Civilian Skills for African Military Officers to Resolve the Infrastructure, Economic Development,...

8/7/2019 Civilian Skills for African Military Officers to Resolve the Infrastructure, Economic Development, and Stability Crisis i

1/56

Visit our website for other free publicationdownloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

T t thi bli ti li k h
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1047http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1047


2/56


3/56

SSI Monograph

CIVILIAN SKILLS FOR AFRICANMILITARY OFFICERS

TO RESOLVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE,ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,

AND STABILITY CRISIS IN SUB-SAHARANAFRICA

Diane E. Chido

March 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and donot necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of the Depart-ment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Gov-ernment. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications

enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose clas-sied information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepre-sent ofcial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers themto offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the in-terest of furthering debate on key issues.This report is cleared forpublic release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sec-tions 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copy-righted.


4/56

ii

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and shouldbe forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

*****

Special thanks are extended to my very able research assis-tant, Lieutenant Katherine Porter, who nished at the top of theU.S. 2010 ROTC class. Any errors or omissions are the sole re-sponsibility of the author.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may bedownloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies ofthis report may also be obtained free of charge while supplies lastby placing an order on the SSI website. The SSI website addressis: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mailnewsletter to update the national security community on the re-search of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, andupcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newslet-ter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research

analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, pleasesubscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-480-5


5/56

iii

FOREWORD

In the United States, we often think of the militaryas an alternative to college, as a professional trainingground, for a wide variety of skills that may includecomputer science, electronics, cooking, or medicine.We have comprehensive job placement and supportprograms for separating service members. Our mili-tary training includes discipline, teaming concepts,

and a respect for civil society, traits expected to re-main with a military member for life.

Through U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)partnership programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, manyofcers are currently benetting from military-to-mil-itary training opportunities to learn aspects of militaryscience and other basic training. A small number of of-

cers will gain valuable skills they can use throughouttheir military careers or even in civilian life.Ms. Diane Chido argues that if our own military

service members on separation or retirement faced re-turn to their hometowns with uncertain pension pay-ments and no transferable skills, along with a suddenloss of purpose and prestige, our country would notbe as stable as it is. Remove our consistent training in

discipline, respect for civilian authority, and loyalty tothe national structure, and we have a greater chance ofinstability. If we add a complete lack of energy, tele-communications, and transportation infrastructure tosupport even basic economic development, we have asituation resembling that of many ethnically dividedAfrican countries, with no employment opportunities

in the civilian sphere and where the rule of law existsonly for some.


6/56

iv

Retirement-age military ofcers have historicallyengaged in coups in numerous African countries, and

frequently civil wars reignite, even with robust dis-armament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)programs. If these experienced ofcers, accustomed toleading and doing, are given the skills to manage con-struction projects and the knowledge to design andbuild power stations, dams, bridges, and roads, andif noncommissioned ofcers are trained to run andmaintain these projects once built; those who pledgedto serve their country in uniform could continue todo so with pride and purpose while wearing mufti.Infrastructure development and enhanced economicopportunity would no longer be entirely reliant on ex-pensive foreign aid and experts. Above all, the threatof destabilization would be reduced.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


7/56

v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DIANE E. CHIDO is an adjunct professor of intel-ligence studies at the Mercyhurst College Institute forIntelligence Studies. She also serves as a faculty advi-sor for student researchers on numerous Departmentof Defense contracts with the Center for IntelligenceResearch, Analysis, and Training. She is the Presidentof DC Analytics, a research and analysis rm formed

in October 2008. She is currently subcontracted as acultural awareness expert on the Horn of Africa, as-sisting in creating training materials for U.S. troops.She has over 15 years of experience in research withthe International Monetary Fund and with the Brook-ings Institution Foreign Policy Program. Ms. Chidopublishes widely on intelligence analysis, ethnic con-

ict, and international security topics. She completedthe U.S. Army Culture Centers train-the-trainercourse on Cultural Awareness in the Horn of Africaand holds a Graduate Certicate in Russian/East Eu-ropean Studies, a BA in international studies and Rus-sian studies, an MA in Russian language, and an MSin applied intelligence analysis.


8/56


9/56

vii

SUMMARY

United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) haspledged to work toward stability in Africa throughenhanced partnerships with African countries, mainlythrough military-to-military training. This is likelyto be highly benecial to serving ofcers in Africanmilitary institutions. However, military training alonedoes not prepare those ofcers for separation from

service and an uncertain future in societies that do notpay pensions on time, if at all, and that do not offereconomic opportunities in general, but especially notto those without needed skills.

USAFRICOM is at a unique point in its engage-ment with the continent as it develops programs andadjusts its approach. This is the optimum time to create

a holistic framework in which to focus on training andto give these ofcers sustainable skills in engineeringand other technical elds as part of the military cur-riculum. Such skills are urgently needed to constructand maintain the national infrastructures now lackingin Africa. Such infrastructures are essential if Africais to move into the new economy. Moreover, such aneffort will ultimately provide opportunities for retired

service members to continue to contribute to buildingthe societies they once served to protect.


10/56


11/56

1

CIVILIAN SKILLS FOR AFRICANMILITARY OFFICERS

TO RESOLVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE,ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,

AND STABILITY CRISIS IN SUB-SAHARANAFRICA

PROBLEMS OF STABILITY IN SUB-SAHARANAFRICA

Quintius [Cincinnatus] laid down his dictatorship onthe sixteenth day, having received it for six months.1

Livy

Like Cincinnatus, who peacefully returned to hisfamily farm at the end of his agreed term as Romanmilitary dictator, retiring American military ofcerstypically look forward to promising second careers.These may be in the private sector, either as contrac-tors to the military or consultants in various capaci-ties, or by entering a eld in which they were trainedwhile in the service, such as accounting, engineering,information management, or medicine.

If these individuals faced simply heading back to

their hometowns with uncertain pension paymentsand no transferable skills, could we assume that sucha dire decline in their fortunes, along with a suddenloss of prestige and purpose, would not adversely af-fect American social stability? It might not, because somuch of our military training emphasizes disciplineand loyalty to the nation. Would that be enough,though?

A common characteristic of Sub-Saharan Africa islack of economic opportunity. This lack underpins its


12/56

2

history of instability, which is particularly pervasive inpost-conict societies. Such societies tend repeatedly

to descend into conict when economic interests beginto collide. Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Bouchats Jan-uary 2010 Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publication,Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach,provides a primer for military and government staffmembers who may be unfamiliar with Africa but areassigned duties that involve participation in Africanaffairs. Bouchats paper lays a foundation as to howand why the U.S. Government, and especially themilitary, might become involved in improving Afri-can economic development and political governancein order to attain security and stability.

Bouchat also explains that,

Economic activities are the most central of all human

endeavors. Although rich in human and geographicdiversity, Africa has fallen behind the rest of the worldin its economic development, adversely impactingAfrican aspirations. . . . [E]conomic development andgood governance need to be the basis of security andstability in Africa, and why both should be a main fo-cus for U.S. military engagement on the continent.2

The only part of Bouchats argument with whichone might nd fault regards whether good gover-nance should be a primary focus for U.S. militaryengagement. While economic development throughtargeted education under the direction of the U.S. mil-itary is a likely gateway to good governance, the mili-tary should not engage in expensive and commonlyunsuccessful anti-corruption programs currently and

historically imposed on the nations of Sub-SaharanAfrica.

We must look at Africa without our Western l-ter in order to understand it from a cultural and his-


13/56


14/56

4

nally, which likely would have prevented many of thepost-independence battles over power and resources

that still occur today.Richard Dowden notes in his book, Africa: Altered

States, Ordinary Miracles (2009):

Africas economies were twisted to serve Europesneeds. With the missionaries and colonial governorscame the destruction of Africas political systems, itsculture, its dignity and self-worth. The brutal but brief

conquest of Africa, particularly south of the Sahara,left it somehow stranded between tradition and West-ern modernity. . . . In Africa the European powers hadbeen strong enough to destroy or subdue traditionalAfrican political systems but did not stay long enoughto create new ones.3

In this conict-prone region, national disarma-

ment, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) pro-grams do not go far enough in providing vocationaltraining for former military or paramilitary members.Despite the best efforts of well-meaning civil societyand rule-of-law training, the overriding factor thatemerges in keeping African ex-combatants from re-turning to the battleeld is jobs (individual and grouppost-traumatic therapy could greatly assist as well).

But training for jobs is missing within African mili-tary establishments for those who will one day retire.Without jobs, they may otherwise resort to coups tomaintain their status quo.

Therefore, rather than continuing to spend so muchon post-conict peacekeeping and nation rebuilding,focusing on creating opportunities and training pro-

grams leading to lucrative and status-maintaining ci-vilian careers for serving African ofcers and noncom-missioned ofcers (NCOs) is more likely to enhance


15/56

5

the economic underpinnings of stability throughoutthe region. A number of African countries have mili-

tary academies, but the vast majority of these teachonly military sciences, not engineering or computerscience, unlike, for example, West Point in the UnitedStates. When African ofcers and NCOs retire, all theyknow is soldiering.

Botswana is known in the region for its stabilityand relative economic opportunities. It is difcult notto connect this happy status with the fact that themajority of serving ofcers in the Botswana DefenceForces have completed U.S.-sponsored InternationalMilitary Education and Training (IMET), billed as alow cost, key funding component of U.S. security as-sistance. In addition to traditional military training,IMET graduates also receive instruction in aviationsafety . . . and [repair of] aircraft structure, re control

systems, avionics ight systems, and radio repair.4

Expanding on the IMET concept by establishing a

single training facility in Africa would enable the U.S.military to provide engineering training to selected of-cers and NCOs. This could make an already low-costprogram even less expensive as the early cohorts pro-vide the trainers. Provision of engineering, telecom-munications, and other valuable skills transferrableto the civilian economy would improve the disciplineand loyalty of national service ofcers and NCOs. Useof this ready labor force to create a sustainable, func-tional infrastructure is also likely to attract neededprivate foreign investment.

Graduates will provide local expertise for infra-structure development, putting the tools in place for

purely African solutions, without foreign entitiesdetermining the direction development should take.The African stakeholders themselves, in the form of


16/56

6

governments, business interests, indigenous NGOs,and private investors, will identify the most pressing

needs, develop the plans, create the supporting indus-tries, and engage proactively in creating a future forAfrica, without resorting to welfare state dependencyresulting from aid-addicted budgets and corrupt re-gimes.

The Importance of Infrastructure to AfricanDevelopment.

According to a 2008 World Bank study, the lack ofinfrastructure in African nations diminishes businessproductivity by 40 percent. The largest infrastructuredecit is the inability to develop power and industrialsectors.5 Once these fundamental gaps are lled, otheraspects of African infrastructure can be expected to

improve.In conjunction with underdeveloped power in-

dustries, Africa writ large also lacks a unied roadand rail infrastructure, which paralyzes its macroeconomies and divides the citizenry. However, atthe regional and individual country level, the lack ofphysical infrastructure is also preventing growth andforeign investment needed to advance power and in-dustrial sectors, and is ultimately limiting economicopportunity at the micro level, which leads to furtherinstability.

As noted by Terry Dunmire, Corporate Council onAfricas (CCA) host to the U.S.-Africa InfrastructureConference in Washington, DC, in July 2007:

Infrastructure and its effectiveness and stability arethe key skeletal structures on which the economies [ofAfrica] depend. It is the transportation systems thatpermit the goods and service to move effectively to


17/56

7

and from the markets; it is the telecommunicationsand IT [information technology] infrastructure thatlink the Continent with the rest of the world; it is thelogistical systems that deliver products for all aspectsof daily life; it is the electrical and power systems thatmake it runin short, it is the efciency and sufcien-cy of infrastructure that [are] essential to continuedeconomic development in Africa.6

With regard to the value of using military resourc-es to aid in infrastructure development, Adam Hoch-schild tells us in King Leopolds Ghost that even in theCongo in 1889:

[A]lmost all of Leopolds [Leopold II, King of the Bel-gians] agents in the Congo were ofcers on extendedleave from the Belgian or other European armies. Staffin place and tools in hand, Leopold set out to buildthe infrastructure necessary to exploit his colony. A

rudimentary Congo transportation system was therst item on his agenda, without it, the territorysriches, whatever they might turn out to be, could notbe brought to the sea except on foot.7

But while Leopold wisely used military resourcesto build infrastructure, the infrastructure built wasfor the wrong purpose. Unfortunately, Leopoldsscheme produced a prime example of much of the ex-isting infrastructure across Sub-Saharan Africa. Withvery few exceptions, roads and railways, many ofwhich have not seen signicant improvements sincethe late 19th century, were built from mine to port,or merely served as a conduit for moving riches fromthe exploited colony to the mother country in Europe.

They were not planned to move later commerce or toconnect communities internally. This early pattern hasperpetuated the divisive nature of tribalism and re-


18/56

8

gionalism that so often degenerate into violent clashesto obtain economic potential for ones own, mainly in

the form of land, natural resources, and labor.This pattern is still being pursued with the major-

ity of transportation and mining infrastructure rap-idly built today by Chinese engineers in regions withvaluable mineral and oil resources. It serves only theindustries in which the Chinese rms have an interest,doing little to interconnect other commercial sectorsand communities. In addition, indigenous jobs arenot created by these projects, since the contracts goto Chinese rms that use their own labor resources.8Therefore, such infrastructural investments are un-likely to lead to long-term economic growth, either atthe macro level for the country at large, or at the microlevel for the benet of individual African workers.

SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTUREDEVELOPMENT AS KEY TO STABILITY

In the past, U.S. policymakers have tended to be-have as patrons, treating each African country on acase-by-case basis by attempting to develop ties withindividual leadersusing incentives such as food orother humanitarian or nancial assistance and provid-ing military training exercises and materiel. However,the United States has increasingly recognized Africaas the next front in the battle against radical Islam andas a strategic theater demanding a counterbalanceagainst rising Chinese inuence in the region. Thus,for America to provide practical education that cansupport African economic development is a logical

approach.


19/56

9

The mandate of the newly established U.S. AfricaCommand (AFRICOM), requiring joint efforts of the

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Depart-ment of State (DoS), is to enhance the development ofprofessional, transparent, democratic, and appropri-ately tasked military institutions in African partnercountries. It is instructive to note that U.S. policymak-ers, as well as Africans, have supported infrastructureas a key to this development. The AFRICOM 2009Posture Statement notes the lack of infrastructure as amajor factor hindering states efforts to develop in anever-globalizing international environment.9

AFRICOM Commander General William KipWards Commanders Intent 2010 statement notes that:

[O]ur national interests lie in a stable continent of Af-rica. This means that Africans live in the relative peaceof a stable environment, are governed effectively, andenjoy a degree of economic and social advancement.An Africa whereby African populations are able toprovide for themselves, contribute to global economicdevelopment, and allow access to markets in free, fair,and competitive ways, is good for America and forthe world. . . . We will build partner security capacityin areas such as support and special staff capabilities,the African non-commissioned ofcer corps, and mili-

tary/dual use infrastructures. . . . 10

Prior to his appointment as AFRICOM Command-er, General Ward declared in a November 14, 2007,interview on TheCharlie Rose Show that he sees Ameri-can forces in Africa as facilitators, as trainers, as ex-amples, as models, as forces for helping Africans bebetter prepared to increase their capacity to do theirwork.11

Before he even began his assignment as AFRICOMcommander, Ward already knew what needed to bedone. The Sub-Saharan region as a whole has not fully


20/56

10

recovered from the shock of colonialism and the sud-den onslaught of independence. Understanding this

region as a body in the throes of post-traumatic stress,as opposed to a lagging developmental headache, pro-vides us a better perspective for treating it in a holisticmanner appropriate to its ills.

In a 2007 article entitled Horizons of Hope, Warddiscussed his experiences in three post-conict op-erational environments, Somalia (1992), Bosnia (2000),and Palestine (2005):

The United States and the international communitymust take the initiative to inuence and rectify post-conict situations before they become new fronts inthe war on terror. . . . Unlike war plans that directour own activities to achieve an objective, road mapsrecommend activities of the supported nation. Thus,they provide war-torn nations with plans and a direc-

tion that they themselves should embark upon. . . .The more situation-dependent implementation phasefollows with the deliberate efforts to stabilize, recon-struct, and rebuild the country, concluding with thetransition to an effective and stable society [whichsecures] the critical surviving infrastructure such aspower grids, transportation networks, farmland, man-ufacturing, and other elements vital to the early recon-struction of the economy. . . . At the end of the imple-mentation phase, the nations economy is sufcientlyself-sustaining that it can seek any further economicassistance on its own through standard internationalchannels.12

By following Wards own prescription, his Com-mand can implement the U.S. Military Academy mod-el as the road map for providing substantial and use-ful education to African military ofcers and NCOs,thus offering entire societies the opportunity to tapinto their own structures and human resources to de-


21/56

11

velop the tangible linkages necessary for sustainedeconomic growth and a healthy body politic.

DoD Directive 3000.05, U.S. Department of Defense,Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, andReconstruction (SSTR) Operations (November 2005), es-tablishes that it is DoD policy to continue to supportthe development, implementation, and operations ofcivil-military teams and related efforts aimed at unityof effort in: rebuilding basic infrastructure; develop-ing local governance structures; fostering security,economic stability, and development; and buildingindigenous capacity for such tasks.13

In their January 2010 Strategic Studies Institute(SSI) monograph, Security Sector Reform: A Case StudyApproach to Transition and Capacity Building, Sarah Me-harg and Aleisha Arnusch argue that stability requiresa level of economic development that provides oppor-

tunities for the rising majority of currently idle anduneducated youth in Sub-Saharan African countriesto participate in constructive activities. They furthernote that the U.S. Governments security sector reform(SSR) agenda is aligned with the goals of its partners,including:

[M]embers of the OECD [Organisation for Economic

Co-Operation and Development] view developmentand security as inextricably linked. . . . Security in allits dimensions is fundamental to reducing poverty,protecting human rights, and achieving UN Millen-nium Development Goals (MDGs).14

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) AfricaInfrastructure Fact Sheet states that Poor infrastructure

is an obstacle to private sector investment on the Afri-can continent, signicantly driving up the cost of do-ing business, limiting new opportunities, and stuntingeconomic growth.15


22/56

12

Additionally, research has shown strong links be-tween improved infrastructure and poverty reduction,

particularly in the areas of income, education, andhealth. As a result, the vast majority of countries eli-gible for Millennium Challenge Corporation fundinghave requested assistance in addressing local infra-structure needs. Among other initiatives, MCC proj-ects include improvements to roads, bridges, energyfacilities, water services, industries, and schools.16

Since the focus of this monograph is on Sub-Sa-haran Africa, it is appropriate to note what Africanleaders themselves have determined to be the criticalinfrastructure needs for economic development. Thisis clearly laid out in the New Partnership for AfricasDevelopment (NEPAD) Strategic Framework, adopt-ed at the 37th Summit of the Organisation for AfricanUnity (OAU) in July 2001 as a program to create an

integrated socioeconomic development frameworkfor Africa. NEPADs October 2001 report offers an ini-tial road map that Ward said is so important for con-structing or reconstructing these societies, including,roads, highways, airports, seaports, railways, water-ways, and telecommunications facilities.17

Western Aid Unsustainable Without Local Skills.

A recent New York Times article referred to theEthiopian village of Koraro as an important testingground for the Millennium Village Project (MVP), anexperiment in global development strategy spearhead-ed by economist Jeffrey Sachs. This case underscoresthe need to create the indigenous human capital that

Africa needs to develop. I think the sustainability ofthe project is a real problem, notes Robert Chase, aWorld Bank Economist and Human Development


23/56

13

Sector Leader in Ethiopia. How youre going to pullout and expect the economic growth to continue is not

immediately clear to me.The article noted that others

question the teams ability to scale the project up tothe hundreds of millions of people stuck in extremepoverty, cringing at the additional billions of dollarsthat would need to be spent and the army of well-trained, highly-educated managers that would need

to be identied.

It further notes that

one MVP employee who has worked at multiple Mil-lennium Villages (and wished to remain anonymous)said that the local project coordinatorspeople withsignicant development experience and ties to theregionare few and far between. Finding similarly-qualied people to liaise with every single villagethroughout the poverty-stricken world, he believes, isa long shot.18

Stella Kagwanja, a Kenyan woman from the Kam-ba tribe, said recently at a U.S. Army Culture Centerevent, You know, Africans have a collective culture,

once you teach something to one person, you havetaught a whole village, because they will go home andteach everyone what they have learned. Kagwanjawent on to say that:

Everyone worries about all this tribalism. This is notan important issue in reality, because if the Kambaor the Luo see the Kikuyu doing something or hav-

ing something like a new road or a power station intheir lands, they will work to make sure they have onetoo. This is also the beauty of building infrastructure,who cares if the Kikuyu are getting all the funding


24/56

14

now for new roads, for instance, once the roads arethere, everyone can use them, not only the Kikuyu orwhomever built them. Once they are there, everybodybenets.19

As noted in a recent Philadelphia Enquirer article,The Joint Chiefs Chairman, Admiral Mike Mullen,travelled to the opening of one of the Central AsiaInstitutes (CAIs) Afghan schools, and later told anAmerican Legion convention: We cannot capture

hearts and minds. We must engage them; we must lis-ten to them.20

U.S. civilian ofcials have been slower to grasp theneed to confer more with locals and nd it harder todo because of security considerations. CAI DirectorGreg Mortenson says if they did sit down with shu-ras (councils of local elders), they would understandthat what Afghans want most is training, whether inregular schools, or vocational or agricultural courses.Rather than use big contractors, he says, we mustteach the Afghans themselves to do the job.21

The same can clearly be said of Africans individu-ally, and of the Sub-Saharan region generally, that isotherwise likely to become prey to extremist ideolo-gies. Such training in this region, even in its genesis, is

likely to head off many of the problems that U.S. Cen-tral Command (CENTCOM) is now ghting to containand eliminate. Why not train in-country for the skillsneeded? Why have to scour Western universities, asis currently happening, for qualied engineers, proj-ect managers, and development experts at prohibitivecosts, when they could be found among African mili-tary ofcers and NCOs seeking a useful transition tocivilian life?


25/56


26/56

16

by later expanding the new middle class that will ul-timately ensure that the rulers are responsible to the

taxpaying electorate, thus increasing stability andaccountability in all facets of society. Secure pay andbenets for military retirees and those in active servicewill reinforce this benecial effect.

d. Personal Issues. Providing opportunities for ex-military in the civilian sector diminishes turf battlesand the need to protect ones own interests at the ex-pense of society.23

Providing widespread economic opportunitywithin society, especially for army ofcers and NCOswhen they separate from service, is likely to diminishgreatly the pressures of these underlying causes.

As Nigeria has been the most coup-prone and cor-rupt of the regions states since independence, it is not

surprising that it has a poor record of caring for itsretired military. At the very least, ensuring retirementpayments should be a priority. In December 2009, thenew Chairman of the Military Pensions Board (MPB),Brigadier General BVT Kwaji, reported on the militarypension plan in place by law since 2004. He found thatthe Pension Reform Act had not improved the prob-lem of irregular pay for military retirees.24

A 2009 allAfrica article praised Kwajis efforts toimprove the situation, stating, Before his arrival, itwas almost seen as a luxury to extend pension andgratuity to retired and discharged members of thecountrys military force, who had put their lives onthe line to defend the land.25 Encouraging those cur-rently serving to pursue education that would pro-

vide economic opportunity upon separation is likelyto prevent additional military coups and improve Ni-gerias poor infrastructure, thus removing some of the


27/56

17

nancial burden on the state, which has thus far failedto provide its pledged support.

Some countries in the region are making militaryeducation a priority and striving to use it as a resourceto grow their economic opportunities across society.Botswana and Somaliland, for example, are focusedon the value of education, seeing the military as an im-portant component of stability. Nigeria is a negativeexample, demonstrating how not to invest effectivelyin infrastructure.

Botswana: What Africa Might Have Become.

Botswana has not experienced violence, nor has itrequired DDR programs. It is commonly held up as theprime example of what can go right in Sub-Saharan Af-rica. It must be noted that although there is a minority

population of Bushmen who still live in the traditionalmode, they do not directly interact with the majorityBotswana population, which is largely homogeneousand a strong factor in the countrys stability. Botswanais an example of the effective use of an African mili-tary to safeguard national infrastructure. In his book,Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles (2009), Rich-ard Dowden notes, Botswanas elected governmentspent the money [from diamond revenues] on givingits people improved education and health and betterroads and water. Visiting Botswana makes you realizewhat all of Africa might have become.26

The Botswana Defence Forces (BDF) are oftenhailed as a model professional military, with 30 of-cers a year participating in U.S. Army IMET train-

ing.27 Analysts have described the BDF as having highstandards of discipline, an emphasis on education,and competent leadership at all levels. Reecting


28/56


29/56

19

Somaliland: Opting Out of Civil War by BuildingCapacity.

Somaliland is a republic within Somalia, havingdeclared its independence from British rule in 1960but eventually agreeing to a partnership with Punt-land and Somalia. However, once violence overtookthose regions in 1991, the Somaliland Congress votedto reinstate its independent status. Since that time,despite the fact that no country has recognized its se-cession, it has managed to maintain relative securityand stability, even prosecuting 15 pirates that Somalil-ands own Navy had caught in its territorial waters inDecember 2009.31

Interestingly, this unrecognized, poverty-strickenrepublic managed to create the Berbera MaritimeCollege in 2005. This college, claiming to follow In-

ternational Maritime Bureau (IMB) standards, is thetraining ground for the Somaliland Navy, with over100 ofcers specically trained to ght pirates off the450 mile-long Somaliland coast. The idea of forming arobust Somali Coast Guard both to prevent piracy andto provide jobs for former pirates willing to forsaketheir current profession has been proposed by a num-ber of international organizations and individuals, butrather than waiting for the world to act on the idea,Somaliland has gotten to work on its own.

The Colleges business plan notes that despite theshing industrys potential as an economic driver, itcontributes less than 1 percent to the nations grossnational product (GNP). This is due to the lack of ad-equate shing equipment, on-shore facilities, skilled

personnel, commercial organisation, public policy,and cultural orientation. The college claims to bethe rst in the country to address these issues, aim-


30/56

20

ing to take a leading role in the development of thenational marine economy by providing professional

and vocational skill training programs for secondaryschool [drop-outs], shermen as well as ship and portoperators. It also aims to become a prominent marineresearch and resource center, which will undertakestudies on marine resources, the environment, andcommercial development.32

The course curriculum includes a full offering ofscience and mathematics courses, as well as Englishlanguage and courses focused on port maintenance,the shing industry, and marine ecology as promised.Although its website indicates a long wish list ofmaterials, equipment, and even instructors needed,this is a critical effort to provide vocational trainingwithin both the civilian and military contexts so as todevelop the knowledge and infrastructure for a sus-

tainable economic sector. Without international recog-nition, Somaliland is ineligible for international aid;therefore, it is attempting to use education and its ownNavy to develop expertise and infrastructure to takeadvantage of existing resources for development.

Nigeria: What NOT to Do.

The Niger Delta Development Commission(NDDC) was established in 2000, in recognition ofthe marginalization and environmental degradationcaused since the 1950s in the Delta and the increas-ingly poor conditions of those living there as oil prof-its are siphoned off in Nigerias rampant corruption.In an attempt to end the violence in the region, the

NDDC has initiated a number of localized infrastruc-ture projects, including electrication, canals, roads,bridges, water systems, schools, and hospitals. The


31/56

21

NDDC notes that its [s]kills acquisition program isdesigned to train youths in vocational skills in vari-

ous trades such as pipetting, welding, automobileand river craft repairs, electrical/electronics. . . . Therationale is to create more jobs for youths with a viewto making them self-reliant. The latest NDDC datashow that a total of 6,070 youths have beneted fromthe skills-acquisition program. A survey conducted bythe Commission showed that most of the beneciariesare either self-employed or gainfully employed inprivate institutions.33

This is progress of a sort, but it is notable that sofew have been trained and that these students areself-employed when they could be building the infra-structure the program has mandated as its goal. Asrecently as February 18, 2010, the Nigerian House ofRepresentatives passed a bill recommending that all

operators and alliance partners . . . maintain a biddingprocess for acquiring goods and services which shallgive full and fair opportunity to Nigerian indigenouscontractors and companies. The bill further states thatqualied Nigerians shall be given rst considerationfor training and employment in work programmes forwhich the plan was submitted.34 This bill was passednearly 10 years after the NDDC Act went into effect.Most egregiously, the lawmakers only belatedly (2009)recognized that operators should train Nigerians inthe areas Nigerians were not [qualied for] in oil andgas contracts due to lack of requisite experience andqualication.35

An October 2009 BBC report on the progress ofNigerias current demobilization of Movement for the

Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) militantsnotes:


32/56

22

Until now, they have lived in militant camps, carry-ing out kidnappings, blowing up oil pipelines andstealing massive amounts of crude oil. What happensto these men now is crucial to the future of the Delta.Already there have been street protests in Yenagoa, inBayelsa State, by youths angry at not receiving moneythey had been promised in return for dumping guns.The government says it will take these young men andre-train themsponsoring them through educationto learn new skills or trades. But if the promises of abetter future are broken, it is likely they will return to

violence.36

The Nigerian authorities are only beginning theprocess of interviewing these young men at transi-tional centers to determine what kind of training theywant and need. The next questions include who willprovide and fund the program, and will society ac-cept them in their chosen trades if they actually obtainthe promised education? Bonny Gaeei, a young leaderwho induced the 260 former MEND members underhis command to turn in their weapons, said, I trustthem, I must trust them. They, the government, theyhave every power. Let them do as they say. If theydont? Then, I will bust pipelines again. That is thetruth.37

Nigeria has the capacity to make good on thesepromises with its proven oil reserves and the manyjobs this industry should have been providing for Ni-gerians since the 1950s. However, the government hassuccumbed to the Dutch Disease, that is, failing todevelop the industry as a national asset for economicgrowth, but rather as a cash cow for elites. Today, onlya small percentage of those employed in Nigerias oiland gas industry are Nigerian.


33/56

23

Augustine Ikelegbe described the negative effectsof the mismanagement of oil revenues in the Delta in

a 2006 African and Asian Studies article, noting that theeconomy of conict has destroyed the traditional co-hesive culture and replaced it with new values. Thesenew values only help private interests, and lead todisrespect for elders and traditional systems. Ikelegbesays that they have also created a macho, might isright, cultist and violent culture. Productive labor hasbeen disdained in the context of cheap oil fallouts andhandouts.38

There is a widespread understanding that DDR,including a universal appreciation for education as abasis for economic growth, is an important aspect ofpost-conict civil-society building. However, imple-mentation tends to be the sticking point.

In the popular book Three Cups of Tea (2006), there

is a poignant scene between the author, Greg Morten-son, and an Afghan warlord, Sadhar Khan. Mortensonnotes that Khan routinely collected tolls from opi-um trafckers crossing his efdom and used the fundsto help his people in Baharak, Northern Afghanistan,by building a huge bazaar and extending loans to hismen to set up lucrative shops once they laid downtheir arms. Khan commented to Mortenson that allthe stones they saw in the valley below the roof ofthe building on which they stood represented Khansfallen soldiers, his mujahedeen, and asked Mortensonto turn all these stones into schools as a monument totheir sacrice.39

A 2007 UNDP report assessing the effectiveness ofDDR programs in Africa asserts, [O]f those emerging

states that have relapsed into conict since the end ofthe cold war, the failure of DDR has contributed, eitherdirectly or indirectly, to the outbreak of approximate-


34/56

24

ly 60% of these armed conicts.40 The common factorin all these experiences is the clear understanding that

one-time payoffs, individual therapy, and civil societytraining are not enough to dissuade potential spoilersfrom causing further instability.

The critical factor for success is providing skillstraining that can ensure viable employment in infra-structure creation and maintenance for individual andsocietal development. While the training may be pro-vided by foreign entities, the participants self-selectfor the skill-sets most appropriate to the domesticeconomy, matching those needed for building the in-frastructure that will lead to sustainable overall eco-nomic development. In Nigeria, the focus would ini-tially be on professions associated with the oil and gasindustry; in Liberia, the timber industry; and so on.

In the nal phase of post-conict DDR, reintegra-

tion, only the very basic aspects of education are ad-dressed in most cases, as noted by Massimo Fusatoin a 2003 article describing the processes and require-ments of successful DDR:

Economic integration is the nal requirement for aDDR program to be successful and sustainable in thelong term. The goal of economic reintegration efforts

is to provide ex-combatants with nancial indepen-dence through employment. . . . Common economicintegration programs include education and profes-sional training, public employment, encouragementof private initiative through skills development andmicrocredit support, and access to land.41

Only the most cursory attention to education

and professional training is made in most cases, andFusato notes that cash payments in place of trainingtend to be favored for ex-combatants. However, their


35/56

25

effectiveness has not been proven as a long-term strat-egy. As stated by Mr. Francis Kai-Kai, who headed

Sierra Leones national DDR committee, You dontjust focus on men and weapons, but on their futuresas well.42

As attested by a review of a number of AfricanDDR cases, vocational training emerges as the great-est single indicator of success. However, rather thanrewarding combatants who have destabilized centralgovernments, this review advocates rewarding thosein the national military who are currently serving tosupport and maintain central government stability.The primary participants should be those who havedone their duty and deserve the skills needed toachieve success when they separate. At that time, theyare able to combine those infrastructure-developingskills with the discipline and desire to continue to

serve their nation.The point of this monograph is not necessarily to

suggest that the intent of training African ofcers andNCOs as engineers while they are in the military is forthem to perform that duty while in the service. But acase might be made, in some instances, for creating aseparate serving corps for infrastructure developmentalong the lines of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, asBotswana has done.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING MODELS FORAFRICAN MILITARY ACADEMIES

The need in Sub-Saharan Africa is for trained en-gineers of various types to spearhead infrastructure

development as civilian actors, whether employedby their own civil administrations or local or interna-tional NGOs, or in private practice with local capital


36/56

26

or through foreign direct investment. Engineeringtraining is not needed only in African militaries, but

the military provides the necessary structure and thediscipline for developing this capacity. Moreover,it is an arena in which U.S. partnership is uniquelysuited. The added benet of improving civil-militaryrelations as a result of visible infrastructure projects islikely to further enhance stability in the region.

Except for South Africa, the Botswanan, Kenyan,and Tanzanian militaries have the most advancedmilitary academies in Sub-Saharan Africa and providetraining for their own and for other African countriesservice personnel. However, based on these nationsinstitutions, it is evident that the current model ofmilitary academies in Africa is that of a liberal artseducation with a focus on humanities. While this ap-proach is understandable, given the current role of

African militaries in peacekeeping and humanitarianmissions, it likely does little to benet post-militarycareers or to create the skills needed for national eco-nomic development.43

The lack of infrastructure development in Africa isnot strictly a military problem; however, the model ofthe U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (CoE) and the U.S.armed services engineering components indicates thathaving the military involved in infrastructure devel-opment and maintenance is likely an efcient strategy.

There are myriad historical examples of criticalinfrastructure development, both domestic and over-seas, where these U.S. military-engineering organiza-tions have participated. More specically, U.S. ArmyCoE, as part of the Military Civic Action (MCA), op-

erated in Africa from 1985 to 1995, working to buildup civil capabilities. The goal of the program was todemonstrate to African militaries the usefulness of


37/56

27

building facilities for civilians as a method to improvecivil-military relations and civil-military trust.44

The program was extremely successful in improv-ing civil opinion of the military; however, U.S. engi-neers provided all the technical expertise. The UnitedStates supplied all of the technical engineering assis-tance in project evaluation, planning, and cost esti-mates; site surveys; logistical advice; implementationoversight; and a limited amount of equipment pro-curement, materials, and spare parts.45 Consequently,once each individual project was complete, the hostnation was left with no residual capability to dupli-cate its success.

While the majority of U.S. Army CoE personnelare not military ofcers, the leader of the organizationis, and the organization has a clear military afliationand atmosphere.46 Additionally, the United States has

built an engineering component into each of its ser-vices with many certied engineers serving as juniorand senior ofcers.

This capability is not only combat effective; it alsoprovides vital skills, training, and educational oppor-tunities to individual ofcers once their military ser-vice is complete. According to a 1999 report, the U.S.military and government employed over 110,000 engi-neers combined, whereas the private sector employed1.3 million. However, engineers employed in the pri-vate sector tended to be older by 4 years on average,and private sector employers tend to favor applicantswith proven job experience gained through militaryengineering service.47

The importance of engineering and technical skills

to the U.S. military is evident in the curriculum of theU.S. military service academies, particularly West


38/56

28

Point. Every cadet attending the academy must take aminimum of four math, two chemistry, two informa-

tion technology, two physics, and three engineeringcourses as part of the basic curriculum.

Additionally, cadets can choose to major in one ofonly three tracks: engineering, science, or humanities.According to West Points own data, approximately45 percent of students choose to focus on engineer-ing or science. Within the engineering program, theAcademy offers six specic accredited programs:civil engineering, electrical engineering, engineeringmanagement, environmental engineering, mechanicalengineering, and systems engineering.48 In addition toWest Point, the other service academies have similarlystrong engineering and science traditions.49

In contrast, African militaries and military acad-emies lack the engineering education and training

available to U.S. ofcers. The Kenyan military acad-emy, for example, does not offer any engineeringprograms, and the only relevant courses offered arein basic mathematics and computer use. However, theKenyan Army Electrical and Mechanical Engineer-ing specialty is similar to the engineering MilitaryOccupation Specialty in the U.S. Army. The KenyanAir Force does offer engineering programs and de-gree opportunities to future ofcers that are likely tobe of an extremely high caliber.50 However, it is stillthe only service with an engineering training capabil-ity, which is used only in narrowly operational roleswithin the military and is compartmentalized withinthe air force.51

While it is likely that a transition to a science and

technology focused military academy system basedon the U.S. West Point model would greatly benetAfrican militaries, the Chinese model of ofcer place-


39/56

29

ment in civil service and infrastructure developmentprojects is also a possible model to increase civil-mili-

tary stability in Africa. If a Kenyan ofcer retires priorto the age of 55, he or she must remain in a reservecapacity.52 In contrast, ofcers who retire at any agefrom the Chinese military are funneled into civil ser-vice. Over the last 60 years, the Chinese governmentestimates that over 4 million former ofcers have beenassigned jobs working on civil service projects build-ing Chinese infrastructure in both rural and urban ar-eas.53

The Chinese model thus instills a lifelong dedica-tion to and investment in the country by its militaryofcers (we must admit that opportunities for someusurpation of state resources serve as an additional in-centive), making it unlikely that ofcers would want toundermine the countrys stability. This principle was

underscored by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinpingsstatement that ofcers carry on a good tradition inthe army, maintain loyalty to the party, and continueworking for the countrys development and stabil-ity.54 By applying the Chinese model in conjunctionwith a well-trained engineering corps, African gov-ernments would be able to build capacity in formerofcers to develop the infrastructure of the nation,foster continued loyalty to the nation, and remove anincentive to participate in coups or other destabilizingactivities.

In conjunction with the improvement of ofcereducation and placement, it is highly likely that thedevelopment of a job-placement program for enlistedsoldiers and NCOs would greatly improve civil-mili-

tary relations. In conjunction with the data from othercases noted above, from 1992 to 1995, Uganda con-ducted a large demobilization. However, there wereclear failures to provide post-military workshops, a


40/56

30

drought coincidentally created unexpected agricul-tural strains, housing and residency issues arose for

displaced veterans, and all but the most conspicuous-ly qualied veterans lacked marketable skills and thusmoney to live. Accordingly, the general public becamefearful of the veterans presence in society.55

For correcting these problems, a 2001 monographby the South African-based Institute for Security Stud-ies recommends that prior to any demobilization, gov-ernments plan for transition by the following steps:(1) create social networks to help integrate and tran-sition soldiers back into civilian society; (2) providethem with information and training; (3) alert domesticrms of the skills soldiers offer to private industry; (4)provide vouchers for technical training; (5) encourageinvolvement in civil service; and (6) create systems tomonitor veterans. These recommendations mirror the

U.S. Army Program for Youth Success (PaYS) system,which is designed to provide an all-source resourcecenter for job placement and career training for Cadetsand enlisted personnel as well as a source for ndingqualied applicants for private industry positions.56

A 2007 Bureau of Labor Statistics article, MilitaryTraining for Civilian Careers, in Occupational OutlookQuarterly, points out that the unemployment rate forveterans tends to be lower than that of the general U.S.labor force. In August 2005, the unemployment ratewas 3.6 percent for veterans and 4.9 percent overall.The article continues:

The military trains you to be technically procient inwhatever occupation you are assigned. But youll alsolearn teamwork, perseverance, leadership, and otherskills widely applicable in the civilian workforce. Infact, some employers looking for workers with specicqualications . . . often seek out former military per-sonnel.


41/56

31

Most armed-services jobs have a direct civilian coun-

terpart. If you learn how to repair and maintain ve-hicles, for example, you might later use these skills asa mechanic in the civilian world. . . . And if you learnto maintain military computer systems, you mightnd civilian work as a computer specialist. In the mili-tary, youll earn career credentials. Youll also have achance to further your education while you serve--andafterward.57

The economic climate of 2008-2010 has not been askind to American veterans returning from Afghani-stan and Iraq as it was in 2005. However, developingan African-based training program could employ anumber of currently displaced veterans with the req-uisite health and skills.

THE MILITARY ACADEMY MODEL AND ITSAPPLICABILITY TO AFRICA

Developing U.S.-style military academies in Sub-Saharan Africa to educate military ofcers and NCOswho might otherwise engage in destructive or desta-bilizing activities due to a lack of economic oppor-tunity, is a long-term stabilization effort. Providing

such positive opportunities for economic and statusadvancement is critical within the context of a basicand widespread lack of lucrative post-retirement em-ployment opportunity, particularly in post-conictDDR situations.

To enhance stability in Sub-Saharan Africa, mili-tary ofcers need to be given incentives to remain

loyal, professional, and disciplined. As the Nigeriancase illustrates, retiree payments are not always reli-able, a situation made worse by loss of status when


42/56

32

one leaves the military. Therefore, instituting a civil-ian career path for current and future ofcers and

NCOs, as Botswana, China, the United States, andmany other professional military organizations havedone, is likely to have a salutary effect.

It is clear that a lack of education and infrastructureunderlie the low level of economic development thatleads to poverty and violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.The greatest hindrance to building the infrastructureAfrica needs for economic development and stabil-itywhether it is for transportation, communication,power generation, or water sanitation and irriga-tionis not only lack of material resources, but lack ofhuman capital. This region lacks the massive numbersof engineers and project managers needed to plan, de-sign, develop, implement, and maintain the projectsmost critical to national and regional development.

Development professionals like to talk about Af-rican solutions for African problems. Without therequisite education, however, it is nearly impossiblefor Africans to develop or implement optimum solu-tions to the continents problems. Since its inceptionin October 2008, AFRICOM has provided valuablemilitary-to-military training to a number of Africanpartners. However, a long-term strategy should focuson creating a holistic approach to professionalizingmilitary service as a part of members lives and as anavenue to greater economic development efforts uponseparation from the service.

The larger objective of building a critical mass ofskills necessary for designing, building, and main-taining essential infrastructure must include the in-

termediate objective of creating a train-the-trainercurriculum lending itself to the ultimate developmentof a cadre of African instructors who can continually


43/56

33

reassess the requirements and conduct the training offuture skilled African military ofcers and NCOs.

U.S.-style military academies offer the best venue.Such academies are highly likely to engender a cycleof professional services and opportunity developmentto stem the current brain drain leading educated andambitious African civilians to abandon their own landfor opportunities abroad. Such an academy initiativeis also likely to provide educational and advance-ment opportunities to former service members, thusdiscouraging them from seeking less constructive em-ployment pathways for themselves at the expense ofthe larger society.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

How to develop curricula, stafng, and an admis-

sions program for professional-skills military acad-emies in Sub-Saharan Africa is beyond the scope ofthis monograph. However, some recommendationscan be made based on the current body of researchand an appreciation of African conditions. The rstrecommendation is to create an initial pair of state-of-the-art academies, one for ofcers and one for NCOs.The second recommendation is to train cadets (andlater ofcers) to become engineers in such specialtiesas energy, electrical, industrial, hydro, mechanical,mining, and petrochemical. The third recommenda-tion relates to NCOs, who are the subject matter ex-perts and teachers of junior enlisted service members.They must be taught leadership and managerial skills,as well as mechanical; bridge, airport and port facility

management; power station maintenance; and waterirrigation, reclamation, or sanitation plant-buildingand maintenance skills. Their academies must ensure


44/56


45/56


46/56

36

and European faculty needed from the outset. The ap-proach is likely to have the added benet of enhancing

U.S.-South African relations within a partnership forregional success, rather than a patronage relationship.

As Metz has observed, The African security en-vironment may be the most complex on earth, with asometimes bewildering array of actors, shifting aflia-tions, and unique characteristics.61 All of these factorsare potentially destabilizing and must be rst under-stood, then accommodated, when designing engage-ment strategy. The personalization of power requireslong-term U.S. strategic engagement, rather than thehistorical norm of providing short-term support toparticular rulers as they t into the scheme du jourof U.S. or European national interest. However, Metzfurther notes that African leaders have recognizedthat the regions internal conicts are extraordinarily

complex and often expensive in both blood and mon-ey.62 Mutual understanding of this fact is likely to bean excellent basis for positive engagement.

Determining the training programs most optimalfor sustained development in the region is a criticalpart of the planning of the two academies, and mustbe conducted with input from local authorities andexperts, who can ensure that the skills training meetsthe most critical skills requirements. Too often West-ern assistance is directed toward programs that ap-pear logical in Washington or Brussels, but have littlerelevance to the situation on the ground in Africa.

By the same token, the goal of the recommendedprogram is to create a local pool of trained engineersand skilled laborers who can accomplish the infra-

structure design and development tasks requiredmost for sustained economic development and growthin the region over the long term. It is critical that theprogram keep in sight that singular goalavoiding


47/56

37

any so-called mission creep toward such secondarygoals as establishing transparency in government, or

ending corruption, or any other ultimately desirableoutcome. Though desirable, these goals must comelater as by-products of sustained and widespread eco-nomic opportunity and growth.

The author, a former member of InternationalMonetary Fund mission teams, arrived at these con-clusions through extensive research on the currentU.S. military training that is intended to prepare ser-vice members for civilian occupations; on DDR pro-grams; on U.S. and African convictions on the criticalneed for infrastructure creation as the key to sustain-able economic development; and on their conclusionsas to what has gone right and wrong in Africa towardachieving these goals in the decades since indepen-dence.

When considering planning for a military-to-mili-tary training program that will diminish the likelihoodof a military coup or further instability in the targetcountry, the recommendations set forth in Dr. Dono-van Chaus SSI Monograph, U.S. Counterterrorism inSub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures, andConicts (2008), are clearly valid:

[T]he USG [U.S. Government] [should] think long-term continually, build meaningful relationships inSSA [Sub-Saharan Africa], move counterterrorism be-yond DoD-centric operations, and, most importantly,educate future analysts, ofcers, and policymakersabout the African continent. What should be borne inmind throughout, and is often lost in the U.S. policy-making process, is that foreign governments and peo-

ples do not often view the world according to Westernliberal values, attitudes, and beliefs. This is as true incounterterrorism as it is in any other strategic issue. 63


48/56

38

Ensuring equitable admission to the academies interms of merit, as opposed to tribal or other forms of

patronage, is the purview of those tasked to set up theschools and not within the scope of this monograph.However, ensuring meritorious matriculation of thebest and brightest students most likely to succeed intheir studies is paramount in achieving the success ofthis initiative.

The United States can assist in designing meth-ods to identify the up-and-coming leaders who maybe only on the periphery now. They will become thenew generation of African leaders with a fresh per-spectivethose who may have spent time abroad,those who understand that the rule of law and the de-velopment of a stable middle class have longer-termbenets for the security of all, and those who rejectthe traditional corrupt practices that have bankrupted

most African countries.As Philip Neikerk has cogently argued:

Africas hope for leadership is a younger generationthat for now remains on the margins. The sooner anew wave of leaders is able to exert power and moraldirection, the better placed the continent will be to me-diate its own problems and ward off outside interfer-

ence. Until then, the dinosaurs rule.64

ENDNOTES

1. Project Gutenbergs The History of Rome, Books 01 to 08, byTitus Livius, D. Spillan, A.M. M.D., trans. and annotated, London,UK: Henry G. Bohn, 1853, p. 194, para. 29, available from www.gutenberg.org/les/19725/19725-h/19725-h.htm .

2. Clarence J. Bouchat, Security And Stability In Africa: A De-velopment Approach, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.Army War College, 2010, p. vii, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=964.


49/56

39

3. Richard Dowden, Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles,New York: Public Affairs, 2009, pp. 55-56.

4. International Military Education and Training (IMET) page,Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) web site, July 21,2010, available from www.dsca.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm .

5. Vivien Foster, Overhauling the Engine of Growth: Infra-structure in Africa,Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic(AICD),Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2008, available fromsiteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFR:ICA/Resources/AICD_exedc_summ_9-30-08a.pdf.

6. Erik Arnetz, Interview with Terry Dunmire, the Director ofBusiness Development of DynCorp International (DI), while Dun-mire hosted theBuilding On StabilityThe U.S.-Africa Infrastruc-ture Conference in Washington, DC, onJuly 28, 2007, published inAfrica Journal, available from craigeisele.wordpress.com/2007/09/02/building-on-stability-the-us-africa-infrastructure-conference/; DerekReveron, Africa Command: Security and Stability, Not Oil orConfrontation, Council for Emerging National Security Affairs(CENSA) Notes, February 2007, available from www.censa.net/AfricaCommand_DReveron.pdf.

7. Adam Hochschild, King Leopolds Ghost: A Story of Greed,Torture, and Heroism in Colonial Africa, New York: First MarinerBooks, 1999, pp. 90-91.

8. Eugene Bawelle, China-Africa relations, any bene-ts? Modern Ghana: Business and Finance, available from www.modernghana.com/news/254412/1/china-africa-relations-any-benets.html.

9. United States Africa Command Posture Statement2009, March 2009, available from www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=4133&lang=0.

10. General William Kip Ward, United States Africa Com-mand Commanders Intent 2010, available from www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/Commander%27s%20Intent%20January%202010.pdf.


50/56

40

11. Interview with General William Kip Ward by CharlieRose, The Charlie Rose Show, November 17, 2007, available fromwww.charlierose.com/view/interview/8779.

12. See www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i45/12.pdf.

13. Stability Operations, U.S. Department of Defense Instruc-tion Number 3000.05, Washington, DC: Department of State, Sep-tember 16, 2009, available from www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf.

14. Sarah Meharg and Aleisha Arnusch, Security Sector Re-form: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building,Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,2010, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=960 .

15. MCC Infrastructure Programs in African Coun-tries, Millennium Challenge Corporation Fact Sheet, April 8,2008, available fromwww.mcc.gov/documents/press/factsheet-040808- africa-infrastructure.pdf.

16. Ibid.

17. New Partnership for Africas Development, October 2001, pp.22-23, available from www.nepad.org/images/framework.pdf.

18. Nicholas D. Kristof, Kararo: The Sustainability Factor,New York Times: On the Ground, January 27, 2010, available fromkristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/koraro-the-sustainability-factor/.

19. Stella Kagwanja, Kenyan native and former USAID sub-contractor in Nairobi now residing in Sierra Vista, AZ, conversa-tion with author, February 21, 2010.

20. Ibid.

21. Trudy Rubin, Worldview: A Surge in Schools, The Phila-delphia Inquirer, January 17, 2010, available from: www.philly.com/inquirer/columnists/trudy_rubin/20100117_Worldview_A_surge_in_schools.html.


51/56

41

22. Meharg and Arnusch.

23. William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa, FourthEd., Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002, pp. 168-195.

24. Yochuku Ofoka Yobolisa, Nigeria: PensionsHang-ing Fate of Retired Military Personnel, allAfrica.com, Decem-ber 23, 2009, available from allafrica.com/stories/200912240111.html?page=2.

25. Ibid.

26. Richard Dowden, Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles,New York: Public Affairs, 2009, p. 53.

27. Janes World Armies: Botswana, Janes InformationGroup, updated December 2, 2009, available by subscription only.

28. Dan Henk, The Botswana Defence Force: Evolution ofa Professional African Military, African Security Review, Vol. 13,No. 4, 2004, available from www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/13No4/EHenk.htm;

29. Ibid.

30. Dan Henk, The Botswana Defence Force in the Struggle for anAfrican Environment, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007; U.S.Department of State Background Note: Botswana, updated De-cember 2009, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm.

31. Pirates Given 15 Year Jail Term In Somaliland RegionalCourt, Somaliland Government News Site, Hargiesa, Somalil-and, February 17, 2010, available at www.somalilandgov.com/.

32. Berbera College Business Plan, Hargeisa, Somaliland,available from www.berberacollege.com/index.php?id=95&parent_id=86&lname=Business%20Plan .

33. Niger Delta Development Commission Website, Skills Ac-quisition page, available from nddc.gov.ng/?page=program&id=2 .

34. Berbera College Business Plan.


52/56

42

35. Festus Owete, Reps pass bill to promote Nigerian partici-pation in oil industry, Next News (Nigerian and African News),October 23, 2009 available from 234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Home/5473137-146/Reps_pass_bill_to_promote_Nigerian.csp .

36. Caroline Dufeld, Will amnesty bring peace to NigerDelta? BBC News Africa, October 5, 2009, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8291336.stm.

37. Ibid.

38. Augustine Ikelegbe, The Economy of Conict in the OilRich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, African and Asian Studies,Vol.5, No. 1, 2006, p. 49.

39. Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin, Three Cups of Tea:One Man's Mission to Promote PeaceOne School at a Time, NewYork: Penguin Books, 2006.

40. Robert Muggah, Comparing DDR and Durable Solu-tions: Some Lessons from Ethiopia, Humanitarian Exchange Mag-azine, Issue 39, June 2008, available from www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2913.

41. Massimo Fusato, Disarmament, Demobilization, andReintegration of Ex-Combatants, Beyond Intractability KnowledgeBase Essay Series, July 2003, available from www.beyondintractabil-ity.org/essay/demobilization/.

42. Ernest Harsch, Reintegration of Ex-combatants: WhenWar Ends; Transforming Africas Fighters into Builders, Vol. 19,No. 3, October 2005, p. 1, available from www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol19no3/193combatant.html .

43. See www.mod.go.ke/?page_link=kma .

44. Historical Vignette 121: Corps Construction in Sub-Sa-haran Africa, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Website, availablefrom www.usace.army.mil/History/hv/Pages/121-AfricaCivicAction.aspx.

45. Ibid.


53/56

43

46. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanding GeneralOrganizational Chart on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Web-site, available from www.usace.army.mil/about/HQORG/Pages/CECGCommandingGeneral.aspx .

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Academics page, Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Academy,available from www.usna.edu/academics.htm ; Academics Page,Boulder, CO: U.S. Air Force Academy, available from www.usafa.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=9410.

50. Samwel Kumba, Bust-up with leaders a blessing for ex-KAF soldier, Daily Nation, January 22, 2010, available fromwww.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/847690/-/vpemu8/-/index.html ;Kenya Armed Forces Technical College page of the Kenyan AirForce Website, available from www.mod.go.ke/Kafsite/Kaftec.htm.

51. Contemporary Army Operational Activities page of theKenyan Army Website, available from www.mod.go.ke/Armysite/currentoperations.htm.

52. Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Africa,Armed Forces: Kenya, November 10, 2009, available by subscrip-tion only.

53. China Addresses Employment of Discharged MilitaryOfcers, Peoples Daily Online (news organ of the Central Com-mittee), June 2009, in English, available from english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6670274.html ; The Great Global Of-cer Shortage, August 29, 2009, Strategy Page, online militaryaffairs article aggregator, available from www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/20090829.aspx .

54. China Addresses Employment of Discharged MilitaryOfcers, Peoples Daily Online, June 2009, in English, availablefrom english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6670274.html .

55. Dr. Garth Shelton and The Wits University Peace Stud-ies Group, Case Study Demobilisation in Uganda, Demobilisa-tion and its Aftermath: A Prole of South Africas Demobilised Military


54/56

44

Personnel, Monograph No 59, Pretoria, South Africa: Institute forSecurity Studies (ISS) August 2001, available from www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Monographs/No59/Chap3.html .

56. Ibid.

57. Military Training for Civilian Careers, Occupational Out-look Quarterly, Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),2007, available from www.bls.gov/opub/ooq/2007/spring/art02.pdf.

58. Janes World Armies: Botswana, Janes InformationGroup, updated December 2, 2009, available by subscription only.

59. Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Africa,Armed Forces: Kenya, July 14, 2009, available by subscription only.

60. Dr. Steven Metz, Rening American Strategy in Africa, Car-lisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Feb-ruary 1, 2000, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=199.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Dr. Donovan C. Chau, U.S. Counterterrorism in Sub-SaharanAfrica: Understanding Costs, Cultures, and Conicts, Carlisle, PA:Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 27,2008, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=821 .

64. Phillip Van Neikerk, Africas Leadership Vacuum,Current History, May 2009, pp. 232-234, available from EBSO Host,ejscontent.ebsco.com.ezproxy.mercyhurst.edu/ContentServer.aspx?target=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.currenthistory.com%2Fpdf_org_les%2F108_718_232.pdf.


55/56

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. MartinCommandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

DirectorProfessor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of ResearchDr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

AuthorMs. Diane E. Chido

Director of PublicationsDr. James G. Pierce

Publications AssistantMs. Rita A. Rummel

*****

CompositionMrs. Jennifer E. Nevil


56/56

Date post:	08-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	ssi-strategic-studies-institute-us-army-war-college
View:	220 times
Download:	0 times

Civilian Skills for African Military Officers to Resolve the Infrastructure, Economic Development,...

Documents