Civilian Protection in Conflicts – The Principle of Re- … · Armenian genocide 1 and Hitler’s...

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United Nations Security Council

UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations Journal ISSN: 2318-3195 | v1, 2013| p.98-131

Civilian Protection in Conflicts – The Principle of Re-sponsibility to Protect

Laura de Castro QuagliaLuiza Bulhões Olmedo

Historical background1. Th e development of International Humanitarian LawTh e concept of humanitarian intervention has its roots on the Dutch jurist Hugo

Grotius’ arguments from 1625. Even if not using the expression “humanitarian intervention”, in his book De Iure Belli ac Pacis, he asserted that resort to war was admissible to assist people who were resisting extreme tyranny (Homans 2011). In the other hand the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 created the key elements of the modern system of sovereign states: states legally equal to each other, not subject to the imposition of supranational authority, and not intervening in each other’s internal aff airs. Th roughout the centuries, the argument raged between the defenders of the traditional prerogatives of state sovereignty and the advocates of “humanitarian intervention” (Evans 2008).

Grotius position would be adopted by many scholars throughout the nineteenth century, which Britain’s central role in the ending of the slave trade, through negotiating and enforcing suppression treaties, serves as one example. In 1863, it was formed the International Committee of the Red Cross, which can be considered the world’s fi rst humanitarian organization. Created by Henri Dunant based on the terrible mistreatment of wounded soldiers he witnessed during the Solferino Battle, the Red Cross is the foundation of the modern humanitarian act and the international humanitarian law. It is from these inspirations that the fi rst Geneva Convention would be adopted in 1864, defi ning “the basis on which rest the rules of international law for the protection of the victims of armed confl icts.” (Pictet 1951: 462)

From then on, international humanitarian law evolved. Th e subsequent Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 limited the means by which belligerent states could conduct warfare (Red Cross n.d). In the context of post-World War I, Armenian genocide1 and Hitler’s rise, legal scholars started a movement to protect

1 Th e Armenian Genocide “ was the Turkish killing of some 1.5 million Armenians in 1915–16 by direct massacre and forced marches under appalling conditions” (Evans, 2008: 16). However, the concept of genocide would be

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populations from ethnically motivated mass killings. Th ese ideas, however, were rejected by the League of Nations.

Th e Paris Peace Conference at Versailles, which gave birth to the League of Nations, was in most ways a profound disappointment to those who had hoped for a really signifi cant change of direction. It was overwhelmingly statist in its approach, rejected the incorporation of human rights standards in the league’s covenant, and—in the face of particularly strong lobbying by the United States—made no eff ective provision for the trial of war criminals, accepting the principle of sovereign immunity for high offi cials” (Evans 2008: 18)

Hence, it was only aft er World War II, when civilians and military personnel were killed in equal numbers, that international law related to the protection of war-victims and to the conduct of war was strongly aff ected by the development of human rights legal protection (Lemaire 2012).

Under this perspective, the United Nations Charter was adopted in 1945, a mandate including respect for human rights, considering peace a supreme value, and prohibiting, in principle, the use or threat of force in international relations. However, at the same time, it confi rmed the rule of non-interference in the internal aff airs of sovereign states. Th us, a problem would be drawn, involving how to act to ensure human rights when the action is considered a violation of sovereignty of the State itself. Th e solution is at Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which establishes that if there is a threat to peace and international security, the Security Council has the right to intervene and it may then take enforcement action: “Th e Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” (UN charter, art. 39).

Along with these constraint measures, other important international instruments in the fi eld of human rights were adopted. Such as: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) by the UN General Assembly, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), contributing to affi rm the idea that everyone is entitled to the enjoyment of human rights, whether in time of peace or war (Bierrenbach 2011).

As a result of these human rights institutionalizations under the International Law, in the 20th century the international community, reached consensus on defi nitions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In this sense, shortly aft er World War II, twenty-four Nazis were put on trial at Nuremberg by Allies for atrocities committed during the War, initiating a movement for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, which would lead, fi ft y years later, to the current International Criminal Court (ICC). Th e ICC is the

developed only in 1944 by the legal scholar and campaigner Raphael Lemkin.

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fi rst permanent, treaty-based, international criminal court established in order to punish the most serious crimes perpetrators that concern the international community (Homans 2011).

1.2. From Humanitarian Intervention to the idea of Responsibility to ProtectTh e concept of humanitarian intervention would fi rst be implemented

during the Biafra War (1967-1970)2. Th e confl ict led to a great starvation widely covered by the Western media, but relatively ignored by some Heads of State and Government in the name of neutrality and non-interference. Th is situation has led to the creation of NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders, which defended the idea that inhumane health conditions could justify, in an extraordinary basis, questioning the sovereignty of States (Armand 2009).

Th e concept “Le droit d’ingérence”3 was fi rst proposed by the French philosopher Jean-François Revel in 1979. It was the recognition of rights of one or more nations to violate the sovereignty of another State, under a mandate given by a supranational authority. However, it was the law professors Bernard Kouchner and Mario Bettati, who popularized the term. In 1987, at an international symposium on the law and humanitarian moral, both professors took part on a resolution that was adopted by all participants, concluding that: “should be recognized, in the same international document by all State-member of the international community both the victims’ right to humanitarian assistance and the obligation of States to make their contribution” (our translation. France Terre d’Asile 2012).

Under the UN framework, although the bodies became more assertive in interceding with off ending governments, and generally seeking to make the domestic violation of human rights a legitimate concern of the international community, there is little evidence that any of this did much to make any less bloody the continuing mass atrocity crimes. Th e dynamics of the cold war constituted an important factor in this reality, dominating the UN system when it came to dealing with mass atrocities. Th e two major superpowers rapidly became very focused on what was needed to keep their respective alliance blocs functioning, and were reluctant to impose any signifi cant constraints on misbehaving partners (Evans 2008).

With the end of the Cold War, new possibilities for the United Nations Security Council opened, since this committee was now unlocked by the end of the bipolar confrontation that had prevented its operation. In this sense, it was during the military intervention of several Western states in Iraqi Kurdistan, in April 1991, that for the fi rst time the emergence of the “right to intervene” was mentioned by the UNSC. Th e Council was invoking as justifi cation a threat against the international peace and security (Bierrenbach 2011).

2 Also known as the Nigerian Civil war, 6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970, was a political confl ict caused by the attempted secession of the southeastern provinces of Nigeria as the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra.

3 Usually translated as the “Right to Intervene”


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However, there were too many occasions during the 1990s when the Security Council failed to respond to humanitarian atrocities. Th ese events demonstrated that even a decision by the Security Council to authorize international action to address situations of grave humanitarian concern was no guarantee that any action would be taken, or that it would be eff ectively taken (ICISS Report 2001).

Th roughout this last decade, the signifi cant reduction in the number of international confl icts has been accompanied by an increase in the number of internal ones. It has become more diffi cult to distinguish war from organized crime. Th e weakening of State institutions in many countries has increased risks, providing opportunities for armed groups to take political control with the aim to exploit economic resources. With the use of highly destructive weapons and technologies, internal confl icts have also become much more lethal and complex, (Bierrenbach 2011).

Th e next academicals debates regarding humanitarian intervention, infl uenced by the events in Kosovo and in view of the negative experiences of the UN in Somalia-, Rwanda and Bosnia4, analyzed that governments are not always able to protect their own citizens. In matter of fact, they may eventually be the source of the threat. In order to achieve greater international consensus in crisis and no longer have to choose between respect for sovereignty and the need to intervene for humanitarian purposes, a new concept arose in 2000: the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Th e term Responsibility to Protect has its direct origin in the work of Francis M. Deng, former Minister of Foreign Aff airs of Sudan, representative of the UN Secretary-General for Internally Displaced Persons (1994-2002). Th e concept was developed in a series of books and articles published within the Brookings Institution, especially in the work Sovereignty Responsibility (Bierrenbach 2011). Such concept expresses that is up to each government to protect its own population from crimes against humanity. Th is responsibility would then fall to the international community when states are unwilling or unable to do so (Meza 2010).

It was during Kofi Annan UN Secretary-General mandate that the Responsibility to Protect has evolved more articulately and purposefully. One year aft er the North Atlantic Treaty Ogeanization (NATO) air strikes on the former Yugoslavia, on April 3 2000, was presented the report We the Peoples: Th e Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, in which Annan notes that “safety starts with prevention” and “to enhance the protection, we must reaffi rm the centrality of International Humanitarian Law and the International Law of Human Rights”. According to him:

4 “In Somalia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994, and Bosnia in 1995, the UN action taken (if taken at all) was widely perceived as too little too late, misconceived, poorly resourced, poorly executed, or all of the above. During NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo, Security Council members were sharply divided; the legal justifi cation for action without UN authority was asserted but largely unargued; and great misgivings surrounded the means by which the allies waged the war” (Sahnoun and Gareth 2002)

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Humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue, fraught with political diffi culty and not susceptible to easy answers. But surely no legal principle—not even sovereignty—can ever shield crimes against humanity. Where such crimes occur and peaceful attempts to halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act on behalf of the international community. Th e fact that we cannot protect people everywhere is no reason for doing nothing when we can. Armed intervention must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder it is an option that cannot be relinquished (Annan 2000, pg.48).

Following the construction of the Responsibility to Protect, the International Law also would evolve in such area. Aft er the end of the Cold War, tribunals as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda were the result of relative consensus between the main powers that impunity was unacceptable in those cases. On 17 July 1998, the international community reached an historic milestone when 120 States adopted the Rome Statute, the legal basis for establishing the permanent International Criminal Court, which is an independent international organization, and is not part of the United Nations system (ICC offi cial website)

1.3 Th e International Commission on Intervention and State SovereigntyOn the UN Millennium Assembly in 2000, the UN Secretary-General Kofi

Annan issued a challenge to the international community: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to gross and systemic violations of human rights that aff ect every precept of our common humanity?” In response to this, and troubled by the inconsistency of the international response trough several international crisis, the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced that an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) would be established (Annan 2000).

Th e ICISS was a group composed of prominent international human rights leaders, chaired by Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia, author of the United Nations (UN) peace plan for Cambodia, and Mohamad Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat and Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General. Th ey were supposed to address the calls for improvement on the concept of humanitarian intervention by General Secretary Annan and bridge the trenches between deep defenders of state sovereignty and convinced defenders of intervention policy (Berkeley 2013).

Within a year the ICISS had developed a detailed report that set out new guidelines and principles according to which international crisis management should become more effi cient and coherent. Th e R2P concept was formally established by the report published in December 2001. Th e Commission has sought to address these concerns by focusing, above all, on the central role and responsibility of the United Nations Security Council to take whatever action needed (R2P Coalition Offi cial Website).


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A fundamental step in the ICISS report is the recognition of a “residual or secondary responsibility” of all States of the international community. Indeed, it is recognized that the responsibility to protect lays on the chief of State whose population is in risk, but if the latter is unable, or unwilling, to protect them, and if he is the principal author of these injuries, then the international community must act in his place and the international responsibility takes precedence over the principle of non-intervention. Evans and Sahnoun (Report ICISS: Responsibility to Protect, 2001) go further, pointing the Security Council of the UN as the competent body to authorize a military operation for humanitarian protection. Moreover, they consider this responsibility to include three complementary dimensions: prevention, response and reconstruction. According to the report:

Th is report has been about compelling human need, about populations at risk of slaughter, ethnic cleansing and starvation. It has been about the responsibility of sovereign states to protect their own people from such harm – and about the need for the larger international community to exercise that responsibility if states are unwilling or unable to do so themselves (Report ICISS: Responsibility to Protect, 2001, pg 69).

Even if not all proposals of the ICISS were adopted by the United Nations, it was a fundamental step in the process of the concept’s evolution. Th enceforth, the concept of Responsibility to Protect appeared in three major UN documents that will follow5. (1) Th is doctrine received renewed emphasis in 2004, when the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan created the High-Level Panel on Th reats, Challenges, and Change to identify major threats to peace and security in the international community and to develop potential policies and institutions to address such challenges. Aft er a year of deliberations, the panel’s fi ndings were issued in “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” a report that endorsed R2P as an emerging norm and reiterated the ICISS defi nition of the doctrine. Following the report:

Th ere is a growing recognition that the issue is not the “right to intervene” of any State, but the “responsibility to protect” of every State when it comes to people suff ering from avoidable catastrophe (Report: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2004,paras 201)

(2) At the 2005 World Summit, when the 192 UN member States met to discuss themes such as development, security, human rights and the reform of the United Nations, the concept of R2P gained unprecedented political clout, being devoted two main sections of the Final Document to the Responsibility to Protect (In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, 2005). At the 60th session of the UN General Assembly in 2005, Heads of State and government representatives unanimously endorsed this resolution, supporting 5 2004 - Report: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2004 2005 - Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit- A/RES/60/1, para. 138-140 2009 - Secretary-General’s 2009 Report (A/63/677) on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect

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the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (A/RES/60/1, para. 138-140).In 2006, the UNSC included in Resolution 1674 the topic of protection of

civilians in armed confl icts, a re-affi rmation of R2P. Th en, in Resolution 1706 (2006), which sought to provide a peacekeeping mission to Darfur, the Council once again recognized the importance of R2P and re-asserted its commitment to the principles of this doctrine (R2P Coalition Offi cial Website). (3) But it was only in plenary on 23, 24 and 28 July 2009, that for the fi rst time since its endorsement by the Heads of State Summit of 2005, the General Assembly of the United Nations discussed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and on 14 September it adopted, by consensus, the fi rst resolution of its history on the same subject (A/63/L80 Rev. 1), although the three paragraphs in it were quite short and simple (UNDI 2012).

Nowadays, the Secretary Banki Moon issues once a year a report regarding to the Responsibility to Protect. Meanwhile, many humanitarian emergencies proposals led to the use of force under the concept of Responsibility to Protect, as those occurred in Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Sudan. In this sense, the doctrine discussed has prominently fi gured in many resolutions adopted by the UNSC, as in the case of Libya (2011), Côte d’Ivoire (2011), Yemen (2011), South Sudan (2011) and Syria (2012) (UNDI 2012).

2. Statement of the issue2.1 Responsibility to Protect2.1.1 Defi nitionTh e idea of R2P has suff ered a few changes since its conception until now. Th e

R2P theorized by the ICISS and later worked on by the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Th reats, Challenges, and Change had a much larger scope than the one adopted by the UN Sixtieth Anniversary World Summit, comprising not only the four crimes and violations proposed in the Outcome Document of the World Summit – genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity - but also “overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance” and “situations of state collapse and the resultant exposure of the population to mass starvation and/or civil war” (Evans e Sahnoun 2001, p.33). Th e changes were due to the hesitation shown by some chiefs of State that such a large scope would be used by belligerent States as an excuse to intervene in other countries’ internal aff airs (Orford 2011).

Th e main diff erences between the ICISS report and the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit are well summarized by James Pattinson in the book Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene, and are as follow:


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On the ICISS version of the responsibility to protect, (a) the responsibility to protect transfers to the international community when the state involved is unable or unwilling to look aft er its citizens’ human rights. (b)Military intervention will meet the just cause threshold in circumstances of ‘serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur’ and, in particular, actual or apprehended ‘ “large-scale loss of life” or “large-scale ethnic cleansing”’ (ICISS 2001a: XII). (c) When the state primarily responsible for its people fails to act, reacting robustly to the crisis is a fall-back responsibility of the international community in general (ICISS 2001a: 17). (d) Th e Security Council should be the fi rst port of call for humanitarian intervention, but alternative sources of authority (such as the Uniting for Peace procedure) are not to be completely discounted (ICISS 2001a: 53). (e) Intervention must meet four additional precautionary principles (right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects) (ICISS 2001a: XII).

By contrast, according to the agreement reached at the World Summit, (a) the responsibility to protect transfers to the international community only when ‘national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations’ (UN 2005: 30; emphasis added). (b) Military intervention will meet the just cause threshold only in the more limited circumstances of ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ (UN 2005: 30). (c) Reacting to a crisis is not a fall-back responsibility of the international community. Instead, states are only ‘prepared’ to take collective action ‘on a case-by-case basis’ (UN 2005: 30; emphasis added). (d) Any action is to be collective and to be taken through the Security Council.16 (e) No reference is made to criteria for intervention (Pattinson 2010, p.14).

Still, the core principles of R2P were maintained. Th e main change introduced by the concept of R2P was the shift of policy regarding the international community in the context of one of the four crimes covered by the new norm. Now, instead of the idea of “right to intervene” that any State had, every State is burdened with the “responsibility to protect”, not only inside their own borders, but also elsewhere where it is needed (Evans and Sahnoun 2001). Of course, this shift raises issues of sovereignty, which will be exposed later on.

Th e World Summit Outcome Document, later adopted by the UN General Assembly, states that:

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Th is responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. Th e international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. Th e international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect

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populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and confl icts break out.

140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (A/RES/60/1 2005).

As stated in article 138, the scope of R2P was reduced to four crimes and violations: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity, which can all be encompassed in the term “mass atrocities”. Genocide, as defi ned by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, are “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (A/RES/260). Ethnic cleansing, because is encompassed in crimes against humanity, is not recognizes as a crime per se, but the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect qualifi es it as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove, by violent and terror-inspiring means, the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas” (ICRtoP 2013, p.17). War crimes, according to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, is “an act committed during an armed confl ict that violates international humanitarian or human rights law” (75 UNTS 287). Finally, crimes against humanity are qualifi ed by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as “widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack” (2187 UNTS 90/37).

Th e responsibility to protect rests on three pillars, as stated in the Secretary-General’s 2009 Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect:

1. Th e State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;

2. Th e international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfi lling this responsibility;

3. Th e international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a


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State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. (A/63/677)

Th erefore, the State has the duty to protect its civilians, and only if he fails to do so should the international community intervene. Military intervention should be used only as a last resort, aft er other types of non-forcible actions are exhausted. Th e third pillar was the one that raised the most concerns regarding sovereignty and the tools available to in fact prevent and protect populations in a foreign environment (Bílková 2012).

2.1.2. Humanitarian Intervention vs. R2PTh e concepts of humanitarian intervention and R2P are oft en misused and

confounded. However, no matter the interpretation of either term, they are very diff erent from each other.

Intervention is, by defi nition, illegal. As Jack Donnelly puts it in his book Universal Human Rights in Th eory and Practice: “Intervention is ordinarily defi ned in international relations as coercive foreign involvement in the internal aff airs of a state; violation, short of war, of a state’s sovereignty rights” (Donnelly 2003, p.242). In its turn, humanitarian intervention is any action one state takes to stop, prevent or punish violations of human rights or humanitarian crises, to the benefi t of people of a nationality other than the rescuing state (Donnelly 2003).

In certain way, humanitarian intervention is comprised in the concept of R2P. It would be inserted inside the third pillar, and as aforementioned, only aft er diplomatic and other peaceful means are exhausted. In this sense, humanitarian intervention is a small part of the larger picture off ered by R2P, which is the encouragement of states to keep their responsibilities to protect their citizens (Pattinson 2010).

Notwithstanding, humanitarian intervention can reach further than R2P in the sense that it is not limited to the narrow scope of the four violations R2P focuses. Humanitarian intervention can take place either when human rights are violated by the state, or when there is famine caused by natural disasters, for example. Furthermore, while states looking to enforce R2P require the approval of the United Nations Security Council to take action, humanitarian interventions does not suff er the same limitation (Pattinson 2010).

For this reason, humanitarian intervention can be - and has been - used to make political interferences in other countries (Braga 2013). According to Beat Schweizer, former Deputy Director-General at the International Committee of the Red Cross, “in recent years, the “humanitarian” label has been increasingly used by Western governments to legitimize a new and sometimes controversial security agenda” (Schweizer 2004, p.547).

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2.1.3. Responsibility while ProtectingResponsibility while Protecting (RwP) is a concept introduced in September

2011 by Brazilian president Dilma Roussef in her opening speech at the UN General Assembly. In November, the concept outlined by president Roussef was presented in the form of a statement by the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti. From this statement, the two parts that summarize RwP the best are:

(d) Th e authorization for the use of force must be limited in its legal, operational and temporal elements and the scope of military action must abide by the letter and the spirit of the mandate conferred by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and be carried out in strict conformity with international law, in particular international humanitarian law and the international law of armed confl ict;

(e) Th e use of force must produce as little violence and instability as possible and under no circumstance can it generate more harm than it was authorized to prevent; (A/66/551–S/2011/701).

Th e following year, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Aff airs Antonio de Aguiar Patriota delivered a speech at the United Nations General Assembly further explaining the concept. In his statement, he maintained that R2P and RwP were complementary to each other, and that both should “evolve together” following a basic set of principles:

- prevention is always the best policy. It is the emphasis on preventive diplomacy that reduces the risk of armed confl ict and the human costs associated with it. In that regard, we commend the initiative of the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to establish 2012 as the year of prevention, which has Brazil’s full support. Other initiatives such as “Friends of Mediation” can be seen to fall into the same spirit of promoting the exercise of collective responsibility in the pursuit of peace through diplomacy, dialogue, negotiation, prevention;

- the international community must be rigorous in its eff orts to exhaust all peaceful means available in the protection of civilians under threat of violence, in line with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as embodied in the 2005 Outcome Document;

- the use of force must produce as little violence and instability as possible. Under no circumstances can it generate more harm than it was authorized to prevent;

- in the event the use of force is contemplated, action must be judicious, proportionate and limited to the objectives established by the Security Council;

- enhanced Council procedures are needed to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented to ensure responsibility while protecting (Patriota 2012).

Th e Brazilian proposal aims to limit military intervention in the context of R2P to a minimum, in such a way that political agendas stay out of humanitarian


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aid. To reach this goal, one of the most important aspects of the Brazilian view is that the three pillars follow a sequential path, so that the third pillar, the one that involves possible military intervention, is only reached aft er all the other options are no longer available. In addition, the UNSC or the General Assembly are the only organs that can authorize military action within the scope of R2P (Braga 2013).

2.2. Sovereignty 2.2.1 Security vs. SovereigntyTh e notions of both security and sovereignty have evolved since its conception.

Th e state sovereignty as conceived by Hobbes - absolute, unifi ed and inalienable - in which the citizens are subdued to the state is no longer applicable due to the existence of intervention in the international system (França 2004). Th e very interpretation of Article 2 (4) and (7)6 of the UN Charter has been made more fl exible as to allow an overcoming of legal barriers for intervention (Donnelly 2003).

Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, places security - according to the UNSC - in a higher hierarchy than state sovereignty, as stated in the following press release in 1998:

Th e purpose of Article 2.7, which I quoted just now, was to confi ne such interventions to cases where the international peace is threatened or broken, and to keep the United Nations from interfering in purely domestic disputes. Yet even that article carries the important rider that “this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”. In other words, even national sovereignty can be set aside if it stands in the way of the Security Council’s overriding duty to preserve international peace and security. (SG/SM/6613)

A year later, Mr. Annan discussed the changes in the concept of sovereignty, stating that “the State is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, and not vice-versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty […] has been enhanced by a renewed consciousness of the right of every individual to control his or her destiny” (Annan, 1999, p.37). In this sense, Annan enforces the idea that the state has a responsibility with its citizens, not the other way around. In this same statement, Annan concedes that “the world cannot stand aside when gross and systematic violations of human rights are taking place”, but he also warns that “intervention must be based legitimate and universal principles if it is to enjoy the sustained support

6 (4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

(7) Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll. (Charter of the United Nations)

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of the world’s people” (Annan 1999, p.44). Th is is the statement that ultimately leads to the creation of the ICISS and the whole policy of R2P.

2.2.2. R2P and the UNSCTh e United Nations Security Council has shown support of the Responsibility

to Protect policy since 2006 when Resolution 1674 was passed, followed by a series of resolutions with the same theme (Orford 2011). Resolution 1674 regards the protection of civilians in armed confl ict and is the fi rst reference to R2P by the UNSC, where it reaffi rms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document of 2005 (S/RES/1674). It does the same on Resolution 1894 of 2009, which reaffi rms:

the relevant provisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the protection of civilians in armed confl ict, including paragraphs 138 and 139 thereof regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (S/RES/1894).

Th e Secretary General, in turn, reaffi rms the power invested in the UNSC to either authorize or not a military intervention. In his report of July 2012, current Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that

32. Only the Security Council can authorize the use of force, under Chapter VII, Article 42, of the Charter. Coercive military force can be utilized in various forms, through the deployment of United Nations-sanctioned multinational forces for establishing security zones, the imposition of no-fl y zones, the establishment of a military presence on land and at sea for protection or deterrence purposes, or any other means, as determined by the Security Council (A/66/874–S/2012/578).

However, the UNSC has its shortcomings. More than once the issues of lack of representativeness of developing and emerging countries have been raised, and the power of veto for the fi ve permanent members is oft en questioned by the international community. As a result, the UNSC, in its current form, may not enjoy the legitimacy needed to authorize or prohibit military intervention (Pattinson 2010).

It is important to remember that the UNSC members sometimes fall short of their obligations to safeguard peace and security in favor of their own political agendas. Th is fact became clear during the Cold War, when the UNSC virtually stopped due to constant vetoes from the Unites States and the Former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, these situations have not ceased with the end of the Cold War (Jentleson 2008).

2.3. Situations 2.3.1. KosovoTh e decade of 1990 represented overall a massive failure of the international


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community in preventing human rights violations and protecting civilians. Rwanda, Srebrenica, Somalia and Kosovo all represent situations where the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council took the sidelines and watched as fl agrant cases of crimes against humanity decimated large portions of these regions’ populations (Th akur 2006).

Th e situation in Kosovo represents, however, a turning point in the way the world sees intervention and sovereignty. While in the UNSC Russia and China vetoed military intervention based on the principle of Serbian self determination and sovereignty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, led by the United States, took action without permission from the Security Council (Jentleson 2008), which prompted Kofi Annan to give his 1999 speech challenging the international community to prevent and stop crimes against humanity in a legitimate way (Annan, 1999).

Kosovo was an escalation of the Yugoslav confl ict between Serbians and Albanians. It resulted from centuries of animosities and rivalries between the two populations, which oft en escalated to confl ict, with either side causing massive human and material losses to the other. Th e war of Kosovo itself started in February 1998 and lasted until June 1999. It was fought initially between the Yugoslavian Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians, and later on the NATO forces entered the confl ict (França 2004).

Th e escalation of animosity that drove the Albanians to rebel spurred the Yugoslav regime of Milosevic to start an ethnic cleansing of great proportions in 1999. Aft er Russia and China vetoed actions to stop the confl ict, the United States led the NATO forces in a bombing mission against Serbia, causing their retreat from Kosovo. In turn, the Albanians started their own ethnic cleansing against the Serbian minorities that stayed in the region (Chirot and McCauley 2006). Th e UNSC fi nally adopted resolution 1244 on June 10th, 1999 authorizing international military and civilian presence in Kosovo and establishing the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/RES/1244), which aft er the independence of the country was replaced by the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. As Chirot and McCauley put it, “outside intervention did stop the mass murder and ethnic cleansing but has not brought a self-sustaining peace” (Chirot and McCauley 2006, p.174).

Th e aft ermath of the confl ict and NATO’s intervention without the approval of the UNSC have shown the importance and need of deeper discussions about sovereignty and the role of the international community and its administrative organs regarding matters of human rights violations. As aforementioned, it was the Kosovo confl ict that prompted Kofi Annan’s 1999 speech and the ensuing development of the Responsibility to Protect concept (Th akur 2006).

2.3.2. DarfurTh e confl ict in Darfur started in 2003, when aft er years of escalating tensions,

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rebels of the Sudan liberation Army and of the Justice and Equality Movement attacked government military facilities. Such attacks took the government by surprise and caused some damage to the Sudanese air force capabilities. Th e reaction of the government, however, was severe. It not only deployed its offi cial troops, but also armed and supported janjaweed militias, which proceeded to engage in discriminate killings, sexual assaults, and destruction of property. During the two following years, both sides engaged in a bloody confl ict that claimed the lives of not only combatants, but mainly civilians (Williams and Bellamy 2005).

At fi rst, the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council were cautious with their actions. Even though it was clear that blatant violations of human rights were taking place in Darfur, which was promptly recognized by the then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his speech before the U.S. Congress, the UNSC initially only passed resolutions calling for embargoes and sanctions, leaving out the calls for military intervention coming from a few countries and NGOs (Power 2009). Because of this delay, it is common to fi nd in the literature of the time (2005-2008) harsh criticism to both UN organs.

From the beginning of the confl ict until today, 38 UNSC Resolutions were passed, with varying objectives and measures. Most of them are mainly bureaucratic decisions, such as to extend the mandate of the diff erent UN agencies located in the region. Resolution 1556 passed in July 2004 - therefore before the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document - endorsed actions of intervention taken by the African Union and called for an arms embargo in the region (S/RES/1556). Even though it came before the offi cial UN position on R2P, many members of the international community felt that Resolution 1556 fell short on its task to help end the confl ict (Williams and Bellamy 2005).

Aft er the introduction of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and UNSC Resolution 1674 regarding the protection of civilians in confl ict in 2006, a shift could be perceived in the content of the UNSC Resolutions passed regarding Darfur. In August 2006 - four months aft er UNSC Resolution 1674 - UNSC Resolution 1706 authorizes the deployment of 17,300 UN peacekeeping troops to Darfur:

1. Decides […] that UNMIS’ mandate shall be expanded as specifi ed in paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 below, that it shall deploy to Darfur, and therefore invites the consent of the Government of National Unity for this deployment, and urges Member States to provide the capability for an expeditious deployment (S/RES/1706);

It is important to note that even though the decision to intervene is made, the members of the UNSC still “invite the consent” of the Sudanese government. Th e consent, however, never came.

Finally, UNSC Resolution 1769 was needed due to diffi culties encountered by the UN to deploy its peacekeeping troops to Darfur due to the opposition of Khartoum. Th is new resolution of July 2007 creates an African Union/UN hybrid


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peacekeeping mission in Darfur called UNAMID, and authorizes the deployment of 26,000 troops to the region. Again, the initiative was met with resistance by the Sudanese government, which delayed the deployment of troops and equipment (S/RES/1769).

2.3.3. LibyaTh e confl ict in Libya took place in the context of the Arab Spring, in February

2011. Groups of opposition started protests in Benghazi against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi , who responded by sending government security forces over to suppress the protests. Th e confl ict quickly escalated, becoming more gruesome and violent by the day, mainly due to government forces attacking civilians. Soon, the situation became unsustainable and the UNSC was urged into action (Bellamy 2011).

Many R2P theorists such as Alex Bellamy in his 2011 article Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: the Exception and the Norm and Gareth Evans in his 2012 interview with Alan Philps considered the confl ict in Libya to be a textbook situation where the Responsibility to Protect principle should be applied. Bellamy highlights three main reasons this was the case: 1. Gaddafi more than once publically called his “offi cers” to kill the “cockroaches” that acted against Libya and his government. Th e clear threat of mass atrocities couldn’t have been left unanswered by the international community; 2. Th e situation escalated with such speed that measures were taken and Resolutions were approved without much time for deliberation. Bellamy speculates that had the UNSC taken more time to approve Resolution 1973, the forces of Gaddafi would have decimated the opposition in Benghazi; 3. Th e three main international organizations of the region were in favor of action against Gaddafi . Th e League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of the Islamic Conference all called for a no-fl y zone to be installed in Libya, which helped convince more hesitant UNSC members such as China and Russia not to veto a more fi rm Resolution (Bellamy 2011).

Resolution 1970 of February 2011 - the fi rst one in which the Responsibility to Protect is mentioned since 2006 - imposed an arms embargo, fi nancial sanctions, a travel ban and asset freeze against Libya. It also calls for humanitarian assistance to be sent and supported:

26. Calls upon all Member States, working together and acting in cooperation with the Secretary General, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and requests the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to this paragraph, and expresses its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to achieve this (S/RES/1970);

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Less than a month later, in March 2011, UNSC Resolution 1973 was adopted. Th is Resolution has an important role within the R2P context because it was the fi rst time the UNSC approved the use of military forces to protect civilians without the consent of the government of the state (Bellamy 2011). It established a no fl y zone and called for the enforcement of the arms embargo. Most importantly, it authorized the international community to “take all necessary measures […] to protect civilians”, as stated in paragraph 4:

4. Authorizes Member States that have notifi ed the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council (S/RES/1973);

Th e BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and Germany abstained from voting, hesitant that taking military measure was really necessary and questioning if all other alternatives had been exhausted. What was initially a consensus about the need to intervene soon gained some dissenting voices. Gareth Evans points that Brazil, Russia, India and China were dissatisfi ed with the way the mission was carried out and with its aft ermath, claiming that the U.S., France and Britain were trying to promote a change of regime, not only a humanitarian assistance mission (Evans 2012).

It was this situation that prompted Brazil to promote the idea of Responsibility While Protecting. Brazil defended that some criteria already present in the R2P principle introduced by the ICISS should be taken into greater consideration when debating interventions. Last resort, proportionality and balance of consequences should all be applied before deciding to intervene militarily (Evans 2012).

3. Previous international action Parallel to the debate taking place in the academic plan, the concept of

Responsibility to Protect was the subject of reports and resolutions from diff erent UN agencies and other international organizations. Th erefore, it is important to go through these documents since they refl ect the evolution of R2P at the international level.

3.1. Report: Th e Responsibility to Protect ICISS (2001)Th e ICISS was formed in September 2000 with the goal of developing global

political consensus about how and when the international community should respond to emerging crises involving the potential for large-scale loss of life and


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other widespread crimes against humanity .Th e expression “Responsibility to Protect” was fi rst presented in the report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) set up by the Canadian Government, in response to Kofi Annan’s (UN secretary-general at the time) question of when the international community must intervene for humanitarian purposes (ICRtoP Offi cial Website n.d).

Th e report was presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 18 December 2001. It can be considered a starting point on the evolution of the debate on R2P and is one of the most substantial documents in terms of ideas and contents on the subject (UNDI 2012). It found that sovereignty not only gave a State the right to control its aff airs, it also conferred the State primary responsibility for protecting the people within its borders. It proposed that when a State fails to protect its people, either due to a lack of ability or a lack of willingness, the responsibility shift s to the international community. In this sense, the report emphasized this secondary responsibility of the international community: “where a population is suff ering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it” (ICISS 2001).

Th e Report stresses that military intervention constitutes an exceptional mean and indicates which conditions would have to be fulfi lled in order to be lawful to resort to this action. In this regard, the document states that the United Nations Security Council is the most appropriate agency to decide the resort to military intervention; the UNSC authorization should always be sought prior to any military intervention; when addressed such a request, the Security Council must act quickly, but it should not fail to see that there are conditions that legitimize such an intervention; the permanent members of the Security Council should reach an agreement in the sense of not resorting to the veto. If the Security Council refuses the proposal, or does not act within a reasonable time, the alternatives are: the consideration of the matter by the General Assembly under Resolution “Uniting for Peace”7 or an action by a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In the fi nal part of the document, is predicted - though not approved - the possibility of an action by a State, or a coalition of States outside the Security Council (Lobo 2009).

3.2. Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Th reats, Challenges and Change Report: A More Secure World - Our Shared Responsibility (2004)

Th e document, as its title suggests, covers a wide range of issues, among

7 It resolves that “if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security”(A/RES/377).

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which is included the Responsibility to Protect. Th e Report states that the R2P is an emerging standard, and argues that military intervention is a last resort that should only be used by a decision of the Security Council (Lobo 2009). In this sense, it endorsed the:

emerging norm of a responsibility to protect stating that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent (Our Shared Responsibility, 2004, pa. 203).

Th e panel proposed basic criteria that would legitimize the authorization of the use of force by the UN Security Council, including the gravity of the threat, the fact that it must be a last resort, and the proportionality of the response. It recognizes that a system of genuine collective security will require addressing the security needs of all states. Th erefore, the report included 101 recommendations on how the world must meet the world’s security challenges collectively and comprehensively, including by embracing and implementing the Responsibility to Protect (UN Department of Public Information 2013).

3.3 United Nations Secretary-General Report: In Larger Freedom (2005)In preparation for the 60th session of the General Assembly in 2005, the Secretary-

General Kofi Annan was asked by the UN to report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration. Aft er consultations with governments, UN offi cials and input from civil society, he released a report with recommendations on what issues heads of state and government should address at the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly in years to come (ICRtoP Offi cial Website n.d).

Th rough this report Annan declared its full agreement with the idea expressed in previous documents of the United Nations concerning the existence of an emerging standard related to collective responsibility to protect. When addressing the question of Security Council powers, he argues that the right of this agency to resort to the use of military force to maintain international peace and security covers cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity. Furthermore he suggests a list of proposed criteria, including seriousness of the threat, proportionality and chance of success, be applied for the authorization of the use of force in general (Lobo 2009). Th us, he asserts in the document:

I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it. Th is responsibility lies, fi rst and foremost, with each individual State, whose primary raison d’être and duty is to protect its population. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shift s to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. When such methods appear insuffi cient, the


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Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter of the United Nations, including enforcement action, if so required (In Larger Freedom, 2005, pa. 135).

3.4 United Nations World Summit Outcome Document (2005)On 15 September 2005, the Outcome Document of United Nations World

Summit was signed during the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly by all Member States. In the historic gathering of world leaders in New York, heads of state and government reached consensus on the Responsibility to Protect, also agreeing that when any State fails to meet that responsibility, all States (the international community) are responsible for helping to protect people threatened with such crimes. Th e document was brought before the United Nations General Assembly for adoption as a resolution (A/RES/60/1) on 16 September (UN Department of Public Information 2013).

Although not lengthening too much on the analysis of the issue, the document contains two paragraphs (138 and 139) which constitute the essential reference for all subsequent positions taken on the responsibility to protect. According to paragraph 138, it is asserted the States’ individual responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Regarding to the responsibility concerning to collective action it states, on the 139th paragraph, that the international community is prepared to take action through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as considered appropriate (A/RES/60/1 2005).

Th e summit outcome document also specifi es that the UNSC has a role to play in assisting states to comply with their responsibility to protect before a crisis has reached the level of a threat to peace. According to the ideas exposed on the document the UNSC has the authority to investigate situations that might endanger peace and security and to work with appropriate regional organizations. Th e summit document empowers the UNSC to act, but it has taken only modest steps toward operationalizing this agenda and has faced considerable resistance in doing so (Pace et all 2009).

With this phrasing, UN member states accept in principle that atrocity crimes occurring wholly within a state can be considered a threat to peace, and once Chapter VII is invoked, the UNSC may respond by adopting a range of measures - arms embargoes, travel bans, economic sanctions, and even referrals to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Th e UNSC may take military action to restore international peace and security if measures short of force would be or have proved to be inadequate (Pace et all 2009).

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3.5. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1674 and 1706 (2006)On 28 April 2006, for the fi rst time, the Security Council made offi cial

reference to the Responsibility to Protect, in the resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Confl ict (POC) (UN Department of Public Information, 2013). Th is Resolution reaffi rms the provisions on R2P within paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document (S/RES/1674 Pa. 4).

Th e resolution was unanimously adopted, but the subject of the resolution had to pass through many negotiations, facing more resistance than expected from Russia, China, and several nonpermanent members. Some council members believed that the Security Council was not the appropriate forum to create a new norm, and that further consideration of this issue should be decided by the General Assembly. In spite of some disagreements, since then, the Council has held semi-annual open debates to take stock of developments in the area of protection of civilians and assess progress in the implementation of the commitments made in Resolution 1674. Governments were positive in affi rming their support for R2P during the fi rst open debate, as well as in subsequent debates (ICRtoP Offi cial Website n.d).

In this context, the council referenced R2P for the fi rst time in one country-specifi c resolution in the preamble to the 31st August 2006 resolution calling for the rapid deployment of peacekeepers in Darfur (S/RES/1706). In this resolution, the council recalled the provisions of its Resolution 1674 with a specifi c reference to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome document. Th e Security Council passed Resolution 1706 authorizing the deployment of 17,300 UN peacekeeping troops to Darfur (Pace et all 2009)8.

3.6 United Nations Secretary General Report: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (2009)

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released on 12 January 2009 the fi rst comprehensive document from the UN Secretariat on the R2P entitled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Th e report was intended to serve as a basic document consecrating this topic for debate on the General Assembly held from 23 to 28 July 2009. Th e starting point of the paper is constituted by paragraphs 138 and 139 from the World Summit Outcome Document of 2005. Hence, early in the report, there are concerns stating that those provisions are based solidly in international law, so the task which currently lies ahead is not to reinterpret or renegotiate the summit conclusions, but to fi nd ways for a consistent application of the same. It is a long and detailed report, more focused on analysis than for on presentation of new ideas (Lobo 2009).

On the document the Secretary-General outlined a strategy around three pillars of the responsibility to protect: 1. the individual responsibility of each State, 8 Th e confl ict fl ared in 2003 when rebels in Darfur took up arms, accusing the government of neglecting the

region. Th e government responded with a counter-insurgency campaign (Th omas Reuters Foundation 2013).


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for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement; 2. the international community responsibility to assist to States; 3. the international community responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. Th e international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the UN Charter (UN Department of Public Information 2013).

It is interesting to note that in the beginning of the report there is a reference to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, from 2000, and specifi cally to its Article 4, paragraph (h), according to which: “(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;” (AU Constitutive Act, 2000). Citing this provision the Report notes that while the Organization of African Unity emphasized the principle of nonintervention its successor - the African Union - accentuates the principle of non-indiff erence (Implementing the Responsibility to Protect 2009).

3.7 Security Council Recent Resolutions on R2PSince its resolution on Darfur (1706), in 2006, the Security Council has been

discussing the applicability of the concept of Responsibility to Protect. On 12 January 2007, the Council discussed the situation in Burma/Myanmar. United Kingdom and United States presented a non-coercive draft resolution, which called for a cession of all attacks against minorities, access for humanitarian organizations, cooperation with the International Labor Organization, political dialogue and progress towards democracy. However, China, Russia and South Africa questioned the role of the UNSC in responding to an intra-state situation, and the resolution was vetoed (ICRtoP Offi cial Website n.d).

It was only on February and March 2011, that the Security Council eff ectively approved three Resolutions - two concerning the confl ict in Libya (resolutions 1970 and 1973), and one on the post-electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire (resolution 1975) - endorsing the “Responsibility to Protect”. On 26 February 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, which recalled Libya’s “Responsibility to Protect”, referring the situation to the International Criminal Court and imposing fi nancial sanctions as well as an arms embargo. As the Council considered that the threat to populations persisted, it adopted Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, which called for the enforcement of a no-fl y zone. It was the fi rst time the Security Council had implemented a military response to protect populations in a non-consenting State (Peters 2011).

Regarding Côte d’Ivore, in response to the escalating, post-election violence in late 2010 and early 2011, the UN Security Council, on 30 March 2011, unanimously adopted resolution 1975 condemning the gross human rights violations committed by supporters of both ex-President Laurent Gbagbo and President Ouattara.

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Resolution 1975 also authorized targeted sanctions against Gbagbo and his close supporters and reaffi rmed the UN mandate in Côte d’Ivoire to prevent the use of heavy weapons and protect civilians using all necessary means (ICRtoP Offi cial Website n.d).

4. Bloc positionsTraditionally, Argentina has shown support to the protection of human

rights in the major international organizations in which it takes part, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN. Argentina has repeatedly insisted on opposing any type of coercive action either by a State or a coalition of States against any given State without proper consent by the UNSC, and it recognizes the authority of the Security Council to decide on the matters of Responsibility to Protect (Arredondo 2012). During the annual debates and dialogues on Responsibility to Protect that take place in the General Assembly since 2009, Argentina has consistently intervened in favor of deepening and furthering the debate and has endorsed the reports by the Secretary General, such as the A/63/677 (Implementing the Responsibility to Protect) of 2009 Argentina, 2009) and the A/64/864 of 2010 (Early warning, assessment and the Responsibility to Protect) (Argentina 2010).

Australia has taken a very practical stand regarding the Responsibility to Protect principle not only on a global level, but also at a regional level through a $2mi fund the country established with the Asia-Pacifi c Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Th ese resources are destined to fund research projects on R2P both in the Asia-Pacifi c region and on a global level (Australian Minister of Foreign Aff airs 2009). Australia also cooperates with other NGOs to advance the R2P cause, such as the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, in addition to directly assisting countries to further their abilities to prevent confl ict and civilian suff ering through development assistance programs such as AusAID (Australia 2009).

Not much has been said by the Republic of Azerbaijan regarding the Responsibility to Protect principle. In the 2009 UN General Assembly Debate on R2P, Azerbaijan has expressed concern regarding the non-compliance of many States with Human Rights principles, especially when it comes to crimes of genocide. Th e document also recalls the responsibility of each State to worry about its own civilians, and it considers the report of Secretary General A/63/677 (Implementing the Responsibility to Protect) an important fi rst step to turn the decisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document into more practical guidelines (Azerbaijan 2009).

Th e People’s Republic of China’s standing regarding R2P has shift ed since the fi rst ICISS report on the matter. Th e root of China’s initial reservations concerning R2P lays in the country’s strict interpretation of the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention, which oppose R2P’s foundation. Th at is why China initially


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rejected the notion of R2P, stating concern regarding the misuse of the concept by Western countries to intervene in the internal aff airs of other States. Due to these preoccupations, China insisted that the power to decide on any coercive measure against any State under the R2P rule would lay in the hands of the Security Council, which was accepted in the World Summit and was included in the 2005 Outcome Document, and led to the fi nal Chinese endorsement of the document (Garwood-Gowers 2012). Since then, the country has taken a cautious stance on the subject. Even if Chinese rhetoric supports the use of R2P based action, the country has either abstained from voting or vetoed the main resolutions discussed in the UNSC regarding the use of force against a country that has supposedly failed to protect its civilians, in situations such as Darfur (S/RES/1706), Myanmar and Zimbabwe (Teitt 2008).

France has long history of advancing Human Rights – at least in its discourse - starting with the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789, right to the theorization of the concept of humanitarian intervention by Frenchmen Mario Bettati and Bernanrd Kouchner in the 1980’s. Accordingly, France has endorsed the concept of R2P since its creation at the 2001 ICISS Report, and continued to do so fully supporting the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document outline of the concept (France 2013). France has also voted for every UNSC resolution reaffi rming its commitment to R2P, and its interventions in the annual informal debates on Responsibility to Protect held by the General Assembly always show a fi rm alignment with the Secretary General (France, 2009). Outside the UN, France has taken steps to implement R2P principles to both its Foreign Policy and that of the European Union. In 2008 France included R2P in its White Papers9 Defense and National Security (France 2008) and France and Europe in World Politics (France 2008), not only adopting Responsibility to Protect principles in its internal policy, but also urging the rest of the European Union to do so as well.

Resolution A/RES/63/308, adopted by a consensus on 14 September 2009 was the fi rst resolution on R2P voted in the General Assembly and was introduced by Guatemala with the support of 67 other States. Since then, however, Guatemala has shown a few concerns regarding the application of R2P. In its intervention during the 2012 General Assembly Fourth Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect, the ambassador representative of Guatemala gave his insight on why Latin American countries tend to have issues with the third pillar of R2P, explaining that the principle of non-intervention is deeply rooted in the region. Because of this, Guatemala has raised concerns regarding the possibility of the permanent members of the Security Council using R2P arguments to advance their own foreign policy agenda. As a solution, Guatemala defends the concept of Responsibility while Protecting introduced by Brazil in 2011 (Guatemala, 2012)

Since the fi rst UN General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect, in

9 White Papers are documents released by governments or international organizations containing information or guidelines on specifi c subjects.

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2009, Morocco has voiced concern regarding the criteria and conditions to employ R2P, particularly in the scope of the third pillar (Morocco, 2009). Th e country has shown, however, its willingness to fi nd solutions to these concerns, supporting the Brazilian proposed concept of Responsibility while Protecting during the 2012 General Assembly Fourth Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (Morocco, 2012).

Luxembourg has been supportive of the R2P initiative since its beginning, demonstrating interest in advancing the principle already in a speech at the 61st Session of the General Assembly in September 2006 (Luxembourg, 2006). Later, in 2009, Luxembourg sponsored aforementioned Resolution A/RES/63/308, demonstrating its endorsement to the concept of R2P once again (ICRtoP 2009). Recently, during its candidacy to the UNSC, Luxembourg vowed to help promote the principle of R2P (Luxembourg 2012).

Much like Morocco, Pakistan has been hesitant to fully accept the principles of R2P. In its intervention in the 2009 UN General Assembly Debate on R2P, Pakistan states that R2P doctrine should not surpass the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference (Pakistan 2009). In 2012, Pakistan has voiced, like other countries, concern regarding the application of the third pillar. Th e country insists that it should be used only as a last resort and its use should be subjected to strict criteria (Pakistan 2012).

Russia has been cautious in its support for R2P. Th e country supports the principle, specially pillars one and two, repeatedly claiming at General Assembly informal dialogues on R2P that the role of the international community should be to enable States to implement the Responsibility to Protect practices in their own territory, through guidance and assistance (Russia 2009). Th e third pillar, however, still represents a point of controversy, as the Russian government defends the principle of non-interference (Cooper e Kohler 2009). Russia has been criticized for justifying its actions in Georgia during the 2008 crisis in the region by claiming it was an exercise of the responsibility to protect principle (Evans 2008). Th e country has repeatedly defended this position, including at the 2011 General Assembly Informal Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (Russia, 2011). More recently, Russia chose to abstain from voting (or vetoing) Resolution 1973, which granted a legal basis for international intervention in Libya (S/RES/1973). Th e way the intervention was conducted, however, was perceived by Russia as interference by Western nations in the internal aff airs of another country, which led to the current reluctance to act on Syria. Russia has repeatedly vetoed any resolution draft ed by the Security Council regarding the situation in the country (Charbonneau 2013).

Rwanda has an important - and unfortunate - role in the history of R2P, for it was recognized by both former Secretary-General Kofi Annan and current SG Ban Ki-moon the impact that the Rwandan genocide10 and the international community’s

10 Th e Rwandan genocide happened in 1994, when tensions between the Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority escalated, resulting in the widespread mass murder of Tutsis in the hands of the Hutus. Even though the


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unwillingness to help had in the UN shift towards a more defi nite approach regarding the protection of civilians in confl ict (Krieg 2009). Accordingly, during the annual informal dialogues held at the General Assembly since 2009, Rwanda has shown great support and understanding of the principle of R2P (Rwanda 2009). Th e country has defended that, in cases of genocide, the P5’s right of veto should be abolished, and that, while not ideal, the use of collective military force under the UN Charter can and should be used to protect civilians when a State fails to do so (Rwanda 2012).

During the 2005 World Summit, South Korea, represented by then Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, supported the idea of Responsibility to Protect, but called for further discussion on the matter. Th e text approved in the WSOD satisfi ed South Korea’s conditions, and the delegation supported its passing. Later, Ban Ki-moon defended R2P in its campaign to become Secretary General (Asia-Pacifi c Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2008). In the 2009 Meeting of the General Assembly on R2P, the Korean delegation fully supported the Secretary General position on the subject, emphasizing the need to promote the Second Pillar – the assistance for States trying to implement R2P (South Korea, 2009). Still, South Korea avoids the use of the term in its foreign policy, opting to use more general terms such as “human security” (Asia-Pacifi c Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2008).

Th e African Union had a key role in the development of the R2P concept, integrating the non-indiff erence principle in its Constitutive Act of 2000. Togo, as a member of the AU, has shown support for the principle of R2P (ICRtoP s.d.). Even though Togo hasn’t been really outspoken about the subject, the country has supported, under the R2P principle, the intervention of the UN on specifi c countries such as Syria (Togo, 2012).

Th e United Kingdom has been a fi rm supporter of the R2P principle since its formulation by the ICISS. In addition to reaffi rming their commitment with R2P in the informal talks held regularly at the General Assembly, the country has promoted dialogue with nongovernmental organizations, being a fi nancial supporter of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2013). Th e UK emphasizes the importance of a strong early-warning and early-action system, in order to avoid the need for a more intense intervention. In the context of the European Union, the UK has promoted the principle and its use in the humanitarian missions the EU is involved. Th e country supported every UNSC resolution that invoked R2P, including in Libya and Syria. As opposed to Russia and China, the UK defends the action taken in Libya, and claims that it was all necessary in order to prevent mass atrocities in the country (United Kingdom 2011).

international community was well aware of the slaughter going on in Rwanda, no leading actor - including the UN - acknowledged the genocide, which arguably resulted in the extension of the massacre and the deaths of over 800,000 Tutsis. (Human Rights Council 2013)

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Th e United States has taken a ambivalent stance regarding R2P. While the diff erent American missions have shown support for R2P in diff erent UN fora, such as the Security Council, the Human Rights Council and even at the General Assembly, up until the recent events in Libya it was rare for American government offi cials – and even the President - to speak out about the Responsibility to Protect in major speeches (Albright e Williamson 2013). Th e U.S. joined the UK and France in advocating the principle of R2P to justify an intervention in Libya and the ousting of then-president Gaddafi . Th e country does take steps to help prevent mass atrocities and genocide, such as the recent establishment of the U.S. Atrocity Prevention Board, created in 2012 (Norris e Malknecht 2013). Th e US representation in the UNSC has tried to articulate further intervention in Syria, but the Council has failed to approve a resolution. Still, the American government continues to publicly push for the resignation of president Bashar al-Assad (Horn 2011).

5. Questions to ponderWhere does the boundary between States’ sovereignty and international

community’s Responsibility to Protect lie? How can international community further develop the concept of R2P to guarantee that when States are unwilling or unable to protect their own population there will be a response according to Humanitarian Law?

Considering the historical cases of international community intervention in national confl icts, how can interventions guided only by superpower interests be avoided?

What can the UNSC do to make sure that measures are taken in every situation that falls under the principle of R2P, regardless of the alliances of the off ending State?

What measures can the UNSC take to enforce the Responsibility to Protect?Is there a lack of enforcing tools available to further the reach of R2P? What

options could be considered?How can the UNSC better distinguish the three pillars that form the principle

of R2P?How can R2P be applied in the current confl icts taking place in Africa and the

Middle East?


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AbstractTh e protection of civilians during a confl ict is a key matter that has come to the world’s

attention during the last two decades, when confl icts such as the ones in Darfur, Rwanda, Former Yugoslavia and, as of 2011, the Arab Spring, became notorious for their huge tolls on civilian lives. Th e United Nations Security Council has taken measures to reiterate the importance of protecting the civil society through the adoption of several resolutions. Whereas the protection of civilians is a matter that goes unquestioned by world leaders, the measures that are taken to protect these civilians raise the issue of sovereignty. Th e notion of Responsibility to Protect, or R2P, rests on three main pillars: a state has a responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities; the international community has a responsibility to assist the state if it is unable to protect its population on its own; and if the state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures, such as economic sanctions or even military intervention (as the last resort). In order to protect the principles of international law, there must be a discussion on how to establish whether the State is in fact failing to protect its citizens, and on when military intervention should be employed. In addition, aft er intervention takes place, be it through economic sanctions or military force, it is a diffi cult task to determine when to withdraw such measures. It is of utmost importance to discuss an effi cient way to help civilians without destroying chances for a stable State and lasting peace.

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