Attitude to European Union in Poland: Enthusiastic with Some Reservations

1

CIVIL SOCIETY IN POLAND Case study

Prepared for international conferenceThe Logic of Civil Society in New Democracies:

East Asia and East Europe

Taipei, June 5-7

2

Politics

Parl. term Government coalition

IX 1989 – XI 1991 (semi-free)Solidarity with Communist and Communist-allied ministers

XII 1991 – X 1993 post-Solidarity right wing

XI 1993 – X 1997 post-communist left wing

XI 1997 – X 2001 right wing

XI 2001 – X 2005 left wing

• Party in power always loses elections

3

Economic conditions

1989-1992 Transformation shock 1993-2000 Sustained growth 2001-2002 Crisis 2003-2008 Pre- and post-EU accession boom

‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09

0

10

20

30

-10

-20

Unemployment rate Annual GDP growth

Annual GDP growth (data of Central Statistical Office). Projections for 2009 vary.Unemployment rate (Rounded. Pct. of economically active population. January results for each year. Data of Central Statistical Office).

4

Civil society and the state

• 1989-1990: Effective and legal freedom of association. Introduction of self-government

• 1999: De-centralization reforms

5

Attitude to Poland's membership in European Union

1989: Independence1994: Start of EU accession negotiations1999: NATO membership2002-2004: Final stage of negotiations, referendum, EU accession

VI1994

V1995

V1996

IV1997

VIII V1998

XII V1999

II2000

V IX III2001

VII I2002

V IX I2003

V IX I2004

IV IX II2005

V IX I2006

IV X I2007

VII IV2008

XI I2009

IV0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Undecided

Opponents

Supporters

Source: CBOS

6

Attitude to Poland's membership in NATO

Source: CBOS

78%

80%

11%

11%

11%

9%

IX 2007

II 2009

Supporters Opponents Don't know

•universal support for EU and NATO membership

7

Evaluation of current situation 1989-2009

Evaluation of current situation in Poland (3-month moving average)

1990-1992 Disenchantment with changes1993-1995 Gradual return of optimism1996-1999 Sustained positive evaluations1999-2001 Continuing slide 2002-2007 Crisis in collective psychological well-being, with brief return of hope in early 2006 2007-2008 Return of optimism, checked by the crisis

III1990

I1991

I1992

I1993

I1994

I1995

I1996

I1997

I1998

I1999

I2000

I2001

I2002

I2003

I2004

I2005

I2006

I2007

I2008

I2009

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Bad

Good

Don’t know

Source: CBOS

8

Number of events

• in good times there are more protests

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20040%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

0

100

200

300

400

Average pct. of positive evaluations of current situationNo. of protests

9

Organizers

• trade unions organized the majority of events for which the organization is recorded

Organizations leading or sponsoring the event N Pct. of cases

Labor unions 1751 43.5%

out of which: Solidarity Trade Union 775 19.2%

Domestic social movements 312 9.3%

Political parties 260 7.8%

Professional organizations 239 7.1%

Radical political movements 216 6.5%

Strike committees. employees councils 158 4.7%

Regional. local organizations 130 3.9%

Youth organizations 125 3.7%

None 504 15.1%

10

Organizations leading or sponsoring the event (no. of events)

• unions decrease in importance

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20040

50

100

150

200

Labor unions Professional organizations

Political parties Youth organizations

11

Protesting groups

N Percent of Cases

workers 1562 39.5%

neighborhood or local 407 10.3%

youth. students 393 9.9%

farmers 262 6.6%

transport 257 6.5%

health or welfare 229 5.8%

public sector (unspecified) 189 4.8%

service industries 187 4.7%

manual workers protest the most

youth & local groups consistently strong

12

Protesting groups (no. of events)

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

0

50

100

150

200

workers farmers service industries public sector

• relative importance of workers diminish

• 1996-98 rise in protests by public sector employees and healthcare specialist coincides with reform preparation

• farmers active during early transformation and late 1990s (Samoobrona), later fade away

13

Methods of protest

• strikes diminish in importance (from 1st to 5th most common method)

• methods become less disruptive

Riots Occupationof public buildings

Blockadeof road.picket

Symbolicmanifestation

’89 ’90 ’91 ’92 ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

’89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Strike Demonstration. march. rally

pen letters.appeals

most common less common

14

Methods of protest by type of organization leading or sponsoring (% of events)

• demonstration most common method regardless of organizer

• only 21% of union protests are strikes

Labor unions Political parties Youth organizations None (spontaneous

events)

Demonstration, march, rally 30.4%

Demonstration, march, rally 59.6%

Demonstration, march, rally 75.2%

Demonstration, march, rally 34.4%

Threat to undertake protest action26.6%

Open letters, statements and appeals 23.5%

Open letters, statements and appeals 32.0%

Open letters, statements and appeals 25.3%

Strike 20.9%

Blockade of road, picket 14.6%

Threat to undertake protest action 8.0%

Threat to undertake protest action 17.7%

15

Demands

• economic demands most common

N Percent of Cases

Change domestic economic policies 920 22.8%

Material compensation 860 21.3%

Change domestic policies 762 18.9%

General dissatisfaction with policies 391 9.7%

General economic demands 303 7.5%

Increased influence in decision making 140 3.5%

Change external/foreign policies 128 3.2%

Ecological demands 121 3.0%

Recognition of identity 60 1.5%

Abortion debate 48 1.2%

Problems of ethnic minorities 36 0.9%

Religious demands 26 0.6%

Other demands 840 20.8%

16

Economic demands

... but becoming gradually less important

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

0

50

100

150

200

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

No. of events with ec. dem.Material compens.

Events with economic demands as pct. of all events in a year

17

Size Pct. of cases

• small events predominate

Data are available for 45.3% of events. Descriptions suggest that many events for which size was not recorded were small

16.4%

37.0%

17.2%

7.6% 7.2% 9.4%5.2%

0-20 21-200 201-500 501--1000

1001--2000

2001--10.000

over 10.000

No. of participants

18

Intervention by authorities (% of events)

Intervention without force 4.0%

Intervention with force 5.7%

No intervention 42.2%

Data unavailable 39.6%

• authorities intervene in 10% of cases

19

Intervention (% of events)

• attitude of authorities to protests changed, but there is no clear trend

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

20

Intervention (% of events in which intervention was recorded)

• young people are at the receiving end of the stick

Protesting groups

workers service sector

neighborhood, local

youth farmers health or welfare

Intervention without force 4.0% 2.1% 4.7% 5.3% 5.0% 3.1%

Intervention with force 4.7% 2.7% 6.6% 16.5% 6.9% 4.4%

21

Protest activities in Europe

• culture of protest weakly developed in CEE

• Poland at the bottom of the ranking

22,4%

17,3%

14,5%

11,2%

9,3%

7,5%

7,1%

7.0%

6,3%

5,8%

4,5%

4,2%

3,7%

3,7%

3,4%

3,3%

2,8%

2,8%

2,1%

2%

1,5%

SpainLuxembourg

FranceItaly

GermanyBelgium

Denmark AustriaSwedenIrelandGreece

United KingdomCzech Republic

PortugalNetherlands

SlovakiaSloveniaHungaryEstoniaFinlandPoland

Respondent had taken part in lawful public demonstration (% of adults)

ESS data 2002-2007

22

Activity in organizations

• this time, Hungary is at the bottom

Worked in non-political organization or association in last 12 months (% of adults)

ESS data

31,9%

25,2%

22,1%

21,5%

21,4%

21,2%

20,9%

19,6%

16,1%

15,5%

12,9%

9,8%

8,8%

8,7%

8,4%

5,5%

5,4%

3,7%

3,6%

2,1%

1,9%

FinlandSweden

DenmarkBelgium

NetherlandsAustria

LuxembourgGermany

FranceSpain

IrelandCzech Republic

United KingdomItaly

SlovakiaPolandGreece

PortugalEstonia

SloveniaHungary

23

Civic activity in organizations

77% 76% 79% 76% 77% 80%

23% 24% 21% 24% 23% 20%

1998 1999 2002 2004 2006 2008Source: CBOS

Inactive Active

• while ESS surveys prove NGOs are weak in CEE, actual number of activists is almost certainly higher than recorded in them

• CBOS surveys indicate that up to 20% of adults may be performing some type of civic activity in organizations, many in more than one area.

24

Membership in trade unions

• unionization in CEE is low, but comparable with many "old" EU countries

(% of employees)

ESS data

81,9%

74,4%

68,1%

43,6%

42,2%

39,6%

33,8%

28,8%

27,1%

25,9%

23,6%

19,8%

16,3%

15,9%

15,1%

14,1%

14,0%

14,0%

13,5%

11,0%

10,2%

DenmarkSwedenFinland

BelgiumLuxembourg

SloveniaIrelandAustria

NetherlandsUnited Kingdom

ItalyGreece

GermanyHungarySlovakiaPortugal

Czech RepublicPolandSpain

FranceEstonia

25

Trade union membership in Poland 1989-2008 (% of adults in Poland)

• membership falls almost everywhere, but in Poland the drop was steeper than in developed countries

• drop in membership stopped and now the rate is constant

CBOS data

V1989

III 990

IV1991

VI1992

XII1993

III1994

IX1995

VI1996

III1999

V2000

VII2001

VII2002

X2003

IX2004

IX2005

II2006

XI2007

XII2008

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Total Solidarity OPZZ

26

Trust Most people can be trusted OR You can't be too careful (10-point scale)

ESS data

6.92

6.51

6.14

5.74

5.59

5.25

5.21

5.11

5.09

4.96

4.86

4.69

4.47

4.41

4.19

4.17

4.12

4.06

3.99

3.79

3.77

Denmark Finland

Sweden Netherlands

Ireland Estonia

United Kingdom Luxembourg

Austria Spain

BelgiumGermany

France Italy

Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Slovenia Portugal

Poland Greece

• very low level of trust in CEE

27

The end of the transformation?1. In a long-term perspective, protest density diminishes due to

falling stakes.

2. Satisfaction with country situation coincides with  strong protest activity: psycho-social factors must be taken into account as potential explanatory variables

3. Labor mobilization steadily decreases due to consolidation of the economic system on the one hand, and to the weakness of unions on the other

4. In the early years, protesting groups defined by professional status. Later,  young people and neighbors/locals became major players: formation of civil society based on post-material values?

5. Identity articulation rare, occurs in the early transformation years. Early 1990s were formative also in the cultural sphere, pre-determined long-term collective ideological and cultural definitions

6. If the generally accepted indicators are considered, civil society is weak in Central and Eastern Europe in comparison with other EU or OECD countries, and is not improving.

7. Need for other indicators: informal networks may constitute core of civil society in the region. Picture not so bleak if other dimensions are considered