CivPro Notes

7/21/2019 CivPro Notes

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III.

Civil Procedure

A. Actions

1. Ordinary civil actions

An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection

of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A special proceeding, on the other hand, is

a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. The Rules of

Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in

court. (Reyes vs. Enriue!, ".R. #o. $%&'%, April $), &))*+

2. Special civil actions

n the absence of special reasons, it has long been the rule that the -upreme Court will decline

original urisdiction in certiorari, prohibition and mandamus cases, especially when it is

necessary to take evidence and make findings on controverted facts, since it is not a trier of facts and that is a function which can better be done by the trial courts (/isher vs. 0angco

-teamship Co., 1$ 2hil. $+

3y virtue of -ec. 1 of Rule $, the provisions of Rule $% on motion to dismiss are applicable in

special civil actions (#ational 2ower Corp. vs. 4alera, 56$&', #ov. 1), $'%$+

788, a favorable udgment rendered in a special civil action for mandamus is in the nature of aspecial udgment. As such, it reuires the performance of any other act than the payment of

money or the sale or delivery of real or personal property the e8ecution of which is governed

by -ection $$, Rule 1' of the Rules of Court which states9

:-ECT;# $$. E8ecution of -pecial <udgment.=>hen the udgment reuires the performance of any act other than those mentioned in the two preceding sections, a

certified copy of the udgment shall be attached to the writ of e8ecution and shall be

served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any

other person reuired thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or personmay be punished for contempt if he disobeys such udgment.? (#ational @ome

ortgage /inance Corp. vs. Abayari, ".R. #o. $%%)*, ;ctober &, &))'+

3. Criminal actions

Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction

of the public prosecutor. (2inote vs. Ayco, A.. #o. RT<6)6$'BB, ecember $1, &))+

f the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no public

prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authori!ed in writing by the Chief of the 2rosecution

;ffice or the Regional -tate 2rosecution ;ffice to prosecute the case, subect to the approvalof the court. ;nce so authori!ed, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case

until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority

is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. Id.

4iolation of criminal laws is an affront to the 2eople of the 2hilippines as a whole and not

merely to the person directly preudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. t is on thisaccount that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to

protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the

bedrock of peace of the people. Id.

4. Civil actions versus Special proceedings

Dnlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definiteadverse party. 8 8 8 As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the

decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,pay its liabilities ( Pacific Banking



Corporation Employees Organization v. Court of Appeals, 3! P"il. #$%, #&3 '&&#( and to

distribute the residual to those entitled to the same ')da. de *analo v. Court of Appeals, +!

P"il. #!, - '!(.

A special proceeding as :a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a

particular fact? n a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and

distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and laterto be duly recogni!ed as among the decedentFs heirs, which would allow them to e8ercise their

right to participate in the settlement and liuidation of the estate of the decedent. ontaner vs.

-hariFa istrict Court, /ourth -hariFa <udicial istrict,arawi City (G%-CRAGB%+

The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents have to institute a special

proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an

ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and ionisia Reyes, the

E8tra6<udicial -ettlement with the -ale of Estate of ionisia Reyes, and the eed of-egregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of -ale e8ecuted by the heirs of ionisia Reyes

and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title

issued by virtue of the above6uestioned documents. >e answer in the affirmative. (Reyes vs.

Enriue!, ".R. #o. $%&'%, April $), &))*+

5. Personal actions and real actions

2rivate respondent appears to be confused over the difference between personal and real

actions vis6a6vis actions in personam and in rem. The former determines venue the latter, the binding effect of a decision the court may render over the party, whether impleaded or not.

(2aderanga vs. 3uissan, ".R. #o. 56B'BG, -eptember &*, $''1+

n a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of acontract or the recovery of damages. n a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real

property, or, as indicated in section &(a+ of Rule B, a real action is an action affecting title to

real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or

foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property. (@ernande! v. Rural 3ank of 5ucena, nc., #o. 56&'G'$, $) <anuary $'G*, *$ -CRA G, *B6*+

6. Local and transitory actions

The following language is taken from The Earl of @alsburyHs 5aws of England (vol. $, p. )+9

The old distinction between HlocalH and HtransitoryH actions, though of far less

importance than it was before the passing of the udicature acts, must still be borne in

mind in connection with actions relating to land situate outside the local urisdictionof our courts. HTransitoryH actions were those in which the facts in issue between the

parties had no necessary connection with a particular locality, e.g., contract, etc.

whilst IlocalI actions were those in which there was such a connection, e.g., disputes

as to the title to, or trespasses to, land.

;ne importance of this distinction lay in the fact that in the case of local actions the

plaintiff was bound to lay the venue truly, i.e., in the county (originally in the actual

hundred+ in which the land in uestion lay. n the case, however of a transitory action,

he might lay it wherever he pleased, subect to the power of the court to alter it in a proper case. 5ocal venues have now been abolished, and, therefore, so far as actions

relating to land in England are concerned, the distinction may be disregarded.

t is, however, important from another point of view, vi!, that of urisdiction as

distinct from procedure. n the case of real actions relating to land in the colonies or

foreign countries the English relating courts had, even before the udicature acts, no urisdiction and, therefore, the removal by those acts of a difficulty of procedure =

vi!, the rule as to local venue = which might have stood in the way, if they had andwished to e8ercise urisdiction, did not in any way confer urisdiction in such cases.

The lack of urisdiction still e8ists, and our courts refuse to adudicate upon claims oftitle to foreign land in proceedings founded on an alleged invasion of the proprietary

rights attached thereto, and to award damages founded on that adudication in other

words, an action for trespass to, or for recovery of, foreign land can not be maintained

in England, at any rate if the defendant chooses to put in issue the ownership of suchland. (The anila Railroad Company vs. The Attorney6"eneral, representing the

nsular "overnment, et al".R. #o. 56%&*G, ecember $, $'$$+



There is no decision of the -upreme Court of the 2hilippine slands in conflict with the

principles laid down in this opinion. Id.

. Actions in rem! in personam and "uasi in rem

The aim and obect of an action determine its character. >hether a proceeding is in personam,

or in rem or uasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by theseonly. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations

brought against that person and is based on the urisdiction of the person, although it may

involve his right to, or the e8ercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to

control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. (0u vs. 2acleb *) -CRA$'G+

An action for specific performance praying for the e8ecution of a deed of sale in connection

with an undertaking in a contract, such as a contract to sell, is an action in personam. t is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an

opportunity to be heard. (Ching vs. CA, $*$ -CRA '+

The settled rule is that the aim and obect of an action determine its character. >hether a

proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or uasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its

nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce

personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the urisdiction ofthe person, although it may involve his right to, or the e8ercise of ownership of, specific

property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of

the court. The purpose of the proceeding in personam is to impose, through the udgment of a

court, some responsibility or liability disrectly upon the person of the defendant. ;f thischaracter are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a

pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its obect a

udgment against the person, as distinguished from a udgment against the property to

determine its state. t has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations such action is brought against the person.

;n the other hand, a proceeding uasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subect

the property to such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. n an action uasi in rem,an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subect his

interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions in uasi in rem deal

with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate

on these uestions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertainor cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The udgments therein are binding

only upon the parties who oined in the action. (omagas vs. <ense, BB* -CRA %%1 J&))K+

#. Cause o$ Action

1. %eaning o$ cause o$ action

-ection & Rule & the Rules of Civil 2rocedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission

by which a party violates the right of another. ts essential elements are as follows9 $+ A right in

favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created &+ An

obligation on the part of the main defendant to respect or not to violate such right and 1+ An

act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or

constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may

maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. (@eirs of Tomas

olleton vs. /il6Estate anagement, nc., *B -CRA B)' @eirs of 5oreto C.aramag vs.

aramaag, ** -CRA GGB 2hilippine Charter nsurance Corporation vs. 2hilippine #ational

Construction Corporation, %)& -CRA G&1-ubic Telecommunications Company, nc. vs. -ubic

3ay etropolitan Authority, %)1 -CRA BG)+

A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to udicial

interference in his behalf. (-ubic Telecommunications Company, nc. vs. -ubic 3ay

etropolitan Authority, %)1 -CRA BG)+

2. &ig't o$ Action versus Cause o$ action



The term Icause of actionI has been held to be synonymous with Iright of actionI, but in the

law of pleading (Code 2leading+ one is distinguished from the other in that a right of action is a

remedial right belonging to some person, while a cause of action is a formal statement of the

operative facts that give rise to such remedial right. The one is a matter of right and depends on

the substantive law, while the other is a matter of statement and is governed by the law of

procedure. (arue! vs. 4arela, ".R. #o. 56B*B ecember &B, $'&, citing 1G >ords and

2hrases, %B& and 2hillips, Code 2leading, section $*', page $G)+

3. (ailure to state a cause o$ action

The fundamental test for failure to state a cause of action is whether, admitting the veracity of

what appears on the face and within the four corners of the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to therelief prayed for. -tated otherwise, may the court render a valid udgment upon the facts

alleged thereinL ndeed, the inuiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material

allegations. f the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be

maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be presented bydefendants. (AC Enterprise vs. /rabelle 2roperties Corp. ".R. #o. $%%GBB. #ovember &, &))%+

4. )est o$ t'e su$$iciency o$ a cause o$ action

The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts

alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid udgment upon the same, in

accordance with the prayer in the complaint. @owever, this rule is subect to well6recogni!ed

e8ceptions, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if9 $.+

the falsity of the allegations is subect to udicial notice &.+ such allegations are legally

impossible 1.+ the allegations refer to facts which inadmissible in evidence B.+ by the record

or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded or .+ there is evidence which

has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties ot in the course of the hearings

related to the case. (@eirs of 5oreto C. aramag vs. aramag, ** -CRA GGB+

5. Splitting a single cause o$ action and its e$$ects

The rule against splitting a cause of action is intended to prevent repeated litigation between

the same parties in regard to the same subect of controversy to protect the defendant fromunnecessary ve8ation and to avoid the costs and e8penses incident to numerous suits. (Chua

vs. etropolitan 3ank and Trust Company, '% -CRA &B+

Even if the two cases contain two separate remedies that are both available to petitioners, theretwo remedies that arose from one wrongful act cannot be pursued in two different cases. The

rule against splitting a cause of action is intended to prevent repeated litigation between the

same parties in regard to the same subect of controversy, to protect the defendant fromunnecessary ve8ation and to avoid the costs and e8penses incident to numerous suits. t comesfrom the old ma8im nemo deet is ve/ari, pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be twise

ve8ed for one and the same cause+ (3achrach otor Co., nc. vs. carangal, %* 2hil. &*G+

There was a foreclosure of a mortgage due to the debtorFs failure to pay an obligation. Thedebtor filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the foreclosure proceedings. Then, there

was a complaint for damages arising out of the foreclosure proceedings. There was splitting of

causes of action resulting in forum shopping because of the filing of multiple cases based onthe same cause of action although with different prayers.

-ections 1 and B, Rule & of the Rules of Court proscribe the splitting of a single cause of action

as they provide that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. f

two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a udgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

(Chua, et. al. vs. etrobank, et. al., ".R. #o. $*&1$$, August $', &))'+

/orum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be different, when it can be seen that

there is a splitting of a cause of action. (Cuenca vs. Atas, 1 -CRA B* J&))GK+

A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by thedefendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. t is true that a single act or

omission can violate various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes uridically a

violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. @owever, where there is only one



delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may

have been violated belonging to one person. (<oseph vs. 3autista, $G) -CRA B)+

6. *oinder and mis+oinder o$ causes o$ action

788 oinder of several causes of action, the pertinent provision of which is embodied in Rule

&, section , which provides that I-ubect to rules regarding venue and oinder of parties, a party may in one complaint, counterclaim, cross6claim and third6party claim state, in the

alternative or otherwise, as many different causes of action as he may have against an opposing

party. (-ps. 2ere!, ".R. #o. $BGB$G, <uly *, &))+

>hile this rule appears simple, however, difficulties may arise in its application, for it does not

state specifically the cases where several causes of action may be oined, each case apparentlydepending upon the nature of the transactions involved. 3ut one thing is clear9 That the oining

of causes of action must be subect to the rules regarding venue and oinder of parties. f these

rules are violated, then a misoinder of causes of action may arise. Id.

/ormer Chief <ustice oran gives several illustrations of how this rule may be applied whichare interesting. ;n this point he makes the following comment9

This rule, which is e8pressly e8tended to counterclaims, cross6claims, and third6party

claims, is subect to the limitation regarding venue, whereby several causes of action

with no common venue cannot be oined. /or instance, if A, a resident of anila, has

against E, a resident of 3aguio, two causes of action, one for money, and another fortitle to real property located in Mamboanga, he cannot oin them in a single complaint,

for the venue of the first action, which is either anila or 3aguio, is different from

the venue of the second, which is Mamboanga.

The rule is likewise subect to the limitation regarding oinder of parties. /or instance

plaintiff A has a cause of action against 3, another cause of action against C, andanother cause of action against , the three causes of action cannot be oined, because

there would be a misoinder of parties defendant, each of them being interested in the

cause of action alleged against him not in the other causes of action pleaded againstthe others. A claim on a promissory note against three defendants may not be oined

with a claim on another promissory note against two of the defendants, for again there

is a misoinder of parties, the third defendant in the first cause of action not having an

interest in the second cause of action.&(oran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 4ol.$, $'& Ed., p. &B+. Id.

C. Parties to Civil Actions

1. &eal Parties in interest

A suit may only be instituted by the real party in interest. (E8cellent Nuality Apparel, nc. vs

>in ulti6Rich 3uilders, nc. G* -CRA &G& 2antranco Employees Association (2EA6

2T">;+ vs. #5RC, *$ -CRA '*+

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or inured by the udgment in the

suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. d.

nterest within the meaning of the Rules refers to material interest in issue to be affected by the

decree or udgment of the case. ;ne having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the

the urisdiction of the court as the plaintiff (or petitioner+ in action (#@A v. agat ".R. #o.

$%B&BB, <uly 1), &))'+.

,ndispensa-le parties

The defendants could not be blamed if they did not raise the issue of failure to implead

indispensable parties in their answer because in an action for partition of real estate, it is the

plaintiff who is mandated by the rules to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that

the absence of one such party renders all subseuent actions of the court null and void for want



of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. (Nuilatan vs.

@eirs of 5oren!o Nuilatan, 'G -CRA $'+

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subseuent actions of the court null and void

for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

(4alde!6Tallorin vs. @eirs of <uanito Tarona, %) -CRA &)'+

>ithout the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the udgment of the court cannot

attain finality. ;ne who is not a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court

otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. (Aron vs. Realon, B) -CRA 1G&

J&))K+ That is why the case is generally remanded to the court of origin for further

proceedings. (ode8 Realty, nc. vs. @5DR3, & -CRA $'* J&))GK+

#on6impleading of an indispensable part could result in a possible violation of due process.

The inclusion of an indispensable party is necessary for the effective and complete resolution

of the case and in order to accord all parties the benefit of due process and fair play (2epsi

Cola, nc. v. Emerald 2i!!a nc. ".R. #o. $1)', August $B, &))G n 5agunilla, et al., v.

4elasco, et al., ".R. #o. $%'&G%, <une $%, &))', (#achura, <K+.

n Commissioner omingo v. -cheer, (B%% 2hil. &1+, 5otte 2hil. Co., nc. v. ela Cru!, (B%B

-CRA '$+, and 2epsiCo, nc., v. Emerald 2i!!a, nc. (1) -CRA * J&))GK+, the non oiner of

indispensable parties is not a ground of the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead

the non6party claimed to be indispensable. 2arties may be added by the order of the court, on

motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action andOor at such time as are

ust. f the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court,

then the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffFs failure or comply with a lawful

court order (5agunilla, et al. v. 4elasco, et. al ".R. #o. $%'&G%, <une $%, &))'+

&epresentatives as parties

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the

suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total

lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely -ection 1, Rule 1

and -ection &, Rule *G of the Rules of Court. n fact, in the case of "ochan v. 0oung, thisCourt recogni!ed the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the

decedent under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus9

The above6uoted rules, while permitting an e8ecutor or administrator to represent or

to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representingthe deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has

already been appointed. 3ut no rule categorically addresses the situation in which

special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no

administrator has been appointed. n such instances, the heirs cannot be e8pected towait for the appointment of an administrator then wait further to see if the

administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the

interests of the deceased and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the

properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. (Rioferio vs. CA, ".R. #o.$&'))*, <anuary $1, &))B+

Even if there is an appointed administrator, urisprudence recogni!es two e8ceptions, vi!9 ($+ if

the e8ecutor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit and (&+ when the

administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party

defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek udicial relief to recover property of theestate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is

an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty

parties himself. Id.

All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of

property of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three e8ceptions,the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case. Id.



ecessary parties/

An e8ample of a necessary party may be found in -eno v. angubat. 2etitioner therein soldher property through a deed of sale to three vendees. Two of the vendees then sold their shares

to the third buyer, who then sold the property to another set of persons. Thereafter, petitioner,

who claimed that the true intent of the first sale was an euitable mortgage, filed a complaint

seeking the reformation of the deed of sale and the annulment of the second sale. The uestionarose whether the two vendees who had since disposed of their shares should be considered as

indispensable parties or necessary parties. n concluding that they were only necessary parties,

the Court reasoned9

n the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres Evangelista and

3ienvenido angubat to be safeguarded if the sale should be held to be in fact anabsolute sale nor if the sale is held to be an euitable mortgage. efendant arcos

angubat became the absolute owner of the subect property by virtue of the sale to

him of the shares of the aforementioned defendants in the property. -aid defendants

no longer have any interest in the subect property. @owever, being parties to theinstrument sought to be reformed, their presence is necessary in order to settle all the

possible issues of the controversy. >hether the disputed sale be declared an absolute

sale or an euitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will have been amply protected. efendants6spouses 5u!ame in any event may enforce their rights againstdefendant arcos angubat. (Chua vs. Torres, ".R. #o. $$')) August 1), &))+

n -eno, the persons deemed by the Court as necessary parties may have had already disposed

of their interests in the property. @owever, should the lower court therein grant the prayer for

the reformation of the deed of sale, the ruling will undoubtedly have an effect on such parties,on matters such as the purchase price which they may have received, and on whatever

transmission of rights that may have occurred between them and the vendor. Id.

,ndigent Parties/

Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for e8emption meets

the salary and property reuirements under -ection $' of Rule $B$, then the grant of the

application is mandatory. ;n the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both

reuirements, then the application should not be denied outright instead, the court should

apply the Iindigency testI under -ection &$ of Rule 1 and use its sound discretion in

determining the merits of the prayer for e8emption. (Algura vs. 5"D of the City of #aga, ".R.

#o. $)$1, ;ctober 1), &))%+

Alternative de$endants

Considering that the action against elgado -hipping Agencies, nc. is one of admiralty and

belongs to the urisdiction of the Court of /irst nstance while the action against the anila

2ort -ervice and the anila Railroad Company is based on the arrastre contract which becauseof the amount involved, comes under the e8clusive urisdiction of the municipal court, can the

instant case be taken cogni!ance of by the former upon the theory that both defendants are

sued in the alternativeL The answer must be in the affirmative bearing in mind that the cause of

action against the alternative defendants arises out of the same transaction which is therecovery of the value of the lost merchandise and the nature of the loss could not be

determined at the moment. This view finds support in -ection of Rule & of the Rules of Court

which provides (for the rule on oinder of causes of action+. (Ri!al -urety and nsurance

Company vs. anila Railroad Company, et al., ".R. #o. 56&$%&1, April 1), $'%%+

2. Compulsory and permissive +oinder o$ parties

The general rule with reference to parties at civil action reuires the oiner of all necessary

parties, where possible, and the oiner of indispensable parties under and any and all

conditions. The evident intent of the Rules on the oinder of indispensable and necessary

parties is the complete determination of the possible issues, not only between the parties



themselves but also as regards the other person who may be affected by the udgment (oldes

v. 4illanueva, ".R. #o. $%$', August 1$, &)), B%* -CRA %'G 5agunilla, et al, ".R. #o.

$%'&G%, <une $%, &))'+.

3. %is+oinder and non0+oinder o$ parties

#either a misoinder nor a non6oinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. 2arties may

be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the courtHs own initiative at any

stage of the action. The RTC should have ordered the oinder of such party, and noncompliance with thesaid order would have been ground for dismissal of the action. (Cabutihan vs. 5andcenter Construction

P evelopment Corporation, ".R. #o. $B%'B, <une $), &))&+

4. Class Suit

Courts must e8ercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the e8ception to thereuirement of oinder of all indispensable parties. /or while no difficulty may arise if the decision

secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a uandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those

who were deemed impleaded by their self6appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due

process. (3oard of ;ptometry v. Colet, 1&* 2hil. $$*G, $&)B J$''%K.+

788 the reuisites of a class suit are9 $+ the subect matter of controversy is one of common or general

interest to many persons &+ the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them

all to court and 1+ the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of theclass and can fully protect the interests of all concerned. (3anda vs. Ermita, ".R. #o. $%%%&), April &),

&)$)+

An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings.

>hether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the e8istence of the necessary facts, to wit, the

e8istence of a subect matter of common interest, and the e8istence of a class and the number of persons

in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of theclass are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the

number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on

record adeuately represent the class and the subect matter of general or common interest. (athay v.

The Consolidated 3ank and Trust Company, $G 2hil. $, %16%B J$'GBK+

ndeed, in 4R- 2ublications, nc. v. slamic aFwah Council of the 2hilippines, nc., we observed

that an element of a class suit or representative suit is the adeuacy of representation. n determining

the uestion of fair and adeuate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a+whether the interest of the named party is coe8tensive with the interest of the other members of the

class (b+ the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class and(c+ any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class. (3anda

vs. Ermita, ".R. #o. $%%%&), April &), &)$)+

5. Suits against entities it'out +uridical personality

3ut even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that :5apanday? does not have a uridical personality, it maynonetheless be sued under such a name considering that respondents commonly know petitioner by the

name :5apanday "roup of Companies?, as shown in their alleged letter of intent to relinuish their

rights over the subect land. This brings to mind -ection $, Rule 1, of the $''G Rules of Civil

2rocedure, which reads9

:-EC. $. Entity without uridical personality as defendant. 6 >hen two or more persons notorgani!ed as an entity with uridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued

under the name by which they are generally or commonly known,? (5apanday vs. Estita, ".R.

#o. $%&$)', <anuary &$, &))+

6. $$ect o$ deat' o$ party litigant



The action that led to the present controversy was one for cancellation of title, which is a real action

affecting as it does title to or possession of real property. t is an action that survives or is not

e8tinguished upon the death of a party, pursuant to -ection $, Rule *G of the Rules of Court. -ection$%, Rule 1 lays down the procedure that must be observed when a party dies in an action that survives.

The rule is intended to protect every partyHs right to due process. The estate of the deceased party will

continue to be properly represented in the suit, through the duly appointed legal representative.

oreover, no adudication can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right toa day in court is denied. (Regalado vs. Regalado, ".R. #o. $'%'$', <une %, &)$$+

. enue

The controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary obective for which said cases are

filed. (;lympic inds and evelopment Corporation vs. 2latinum "roup etals Corporation, *G

-CRA %&B+

1. enue versus *urisdiction

A former colleague, the @on. /loren! . Regalado (Remedial 5aw Compendium, 4ol. $, -i8th RevisedEd., p. %.+, differentiated urisdiction and venue as follows9 (a+ <urisdiction is the authority to hear anddetermine a case venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried (b+ <urisdiction is a matter of

substantive law venue, of procedural law (c+ <urisdiction establishes a relation between the court and

the subect matter venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent and,

(d+ <urisdiction is fi8ed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties venue may be conferred by theact or agreement of the parties. (#ocum vs. Tan, ".R. #o. $B)&&, -eptember &1, &)), Chico6#a!ario,

<.+

2. enue o$ real actions

n accordance with the wordings of -ec. $ of Rule B, the venue of real actions shall be the proper court

which has territorial urisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,

is situated. (rene arcos6Araneta vs. CA, ".R. #o. $B)'%, August &&, &))*+

3. enue o$ personal actions

T he venue of personal actions is the court where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,

or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non6resident

defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. (rene arcos6Araneta vs. CA, ".R.

#o. $B)'%, August &&, &))*+

-ec. & of Rule B indicates uite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action

case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue. According

to the late <ustice <ose 0. /eria, Ithe word QprincipalH has been added Jin the uniform procedure ruleK in

order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the

venue.I Eliminate the ualifying term IprincipalI and the purpose of the Rule would, to borrow from

<ustice Regalado, Ibe defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded in the action since the

latter would not have the degree of interest in the subect of the action which would warrant and entail

the desirably active participation e8pected of litigants in a case. Id.

4. enue o$ actions against non0residents

As a general rule, when the defendant is not residing and is not found in the 2hilippines, the 2hilippine

courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acuiring urisdiction over his

person, unless he voluntarily appears in court. 3ut, when the action affects the personal status of the

plaintiff residing in the 2hilippines, or is intended to sei!e or dispose of any property, real or personal,

of the defendant, located in the 2hilippines, it may be validly tried by the 2hilippine courts, for then,

they have urisdiction over the res, i.e., the personal status of the plaintiff or the property of the

defendant, and their urisdiction over the person of the non6resident defendant is not essential. 4enue in



such cases may be laid in the province where the plaintiff whose personal status is in uestion resides,

or where the property of the defendant or a part thereof involved in the litigation is located. (abanag

vs. "allemore, ".R. #o. 56*&, <uly &), $'B*+

5. 'en t'e &ules on enue o not Apply

At the outset, we must make clear that under -ection B (b+ of Rule B of the $''G Rules of Civil

2rocedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of

the action, have validly agreed in writing on an e8clusive venue. (-ps. 5antin vs. 5antion, ".R. #o.

$%))1, August &*, &))%+

6. $$ects o$ Stipulations on enue

The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from

bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is e8clusive. nthe absence of ualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement

on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. (-ps. 5antin vs. 5antion, ".R. #o.

$%))1, August &*, &))%+

. Pleadings

The rule allows the pleadings to be signed by either party to the case or the counsel representing that

party. (-ameer ;verseas 2lacement Agency, nc. vs. -antos, ' -CRA %G+

1. inds o$ Pleadings

a. Complaint

A complaint may be dismissed when the facts establishing prescription are apparent from the complaint

or the records. /irst 2hilippine @oldings Corporation vs. Transmiddle East (2hils+ Euities, nc., %)G

-CRA %).

-. Anser

788 the RTC had indeed acuired urisdiction over the person of private respondent when the latterHs

counsel entered his appearance on private respondentHs behalf, without ualification and without

uestioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even filed two otions for E8tension of Time

to /ile Answer. n effect, private respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the RTCFs

urisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for e8tension of time to file answer be granted.

>e have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for

additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default udgment, and to lift order of default with

motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the urisdiction of the court. >hen

private respondent earlier invoked the urisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in her motions

for additional time to file answer, she voluntarily submitted to the urisdiction of the RTC and is thereby

estopped from asserting otherwise. (2alma vs. "alve!, ".R. #o. $%&G1, arch $), &)$)+

f the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be declared in default upon motion of the

plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. n case he is declared in default, the court shall proceed to

render udgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its

discretion reuires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant may not take part in the

trial but shall be entitled to notice of subseuent proceedings. (-antos vs. 2#;C E8ploration Corp.,

".R. #o. $G)'B1, -eptember &1, &))*+



2etitioner failed to file his answer within the reuired period. ndeed, he would not have moved for the

admission of his answer had he filed it on time. Considering that the answer was belatedly filed, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying its admission. 2etitionerFs plea for euity must fail in

the face of the clear and e8press language of the rules of procedure and of the -eptember $$, &))1 order

regarding the period for filing the answer. Euity is available only in the absence of law, not as its

replacement. Euity may be applied only in the absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention

thereof. (-antos vs. 2#;C E8ploration Corp., ".R. #o. $G)'B1, -eptember &1, &))*+

718 egative de$enses

-ection , Rule % of the $'%B Rules of Court states9 -ECT;# . efenses. = (a+ #egative

defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint, essential to

the plaintiffHs cause or causes of action. (ongao vs. 2ryce 2roperties Corp., ".R. #o.

$%BGB. August $%, &))+

A negative defense 'specifically( denies the material facts averred in the complaint essential to

establish the plaintiffHs cause of action 888. (5a #aval rug Corp. vs. CA, ".R. #o. $)1&))

August 1$, $''B+

Rule *, -ection $) of the Rules of Court, as amended, reuires a defendant to specify each

material allegations of fact, the truth of which he does not admit, and whenever practicable, toset forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. >here a

defendant desires to deny part of an averment for a ualification thereof, he is mandated to

specify so much of the averment as true and material and shall deny the remainder. f a

defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of amaterial averment in the complaint, he is bound to so state and this shall have the effect of a

denial. n such a case, it is indispensable that the matter regarding where lack of knowledge is

alleged be clearly set forth so that the adverse party is informed of what is denied. The

purpose of reuiring the defendant to make a specific denial is to make him disclose thematters alleged in the complaint which he succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together

with the matter which he relied upon to support the denial. The parties are compelled to laytheir cards on the table. (2#3 vs. CA, ".R. #o. $&%$1. <anuary $B, &))B+

A denial is not specific simply because it is so ualified by the defendant. A general denial

does not become specific by the use of the word :specifically.? >hen the matters of whether the defendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, are

plainly and necessarily within the defendantFs knowledge, his alleged ignorance or lack of

information will not be considered as a specific denial. -ection $$, Rule * of the said Rule,

provides that material averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of unliuidated damages shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Id.

728 egative pregnant

A negative pregnant is a form of negative e8pression which carries with it an affirmation or at

least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. t is a denial pregnant with an

admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. >here a fact is alleged with

ualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so ualified or modified

are literally denied, has been held that the ualifying circumstances alone are denied while the

fact itself is admitted. (Republic vs. -andiganbayan, et. al., ".R. #o. $&$B, <uly $, &))1+

738 A$$irmative e$enses

/or the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient

in the plaintiffFs cause of action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense i.e. an

IavoidanceI of the claim. (32 2ool of Accredited nsurance Co. vs. Radio indanao

#etwork, nc., ".R. #o. $BG)1'. <anuary &G, &))%+

788 an affirmative defense in an allegation of a new matter which, while admitting the

material allegations of the complaint, would, nevertheless, prevent or bar recovery by the

plaintiff. (5a #aval rug Corp. vs. CA, ".R. #o. $)1&)) August 1$, $''B+



c. Counterclaims

>here the defendant has interposed a counterclaim (whether compulsory or permissive+ or is

seeking affirmative relief by a cross complaint, the plaintiff cannot dismiss the action so as to

affect the right of the defendant in his counterclaim or prayer for affirmative relief. (endo!a

vs. 2aule, G' -CRA 1B$+

A counterclaim is considered an original complaint and, as such, the attack on the title in a case

originally for recovery of possession is not considered a collateral attack on the title. (5una, <r.

vs. Cabales %)* -CRA $'1+

718 Compulsory counterclaim

A counterclaim is compulsory when its obect arises out of or is necessarily connected

with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subect matter of the opposing

partyFs claim.and does reuire for its adudication the presence of third parties of

whom the court cannot acuire urisdiction. (Reillo vs. -an <ose, *' -CRA B*+

728 Permissive counterclaim

t is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the

subect matter of the opposing partyFs claim.(5afarge cement 2hils., nc. v.

Continental Cement Corp., BB1 5ope! v. "loria, B) 2hil. &%J$'$'K+.

n this case, the action was for annulment of the eed of E8traudicial -ettlement of

Estate. The answer alleging counter6partition and accounting of other parcels of land

is not a compulsory counterclaim as it did not arise out of or is necessarily connectedwith the action for Annulment of the eed. (Reillo, et al. v. -an <ose, et al., ".R. #;.

$%%1'1, <une $*, &))', 2eralta, <+.

738 $$ect on t'e Counterclaim 'en t'e complaint is dismissed

The cause of action of a defendantFs counterclaim for damages and attorneyFs fees

arising from an unfounded suit is not eliminated by the mere dismissal of the

plaintiffFs complaint. (Ri!al Commercial 3anking Corporation vs. Royal Cargo

Corporation, %)& -CRA B+

d. Cross0claims

The filing of a cross6claim is provided for in Rule $), sections & and * of the Rules of Court,

the purpose being to settle in a single proceeding all the claims of the different parties against

each other in the case in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. (2eople vs. 2aredes, et. al., ".R.

#o. 56$&B% ay &), $'%)+

e. )'ird 7$ourt'! etc.8 party complaints

The third6party complaint, is 8 8 8 a procedural device whereby a Sthird partyF who is neither a

party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case

with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third6party plaintiff to enforce against such

third6party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in

respect of the plaintiffFs claim. The third6party complaint is actually independent of and

separate and distinct from the plaintiffFs complaint. >ere it not for this provision of the Rules

of Court, it would have to be filed independently and separately from the original complaint by

the defendant against the third6party. 3ut the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third6party



defendant or so to speak, to litigate his separate cause of action in respect of plaintiffFs claim

against a third party in the original and principal case with the obect of avoiding circuitry of

action and unnecessary proliferation of lawsuits and of disposing e8peditiously in one

litigation the entire subect matter arising from one particular set of facts. 2rior leave of Court

is necessary, so that where the allowance of a third6party complaint would delay the resolution

of the original case, such as when the third6party defendant cannot be located or where matters

e8traneous to the issue of possession would unnecessarily clutter a case of forcible entry, or the

effect would be to introduce a new and separate controversy into the action, the salutary obectof the rule would not be defeated, and the court should in such cases reuire the defendant to

institute a separate action. 8 8 8. (/irestone Tire and Rubber Co. of the 2hilippines v.

Tempongko, ".R. 56&B1'', arch &*, $'%*, &G -CRA B$*+

$. Complaint0in0intervention

ntervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,

becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest

which may be affected by such proceedings. (AsiaFs Emerging ragon Corporation v.

epartment of Transportation and Communications, ".R. #os. $%''$B and $GB$%%, arch &B,

&))*, B' -CRA BB, B'+

ntervention is defined as Ia proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted

by the court to make himself a party, either oining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the

complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding

something adversely to both of them the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a

party in a suit pending between others the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an

original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for

the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings.

(etropolitan 3ank and Trust Co. v. 2residing <udge, RTC anila, 3r. 1', ".R. #o. *'')',

-eptember &$, $''), $*' -CRA *&), *&B+

Dnder this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has ($+ a legal interest in the

matter in litigation (&+ or in the success of any of the parties (1+ or an interest against the

parties (B+ or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition

of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. (Alfelor v. @alasan, ".R. #o.

$%'*G, arch 1$, &))%, B*% -CRA B$, B%)+

788 the initial lack of the complaint6in6intervention of the reuisite verification and

certification on non6forum shopping was cured when the intervenors, in their motion for

reconsideration of the order denying the motion to intervene, appended a complaint6in6

intervention containing the reuired verification and certificate of non6forum shopping.

(actan6Cebu nternational Airport Authority vs. @eirs of Estanislao io!a, et. al., ".R. #o.

$*%)B, /ebruary &, &)$$+

g. &eply

Rule *, -ection * specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written instrument

and provides the manner of denying it. t is more controlling than Rule %, -ection $) which

merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. (Casent Realty evelopment Corp., vs.2hilbanking Corp., ".R. #o. $)G1$, -eptember $B, &))G+

Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply

specifically denying it under oath must be made otherwise, the genuineness and due e8ecutionof the document will be deemed admitted. (Toribio v. 3idin, #o. 56G*&$, <anuary $G, $'*,

$1B -CRA $%&, $G)+

-ince respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due e8ecution of the acion and

Confirmation -tatement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by

the court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. (Casent Realty evelopment Corp., vs.

2hilbanking Corp., ".R. #o. $)G1$, -eptember $B, &))G+

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788 when the due e8ecution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of

the adverse partyFs failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be

presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact. (2hilippine American

"eneral nsurance Co., nc. v. -weet 5ines, nc., ".R. #o. *GB1B, August , $''&, &$& -CRA

$'B, &)B+

2. Pleadings alloed in small claim cases and cases covered -y t'e rules on summary

procedure

n the Dnited -tates, assachusetts was the first to pass a state6wide act providing for a procedure on

minor claims because it was there found that Ithe poor man with a small case in many instances, found

the courts practically closed to him, because the fees for entry and service of process were more than he

could afford and because of the e8pense of employing counsel to pilot his title case through the

intricacies of pleadings, evidence, and trial procedure.I (Report of Committee on -mall Claims and

Conciliation 2rocedure, A. 3. A. <., 4ol. 7, p. *&*.+ ;ther states have followed suit under the same

spirit, such as the -tates of California, Connecticut, daho, owa, innesota, #evada, #ew <ersey,

;regon, -outh akota, Dtah, 4ermont, >ashington, and Uansas, and the Cities of Chicago, Cleveland,

and 2hiladelphia, and others. (-ee Columbia 5aw Review, 4ol. 1B, p. '1& >illoughby, 2rinciples of

udicial Administration, pp. 1)G61$'.+ 3ecause litigants cannot afford to avail themselves of the services

of attorneys, the procedure in such cases reuires generally no formal pleadings but a mere statement of

the claim to the clerk of the court, and hearing is conducted in such manner and form and with such

methods of proof as the court deems best suited to discover the facts and to determine the ustice of the

case. (Cabangis vs. 5ope!, ".R. #o. BG%*, -eptember &), $'B)+

The purpose of the Rules on -ummary 2rocedure is to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases

and to achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings is prohibited, including the filing of a motion for

reconsideration. @owever, the motion for reconsideration that petitioners allege to be a prohibited

pleading was filed before the RTC acting as an appellate court. The appeal before the RTC is no longercovered by the Rules on -ummary 2rocedure. The Rules on -ummary 2rocedure apply before the

appeal to the RTC. @ence, respondentsF motion for reconsideration filed with the RTC is not a

prohibited pleading. (acadangdang vs. "aviola, ".R. #o. $%*)', arch B, &))'+

3. Parts o$ a pleading

A pleading is sufficient in form when it contains the following9

$. A Caption, setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action indicating the names of

the parties, and the docket number which is usually left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to

assign yet a docket number

&. The 3ody, reflecting the designation, the allegations of the partyFs claims or defenses, therelief prayed for, and the date of the pleading

1. The -ignature and Address of the party or counsel

B. 4erification. This is reuired to secure an assurance that the allegations have been made in

good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative

. A Certificate of #on6forum -hopping, which although not urisdictional, the same is

obligatory

%. An E8planation in case the pleading is not filed personally to the Court. 5ikewise, for

pleading subseuent to the complaint, if the same is not served personally to the partiesaffected, there must also be an e8planation why service was not done personally.

5ikewise, for all other pleadings, not initiatory in nature, there must be9

A 2roof of -ervice, which consists in the written admission of the party served, or the official

return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. f the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an

affidavit of the person mailing. f service is by registered mail, proof shall be made by such

affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.

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n case a party is represented by counsel de parte, additional reuirements that go into the form of the

pleading should be incorporated, vi!.9

$. The Roll of AttorneyFs #umber

&. The Current 2rofessional Ta8 Receipt #umber and

1. The 32 ;fficial Receipt #o. or 32 5ifetime embership #umber.

B. C5E Compliance or E8emption Certificate #umber and ate of ssue (effective <anuary$, &))'+.

(-ps. unsalud vs. #@A, ".R. #o. $%G$*$, ecember &1, &))*+

a. Caption

The designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the complaint. t isnot even an indispensable part of the complaint. (-ps. unsalud vs. #@A, ".R. #o. $%G$*$,

ecember &1, &))*+

The trial court is reminded that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature

of the action. The caption of the pleading should not be the governing factor, but rather the

allegations in it should determine the nature of the action, because even without the prayer fora specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the proper relief as may be warranted by

the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced. Id.

-. Signature and address

>hile an unsigned motion under -ection $), Rule $ in relation to -ec. 1, Rule G of the $''G

Revised Rules on Civil 2rocedure has no legal effect and may be deemed a mere scrap of

paper, >e brush aside this procedural deficiency as it appears to be a mere inadvertence on the

part of respondentsF counsel. n fact, respondents have filed an Drgent otion to Resolve and

-econd Drgent otion to Resolve their unsigned motion, which >e deem as substantial

remediation of the lack of signature of counsel in the unsigned motion. (/ama Realty, nc. and

/eli8 Assad vs. -ps. Trinidad, J".R. #o. $G'*$$ 9 <une )%, &)$$+

c. eri$ication and certi$ication against $orum s'opping

The reuirement of verification may be made by the party, his lawyer or his representative or

any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading. (Tanuatco vs.

"ako <r., *& -CRA &))+

Even if the verification is flawed or defective, the court may still give due course to the

pleading if the circumstances warrant the rela8ation of the rule in the interest of ustice. d.

5ack of verification is not a fatal defect verification is only a formal, not a urisdictional

reuirement it could easily be corrected by directing compliance therewith, it purpose being

simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition (or complaint+ have been

made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative. (3acolod6Talisay Realty

and evelopment Corporation vs. ela Cru!, *G -CRA 1)B+

The purpose of reuiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in a

petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative

verification is only a formal, not a urisdictional reuirement. (2eople vs. e "rano, **

-CRA )+



718 &e"uirements o$ a corporation e9ecuting t'e

veri$ication:certi$ication o$ non0$orum s'opping

n a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be

signed, for and on behalf of the said corporation, by a specifically authori!ed

person, including its retained counsel, who has personal knowledge of thefacts reuired to be established by the documents. (E8pertravel P Tours,

nc. vs. CA, ".R. #o. $&1'&. ay &%, &))+

Dnlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only

through properly delegated individuals namely, its officers andOor agents.( #ational -teel Corporation v. Court of Appeals

, ".R. #o. $1BB%*, August

&', &))&+

ndeed, the certificate of non6forum shopping may be incorporated in the

complaint or appended thereto as an integral part of the complaint. The rule

is that compliance with the rule after the filing of the complaint, or thedismissal of a complaint based on its non6compliance with the rule, is

impermissible. @owever, in e8ceptional circumstances, the court may allow

subseuent compliance with the rule. f the authority of a partyFs counsel to

e8ecute a certificate of non6forum shopping is disputed by the adverse party,the former is reuired to show proof of such authority or representation.

(E8pertravel P Tours, nc. vs. CA, ".R. #o. $&1'&. ay &%, &))+

d. $$ect o$ t'e signature o$ counsel in a pleading

t was contented that since the lawyer did not sign the petition and the R, the same are mere

scraps of paper as they were considered as unsigned. n brushing aside the contention, the -C

said that the rules allow the pleadings to be signed by either the party to case or the counsel

representing that party. n this case, petitioner opted to sign its petition and its motion for

reconsideration in its own behalf, through its corporate president who was duly authori!ed by

the 3oard to represent the company in prosecuting the case. Therefore, the said pleadings

cannot be considered unsigned and without any legal effect. '0ameer Overseas Employment

Agency, Inc. v. 0antos, 1.2. o #!#$&, August +, !&(

4. Allegations in a pleading

The allegations of the pleading prevail over its title in determining the character of the action taken.

(Tomas vs. -antos, ".R. #o. $')BB*, <uly &%, &)$)+

a. %anner o$ ma;ing allegations

718 Condition precedent

The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acuisition of the right is not

effected while said condition is not complied with or is not deemed complied with.

(2arks vs. 2rovince of Tarlac, ".R. #o. 56&B$'), <uly $1, $'&%+

2.. #o. $)* makes the conciliation process at the 3arangay level a condition

precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. #on6compliance with that condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiffHs cause of action and make his

complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or

prematurity. The condition is analogous to e8haustion of administrative remedies, orthe lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members, lackingwhich the case can be dismissed. (orata vs. "o, $& -CRA BBB J$'*1K, and 4da. de

3orromeo vs. 2ogoy, $&% -CRA &$G J$'*1K+

The conciliation procedure reuired under 2 $)* is not a urisdictional reuirement

in the sense that failure to have prior recourse to it does not deprive a court of its urisdiction, either over the subect matter or over the person of the defendant. #on6

compliance with the condition precedent under said law does not prevent a court of

competent urisdiction from e8ercising its power of adudication over a case where

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/134468.htm





defendants fail to obect to such e8ercise of urisdiction. 3ut such obection should be

seasonably made before the court first taking cogni!ance of the complaint, and must

be raised in the Answer, or in such other pleading allowed under the Rules of Court.(<unson vs. artine!, ".R. #o. $B$1&B, <uly *, &))1+

A complaint or petition filed in court or other government office without compliance

with the precondition may be dismissed on motion of any interested party on theground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The defect may however be

waived by failing to make seasonable obection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, thedefect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the urisdiction of

the court. (Agbayani vs. 3elen, ".R. #o. 56%%&', #ovember &B, $'*%+

728 (raud! mista;e! malice! intent! ;noledge and ot'er condition o$ t'e

mind! +udgments! o$$icial documents or acts

-ection , Rule * of the $''G Rules of Civil 2rocedure states9

-ection . /raud, mistake, condition of the mind. 6 n all averments of fraud

or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be statedwith particularity. alice, intent, knowledge or other condition of the mindof a person may be averred generally.

Again, the complaint falls short of the reuirement that fraud must be stated with

particularity. The complaint merely states9

B. That sometime in the year of $''G, the consolidator6facilitator of the

efendants /"2C and 3alfour by means of fraud and machinations of words

were able to convinceJK the plaintiff to enter into SC;#TRACT ;/EA-EE#T ;/ R"@T ;/ >A0F wherein the latter granted in favor of the

defendant /"2C the right to erect JitsK Tower #o. '* on the land of the

plaintiff situated at 3arangay aigsing ahilig, 5emery B&)' 3atangas

including the right to nstall Transmission 5ines over a portion of the same property for a consideration therein stated, a 8ero8 copy of said contract is

hereto attached as JK A##E7E- IAI up to IA6BI of the complaint

. That the said contract, (Anne8es IAI up to IA6BI+ was entered into by the

plaintiff under the I-RE2RE-E#TAT;#, 2R;-E-, /A5-E A#/RADD5E#T A--DRA#CE- A# TRCU-I of the defendantsJ.K

(5uistro vs. CA, ".R. #o. $**$', April $%, &))'+

788 this Court, it will not be amiss, to state, finds that the allegations of threats,

intimidation, harassment made by plaintiffs are couched in general terms contrary to

-ection , Rule * of the Rules of Court which states that in (sic+ all averments of

fraud, or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with

particularity. (Associated 3ank vs. -ps. ontano, ".R. #o. $%%1*1, ;ctober $%,

&))'+

-. Pleading an actiona-le document

The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Rule *, -ection G of the Rules of Court

which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, the genuineness or

due e8ecution of the instrument shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless the defendant,under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts. (2ermanent

-avings and 5oan 3ank vs. 4elarde, ".R. #;. $B)%)*, -eptember &1, &))B+

c. Speci$ic denials

718 $$ect o$ $ailure to ma;e speci$ic denials

0ection , 2ule % of t"e 2ules of Court likewise provides that material allegations in the

complaint which are not specially denied, other than the amount of unliuidated damages, are



deemed admitted. A denial made without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon

in support of the denial, even when to do so is practicable, does not amount to a specific

denial. (Rep. 4. -outhside @omeowners Assn., nc., )& -CRA *G J&))%K Rep. v. -3 B)%-CRA $') J&))1K

The denials were not specific as the petitioners failed to set forth the substance of the matters

in which she relied upon to support her denial. The petitioner merely alleged that consent wasgiven how and why, she did not say. f indeed consent were given, it would have been easy to

fill in the details. -he could have stated in her pleadings that she verbally informed the

respondent of the need for the repairs, or wrote him a letter. -he could have stated his response,

and how it was conveyed, whether verbally or in writing. -he could have stated whrn theconsent was solicited and procured. These, she failed to do. Ergo, the petitioner is deemed to

have admitted the material allegations in the complaint. (Terana v. @on. e -agun, et al., ".R..

#;. $&$1$, April &', &))'+

728 'en a speci$ic denial re"uires an oat'

Dnder -ec. G, Rule * of the Rules of Court, when the cause of action is anchored on a

document, the genuineness or due e8ecution of the instrument shall be deemed

impliedly admitted unless the defendant, under oath, specifically denies them, andsets forth what he claims to be the facts. -aid rule should be read in conunction with

-ec. ' of Rule $1) of the Revised Rules of Evidence which provides, in substance,

that when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing they have made suchwriting the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the

writing must be understood to have been waived or abandoned, unless he puts in issue

that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not e8press the

true agreement of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there is anintrinsic ambiguity in the writing. (aunlad -avings P 5oan Association, nc., vs.

CA, ".R. #o. $$B'B&. #ovember &G, &)))+

n the instant case, while the specific denial in the original answer was not under oath

and thus gave rise to the implied admission of the genuineness and due e8ecution ofthe contents of the promissory note, private respondent, thru his testimony, was able

to put in issue and present parol evidence to controvert the terms of the promissory

note, which are essentially the bedrock of his defense. The presentation of the

contrariant evidence for and against imputations of genuineness and due e8ecutionundoubtedly cured, clarified or e8panded, as the case may be, whatever defects in the

pleadings or vagueness in the issues there might have been as presented in the original

answer. Id.

5. $$ect o$ $ailure to plead

1. (ailure to plead de$enses and o-+ections

The fact that the plainti's own allegation in the complaint or theevidence it presented shows clearly that the action had prescribedremoves this case from the rule regarding waiver of the defense by

failure to plead the same. (B & I Realty o.! Inc. vs. Teodoro aspe "nd#uri$cacion "guilar aspe! %.R. o. )*+,! -anuary ,*! ,/0

2. (ailure to plead a compulsory counterclaim and cross0claim

In Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. vs. Glodel Brokerage Corporation

(%.R. o. +*)! -anuary ! ,0! the 1upreme ourt held in

resolving the issue of whether %lodel can collect from 2oadmasters! it

having failed to $le a cross3claim against the latter4



Undoubtedly, Glodel has a defnite cause o action against Loadmasters or breach o contract o service as the latter is primarily liable or the loss o thesubject cargo. In this case, however, it cannot succeed in seeking judicial sanction against Loadmasters because the records disclose that it did not properly interpose a crossclaim against the latter. Glodel did not even pray that Loadmasters be liable or any and all claims that it may be adjudged liablein avor o !"# Insurance. Under the !ules, a compulsory counterclaim, or acrossclaim, not set up shall be barred. $hus, a crossclaim cannot be set up or

the frst time on appeal .

6. e$ault

a. 'en a declaration o$ de$ault is proper

The eects of a defendant's failure to $le an answer within thetime allowed therefor are governed by 1ections 5 and ! Rule * (on6ect of 7ailure to #lead0 of the Rules of ourt. If the defendant fails to$le his answer on time! he may be declared in default upon motion of the plainti with notice to the said defendant. (1antos vs. #8! %.R.o. +*5! 1eptember ,5! ,/0 In Santos vs. PNOC! supra! respondentmoved only for the e9 parte presentation of evidence! not for the

declaration of petitioner in default. The 1upreme ourt held4

%s is readily apparent, the &eptember '', ())* order did not limit itsel to permitting respondent to present its evidence e+ parte but in eect issued anorder o deault. #ut the trial court could not validly do that as an order o deault can be made only upon motion o the claiming party. &ince no motion todeclare petitioner in deault was fled, no deault order should have been issued.

-. $$ect o$ an order o$ de$ault

In case he is declared in default! the court shall proceed to render :udgment granting the plainti such relief as his pleading may warrant!unless the court in its discretion re;uires the plainti to submit

evidence. The defaulting defendant may not ta<e part in the trial butshall be entitled to notice of subse;uent proceedings. (1antos vs. #8!%.R. o. +*5! 1eptember ,5! ,/0

To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion! if a partydeclared in default is entitled to notice of subse;uentproceedings! all the more should a party who has not beendeclared in default be entitled to such notice. But what happens if the residence or whereabouts of the defending party is not <nownor he cannot be located= In such a case! there is obviously no waynotice can be sent to him and the notice re;uirement cannot

apply to him. The law does not re;uire that the impossible bedone. -emo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one toperform an impossibility. 2aws and rules must be interpreted in away that they are in accordance with logic! common sense! reasonand practicality. (1antos vs. #8! %.R. o. +*5! 1eptember,5! ,/0. >ence! even if petitioner was not validly declared indefault! he could not reasonably demand that copies of ordersand processes be furnished him.

Regarding :udgments by default! it was e9plained in Gajudovs. Traders o!al Bank (%.R. o. ?*/! @arch ,! ,)0 that

complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayedfor! once the defendants are declared in default. 7avorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence oered and the facts proven by thepresenting party. In #ascua! this ourt ruled that it would bemeaningless to re;uire presentation of evidence if every time theother party is declared in default! a decision would automaticallybe rendered in favor of the non3defaulting party and e9actlyaccording to the tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by



the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause. Beingdeclared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights e9ceptthat of being heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court.(%a:udo vs. Traders Royal Ban<! supra0

In other words! a defaulted defendant is not actually thrownout of court. Ahile in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he

leaves himself at the mercy of the court! the rules see to it thatany :udgment against him must be in accordance with law. Theevidence to support the plaintis cause is! of course! presentedin his absence! but the court is not supposed to admit that whichis basically incompetent. "lthough the defendant would not be ina position to ob:ect! elementary :ustice re;uires that only legalevidence should be considered against him. If the evidencepresented should not be suCcient to :ustify a :udgment for theplainti! the complaint must be dismissed. "nd if an unfavorable

:udgment should be :usti$able! it cannot e9ceed in amount or bedierent in <ind from what is prayed for in the complaint. (%a:udo

vs. Traders Royal Ban<! %.R. o. ?*/! @arch ,! ,)0

c. &elie$ $rom an order o$ de$ault

" @otion to 2ift 8rder of Default is dierent from an ordinarymotion in that the @otion should be veri$edE and must showfraud! accident! mista<e or e9cusable neglect! and meritoriousdefenses. The allegations of (0 fraud! accident! mista<e ore9cusable neglect! and (,0 of meritorious defenses must concur.(Banco De 8ro36pci! Inc. vs. -ohn Tansipe<! %.R. o. /,5?! -uly,,! ,*0

d. $$ect o$ a partial de$ault

1ec. 5(c0 of Rule * states that when a pleading asserting aclaim states a common cause of action against several defendingparties! some of whom answer and the others fail to do so! thecourt shall try the case against all upon the answers thus $ledand render :udgment upon the evidence presented. Therefore! theanswer $led by a defendant inure to the bene$t of all thedefendants! defaulted or not! and all of them share a commonfate in the action. It is not within the authority of the trial court todivide the case before it by $rst hearing it e+ parte as against thedefaulted defendant and rendering a default :udgment (in theinstant case! partial decision0 against it! then proceeding to hearthe case! as to the non3defaulted defendant. This deprives thedefaulted defendant of due process as it is denied the bene$t of the answer and the evidence which could have been presented byits non3defaulted co3defendant. (>eirs of @amerto @anguiat vs."! %.R. o. ?+)/F)+)! "ugust ,! ,/0

e. 9tent o$ relie$

No recent jurisprudence on this topic.

$. Actions 'ere de$ault are not alloed

The purpose of the active participation of the #ublic #rosecutor orthe 1olicitor %eneral is to ensure that the interest of the 1tate isrepresented and protected in proceedings for annulment anddeclaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between theparties! or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. Ahile theappearances of the 1olicitor %eneral andFor the #ublic #rosecutor aremandatory! the failure of the RT to re;uire their appearance does not



per se nullify the ompromise "greement. (@a;uilan vs. @a;uilan! %.R.8. ??*! -une /! ,+0

"side from "rticle / of the 7amily ode and Rule *! 1ection 5(e0of the Rules of ourt! the Rule on Declaration of "bsolute ullity of Goid@arriages and "nnulment of Goidable @arriages (".@. o. ,33310also re;uries the participation of the public prosecutor in casesinvolving void marriages. It speci$cally mandates the prosecutor tosubmit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusionbetween the parties. (2lave vs. Republic of the #hilippines! %.R. o.)*+))! @arch 5! ,0.

g. &ule 133 Sec. 1 vs. &ule < Sec. 3

Between 1ec. of Rule 55 and 1ec. 5 of Rule *! there is noincompatibility that would preclude the application of either one of them. To begin with! 1ection 5 of Rule * governs the procedure whichthe trial court is directed to ta<e when a defendant fails to $le ananswer. "ccording to this provision! the court Hshall proceed to render :udgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading maywarrant!H sub:ect to the courts discretion on whether to re;uire thepresentation of evidence e9 parte. The same provision also sets downguidelines on the nature and e9tent of the relief that may be granted. Inparticular! the courts :udgment Hshall not e9ceed the amount or bedierent in <ind from that prayed for nor award unli;uidated damages.H(%a:udo vs. Traders Royal Ban<! %.R. o. ?*/! @arch ,! ,)0

In sum! while petitioners were allowed to present evidence e9parte under 1ection 5 of Rule *! they were not e9cused fromestablishing their claims for damages by the re;uired ;uantum of proof under 1ection of Rule 55. 1tated dierently! any advantage they mayhave gained from the e9 parte presentation of evidence does not lowerthe degree of proof re;uired. learly then! there is no incompatibilitybetween the two rules. (%a:udo vs. Traders Royal Ban<! %.R. o.?*/! @arch ,! ,)0

. (iling and Service o$ pleadings

,. Payment o$ doc;et $ees

General Rule: Mandatory

"ppeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege! thus!appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by

law. 7urthermore! upon the $ling of the petition! the petitioner shall payto the " cler< of court the doc<eting and other lawful feesE non3compliance with the procedural re;uirements shall be a suCcientground for the petitions dismissal. Thus! payment in full of doc<et feeswithin the prescribed period is not only mandatory! but also :urisdictional. It is an essential re;uirement! without which! the decisionappealed from would become $nal and e9ecutory as if no appeal hasbeen $led. (1aint 2ouis niversity! Inc. vs. obarrubias! %.R. o./+! "ugust 5! ,0

Exception: 2 Requisites

The rule is that payment in full of the doc<et fees within theprescribed period is mandatory. " court ac;uires :urisdiction over anycase only upon the payment of the prescribed doc<et fee. The strictapplication of this rule was! however! rela9ed two (,0 years after in thecase of 1un Insurance 8Cce! 2td. vs. "suncion (,55 #hil. ?+* (*/+00!wherein the ourt decreed that where the initiatory pleading is notaccompanied by the payment of the doc<et fee! the court may allowpayment of the fee within a reasonable period of time! but in no casebeyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This rulingwas made on the premise that the plainti had demonstrated his



willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional doc<et feesre;uired. Thus! in the more recent case of nited 8verseas Ban< vs. Ros(,?, #hil. ,/ (*/*00! the ourt e9plained that where the party doesnot deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of doc<et fees!and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additionaldoc<et fees when re;uired by the court! the liberal doctrine enunciatedin 1un Insurance 8Cce! 2td.! and not the strict regulations set in@anchester! will apply. It has been on record that the ourt! in severalinstances! allowed the rela9ation of the rule on non3payment of doc<etfees in order to aord the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate theircases on the merits. (The >eirs of the 2ate Ruben Reinoso! 1r.! vs. "!%.R. o. ),! -uly /! ,0

Thus! the liberal application of procedural rules is allowed onlywhen two re;uisites are present4 (0 there is a plausi"le e#planation $or t%enon&compliance! and (,0 the outrig%t dismissal 'ould de$eat t%e administrationo$ justice. (Domingo vs. "! %.R. o. )*,,! 7ebruary ,! ,0

,,. (iling versus service o$ pleadings

#ersonal service and $ling are preferred for obvious reasons.#lainly! such should e9pedite action or resolution on a pleading! motionor other paperE and conversely! minimiJe! if not eliminate! delays li<elyto be incurred if service or $ling is done by mail! considering theineCciency of postal service. 2i<ewise! personal service will do awaywith the practice of some lawyers who! wanting to appear clever! resortto the following less than ethical practices4 (0 serving or $lingpleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel o3guard! thus leaving thelatter with little or no time to prepare! for instance! responsivepleadings or an oppositionE or (,0 upon receiving notice from the postoCce that the registered parcel containing the pleading of or otherpaper from the adverse party may be claimed! unduly procrastinatingbefore claiming the parcel! or! worse! not claiming it at all! therebycausing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.(Domingo vs. "! %.R. o. )*,,! 7ebruary ,! ,0

,,,. Periods o$ $iling o$ pleadings

No recent jurisprudence on this topic.

,. %anner o$ $iling

1ection 5! Rule 5 of the Rules of ourt provides that if a pleadingis $led by registered mail! then the date of mailing shall be considered

as the date of $ling. It does not matter when the court actually receivesthe mailed pleading. (Russel vs. 6basan! %.R. o. /?,! "pril ,5!,0

If the pleading $led was not done personally! the date of mailing!as stamped on the envelope or the registry receipt! is considered as thedate of $ling. nder the Rules! should the last day of the period to $le apleading fall on a 1aturday! a 1unday! or a legal holiday! a litigant isallowed to $le his or her pleading on the ne9t wor<ing day. (#adre vs.Badillo! %.R. o. )?,5! -anuary *! ,0

. %odes o$ service

nder 1ection ! Rule 5 of the **+ Rules of ivil #rocedure!personal service and (ling is t%e general rule! and resort to ot%er modes o$ service and (ling, t%e e#ception. >enceforth! '%enever personal service or(ling is practica"le! in light of the circumstances of time! place andperson! personal service or (ling is mandator!. 8nly when personal serviceor $ling is not practicable may resort to other modes be had! whichmust then be accompanied by a written e9planation as to why personalservice or $ling was not practicable to begin with. In ad:udging theplausibility of an e9planation! a court shall li<ewise consider the





confer :urisdiction on the court provided that the court ac;uires :urisdiction over the res. onetheless! summons must be served uponthe defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with :urisdictionbut merely for satisfying the due process re;uirements. Thus! where thedefendant is a non3resident who is not found in the #hilippines and (0the action aects the personal status of the plaintiE (,0 the actionrelates to! or the sub:ect matter of which is property in the #hilippinesin which the defendant has or claims a lien or interestE (50 the actionsee<s the e9clusion of the defendant from any interest in the propertylocated in the #hilippinesE or (0 the property of the defendant has beenattached in the #hilippines33 service of summons may be eected by (a0personal service out of the country! with leave of courtE (b0 publication!also with leave of courtE or (c0 any other manner the court may deemsuCcient. (1ps. Belen vs. haveJ! %.R. o. +?55! @arch ,)! ,/0

748 Service o$ +udgments! $inal orders or resolutions

-udgments! $nal orders and resolutions are appealable. It isnecessary that they be served personally or! if not possible! byregistered mail accompanied by a written e9planation why the servicewas not done personally! in order that the period for ta<ing an appealmay be computed. (DB# vs. ommission on "udit! %.R. o. ))*55!"ugust ! ,)0

8n many occasions! the ourt has strictly construed there;uirements of the proper service of papers and :udgments. Both in>eirs of Delos 1antos vs. Del Rosario and TuaJon vs. @olina! the serviceof the trial court's decision at an ad:acent oCce and the receipt thereof by a person not authoriJed by the counsel of record was heldineective. 2i<ewise! the service of the decision made at the groundKoor instead of at the *th Koor of a building in the address on record of petitioners' counsel! was held invalid in #2DT vs. 2R. In these cases!there was no constructive service of the decision even if the service wasmade at the oCces ad:acent to the address on record of the parties'counsels and even if the copies eventually found their way to personsduly authoriJed to receive them. (DB# vs. ommission on "udit! %.R. o.))*55! "ugust ! ,)0

758 Priorities in modes o$ service and $iling

In an action strictly in personam! personal service on thedefendant is the preferred mode of service! that is! by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If the defendant! for :usti$able reasons! cannot be served with the summons within areasonable period! then substituted service can be resorted to. Ahilesubstituted service of summons is permitted! Hit is e9traordinary incharacter and in derogation of the usual method of service.H (1ps. Belenvs. haveJ! %.R. o. +?55! @arch ,)! ,/0

If defendant cannot be served with summons because he istemporarily abroad! but otherwise he is a #hilippine resident! service of summons may! by leave of court! be eected out of the #hilippinesunder Rule ! 1ection ?. In all of these cases! it should be noted!defendant must be a resident of the #hilippines! otherwise an action inpersonam cannot be brought because :urisdiction over his person isessential to ma<e a binding decision. (1ps. Belen vs. haveJ! %.R. o.+?55! @arch ,)! ,/0

768 'en service is deemed complete

There is no doubt that under the Rules! service by registered mailis complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. >owever! if theaddressee fails to claim his mail from the post oCce within $ve (?0 daysfrom the date of the $rst notice! service becomes eective upon thee9piration of $ve (?0 days therefrom. In such a case! there arises a



presumption that the service was complete at the end of the said $ve3day period. This means that the period to appeal or to $le the necessarypleading begins to run after $ve days from the $rst notice given by thepostmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have received and tohave been noti$ed of the :udgment at that point. (Luelnan vs. G>7 #hil!%.R. o. 5/? 1eptember )! ,?0

78 Proo$ o$ $iling and service

Ahen service of notice is an issue! the rule is that the personalleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. Theburden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its e9istence. Incivil cases! service made through registered mail is proved by theregistry receipt issued by the mailing oCce and an aCdavit of theperson mailing of facts showing compliance with 1ection 5! Rule 5 of the **+ Rules on ivil #rocedure. (Republic vs. Resins! Inc.! %.R. o.+?/*! -anuary ,! ,0

@ere photocopies of the return slips are also insuCcient. Theoriginal copies of the registry receipt or! in lieu thereof! the unclaimednotice and a certi$cation from the postmaster of the issuance of notice!should be presented. (Republic vs. Resins! Inc.! %.R. o. +?/*! -anuary ,! ,0

Ahile we concede that there may be a presumption of regularity!in the ordinary course of events! that the ler< of ourt sent the -udgment to the Mparties to the actinoN! such presumption should failwhen the Mconcerned partyN itself denies receipt. Ahen the service of the :udgment is ;uestioned! there is a need to present both the registryreceipt registry receipt issued by the mailing oCce and the aCdavit of the person mailing. (Republic vs. Resins! Inc.! %.R. o. +?/*! -anuary,! ,0

=. Amendment

"mendments to pleadings are generally favored and should beliberally allowed in furtherance of :ustice so that every case may so faras possible be determined on its real facts and in order to prevent thecircuity of action. (Luirao vs. Luirao! %.R. o. /,! 8ctober ,!,50 >owever! an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no :urisdiction over the original omplaint and the purpose of theamendment is to confer :urisdiction on the court. (1iasoco vs. "! %.R.o. 5,+?5! 7ebruary ?! ***0

a. Amendment as a matter o$ rig't

1ection ,! Rule of the Revised Rules of ourt e9plicitly statesthat a pleading may be amended as a matter of right before aresponsive pleading is served. This only means that prior to the $ling of an answer! the plainti has the absolute right to amend the complaintwhether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. Thereason for this rule is implied in the subse;uent 1ection 5 of Rule .nder this provision! substantial amendment of the complaint is notallowed without leave of court after an answer has been served!because any material change in the allegations contained in thecomplaint could pre:udice the rights of the defendant who has already

set up his defense in the answer. (Remington vs. "! %.R. o. 55)?+!@ay ,*! ,,0

onversely! it cannot be said that the defendants rights havebeen violated by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to $le ananswer thereto. In such an event! the defendant has not presented anydefense that can be altered or aected by the amendment of thecomplaint in accordance with 1ection , of Rule . The defendant stillretains the un;uali$ed opportunity to address the allegations against



him by properly setting up his defense in the answer. onsiderableleeway is thus given to the plainti to amend his complaint once! as amatter of right! prior to the $ling of an answer by the defendant.(Remington vs. "! %.R. o. 55)?+! @ay ,*! ,,0

The right granted to the plainti under procedural law to amendthe complaint before an answer has been served is not precluded "! t%e(ling o$ a motion to dismiss or an! ot%er proceeding contesting its su/cienc! .Aere we to conclude otherwise! the right to amend a pleading under1ection ,! Rule will be rendered nugatory and ineectual! since allthat a defendant has to do to foreclose this remedial right is tochallenge the ade;uacy of the complaint before he $les an answer.(Remington vs. "! %.R. o. 55)?+! @ay ,*! ,,0

@oreover! amendment of pleadings is favored and should beliberally allowed in the furtherance of :ustice in order to determineevery case as far as possible on its merits without regard totechnicalities. This principle is generally recogniJed to speed up trialand save party litigants from incurring unnecessary e9pense! so that a

full hearing on the merits of every case may be had and multiplicity of suits avoided. (Remington vs. "! %.R. o. 55)?+! @ay ,*! ,,0

-. Amendments -y leave o$ court

It is clear from 1ections , and 5 of Rule that once a case hasalready been set for hearing! regardless of whether a responsivepleading has been served! substantial amendments such as thosecontained in petitioners "mended "nswer may only be made uponleave of court. (@aranan vs. @anila Ban<ing orp! %.R. o. )5*/!@arch 5! ,+0

The clear import of such amendment in 1ection 5! Rule is thatunder the new rules! Othe amendment may (now0 substantially alter thecause of action or defense.P This should only be true! however! whendespite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action ordefense! the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higherinterests of substantial :ustice! and prevent delay and e;ually promotethe laudable ob:ective of the rules which is to secure a O:ust! speedyand ine9pensive disposition of every action and proceeding.P (hing Tiuvs. #B! %.R. o. ?*5,! "ugust *! ,*0

The granting of leave to $le amended pleading is a matterparticularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial courtE andthat discretion is broad! sub:ect only to the limitations that theamendments should not substantially change the cause of action oralter the theory of the case! or that it was not made to delay the action.evertheless! even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense! such amendment could still be allowed when it issought to serve the higher interest of substantial :usticeE prevent delayEand secure a :ust! speedy and ine9pensive disposition of actions andproceedings. (hing Tiu vs. #B! %.R. o. ?*5,! "ugust *! ,*0

c. (ormal amendment

1ubstitution of the party plainti would not constitute a change inthe Identity of the parties. The defect of the complaint is merely formal!not substantial. o unfairness or surprise to private respondent Dolla!defendant in the court a ;uo! would result by allowing the amendment!the purpose of which is merely to conform to procedural rules or tocorrect a technical error. (-uasing >ardware vs. @endoJa! %.R. o. 23??)/+ -uly 5! */,0 There being a Hdefect in the designation of thepartiesH! its correction could be summarily made at any stage of theaction provided no pre:udice is caused thereby to the adverse party.(%enato vs. %enato! %.R. o. )*+)! 7ebruary ?! ,0



"mendments of pleadings may be resorted to sub:ect to thecondition that Othe amendments sought do not alter the cause of actionof the original complaint.P @ore aptly! in another case! the ourtpronounced that amendment of pleadings may be resorted to! so longas the intended amendments are not inconsistent with the allegationsin the initial complaint! and are obviously intended to clarify theintrinsic ambiguity in it with respect to the time of accrual of the causeof action. (Bormaheco! Inc. vs. @alayan Insurance o.! %.R. o. ?)?**! -uly ,)! ,0

d. Amendments to con$orm to or aut'ori>e presentation o$ evidence

1ection ?! Rule of the Rules of ourt pertinently provides that if evidence is ob:ected to at the trial on the ground that it is not withinthe issues raised by the pleadings! the court may allow the pleadings tobe amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of themerits of the action and the ends of substantial :ustice will be subserved thereby. Thus! what is needed is presentation of the parties'evidence on the issue. ote also that under 1ection ?! Rule !necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them toconform to the evidence. (#lanners vs. ity of rdaneta! %.R. o.),?,?! 1eptember ,5! ,/0

e. i$$erent $rom supplemental pleadings

$. $$ect o$ amended pleading

(. Summons

1. ature and purpose o$ summons in relation to actions in personam! in rem and

"uasi in rem2. oluntary appearance

-urisdiction over the person of the defendant can be ac;uired notonly by proper service of summons but also by defendants voluntaryappearance without e9pressly ob:ecting to the courts :urisdiction! asembodied in 1ection ,! Rule of the Rules of ourt! viJ4

&/. (). 0oluntary appearance. 1 $he deendant2s voluntary appearance in theaction shall be e3uivalent to service o summons. $he inclusion in a motion todismiss o other grounds aside rom lack o jurisdiction over the person o thedeendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

The $ling of motions see<ing aCrmative relief! such as! to admitanswer! for additional time to $le answer! for reconsideration of adefault :udgment! and to lift order of default with motion forreconsideration! are considered voluntary submission to the :urisdictionof the court. ("ti<o Trans! Inc. vs. #rudential %uarantee and "ssurance!Inc.! %.R. o. )+??! "ugust +! ,0

3. Personal service

Summons through an agent

Ahere service of summons upon the defendant principal iscoursed thru its co3defendant agent! and the latter happens to be adomestic corporation! the rules on service of summons upon a domesticprivate :uridical entity must be strictly complied with. 8therwise! thecourt cannot be said to have ac;uired :urisdiction over the person of both defendants. "nd insofar as the principal is concerned! such :urisdictional Kaw cannot be cured by the agents subse;uent voluntary



appearance. ("ti<o Trans! Inc. vs. #rudential %uarantee and "ssurance!Inc.! %.R. o. )+??! "ugust +! ,0

Summons on Foreign Juridical Entity

Ahen the defendant is a foreign :uridical entity! service of summons may be made upon4

*. Its resident agent designated in accordance with law for thatpurposeE

. The government oCcial designated by law to receivesummons if the corporation does not have a resident agentEor!

-. "ny of the corporations oCcers or agents within the#hilippines ("ti<o Trans! Inc. vs. #rudential %uarantee and"ssurance! Inc.! %.R. o. )+??! "ugust +! ,0

4. Su-stituted service

5. Constructive service 7-y pu-lication8

The re;uired prior or contemporaneous service of summons maybe dispensed with in the following instances4 (a0 when the summonscannot be served personally or by substituted service despite diligenteorts! (b0 when the adverse party is a resident of the #hilippinestemporarily absent therefrom! or (c0 when such party is a nonresident.(%onJales vs. 1tate #roperties orporation! %.R. o. +)? -anuary ,?!

,0.

a. Service upon a de$endant 'ere 'is identity is un;non or 'ere 'is

'erea-outs are un;non-. Service upon residents temporarily outside t'e P'ilippines

6. 9tra0territorial service! 'en alloed

. Service upon prisoners and minors

=. Proo$ o$ service

?. %otions

1. %otions in generala. e$inition o$ a motion

-. %otions versus pleadingsc. Contents and $orm o$ motions

d. otice o$ 'earing and 'earing o$ motions

4hen hearings are not re3uired5 -onlitigious motions

*. @otion for Issuance of "lias 1ummons is non3litigious in nature!which does not re;uire a hearing under the Rules! as the samecould have been acted upon by the RT without pre:udicing therights of the respondents. "ll facts necessary for thedetermination of the motion are already speci$ed therein or amatter of record and there was yet no adverse party to disputethe same as the court had not even ac;uired :urisdiction over theperson of the respondents. It was serious error on the part of the



trial court to have denied the $rst motion for issuance of aliassummons for want of notice of hearing. It was also not mandatoryfor the trial court to set the second motion for hearing. (#I2easing and 7inance! Inc. vs. "ntonio . @ilan! et al.! %.R. o.?,?! "pril ?! ,0

e. Omni-us motion rule

$. Litigated and e9 parte motionsg. Pro0$orma motions

2. %otions $or #ill o$ Particulars

a. Purpose and 'en applied $or-. Actions o$ t'e court

c. Compliance it' t'e order and e$$ect o$ noncomplianced. $$ect on t'e period to $ile a responsive pleading

3. %otion to ismiss

a. ?rounds-. &esolution o$ %otion

c. &emedies o$ plainti$$ 'en t'e complaint is dismissed

d. &emedies o$ t'e de$endant 'en t'e motion is deniede. $$ect o$ dismissal o$ complaint on certain grounds$. 'en grounds pleaded as a$$irmative de$enses

g. #ar -y dismissal'. istinguised $rom demurrer to evidence under &ule 33

@. ismissal o$ Actions

1. ismissal upon notice -y plainti$$/ )o0dismissal rule

2. ismissal upon motion -y plainti$$/ e$$ect on e9isting counterclaim3. ismissal due to t'e $ault o$ plainti$$

1ec. 5! Rule + enumerates the instances when a complaint maybe dismissed due to the plaintis fault4

)*+ If he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of hisevidence in chief on the complaintE

)+ If he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable lengthof timeE or

)-+ If he fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the court.(#I 2easing and 7inance! Inc. vs. "ntonio . @ilan! et al.! %.R.o. ?,?! "pril ?! ,.0

The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the eect of ad:udication on the merits! and is necessarily understood to be withpre:udice to the $ling of another action! unless otherwise provided inthe order of dismissal. 1tated dierently! the general rule is thatdismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as anad:udication on the merits and with pre:udice to the $ling of anotheraction! and the only e9ception is when the order of dismissal e9presslycontains a ;uali$cation that the dismissal is without pre:udice. (#I2easing and 7inance! Inc. vs. "ntonio . @ilan! et al.! %.R. o. ?,?!"pril ?! ,0

Ahile a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prose;uitur!

the real test for the e9ercise of such power is whether! under thecircumstances! plainti is chargeable with want of due diligence infailing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of apattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wantonfailure to observe the mandatory re;uirement of the rules on the part of the plainti! courts should decide to dispense with rather than wieldtheir authority to dismiss. (#I 2easing and 7inance! Inc. vs. "ntonio .@ilan! et al.! %.R. o. ?,?! "pril ?! ,0



4. ismissal o$ counterclaim! cross0claim or t'ird0party complaint

,. Pre0trial

1. Concept o$ pre0trial2. ature and purpose

3. otice o$ pre0trial4. Appearance o$ parties/ e$$ect o$ $ailure to appear

5. Pre0trial -rie$/ e$$ect o$ $ailure to appear6. istinction -eteen pre0trial in civil case and pre0trial in criminal case

. Alternative ispute &esolution 7A&8

*. ,ntervention

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party! not originallyimpleaded in the proceedings! becomes a litigant therein to enable him!her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be aectedby such proceedings. It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which athird person is permitted by the court to ma<e himself a party! either :oining plainti in claiming what is sought by the complaint! or uniting

with defendant in resisting the claims of plainti! or demandingsomething adversely to both of themE the act or proceeding by which athird person becomes a party in a suit pending between othersE theadmission! by leave of court! of a person not an original party topending legal proceedings! by which such person becomes a partythereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to beaected by such proceedings. (@I"" vs. >eirs of 6stanislao! %.R. o./)?! 7ebruary ,! ,0

1. &e"uisites $or intervention

The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to

become a party in order for him to protect his interest and for the courtto settle all conKicting claims. Intervention is allowed to avoidmultiplicity of suits more than on due process considerations. Towarrant intervention under Rule * of the Rules of ourt! two re;uisitesmust concur4

)*+ The movant has a legal interest on the matter in litigationEand

)+ Intervention must not unduly delay or pre:udice thead:udication of the rights of the parties! nor should the claimof the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in aseparate proceeding. (@etropolitan Ban< vs Intl 69change

Ban<! %.R. o. +)/F +)5! "ugust ! ,0

Intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has alreadyrendered its Decision! and much less! as in the case when even theourt of "ppeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.(@etropolitan Ban< vs Intl 69change Ban<! %.R. o. +)/F +)5!"ugust ! ,0

2. )ime to intervene

3. &emedy $or t'e denial o$ motion to intervene

Intervention is merely accessory to the principal action and! as

such! is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on the case between theoriginal parties. (nion Ban< of the philippines vs. oncepcion! %.R. o.)+,+! -une ,)! ,+0

. Su-poena

1. Su-poena duces tecum2. Su-poena ad testi$icandum

3. Service o$ su-poena



4. Compelling attendance o$ itnesses/ Contempt5. uas'ing o$ su-poena

L. %odes o$ iscovery

1. epositions pending action/ epositions -e$ore action or pending appeala. %eaning o$ deposition

-. Bses/ Scope o$ e9aminationc. 'en may o-+ections to admissi-ility -e made

d. 'en may ta;ing o$ deposition -e terminated or its scope limited2. ritten interrogatories to adverse parties

a. Conse"uences o$ re$usal to anser

-. $$ect o$ $ailure to serve ritten interrogatories3. &e"uest $or Admission

a. ,mplied admission -y adverse party

-. Conse"uences o$ $ailure to anser re"uest $or admissionc. $$ect o$ admission

d. $$ect o$ $ailure to $ile and serve re"uest $or admission4. Production or inspection o$ documents or t'ings

5. P'ysical and mental e9amination o$ persons6. Conse"uences o$ re$usal to comply it' modes o$ discovery

%. )rial

1. Ad+ournments and postponements2. re"uisites o$ motion to postpone trial

a. $or a-sence o$ evidence-. $or illness o$ party or counsel

3. Agreed statement o$ $acts4. Order o$ trial/ reversal o$ order

5. Consolidation or Severance o$ 'earing or trial6. elegation o$ reception o$ evidence

. )rial -y commissionersa. &e$erence -y consent or ordered on motion

-.Poers o$ t'e commissioner

c.Commissioners report/ notice to parties and 'earing on t'e report

. emurrer to vidence

1. ?round2. $$ect o$ denial

3. $$ect o$ grant

4. aiver o$ rig't to present evidence5. emurrer to evidence in a civil case versus demurrer to evidence in a criminal

case

O. *udgments and (inal Orders1. *udgment it'out trial

2. Contents o$ a +udgment3. *udgment on t'e pleadings

4. Summary +udgments

1ummary :udgment is a procedural devise resorted to in order toavoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. Ahen thepleadings on $le show that there are no genuine issues of facts to betried! the Rules of ourt allows a party to obtain immediate relief byway of summary :udgment. That is! when the facts are not in dispute!the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law tothe material facts. onversely! where the pleadings tender a genuineissue! summary :udgment is not proper. " genuine issue is such fact

which re;uires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from asham! $ctitious! contrived or false claim. ("tty. #edro @. 7errer vs.1pouses "lfredo DiaJ! et al.! %.R. o. )?5! "pril ,5! ,0 1ection 5of the said rule provides two (,0 re;uisites for summary :udgment to beproper4

)*+ There must be no genuine issue as to any material fact! e9ceptfor the amount of damagesE and



)+ The party presenting the motion for summary :udgment mustbe entitled to a :udgment as a matter of law. (@anuelBungcayao! 1r.! et al. vs. 7ort Ilocandia #roperty >oldings andDevelopment orporation! %.R. o. +/5! "pril *! ,0

" summary :udgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issueas to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a :udgment as amatter of law. " summary :udgment is proper if! while the pleadings ontheir face appear to raise issues! the aCdavits! depositions! andadmissions presented by the moving party show that such issues arenot genuine. (@anuel Bungcayao! 1r.! et al. vs. 7ort Ilocandia #roperty>oldings and Development orporation! %.R. o. +/5! "pril *!,0

To stress! trial courts have limited authority to render summary :udgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue asto any material fact. Ahen the facts as pleaded by the parties aredisputed or contested! proceedings for summary :udgment cannot ta<ethe place of trial. The trial court should refrain from issuing the

summary :udgment but instead proceeded to conduct a full blown trialof the case. ("tty. #edro @. 7errer vs. 1pouses "lfredo DiaJ! et al.! %.R.o. )?5! "pril ,5! ,0

a. $or t'e claimant

-. $or t'e de$endantc. 'en t'e case not $ully ad+udicated

d. a$$idavits and attac'ments5. *udgment on t'e pleadings versus summary +udgments

6. &endition o$ +udgments and $inal orders

Amendment and Supplemental Judgement

There is a dierence between an amended :udgment and asupplemental :udgment. In an amended and clari$ed :udgment! thelower court ma<es a thorough study of the original :udgment andrenders the amended and clari$ed :udgment only after considering allthe factual and legal issues. The amended and clari$ed decision is anentirely new decision which supersedes the original decision. 7ollowingthe courts dierentiation of a supplemental pleading from an amendingpleading! it can be said that a supplemental decision does not ta<e theplace or e9tinguish the e9istence of the original. "s its very namedenotes! it only serves to bolster or adds something to the primarydecision. " supplement e9ists side by side with the original. It does notreplace that which it supplements. ("ssociated "nglo3"merican Tobacco

orporation! et al. vs. "! et al.! %.R. o. )+,5+! "pril ,5! ,.0

Deeply ingrained in our :urisprudence is the principle that adecision that has ac;uired $nality becomes immutable and unalterable."s such! it may no longer be modi$ed in any respect even if themodi$cation is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or lawand whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by thehighest court of the land. In light of the foregoing! it would beunnecessary! if not useless! to discuss the issues raised by petitioner.(Republic vs. Tango! %.R. o. )),! -uly 5! ,*0

The doctrine o$ (nalit! o$ judgment is grounded on the fundamental

principle of public policy and sound practice that! at the ris< of occasional error! the :udgment of courts and the award of ;uasi3:udicialagencies must become $nal on some de$nite date $9ed by law. The onlye9ceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors! theso3called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no pre:udice to any party!void :udgments! and whenever circumstances transpire after the $nalityof the decision which render its e9ecution un:ust and ine;uitable.(Republic vs. Tango! %.R. o. )),! -uly 5! ,*0



. ntry o$ +udgment and $inal order

P. Post *udgment &emedies

1. %otion $or e )rial or reconsiderationa. ?rounds

-. 'en to $ile

0s a general rule, t%e statutor! re1uirement t%at '%en no motion $orreconsideration is (led 'it%in t%e reglementar! period, t%e decision attains(nalit! and "ecomes e#ecutor! in due course must "e strictl! en$orced as t%e!are considered indispensa"le interdictions against needless dela!s and $or orderl!disc%arge o$ judicial "usiness. T%e purposes $or suc% statutor! re1uirement aret'o$old2 (rst, to avoid dela! in t%e administration o$ justice and t%us,procedurall!, to make orderl! t%e disc%arge o$ judicial "usiness, and, second, toput an end to judicial controversies, at t%e risk o$ occasional errors, '%ic% areprecisel! '%! courts e#ist. Controversies cannot drag on inde(nitel!. T%e rig%tsand o"ligations o$ ever! litigant must not %ang in suspense $or an inde(nite

period o$ time. )Guas% vs. 3ela Cru4, 567 SC0 78 9::7;+

<o'ever, in e#ceptional cases, su"stantial justice and e1uit!considerations 'arrant t%e giving o$ due course to an appeal "! suspending t%een$orcement o$ statutor! and mandator! rules o$ procedure. Certain elements areconsidered $or t%e appeal to "e given due course, suc% as2

*. t%e e#istence o$ special or compelling circumstances,. t%e merits o$ t%e case,-. a cause not entirel! attri"uta"le to t%e $ault or negligence o$ t%e

part! $avored "! t%e suspension o$ t%e rules,

. lack o$ an! s%o'ing t%at t%e revie' soug%t is merel! $rivolous anddilator!, andt%e ot%er part! 'ill not "e undul! prejudiced t%ere"!. )Guas% vs. 3ela Cru4,567 SC0 78 9::7;+

c. enial o$ t'e motion/ e$$ectd. ?rant o$ t'e motion/ e$$ect

e. &emedy 'en motion is denied! (res' 150day period rule

" litigant is given another fresh period of ? days to perfect anappeal after receipt of the order of denial of hisFher motion forreconsiderationFnew trial before the RT. (%o vs. 1unbanun! %.R. o.)/,! 7ebruary *! ,0

To standardiJe the appeal periods provided in the Rules and toaord litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases! the ourt deems itpractical to allow a fresh period of ? days within which to $le thenotice of appeal in the Regional Trial ourt! counted from receipt of theorder dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.(%o vs. 1unbanun! %.R. o. )/,! 7ebruary *! ,0

>enceforth! this Hfresh period ruleH shall also apply to Rule governing appeals from the @unicipal Trial ourts to the Regional TrialourtsE Rule , on petitions for review from the Regional Trial ourts tothe ourt of "ppealsE Rule 5 on appeals from ;uasi3:udicial agencies tothe ourt of "ppeals and Rule ? governing appeals by certiorari to the1upreme ourt. The new rule aims to regiment or ma<e the appealperiod uniform! to be counted from receipt of the order denying themotion for new trial! motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial0or any $nal order or resolution. (%o vs. 1unbanun! %.R. o. )/,!7ebruary *! ,0



To recapitulate! a party litigant may either $le his notice of appealwithin ? days from receipt of the Regional Trial ourts decision or $leit within ? days from receipt of the order (the O$nal orderP0 denyinghis motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. 8bviously! thenew ?3day period may be availed of only if either motion is $ledEotherwise! the decision becomes $nal and e9ecutory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule ! 1ection 5. (#I 2easingand 7inance! Inc. vs. "ntonio . @ilan! et al.! %.R. o. ?,?! "pril ?!,0

2. Appeals in ?eneral

The provisions of law and the rules concerning the manner andperiod of appeal were mandatory and :urisdictional re;uirementsessential to enable the appellate court to ta<e cogniJance of the appeal.(DadiJon vs. "! %.R. o. ?*)! 1eptember 5! ,*0

a. *udgments and $inal orders su-+ect to appeal

1ome matters where appeal is the proper remedy

*. " denial of a motion for the e9ecution of :udgment is appealableunder 1ection ! Rule of the Rules of ourt. (GaldeJ vs.7inanciera @anila! Inc.! %.R. o. /55/+! 1eptember ,*! ,*0

. "n aggrieved party aected by the decision of a cabinet secretaryneed not appeal to the 8# MoCce of the presidentN and may $le apetition for certiorari directly in the ourt of "ppeals assailing theact of the said secretary. (@anubay vs. %arilao! %.R. o. ++!"pril )! ,*0

-. Matters not appealable

1ome matters where appeal is 8T the proper remedy

*. ertiorari is not the proper substitute for a lost appeal. (GaldeJ vs.7inanciera @anila! Inc.! %.R. o. /55/+! 1eptember ,*! ,*0>owever! it admits of several e9ceptions! thus4

a. Ahere the appeal does not constitute a speedy andade;uate remedy (1alvadades vs. #a:arillo! et al.! +/ #hil.++0! as where 55 appeals were involved from orders issuedin a single proceeding which will inevitably result in aproliferation of more appeals (#IB vs. 6scolin! et al.! 23,+/) and ,+/*)! @ar. ,*! *+0E

". Ahere the orders were also issued either in e9cess of orwithout :urisdiction ("guilar vs. Tan! 23,5)! -une 5! *+!f. Bautista! et al. vs. 1armiento! et al.! 23?5+! 1ept.!,5*/?0E

c. 7or certain special consideration! as public welfare or publicpolicy (1ee -ose vs. Qulueta! et al. 23)?*/! @ay 5! *)and the cases cited therein0E

d. Ahere in criminal actions! the court re:ects rebuttalevidence for the prosecution as! in case of ac;uittal! therecould be no remedy (#eople vs. "balos! 23,*5*! ov. ,/!*)/0E

e. Ahere the order is a patent nullity (@arcelo vs. De %uJman!et al.! 23,*++! -une ,*! */,0E and

$. Ahere the decision in the certiorari case will avoid futurelitigations (1t. #eter @emorial #ar<! Inc. vs. ampos! et al.!235/,/! @ar. ,! *+?0

. The remedy of appeal is not available from an order dismissing anaction without pre:udice. (#ositos vs. chua! )* 1R" ?! ,*0

-. By e9press provision of law! the :udgment of the court in asummary proceeding shall be immediately $nal and e9ecutory. "sa matter of course! it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial



courts :udgment in a summary proceeding. (Republic vs. Tango!%.R. o. )),! -uly 5! ,*0

c. &emedy against +udgments and orders 'ic' are not appeala-le

d. %odes o$ appeal

,n Murillo vs. Consul 7?.&. o. 1151D4! Octo-er 12! 1<<=8! t'e Supreme Court'ad t'e occasion to clari$y t'e t'ree 738 modes o$ appeal $rom decisions o$ t'e &)C!

namelyE

718 ordinary appeal or appeal -y rit o$ error! 'ere +udgment as rendered in acivil or criminal action -y t'e &)C in t'e e9ercise o$ original +urisdiction!

covered -y &ule 41/728 petition $or revie! 'ere +udgment as rendered -y t'e &)C in t'e e9ercise

o$ appellate +urisdiction! covered -y &ule 42/ and738 Petition $or revie to t'e Supreme Court under &ule 45 o$ t'e &ules o$ Court.

)'e $irst mode o$ appeal is ta;en to t'e CA on "uestions o$ $act or mi9ed

"uestions o$ $act and la. )'e second mode o$ appeal is -roug't to t'e CA on "uestionso$ $act! o$ la! or mi9ed "uestions o$ $act and la. )'e t'ird mode o$ appeal is elevated

to t'e Supreme Court only on "uestions o$ la. 7%aca-a--ad! *r. vs. %asirag! 56 SC&AD F2DD<G8

e. ,ssues to -e raised on appeal

Issues Raised for the First time

1ection ?! Rule of the **+ Rules of ourt provides that theappellant Omay include in his assignment of errors any ;uestion of lawor fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within theissues framed by the parties.P It is a fundamental rule that this ourtwill not resolve issues that were not properly brought and ventilated in

the lower courts. Luestions raised on appeal must be within the issuesframed by the parties and! conse;uently! issues not raised in the trialcourt cannot be raised for the $rst time on appeal. "n issue! which wasneither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the lowercourts! cannot be raised for the $rst time on appeal because it would beoensive to the basic rule of fair play and :ustice! and would beviolative of the constitutional right to due process of the other party.(>eirs of 2orenJo Gidad and armen Gidad! et al. vs. 2and Ban< of the#hilippines! %.R. o. )))! "pril 5! ,0

Thus! points of law! theories! issues and arguments not brought tothe attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be

considered by a reviewing court! as these cannot be raised for the $rsttime on appeal. Basic consideration of due process impels this rule.(>ubert ueJ vs. 12T6"1 #hoeni9 1olutions! Inc.! %.R. o. /?,! "pril,! ,0

=rrors aised "! t%e Parties

"s a general rule! the appellate court may only pass upon errorsassigned by the parties. By way of e9ception! even unassigned errorsmay be ta<en up by the court on appeal if they involve4

)*+ errors aecting the lower court's :urisdiction over the

sub:ect matter!)+ plain errors not speci$ed! and)-+ clerical errors. (@adrid vs. @apoy! ?*) 1R" M,*N0

In the present case! we note that the award of attorney's feesappears only in the dispositive portion of the RT decision without anyelaboration! e9planation! and :usti$cation. The award stood there all byitself. Ae view this as a plain legal error by the RT that must berecti$ed. (@adrid vs. @apoy! ?*) 1R" M,*N0



>actual >indings o$ t%e Trial Court

7actual $ndings of the trial court are entitled to great weight andrespect by the 1upreme ourt! more so when they are aCrmed by theappellate court. >owever! the rule is not without e9ceptions! such as4

)*+ Ahen the conclusion is a $nding grounded entirely onspeculations! surmises! and con:ecturesE

)+ The inferences made are manifestly mista<enE)-+ There is grave abuse of discretionE and)+ The :udgment is based on misapprehension of facts or

premised on the absence of evidence on record. ("nthony 2.g vs. #eople of the #hilippines! %.R. o. +5*?! "pril ,5!,0

)5+ when the $ndings of fact are conKictingE)?+ when the ourt of "ppeals! in ma<ing its $ndings! went

beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary tothe admissions of both appellant and appelleeE

)8+ when the $ndings are contrary to those of the trial courtE)6+ when the $ndings of fact are conclusions without citation of

speci$c evidence on which they are basedE)7+ when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the

petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by therespondentsE and

)*:+ when the $ndings of fact of the ourt of "ppeals arepremised on the supposed absence of evidence andcontradicted by the evidence on record (atores vs."$dchao! %.R. o. ?,! @arch 5! ,*0

6specially in criminal cases where the accused stands to lose hisliberty by virtue of his conviction! the ourt must be satis$ed that thefactual $ndings and conclusions of the lower courts leading to hisconviction must satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.("nthony 2. g vs. #eople of the #hilippines! %.R. o. +5*?! "pril ,5!,0

@uestions o$ >act

1ettled is the rule that ;uestions of fact cannot be raised in anappeal via certiorari before the 1upreme ourt and are not proper forits consideration. The rationale behind this doctrine is that a review of the $ndings of fact of the trial courts and the appellate tribunal is not afunction this ourt normally underta<es. The ourt will not weigh theevidence all over again unless there is a showing that the $ndings of the lower courts are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneousso as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. ("le:andra 1. 2aJaro! etal. vs. @odesta "gustin! et al.! %.R. o. ?,5)! "pril ?! ,0

1amples of Luestions of 7act4*. The issue of whether or not the accused acted in self3defense

(#eople of the #hilippines vs. Benancio @ortera y Belarmino! %.R.o. //! "pril ,5! ,0

The well3entrenched rule in our :urisdiction is that only ;uestions

of law may be entertained by this ourt in a petition for review oncertiorari. This rule! however! is not iron3clad and admits certaine9ceptions! such as when4

*. the conclusion is grounded on speculations! surmises orcon:ecturesE

. the inference is manifestly mista<en! absurd orimpossibleE

-. there is grave abuse of discretionE. the :udgment is based on a misapprehension of factsE



5. the $ndings of fact are conKictingE?. there is no citation of speci$c evidence on which the

factual $ndings are basedE8. the $ndings of absence of facts are contradicted by the

presence of evidence on recordE6. the $ndings of the ourt of "ppeals are contrary to those

of the trial courtE

7. the ourt of "ppeals manifestly overloo<ed certainrelevant and undisputed facts that! if properlyconsidered! would :ustify a dierent conclusionE

*:. The $ndings of the ourt of "ppeals are beyond theissues of the caseE and

**. 1uch $ndings are contrary to the admissions of bothparties. (>eirs of Domingo >ernandeJ! 1r. vs. @ingoa!1r.! )/ 1R" 5*0

If the appeal raised involves mi9ed ;uestions of fact and law! noerror can be for invo<ing the appellate :urisdiction of the " through

an ordinary appeal. (0

$. Period o$ appeal

g. Per$ection o$ appeal

The perfection of an appeal within the period laid down by law ismandatory and :urisdictional! because the failure to perfect the appealwithin the time prescribed by the Rules of ourt causes the :udgment or

$nal order to become $nal as to preclude the appellate court fromac;uiring the :urisdiction to review the :udgment or $nal order. (1ps.2ebin vs. @irasol! %.R. o. ),??! 1eptember +! ,0

nder Rule ! 1ection ? of the Rules of ourt! a notice of appealis only re;uired to indicate (a0 the parties to the appeal! (b0 the $nal :udgment or order or part thereof appealed from! (c0 the court to whichthe appeal is being ta<en! and (d0 the material dates showing thetimeliness of the appeal. In usual court practice! a notice of appealwould consist of one or two pages. (#I 2easing and 7inance! Inc. vs."ntonio . @ilan! et al.! %.R. o. ?,?! "pril ?! ,0

In appeals by notice of appeal! the court loses :urisdiction over thecase upon the perfection of the appeals $led in due time and thee9piration of the time to appeal of the other parties. 6ach party onlyhas at most ? days from their receipt of the $nal order to appeal it.("ssociated "nglo3"merican Tobacco orporation! et al. vs. ourt of "ppeals! et al.! %.R. o. )+,5+! "pril ,5! ,0

'. Appeal $rom +udgments or $inal orders o$ t'e %)Ci. Appeal $rom +udgments or $inal orders o$ t'e &)C

It is not possible to ta<e an appeal by certiorari to the ourt of

"ppeals. "ppeals to that ourt from the Regional Trial ourts areperfected in two (,0 ways! both of which are entirely distinct from anappeal by certiorari to the 1upreme ourt. They are4

a+ By ordinary appeal! or appeal by writ of error 3 where :udgmentwas rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RT in thee9ercise of original :urisdictionE and



"+ By petition for review 3 where :udgment was rendered by theRT in the e9ercise of appellate :urisdiction. (DadiJon vs. "!%.R. o. ?*)! 1eptember 5! ,*0

The petition for review must be $led with the ourt of "ppealswithin ? days from notice of the :udgment! and as already stated! shallpoint out the error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal ormodi$cation of the decision or :udgment sought to be reviewed. "nordinary appeal is ta<en by merely $ling a notice of appeal within ?days from notice of the :udgment! e9cept in special proceedings orcases where multiple appeals are allowed in which event the period of appeal is 5 days and a record on appeal is necessary. (1ps. 2ebin vs.@irasol! %.R. o. ),??! 1eptember +! ,0

There is therefore no longer any common method of appeal in civilcases to the 1upreme ourt and the ourt of "ppeals. The presentprocedures for appealing to either court S and! it may be added! theprocess of ventilation of the appeal S are now to be made by petition forreview or by notice of appeals (and! in certain instances! by record on

appeal0! but only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule ?.(1ps. 2ebin vs. @irasol! %.R. o. ),??! 1eptember +! ,0

+. Appeal $rom +udgments or $inal orders o$ t'e CA;. Appeal $rom +udgments or $inal orders o$ t'e C)A

l. &evie o$ $inal +udgments or $inal orders o$ t'e COAm. &evie o$ $inal +udgments or $inal orders o$ t'e CO%LC

n. &evie o$ $inal +udgments or $inal orders o$ t'e CSC

o. &evie o$ $inal +udgments or $inal orders o$ t'e Om-udsman

p. &evie o$ $inal +udgments or $inal orders o$ t'e L&C

". &evie o$ $inal +udgments or $inal orders o$ "uasi0+udicial agencies

Ahile 1ection * (50 of B# ,* and 1ection of Rule 5 of the Rulesof ourt does not list Mational Aater Resources BoardN as OamongP the;uasi3:udicial agencies whose $nal :udgments! orders! resolutions orawards are appealable to the appellate court! it is non se;uitur to holdthat the ourt of "ppeals has no appellate :urisdiction over MARBsN :udgments! orders! resolutions or awards. It is settled that the list of

;uasi3:udicial agencies speci$cally mentioned in Rule 5 is not meant tobe e9clusive. The employment of the word OamongP clearly instructsso. (ational Aater Resources Board (ARB0 vs. ".2. "ng etwor<! Inc.!%.R. o. /)?! "pril ! ,0

Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished

Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari! there aresubstantial distinctions which shall be e9plained below.

"s to the #urpose. ertiorari is a remedy designed for thecorrection of errors of :urisdiction! not errors of :udgment. In #ure

7oods orporation vs. 2R! the 1upreme ourt e9plained the simplereason for the rule in this light4

OAhen a court e9ercises its :urisdiction! an error committed whileso engaged does not deprive it of the :urisdiction being e9ercised whenthe error is committed. If it did! every error committed by a court woulddeprive it of its :urisdiction and every erroneous :udgment would be avoid :udgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of :usticewould not survive such a rule. onse;uently! an error of :udgment that



the court may commit in the e9ercise of its :urisdiction is notcorrectMaNble through the original civil action of certiorari.P

The supervisory :urisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writof certiorari cannot be e9ercised for the purpose of reviewing theintrinsic correctness of a :udgment of the lower court S on the basiseither of the law or the facts of the case! or of the wisdom or legalsoundness of the decision. 6ven if the $ndings of the court areincorrect! as long as it has :urisdiction over the case! such correction isnormally beyond the province of certiorari. Ahere the error is not oneof :urisdiction! but of an error of law or fact S a mista<e of :udgment Sappeal is the remedy.

"s to the @anner of 7iling. 8ver an appeal! the " e9ercises itsappellate :urisdiction and power of review. 8ver a certiorari! the highercourt uses its original :urisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. "n appealis thus a continuation of the original suit! while a petition for certiorariis an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that

had resulted in the rendition of the :udgment or order complained of.The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. Incontrast! the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party(who thereby becomes the petitioner0 against the lower court or ;uasi3 :udicial agency! and the prevailing parties (the public and the privaterespondents! respectively0.

"s to the 1ub:ect @atter. 8nly :udgments or $nal orders and thosethat the Rules of ourt so declare are appealable. 1ince the issue is :urisdiction! an original action for certiorari may be directed against aninterlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the :udgmentE or where there is no appeal or any plain! speedy or ade;uate

remedy.

"s to the #eriod of 7iling. 8rdinary appeals should be $led within$fteen days from the notice of :udgment or $nal order appealed from.Ahere a record on appeal is re;uired! the appellant must $le a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of :udgment or $nal order. " petition for review should be $led and servedwithin $fteen days from the notice of denial of the decision! or of thepetitioners timely $led motion for new trial or motion forreconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari! the petition should be $ledalso within $fteen days from the notice of :udgment or $nal order! or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for

reconsideration.

8n the other hand! a petition for certiorari should be $led not laterthan si9ty days from the notice of :udgment! order! or resolution. If amotion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely $led! theperiod shall be counted from the denial of the motion.

"s to the eed for a @otion for Reconsideration. " motion forreconsideration is generally re;uired prior to the $ling of a petition forcertiorari! in order to aord the tribunal an opportunity to correct thealleged errors. ote also that this motion is a plain and ade;uateremedy e9pressly available under the law. 1uch motion is not re;uired

before appealing a :udgment or $nal order. (1ps. 2eynes vs. "! %.R. o.?),! <anuary $', &)$$+

3. &elie$ $rom +udgments! orders and ot'er proceedings

a. ?rounds $or availing o$ t'e remedy

-. )ime to $ile petitionc. Contents o$ petition



4. Annulment o$ *udgments or $inal orders and resolutions

2et it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of thereliefs provided for by Rule +! i.e.! annulment of :udgments! $nalorders! and resolutions! it is a condition sine ;ua non that one musthave failed to move for new trial in! or appeal from! or $le a petition forrelief against said issuances or ta<e other appropriate remediesthereon! through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of those cited remedies without suCcient :usti$cation! he cannot resort tothe action for annulment provided in Rule +! for otherwise he wouldbene$t from his own inaction or negligence. (Republic vs. 1ps. Deastro! %.R. o. /*+,! 7ebruary +! ,0 "pplying the said doctrine inepu"lic vs. Sps. 3e Castro! supra! the 1upreme ourt held4

In the instant case, not only did petitioner ail to avail o the ordinary and appropriate remedies in assailing the 3uestioned judgments o the trial court,but he also ailed to show to the satisaction o this /ourt that he could not haveavailed o the ordinary and appropriate remedies under the !ules. %ccording to petitioner, he allegedly learned o the cases fled against him by respondent bank only when the writs o e+ecution were issued against him. At the very least then, he could have moved to quash the writs of execution. In the alternative, he could

have led a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 3. Instead, petitioner merely alleged that he approached %tty. Gregorio &ala6ar, the bank2s counsel, or clarifcation and assistance, which is not one o the ordinary and appropriateremedies contemplated by the !ules. 7etitioner2s ailure to e+plain why he ailed to avail o said remedies, which were still available to him at that time, in both/ivil /ase -o. 8*99: and /ivil /ase -o. (;9<0;;, is atal to his cause. !o "esure, a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule #$ is not a su"stitute for one%s ownneglect in not availing of the ordinary and appropriate remedies, "ut a peculiar remedy granted under certain conditions to those who failed to avail of the ordinary remedieswithout their fault. $hus, in our considered view, based on the cited reasons and circumstances, the /ourt o %ppeals did not err when it denied the petition or annulment o judgment

a. ?rounds $or annulment

-. Period to $ile actionc. $$ects o$ +udgment o$ annulment

5. Collateral attac; o$ +udgments

. 9ecution! Satis$action and $$ect o$ *udgments

As a general rule! t'e rit o$ e9ecution s'ould con$orm to t'e dispositive portion

o$ t'e decision to -e e9ecuted/ an e9ecution is void i$ it is in e9cess o$ and -eyond t'e

original +udgment or aard. )'e settled general principle is t'at a rit o$ e9ecution mustcon$orm strictly to every essential particular o$ t'e +udgment promulgated! and may not

vary t'e terms o$ t'e +udgment it see;s to en$orce! nor may it go -eyond t'e terms o$ t'e +udgment soug't to -e e9ecuted. onet'eless! a +udgment is not con$ined to 'at

appears on t'e $ace o$ t'e decision! -ut e9tends as ell to t'ose necessarily includedt'erein or necessary t'ereto. 7arciso )umi-ay! et al. vs. Sps. Holanda ). Sora! et al.!

?.&. o. 152D16! April 13! 2D1D.8

1. i$$erence -eteen $inality o$ +udgment $or purposes o$ appeal/ $or purposes o$e9ecution

2. 'en e9ecution s'all issue

a. 9ecution as a matter o$ rig't-. iscretionary e9ecution

Ahen an appeal had been duly perfected! e9ecution of the :udgment! whether wholly or partially! was not a matter of right! but of discretion provided good reasons therefor e9isted. The compellinggrounds for the issuance of the writ must be stated in a special orderafter due hearing. "side from the e9istence of good reasons! the rulesalso re;uire that the motion for partial e9ecution should have been $ledwhile the trial court still had :urisdiction over the case. ("ssociated"nglo3"merican Tobacco orporation! et al. vs. ourt of "ppeals! et al.!%.R. o. )+,5+! "pril ,5! ,0



3. @o a +udgment is e9ecuted

a. 9ecution -y motion or -y independent action-. ,ssuance and contents o$ a rit o$ e9ecution

c. 9ecution o$ +udgments $or moneyd. 9ecution o$ +udgments $or speci$ic acts

A +udgment $or t'e delivery or restitution o$ property is essentially an order to

place t'e prevailing party in possession o$ t'e property. ,$ t'e de$endant re$uses tosurrender possession o$ t'e property to t'e prevailing party! t'e s'eri$$ or ot'er proper

o$$icer s'ould oust 'im. o e9press order to t'is e$$ect needs to -e stated in t'e

decision/ nor is a categorical statement needed in t'e decision t'at in suc' event t'es'eri$$ or ot'er proper o$$icer s'all 'ave t'e aut'ority to remove t'e improvements on

t'e property i$ t'e de$endant $ails to do so it'in a reasona-le period o$ time. )'e

removal o$ t'e improvements on t'e land under t'ese circumstances is deemed read intot'e decision! su-+ect only to t'e issuance o$ a special order -y t'e court $or t'e removal

o$ t'e improvements. 7arciso )umi-ay! et al. vs. Sps. Holanda ). Sora! et al.! ?.&. o.152D16! April 13! 2D1D8

e. 9ecution o$ special +udgments

$. $$ect o$ levy on t'ird persons4. Properties e9empt $rom e9ecution

5. Proceedings 'ere property is claimed -y t'ird personsa. in relation to t'ird party claim in attac'ment and replevin

6. &ules on &edemption. 9amination o$ *udgment O-ligor 'en *udgment is unsatis$ied

=. 9amination o$ O-ligor o$ *udgment O-ligor<. $$ect o$ *udgment or (inal Orders

" :udgment becomes O$nal and e9ecutoryP by operation of law.7inality becomes a fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapsesand no appeal is perfected within such period. "s a conse;uence! nocourt can e9ercise appellate :urisdiction to review a case or modify a

decision that has became $nal. (#I 2easing and 7inance! Inc. vs."ntonio . @ilan! et al.! %.R. o. ?,?! "pril ?! ,0 General Rule: Immutability of Executable inal !ud"ment

Ahen a $nal :udgment is e9ecutory! it becomes immutable andunalterable. It may no longer be modi$ed in any respect either by thecourt which rendered it or even by this ourt. The doctrine is foundedon considerations of public policy and sound practice that! at the ris< of occasional errors! :udgments must become $nal at some de$nite pointin time.

The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a $nal :udgmenthas a two3fold purpose4 (0 to avoid delay in the administration of :ustice and thus! procedurally! to ma<e orderly the discharge of :udicialbusiness and (,0 to put an end to :udicial controversies! at the ris< of occasional errors! which is precisely why courts e9ist. ontroversiescannot drag on inde$nitely. The rights and obligations of every litigantmust not hang in suspense for an inde$nite period of time. (#I 2easingand 7inance! Inc. vs. "ntonio . @ilan! et al.! %.R. o. ?,?! "pril ?!,.0

#$e Exception: Relaxation of t$e Rules

>owever! the ourt has rela9ed this rule in order to servesubstantial :ustice considering4

)"+ @atters of life! liberty! honor or property!)c+ The e9istence of special or compelling circumstances!)d+ The merits of the case!)e+ " cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of

the party favored by the suspension of the rules!)$+ " lac< of any showing that the review sought is merely

frivolous and dilatory! and



)g+ The other party will not be un:ustly pre:udiced thereby.

Invariably! rules of procedure should be viewed as mere toolsdesigned to facilitate the attainment of :ustice. Their strict and rigidapplication! which would result in technicalities that tend to frustraterather than promote substantial :ustice! must always be eschewed.6ven the Rules of ourt reKects this principle. The power to suspend oreven disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to altereven that which this ourt itself had already declared to be $nal. (#I2easing and 7inance! Inc. vs. "ntonio . @ilan! et al.! %.R. o. ?,?!"pril ?! ,0

Rule 5* 1ec. +(b0 and (c0 comprehends two distinct concepts of res :udicata4 (0 bar by former :udgment and (,0 conclusiveness of :udgment. nder the $rst concept! res :udicata absolutely bars anysubse;uent action when the following re;uisites concur4

)a+ The former :udgment or order was $nalE)"+ It ad:udged the pertinent issue or issues on their meritsE

)c+ It was rendered by a court that had :urisdiction over thesub:ect matter and the partiesE and)d+ Between the $rst and the second actions! there was identity of

parties! of sub:ect matter! and of causes of action. (>aciendaBigaa! Inc. vs. haveJ! et al.! %.R. o. +)! "pril ,! ,0

Ahere no identit! o$ causes o$ action "ut onl! identit! o$ issues e#ists !res :udicata comes under the second concept S i.e.! under conclusivenesso$ judgment. nder this concept! the rule bars the re3litigation of particular facts or issues involving the same parties even if raised underdierent claims or causes of action. onclusiveness of :udgment $ndsapplication when a fact or ;uestion has been s;uarely put in issue!

:udicially passed upon! and ad:udged in a former suit by a court of competent :urisdiction. The fact or ;uestion settled by $nal :udgmentor order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity withthem or their successors3in3interest0! and continues to bind them whilethe :udgment or order remains standing and unreversed by properauthority on a timely motion or petitionE the conclusively settled fact or;uestion furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or otheraction between the same parties or their privies and successors3in3interest! in the same or in any other court of concurrent :urisdiction!either for the same or for a dierent cause of action. Thus! only theidentities of parties and issues are re;uired for the operation of theprinciple of conclusiveness of :udgment. (>acienda Bigaa! Inc. vs.

haveJ! et al.! %.R. o. +)! "pril ,! ,0

Ahile conclusiveness of :udgment does not have the same barringeect as that of a bar by former :udgment that proscribes subse;uentactions! the former nonetheless estops the parties from raising in alater case the issues or points that were raised and controverted! andwere determinative of the ruling in the earlier case. In other words! thedictum laid down in the earlier $nal :udgment or order becomesconclusive and continues to be binding between the same parties! theirprivies and successors3in3interest! as long as the facts on which that :udgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case orincident before the court in a later caseE the binding eect and

enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re3litigated in alater case since the issue has already been resolved and $nally laid torest in the earlier case. (>acienda Bigaa! Inc. vs. haveJ! et al.! %.R. o.+)! "pril ,! ,0

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