal Trial Courts and %unicipal Circuit Trial Courts in their

respecti+e territorial *urisdiction. #uch cases shall be decided on the basis of

the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such

memoranda and:or briefs as ma be submitted b the parties or reuired bthe Regional Trial Courts. 6he "ecision o7 the ,6 in such cases shall @e

appeala@le @- petition 7or re'iew to the Anter4e"iate #ppellate ourt which

4a- i'e it "ue course onl- when the petition shows pri4a 7acie that the

lower court has co44itte" an error o7 7act or law that will warrant a re'ersal

or 4o"i7ications o7 the "ecision or ?u"4ent souht to @e

re'iewe". 'Emphasis supplied.(

t is useful at this point to re+iew the distinction between a final *udgment

and one which has become final and eecutor.

n >C=6 84plo-ees Dnion '. >C=6 (ree 6elephone

. . . 'A(n order or *udgment is deemed final when it finall disposes of the

pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. n

other words, a final order is that which gi+es an end to the litigation . . . when

the order or *udgment does not dispose of the case completel but lea+es

something to be done upon the merits, it is merel interlocutor.

The case of#ntonio '. *a4onte2elaborated on this matter thus>

A final order of *udgment finall disposes of, ad*udicates, or determines therights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire contro+ers

or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it

is re+ersed or set aside . . .)here no issue is left for future consideration,

ecept the fact of compliance or non/compliance with the terms of the

*udgment or order, such *udgment or order is final and appealable.

contrast, in An'est4ents Anc. '. ourt o7 #ppeals, 8we declared>

Now, a final *udgment in the sense *ust described becomes final upon

epiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been dul

perfected or, an appeal therefrom ha+ing been ta&en, the *udgment of the

appellate tribunal in turn becomes final and the records of the case are

returned to the Court of origin. The final *udgment is then correctl

categori!ed as a final and eecutor *udgment in respect to which, as the

law eplicitl pro+ides, eecution shall issue as a matter of right. t bears

stressing that onl a final *udgment or order, i.e., a *udgment or order that

finall dispose of the action of proceeding can become final and eecutor.

A *udgment becomes final and eecutor b operation of law. Finalit of

*udgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementar period toappeal if no appeal is perfected. n such a situation, the pre+ailing part is

entitled to a writ of eecution, and issuance thereof is a ministerial dut of the

court.

oth RA G250 and $ 074 pro+ide that decisions of the regional trial court in

its appellate capacit ma be ele+ated to the Court of Appeals in a petition

for re+iew. n effect, both laws recogni!e that such *udgments are final in

the sense that the finall dispose of, ad*udicate, or determine the rights of

the parties in the case. ut such *udgments are not et final and eecutor

pending the epiration of the reglementar period for appeal. During that

period, eecution of the *udgment cannot et be demanded b the winning

part as a matter of right.

n the present case, the pri+ate respondent had up to 8une 71, 0440, to

appeal the decision of the regional trial court. The motion for eecution was

filed b the petitioner on 8une 02, 0440, before the epiration of the said

reglementar period. As the decision had not et become final and eecutor

on that date, the motion was premature and should therefore not ha+e been

granted. Contrar to the petitioner=s contention, what the trial court authori!ed

was an eecution pending appeal.

)hile it is true that eecution pending appeal is allowed under Rule 54, #ec.

7, of the Rules of Court, this pro+ision must be strictl construed, being an

eception to the general rule. The reason allowing this &ind of eecution must

be of such urgenc as to outweigh the in*ur or damage of the losing part

should it secure a re+ersal of the *udgment on appeal. Absent an such

*ustification, the order of eecution must be struc& down as flawed with gra+e

abuse of discretion. +

)e see no such *ustification in the case before us.


22/32

t is worth remar&ing that as the case was not tried under the Rule on

#ummar procedure, the writ of eecution did not e+en fall under the

following #ection 0< thereof >

d( #ec. 0

nder the Rules of Court the immediate enforcement of a writ of e*ectment

eecution is carried out b gi+ing the defendant notice of such writ, and

ma&ing a demand that defendants compl therewith within a reasonable

period, normall from three '5( to fi+e '1( das, and it is onl after such period

that the sheriff enforces the writ b the bodil remo+al of the defendant and

his personal belonging. 10

9n the issue of the propriet of a special ci+il action for certiorarito assail an

order of eecution pending appeal, this Court has held that I

. . . Although #ec. 0, Rule GG of the Rules of Court pro+ides that the special

ci+il action of certiorarima onl be in+o&ed when there is no appeal, nor anplain, speed and adeuate remed in the 'ordinar( course of law this rule

is not without eception. The a+ailabilit of the ordinar course of appeal

does not constitute sufficient ground to pre+ent a part from ma&ing use of

the etraordinar remed of certiorariwhere the appeal is not an adeuate

remed or euall beneficial, speed and sufficient. t is the ina"equac-

B not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure

of *ustice without merit that usuall determines the propriet of certiorari. 1*

)hile appeal is normall emploed to uestion an order or writ which +aries

the terms of the decision being eecuted, it is ne+ertheless not the sole and

eclusi+e remed. The special ci+il action of certiorariand prohibition underRule G1 was a+ailable to the pri+ate respondent on the allegation that the

regional trial court, in issuing the writ of eecution, committed gra+e abuse of

discretion and acted beond its *urisdiction and that the ordinar remed of

appeal was inadeuate.

The last uestion to be resol+ed is, assuming that the decision of the regional

trial court had alread become final and eecutor, could the said court

order its eecutionJ

The rule is that if the *udgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed to

the regional trial court and the decision of the latter is itself ele+ated to theCourt of Appeals, whose decision thereafter became final, the case should

be remanded through the regional trial court to the metropolitan trial court for

eecution. 17The onl eception is the eecution pending appeal, which can

be issued b the regional trial court under #ec. < of Rule 32 or the Court of

Appeals or the #upreme Court under #ec. 02 of the same Rule.

As pre+iousl obser+ed, the petitioner has shown no weight *ustification for

the application of the eception. ?ence, the respondent court committed no

error in re+ersing the Regional Trial Court of %anila and annulling the writ of

eecution issued b it on 8une 02, 0440, pending appeal of its decision.


23/32

ACC9RDNH"@, the petition is D#%##ED, and the challenged decision of

the Court of Appeals is AFFR%ED intoto. No costs.

#9 9RDERED.

Ear'asa Melencio)0errera Futierre Jr. >aras (eliciano >a"illa i"in

Frio)#quino Me"ial"ea ,eala"o =a'i"e Jr. an" ,o4ero JJ. concur.

(ernan .J. is on lea'e.

ICTOR '. 4ALENCIA,petitioner, vs. COURT O APPEALS, HON.

TEOISTO T. 'UIN'ONA, JR., as Ee$tive Seretar&, HON. ERNESTO

'ARILAO, Seretar& o9 A>rarian Re9or;, CRISOSTOMO M. CORPIN,

Re>iona= (iretor, (AR Re>ion 4II, SANTOS 'AR'AFA, JULIANO

MA'(AFAO, CRESCENCIANO RIAS, E(ERICO JARE, ROSEN(O

LO3RESCO, ERNESTO LO3RESCO, ELICIANO LO3RESCO,

CATALINO MANTAC, 4ICTORIANO MONTE)ALCON, RANCISCO

O3AN', AM3ROSIO SEMILLANO, RO'ELIO TAMAFO and E(IL3ERTO

LO3RESCO,responents.

( E C I S I O N

3ELLOSILLO, !.6

T?E TENANC@ CR## N T?E $?"$$NE# is not *ust of recent

+intage. ?istor is replete with instances where tenant/farmers, relegated to

a life of perpetual bondage, ha+e rushed onto the battlefield with hopes of

freedom from imminent thralldom, aptl described b $rofessor ?arold 8.

"as&i as the normal life of the poor / their perpetual fear of the morrow, their

haunting sense of impending disaster, their fitful search for beaut that

perpetuall eludes them.

E+er administration that too& o+er the reins of go+ernment saw the gra+it

of this problem. Thus, each offered to the tenant/tillers its own +ersion of the

appropriate legislation for their emancipation.

6he#ricultural 6enanc- #ct o7 1GHI 'R. A. No. 0044(, the initial attempt of

$resident %agsasa at agrarian reform, was concei+ed as a remedial

legislation to uplift the social and economic status of tenants. t was

insinuated in the legislati+e deliberations that se+eral pro+isions therein

operated to depri+e the landowner of his right to contract and his right topropert without due process of law. ut, it was also argued, this in+ol+ed

societal +alues and the agricultural tenanc act was meant to remed an

eisting social e+il. ?ence, all tenanc laws that followed thereafter were

crafted along this line. This case is now being scrutini!ed and tested against

the bedroc& of legal and euitable safeguards to achie+e a trul successful

and balanced agrarian reform initiati+e.

For more than a uarter of a centur petitioner Bictor H. Balencia, a

go+ernment retiree, sought *ustice through administrati+e and *udicial

channels to regain possession of his two '7( parcels of land which he claims

to ha+e been un*ustl withheld from him b persons claiming to be tenants

with the ostensible complicit of go+ernment officials implementing the

agrarian reform program. n the meantime his appeal for fairness and *ustice

was denied him through procedural infirmities. )e are now as&ed to probe

into his lonel plight with a reminder that it is our solemn dut to dispense

eual *ustice to the rich and the poor.


24/32

9n 3 %a 0413 Bictor H. Balencia acuired the first parcel co+ered b TCT

No. ?/T/053 from a certain onifacio #upnet. The onl tenant of the propert

at that time was a certain Digo esario who was succeeded b his son

8esus esario. 9n 7 8ul 04G0 Balencia and 8esus esario terminated their

landlord/tenant relationship through a public instrument +oluntaril eecuted

b them, thus re+erting the actual phsical possession of the propert to

petitioner Balencia.

9n 77 9ctober 04G7 Balencia entered into a ten '02(/ear ci+il law leaseagreement o+er his two '7( parcels of land with a certain Hlicerio

?enson. efore the ten '02(/ear lease epired, apparentl without ob*ection

from ?enson, Balencia leased the propert for fi+e '1( ears to Fr. Andres

Flores under a ci+il law lease concept beginning 70 August 0432 or until 52

8une 0431 after which the lease was cancelled and inscribed as Entr No.

013< in TCT No. ?/T/053. The lease agreement between Balencia and Fr.

Flores was sub*ect to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering the

land without Balencias written consent. This was admitted b the parties as

reflected in the DAR An'estiation ,eport an" ,eco44en"ations.O7PThe

prohibition against subleasing or encumbering of the land apparentlincluded the prohibition against installing a leasehold tenant

thereon. ncidentall, it ma be mentioned that in the prior lease agreement

with ?enson no such prohibition was stipulated.

During the period of his lease, ?enson instituted Crescenciano Frias and

%arciano Frias to wor& on the propert, although onl Crescenciano Frias

apparentl remained in the land while %arciano Frias must ha+e abandoned

his cause if an, as he was not impleaded in this case6 neither did he appear

on record to ha+e been issued a C"T in his name.

During the lease of Fr. Andres Flores, he designated Francisco 9bang 'as

o+erseer(, Rogelio Tamao, Federico 8are, Feliciano "obresco, %elchor

%oncada, Rosendo "obresco, Bictoriano %ontefalcon, #antos Hargaa,

Catalino %antac, ?erodita #emillano, Ernesto "obresco, Nati+idad "obresco

and Alfredo Demerin, along with Crescenciano and %arciano Frias, to

culti+ate the land. These farmhands shared their produce with Fr.

Flores. #ubseuentl, Francisco 9bang, #antos Hargaa, Crescenciano

Frias, Federico 8are, Rosendo "obresco, 8uliano %agdaao, Ernesto

"obresco, Feliciano "obresco, Catalino %antac, Bictoriano %ontefalcon,

Ambrosio #emillano, Rogelio Tamao and Edilberto "obresco, became

recipients of C"Ts and are collecti+el referred to herein as pri+ate

respondents.

)hen the lease agreement between Balencia and Fr. Flores epired on 52

8une 0431, Balencia demanded that pri+ate respondents +acate the

premises. nstead of compling with the demand, the refused and

continued culti+ating the land despite the demand for them to

+acate. Balencia wanted to regain possession of his propert so he could

wor& it b administration, ha+ing in fact appointed ernie autista as

o+erseer until petitioner could retire from the go+ernment ser+ice.

n his initial step in his long and agoni!ing *ourne, Balencia filed a letter ofprotest with the %inister of Agrarian Reform to ta&e bac& the actual

possession of his propert that was sub*ect of the ci+il law lease

agreement. 9n 72 %arch 043G his letter was referred to the DAR Regional

9ffice in Cebu Cit.

%eanwhile, without the &nowledge much less consent of Balencia, pri+ate

respondents applied for Certificates of "and Transfer 'C"Ts( under the

9peration "and Transfer '9"T( $rogram pursuant to $residential Decree No.

73 claiming the were @ona 7i"etenants of the propert.

9n 02 December 04


25/32

;. Federico 8are a( 2/30030 2072 2.;G22 ha.

b( 2/30037 2070 2.7122 ha.

1. Rosendo "obresco a( 2/2300


26/32

under R. A. No. GG13 otherwise &nown as 6heo4prehensi'e #rarian

,e7or4 Caw.

9n < 9ctober 0445 Eecuti+e #ecretar Teofisto Huingona, 8r., b authorit

of the $resident, affirmed the order of the DAR of 07 8ul 0440 sub*ect to the

modification that the area acuired b petitioner Balencia as homestead be

ecluded from the co+erage of $. D. No. 73.

Balencia then brought his case to the Court of Appeals contending that theEecuti+e #ecretar erred in recogni!ing pri+ate respondents as tenants and

disallowing him and his se+en '3( Qcompulsor heirs from eercising their

right of retention under R. A. No. GG13. ?owe+er, in a decision promulgated

on 73 8ul 0441 the Court of Appeals dismissed the case on a technical

ground, i.e., that his appeal was filed out of time. O4PThe appellate court ruled

that petitioner should ha+e filed with it a petition for re+iew within fifteen '01(

das from receipt of the order of the DAR #ecretar pursuant to #ec. 1; of R.

A. No. GG13 and #upreme Court Adm. Circ. No. 0/41, instead of ele+ating the

case to the 9ffice of the $resident pursuant to DAR %emo. Circ. No. 5,

series of 044;. ?ence, according to the Court of Appeals, the petition of

Balencia was filed out of time.

9n 77 #eptember 0441 petitioners motion for reconsideration was

denied. n its Resolution the Court of Appeals, citing *hell >hilippines Anc.

'. entral ankO02Pheld that in case of discrepanc between the basic law

and a rule or regulation issued to implement the law, the basic law pre+ails

because the rule or regulation cannot go beond the terms and pro+isions of

the basic law.O00PThus, DAR %emo. Circ. No. 5, series of 044;, according to

the Court of Appeals, cannot be considered +alid and effecti+e since it runs

counter to #ec. 1; of R. A. No. GG13 which pro+ides for an appeal from an

decision, order, award or ruling b the DAR to the Court of Appeals.O07P"i&ewise, the appellate court held that the doctrine of ehaustion of

administrati+e remedies does not appl in the present case where the

respondent is a Department #ecretar whose acts, as alter ego of the

$resident, bear the implied appro+al of the latter.O05P

Balencia filed this >etition 7or ,e'iew on ertiorariunder Rule ;1 of the

Rules of Court see&ing to re+erse and set aside the Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA/H.R. #$ No. 57GG4 dated 73 8ul 0441 as well as its

Resolution dening his %otion for Reconsideration of 77 #eptember 0441.

$etitioner contends that DAR %emo. Circ. No. 5, series of 044;, is +alid not

being contrar to law and *urisprudence, and should be accorded respect

being the Agrarian Reform #ecretars construction of the law that his

Department administers and implements.

$ublic respondents, on the other hand, a+er that #ecs. 01 and 72 of oo& B

of E. 9. No. 747 which are cited as the legal bases of DAR %emo. Circ. No.

5 refer to the procedure for administrati+e appeals from an agenc to the

Department ?ead which in this case is the DAR through its #ecretar. The

argue that there is no pro+ision for appeal to the 9ffice of the $resident since

in the administrati+e structure the #ecretar of Agrarian Reform is the alterego of the $resident. The contend that #ec. 75 of oo& B cites the finalit

of the decision of the appellate agenc without pro+iding for a further appeal,

and that #ec. 71 pro+ides for *udicial re+iew from an agenc decision, as the

point to #ec. 1; of R. A. No. GG13 O0;Pand #C Adm. Circ. No. 0/41.O01P

)e agree with petitioner. nterpreting and harmoni!ing laws with laws is the

best method of interpretation. Anterpretare et concor"are lees lei@us est

opti4us interpretan"i 4o"us.O0GPThis manner of construction would pro+ide a

complete, consistent and intelligible sstem to secure the rights of all persons

affected b different legislati+e and uasi/legislati+e acts. )here two '7(

rules on the same sub*ect, or on related sub*ects, are apparentl in conflict

with each other, the are to be reconciled b construction, so far as ma be,

on an fair and reasonable hpothesis. Balidit and legal effect should

therefore be gi+en to both, if this can be done without destroing the e+ident

intent and meaning of the later act. E+er statute should recei+e such a

construction as will harmoni!e it with the pre/eisting bod of laws.

?armoni!ing DAR %emo. Circ. No. 5, series of 044;, with #C Adm. Circ. No.

0/41 and #ec. 1; of R. A. No. GG13 would be consistent with promoting the

ends of substantial *ustice for all parties see&ing the protecti+e mantle of the

law. To reconcile and harmoni!e them, due consideration must be gi+en to

the purpose for which each was promulgated. The purpose of DAR %emo.

Circ. No. 5, series of 044;, is to pro+ide a mode of appeal for matters not

falling within the *urisdictional ambit of the Department of Agrarian Reform

Ad*udication oard 'DARA( under R. A. No. GG13 and correct technical

errors of the administrati+e agenc. n such eceptional cases, the

Department #ecretar has established a mode of appeal from the

Department of Agrarian Reform to the 9ffice of the $resident as a plain,

speed, adeuate and inepensi+e remed in the ordinar course of

law. This would enable the 9ffice of the $resident, through the Eecuti+e

#ecretar, to re+iew technical matters within the epertise of the

administrati+e machiner before *udicial re+iew can be resorted to b wa of
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27/32

an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule ;5 of the 0443 Rules on Ci+il

$rocedure.

9n the other hand, the purpose of #C Adm. Circ. No. 0/41, now embodied in

Rule ;5 of the 0443 Rules of Ci+il $rocedure, is to in+o&e the constitutional

power of *udicial re+iew o+er uasi/*udicial agencies, such as the Department

of Agrarian Reform under R. A. No. GG13 and the 9ffice of the $resident in

other cases b pro+iding for an appeal to the Court of Appeals. #ection 1; of

R. A. No. GG13 is consistent with #C Adm. Circ. No. 0/41 and Rule ;5 in thatit establishes a mode of appeal from the DARA to the Court of Appeals.

n#nara '. 8lectoral o44issionthis Court upheld the promulgation of the

rules of procedure of the Commission since the were necessar to the

proper eercise of its epress power to hear and decide election contests

in+ol+ing members of the legislature, although not specificall granted b the

Constitution or statute.O03P)e ruledO0


28/32

protracted conflict that has lasted o+er twent/fi+e '71( ears. )e are

resol+ing the uestion at this point to bring this case once and for all to a *ust,

fair and euitable conclusion. )here there are clear errors of law this Court

must eercise its constitutional power of *udicial re+iew to correct such errors.

The substanti+e issue to be resol+ed ma be epressed in this manner> Can

a contract of ci+il law lease prohibit a ci+il law lessee from emploing a tenant

on the land sub*ect matter of the lease agreementJ 9therwise stated, can

petitioners ci+il law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on the sub*ect premiseswithout epress authorit to do so under Art. 0G;4 of the Ci+il Code, more so

when the lessee is epressl prohibited from doing so, as in the instant

caseJ

Contrar to the impression of pri+ate respondents, #ec. G of R. A. No. 5arties to #ricultural Ceasehol",elations, which assumes that there is alread a leasehold tenant on the

land6 not until then. This is precisel what we are still as&ed to determine in

the instant proceedings.

To better understand #ec. G, let us refer to its precursor, #ec. < of R. A. No.

0044, as amended.O75PAgain, #ec. < of R. A. No. 0044 assumes the eistence

of a tenanc relation. As its epigraph suggests, it is a QCi4itation o7 ,elation,

and the purpose is merel to limit the tenanc Qto the person who furnishes

the land, either as owner, lessee, usufructuar, or legal possessor, and to the

person who actuall wor&s the land himself with the aid of labor a+ailable

from within his immediate farm household. 9nce the tenanc relation is

established, the parties to that relation are limited to the persons therein

stated. 9b+iousl, inherent in the right of landholders to install a tenant is

their authorit-to do so6 otherwise, without such authorit- ci'il law lessees as

lan"hol"ers cannot install a tenant on the lan"hol"in. Eeither *ec. o7 ,.

#. Eo. LII nor *ec. o7 ,. #. Eo. 11GG auto4aticall- authories the

persons na4e" therein to e4plo- a tenant on the lan"hol"in.

According to %r. 8ustice Huillermo #. #antos and CAR Eecuti+e 8udge

Artemio C. %acalino, respected authorities on agrarian reform, the reason for

#ec. G of R. A. No. 5


29/32

aid of labor a+ailable from within his immediate farm household, it eliminated

the nominal tenant or middleman from the picture.O7GP

Another noted authorit on land reform, Dean 8eremias . %ontemaor,O73Peplains the rationale for #ec. < of R. A. No. 0044, the precursor of #ec. G

of R. A. No. 5

*ince the law esta@lishes a special relationship in tenanc- with i4portant

consequences it properl- pinpoints the persons to who4 sai" relationshipshall appl-. 6he spirit o7 the law is to pre'ent @oth lan"hol"er a@senteeis4

an" tenant a@senteeis4. 6hus it woul" see4 that the "iscretionar- powers

an" i4portant "uties o7 the lan"hol"er like the choice o7 crop or see"

cannot @e le7t to the will or capacit- o7 an aent or o'erseer ?ust as the

culti'ation o7 the lan" cannot @e entruste" @- the tenant to so4e other

people. 6enanc- relationship has @een hel" to @e o7 a personal character.O7are?aO55Pthe agricultural leasehold

relations were preser+ed because the Qlegal possessors therein were clearl

clothed with legal authorit or capacit to install tenants. ut e+en assuming

that the were not so authori!ed as in the >oncecase where the ci+il law

lessee was epressl barred from installing a tenant under their contract oflease, the subseuent actions of the landowners in etending the lifetime of

the lease, or in negotiating for better terms with the tenants, placed the

landowners in estoppel to contest the agricultural leasehold

relations. Conseuentl, the tenants in those cases ma be categori!ed as

tenants "e ?ureen*oing tenurial securit guaranteed b the Agricultural

Tenanc "aw, now b the Agricultural "and Reform Code, as amended. This

is not the case before us.

t must be noted that Balencia ne+er etended the term of the ci+il law lease,

nor did he negotiate with respondents for Qbetter terms upon the epiration

of the lease. ?e wanted precisel to reco+er possession of the propert

upon the epiration of the contract on 52 8une 0431, ecept from %antac

with whom he alread entered into a tenanc contract as herein before

stated. Balencia appointed an o+erseer to prepare for his e+entual ta&eo+er

and to culti+ate the propert through labor administration after his long ears

in the go+ernment ser+ice. Beril, the intention of Balencia after the

epiration of the lease contract was for him to culti+ate the land b

administration, or b himself, and not to surrender possession, much less

ownership, to the pri+ate respondents.

There ma be apprehensions that should #ec. G of R. A. No. 5


30/32

b reason alone of the acuiescence b petitioner to the continued

possession of the propert.

The Department of Agrarian Reform in Fanonmade the factual

determination that the agreement entered into between Florisco anhaw

'one of the respondents( and Carolina ". Han!on 'petitioner( was a ci+il law

lease. ?owe+er, there was no e+idence to pro+e that the other defendants in

that case allegedl instituted as tenants were sharing or paing rentals to

Florisco anhaw or to the landowner. The DAR held that mere allegationwithout the corresponding receipts would not sufficientl establish a tenanc

relationship especiall since there was an epress prohibition in the ci+il law

lease contract from subleasing the sub*ect land to an other person. O51P

From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a ci+il law

lessee cannot auto4aticall- institutetenants on the propert under to #ec. G

of R. A. No. 5


31/32

stating for the record that such stipulation barring the subletting of the

propert was +iolated b Fr. Flores when he subleased the sub*ect parcels of

land to pri+ate respondents.O;


32/32

0. The area acuired b petitioner Bictor H. Balencia under his ?omestead

Application No. ?A/750G20 with Final $roof and Ta Declaration No. 2101 is

ELC"DED from the co+erage of $res. Decree No. 73, hence, must be

retained b him6

7. The Certificates of "and Transfer 'C"Ts( issued to pri+ate respondents

#antos Hargaa 'C"T No. 2/2300G2(, 8uliano %agdaao 'C"Ts Nos. 2/

2300G0, 2/2300G5, 2/2300GG K 2/230031(, Crescenciano Frias 'C"T No. 2/

2300G;(, Federico 8are 'C"Ts Nos. 2/230030 K 2/230037(, Rosendo"obresco 'C"Ts Nos. 2/2300

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