Class is the Basis of British Party Politics

7/30/2019 Class is the Basis of British Party Politics

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Class is the basis of British party politics. All else is

embellishment and detail (Pulzer, 1963). This was a comment of the

political basis of party support in Britain more than a generation ago.

Explain this thesis from and use the British Election Study data set to

examine the relationship between class as measured by occupational

status and voting support in the 2001 general election. Does this

quote still apply, and if not, why not?

Introduction

The aim of this essay is to examine the class cleavages in Britain and construct a thesis about

the importance of the division between classes as occupational status in the general elections.

According to the past several decades, the social class has a significant account on the choice of

political party, but considering the near past and present situation we can no longer evaluate the

political scene as it was before. It is argued by many critics that the information on the declining

turnout importance of social class is quite extensive. To evaluate the class importance we must have

a clear idea of what is the distinction between class politics and class voting. A proper explanation

of class voting is when we clearly see how a single social class is voting for a party, whether class

politics refers to the extent to which these social groups persist in a period of time. When making

this difference we can observe several phenomena: the ruining of the original alignment between

working class and left voting; the born of new coalitions and social groups; the diminishing results of

examining a one social group to vote for a party. [Han Dorussen; 2002; p.266-268]

Step into the thesis

It can be stated that if a decline emerge in class voting, the social class divisions are losing its

expressive power in the total variation for voter turnout, or simply is no longer a core factor for

prediction of voting. It is argued that there is a significant decline over the traditional working class

voting for the Labour party for decades, but this is not a single problem because there is also a

decrease in the relationship between social group and voter turnout for a specific party. There are

new core elements of examining the political situation and voting. On the one hand, they are linked

to the new, modern shape of the social structure of Western societies. On the other hand, there are

issues for the persistence of class politics over the past and recent decades. The first component is


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changing of the social bases of classes. There are new, more organized postindustrial societies and

the conflict between pitted bourgeois and working class emerged. A modern class occupied the

scene the wide middle class which is based on professionalized sectors in working class, managers

and supervisors in the public administration. The demographic identities of social classes are also

undermined because of the economic development and intergenerational mobility. The new born

educated electorate is more educated and there is a wider system of welfare which is working for it.

The higher income led to undercutting the number of questions for the economic condition and

stability like it was in the past traditional class-polarized system. [Han Dorussen; p. 266-270]

Nieuwebeerta and Ultee derived from their research that the social class voting is declined

in societies with more religious and linguistic heterogeneity, whether the income distribution and

mobility imply no impact:

It can be hypothesized that declines in class voting levels [] were caused by the fact that

left-wing and right-wing political parties became more similar in their policy preferences and images.

Consequently, members of the different classes can be assumed to have become less able to draw

clear distinctions between the parties, and level of class voting decreased. [Nieuwebeerta and Ultee,

1999: 149] . [Butler, 1969; p.196]

The education increased rapidly after the change of government in 1964 and 1970, and in

searching the searching of solutions to problems of economic growth, national creditworthiness,

inflation and industrial turbulence, the ministers of both Labour and Conservative parties has turned

to similar reactions. Following the aforementioned idea, it can easily be stated that the gap between

parties is closing over the decades. [Butler, 1969; p.196]

How the social class voting changed over the time?

The sociological approach

To begin with, we must state that the social class was a core explanatory element of voting

until the 1960s, but it started to decrease gradually until now. This in turns mean that the

sociological approach is a keyless factor now than it was in the 1960. In the BES for 1983-2001 it is

revealed that the working class shifted their voting to the right and the party issues become closer to

the electorate. This has a significant impact on the predictions for the Labours success in both 1997-

2001. Assuming that the leader evaluation is a proxy for more general observation of the party

competence we can conclude that competence itself played major role in the electorates decision

making. [Clarke et al; 2004; 39-40]


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We must say that the class cleavage was a departure point for considering whether to vote

left or right. It was argued that the British electoral politics were significantly dependent on class

divisions with a large proportion of voters recognizing themselves as manual or non-manual workers

(working class or middle class). On the one side, the Labour party was mostly based on the idea to

redistribute wealth by implying taxations and other economic tools, they are also trying to produce

welfare state. On the other side, the Conservatives commit to prevent property rights, business

development, and free enterprise which is a strong shield on the defender class. Furthermore, both

Conservatives and Labourers strongly identify themselves to one of the parties and thus they choose

their preferences and vote left or right for a continuous amount of time. [Political Choice in Britain;

2004; p.40-41]

Another point to make is that in the last four decades we are observing statistically great

decline on the importance of class voting. We can use the Alfords index to contribute people who

are from a traditional social class and do not vote for the party that most of their origin voted.

Social Class 2001 Social Class 1964

Worki

ng Class

Midd

le Class

Wor

king Class

Mi

ddle Class

Party

Voted For

Conserv

ative 19.8

%

34.0

% 28%

62

%

Labour

61.3

%

38.3

% 64%

22

%

[Political Choice in Britain; 2004; p.42; Table 3.1]

Comparing the results from both years, we can conclude that a significant decline has

emerged during the last four decades. In 2001 elections, those who identify themselves as a right

wing voters (people with non-manual occupations), chose to vote 34% for the Conservatives

whether in the 1964 62% voted for them. That is a significant drop of nearly 30% which thoroughly

explains that the current sociological approach is not a core factor in decision making and choosing

which party to support. On the other side, we do not observe such a sharp decline in the side of the

Labourers, but considering that they were the incumbent party in office for 1997, and they did

pretty well with the political issues, it can be stated that in 2001 the working class (people with

manual occupations) was satisfied from the years before and voted again for them. It is also clear to

see that in the 1964 part of the table there is a diagonal strength, whether in the 2001 part there is

not. It is argued that the decreasing class voting do no affect parties equally. Until 1987, those of the


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middle class mostly supported Conservatives and those from the working class voted supported the

Labour party, but during the years the voter turnout for the Conservatives drop dramatically,

whether there is an increase in supporting the Labourers. Therefore, we can conclude that the

Conservatives made a bigger loss of class supporters. It is argued that a half of the British people do

not identify themselves as a party of a socio-originated group, so that a full and clear measurement

of the class politics cannot be measured. During the decades of innovations, institutionalizations,

social improvement and economic development, the British people become less tribal and the era

of class cleavage is coming to its end.

An important point to make is that there are two indexes that examine the class voting:

Alfred and Thomsen. Furthermore, they both measured a decline in the sociological approach. When

Thomsen index used we can state that there is a level of 0.74 decreases from 1.64 in 1945 to 0.90 in

1990. When we use the measurement of Alford we can observe that it declined from 37.3 in 1945 to

23.4 in 1990. [Evans; 1999; p.32-33]

There is another interesting method of testing the decline in class-based politics. It is the

subjective and objective approach. The subjective approach is when people identify themselves as a

party of one group, whether the objective method is when people identify themselves according to

the income level and job occupation. Firstly, I will test the subjective model by cross tabulating the

dependent variable Party voted for and the variable social class.

BES 2001

Subjective Approach

Member of Social

Class

Mid

dle class

Worki

ng class

Party

Voted For

Conserv

ative

Count 150 82

% within Member

of Social Class

35.0

%

14.4

%

Labour Count 160 382

% within Member

of Social Class

37.3

%

67.0

%

We can clearly see that the amount of middle class voted for Conservative party is

significantly lower that the amount of working class voted for Labour.

Secondly, I will examine the objective method by cross tabulating the dependent variable

Party voted for and Social Class[bclass].


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As our question is involving two main parties the table was reduced and simplified. We do

not need an eagle eye to see that A-professionals, B-managers and C1-clerical administrative

identifying themselves as a middle class and tend to vote for the Conservative party , whether C2-

foreman and supervisors, D-skilled manual and E-semi-skilled and unskilled manual are mostly voting

for Labour party.

Another method of testing the relationship between the variables Party voted for and

social class is the relative and absolute approach. The absolute methodology tends to measure the

whole bunch of people that belong to a certain class and also voted for the party that defend their

interests. On the other side, the relative approach is linked to the virtual strength of a party in the

social classes.

Year Middle-class Conservative plus Working-

class Labour as % of all voters

1964 64.0

1970 60.2

February 1974 55.5

October 1974 57.4

1979 56.7

1983 51.7

1987 51.6

[Heath et al; 1991; p.65; table 5.1]

As we clearly see on the table the results in absolute class voting declined over two decades

with more 10%. It cannot be argued that fewer people of a certain traditional class voted for the

party that prevent their interests. We can conclude that the British class cleavages are now less

important for defining a political orientation. [Heath et al; 1991; p.62-66]

A -

professionals B - managers

C1- clerical,

administrative

C2 - foremen

and supervisors

D - skilled

manual

E - semi-

and uns

man

27 182 208 96 3842.9% 40.3% 29.2% 25.2% 14.9%

19 142 309 216 161

30.2% 31.4% 43.3% 56.7% 63.1%

Social Class

Conservative

Labour


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The valence model (A model of performance)

Here I would like to induce the valence politics model and its implication. It is a politics of

performance and argues that the new British electorate is mostly concerned about the performance

of the government and the implications of its politics in areas that people care most. It is also an

approach that has a purpose to achieve and desire the most general goals. It is argued that the

performance of a party can be crystallized in peoples minds through the leader of the specific party,

even it is not the thing that matters the most, it have more significant impacts than we actually think.

While testing different variables it is examined that the most valuable and accurate prediction of

party choice are leadership and partnership. Moreover, it can be stated that, ceteris paribus, a

person who has a negative or neutral opinion for the leader of a party is less likely to vote for it,

whether when he has a positive view the chance to vote for him significantly increases. This findings

do not keep into the boundaries of the voters turnout in 2001, they would rather been used in terms

of the past election researches. The most significant change in the past decades is the ruining of the

impact of class voting. Furthermore, a considerable decrease of social class voting emerged in the

1970s, but this is not he end, thereafter it continued to drop and the sharpest decline was after

Tony Blairs election as the face of Labour party in 1994. The class -voting problem was a major

change in the past decade but the most considerable nexus has been the fall of the support of

Conservatives among the nonmanual workers. [Clarke et al; 2004; p. 58; p. 315-318]

An important point to make is when we compare the results between leadership and class

voting (only Conservative and Labour) we can measure that there is a tendency for leadership to

have bigger effect, excluding 1970 when the results were equal. Furthermore, by examining these

two variables we can conclude that if class voting declined, the efficacy of the leadership did not

drop. Moreover, these strong leadership efficacy proposed that, at least since 1960s the voters

view was impacted significantly by those factor. The above statements proposed that the leader of a

party is playing a dramatic role for voters to chose a party, and that the valence model made a

strong leverage for evaluating and examining the politics of the past decade. [Clarke et al; 2004;

p.58-59 p. 63-64]

Another classical example of valence issue is the economic condition. Economic conditions

are vital for every individual, everybody wants a vigorous rate of growth and low level of

unemployment and inflation. Moreover, everybody is seeking for a peaceful society, without

terrorist attacks, violent crimes, personal and property threats and threats for the national security.


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Most people who belong to an adequate society wants an array of benefits that can insure their

education, transport, environment and health. [Clarke et al; 2009; p.152-154]

I have reduced the table and eliminated the other parties because the main battle on the

political scene is between Conservative and Labour parties. I have also cut some of the issues and

left those with higher percentage of importance. According to this table we can examine which

issues are valued the most by the voter. As it is clearly shown we can conclude that the entering of

the Euro and the European Union problems, along with NHS are the most valuable criteria if it is

according to the electorate, whereas the Transportation and the environmental health are the least

concerned. As we are observing the table we must have a clear distinction between those political

factors. If we can divide those variables into social and economic ones, on the one hand we can state

that those which are including economic issues (taxation, inflation, EURO) are tied to the

Conservatives, whether on the other hand the social factors (NHS, education, transportation) are

more benefited by the Labour party. [Clarke et al; 2009; p.153-155]

The main proposition in this case is that the electorate casts their vote for the party which

could deal in a most competent way with the issues of the day. It is originally assumed that issues

that involve social, health, educational and welfare problems are connected with a left-wing voting,

whether issues as violent crime, national defence, economic problems and specifically taxation and

inflation are linked to right-wing voting. . [Clarke et al; 2004; p.58]

Economic evaluation

When arguing about economic perceptions, it is stated that past and future economic

evaluations are really important for a research on the political economy voting. Downs stated that,

when it is talking about retrospective-prospective diversification, we must assume it like past

performance versus future promises. Assuming that the individual is rational, we must conclude that

using this model he would make his future expectations for his utility based on the former

performance of the government and the utility he already received. If electorate think that the only

reliable base, on which they make their evaluations, concerning actual government politics, then

they must rely on information about the economic performance of the party when it was an

NHS Education Unemployment Taxation Inflation

Economy

general Crime EURO, Europe Transportation Environment

147 29 1 39 2 18 25 162 4 7

25.3% 5.0% .2% 6.7% .3% 3.1% 4.3% 27.8% .7% 1.2%

351 148 9 18 5 63 29 69 13 6

35.7% 15.1% .9% 1.8% .5% 6.4% 3.0% 7.0% 1.3% .6%

Labour

Conservative

Most Important Issue-Summary


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Furthermore, the electorates inclination to join politics according to their class belonging is the

improvement of their economic condition. Following this idea, the income levels of the postwar

electorate have risen progressively to far much higher levels, than those of the prewar period.

Moreover, this revolution in the economic conditions in Britain did not brought the

embourgeoisement of the manual workers in the impression of identifying themselves as middle

class. With the rise of disposable income the gap (living standards and social benefits) between the

mass of working class and the mass of middle class become smaller. The zero-sum game, in which

somebody is gaining from the others losses, has declined in Britain as in many other countries.

[Butler, 1969; 193-194]

Another aspect that reducing the length of the bridge between working class and middle

class is the development of suburban owner-occupancy. Moreover it destroyed the relationship

between many long lived local communities. The more lenient structure of post war period and the

pop-culture broke many traditional frameworks and loosened moral and loyalty of social class and

family values. Broad opened horizons revealed in front of the proletariat, and in the same time the

bourgeois became self-conscious, this factors both together make it much harder for the class

superiority to emerge in terms of political party orientation. [Butler, 1969; p.194-195]

Conclusion

To conclude, the class cleavages in Britain do not explain a big percent from the variation

and do not account to be very important during the last decades. Although, the social class division

was a significant factor in the beginning of the postwar period, but according to modern researches,

the importance of the class cleavages decreased significantly. In the new modern and industrial

society world, where both the left-wing and the right-wing parties approach more centralist ideology,

new variables (economic condition, performance of the incumbent, NHS, Transportation, European

Union politics) are needed for the research to be concrete, new issues are valued the most from the

electorate, so we must finally sum up that the era of class politics is near to its end.


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Appendix

N Percent N Percent N Percent

Party Voted For * Social

Class

2061 68.1% 963.779 31.9% 3024.779 100.0%

Case Processing Summary

Cases

Valid Missing Total

Working Class Middle Class

Count 165 418 583

% within Social Class 19.8% 34.0% 28.3%

Count 511 470 981


Count 118 283 401


Count 19 17 36


Count 8 4 12

% within Social Class 1.0% .3% .6%

Count 3 18 21

% within Social Class .4% 1.5% 1.0%

Count 9 18 27


Count 833 1228 2061


Greens

Other [SPECIFY]

Total

Social Class

Total

Party Voted For Conservative

Labour

Liberal Democrat

SNP

Plaid Cymru

Value df

Asymp. Sig. (2-

sided)

Pearson Chi-Square 123.386a 6 .000

Likelihood Ratio 125.435 6 .000

Linear-by-Linear

Association

.333 1 .564

N of Valid Cases 2061

Chi-Square Tests


Party Voted For * Member of

Social Class

2056 68.0% 968.779 32.0% 3024.779 100.0%


Cases

Valid Missing Total


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Middl e clas s Working clas s Other clas s No Other[SPECIFY] Don't know

Count 150 82 10 320 12 8 582

% within Member of Social

Class

35.0% 14.4% 45.5% 32.8% 38.7% 27.6% 28.3%

Count 160 382 6 409 8 16 981


Class

37.3% 67.0% 27.3% 41.9% 25.8% 55.2% 47.7%

Count 96 72 5 212 10 4 399


Class

22.4% 12.6% 22.7% 21.7% 32.3% 13.8% 19.4%

Count 6 13 0 17 0 0 36


Class

1.4% 2.3% .0% 1.7% .0% .0% 1.8%

Count 1 6 0 5 0 0 12


Class

.2% 1.1% .0% .5% .0% .0% .6%

Count 9 1 0 10 0 0 20


Class

2.1% .2% .0% 1.0% .0% .0% 1.0%

Count 7 14 1 2 1 1 26


Class

1.6% 2.5% 4.5% .2% 3.2% 3.4% 1.3%

Count 429 570 22 975 31 29 2056


Class

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Greens

Other [SPECIFY]

Total

Member of Social Class

Total


Labour

Liberal Democrat

SNP

Plaid Cymru

Value df

Asymp. Sig. (2-

sided)



Linear-by-Linear

Association

4.841 1 .028


Chi-Square Tests


Party Voted For * Social

Class

2061 68.1% 963.779 31.9% 3024.779 100.0%

Cases

Valid Missing Total

A -

professionals B - managers

C1- clerical,

administrative

C2 - foremen

and supervisors

D - skilled

manual

E - semi-skilled

and unskilled

manual

Count 27 182 208 96 38 31 582

% within Social Class 42.9% 40.3% 29.2% 25.2% 14.9% 15.7% 28.2%

Count 19 142 309 216 161 134 981


Count 16 111 156 51 41 26 401


Count 0 5 12 10 7 2 36

% within Social Class .0% 1.1% 1.7% 2.6% 2.7% 1.0% 1.7%

Count 0 1 4 3 3 2 13

% within Social Class .0% .2% .6% .8% 1.2% 1.0% .6%

Count 1 4 13 1 2 0 21

% within Social Class 1.6% .9% 1.8% .3% .8% .0% 1.0%

Count 0 7 11 4 3 2 27

% within Social Class .0% 1.5% 1.5% 1.0% 1.2% 1.0% 1.3%

Count 63 452 713 381 255 197 2061


Greens

Other [SPECIFY]

Total

Social Class

Total


Labour

Liberal Democrat

SNP

Plaid Cymru


12/14

Value df

Asymp. Sig. (2-

sided)



Linear-by-Linear

Association

2.999 1 .083


Chi-Square Tests


Economy

general Crime EURO, Europe Transportation

147 29 1 39 2 18 25 162 4

25.3% 5.0% .2% 6.7% .3% 3.1% 4.3% 27.8% .7%

351 148 9 18 5 63 29 69 13

35.7% 15.1% .9% 1.8% .5% 6.4% 3.0% 7.0% 1.3%


Conservative

Labour


Economy

general Crime EURO, Europe Transportation Environment

147 29 1 39 2 18 25 162 4 7

25.3% 5.0% .2% 6.7% .3% 3.1% 4.3% 27.8% .7% 1.2%

351 148 9 18 5 63 29 69 13 6

35.7% 15.1% .9% 1.8% .5% 6.4% 3.0% 7.0% 1.3% .6%

Labour

Conservative



Party Voted For * Economic

Evaluation-Self, Past Year

2061 68.1% 963.779 31.9% 3024.779 100.0%


Cases

Valid Missing Total


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Lot wors e Little wors e Stayed sam e Little better Lot better Don't know

45 178 258 83 14 2 580

44.1% 51.1% 27.7% 15.3% 11.2% 18.2% 28.1%

37 95 431 332 81 5 981

36.3% 27.3% 46.2% 61.3% 64.8% 45.5% 47.6%

12 53 197 108 28 4 402

11.8% 15.2% 21.1% 19.9% 22.4% 36.4% 19.5%

3 8 18 8 0 0 37

2.9% 2.3% 1.9% 1.5% .0% .0% 1.8%

1 2 5 4 0 0 12

1.0% .6% .5% .7% .0% .0% .6%

3 5 12 1 0 0 21

2.9% 1.4% 1.3% .2% .0% .0% 1.0%

1 7 12 6 2 0 28

1.0% 2.0% 1.3% 1.1% 1.6% .0% 1.4%

102 348 933 542 125 11 2061

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Greens

Other [SPECIFY]

Total

Party Voted For * Economic Evaluation-Self, Past Year Crosstabulation

Economic Evaluation-Self, Past Year

Total


Labour

Liberal Democrat

SNP

Plaid Cymru

Value df

Asymp. Sig. (2-

sided)



Linear-by-Linear

Association

15.292 1 .000


Chi-Square Tests


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Bibliography:

1. Harold D Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne C Stewart, Paul F Whiteley

Political Choice in Britain; 2004; Oxford University Press; p.26-27, p.39-43, p.58-64, p.315-

3182. Harold D Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne C Stewart, Paul F Whiteley

Performance Politics and the British Voter; 2009; Cambridge University Press; p.152-155,

p.156-158, p.307

3. Anthony F Heath, Roger M Jowell, John K Curtice The Rise of New Labour;

2001; Oxford University Press; p.156-163

4. Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, John Curtice, Geoff Evans, Julia Field and

Sharon Witherspoon Understanding Political Change; 1991; Pegamon Press; p.62-66,

p.138-139, p.146-148

5. David Butler and Donald Stokes Political Change in Britain; 1969; The

Macmillan Press; p. 193-196; p.414-415

6. Han Dorussen and Michaell Taylor Economic Voting; 2002; Routledge;

p.261-262, p.266-268

7. Paul Nieuwbeerta The Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries

1945-1990; 1995; Thesis Publishers Amsterdam; p.16-18

8. Geoffrey EvansThe End of Class Politics; 1999; Oxford Scholarship Online:

November 2003; p.32-33

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Class is the Basis of British Party Politics

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