G.R. No. 191412 January 17, 2012
LETICIA A. CADENA, Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Leticia A. Cadena
(Cadena) following the issuance by the Court of Appeals (CA) of its
Decision1 dated June 30, 2009 and Resolution
2 dated January 4, 2010
in the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103646, entitled "Leticia A.
Cadena v. Civil Service Commission."
The Factual Antecedents
Cadena, then a State Auditing Examiner II, Commission on Audit,
assigned at the National Power Corporation, was charged with grave
misconduct by the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region
(CSC-NCR) following an incident that occurred during the Career
Service Professional Examination held on June 29, 1997. Records
indicate that while all examinees were instructed at the start of the
examination to clear their desks of things other than their examination
booklets, scratch papers and answer sheets, Cadena kept her Notice of
Assignment. In the course of the examination, the examiner caught
Cadena with the said notice of assignment where some questions from
the examination were reproduced.
In her answer to the formal charge, Cadena averred that she failed to
fully comprehend the instructions to examinees because she arrived
late for the examinations. She did not know that she was prohibited
from keeping her notice of assignment while the examinations were
ongoing. She further alleged that what she copied from the
examination booklet and wrote on the notice of assignment were terms
she encountered for the first time, and that she only intended to look
up in the dictionary the meaning of those words once she arrived
home.
While Cadena manifested her desire to file a position paper during the
investigations, no such pleading was filed by her counsel. A decision
was then rendered by the CSC-NCR based on available records.
The Ruling of the CSC-NCR
The CSC-NCR found Cadena guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty. The CSC-NCR rejected her defense that she was not aware
of the instructions given to examinees considering that the test
booklets already contained a prohibition from making copies of the
examination questions. Further, she failed to satisfactorily explain her
reason for writing her answer sheet number and the venue of her
examination on her notice of assignment. The CSC-NCR ruled that her
act "does not only amount to Grave Misconduct but also connotes
untrustworthiness and lack of integrity, a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, betray which is tantamount to dishonesty."3 It further
declared:
Further, Item no. 1 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 8, s. 1990 states that:
"Any act which includes the fraudulent procurement and/or use of
fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure
the commission or procurement of the same, or any other act which
amounts to violation of the integrity of the Civil Service examinations,
possession of fake Civil Service eligibility and other similar acts shall
be categorized as a grave offense of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct or
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, as the case may
be, and shall be penalized in accordance with the approved schedule of
penalties." 4
The dispositive portion of CSC-NCR's Decision5 dated June 14, 2005
then reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Leticia A.
Cadena guilty of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty. Cadena is hereby
meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with the
accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, disqualification
from re-employment in the government service and bar from taking
any civil service examination in the future.
SO ORDERED.6
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CSC-
NCR via a decision7 dated September 1, 2006, prompting the filing of
an appeal with the CSC.
The Ruling of the CSC
On March 24, 2008, the CSC, through Commissioner Mary Ann Z.
Fernandez-Mendoza, issued Resolution No. 0804308 dismissing the
petitioner's appeal for having been filed out of time. It emphasized that
the "perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid
down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to
perfect an appeal as legally required has the effect of rendering final
and executory [the] judgment of the court below and deprives the
appellate court [of] jurisdiction to entertain the appeal."9
Dissatisfied with the CSC's ruling, the petitioner filed with the CA a
petition for review raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Commission-NCR erred in denying the
Appeal on its Resolution of March 24, 2008 filed by Petitioner
for being arbitrary and not supported by the evidence on record
and therefore errors of law or irregularities have been
committed prejudicial to the interest of the Petitioner; and
2. Whether or not the failure of her counsel to submit the
position paper could be considered as fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence which would warrant the
reinvestigation of the case to afford Petitioner the chance to
explain her side in the first instance.10
The Ruling of the CA
On June 30, 2009, the CA rendered its decision,11
declaring that the
CSC properly dismissed the appeal from the CSC-NCR's decision
since the same had already become final and executory. On the other
matters raised in the petition, the CA ruled as follows:
Having resolved in the affirmative the issue of the propriety of the
dismissal of petitioner's appeal to the CSC, we no longer find it
necessary to resolve the other issue.12
A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the
CA via a resolution13
dated January 4, 2010. Hence, this petition.
The Present Petition
The present petition includes a statement that it is appealing from the
resolution of the CA. However, this Court observes that the issues
being raised by the petitioner pertain to the rulings of the CSC-NCR
and CSC rather than of the CA, to wit:
1. Whether or not the Commission-NCR erred in denying the
Appeal on its Resolution of March 24, 2008 filed by Petitioner
for being arbitrary and not supported by the evidence on record
and therefore errors of law or irregularities have been
committed prejudicial to the interest of the Petitioner; and
2. Whether or not the failure of her counsel to submit the
position paper could be considered as fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence which would warrant the
reinvestigation of the case to afford Petitioner the chance to
explain her side in the first instance.14
Further, the petitioner's prayer seeks a reversal or setting aside of the
rulings of the CSC instead of the CA, as it reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court
shall set aside and/or reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 2008 by
Commissioner MARY ANN Z. FERNANDEZ[-]MENDOZA and a
new one entered dismissing the above-mentioned Administrative Case
for utter lack of merit or in the alternative, remand the case to the Civil
Service Commission-National Capital Region for further proceedings
where the Petitioner shall be afforded the chance to adduce evidence in
her behalf, in the interest of substantial justice.15
We have earlier denied this petition via a Resolution16
dated October
5, 2010, in view of the petitioner's failure to comply with a lawful
order of the Court when her counsel failed to file a reply as required
under this Court's Resolution17
dated June 29, 2010. The petition's
reinstatement was only allowed following the counsel for the
petitioner's explanation in a motion for reconsideration dated
November 17, 2010 that the belated filing of the reply occurred due to
the fault of their office personnel who inadvertently misplaced a copy
of this Court's resolution requiring the filing of a reply.
This Court's Ruling
We deny the petition.
The present petition does not comply with the requirements of
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the petition is dismissible for
non-compliance with substantial requirements under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
First, we cite that on March 16, 2010, this Court issued a resolution in
relation to the petitioner's failure to include a statement of material
dates in her petition as required under Rule 45, Sections 4 (b) and 5,
the pertinent portions of which read:
Section 4. Contents of the petition. – The petition shall be filed in
eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court
being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall x x x (b) indicate
the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial
or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial
thereof was received; x x x.
Section 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. - The failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding
the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs,
proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the petition on the
ground that the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for
delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration.
Given the foregoing, this Court's resolution of March 16, 2010
required compliance from the petitioner and thus reads in part:
Acting on the Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Court Resolved,
without giving due course to the petition, to
x x x
(b) REQUIRE the petitioner to COMPLY, within five (5) days from
notice hereof, with Rule 45, Sections 4 (b) and 5, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which provides that the petition shall indicate
the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial
or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial
thereof was received.18
A perusal of the case records, however, reveals that despite due notice
of said resolution by the counsel for the petitioner on March 24,
2010,19
no compliance therewith has been filed with this Court. We
reiterate that Rule 45, Section 5 provides that the failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the contents of and the documents
which should accompany a petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. Notably, the material dates appear crucial in this
case, given that this petition was filed more than two months after the
promulgation by the CA of its resolution denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 103646. It has to be
sufficiently established that the petition was timely filed within 15
days from the petitioner's notice of the CA's denial of her motion for
reconsideration.
This Court, instead of dismissing the petition outright, granted the
petitioner a reasonable opportunity to correct the deficiency on the
material dates by issuing the March 16, 2010 resolution. Regrettably,
the petitioner continued to defy this lawful order of the Court, thereby
giving us all the more reason to deny the present petition.
In addition to the foregoing, the matters pertained to in the present
petition are not proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. As earlier mentioned, the petitioner assails rulings
made by the CSC instead of the CA. The issues brought before us
pertain to matters that were neither ruled upon nor discussed by the
CA in its June 30, 2009 decision and January 4, 2010 resolution. The
appellate court only discussed the timeliness of the appeal to the CSC.
After ruling that the CSC made no error in dismissing the appeal from
the CSC-NCR, the CA held that it was no longer necessary for it to
resolve the other issues brought before it.
Further, the CA ruling on the validity of the appeal's dismissal was not
even made an issue in this case.1awphi1 In fact, the issues in this
petition are exactly the same issues raised before the CA. This petition
and the inclusion of issues on matters that were solely decided upon by
the CSC then appear to be a scheme resorted to by the petitioner,
merely to avert the adverse effects of the petitioner's and/or counsel's
previous errors or lapses. We emphasize that under Rule 45, Section
120
of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari is the
remedy that may be resorted to by a party to appeal only a judgment or
final order or resolution of the CA, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court and other courts whenever authorized by law.
With the foregoing infirmities, this Court has sufficient grounds to
deny the present petition, barring the need to further rule on the issues
now brought before us. In any case, we rule that both the CSC and the
CA have correctly held that the rulings of the CSC-NCR had become
final and executory when the petitioner failed to make a timely appeal
before the CSC. As held by the CSC in its decision denying the appeal:
For her failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the adverse decision, herein appellant
lost her right to appeal. Technically, there is nothing more to appeal as
the decision sought to be appealed had already attained finality. It is
well settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by
operation of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of
judgment becomes an established fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal, if no appeal is perfected or motion for
reconsideration or new trial is filed. This jurisprudential rule must be
read together with Section 72 Rule V (B) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), which
provides that the prescriptive period to appeal the decision of the
Regional Offices of the Commission is fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof by the party adversely affected.21
(citation omitted)
Settled is the rule that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part
of due process, but is merely a statutory privilege that may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. The right is
unavoidably forfeited by the litigant who does not comply with the
manner thus prescribed.22
This Court has, on several occasions, ruled that the emerging trend in
our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the determination and just determination of his cause
free from the constraints of technicalities.23
However, failure to perfect
an appeal within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality but
jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment
final and executory.24
In addition, the liberal application of rules of
procedure for perfecting appeals is still the exception, and not the rule;
and it is only allowed in exceptional circumstances to better serve the
interest of justice.25
This exceptional situation does not obtain in this
case as in fact, both the rulings of the CSC and CA are supported by
evidence on record. While the petitioner argues that she was denied the
opportunity to fully present her defenses, she was able to give her
answer to the charges, and even moved for a reconsideration of the
decision of the CSC-NCR. Her arguments and defenses were already
reviewed and considered by the agency when it discussed its rulings.
As held by this Court in the case of Autencio v. Manara,26
the essence
of due process in administrative proceedings is simply the opportunity
to explain one's side or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Furthermore, the counsel's actions and mistakes on
procedural matters bind the client.27
Where the party has the
opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of, defects in procedural due process may be cured.28
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is hereby DENIED
G.R. No. 139951 November 23, 2000
RAMON M. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RUDECON MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals1 in CA G.R. SP No. 51492 entitled
"Ramon M. Veluz vs. Rudecon Management Corporation" dismissing
the Petition for Certiorari2 filed by herein petitioner, Ramon M.
Veluz, from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court3 , National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 78, Quezon City which affirmed the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City
ordering the herein petitioner to vacate Unit 4-D or Room 404 of
Tempus Place I Condominium located at 21 Matalino Street, Diliman
Quezon City; to pay herein respondent P20,000.00 a month as
reasonable rental for the use of the subject unit until petitioner vacates
the same; to pay the respondent P10,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees
and costs of the suit; and dismissing the petitioner’s counterclaim.
The material facts are as follows:
On September 15, 1997, the respondent Rudecon Management
Corporation (RUDECON) filed an action for unlawful detainer against
the petitioner, Ramon M. Veluz (VELUZ) in the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 41, Quezon City.
On July 7, 1998, the MTC rendered its decision4 in favor of the
plaintiff and ordered VELUZ to vacate the property subject of the
action, as earlier cited.
VELUZ appealed to the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 78, Quezon City. During the pendency of the appeal with the
RTC, Sisenando Singson (SINGSON) through Attorney Manuel N.
Camacho (ATTORNEY CAMACHO), filed a Motion for Intervention
with an attached Answer in Intervention with affirmative defenses and
compulsory counterclaim against RUDECON claiming that he is the
real party in interest being the owner of the property subject of the
ejectment case by virtue of a swapping agreement between him and
Pablo Tolentino (TOLENTINO), the party to whom RUDECON
allegedly sold the said property under an Absolute Deed of Sale, and
that VELUZ is his lessee.5 RUDECON opposed the motion for
intervention and also filed a Motion to Show Cause why intervenor
SINGSON and his counsel should not be cited for contempt for forum
shopping inasmuch as SINGSON earlier filed an action for damages
and reconveyance of the subject property in Civil Case No. Q-98-
35444 which is pending in Branch 79 of said court.6
On November 5, 1998, the motion for intervention was denied on the
ground that in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the RTC can
decide the ejectment case based only on the records and the
memoranda of the parties; that the RTC is not allowed to conduct a
new trial or hearing on the merits; that a motion for intervention is no
longer allowed after rendition of judgment by the trial court; and that
the claim of ownership of the would-be intervenor has been raised by
SINGSON as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 wherein his
rights can be fully protected.7
On November 6, 1998, the RTC found RUDECON’s Motion to Show
Cause well taken and reprimanded both SINGSON and ATTORNEY
CAMACHO for forum shopping without prejudice to administrative
sanctions against ATTORNEY CAMACHO.8
Meanwhile, RUDECON filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal
and a Second Motion for Execution pending appeal, which were both
granted by the RTC on October 15, 1998.9 The writ of execution
ordered VELUZ and anyone claiming rights under him to vacate the
subject property and restore possession thereof to RUDECON.10
On December 1, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision against VELUZ
affirming in toto the decision of the MTC.11
Motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision was denied12
prompting VELUZ to file a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
injunctive relief with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA G.R. No.
51492 through his lawyer, ATTORNEY CAMACHO (also
SINGSON’s lawyer) on March 12, 1999.13
On April 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals, without necessarily giving
due course to the petition, required the respondent RUDECON to file
comment within ten (10) days and also allowed the petitioner to file a
reply within five (5) days from receipt of said comment.14
On April 27, 1999, RUDECON filed comment to the petition praying
for its outright dismissal. RUDECON further alleged that the petitioner
and his counsel were guilty of forum shopping since another petition,
CA-G.R SP No. 49648 (a petition for certiorari filed by SINGSON
through his lawyer, ATTORNEY CAMACHO of the decision of the
RTC in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 and the orders issued by it which
affirmed the order of ejectment issued by the MTC against VELUZ)
was already pending in the Court of Appeals.15
Subsequently, on April
29,1999, RUDECON filed a "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION"16
with "MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITIONER AND HIS
COUNSEL SHOULD NOT BE CITED FOR CONTEMPT AND BE
PENALIZED FOR FORUM-SHOPPING" (CA-G.R. SP No. 51492)17
and "SECOND MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITIONER
AND HIS COUNSEL SHOULD NOT BE CITED FOR CONTEMPT
AND BE PENALIZED FOR FORUM-SHOPPING" (CA-G.R. SP No.
49648)18
. Briefly, the motions alleged that ATTORNEY CAMACHO
failed to inform the Court of Appeals that he filed two Petitions for
Certiorari raising substantially the same facts, issues and relief sought
by substantially the same parties docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49648
in favor of his client SINGSON, and CA-G.R. SP No. 51492 in favor
of his other client VELUZ in violation of Supreme Court Circular No.
04-94 dated April 1, 1994 and Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure proscribing forum-shopping.
On July 1, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision now
subject of this present petition dismissing on the ground of forum
shopping herein petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari of the RTC
decision.19
In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated
that the allegations of RUDECON in its "Motion to Show Cause Why
Petitioner and His Counsel Should Not Be Cited For Contempt And
Be Penalized For Forum-Shopping" (CA-G.R. SP No. 51492) to the
effect that the petitioners were guilty of forum-shopping remained
unrebutted inasmuch as the petitioner did not file a Reply to the
Comment filed by RUDECON.
Motion for reconsideration was denied20
hence this present petition
where the petitioner raises the following issues:
"(1) Whether or not, there was violation of procedural due process in
the dismissal of the Petition for Review/Certiorari in said CA-G.R. SP
No. 51492 under Rule 42/65 by the Court of Appeals merely because
of herein Petitioner’s failure to file a Comment or Reply to private
Respondent’s ‘Motion to Show Cause’ without having been required
by the Court of Appeals to file the same as usually required of parties
to conform with procedural due process of law.
(2) Whether or not a Petition for Review/Certiorari under Rule 42/65
filed with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51492,
originating from an unlawful detainer case filed against therein
petitioner and thereafter appealed by Petition for Review to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, may be dismissed for Forum
Shopping on the ground that another Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 has been filed with the Court of Appeals by an indispensable party
(therein petitioner’s lessor), albeit not impleaded in the unlawful
detainer case and whose intervention was denied by the appellate
Regional Trial Court, but nevertheless was the party against whom the
adverse decisions were enforced and implemented."21
In support of his petition, VELUZ argues that he was denied
procedural due process when the Court of Appeals dismissed his
petition for review for failure to file a reply to RUDECON’s comment.
Moreover, the Motion to Show Cause filed by RUDECON was
resolved without giving him the opportunity to be heard on said
motion. VELUZ maintains that his failure to file a reply should not
have been construed by the Court of Appeals as an admission of the
allegation of forum shopping for the allegation of forum shopping is a
newly alleged matter. Under the Rules of Court, any new matter
alleged in an answer is deemed controverted should the opposing party
fail to file a reply.
VELUZ also contends that the claim of RUDECON that he is guilty of
forum shopping is devoid of any legal and factual basis considering
that he is not a party to the petition filed by SINGSON in CA-G.R. No.
49648. He claims that forum shopping exists when the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case would
amount to res judicata in the other. Since he is not a party in CA-G.R.
No. 49648, there can neither be litis pendentia or res judicata.
Finally, the petitioner prays that this Court resolve the petition on the
merits inasmuch as the facts of the present case are undisputed and the
pleadings of the parties necessary for the final determination of the
controversy are before this Court.
We find the petition partly meritorious.
First of all, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the allegation
made by RUDECON that VELUZ was guilty of forum shopping was
unrebutted since VELUZ failed to file a reply to the comment is
erroneous.
Under Section 10, Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any
new matter alleged by way of defense in the answer (or comment as in
this case) is deemed controverted should a party fail to file a reply
thereto. Except in cases where the answer alleges the defense of usury
in which case a reply under oath is required otherwise the allegation of
usury is deemed admitted, or is based on an actionable document in
which case a verified reply is necessary otherwise the genuineness and
due execution of said actionable document is generally deemed
admitted, the filing of a reply is merely optional as the new matters
raised in the answer are deemed controverted even without a reply.22
Considering that the allegation that VELUZ was guilty of forum-
shopping is a new matter raised in RUDECON’s comment, such
allegation should have been deemed controverted when the petitioners
did not file a reply thereto and it should not, as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, have been deemed unrebutted.
Secondly, the Court of Appeals also erred in basing its dismissal of
VELUZ’s petition on RUDECON’s Motion to Show Cause and not on
RUDECON’s comment.
RUDECON’s Motion to Show Cause essentially prayed that the
petitioner and his counsel ATTORNEY CAMACHO be ordered to
show cause why they should not be found guilty of direct and indirect
contempt on the ground of forum-shopping. Said motion was not filed
as an answer to the petition for it was a distinct pleading from
RUDECON’s comment which, aside from the petition, should have
been the basis for the Court of Appeal’s order of dismissal pursuant to
Section 4 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court which provides that:
"SEC. 4. Action on the Petition. – The Court of Appeals may require
the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to
dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, or dismiss the petition if it
finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for
delay, or that the questions raised are too unsubstantial to require
consideration." (emphasis supplied)
In basing its order of dismissal on RUDECON’s motion to show
cause, the Court of Appeals in effect treated the same as a motion to
dismiss in contravention of the tenor of the above section.
We are however not persuaded by the assertion of the petitioner that he
was denied procedural due process.
The petitioner’s claim that the Court of Appeals never required him to
file a reply to the comment is belied by the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated April 15, 1999, which states:
"WITHOUT necessarily giving due course to this petition for certiorari
with a prayer for injunctive reliefs (sic), the Court RESOLVES to
require the responent to COMMENT thereon (not to file a Motion To
Dismiss) within ten (10) days from notice hereof, which Comment
may be deemed as an Answer in the event the petition is given due
course.
Petitioner may file a Reply within five (5) days from receipt of the
Comment.
Action on the temporary restraining order is held in abeyance pending
receipt of respondent’s comment on the petition.
SO ORDERED."23
(italics supplied)
The above order is plain and simple and clearly states that the
petitioner was given an opportunity to file a reply to the comment.
As regards the claim of forum shopping, a review of the two petitions
filed with the Court of Appeals shows that there was no forum
shopping. There is forum shopping when, in the two or more cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and relief
sought.24
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia
are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other.25
For litis pendentia to exist, the following
requisites must be present:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same interests in both actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts;
3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the
two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other case.26
In the present case, the petitioner admits that the facts and
circumstances of the two subject petitions and the causes of action and
relief sought therein are identical.27
However, we agree that there is
neither identity of parties nor an identity of rights asserted. CA-G.R.
No. SP No. 51492 is a petition for certiorari filed by VELUZ while
CA-G.R. SP No. 49648 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
by SINGSON. In his petition, VELUZ asserts his right to possess as
lessee the subject property pursuant to a lease contract entered into by
him and the alleged owner SINGSON. On the other hand, SINGSON,
in his petition, asserts his better right to possess the subject property by
virtue of his ownership thereof arising from an alleged swapping
agreement between him and TOLENTINO to whom RUDECON had
allegedly sold the property. Although both VELUZ and SINGSON
were represented by the same ATTORNEY CAMACHO, it is clear
that VELUZ and SINGSON are asserting different rights.28
Moreover,
a judgment rendered in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 51492 will not amount to
res judicata as against SINGSON who was not a party to the appealed
case in the subject petition, i.e. MTC Civil Case No. 18436 or RTC
Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 (appeal of the MTC decision where
SINGSON’s motion to intervene was denied).
Accordingly, VELUZ cannot be held guilty of forum shopping
inasmuch as the requisites of litis pendentia have not concurred.
On August 25, 2000, RUDECON filed a Manifestation and Motion
where RUDECON claims that VELUZ and ATTORNEY CAMCAHO
again violated the prohibition on forum shopping when they failed to
inform this Court of the pendency of the following actions filed by
them concerning the same alleged facts and circumstances arising
from the present petition:
1. Commission on Bar Discipline Case No. 00-752 entitled
"Pablo Tolentino et. al. vs. Rudegelio D. Tacorda" – a
complaint for disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law filed against Attorney Rudegelio D. Tacorda,
RUDECON’s president;
2. I.S. No. 99-7152 entitled "Sisenando Singson vs. Rudegelio
D. Tacorda" for violation of Art. 316 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code;
3. I.S. No. 99-7171 entitled "Sisenando Singson vs. Rudegelio
D. Tacorda" for violation of Art. 318 of the Revised Penal
Code; and
4. CA-G.R. CV No. 64281 entitled "Sisenando Singson vs.
Rudecon Management Corporation" – the appeal of SINGSON
from the dismissal of his complaint for reconveyance of the
subject property.
Indeed, these cases involve the same facts and circumstances due to
the fact that they arise from the same alleged transactions claimed by
the respective parties. However, the causes of action in each of these
subsequent cases are distinct from the case at hand and are in fact
distinct from each other. Moreover, except for the disbarment
proceedings, it does not appear that VELUZ is a party to any of the
three other cases. Neither does it appear that CAMACHO acted as
counsel in any of them. Consequently there can be no forum shopping
since the requisites of litis pendentia do not obtain.
Finally, we deny the petitioner’s prayer that this Court decide the
substantive issues of the case inasmuch as the Court of Appeals has
not yet passed upon the factual issues raised by the parties.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing
herein petitioners Petition for Certiorari is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.
G.R. No. 117574 January 2, 1997
CONCRETE AGGREGATES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PRISCILA S. AGANA, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, and VIVIEN S. SORIGUEZ, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Does Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of Court require a party to respond to a Request for Admission of matters raised in his pleadings? Will his failure to place under oath his denials in his response to the request be deemed an admission of the matters sought to be admitted?
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling Bituminous Concrete Mix, Ready Mix Concrete and other construction materials. It has several plant sites in the country one of which is the Cebu plant site situated in Tuyan, Naga, Cebu. Private respondent on the other hand is engaged in the business of providing security services to various establishments under the name and style 101 Security and Detective Services.
Sometime in October 1990 petitioner retained the services of private respondent for its Cebu plant site. On 8 November 1991 it terminated the services of private respondent alleging that it was dissatisfied with the latter's services because she failed to prevent and promptly investigate a theft case which occurred in its Cebu plant site.
On 6 October 1992 private respondent Vivien S. Soriguez instituted an action with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu 1 for collection of unpaid fees for her security services rendered to petitioner. She also claimed that the termination of her services was unlawful so that she should be awarded moral damages.
Petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was justified because private respondent was answerable for the losses it incurred arising from the theft attributable to her fault. Petitioner thus claimed that there was legal set-off or compensation regarding the unpaid fees due private respondent and the amount of the stolen articles owned by petitioner.
On 30 August 1993 petitioner sent private respondent a Request for Admission by the latter of her responsibility of the theft that occurred on 5 June 1991 at the Cebu plant site. 2 Thereafter private respondent through counsel filed a Manifestation and Reply to the Request for Admission. 3 It was not under oath.
On 8 October 1993 petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment positing that private respondent impliedly admitted the matters set forth in the Request for Admission by failing to respond under oath as required under Sec. 2, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court. 4 Petitioner contended that the manifestation and reply not being verified was ineffectual and thus should be stricken off the records. Private respondent countered that her reply although not under oath effectively denied the matters set forth in the request.
Public respondents ruled in favor of private respondent holding that the circumstances warranted a relaxation of the rules in the interest of justice. 5 The trial court rationalized that —
While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses as in this case which do not really impair the proper administration of justice. Considering that the protection of the substantive rights of the parties is paramount over mere technicalities, the court elects to deny defendant's motion for summary judgment.
6
Respondent courts further ruled that a summary judgment was improper because the dispute involved factual issues which could only be resolved in a full-blown hearing. 7
After the trial court denied its motion for reconsideration petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in a special civil action for certiorari but the latter likewise denied the petition for lack of merit; hence, the instant petition.
The pivotal issue in this case is the effect of the Request for Admission filed by petitioner and, consequently, whether private
respondent may be considered to have impliedly admitted the matters referred to in the request when she filed a manifestation and reply that was not under oath. 8
We deny the petition.
The Request for Admission of petitioner does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As we held in Po v. Court of Appeals 9 and Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, 10 Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading. That is its primary function. It does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.
A cursory reading of petitioner's Request for Admission clearly shows that it contains the same material averments in his Answer to respondent's Complaint in the trial court. Petitioner merely recopied or reproduced in its Request for Admission its affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleged in its Answer. As we held in Bo v. CA, 11 petitioner's request constitutes an utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process which the respondent should not be subjected to. In the first place, what the petitioner seeks to be admitted by private respondent is the very subject matter of the complaint. In effect, petitioner would want private respondent to deny her allegations in her verified Complaint and admit the allegations in the Answer of petitioner (Manifestation and Reply to Request for Admission). Plainly, this is illogical if not preposterous. Respondent cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Answer of petitioner just because she failed to have her response to the request placed under oath since these are the very matters she raises in her verified Complaint in the court below. The following allegations specifically contained therein are self-evident —
9. That, in compliance thereto (sic) (referring to the request for investigation), herein plaintiff, through her authorized representative, went at (sic) the place and conducted the necessary investigation and found out that the herein plaintiff was not responsible for those alleged losses simply because of the following, to wit:
a. Those alleged losses like Blower, Oil Filter, transmission and others were taken and brought outside the guarded place by certain Danny Baterna, driver of defendant, as reflected in the Log Book of the plaintiff . . .
12
Clearly, therefore, private respondent need not reply to the Request for Admission because her Complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Answer of petitioner which were merely reproduced in the request. In Uy Chao v. De la Rama Steamship 13 we observed that the purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.
In the aforesaid cases of Po and Briboneria we held that —
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint.
14
To this we add that a party should not be made to deny matters already averred in his complaint. At this point, it is necessary to emphasize what this Court laid down in the same Po and Briboneria cases —
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense.
15
Since the answer of private respondent to the request is no longer required in the instant case, it therefore becomes unnecessary to dwell on the issue of the propriety of an answer that is not under oath. Even assuming that a response to the request is needed, private respondent had already substantially complied with the requirement of the law when she specifically denied the material allegations of the petitioner in her
Manifestation and Reply to the Request for Admission. Although not under oath the reply to the request readily showed that the intent of private respondent was to deny the matters set forth in the Request for Admission. That the reply is not under oath is merely a formal and not a substantive defect. This procedural lapse may be dispensed with if the circumstances call for the dispensing of the rule in the interest of justice. While we commend petitioner's zeal in promoting faithful adherence to the rules of procedure we cannot ignore the well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed as to do substantial justice. 16
There being genuine issues of fact between the private parties, public respondents correctly denied the motion of petitioner for summary judgment. Where facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. 17 Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. 18 Verily, there is a need to determine by presentation of evidence if respondent is really liable for the stolen articles and for violating its contract for security services with petitioner. Until these issues are determined no legal compensation can take place between the parties. This factual dispute can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits, a process which need not take long to conclude. 19
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, as well as by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, the instant petition is DENIED and the records of this case are remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 158370 August 17, 2006
SPOUSES MICHAEL UY & BONITA UY, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ARIZA, ERLINDA A. ABDON, BENJAMIN ARIZA,
TERESITA A. SIMPORIOS, HEIRS OF MARIANO ARIZA, JR.,
namely: JUANITA L. ARIZA, DENNIS L. ARIZA, ROLDAN L.
ARIZA, & JOVANNI L. ARIZA; and the Heirs of FAUSTO
ARIZA, namely: JESUSA ARIZA, THELMA SOLLANO,
ARTURO ARIZA, ELDINA CONOS, VILMA SABERON, &
REBECCA PADULLO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
The facts:
On October 8, 1996, spouses Michael and Bonita Uy, petitioners,
purchased 200 square meters of the parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 3229-C-2-F, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
20007, from respondents. The contract stipulated that petitioners had
the right of choice to designate which portion of Lot No. 3229-C-2-F
would be the subject of the sale. 1
Petitioners exercised their right to choose within two to three months
from the sale, informing respondents that they have selected and in
fact occupied around 200 square meters of a portion of land. 2
On August 4, 1997, petitioners purchased another 200 square meters of
the same Lot No. 3229-C-2-F, with the same option to choose which
portion. They selected and occupied an adjoining portion to the lot in
their first sale. 3
It appears that the parcels of land petitioners had chosen and occupied
were already titled in the names of the Delgados, namely, Carlos,
Allan and Antonio, Jr. Although originally part of Lot No. 3229-C-2-
F, the two parcels of land were part of some 3,500 square meters that
were purportedly sold by the respondents to the Delgados on July 31,
1985. This deed of sale to the Delgados was annotated on TCT No. T-
20007 (covering Lot No. 3229-C-2-F) on June 10, 1993, and a new
title for the covered area was issued on April 21, 1994, which was
likewise annotated on TCT No. T-20007 on the same date. 4 Thus, at
the time of the first sale by the respondents to petitioners, the two
parcels of land had been cancelled from Lot No. 3229-C-2-F (covered
by TCT No. T-20007), and were already part of Lot No. 3229-C-2-F-1
(covered by TCT No. T-39106). 5
Petitioners were sued for unlawful detainer by the Delgados. In
September 1998, petitioners entered into a compromise agreement
with the Delgados and surrendered possession of the subject parcels of
land. Petitioners compromised the case without giving notice to
respondents. 6
Thereafter, petitioners demanded from respondents that they be
allowed to choose again from Lot No. 3229-C-2-F. When respondents
refused, petitioners filed, on March 12, 1999, a case for specific
performance with delivery of possession of real property and damages. 7 Petitioners anchored their claim for specific performance on the
averment that they "could not exercise [their] right to choose the
portion bought from the parcel of land afore-described because the
portion pointed out by the [petitioners] were already sold and claimed
by third persons…" 8
Respondents filed their answer and by way of special and affirmative
defenses alleged that they had already complied with their obligation
to deliver, as petitioners had already chosen and been in possession of
the parcels of land they chose. 9 Respondents also faulted petitioners
for losing possession of the parcels of land by entering into a
compromise agreement with the Delgados on two grounds: first,
because respondents have allegedly initiated the necessary legal steps
to defend their possessory rights to the disputed land by filing a case
for the declaration of nullity of the title of the Delgados, and second,
because petitioners failed to interpose a third-party complaint to
implead respondents in the unlawful detainer case. 10
The trial court denied respondents’ motion to dismiss based on their
Special and Affirmative Defenses as well as their motion for
reconsideration. 11
They went to the Court of Appeals on an action for
certiorari and prohibition contending that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding that:
1. petitioners had a cause of action for specific performance against
respondents;
2. petitioners erroneously selected the parcels of land by some
unfortunate turn of events so that the portions selected were not owned
by respondents but the Delgados; and
3. the parcels of land were owned by the Delgados, a conclusion that
was premature considering that the case for the declaration of nullity
of the Delgados’ title covering the parcels was pending before the trial
court.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court. It held that petitioners had no cause of action to file a case of
specific performance against respondents. 12
It ruled that the proper
remedy of the petitioners is an action for enforcement of warranty
against eviction.
Petitioners now come before this Court on a petition for review on the
following issues:
(1) whether the complaint filed in the RTC by petitioners fails to state
a cause of action for specific performance with delivery of possession
of real property and damages against respondents; and
(2) whether the RTC’s denial of the motion to dismiss on lack of cause
of action was the proper subject of certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.
We deny the petition.
We quote with approval the following ruling of the appellate court, viz:
At the outset, it could already be seen that indeed, [petitioners] have no
cause of action against [respondents]. The case for specific
performance which was filed by [petitioners] against [respondents] is
not the proper remedy in this case. Rather, said action was purely an
afterthought on the part of [petitioners] when they were eventually
evicted from the lots they bought from [respondents].
The facts of the case are very clear. [Petitioners] bought from
[respondents] a 200 square meter lot which was part of a bigger parcel
of land covered by TCT No. 20007 registered in the names of
[respondents], and which [petitioners] immediately took possession of.
After a year, [petitioners] again bought from [respondents] and took
possession of the adjacent lot also measuring 200 square meters. Since
the sale, [petitioners] had been in peaceful possession of the lots until
they were evicted from the same by third persons claiming to be the
owners of the said lots. Thus, if [petitioners] have a cause of action
against [respondents], it would be one for the enforcement of warranty
against eviction and not one for specific performance.
The core of [petitioners’] argument to support their action for specific
performance was that [respondents] failed to deliver to them the lots
subject matter of the sale, since what was delivered were not owned by
[respondents] but by third persons. They likewise maintain that they
were not able to exercise their choice on which lot to occupy as agreed
upon by them. We do not find these arguments tenable. The truth of
the matter is that [respondents] were able to deliver the said parcels of
land to [petitioners]. It could not be said that [petitioners were]
deprived of their choice on which parcel of land they were to buy and
occupy. The fact that they even decided to buy the lot adjacent to the
first lot they bought would clearly indicate that the said lots were their
choice. Moreover, [petitioners] had been enjoying possession of the
same until an unlawful detainer case was filed against them by third
persons. After having enjoyed the property for sometime, [petitioners]
cannot now come before the court claiming that [respondents] failed to
deliver the property subject of the sale.
There is no denying also that these lots were originally part of a bigger
parcel of land owned by [respondents] and covered by TCT No.
20007. That third persons armed with a certificate of title in their favor
suddenly surfaced claiming to be the owners of the subject lots does
not automatically render the delivery made by [respondents] to
[petitioners] ineffectual. Stated otherwise, although third persons later
on claimed ownership over the property, it does not mean that
[respondents] failed to deliver the lots subject matter of the sale. It is
also worth mentioning that the claim of these third persons to the
subject lots is being disputed by [respondents] as in fact, they filed an
action for the declaration of nullity of the title of Allan, Carlos and
Antonio Delgado over the subject lots and which up to now is still
pending before the Court of Appeals. This action on the part of
[respondents] would show that they do not recognize the right of these
third persons to the subject lots and that [respondents] still maintain
that they are the lawful owners of the same.
What is before Us is a clear case of eviction. Thus, the action for
specific performance filed by [petitioners] against [respondents] must
necessarily fail. If at all, [petitioners] may file an action for the
enforcement of warranty in case of eviction which every vendor of a
parcel of land is enjoined by law to guarantee as provided under
Article 1548 of the New Civil Code:
Art. 1548. Eviction shall take place whenever by a final judgment
based on a right prior to the sale or an act imputable to the vendor, the
vendee is deprived of the whole or part of the thing purchased.
The vendor shall answer for the eviction even though nothing has been
said in the contract on the subject.
The contracting parties, however, may increase, diminish or suppress
this legal obligation of the vendor.
But even if [petitioners] would file an action for the enforcement of
warranty in case of eviction against [respondents], We are afraid that
the same will not prosper. The records of the case reveal that the
unlawful detainer case filed by third persons against [petitioners],
which led to the ouster of the latter from the subject lots, was decided
by compromise agreement without impleading [respondents] as third-
party defendants. It should be stressed that in order for the case to
prosper, it is a precondition that the seller must have been summoned
in the suit for the eviction of the buyer. This rule is provided under the
provisions of Articles 1558 and 1559 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1558. The vendor shall not be obliged to make good the proper
warranty, unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at the instance
of the vendee.
Art. 1559. The defendant vendee shall ask, within the time fixed in the
Rules of Court for answering the complaint, that the vendor be made a
co-defendant.
Applying the above-quoted provisions of law, the Supreme Court
enumerated the requisites in the enforcement of a vendor’s liability for
eviction, in the case of Maria Luisa De Leon Escaler and Ernesto
Escaler v. Court of Appeals, et al., [G.R. No. L-42636. August 1,
1985.], to wit:
In order that a vendor’s liability for eviction may be enforced, the
following requisites must concur – a) there must be a final judgment;
b) the purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing
sold; c) said deprivation was by virtue of a right prior to the sale made
by the vendor; and d) the vendor has been summoned and made co-
defendant in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee. In the
case at bar, the fourth requisite – that of being summoned in the suit
for eviction (Case No. 4252) at the instance of the vendee – is not
present.
We need only add that petitioners could have filed a third-party
complaint against the respondents when they were sued for eviction by
the
Delgados under Rule 6, Section 11. 13
In Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co. of the Philippines v. Tempongko, 14
we explained the function of a
third-party complaint, viz:
The third-party complaint, is x x x a procedural device whereby a
‘third party’ who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed
complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave
of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce
against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff’s claim. The
third-party complaint is actually independent of and separate and
distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. Were it not for this provision of
the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed independently and
separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the
third-party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-party
defendant or so to speak, to litigate his separate cause of action in
respect of plaintiff’s claim against a third party in the original and
principal case with the object of avoiding circuitry of action and
unnecessary proliferation of lawsuits and of disposing expeditiously in
one litigation the entire subject matter arising from one particular set
of facts. Prior leave of Court is necessary, so that where the allowance
of a third-party complaint would delay the resolution of the original
case, such as when the third-party defendant cannot be located or
where matters extraneous to the issue of possession would
unnecessarily clutter a case of forcible entry, or the effect would be to
introduce a new and separate controversy into the action, the salutary
object of the rule would not be defeated, and the court should in such
cases require the defendant to institute a separate action. x x x.
If petitioners filed the third-party complaint against the respondents,
they could have sought from the respondents "x x x contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief" in respect of the claim of
the Delgados. The phrase "any other relief" includes a claim of a
vendee for warranty against the vendor. 15
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied.
G.R. No. 119321 March 18, 1997
CATALINO F. BAÑEZ and ROMEO P. BUSUEGO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
AYALA CORPORATION issued on 23 December 1987 BPI Check No. 707802 for P33,226,685.69 payable to PAL Employees' Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA). The check with the words "FOR PAYEE'S ACCOUNT ONLY" written on its face was delivered in trust to Catalino Bañez in his capacity as President of PESALA. However, on the same date, Bañez and his co-officers Romeo Busuego and Renato Lim
deposited the check in their joint account with respondent Republic Planters Bank, Cubao Branch, which was not an official depositary bank of PESALA. Later, Bañez, Busuego and Lim withdrew the amount and failed to account for it to PESALA.
On 21 April 1992, aside from a criminal case for estafa against its officers Bañez, Busuego and Lim, PESALA sued Republic Planters Bank (RPB) for the face value of the check and P500,000.00 as damages for allowing the deposit and encashment of the check despite the fact that it was a crossed check payable only to the account of PESALA, to its great prejudice and in violation of banking laws in the country. 1
On 14 March 1994 RPB moved for leave to file a third-party complaint against Catalino Bañez, Romeo Busuego, Renato Lim and Alberto Barican, the latter as manager of RPB, Cubao Branch, alleging that they were solely and exclusively responsible for the loss of the value of the check through their misrepresentation which led the bank to believe that they were authorized to deposit and withdraw the amount. The motion was granted.
Meanwhile on 6 April 1994 PESALA and RPB (by then known as PNB-RB) 2 forged a compromise agreement under which PNB-RB agreed to pay PESALA P20,226,685.00. PESALA, in turn, undertook to assist PNB-RB in prosecuting the third-party defendants for the liability assumed by the bank.
On 13 April 1994 the trial court approved the compromise.
Upon the foregoing amicable settlement, third-party defendant Lim moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that it could not stand on its own after the termination of the main complaint by compromise since the third-party complaint was but an incident and a continuation of the main case. Third-party defendants Bañez and Busuego, aside from adopting the ground invoked by defendant Lim, likewise moved to dismiss on grounds of lis pendens, forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction and cause of action.
On 14 July 1994 the trial court deferred action on the motion to dismiss anchored on grounds of lis pendens and forum shopping, but denied the motion outright anchored on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and termination of the principal complaint. 3 The motion of third-party defendants to reconsider the order was denied on 27 October 1994 since the compromise between plaintiff PESALA and third-party plaintiff PNB-RB did not operate to automatically dismiss the third-party complaint as the latter was actually independent of, and separate and distinct from, the plaintiff's complaint. 4
On 1 December 1994 petitioners Bañez and Busuego instituted a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the Orders of 14 July and 27 October 1994 attaching duplicate original copies thereof. On 14 December 1994 the Special Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, without necessarily giving due course to the petition, ordered respondents to comment thereon. 5 However, on 31 January 1995, another Resolution 6 was issued by the appellate court, this time through its Special Eleventh Division, dismissing the petition for failure of petitioners to attach certified true copies of the questioned orders as required under Sec. 2, par. (a), Rule 6, of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. The motion for reconsideration was denied. 7 Hence, this petition.
Two issues are presented before us: whether respondent Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the special civil action for certiorari for failure of petitioners to attach certified true copies, as opposed to duplicate originals, of the questioned orders; and whether the earlier dismissal (by virtue of compromise) of the main complaint warrants the automatic dismissal of the third-party complaint filed in consequence thereof.
On the procedural issue, petitioners do not deny their failure to attach certified true copies of the questioned Orders dated 14 July and 27 October 1994. However they contend that the duplicate originals thereof which they attached to their petition constitute sufficient compliance with the requirements of Sec. 2,
par. (a), Rule 6, of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals 8 since Revised Circular No. 1-88 issued by the Supreme Court itself allows either a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed decision, judgment, resolution or order to be attached to the petition. 9 Thus, petitioners posit that Sec. 2, par. (a), Rule 6, of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals should not be read in a "myopic" manner but, rather, liberally consistent and in conjunction with SC Revised Circular No. 1-88.
On the other hand, respondent PNB-RB argues that Revised Circular No. 1-88 cannot be successfully invoked by petitioners since it pertains only to requirements for petitions filed with the Supreme Court, not with the Court of Appeals. In the latter case, its Revised Internal Rules, which mandate that certified true copies of the questioned order must be attached to a petition in special civil actions for certiorari, apply.
We had occasion to rule that the submission of a duplicate copy of the questioned order of the trial court (bearing its seal) in a petition for certiorari constitutes substantial compliance with the rule requiring submission of the certified copies of the orders complained of. 10 However, a similar liberal construction cannot be applied in favor of petitioners since courts suspend their own rules or except a case from them only when substantial justice so warrants, as when the merit of a party's cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements. 11 To reiterate, a similar relaxation of procedural rules is not warranted in the case at bench due to the lack of merit of petitioners' cause.
Petitioners argue that the third-party complaint filed against them by PNB-RB should have been immediately dismissed in view of the prior dismissal of the main complaint filed against PNB-RB by PESALA. Since jurisdiction of the trial court over the main action has been terminated, its jurisdiction over the third-party complaint necessarily ended as well since the latter is but a continuation of, or ancillary to, the main action.
The above contention is devoid of merit. Petitioners liken a third-party complaint to a cross-claim and then, by analogy, apply the ruling in Ruiz Jr. v. Court of Appeals 12 where the Court said that the dismissal of the complaint divested the cross-claimants of whatever appealable interest they might have had before and made the cross-claim itself no longer viable. 13
A third-party complaint is indeed similar to a cross-claim, except only with respect to the persons against whom they are directed. 14 However, the ruling in Ruiz cannot be successfully invoked by petitioners. In Ruiz we declared that the dismissal of the main action rendered the cross-claim no longer viable only because the main action was categorically dismissed for lack of cause of action. Hence, since defendants could no longer be held liable under the main complaint, no reason existed for them anymore to sue their co-party under the cross-claim.
In sharp contrast thereto, the termination of the main action between PESALA and PNB-RB was not due to any finding that it was bereft of any basis. On the contrary, further proceedings were rendered unnecessary only because defendant (third-party plaintiff) PNB-RB, to avoid a protracted litigation, voluntarily admitted liability in the amount of P20,226,685.00. Hence, the termination of the main action between PESALA and PNB-RB could not have rendered lifeless the third-party complaint filed against petitioners, as it did the cross-claim in Ruiz Jr. v. Court of Appeals, since it involved a finding of liability on the part of PNB-RB even if it be by compromise.
Petitioners allege that it would be an injustice to them if they should be made to carry the burden of contribution or indemnity for the liability voluntarily assumed by respondent PNB-RB in the compromise agreement to which they were never parties. But no injustice will result. A continuation of the proceedings with respect to the third-party complaint will not ipso facto subject petitioners, as third-party defendants, to liability as it will only provide the parties with the occasion to litigate their respective claims and defenses. Petitioners' assertion that they are not liable for the obligation voluntarily assumed by PNB-RB
in the compromise is but a defense to resist the third-party complaint which they can properly raise in the course of the trial and prove by whatever evidence they may have on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January and 22 February 1995 are AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010
ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, CONSORICIA O. PENSON, RADITO
V. PADRIGANO, JEAN R. DE MESA, LEAH P. DELA CRUZ,
ANDY V. MACASAQUIT, SENEN B. CORDOBA, ALBERT
BRILLANTES, GLORIA BISDA, JOVITA V. CONCEPCION,
TERESITA G. CARVAJAL, ROSANNA T. MALIWANAG,
RICHARD ODERON, CECILIA ESTERNON, BENEDICTO
CABRAL, MA. VICTORIA E. LAROCO, CESAR ANDRA,
FELICISIMO GALACIO, ELSA R. CALMA, FILOMENA A.
GALANG, JEAN PAUL MELEGRITO, CLARO G. SANTIAGO,
JR., EDUARDO FRIAS, REYNALDO O. ANDAL, NEPHTALIE
IMPERIO, RUEL BALAGTAS, VICTOR R. ORTIZ,
FRANCISCO P. REYES, JR., ELISEO M. BALAGOT, JR.,
JOSE C. MONSALVE, JR., ARTURO ADSUARA, F.C.
LADRERO, JR., NELSON PADUA, MARCELA C. SAYAO,
ANGELITO MALAKAS, GLORIA RAMENTO, JULIANA
SUPLEO, MANUEL MENDRIQUE, E. TAYLAN, CARMELA
BOBIS, DANILO VARGAS, ROY-LEO C. PABLO, ALLAN
VILLANUEVA, VICENTE R. VELASCO, JR., IMELDA
ERENO, FLORIZA M. CATIIS, RANIEL R. BASCO, E.
JALIJALI, MARIO C. CARAAN, DOLORES M. AVIADO,
MICHAEL P. LAPLANA, GUILLERMO G. SORIANO, ALICE
E. SOJO, ARTHUR G. NARNE, LETICIA SORIANO,
FEDERICO RAMOS, JR., PETERSON CAAMPUED, RODELIO
L. GOMEZ, ANTONIO D. GARCIA, JR., ANTONIO GALO, A.
SANCHEZ, SOL E. TAMAYO, JOSEPHINE A.M. COCJIN,
DAMIAN QUINTO, JR., EDLYN MARIANO, M.A. MALANUM,
ALFREDO S. ESTRELLA, and JESUS MEL SAYO, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
The Director General of the Philippine Information Agency and
The National Treasurer, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (President Arroyo). Petitioners characterize their action as a
class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-
employees at the National Printing Office (NPO).
The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former
President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino), by virtue of
Executive Order No. 2851 which provided, among others, the creation
of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and
the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA).
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 reads:
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. – There is
hereby created a National Printing Office out of the merger of the
Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the
Philippine Information Agency. The Office shall have exclusive
printing jurisdiction over the following:
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and
accountable forms of national, provincial, city and municipal
governments, including government corporations;
b. Printing of officials ballots;
c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette,
General Appropriations Act, Philippine Reports, and
development information materials of the Philippine
Information Agency.
The Office may also accept other government printing jobs, including
government publications, aside from those enumerated above, but not
in an exclusive basis.
The details of the organization, powers, functions, authorities, and
related management aspects of the Office shall be provided in the
implementing details which shall be prepared and promulgated in
accordance with Section II of this Executive Order.
The Office shall be attached to the Philippine Information Agency.
On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed
Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No.
285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over
the printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities. The pertinent portions of Executive Order No. 378,
in turn, provide:
SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing services to
government agencies and instrumentalities as mandated by law.
However, it shall no longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the
printing services requirements of the government over standard and
accountable forms. It shall have to compete with the private sector,
except in the printing of election paraphernalia which could be shared
with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the
Commission on Elections consistent with the provisions of the
Election Code of 1987.
SECTION 2. Government agencies/instrumentalities may source
printing services outside NPO provided that:
2.1 The printing services to be provided by the private sector is
superior in quality and at a lower cost than what is offered by
the NPO; and
2.2 The private printing provider is flexible in terms of meeting
the target completion time of the government agency.
SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount to be
appropriated for the programs, projects and activities of the NPO in the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) shall be limited to its income
without additional financial support from the government. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied.)
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and
instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the
private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition
that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality
and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO.
Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of
tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its
constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers
of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285
issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised
legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates
petitioners’ security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual
abolition of the NPO.
We dismiss the petition.
Before proceeding to resolve the substantive issues, the Court must
first delve into a procedural matter. Since petitioners instituted this
case as a class suit, the Court, thus, must first determine if the petition
indeed qualifies as one. In Board of Optometry v. Colet,2 we held that
"[c]ourts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit,
which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all
indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision
secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the
decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by their
self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due
process."
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as
follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. – When the subject matter of the controversy is one
of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court
finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect
the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his
individual interest.
From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the
subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the
class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and
can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company,3 the Court
held that:
An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated
as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit
depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading
initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary
facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and
the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class,
in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the
members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to
bring them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on
the record with the number in the class and to determine whether
claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject
matter of general or common interest. (Emphases ours.)
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who
would be affected by the assailed Executive Order and who were
allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as
counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549
employees in the NPO.4 The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a
small fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to represent.
Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of
Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing the
petition,5 ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34. We note
that counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the desistance
or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and insinuated that such
desistance was due to pressure from people "close to the seat of
power."6 Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance
filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a sufficient,
representative number of NPO employees have instituted this
purported class suit. A perusal of the petition itself would show that of
the 67 petitioners who signed the Verification/Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in the
jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In
other words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case.
Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’wah Council of the
Philippines, Inc.,7 we observed that an element of a class suit or
representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining
the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class,
the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is
coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the
proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total
membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability
of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.
Previously, we held in Ibañes v. Roman Catholic Church8 that where
the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class they
seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not
prosper.
It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance,9 to which
the previously mentioned Affidavit of Desistance10
was attached, was
filed by the President of the National Printing Office Workers
Association (NAPOWA). The said manifestation expressed
NAPOWA’s opposition to the filing of the instant petition in any
court. Even if we take into account the contention of petitioners’
counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such
manifestation, the said pleading is a clear indication that there is a
divergence of opinions and views among the members of the class
sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present
suit. There is here an apparent conflict between petitioners’ interests
and those of the persons whom they claim to represent. Since it cannot
be said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of the entire
class, the instant case cannot be properly treated as a class suit.
As to the merits of the case, the petition raises two main grounds to
assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378:
First, it is contended that President Arroyo cannot amend or repeal
Executive Order No. 285 by the mere issuance of another executive
order (Executive Order No. 378). Petitioners maintain that former
President Aquino’s Executive Order No. 285 is a legislative
enactment, as the same was issued while President Aquino still had
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution;11
thus, only
Congress through legislation can validly amend Executive Order No.
285.
Second, petitioners maintain that the issuance of Executive Order No.
378 would lead to the eventual abolition of the NPO and would violate
the security of tenure of NPO employees.
Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently
without merit.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the
power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power
of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation
of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing
statutes.
In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,12
the Court pointed out that
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the
President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions
of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book
III of the said Code, is explicit:
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his
Office. – The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common
Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to
any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions
to the Office of the President from other Departments and
Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to
any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to
the Office of the President from other Departments or agencies.
(Emphases ours.)
Interpreting the foregoing provision, we held in Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to
reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not
have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the
power – that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under
Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy
in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this
purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or
Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323
SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when
there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or
units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President.
Hence, it is subject to the President’s continuing authority to
reorganize.13
(Emphasis ours.)
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of
the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency
directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency
under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the
President.14
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 quoted above authorizes the President (a) to restructure the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including
the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the
Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the
Executive Branch, and vice versa.
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in
the Office of the President Proper and to transfer functions/offices not
only among the offices in the Office of President Proper but also the
rest of the Office of the President and the Executive Branch, the
President implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less
substantive changes to the functional and internal structure of the
Office of the President, including the modification of functions of such
executive agencies as the exigencies of the service may require.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a
removal of any of its functions to be transferred to another agency.
Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the
main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government
forms and publications but in the interest of greater economy and
encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the
private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception
of election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of
the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the
Commission on Elections may determine. At most, there was a mere
alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity
of its printing responsibility to election forms.15
There is a view that the reorganization actions that the President may
take with respect to agencies in the Office of the President are strictly
limited to transfer of functions and offices as seemingly provided in
Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code
significantly provides:
Sec. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the
President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and which are not
specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the
President in accordance with law. (Emphasis ours.)
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the
Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and
functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an
inclusive and broad interpretation of the President’s power to
reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by
specific provisions in general appropriations laws.
In the oft-cited Larin v. Executive Secretary,16
the Court likewise
adverted to certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7645, the general
appropriations law for 1993, as among the statutory bases for the
President’s power to reorganize executive agencies, to wit:
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
"Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies
Within the Executive Branch. — The heads of departments, bureaus
and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective
activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public
services and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished,
subject to civil [service] rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling
down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effected
pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of
the President."
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out
and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of
offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and
decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62,
which provides that:
"Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. — Unless otherwise
created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or
agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures
and be funded from appropriations by this Act."
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is
authorized to effect organizational changes including the creation of
offices in the department or agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves
scant consideration. Well settled is the rule that every law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality. Unless and until a specific
provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same
is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.17
(Emphases ours)
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,18
where the Court upheld as
valid then President Joseph Estrada’s Executive Order No. 191
"deactivating" the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) of the Department of Finance, hewed closely to the reasoning in
Larin. The Court, among others, also traced from the General
Appropriations Act19
the President’s authority to effect organizational
changes in the department or agency under the executive structure,
thus:
We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision
recognizes the authority of the President to effect organizational
changes in the department or agency under the executive structure.
Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No.
8760. Under this law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to
conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates,
missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and
systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which are no longer
essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled
down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result
in the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of
their respective agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the
actual streamlining and productivity improvement in agency
organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or
Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. x x x.20
(Emphasis ours)
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act,
which was reenacted in 2004 (the year of the issuance of Executive
Order No. 378), likewise gave the President the authority to effect a
wide variety of organizational changes in any department or agency in
the Executive Branch. Sections 77 and 78 of said Act provides:
Section 77. Organized Changes. – Unless otherwise provided by law
or directed by the President of the Philippines, no changes in key
positions or organizational units in any department or agency shall be
authorized in their respective organizational structures and funded
from appropriations provided by this Act.
Section 78. Institutional Strengthening and Productivity Improvement
in Agency Organization and Operations and Implementation of
Organization/Reorganization Mandated by Law. The Government
shall adopt institutional strengthening and productivity improvement
measures to improve service delivery and enhance productivity in the
government, as directed by the President of the Philippines. The heads
of departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and other entities of the
Executive Branch shall accordingly conduct a comprehensive review
of their respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions,
programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; identify
areas where improvements are necessary; and implement
corresponding structural, functional and operational adjustments that
will result in streamlined organization and operations and improved
performance and productivity: PROVIDED, That actual streamlining
and productivity improvements in agency organization and operations,
as authorized by the President of the Philippines for the purpose,
including the utilization of savings generated from such activities,
shall be in accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued by
the DBM, upon consultation with the Presidential Committee on
Effective Governance: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in the
implementation of organizations/reorganizations, or specific changes
in agency structure, functions and operations as a result of institutional
strengthening or as mandated by law, the appropriation, including the
functions, projects, purposes and activities of agencies concerned may
be realigned as may be necessary: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That any
unexpended balances or savings in appropriations may be made
available for payment of retirement gratuities and separation benefits
to affected personnel, as authorized under existing laws. (Emphases
and underscoring ours.)
Implicitly, the aforequoted provisions in the appropriations law
recognize the power of the President to reorganize even executive
offices already funded by the said appropriations act, including the
power to implement structural, functional, and operational adjustments
in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign
appropriations of funds as may be necessary under such
reorganization. Thus, insofar as petitioners protest the limitation of the
NPO’s appropriations to its own income under Executive Order No.
378, the same is statutorily authorized by the above provisions.
In the 2003 case of Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration,21
we upheld the "streamlining" of the National Tobacco Administration
through a reduction of its personnel and deemed the same as included
in the power of the President to reorganize executive offices granted
under the laws, notwithstanding that such streamlining neither
involved an abolition nor a transfer of functions of an office. To quote
the relevant portion of that decision:
In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo
D. Zamora, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, et al., this
Court has had occasion to also delve on the President’s power to
reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31(2) and (3) of
Executive Order No. 292 and the power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper. x x x
x x x x
The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. The succeeding numbered paragraphs are not
in the nature of provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of the
grant to the President of the power to reorganize but are to be viewed
in consonance therewith. Section 31(1) of Executive Order No. 292
specifically refers to the President’s power to restructure the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units hereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another, while Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive
offices outside the Office of the President Proper allowing the
President to transfer any function under the Office of the President to
any other Department or Agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of
any agency under the Office of the President to any other department
or agency and vice-versa.
In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of
offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general
provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the
interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within
the authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to
the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment
that this Court could only but accept.22
(Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
In the more recent case of Tondo Medical Center Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals,23
which involved a structural and
functional reorganization of the Department of Health under an
executive order, we reiterated the principle that the power of the
President to reorganize agencies under the executive department by
executive or administrative order is constitutionally and statutorily
recognized. We held in that case:
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President
may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the Executive Department. This is also
sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he
president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices." Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292,
also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his
Office - The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:
x x x x
In Domingo v. Zamora [445 Phil. 7 (2003)], this Court explained the
rationale behind the President’s continuing authority under the
Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. The law grants the President the power to
reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring
need of every President to reorganize his or her office "to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency." To remain effective and efficient,
it must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in
the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential
directives and policies.
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President
consists of the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it.
The agencies under the Office of the President are identified in Section
23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.—The
agencies under the Office of the President refer to those offices placed
under the chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision
and control of the President, those under the administrative
supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for
policy and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law
or order creating them under any specific department.
x x x x
The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is
likewise recognized in general appropriations laws. x x x.
x x x x
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional
power of the President to issue. The President did not usurp any
legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an
exercise of the President’s constitutional power of control over the
executive department, supported by the provisions of the
Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently
affirmed by this Court.24
(Emphases supplied.)
Subsequently, we ruled in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v.
Executive Secretary25
that:
The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control in the
President justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization
measures under a broad authority of law.
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated
with full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the
subject. It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which
places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in
accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on the President’s
power to reorganize.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the
legislature necessarily ordains an executive agency’s position in the
scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary, but
subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify
the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law
may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures. The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such
law.26
The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an
exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the
aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing
authority of the President to reorganize the Office of the President, "in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." This is a matter
already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The reorganization of such
an office through executive or administrative order is also recognized
in the Administrative Code of 1987. Sections 2 and 3, Chapter 2, Title
I, Book III of the said Code provide:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of
a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive
orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders. (Emphases supplied.)
To reiterate, we find nothing objectionable in the provision in
Executive Order No. 378 limiting the appropriation of the NPO to its
own income. Beginning with Larin and in subsequent cases, the Court
has noted certain provisions in the general appropriations laws as
likewise reflecting the power of the President to reorganize executive
offices or agencies even to the extent of modifying and realigning
appropriations for that purpose.
Petitioners’ contention that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 is
an invalid exercise of legislative power on the part of the President has
no legal leg to stand on.
In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary
reforms in government in order to improve and upgrade efficiency in
the delivery of public services by redefining the functions of the NPO
and limiting its funding to its own income and to transform it into a
self-reliant agency able to compete with the private sector, is well
within the prerogative of President Arroyo under her continuing
delegated legislative power to reorganize her own office. As pointed
out in the separate concurring opinion of our learned colleague,
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the objective behind Executive
Order No. 378 is wholly consistent with the state policy contained in
Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act to
encourage competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to private
contracting parties who are eligible and qualified.27
1avvphi1
To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize
pertains only to the Office of the President and the departments,
offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the
Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated
bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President
of the power to reorganize the executive department must be in
accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing
jurisprudence.
In this regard, we are mindful of the previous pronouncement of this
Court in Dario v. Mison28
that:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because
the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure
would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition,"
which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in
good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is
done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is
merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. (Emphasis ours.)
Stated alternatively, the presidential power to reorganize agencies and
offices in the executive branch of government is subject to the
condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith.
If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions,
which results in loss of security of tenure of affected government
employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,29
we even observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to
hold office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can
be said to have any vested right to an office or salary.30
This brings us to the second ground raised in the petition – that
Executive Order No. 378, in allowing government agencies to secure
their printing requirements from the private sector and in limiting the
budget of the NPO to its income, will purportedly lead to the gradual
abolition of the NPO and the loss of security of tenure of its present
employees. In other words, petitioners avow that the reorganization of
the NPO under Executive Order No. 378 is tainted with bad faith. The
basic evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of
an issue has the burden of proving it.31
A careful review of the records will show that petitioners utterly failed
to substantiate their claim. They failed to allege, much less prove,
sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the NPO’s budget to its
own income would indeed lead to the abolition of the position, or
removal from office, of any employee. Neither did petitioners present
any shred of proof of their assertion that the changes in the functions
of the NPO were for political considerations that had nothing to do
with improving the efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy
in, the said agency.
In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show any
constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo’s issuance of Executive
Order No. 378.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
G.R. No. 111014 May 31, 1996
LIANA'S SUPERMARKET, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:p
LIANA's SUPERMARKET, as its name implies, is a departmentized self-service retail market selling foods, convenience goods, and household merchandise with business outlets in Sucat, Parañaque, and Pasig City. Sometime in 1980, 1981 and 1982 it employed as sales ladies, cooks, packers, cashiers, electricians, warehousemen, etc., members of private respondent National Labor Union. However in the course of their employment they were allegedly underpaid and required, among others, to work more than eight (8) hours a day without overtime pay and deprived of legal holiday pay and monthly emergency allowance. Starting late 1982 and early 1983 they aired their grievances to petitioner through Peter Sy, its General Manager, and Rosa Sy, its Consultant, but were only scolded and threatened with outright dismissal. Consequently, they formed a labor union and affiliated it with respondent National Labor Union. Thereafter they demanded from petitioner recognition and compliance with Existing labor laws.
On 30 April 1983 petitioner entered into a three-year contract with Warner Laputt, owner of BAVSPIA International Services, to supply petitioner with laborers.
About November and December 1984 Rosa Sy met with the employees individually and told them to quit their membership
with the union under pain of being suspended, dismissed or criminally prosecuted. When they refused, many were dismissed without any charges and others were given memorandum on concocted offenses and violations.
Meanwhile in March and April 1984 petitioner through Peter Sy and Rosa Sy required the other employees to resign from employment and to accomplish information sheets and/or application forms with BAVSPIA otherwise they would be dismissed and/or not paid their salaries. With some degree of reluctance they complied. Nonetheless, they were allowed to continue working with petitioner under the same terms and conditions of their previous employment.
On 24 March 1984 respondent Union on behalf of its members filed a complaint against petitioner and/or Peter Sy, Rosa Sy, BAVSPIA and Warner Laputt before the Labor Arbiter for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime pay, monthly emergency allowance, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay (NLRC-NCR Case No. 3-1270-84). On 24 May 1984 the complaint was amended since respondent Union manifested through its authorized representative that it was intended as a class suit.
On 28 August 1984 another case was filed, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 8-3043-84, with Elorde Fadilla, Jr., et al., as complainants.
On 22 October 1984 a third case was filed, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 10-3755-84, with Carmelita Reyes, Elizabeth Mahanlud, Danny Sida, Omar Napiri and Edgar Mahusay as individual complainants.
On 12 December 1984 still another case was filed, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 12-4312-84, with Gloria Estoque and Estrellita Bansig as individual complainants.
Subsequently the four (4) cases were consolidated. Respondent National Labor Union submitted two (2) lists of one hundred
thirty-six (136) workers, seventy-three (73) assigned at Sucat and sixty-three (63) at Pasig City. There were eighty-five (85) original complainants in the lists. However Sixteen (16) complainants later filed motions to withdraw with prejudice and five (5) were found to be non-employees of petitioner. On 27 January 1987 three (3) other complainants settled with petitioner and moved to dismiss their complaints. Thus, a total of twenty-four (24) complainants were dropped from the lists thereby reducing the number to sixty-one (61). But twenty-seven (27) more employees submitted their sworn statements thus increasing again the number of complainants to eighty-eight (88).
When petitioner learned of the charges before the Labor Arbiter it demanded the resignation of the employees from the Union and withdrawal of their cases or face criminal charges. It also threatened to withhold their wages and even to dismiss them from their employment. Since they refused to resign petitioner dismissed them. Hence, charges of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal were added as causes of action in their complaints.
Petitioner contended that there was no unfair labor practice because there was no ongoing union activity before the alleged illegal dismissals; but even if there were, the dismissals were not effected by petitioner as complainants were not its employees but of BAVSPZA. If what were referred to as illegal dismissals were those of complainants who resigned, there can be no unfair labor practice as their resignations were voluntary and their applications with BAVSPIA were of their own volition.
On 6 February 1987, after the consolidated cases were submitted for decision, petitioner filed what was purportedly a compromise agreement between itself and the local chapter of respondent Union. It appeared to have been signed by representatives of petitioner and the President, Vice President and another officer of the local chapter of respondent Union with a prayer that the consolidated cases be dismissed.
BAVSPIA participated during the initial stages of the hearings but later moved to have its name dropped as co-respondent when it noted, after complainants have rested, that the evidence formally offered was directed only against petitioner.
On 28 February 1989 the Labor Arbiter held that (1) petitioner was the employer of complainants with BAVSPIA being engaged in labor-only contracting; (2) complainants were illegally dismissed; (3) Peter Sy and Rosa Sy were not personally liable; and, (4) the charge of unfair labor practice and all labor standards claims were unsubstantiated by evidence. Corollarily, petitioner was ordered to reinstate all the complainants and to pay them backwages and all benefits reckoned from the date of their respective dismissals until actual reinstatement but not to exceed three (3) years, and if reinstatement was no longer feasible the complainants should be granted separation pay equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered as one (1) whole year. 1
On 30 June 1993 public respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. 2
The petitioner now asks how many individual complainants are there in these cases, whether seven (7) or eighty-five (85); whether these complainants were illegally dismissed; and, whether a compromise agreement with a motion to dismiss filed by a local chapter of respondent Union may be given legal effect.
Petitioner claims that there are only seven (7) individual complainants in these cases whose names appear in the captions of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Anent thereto, petitioner argues that Sec. 3, Rule 6, of the Rules of Court clearly provides that the names and residences of the parties plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint; similarly, Sec. 1, Rule III, of the New Rules of Procedure of respondent NLRC states that the full names of all the real parties in interest, whether natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by
law, shall be stated in the caption of the complaint or petition as well as in the decision, award or judgment. Moreover, according to petitioner, these cases do not fall under the term "class suit" as defined in Sec. 12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court because the parties are not so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court. It is further the position of petitioner that BAVSPIA is the true employer of the complainants and the resignations of certain employees were voluntary. Petitioner still further argues that the compromise agreement duly signed by the officers of the local chapter of respondent Union and filed while the case was still pending before the Labor Arbiter is binding on all the complainants.
We disagree with petitioner. This is a "representative suit" as distinguished from "class suit" defined in Sec. 12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court —
Sec. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all. But in such case the court shall make sure that the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative so that all interests concerned are fully protected. Any party in interest shall have a right to intervene in protection of his individual interest.
In Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of the Doña Paz to Set Aside the Order Dated January 4, 1988 of Judge B. D. Chingcuangco, 3 the Court had occasion to explain "class suit" —
What is contemplated, as will be noted, is that (a) the subject matter in controversy is of common or general interest to many persons, and (b) those persons are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court . . . What makes the situation a proper case for a class suit is the circumstance that there is only one right or cause of action pertaining or belonging in common to many persons (emphasis supplied), not separately or severally to distinct
individuals . . . . The object of the suit is to obtain relief for or against numerous persons as a group or as an integral entity, and not as separate, distinct individuals whose rights or liabilities are separate from and independent of those affecting the others. . . The other factor that serves to distinguish the rule on class suits . . . is . . . the numerousness of parties involved . . . The rule is that for a class suit to be allowed, it is needful inter alia that the parties be so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court.
In the present case, there are multiple rights or causes of action pertaining separately to several, distinct employees who are members of respondent Union. Therefore, the applicable rule is that provided in Sec. 3, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court on "representative parties," which states —
Sec. 3. Representative parties. A trustee of a an express trust, a guardian, executor or administrator or a party authorized by statute (emphasis supplied), may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended; but the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order such beneficiary to be made a party. . .
One of the rights granted by Art. 242 of the Labor Code to a legitimate labor organization, like respondent Union, is to sue and be sued in its registered name. In Liberty Manufacturing Workers Union v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 4 citing National Brewery and Allied Industries Labor Union of the Philippines v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., 5 and Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Sañgilo-Itogon Workers' Union, 6 the Court held that the aforementioned provision authorizes a union to file a "representative suit" for the benefit of its members in the interest of avoiding an otherwise cumbersome procedure of joining all union members in the complaint, even if they number by the hundreds. The Court further rationalized that —
To hold otherwise and compel the 57 union members-employees to file 57 separate cases on their own individual and respective causes of action before the municipal court rather than through the present single collective action filed
by petitioner union on their behalf and for their benefit would be to unduly clog the court dockets and slow down the prompt and expeditious determination of cases by the sheer number, time and volume of paper work that would be involved and required in disposing of 57 identical cases that could be adjudged in a single case such as that filed before the lower court.
What is worse then . . . by such an unrealistic approach, the courts would not keep faith with the Constitutional injunction to extend protection to labor . . .
In another case, Davao Free Workers Front v. Court of Industrial Relations, 7 the Court stated that the detail that the number and names of the striking members of petitioner union were not specified in the decision nor in the complaint is of no consequence. Reiterating the rule in the Liberty case, the Court held that it was the function precisely of a labor union to carry the representation of its members and to file an action for their benefit and behalf without joining them and avoid the cumbersome procedure of joining each and every member as a separate party. Still, in La Carlota Sugar Central v. Court of Industrial Relations, 8 the Court emphasized that it would be an unwarranted impairment of the right to self-organization through formation of labor associations if thereafter such collective entities would be barred from instituting action in their representative capacity.
A "representative suit" is akin to a "class suit" in the limited sense that the phrases found in Sec. 12 of Rule 3, "one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all," and "the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative," are similar to the phrase may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended" found in Sec. 3 of the same Rule. In other words, both suits are always filed in behalf of another or others. That is why the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Apparently respondent Union, the Labor Arbiter and respondent Commission merely denominated the suit, although erroneously, as a "class suit" when, in reality, it is a
"representative suit." Anyway, the issue as to the actual number of complainants in this case was correctly resolved by the Labor Arbiter with this ratiocination —
The very first complaint (No. 3-1270-84) filed in these consolidated cases was captioned National Labor Union for and in behalf of its members as complainants. It was dated March 24, 1984. When the same was amended on May 24, 1984, the same caption for complainants also appeared . . . Consistently with the instruction of said Arbiter as to the number of complainants allegedly prejudiced by the acts of respondents, their counsel submitted two lists (Exhs. A-1 & A-2) containing a total of one hundred thirty-six names. However, said counsel submitted in evidence only around sixty affidavits of complainants, thereby giving credence to the allegation of respondents that not all those listed are actually complaining. Nonetheless and considering that respondents recognized that there are eighty-five complainants (Exhs. 48 & 49) we hold that the instant cases have been filed by the said Union for and in behalf of such number (85) of complainants.
9
Section 1, Rule III, of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure cited by petitioner is simply inapplicable because it was issued on 31 August 1990 or six (6) years after the complaints in these cases were filed in 1984.
The evidence clearly establishes that complainants were employed by petitioner. According to the Labor Arbiter —
As to the issue of which company is the employer of complainants, we hold that it is respondent Liana's. This is so because we find the co-respondent BAVSPIA engaged in labor-only contracting which is prohibited under the Labor Code.
10
Article 106, par. 4, of the Labor Code provides that there is "labor-only contracting" where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are
performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer.
In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. The conclusion of the Labor Arbiter was bolstered by the fact that —
. . . even the employees who allegedly resigned from Liana's and applied/accepted by BAVSPIA were also re-assigned to Liana's. These employees were performing jobs which are necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of Liana's. Even the premises, tools and equipment used by the employees were those of Liana's. And, more important, these employees were under the control and supervision of said respondent Liana's.
11
Likewise, the evidence sufficiently proves that complainants were illegally dismissed by petitioner —
Coming now to the main thrust of these complaints — the issue of illegal dismissal — we find that indeed the complainants were illegally dismissed. Respondents' contention that complainants were dismissed not by them but by BAVSPIA is untenable precisely because the latter was engaged in labor-only contracting. In this connection, respondent Liana's (has) not been able to show that the dismissals of complainants were for a just cause and, if ever, they were accorded due process. In short, said respondent Liana's failed to prove that their (its) dismissals of complainants were justified.
xxx xxx xxx
The alleged resignation of thirty-three other complainants (who later applied to BAVSPIA) cannot be given effect, not because they were forced to do so but in view of our finding that said BAVSPIA was engaged in labor-only contracting. Hence, they could not have been working without any employer. Besides, resigned from Liana's and then apply to BAVSPIA only to be re-assigned later to the former, not to
mention the glaring fact that all such letters of resignations are uniformly worded.
12
Before money claims can be the object of settlement through a union, the individual consent of the employees concerned should first be procured. This is because waiver of money claims is considered a personal right which must be protected by the courts on consideration of public policy. To really give teeth to the constitutional mandate of giving laborers maximum protection and security, they must be protected not only against their employer but also against the leaders of their own labor union. Thus, in General Rubber and Footwear Corporation v. Drilon, 13 citing Kaisahan ng Manggagawa sa La Campana v. Sarmiento, 14 it was held —
Money claims due to laborers cannot be the object of settlement or compromise effected by a union or counsel without the specific individual consent of each laborer concerned. The beneficiaries are the individual complainants themselves. The union to which they belong can only assist them but cannot decide for them . . . .
There is no evidence on record that the compromise agreement was approved by the complainants individually. The document does not bear their signatures except those of the local Union's President, Vice President and another officer. Neither is there evidence to show that the compromise agreement was ever approved by the Labor Arbiter. Clearly then, it cannot bind the complainants.
The grave abuse of discretion imputed to public respondent NLRC does not exist. But the alternative award of separation pay granted by the Labor Arbiter in an amount equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service must be modified, It has been our consistent ruling that in awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. 15 We have no reason to hold otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 June 1993 affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 28 February 1989 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the separation pay granted as an alternative relief shall be equivalent to one-month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered one (1) whole year.
Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 144568 July 3, 2007
GUILLERMA S. SABLAS, joined by her husband, PASCUAL
LUMANAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTERLITA S. SABLAS and RODULFO S. SABLAS, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This case traces its roots to a complaint for judicial partition, inventory
and accounting filed by respondents Esterlita S. Sablas and Rodulfo S.
Sablas against petitioner spouses Pascual Lumanas and Guillerma S.
Sablas in the Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, Branch 141 on
October 1, 1999.2
Petitioner spouses were served with summons and a copy of the
complaint on October 6, 1999. On October 21, 1999, they filed a
motion for extension of time requesting an additional period of 15
days, or until November 5, 1999, to file their answer. However, they
were able to file it only on November 8, 1999. While the trial court
observed that the answer was filed out of time, it admitted the pleading
because no motion to declare petitioner spouses in default was filed.3
The following day, November 9, 1999, respondents filed a motion to
declare petitioner spouses in default.4 It was denied by the trial court in
an order dated December 6, 1999.5 Respondents moved for
reconsideration but it was also denied.6 Thereafter, they challenged the
December 6, 1999 order in the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari7 alleging that the admission of the answer by the trial court
was contrary to the rules of procedure and constituted grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In a decision dated July 17, 2000,8 the appellate court ruled that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion because, pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the trial court had no recourse
but to declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed to file
their answer on or before November 5, 1999. Thus, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition, vacated the December 6, 1999 order and
remanded the case to the trial court for reception of plaintiffs’
evidence.
Aggrieved, petitioner spouses (defendants in the trial court) now assail
the July 17, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in this petition for
review on certiorari.9
Petitioner spouses contend that the Court of Appeals decision was not
in accord with the rules of procedure as it misconstrued Section 3,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and was in contravention of
jurisprudence.
We agree.
Where There Is No Motion, There
Can Be No Declaration of Default
The elements of a valid declaration of default are:
1. the court has validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the defending party either by service of summons or voluntary
appearance;10
2. the defending party failed to file the answer within the time
allowed therefor and
3. a motion to declare the defending party in default has been filed by
the claiming party with notice to the defending party.
An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming
party.11
It can be properly issued against the defending party who
failed to file the answer within the prescribed period only if the
claiming party files a motion to that effect with notice to the defending
party.
In this connection, Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Default: Declaration of. – If the defending party fails to
answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion
of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of
such failure, declare the defending party in default. x x x. (emphasis
supplied)
Three requirements must be complied with before the court can
declare the defending party in default: (1) the claiming party must file
a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2)
the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in
default and (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party
has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rules of
Court.12
The rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such
motion to the defending party. It is not enough that the defendant fails
to answer the complaint within the reglementary period.13
The trial
court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default14
as the rules
leave it up to the claiming party to protect his or its interests. The trial
court should not under any circumstances act as counsel of the
claiming party.
Where There Is No Declaration of Default, Answer May be
Admitted Even If Filed Out Of Time
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the
defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after
the reglementary period for filing the answer expires.15
The Rules of
Court provides for discretion on the part of the trial court not only to
extend the time for filing an answer but also to allow an answer to be
filed after the reglementary period.16
Thus, the appellate court erred when it ruled that the trial court had no
recourse but to declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed
to file their answer on or before November 5, 1999.
The rule is that the defendant’s answer should be admitted where it is
filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the
plaintiff.17
Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period
but before the defendant is declared in default and there is no showing
that defendant intends to delay the case, the answer should be
admitted.18
1avvphi1
Therefore, the trial court correctly admitted the answer of petitioner
spouses even if it was filed out of time because, at the time of its
filing, they were not yet declared in default nor was a motion to
declare them in default ever filed. Neither was there a showing that
petitioner spouses intended to delay the case.
Where Answer Has Been Filed, There can Be No Declaration of
Default Anymore
Since the trial court already admitted the answer, it was correct in
denying the subsequent motion of respondents to declare petitioner
spouses in default.
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Hon. Romillo, Jr.,19
the Court ruled
that it was error to declare the defending party in default after the
answer was filed. The Court was in fact even more emphatic in
Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education:20
it was grave abuse of discretion to declare a defending party in default
despite the latter’s filing of an answer.
The policy of the law is to have every litigant’s case tried on the merits
as much as possible. Hence, judgments by default are frowned upon.21
A case is best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate
their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in
support thereof. The parties are thus given the chance to be heard fully
and the demands of due process are subserved. Moreover, it is only
amidst such an atmosphere that accurate factual findings and correct
legal conclusions can be reached by the courts.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 17, 2000
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57397 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the December 6, 1999 order of the
Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, Branch 14 is REINSTATED.
The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 147417 July 8, 2005
SPS. VICTOR & MILAGROS PEREZ and CRISTINA
AGRAVIADOR AVISO, Petitioners,
vs.
ANTONIO HERMANO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals dismissing
petitioners’ original action for certiorari under Rule 65 for being filed
out of time. Assailed as well is the Resolution2 dismissing petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:
On 27 April 1998, petitioners Cristina Agraviador Aviso and spouses
Victor and Milagros Perez filed a civil case for Enforcement of
Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon
Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita
Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio Hermano before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 224.3 On 15 May
1998, respondent (then defendant) Hermano filed his Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim. On 17 January 2000, respondent Hermano
filed a "Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered
Severed for Separate Trial" which was granted by the trial court in an
Order dated 28 February 2000.
This Order was received by petitioners on 21 March 2000. On 23
March 2000, petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied
by the trial court on 25 May 2000 and received by petitioners on 18
June 2000. On 17 August 2000, petitioners filed an original action for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing the complaint
against respondent Hermano.
On 19 October 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the first assailed
Resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari "for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended." On 02 March 2001, the
second assailed Resolution was promulgated dismissing petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals holding that:
From the time petitioners received the assailed Order on March 21,
2000 and filed their motion for reconsideration, four (4) days had
elapsed. On June 18, 2000, petitioners received the denial of their
motion for reconsideration. When the instant petition was filed on
August 17, 2000, a total of 63 days had elapsed.
A.M. No. 00-2-03-50 further amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the New
Rules on Civil Procedure states that the petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, Order or Resolution
and in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the 60-day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
Viewed from its light, the assailed Orders had already attained finality,
and are now beyond the power of this Court to review.4
Aggrieved by the foregoing ruling, petitioners are now before us
assigning the following –
MANIFEST AND/OR SERIOUS ERROR COMMITTED BY THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE COMPUTATION OF
THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE PETITIONERS FILED THEIR
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE IT AND
CONSEQUENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN THE APPRECIATION OF FACTS AND/OR
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, WITH ITS FINDING OF FACT
NOT BEING BORNE BY THE RECORD OR EVIDENCE, AND
THUS ITS CONCLUSION IS ENTIRELY BASELESS.5
According to petitioners, following the amendment introduced by
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, their petition was filed on the 60th day, thus, within the
reglementary period. Respondent insists, on the other hand, that the
petition was filed on the 61st day while the Court of Appeals had
declared that the petition was filed on the 63rd day.
We agree in the position taken by petitioners.
Admittedly, at the time petitioners filed their petition for certiorari on
17 August 2000, the rule then prevailing was Section 4, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by Circular No. 39-98
effective 01 September 1998, which provides:
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought
to be assailed in the Supreme Court, or if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person
in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court
of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If
it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in
and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in
due time after notice of said judgment, order, or resolution, the period
herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the
petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied)
However, on 01 September 2000, during the pendency of the case
before the Court of Appeals, Section 4 was amended anew by A.M.
No. 00-2-03-SC6 which now provides:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)
day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the
acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under this amendment, the 60-day period within which to file the
petition starts to run from receipt of notice of the denial of the motion
for reconsideration, if one is filed.7
In Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission,8 we described
this latest amendment as curative in nature as it remedied the
confusion brought about by Circular No. 39-98 because, "historically,
i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a
party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion
for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari." Curative statutes,
which are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal
proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity
with certain legal requirements, by their very essence, are retroactive.9
And, being a procedural rule, we held in Sps. Ma. Carmen and Victor
Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge Benito Legarda10
that "procedural
laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive
in that sense and to that extent."
Consequently, petitioners had a fresh period of 60 days from the time
they received the Order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration on 18 June 2000. When they filed their petition with
the Court of Appeals on 17 August 2000, exactly 60 days had elapsed
following the rule that in computing a period, the first day shall be
excluded and the last day included.11
Hence, there can be no doubt that
the petition was filed within the reglementary period for doing so and
it was reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in not giving
said petition due course. However, instead of remanding the case to
the Court of Appeals which would only unduly prolong the disposition
of the substantive issue raised, we shall resolve the petition originally
filed therein.
Petitioners brought to the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 the lone issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT [Hon. Emilio L.
Leachon, Jr., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 224, Quezon City] HAD
PLAINLY AND MANIFESTLY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, TANTAMOUNT
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AS AGAINST RESPONDENT ANTONIO
HERMANO IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-98-34211.12
Petitioners assert that respondent Hermano should not have been
dismissed from the complaint because: (1) He did not file a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court and, in fact, his "Motion
with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate
Trial" was filed almost two years after he filed his Answer to the
complaint; (2) There was no misjoinder of causes of action in this
case; and (3) There was no misjoinder of parties.
The case filed by petitioners against respondent Hermano and the other
defendants, namely Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-
Contreras and Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele, was one for "Enforcement of
Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction" docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-98-34211 and raffled to Branch 224.
Petitioners presented three causes of action in their complaint, the first
for enforcement of contract to sell entered into between petitioners and
Zescon Land, Inc., the second for annulment or rescission of two
contracts of mortgage entered into between petitioners and respondent
Hermano and the third for damages against all defendants.
For the first cause of action, petitioners allege that sometime in
November 1997, they entered into a Contract to Sell with Zescon
Land, Inc., through Zenie Sales-Contreras, for the purchase of five (5)
parcels of land in the total amount of Nineteen Million One Hundred
Four Thousand Pesos (P19,104,000.00). As part of their agreement, a
portion of the purchase price would be paid to them as down payment,
another portion to be given to them as cash advance upon the
execution of the contract and another portion to be used by the buyer,
Zescon Land, Inc., to pay for loans earlier contracted by petitioners
which loans were secured by mortgages.
Re-pleading the foregoing in their second cause of action, petitioners
contend that "in a tricky machination and simultaneous with the
execution of the aforesaid Contract to Sell," they were made to sign
other documents, two of which were Mortgage deeds over the same
five properties in favor of respondent Hermano, whom they had never
met. It was allegedly explained to them by Sales-Contreras that the
mortgage contracts would merely serve to facilitate the payment of the
price as agreed upon in their Contract to Sell. Petitioners claim that it
was never their intention to mortgage their property to respondent
Hermano and that they have never received a single centavo from
mortgaging their property to him. Petitioners acknowledge, however,
that respondent Hermano was responsible for discharging their
obligations under the first mortgage and for having the titles over the
subject lands released, albeit not to them but to respondent Hermano.
They seek a TRO against respondent Hermano who had informed
them that he would be foreclosing the subject properties.
In their third cause of action, petitioners pray for damages against all
the defendants alleging that:
Due to the failure and refusal, without any valid justification and
reason, by defendants Zescon and Contreras to comply with their
obligations under the Contract to Sell, including their failure and
refusal to pay the sums stipulated therein, and in misleading and
misrepresenting the plaintiffs into mortgaging their properties to
defendant Antonio Hermano, who in turn had not paid the plaintiffs
the proceeds thereof, putting them in imminent danger of losing the
same, plaintiffs had suffered, and continue to suffer, sleepless nights
….
By reason of defendants Zescon and Contreras’s failure and refusal to
pay the sums stipulated in the Contract to Sell, and of defendant
Antonio Hermano’s not having paid plaintiffs the proceeds of the
mortgage agreements, plaintiffs had been deprived of the beneficial
use of the proceeds and stood to lose, as they continue to lose, by way
of unearned profits at least P1,000,000.00.13
In his Answer with (Compulsory) Counterclaim dated 15 May 1998,
respondent Hermano denied petitioners’ allegations.14
Then, on 19
February 1999, respondent Hermano filed a civil case entitled
"Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage" against petitioner
Aviso docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-36914 and raffled to Branch
216 of the RTC of Quezon City. On 17 January 2000, respondent
Hermano filed a "Motion With Leave To Dismiss The Complaint
Against Defendant Antonio Hermano, Or Ordered Severed For
Separate Trial" before Branch 224. In said motion, respondent
Hermano argued that there was a mis-joinder of causes of action under
Rule 2, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. To quote respondent
Hermano:
3. In the instant case, the plaintiffs’ action for the Enforcement of
Contract and Damages with Prayer for The Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon
Land, Inc., and/or its President Zenie Sales Contreras, may not, under
Rule 2, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, join defendant
Hermano as party defendant to annul and/or rescind the Real Estate
Mortgages of subject properties. There is a misjoinder of parties
defendants under a different transaction or cause of action; that under
the said Rule 2, Section 6, upon motion of defendant Hermano in the
instant case, the complaint against defendant Hermano can be severed
and tried separately; . . . .15
Over petitioners’ opposition to said motion, the same was granted by
the trial court in its Order dated 28 February 2000 on the justification
that:
. . . [D]efendant having filed a special civil action for judicial
foreclosure of mortgage and now pending before RTC Branch 216, he
should be dropped as one of the defendants in this case and whatever
claims plaintiffs may have against defendant Hermano, they can set it
up by way of an answer to said judicial foreclosure.16
And, in an Order dated 25 May 2000, the trial court resolved
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration by dismissing the same, to wit:
After going over the arguments of the parties, the Court believes that
defendant Hermano has nothing to do with the transaction which the
plaintiffs entered into with defendant Zescon Land, Inc. Besides, the
said motion raised matters and defenses previously considered and
passed upon by the Court.17
It is these two Orders that were brought up by petitioners to the Court
of Appeals on petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The pivotal issue
to be resolved, therefore, is whether or not respondent trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint
against respondent Hermano in Civil Case No. Q-98-34211.
As far as we can glean from the Orders of the trial court, respondent
Hermano was dropped from the complaint on the ground of misjoinder
of causes of action. Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that there was
no misjoinder in this case.
To better understand the present controversy, it is vital to revisit the
rules on joinder of causes of action as exhaustively discussed in
Republic v. Hernandez,18
thus:
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action,
is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one
action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.
It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which
could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint,
declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances
join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one
declaration, complaint or petition.
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is
generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of
action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is
permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory
provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same
factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined.
Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a
multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of
justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the
litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party
litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action
to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following
requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands
for money or are of the same nature and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of
suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by
effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in
controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject
matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost.
The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity,
where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being
of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the
end that related controversies between the same parties may be
adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as
practicable, with the end in view of promoting the efficient
administration of justice.
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of
action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be
said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not
succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in
developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to
permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is
some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff
to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should
nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common
question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction
thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited
joinder is not authorized.
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso
subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder
of parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented,
effectively disallows unlimited joinder.
Section 6, Rule 2 on misjoinder of causes of action provides:
Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of causes of action
is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action
may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed
and proceeded with separately.
There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder
under Section 5, Rule 2 are not met. Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading
assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he
may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules
on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions
governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain
to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within
the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for
recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction.
As far as can be gathered from the assailed Orders, it is the first
condition - on joinder of parties - that the trial court deemed to be
lacking. It is well to remember that the joinder of causes of action may
involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder involves
different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of
law common to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction
or series of transaction.19
In herein case, petitioners have adequately alleged in their complaint
that after they had already agreed to enter into a contract to sell with
Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, the latter also gave them
other documents to sign, to wit: A Deed of Absolute Sale over the
same properties but for a lower consideration, two mortgage deeds
over the same properties in favor of respondent Hermano with
accompanying notes and acknowledgment receipts for Ten Million
pesos (P10,000,000) each. Petitioners claim that Zescon Land, Inc.,
through Sales-Contreras, misled them to mortgage their properties
which they had already agreed to sell to the latter.
From the above averments in the complaint, it becomes reasonably
apparent that there are questions of fact and law common to both
Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano arising from a series of
transaction over the same properties. There is the question of fact, for
example, of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., indeed misled
petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of respondent
Hermano. There is also the question of which of the four contracts
were validly entered into by the parties. Note that under Article 2085
of the Civil Code, for a mortgage to be valid, it is imperative that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus,
respondent Hermano will definitely be affected if it is subsequently
declared that what was entered into by petitioners and Zescon Land,
Inc., was a Contract of Sale (as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute
Sale signed by them) because this would mean that the contracts of
mortgage were void as petitioners were no longer the absolute owners
of the properties mortgaged. Finally, there is also the question of
whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., as represented by Sales-Contreras,
and respondent Hermano committed fraud against petitioners as to
make them liable for damages.
Prescinding from the foregoing, and bearing in mind that the joinder of
causes of action should be liberally construed as to effect in one action
a complete determination of all matters in controversy involving one
subject matter, we hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in severing from the complaint petitioners’ cause of action
against respondent Hermano.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 19 October 2000 dismissing petitioners’ petition for
certiorari and its Resolution dated 02 March 2001 denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, dated 28 February
2000 and 25 May 2000 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The RTC
is further ordered to reinstate respondent Antonio Hermano as one of
the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-98-34211. No costs.
G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005
SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The petitioners, Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena were the owners
of a parcel of land, with a house constructed thereon, located in
Parañaque, Metro Manila (now Parañaque City) covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 134391 issued on February 24, 1998.1
On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents, the
Spouses Pedro and Valeria Piquero, executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA)2 in which the former sold the property to the latter
for the price of P940,250.00 payable in six (6) installments via
postdated checks. The vendees forthwith took possession of the
property.
It appears in the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to
transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of the
MOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would be
dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to
reconvey the property to the petitioners.
On May 17, 1999, the petitioners, then residents of Malolos, Bulacan,
filed a Complaint3 against the respondents with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment of the sale/MOA,
recovery of possession and damages. The petitioners alleged therein
that, they did not transfer the property to and in the names of the
respondents as vendees because the first two checks drawn and issued
by them in payment for the purchase price of the property were
dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash
despite demands therefor.
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in their favor, thus:
a. The sale/Memorandum of Agreement (Annex "A," supra) be
declared null and void, rescinded and with no further force and effect;
b. Defendants, and all persons claiming right under them, be ordered to
immediately vacate the subject property and turnover its possession to
the plaintiffs;
c. Defendants, jointly and severally, be ordered to pay the plaintiffs:
i. P10,000.00 – monthly, starting 01 October 1997 until complete
turnover of the subject property to the plaintiffs, as reasonable
compensation for its continued unlawful use and occupation by the
defendants;
ii. P200,000.00 – moral damages;
iii. P200,000.00 – exemplary damages;
iv. P250,000.00 – attorney’s fees and litigation – related expenses; and
v. the costs of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for.4
The petitioners declared in their complaint that the property subject of
the complaint was valued at P6,900,000.00. They appended copies of
the MOA and TCT No. 134391 to their complaint. The case was
eventually raffled to Branch 13 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground,
inter alia, of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property
subject matter of the action.
On the first ground, the respondents averred that the principal action of
the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of the
possession of the property is a real action and not a personal one;
hence, it should have been brought in the RTC of Parañaque City,
where the property subject matter of the action was located, and not in
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, where the petitioners resided. The
respondents posited that the said court had no jurisdiction over the
property subject matter of the action because it was located in
Parañaque City.5
In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their action for damages and
attorney’s fees is a personal action and not a real action; hence, it may
be filed in the RTC of Bulacan where they reside. They averred that
while their second cause of action for the recovery of the possession of
the property is a real action, the same may, nevertheless, be joined
with the rest of their causes of action for damages, conformably with
Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.6
By way of reply, the respondents averred that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of
the Rules of Court applies only when one or more of multiple causes
of action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts,
and the other or others are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC, and the venue lies therein.
On February 9, 2000, the trial court issued an Order7 denying the
motion for lack of merit. It found merit in the petitioner’s contention
that Section 5(c), Rule 2 was applicable.
Meanwhile, the case was re-raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan. In a Motion8 dated December 20, 2000, the
respondents prayed for the reconsideration of the trial court’s February
9, 2000 Order. On October 16, 2001, the court issued an Order9
granting the motion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It
ruled that the principal action of the petitioners was a real action and
should have been filed in the RTC of Parañaque City where the
property subject matter of the complaint was located. However, since
the case was filed in the RTC of Bulacan where the petitioners reside,
which court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, it
must be dismissed.
Hence, the present recourse.
The petition has no merit.
The sole issue is whether or not venue was properly laid by the
petitioners in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The resolution of this
issue is, in turn, anchored on whether Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court invoked by the petitioners is applicable in this case.
Under the said Rule, a party may, in one pleading, assert, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have
against an opposing party subject to the conditions therein enumerated,
one of which is Section 5(c) which reads:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. -- …
…
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain
to different venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within
the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; …
Explaining the aforequoted condition, Justice Jose Y. Feria declared:
(c) Under the third condition, if one cause of action falls within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and the other falls within the
jurisdiction of a Municipal Trial Court, the action should be filed in
the Regional Trial Court. If the causes of action have different venues,
they may be joined in any of the courts of proper venue. Hence, a real
action and a personal action may be joined either in the Regional Trial
Court of the place where the real property is located or where the
parties reside.10
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right of the other which causes the latter injury. The essential
elements of a cause of action are the following: (1) the existence of a
legal right of the plaintiff; (2) a correlative legal duty of the defendant
to respect one’s right; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in
violation of the plaintiff’s right.11
A cause of action should not be
confused with the remedies or reliefs prayed for. A cause of action is
to be found in the facts alleged in the complaint and not in the prayer
for relief. It is the substance and not the form that is controlling.12
A
party may have two or more causes of action against another party.
A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or
right of action in a complaint. The question of the joinder of causes of
action involves in particular cases a preliminary inquiry as to whether
two or more causes of action are alleged.13
In declaring whether more
than one cause of action is alleged, the main thrust is whether more
than one primary right or subject of controversy is present. Other tests
are whether recovery on one ground would bar recovery on the other,
whether the same evidence would support the other different counts
and whether separate actions could be maintained for separate relief;14
or whether more than one distinct primary right or subject of
controversy is alleged for enforcement or adjudication.15
A cause of action may be single although the plaintiff seeks a variety
of remedies. The mere fact that the plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs
does not indicate that he has stated more than one cause of action. The
prayer may be an aid in interpreting the petition and in determining
whether or not more than one cause of action is pleaded.16
If the
allegations of the complaint show one primary right and one wrong,
only one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are
incidentally involved, and although different acts, methods, elements
of injury, items of claims or theories of recovery are set forth.17
Where
two or more primary rights and wrongs appear, there is a joinder of
causes of action.
After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that
Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court does not apply. This is so
because the petitioners, as plaintiffs in the court a quo, had only one
cause of action against the respondents, namely, the breach of the
MOA upon the latter’s refusal to pay the first two installments in
payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over to the
petitioners the possession of the real property, as well as the house
constructed thereon occupied by the respondents. The claim for
damages for reasonable compensation for the respondents’ use and
occupation of the property, in the interim, as well as moral and
exemplary damages suffered by the petitioners on account of the
aforestated breach of contract of the respondents are merely incidental
to the main cause of action, and are not independent or separate causes
of action.18
The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA on account
of the respondents’ breach thereof and the latter’s failure to return the
premises subject of the complaint to the petitioners, and the
respondents’ eviction therefrom is a real action.19
As such, the action
should have been filed in the proper court where the property is
located, namely, in Parañaque City, conformably with Section 1, Rule
4 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced
and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed
their complaint in the said RTC, venue was improperly laid; hence, the
trial court acted conformably with Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.