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Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C....

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Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School The University of Chicago 773.702.0864/[email protected] Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved.
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Page 1: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

Class 9 WhiteboardAntitrust, Fall, 2012

Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization

Randal C. PickerLeffmann Professor of Commercial Law

The Law School

The University of Chicago773.702.0864/[email protected] © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved.

Page 2: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 2

Demand and Costs

Production Produced by Manufacturer and sold by

Retailer. Demand Curve

P = 10 - Q Marginal Costs

MC of production (incurred by M) = 2 MC of distribution (incurred by R) = 2

Page 3: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 3

Finding Marginal Revenue

D. Curve: P = 10 - QPrice

109876543210

Quantity012345678910

Total Rev091621242524211690

Rev Diff

97531-1-3-5-7-9

Marg Rev

86420-2-4-6-8

-4.5

P x Q RC[-1] – R[-1]C[-1]

(RC[-1] + R[+1]C[-1])/2

Formula:MR = 10 – 2Q

Page 4: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 4

Deriving Marginal Revenue

TR = P x Q = (10 – Q) x Q = 10Q – QxQ Differentiate TR with respect to Q:

QQ

TR210

Page 5: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 5

Integrated Monopoly

Marginal Revenue Curve: P = 10 - 2Q Max at MR = MC

Marginal RevenueQM

PM

TC

Profits

CS

DWL

P

Q

Demand Curve

Marginal Cost

Page 6: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 6

Stacked Monopolies Suppose that we separate manufacturing and

retail. Retailer Demand and Costs

The retailer faces the same demand curve as before.

As to costs, the retailer buys the good at wholesale from M at a price of Pw.

This means that the retailer faces total per unit costs of Pw + marginal cost of distribution, which is 2.

Page 7: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 7

Derived Demand Curves

Retailer Decisionmaking Our monopolist retailer will maximize by

equating its costs with marginal revenues, so

Pw + 2 = 10 - 2Q

Page 8: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 8

Deriving Demand Curves

Derived Demand Curve for Manufacturer Rearranging Pw = 8 - 2Q. This looks like a relationship between

wholesale prices and the quantity that will be demanded, meaning that we have created the demand curve faced by the manufacturer.

Page 9: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 9

Finding Marginal Revenue

D. Curve: Pw = 8 - 2QP x Q RC[-1] – R[-1]C[-1]

((RC[-1] + R[+1]C[-1])/2)*2

(units rising in half unit increments)

Formula:MR = 8 – 4Q

Price Quantity Total Rev8 0 07 0.5 3.56 1 65 1.5 7.54 2 83 2.5 7.52 3 61 3.5 3.50 4 0

Rev Diff

3.52.51.50.5-0.5-1.5-2.5-3.5

Marg Rev

6420-2-4-6

Page 10: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 10

Deriving Marginal Revenue

TR = P x Q = (8 – 2Q) x Q = 8Q – 2QxQ Differentiate TR with respect to Q:

QQ

TR48

Page 11: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 11

M Decisionmaking

Marginal Revenue We need to derive the marginal revenue

curve from this demand curve, and it is MR = 8 - 4Q.

Max by equating MC and MR 2 = 8 - 4Q, or Q = 1.5.

This gives us Pw = 5 and P = 8.5.

Page 12: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 12

Stacked Monopolies

Derived Demand: Pw = 8 - 2Q M MR Curve: MR = 8 - 4Q

QM

PM

TC

Profits

CS

DWL

Marginal Revenue

P

Q

Demand Curve

Marginal Cost

Q2

PW

P2

M MC

M MR

Derived DC

Page 13: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 13

Double Marginalization

Two Monopolies Are Worse Than One This is the harm of stacked monopolies, or

of double marginalization. What drives this is that the retailer makes its

decisions based on the costs it faces—the wholesale price plus its marginal retail costs—rather than the actual cost of producing a unit of the good.

Page 14: Class 9 Whiteboard Antitrust, Fall, 2012 Vertical Restraints: Double Marginalization Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law The Law School.

April 19, 2023 Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker 14

Double Marginalization

It ignores the profits that that difference creates for the monopolist manufacturer when it makes its purchasing decisions.


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