CIVPRO Set2 Cases

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G.R. No. 181622 November 20, 2013

GENESIS INVESTMENT, INC., CEBU JAYA REALTY INC., and SPOUSESRHODORA and LAMBERT LIM, Petitioners,

vs.

HEIRS of CEFERINO EBARASABAL,* NAMELY: ROGELIO EBARASABAL,SPOUSES LIGAYA E. GULIMLIM AND JOSE GULIMLIM, SPOUSES VISITACION E.CONEJOS and ELIAS CONEJOS, BEN TEJERO, POCAS TEJERO, GERTRUDESTEJERO, BANING HAYO, LACIO EBARASABAL and JULIETA EBARASABAL;HEIRS OF FLORO EBARASABAL, namely: SOFIA ABELONG, PEPITOEBARASABAL AND ELPIDIO EBARASABAL; HEIRS OF LEONA EBARASABAL-APOLLO, namely: SILVESTRA A. MOJELLO and MARCELINO APOLLO; HEIRS OFPEDRO EBARASABAL, namely: BONIFACIO EBARASABAL, SERGIOEBARASABAL and JAIME EBARASABAL; HEIRS of ISIDRO EBARASABAL,NAMELY: SPOUSES CARLOSA E. NUEVO and FORTUNATO NUEVA;** HEIRS ofBENITO EBARASABAL, namely: PAULO BAGAAN, SPOUSES CATALINA A.

MARIBAO and RENE MARIBAO, VICENTE ABRINICA and PATRONEBARASABAL; HEIRS of JULIAN EBARASABAL, NAMELY: ALFREDO BAGAAN,JUAN BAGAAN, AVELINO BAGAAN, FERDINAND BAGAAN, MAURO BAGAAN,SPOUSES ROWENA B. LASACA and FRANCISCO LACASA,*** SPOUSES MARIA B.CABAG and EMILIO CABAG and ESTELITA BAGAAN, all being represented herein byVICTOR MOJELLO, FEDERICO BAGAAN and PAULINO EBARASABAL, as theirAttorneys-in-Fact, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Courtseeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated July 11, 2007 and January

10, 2008, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01017.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

On November 12, 2003, herein respondents filed against herein petitioners a Complaint3 for

Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's

Fees. The Complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu.

On August 5, 2004, herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss4 contending, among others, thatthe RTC has no jurisdiction to try the case on the ground that, as the case involves title to or

possession of real property or any interest therein and since the assessed value of the subject property does not exceed P20,000.00 (the same being only P11,990.00), the action falls within

the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).5

In its Order6 dated September 29, 2004, the RTC granted petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, holding

as follows:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_181622_2013.html#fnt1














x x x x

And while the prayer of the plaintiffs for the annulment of documents qualified the case as oneincapable of pecuniary estimation thus, rendering it cognizable supposedly by the second level

courts but considering that Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides to cover "all civil actions"

which phrase understandably is to include those incapable of pecuniary estimation, like the caseat bar, this Court is of the view that said law really finds application here more so that the same

case also "involves title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein." For being so,

the assessed value of the real property involved is determinative of which court has jurisdictionover the case. And the plaintiffs admitting that the assessed value of the litigated area is less than

P20,000.00, the defendants are correct in arguing that the case is beyond this Court's

jurisdiction.7

Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,8 arguing that their complaint consists of

several causes of action, including one for annulment of documents, which is incapable of

pecuniary estimation and, as such, falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.9

On March 17, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting respondents' Motion for Partial

Reconsideration and reversing its earlier Order dated September 29, 2004. The RTC ruled, thus:

On the issue of want of jurisdiction, this court likewise finds to be with merit the contention ofthe movants as indeed the main case or the primary relief prayed for by the movants is for thedeclaration of nullity or annulment of documents which unquestionably is incapable of pecuniary

estimation and thus within the exclusive original jurisdiction of this court to try although in the

process of resolving the controversy, claims of title or possession of the property in question isinvolved which together with all the other remaining reliefs prayed for are but purely incidental

to or as a consequence of the foregoing principal relief sought.10

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,11 but the RTC denied it in its Order dated June

23, 2005.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA dismissed the

petition via its assailed Decision dated July 11, 2007, holding that the subject matter of

respondents' complaint is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that the main purpose in filing the action is to declare null

and void the documents assailed therein.12

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was, subsequently, denied in the CA Resolution dated

January 10, 2008.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue, to wit:

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in concluding that the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 60 of Barili, Cebu has jurisdiction over the instant case when the

ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT clearly shows that the main cause of action of the

respondents is for the Recovery of their Title, Interest, and Share over a Parcel of Land, which















has an assessed value of P11,990.00 and thus, within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial

Court.13

The petition lacks merit.

For a clearer understanding of the case, this Court, like the CA, finds it proper to quote pertinent portions of respondents' Complaint, to wit:

x x x x

1. Plaintiffs are all Filipino, of legal age, surviving descendants – either as grandchildren or greatgrandchildren – and heirs and successors-in-interest of deceased Roman Ebarsabal, who died on

07 September 1952 x x x

x x x x

8. During the lifetime of Roman Ebarsabal, he acquired a parcel of land situated in Basdaku,Saavedra, Moalboal, Cebu, x x x.

x x x x

with a total assessed value of P2,890.00 x x x. However, for the year 2002, the property wasalready having (sic) a total assessed value of P11,990.00 x x x.

9. Upon the death of said Roman Ebarsabal, his eight (8) children named in par. 7 above, becameco-owners of his above-described property by hereditary succession; taking peaceful possession

and enjoyment of the same in fee simple pro indiviso, paying the real estate taxes thereon and did

not partition the said property among themselves until all of them likewise died, leaving,however, their respective children and descendants and/or surviving heirs and successors-in-interest, and who are now the above-named plaintiffs herein;

10. The plaintiffs who are mostly residents in (sic) Mindanao and Manila, have just recently

uncovered the fact that on 28th January 1997, the children and descendants of deceased Gil

Ebarsabal, namely: Pelagio, Hipolito, Precela, Fructuosa, Roberta, Florentino, Erlinda, Sebastian,

Cirilo, all surnamed Ebarsabal, have executed among themselves a Deed of ExtrajudicialSettlement with Sale of Roman Ebarsabal's entire property described above, by virtue of which

they allegedly extrajudicially settled the same and, for P2,600,000.00 – although only the sum of

P950,000.00 was reflected in their Deed of Sale for reason only known to them, they sold the

whole property to defendants Genesis Investment Inc. represented by co-defendant Rhodora B.Lim, the wife of Lambert Lim, without the knowledge, permission and consent of the plaintiffs

who are the vendors' co-owners of the lot in question, x x x.

11. Surprisingly, however, the defendant Genesis managed to have the Tax Declaration of the

property issued in the name of co-defendant Cebu Jaya Realty Incorporated, a firm which, asalready intimated above, is also owned by Spouses Lambert and Rhodora B. Lim, instead of in





the name of Genesis Investment, Incorporated, which is actually the vendee firm of the lot in

question.

x x x x

Hence, the reason why Cebu Jaya Realty, Incorporated is joined and impleaded herein as a co-defendant.

12. Without the participation of the plaintiffs who are co-owners of the lot in question in the

proceedings, the aforementioned extrajudicial settlement with sale cannot be binding upon the

plaintiff-co-owners.

13. Further, where as in this case, the other heirs who are the plaintiffs herein, did not consent to

the sale of their ideal shares in the inherited property, the sale was only to be limited to the pro

indiviso share of the selling heirs.

x x x x

14. By representation, the plaintiffs, are therefore, by law, entitled to their rightful shares from

the estate of the deceased Roman Ebarsabal consisting of seven (7) shares that would have beendue as the shares of seven (7) other children of Roman Ebarsabal who are also now deceased,

namely: Ceferino, Floro, Leona, Pedro, Isidoro, Julian and Benito, all surnamed Ebarsabal.

15. The defendants who had prior knowledge of the existence of the other heirs who are co-

owners of the vendors of the property they purchased, had unlawfully acted in bad faith ininsisting to buy the whole property in co-ownership, only from the heirs and successors-in-

interest of deceased Gil Ebarsabal, who is only one (1) of the eight (8) children of deceased

Roman Ebarsabal, and without notifying thereof in whatever manner the plaintiffs who are theheirs and successors-in-interest of the other co-owners of the property-in-question; thus, have

compelled the plaintiffs herein to file this instant case in court to protect their interests, x x x.

x x x x

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable

Court that, after due notice and hearing, judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, as

follows, to wit:

1 – Declaring as null and void and not binding upon the plaintiffs, the following documents to

wit:

(a) Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale executed by and between the heirs of

deceased Gil Ebarsabal headed by Pedro Ebarsabal, and Genesis Investment, Inc.,represented by Rhodora Lim, dated 28th of January, 1997, marked as Annex-A;



(b) Memorandum of Agreement executed between Pedro Ebarsabal and Genesis

Investment, Inc., represented by Rhodora Lim dated 27 January, which document is

notarized;

(c) Tax Declaration of Real Property issued to Cebu Jaya Realty, Inc., marked as Annex-

D;

2 – Ordering the defendants to make partition of the property in litigation with the plaintiffs into

eight (8) equal shares; to get one (1) share thereof, which is the only extent of what theyallegedly acquired by purchase as mentioned above, and to transfer, restore or reconvey and

deliver to the plaintiffs, seven (7) shares thereof, as pertaining to and due for the latter as the

heirs and successors-in-interest of the seven (7) brothers and sister of deceased Gil Ebarsabalalready named earlier in this complaint;

x x x x

Further reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises are also herein prayed for.

x x x x14

It is true that one of the causes of action of respondents pertains to the title, possession and

interest of each of the contending parties over the contested property, the assessed value of which

falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, a complete reading of the complaint wouldreadily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed

for, the action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As stated above, it is clear from the records that respondents' complaint was for "Declaration of

Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees." In filingtheir Complaint with the RTC, respondents sought to recover ownership and possession of their

shares in the disputed parcel of land by questioning the due execution and validity of the Deed ofExtrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and

between some of their co-heirs and herein petitioners. Aside from praying that the RTC render

judgment declaring as null and void the said Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale andMemorandum of Agreement, respondents likewise sought the following: (1) nullification of the

Tax Declarations subsequently issued in the name of petitioner Cebu Jaya Realty, Inc.; (2)

partition of the property in litigation; (3) reconveyance of their respective shares; and (3)

payment of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, plus appearancefees.1âwphi1

Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of partition of or recovery of shares or interest over the real property in question but includes an

action for declaration of nullity of contracts and documents which is incapable of pecuniary

estimation.15

As cited by the CA, this Court, in the case of Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,16 held that:









In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary

estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal

action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim isconsidered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or

in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the

basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claimis purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has consideredsuch actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,

and are cognizable by courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts].17

This rule was reiterated in Russell v. Vestil18 and Social Security System v. Atlantic Gulf and

Pacific Company of Manila Inc.19

Contrary to petitioners contention, the principal relief sought by petitioners is the nullification of

the subject Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale entered into by and between some of their co-heirs

and respondents, insofar as their individual shares in the subject property are concerned. Thus,

the recovery of their undivided shares or interest over the disputed lot, which were included inthe sale, simply becomes a necessary consequence if the above deed is nullified. Hence, since the

principal action sought in respondents Complaint is something other than the recovery of a sumof money, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus, cognizable by the RTC.20

Well entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law

and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,

irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.21

Moreover, it is provided under Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court that where the causesof action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder

may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of

said court and the venue lies therein. Thus, as shown above, respondents complaint clearly fallswithin the jurisdiction of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution dated July 11, 2007 and

January 10, 2008, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01017 areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.













HEIRS OF GENEROSO SEBE, G.R. No. 174497

AURELIA CENSERO SEBE

and LYDIA SEBE,

Petitioners, Present:

Quisumbing, J ., Chairperson,

- versus - Carpio Morales,

Nachura,*

Brion, and

Abad, JJ.

HEIRS OF VERONICO SEVILLA and

TECHNOLOGY AND LIVELIHOOD

RESOURCE CENTER, Promulgated:

Respondents.

October 12, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J .:



This case concerns the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts over actions

involving real properties with assessed values of less than P20,000.00.

The Facts and the Case

In this petition for review on certiorari[1] petitioners seek to reverse the

Order [2] dated August 8, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog

City, Branch 9, in Civil Case 5435, for annulment of documents, reconveyance and

recovery of possession with damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint for

lack of jurisdiction over an action where the assessed value of the properties is less

than P20,000.00. Petitioners asked for reconsideration[3] but the court denied

it.[4]

On August 10, 1999 plaintiff spouses Generoso and Aurelia Sebe and their

daughter, Lydia Sebe, (the Sebes) filed with the RTC of Dipolog City[5] a

complaint against defendants Veronico Sevilla and Technology and Livelihood

Resources Center for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Recovery ofPossession of two lots, which had a total assessed value of P9,910.00, plus

damages.[6] On November 25, 1999 they amended their complaint[7] to address a

deed of confirmation of sale that surfaced in defendant Sevilla’s Answer [8] to the

complaint. The Sebes claimed that they owned the subject lots but, through fraud,



defendant Sevilla got them to sign documents conveying the lots to him. In his

Answer[9] Sevilla insisted that he bought the lots from the Sebes in a regular

manner.

While the case was pending before the RTC, plaintiff Generoso Sebe died so

his wife and children substituted him.[10] Parenthetically, with defendant

Veronico Sevilla’s death in 2006, his heirs substituted him as respondents in this

case.[11]

On August 8, 2006 the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over

the subject matter considering that the ultimate relief that the Sebes sought was the

reconveyance of title and possession over two lots that had a total assessed value of

less than P20,000.00. Under the law,[12] said the RTC, it has jurisdiction over

such actions when the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00,[13]

otherwise, jurisdiction shall be with the first level courts.[14] The RTC concluded

that the Sebes should have filed their action with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)

of Dipolog City.

On August 22, 2006 the Sebes filed a motion for reconsideration.[15] They

pointed out that the RTC mistakenly classified their action as one involving title to

or possession of real property when, in fact, it was a case for the annulment of the

documents and titles that defendant Sevilla got. Since such an action for

annulment was incapable of pecuniary estimation, it squarely fell within the



jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, as

amended.

To illustrate their point, the Sebes drew parallelisms between their case and

the cases of De Rivera v. Halili[16] and Copioso v. Copioso.[17]

The De Rivera involved the possession of a fishpond. The Supreme Court

there said that, since it also had to resolve the issue of the validity of the contracts

of lease on which the opposing parties based their rights of possession, the case

had been transformed from a mere detainer suit to one that was incapable of

pecuniary estimation. Under Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as

amended, civil actions, which were incapable of pecuniary estimation, came under

the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (now the RTC).[18] The

Sebes pointed out that, like De Rivera, the subject of their case was ―incapable of

pecuniary estimation‖ since they asked the court, not only to resolve the dispute

over possession of the lots, but also to rule on the validity of the affidavits of

quitclaim, the deeds of confirmation of sale, and the titles over the properties.[19]

Thus, the RTC should try the case.

The Copioso, on the other hand, involves the reconveyance of land the

assessed value of which was allegedly P3,770.00. The Supreme Court ruled that

the case comprehended more than just the title to, possession of, or any interest in

the real property. It sought the annulment of contracts, reconveyance or specific



performance, and a claim for damages. In other words, there had been a joinder of

causes of action, some of which were incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Consequently, the case properly fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Here,

petitioners argued that their case had the same causes of actions and reliefs as those

involved in Copioso. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction over their case.

On August 31, 2006 the RTC denied the Sebes’s motion for reconsideration,

pointing out that the Copioso ruling had already been overturned by Spouses

Huguete v. Spouses Embudo.[20] Before the Huguete, cancellation of titles,declaration of deeds of sale as null and void and partition were actions incapable of

pecuniary estimation. Now, however, the jurisdiction over actions of this nature,

said the RTC, depended on the valuation of the properties. In this case, the MTC

had jurisdiction because the assessed value of the lots did not exceed P20,000.00.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether or not the Sebes’s action involving the two

lots valued at less than P20,000.00 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

The Court’s Ruling



Whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular action

is determined by the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint and the principal relief

he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts.[21]

The gist of the Sebes’s complaint is that they had been the owner for over 40

years of two unregistered lots[22] in Dampalan, San Jose, Dipolog City, covered

by Tax Declaration 012-239, with a total assessed value of P9,910.00.[23] On

June 3, 1991 defendant Sevilla caused the Sebes to sign documents entitled

affidavits of quitclaim.[24] Being illiterate, they relied on Sevilla’s explanationthat what they signed were ―deeds of real estate mortgage‖ covering a loan that

they got from him.[25] And, although the documents which turned out to be deeds

conveying ownership over the two lots to Sevilla for P10,000.00[26] were

notarized, the Sebes did not appear before any notary public.[27] Using the

affidavits of quitclaim, defendant Sevilla applied for[28] and obtained free patent

titles covering the two lots on September 23, 1991.[29] Subsequently, he

mortgaged the lots to defendant Technology and Livelihood Resource Center for

P869,555.00.[30]

On December 24, 1991 the Sebes signed deeds of confirmation of sale

covering the two lots.[31] Upon closer examination, however, their signatures had

apparently been forged.[32] The Sebes were perplexed with the reason for making

them sign such documents to confirm the sale of the lots when defendant Sevilla

already got titles to them as early as September.[33] At any rate, in 1992,

defendant Sevilla declared the lots for tax purposes under his name.[34] Then,



using force and intimidation, he seized possession of the lots from their tenants[35]

and harvested that planting season’s yield[36] of coconut and palay worth

P20,000.00.[37]

Despite demands by the Sebes, defendant Sevilla refused to return the lots,

forcing them to hire a lawyer[38] and incur expenses of litigation.[39] Further the

Sebes suffered loss of earnings over the years.[40] They were also entitled to

moral[41] and exemplary damages.[42] They thus asked the RTC a) to declare

void the affidavits of quitclaim and the deeds of confirmation of sale in the case; b)to declare the Sebes as lawful owners of the two lots; c) to restore possession to

them; and d) to order defendant Sevilla to pay them P140,000.00 in lost produce

from June 3, 1991 to the date of the filing of the complaint, P30,000.00 in moral

damages, P100,000.00 in attorney’s fee, P30,000.00 in litigation expenses, and

such amount of exemplary damages as the RTC might fix.[43]

Based on the above allegations and prayers of the Sebes’s complaint, the law

that applies to the action is Batas Pambansa 129, as amended. If this case were

decided under the original text of Batas Pambansa 129 or even under its

predecessor, Republic Act 296, determination of the nature of the case as a real

action would have ended the controversy. Both real actions and actions incapable

of pecuniary estimation fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.



But, with the amendment of Batas Pambansa 129 by Republic Act 7601, the

distinction between these two kinds of actions has become pivotal. The

amendment expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to

include real actions involving property with an assessed value of less than

P20,000.00.[44]

The power of the RTC under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129,[45] as

amended,[46] to hear actions involving title to, or possession of, real property or

any interest in it now covers only real properties with assessed value in excess ofP20,000.00. But the RTC retained the exclusive power to hear actions the subject

matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Thus –

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations isincapable of pecuniary estimation.

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property

involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in

Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,

original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,

Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x.

Section 33, on the other hand provides that, if the assessed value of the real

property outside Metro Manila involved in the suit is P20,000.00 and below, as in

this case, jurisdiction over the action lies in the first level courts. Thus —



SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal TrialCourts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases -- Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

x x x x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involvetitle to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed

value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos

(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does

not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.

But was the Sebes’s action one involving title to, or possession of, real

property or any interest in it or one the subject of which is incapable of pecuniary

estimation?

The Sebes claim that their action is, first, for the declaration of nullity of the

documents of conveyance that defendant Sevilla tricked them into signing and,

second, for the reconveyance of the certificate of title for the two lots that Sevilla

succeeded in getting. The subject of their action is, they conclude, incapable of

pecuniary estimation.

An action ―involving title to real property‖ means that the plaintiff’s cause

of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal

rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the



same.[47] Title is the ―legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2)

the property itself.‖[48]

―Title‖ is different from a ―certificate of title‖ which is the document of

ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued by the government

through the Register of Deeds.[49] While title is the claim, right or interest in real

property, a certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.

Another way of looking at it is that, while ―title‖ gives the owner the right to

demand or be issued a ―certificate of title,‖ the holder of a certificate of title does

not necessarily possess valid title to the real property. The issuance of a certificate

of title does not give the owner any better title than what he actually has in

law.[50] Thus, a plaintiff’s action for cancellation or nullification of a certificate

of title may only be a necessary consequence of the defendant’s lack of title to real

property. Further, although the certificate of title may have been lost, burned, or

destroyed and later on reconstituted, title subsists and remains unaffected unless it

is transferred or conveyed to another or subjected to a lien or encumbrance.[51]

Nestled between what distinguishes a ―title‖ from a ―certificate of title‖ is

the present controversy between the Sebes and defendant Sevilla. Which of them

has valid title to the two lots and would thus be legally entitled to the certificates of

title covering them?



The Sebes claim ownership because according to them, they never

transferred ownership of the same to anyone. Such title, they insist, has remained

with them untouched throughout the years, excepting only that in 1991 they

constituted a real estate mortgage over it in defendant Sevilla’s favor. The Sebes

alleged that defendant Sevilla violated their right of ownership by tricking them

into signing documents of absolute sale, rather than just a real estate mortgage to

secure the loan that they got from him.

Assuming that the Sebes can prove that they have title to or a rightful claim

of ownership over the two lots, they would then be entitled, first , to secure

evidence of ownership or certificates of title covering the same and, second , to

possess and enjoy them. The court, in this situation, may in the exercise of its

equity jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titles issued

to defendant Sevilla, direct the latter to reconvey the two lots and their

corresponding Torrens titles to them as true owners.[52]

The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of the

documents or the reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of title covering the

two lots. These would merely follow after the trial court shall have first resolved

the issue of which between the contending parties is the lawful owner of such lots,

the one also entitled to their possession. Based on the pleadings, the ultimate issue

is whether or not defendant Sevilla defrauded the Sebes of their property by

making them sign documents of conveyance rather than just a deed of real

mortgage to secure their debt to him. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining



which of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over

which is determined by the assessed value of such lots.

Here, the total assessed value of the two lots subject of the suit is P9,910.00.

Clearly, this amount does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold value of

P20,000.00 fixed by law. The other damages that the Sebes claim are merely

incidental to their main action and, therefore, are excluded in the computation of

the jurisdictional amount.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The

Order dated August 8, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch

9, in Civil Case 5435, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 174414 March 14, 2008

ELMER F. GOMEZ, Petitioner,

vs.MA. LITA A. MONTALBAN, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse (1) the Order 1 dated 20 June 2006 of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 13, which granted herein respondent Ma.

Lita A. Montalban’s Petition for Relief from Judgment and dismissed Civil Case No. 29,717-03for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) the Order

2 dated 2 August 2006 denying herein petitioner Elmer

F. Gomez’s Motion for Reconsideration thereof .

On 30 May 2003, petitioner filed a Complaint3 with the RTC for a sum of money, damages and

payment of attorney’s fees against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 29,717-03. The

Complaint alleged, among other things, that: on or about 26 August 1998, respondent obtained aloan from petitioner in the sum of P40,000.00 with a voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15%

interest per month; upon receipt of the proceeds of the loan, respondent issued in favor of

petitioner, as security, Capitol Bank Check No. 0215632, postdated 26 October 1998, in the sum

of P46,000.00, covering the P40,000.00 principal loan amount and P6,000.00 interest charges forone month; when the check became due, respondent failed to pay the loan despite severaldemands; thus, petitioner filed the Complaint praying for the payment of P238,000.00,

representing the principal loan and interest charges, plus 25% of the amount to be awarded asattorney’s fees, as well as the cost of suit.

Summons was served, but despite her receipt thereof, respondent failed to file her Answer.Consequently, she was declared

4 in default and upon motion, petitioner was allowed to present

evidence ex parte.

After considering the evidence presented by petitioner, the RTC rendered a Decision5 on 4 May

2004 in his favor, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby decides this case in favor of

[herein petitioner] and against [herein respondent], ordering [respondent] to pay [petitioner] thefollowing amounts:

1. P40,000.00 representing the principal amount of the loan;

2. P57,600.00 representing interest at the rate of 24% per annum reckoned from August

26, 1998 until the present; and

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_174414_2008.html#fnt1




















3. P15,000.00 representing attorney’s fees.

On 28 May 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment6 alleging that there was

no effective service of summons upon her since there was no personal service of the same. The

summons was received by one Mrs. Alicia dela Torre, who was not authorized to receive

summons or other legal pleadings or documents on respondent’s behalf. Respondent attributesher failure to file an Answer to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. She claimed

that she had good and valid defenses against petitioner and that the RTC had no jurisdiction as

the principal amount being claimed by petitioner was only P40,000.00, an amount falling withinthe jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).

After petitioner filed his Answer 7 to the Petition for Relief from Judgment and respondent her

Reply,8 the said Petition was set for hearing.

After several dates were set and called for hearing, respondent, thru counsel, failed to appeardespite being duly notified; hence, her Petition for Relief was dismissed

9 for her apparent lack of

interest to pursue the petition.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration10

of the dismissal of her Petition for Relief,

stating that her counsel’s failure to appear was not intentional, but due to human shortcomings or

frailties, constituting honest mistake or excusable negligence.

On 18 November 2005, the RTC granted11

respondent’s motion for reconsideration, to wit:

In regard to the motion for reconsideration file by [herein respondent] of the order of the court

dismissing her petition for relief from judgment, the court, in the interest of justice, shall give

[respondent] one more chance to present the merits of her position in a hearing. The dismissal of

the petition is therefore reconsidered and set aside.

On 20 June 2006, the RTC gr anted respondent’s Petition for Relief from Judgment and set asideits Decision dated 4 May 2004 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The fallo of the assailed

RTC Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for relief is hereby GRANTED. The decision of this court dated

May 4, 2004 is RECONSIDERED and set aside for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court,

without prejudice to the case being refiled in the proper Municipal Trial Courts .12

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted Order, but the same was denied

by the RTC in another Order

13

dated 2 August 2006.

Hence, the present Petition filed directly before this Court.

In his Memorandum,14

petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s consideration:




































1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over this case for sum of

money, damages and attorney’s fees where the principal amount of the obligation is

P40,000.00 but the amount of the demand per allegation of the complaint is P238,000.00;

2. Whether or not respondent’s relief from judgment is proper during the period for filing

a motion for reconsideration and appeal.

Before the Court dwells on the principal issues, a few procedural matters must first be resolved.

Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court categorically provides that in all cases where only

questions of law are raised, the appeal from a decision or order of the RTC shall be to theSupreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

15

The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact has long been settled. A question

of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of

probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. Aquestion of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts orwhen the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of

witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their

relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.16

Simple as it may seem, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes

complicated. In a case involving a "question of law," the resolution of the issue must rest solelyon what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites

a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-

evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding

circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.

17

The first issue raised in the present petition is one of jurisdiction of the court over the subjectmatter - meaning, the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought. Jurisdiction is the

right to act or the power and authority to hear and determine a cause. It is a question of law.18

The second issue refers to the aptness of the grant of a Petition for Relief from Judgment. These

questions are undoubtedly one of law, as they concern the correct interpretation or application ofrelevant laws and rules, without the need for review of the evidences presented before the court a

quo.1avvphi1

Thus, with only questions of law raised in this Petition, direct resort to this Court is proper .19

The Court shall now discuss whether the RTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 29,717-03.

Petitioner’s Complaint before the RTC reads:

3. On or about August 26, 1998, [herein respondent] obtained from the [herein petitioner]

a loan for the principal sum of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) with a























voluntary proposal on her part to pay as much as 15% interest per month. Machine copy

of Cash Voucher dated August 26, 1998 is herewith attached as Annex "A".

4. Upon receipt of the proceeds of the said loan, [respondent] issued in favor of the

Plaintiff Capitol Bank Check with check nos. 0215632 postdated on October 26, 1998 for

the sum of Forty Six Thousand Pesos (P46,000.00) as security on the loan with P6,000.00as the first month of interest charges. When the check became due, [respondent]

defaulted to pay her loan despite several allowances of time and repeated verbal demands

from the [petitioner]. The said check was later on dishonored for the reason: "AccountClosed". Machine copy of Capitol Bank Check wit nos. 0215632 is herewith attached as

Annex "B".

5. On July 4, 2002, [petitioner] engaged the services of the undersigned counsel to collect

the account of the [respondent]; thus, on the same day, a demand letter was sent to and

received by her on July 9, 2002. And despite receipt thereof, she failed and continues to

evade the payment of her obligations to the damage and prejudice of the [petitioner].

Thus, as of July 4, 2002, [respondent]’s loan obligation stood at TWO HUNDREDTHIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P 239,000.00), inclusive of interest charges for

32 months. Machine copy of Demand Letter and its registry receipt and return card isherewith attached as Annexes "C"; "C-1" and C-2", respectively.

6. In view of [respondent]’s refusal to pay her loan, [petitioner] is constrained to engagethe services of counsel to initiate the instant action for a fee of 25% for whatever amounts

is collected as flat attorney’s fee. [Petitioner] will likewise incur damages in the form of

docket fees.

PRAYER

WHERFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that Decision be rendered

ordering the [respondent] to pay [petitioner] as follows:

1. The amount of P238,000.00 with interest charges at the sound discretion of the

Honorable Court starting on July 4, 2002 until paid in full;

2. The sum equivalent to 25 % of the amount awarded as attorney’s fee;

3. Cost of suit;

4. Other relief that the Honorable Court may find just and equitable under the premisesare likewise prayed for .20

[Emphasis ours.]

The Court gleans from the foregoing that petitioner’s cause of action is the respondent’sviolation of their loan agreement.

21 In that loan agreement, respondent expressly agreed to pay

the principal amount of the loan, plus 15% monthly interest. Consequently, petitioner is claiming

and praying for in his Complaint the total amount of P238,000.00, already inclusive of theinterest on the loan which had accrued from 1998. Since the interest on the loan is a primary and











inseparable component of the cause of action, not merely incidental thereto, and already

determinable at the time of filing of the Complaint, it must be included in the determination of

which court has the jurisdiction over petitioner’s case. Using as basis the P238,000.00 amount being claimed by petitioner from respondent for payment of the principal loan and interest, this

Court finds that it is well within the jurisdictional amount fixed by law for RTCs. 22

There can be no doubt that the RTC in this case has jurisdiction to entertain, try, and decide the

petitioner’s Complaint.

To this Court, it is irrelevant that during the course of the trial, it was proven that respondent is

only liable to petitioner for the amount of P40,000.00 representing the principal amount of the

loan; P57,000.00 as interest thereon at the rate of 24% per annum reckoned from 26 August 1998until the present; and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Contrary to respondent’s contention,

jurisdiction can neither be made to depend on the amount ultimately substantiated in the course

of the trial or proceedings nor be affected by proof showing that the claimant is entitled to

recover a sum in excess of the jurisdictional amount fixed by law. Jurisdiction is determined by

the cause of action as alleged in the complaint and not by the amount ultimately substantiatedand awarded.23

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by

law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of

the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.24

The nature of an action, as well aswhich court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in

the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover

upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.25

The averments in the complaint and thecharacter of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

26 Once vested by the allegations in the

complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled

to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

27

On the propriety of the granting by the RTC of respondent’s Petition for Relief from Judgment,

the Court finds and so declares that the RTC did indeed commit an error in doing so.

First of all, a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is only available against a

final and executory judgment.28

Since respondent allegedly29

received a copy of the Decisiondated 4 May 2004 on 14 May 2004, and she filed the Petition for Relief from Judgment on 28

May 2004, judgment had not attained finality. The 15-day period to file a motion for

reconsideration or appeal had not yet lapsed. Hence, resort by respondent to a petition for relief

from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was premature and inappropriate.

Second, based on respondent’s allegations in her Petition for Relief before the RTC, she had no

cause of action for relief from judgment.

Section 1 of Rule 38 provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. – When a judgment

or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court


































through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court

and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the court may grant relief from judgment only

"[w]hen a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in

any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence x x x."

In her Petition for Relief from Judgment before the RTC, respondent contended that judgment

was entered against her through "mistake or fraud," because she was not duly served withsummons as it was received by a Mrs. Alicia dela Torre who was not authorized to receive

summons or other legal processes on her behalf.

As used in Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, "mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of

law, which relates to the case.30

The word "mistake," which grants relief from judgment, does not

apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committedin the trial. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal.

31This does not exist in the case

at bar, because respondent has in no wise been prevented from interposing an appeal.

"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the

aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court ,32

or was used to procure

the judgment without fair submission of the controversy.33

This is not present in the case at handas respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to present her case.

Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have

guarded against.34

Under Section 1, the "negligence" must be excusable and generally imputable

to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client.35

To follow a

contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedingsindefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What

the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and

not ask for the reversal of the court’s ruling.36

Third, the certificate of service of the process server of the court a quo is prima facie evidence of

the facts as set out therein.37

According to the Sheriff’s Return of Service,38

summons was issuedand served on respondent thru one Mrs. Alicia dela Torre, thus:

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on June 25, 2003 at around 1:45 p.m. the undersigned sheriffcaused the service of summons issued in the above-entitled case together with attached

complaints and annexes for and in behalf of defendant [respondent] thru a certain Mrs. Alicia

Dela Torre inside their compound at the given address who acknowledged receipt by signature

and notation of said dela Torre appearing thereof.

Wherefore, this summons is respectfully returned to the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch13, Davao City, duly SERVED for its records and information."




































Finally, even assuming arguendo that the RTC had no jurisdiction over respondent on account of

the non-service upon her of the summons and complaint, the remedy of the respondent was to

file a motion for the reconsideration of the 4 May 2004 Decision by default or a motion for newtrial within 15 days from receipt of notice thereof. This is also without prejudice to respondent’s

right to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of

the order of default of the court a quo and the proceedings thereafter held including the decision,the writ of execution, and the writ of garnishment issued by the RTC, on the ground that it actedwithout jurisdiction.

39 Unfortunately, however, respondent opted to file a Petition for Relief from

the Judgment of the RTC, which, as the Court earlier determined, was the wrong remedy.

In Tuason v. Court of Appeals ,40

the Court explained the nature of a petition for relief from

judgment:

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional

cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedyavailable to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse

decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake orexcusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himselfof this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from theeffects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence;

otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had beenlost thru inexcusable negligence. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

In the case at bar, there being no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that would

have prevented petitioner from filing either a motion for reconsideration or a petition for reviewon certiorari of the 4 May 2004 Decision of the RTC, her resort to a Petition for Relief from

Judgment was unwarranted.

This Court also notes that when respondent was declared in default for her failure to file anAnswer to the Complaint, she did not immediately avail herself of any of the remedies provided

by law. Lina v. Court of Appeals41

enumerates the remedies available to a party declared in

default:

a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment,file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to

answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a

meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);

b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default,

but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial

under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;

c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and

executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1] of Rule 38;and















d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the

evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been

presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41). (Emphasis added)

In addition, and as this Court earlier mentioned, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a

judgment by default is also available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, oreven if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended

such declaration.42

If respondent is really vigilant in protecting her rights, she should have exhausted all the legal

remedies above-mentioned to nullify and set aside the order of default against her, and should no

longer have waited for the judgment to be rendered. Respondent does not deny that she didreceive the summons, although she alleges that it was not properly served upon her, yet she

chose to sit on her rights and did not act immediately. For respondent’s failure to act with

prudence and diligence in protecting her rights, she cannot now elicit this Court’s sympathy.

Respondent’s petition for relief from judgment is clearly without merit and should not have beengranted by the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is herby GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated 4

May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 29,717-03 ishereby REINSTATED and the Order dated 20 June 2006 granting the petition for relief from judgment is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.







ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO

and ALEJO DOPEÑO,

Petitioners,

- versus -

HON. FATIMA G. ASDALA, in hercapacity as the Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,Branch 87; HON. MANUEL TARO,in his capacity as the Presiding Judgeof the Metropolitan Trial Court ofQuezon City, Branch 42; and theHEIRS OF SPOUSES APOLONIOV. DIONISIO and VALERIANADIONISIO (namely, ALLANGEORGE R. DIONISIO andELEANOR R. DIONISIO, hereinrepresented by ALLAN GEORGE R.DIONISIO),

Respondents.

G.R. No. 164560

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.



Promulgated:

July 22, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.

:

This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

praying that the Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 15,

2003 and June 1, 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978, be reversed and set

aside.

The antecedent facts are as follows.



Sometime in July 2001, private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio and

Valeriana Dionisio, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City,

Branch 42, a Complaint[2] against herein petitioners and Wood Crest Residents

Association, Inc., for Accion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and Damages, with

Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Private respondents alleged that

subject property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an assessed value of

P32,100.00, was titled in the name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio;

but petitioners, with malice and evident bad faith, claimed that they were the

owners of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject property. Private

respondents had allegedly been prevented from entering, possessing and using

subject property. It was further alleged in the Complaint that petitioners'

Transfer Certificate of Title over their alleged property was spurious. Private

respondents then prayed that they be declared the sole and absolute owners of

the subject property; that petitioners be ordered to surrender possession of

subject property to them; that petitioners and Wood Crest and/or its members be

ordered to pay actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees.

Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss[3] said complaint on the

ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, as

the subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The MeTC then issued an Order[4] dated July 4, 2002 denying the

motion to dismiss, ruling that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended,



the MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving title to or

possession of real property of small value.

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order dated July 4, 2002 was

denied.

Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition for

certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87. However,

in its Decision[5] dated March 10, 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition, finding no

grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Presiding Judge. The RTC

sustained the MeTC ruling, stating that, in accordance with Section 33(3) of

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, amending B.P. Blg. 129, the MeTC had jurisdiction

over the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, as it involves recovery of ownership

and possession of real property located in Quezon City, with an assessed value

not exceeding P50,000.00. A Motion for Reconsideration[6] of the Decision was

filed by petitioners, but was denied in an Order[7] dated July 3, 2003.

Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for

certiorari, insisting that both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not ordering the dismissal

of the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdiction over the same.

In the assailed CA Resolution dated September 15, 2003, the CA dismissed the



petition outright, holding that certiorari was not available to petitioners as they

should have availed themselves of the remedy of appeal. Petitioners' motion for

reconsideration of the resolution of dismissal was denied per Resolution[8] dated

June 1, 2004.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition and, in support thereof, they

allege that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN (SIC) EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE PETITION

FOR CERTIORARI AND FOR FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE CERTIORARI

REGARDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT TO TAKE

COGNIZANCE OF A CASE OF ACCION REINVINDICATORIA.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA, AS PRESIDING

JUDGE OF RTC BRANCH 87, QUEZON CITY, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF (SIC) JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND IN RESOLVING THAT A CASE OF ACCION

REINVINDICATORIA IS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT MANUEL TARO AS PRESIDING JUDGE MeTC,

BRANCH 42, QUEZON CITY, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR IN (SIC) EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SO TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE

COMPLAINT FOR ACCION REINVINDICATORIA IN CIVIL CASE NO. 27434 ENTITLED, “HEIRS

OF SPS. APOLONIO V. DIONISIO AND VALERIANA DIONISIO, ETC. VS. ANA DE GUIA SAN

PEDRO, ET. AL.”[9]



The present Petition for Certiorari is doomed and should not have been

entertained from the very beginning.

The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or

resolutions of the CA should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari , as

provided for under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, in

Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court expounded as follows:

The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the

CA via Rule 65, because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy

and adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate

remedy, namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court. A petition for review on certiorari , not a special civil action for certiorari was,

therefore, the correct remedy.

x x x x

Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the

special civil action for certiorari will not be entertained – remedies of appeal and

certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not

and cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error

in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of

certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate

remedy. Where an appeal was available, as in this case, certiorari will not prosper,

even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion . Petitioner's resort to this

Court by Petition for Certiorari was a fatal procedural error, and the instant petition

must, therefore, fail.[11]



For the very same reason given above, the CA, therefore, acted properly

when it dismissed the petition for certiorari outright, on the ground that petitioners

should have resorted to the remedy of appeal instead of certiorari. Verily, the

present Petition for Certiorari should not have been given due course at all.

Moreover, since the period for petitioners to file a petition for review on

certiorari had lapsed by the time the instant petition was filed, the assailed CA

Resolutions have attained finality.

Nevertheless, just to put the matter to rest, the Court reiterates the ruling in

Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso,[12] to wit:

In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of or forcancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under

the classification of cases that involve ―title to, or possession of, real property, or

any interest therein.‖

x x x x

x x x Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of

pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, or one involving title to

property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes becamecrucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, which

expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all

civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interesttherein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not

exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in MetroManila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to,possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) ofB.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with theassessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This



amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which

would result in the speedier administration of justice."[13]

Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction

over private respondents' complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of

merit. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978, dated

September 15, 2003 and June 1, 2004, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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