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Class Slides for EC 204

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Class Slides for EC 204. To Accompany Chapter 14. Learning objectives. In this chapter, you will learn about two policy debates: Should policy be active or passive? Should policy be by rule or discretion?. Question 1:. Should policy be active or passive?. ?. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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CHAPTER 14 CHAPTER 14 Stabilization Policy Stabilization Policy slide 1 Class Slides for EC 204 To Accompany Chapter 14
Transcript
Page 1: Class Slides for EC 204

CHAPTER 14CHAPTER 14 Stabilization Policy Stabilization Policy slide 1

Class Slides for EC 204

To Accompany Chapter 14

Page 2: Class Slides for EC 204

CHAPTER 14CHAPTER 14 Stabilization Policy Stabilization Policy slide 2

Learning objectivesLearning objectives

In this chapter, you will learn about two policy debates:

1. Should policy be active or passive?

2. Should policy be by rule or discretion?

Page 3: Class Slides for EC 204

CHAPTER 14CHAPTER 14 Stabilization Policy Stabilization Policy slide 3

Question 1:Question 1:

Should policy be Should policy be active or active or passive?passive?

Should policy be Should policy be active or active or passive?passive?

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CHAPTER 14CHAPTER 14 Stabilization Policy Stabilization Policy slide 4

U.S. Real GDP Growth RateU.S. Real GDP Growth Rate, 1960:1-2001:4, 1960:1-2001:4

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

percent

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

percent

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Arguments for active policyArguments for active policy

1. Recessions cause economic hardship for millions of people.

2. The Employment Act of 1946: “it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to…promote full employment and production.”

3. The model of aggregate demand and supply (Chapters 9-13) shows how fiscal and monetary policy can respond to shocks and stabilize the economy.

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Change in unemployment during recessionsChange in unemployment during recessions

peak troughincrease in no. of

unemployed persons (millions)

July 1953 May 1954 2.11

Aug 1957 April 1958 2.27

April 1960 February 1961 1.21

December 1969 November 1970 2.01

November 1973 March 1975 3.58

January 1980 July 1980 1.68

July 1981 November 1982 4.08

July 1990 March 1991 1.67

1.9March 2001 Nov 2001

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Arguments against active policyArguments against active policy

1. Long & variable lags inside lag: the time between the shock and the policy response takes time to recognize shock takes time to implement policy,

especially fiscal policyoutside lag: the time it takes for policy to affect economy

If conditions change before policy’s impact is felt, then policy may end up destabilizing the economy.

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Automatic Stabilizers Can HelpAutomatic Stabilizers Can Help

definition: policies that stimulate or depress the economy when necessary without any deliberate policy change.

They are designed to reduce the lags associated with stabilization policy.

Examples:– income tax– unemployment insurance– welfare

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Arguments against active policyArguments against active policy

2. Forecasting Macroeconomy is Difficult

Because policies act with lags, policymakers must predict future conditions.

Ways to generate forecasts:• Leading economic indicators:

data series that fluctuate in advance of the economy

• Macroeconometric models:Large-scale models with estimated parameters that can be used to forecast the response of endogenous variables to shocks and policies

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The LEI index and Real GDP, 1960sThe LEI index and Real GDP, 1960s

source of LEI data:The Conference Board

The Index of Leading Economic Indicators includes 10 data series

(see FYI box

on p.383 ).-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970

annual percentage change

Leading Economic Indicators

Real GDP

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The LEI index and Real GDP, 1970sThe LEI index and Real GDP, 1970s

source of LEI data:The Conference Board

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980

annual percentage change

Leading Economic Indicators

Real GDP

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The LEI index and Real GDP, 1980sThe LEI index and Real GDP, 1980s

source of LEI data:The Conference Board

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990

annual percentage change

Leading Economic Indicators

Real GDP

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The LEI index and Real GDP, 1990sThe LEI index and Real GDP, 1990s

source of LEI data:The Conference Board

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

annual percentage change

Leading Economic Indicators

Real GDP

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CHAPTER 14CHAPTER 14 Stabilization Policy Stabilization Policy slide 14

Mistakes Forecasting the Recession of 1982Mistakes Forecasting the Recession of 1982

Year

Unemploymentrate (percent)

1986

Actual

1983:4

1983:2

1982:4

1982:2

1981:4

1981:2

198519841983198219811980

11.0

10.5

10.0

9.5

9.0

8.5

8.0

7.5

7.0

6.5

6.0

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CHAPTER 14CHAPTER 14 Stabilization Policy Stabilization Policy slide 15

Forecasting the macroeconomyForecasting the macroeconomy

Because policies act with lags, policymakers must predict future conditions.

The preceding slides show that The preceding slides show that the forecasts are often wrong. the forecasts are often wrong.

This is one reason why some This is one reason why some economists oppose policy economists oppose policy activism. activism.

The preceding slides show that The preceding slides show that the forecasts are often wrong. the forecasts are often wrong.

This is one reason why some This is one reason why some economists oppose policy economists oppose policy activism. activism.

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The Lucas CritiqueThe Lucas Critique

Due to Robert Lucaswon Nobel Prize in 1995 for “rational expectations”

Forecasting the effects of policy changes has often been done using models estimated with historical data.

Lucas pointed out that such predictions would not be valid if the policy change alters expectations in a way that changes the fundamental relationships between variables.

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An example of the Lucas CritiqueAn example of the Lucas Critique

Prediction (based on past experience):an increase in the money growth rate will reduce unemployment

The Lucas Critique points out that increasing the money growth rate may raise expected inflation, in which case unemployment would not necessarily fall.

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The Historical RecordThe Historical Record

Has Policy been stabilizing or destabilizing?

Not easy to identify sources of economic fluctuations. Historical record often permits more than one interpretation.

Great Depression: Real shocks theory suggests active policy was needed. Monetary shocks theory suggests passive policy would have been preferable.

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Is Post-WWII Stability a Is Post-WWII Stability a Figment of the Data?Figment of the Data?

Work by Romer (AER 1986, JPE 1986).

Hypothesis is that reduction in volatility was due to “better” data not “better” policy.

Hard to construct “good” data for earlier period. So constructs “bad” data for post-World War II period.

Finds that recent period is almost as volatile as earlier period using this “bad” data.

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The Jury’s Out…The Jury’s Out…

Looking at history does not clearly answer Question 1:

• It’s hard to identify shocks in the data,

• and it’s hard to tell how things would have been different had actual policies not been used.

• Good Luck and good policy combined in 1990s to give good performance.

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Question 2:Question 2:

Should policy Should policy be conducted by be conducted by

rule or rule or discretion?discretion?

Should policy Should policy be conducted by be conducted by

rule or rule or discretion?discretion?

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Rules and Discretion: basic conceptsRules and Discretion: basic concepts

Policy conducted by rule: Policymakers announce in advance how policy will respond in various situations, and commit themselves to following through.

Policy conducted by discretion:As events occur and circumstances change, policymakers use their judgment and apply whatever policies seem appropriate at the time.

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Arguments for RulesArguments for Rules

1. Distrust of policymakers and the political process Misinformed politicians Politicians’ interests sometimes not

the same as the interests of society The Political Business Cycle

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Are politicians opportunistic or merely partisan? Do they have different preferences for inflation versus unemployment?

Fixed policy rules would insulate economy from these political influences. Fed would be unable to alter course in response to changing political climate.

So, economy might be more stable and long-run performance might be improved.

But, voice of electorate would be reduced.

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Arguments for RulesArguments for Rules

2. The Time Inconsistency of Discretionary Policy def: A scenario in which

policymakers have an incentive to renege on a previously announced policy once others have acted on that announcement.

Destroys policymakers’ credibility, thereby reducing effectiveness of their policies.

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Examples of Time-Inconsistent PoliciesExamples of Time-Inconsistent Policies

To encourage investment, To encourage investment, government announces it government announces it won’t tax income from capital. won’t tax income from capital.

But once the factories are built, But once the factories are built, the government reneges in the government reneges in order to raise more tax order to raise more tax revenue.revenue.

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Examples of Time-Inconsistent PoliciesExamples of Time-Inconsistent Policies

To reduce expected inflation, To reduce expected inflation, the Central Bank announces the Central Bank announces it will tighten monetary policy. it will tighten monetary policy.

But faced with high But faced with high unemployment, Central Bank may unemployment, Central Bank may be tempted be tempted to cut interest rates.to cut interest rates.

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Examples of Time-Inconsistent PoliciesExamples of Time-Inconsistent Policies

Aid to poor countries is Aid to poor countries is contingent on fiscal reforms. contingent on fiscal reforms.

The reforms don’t occur, but aid The reforms don’t occur, but aid is given anyway, because the is given anyway, because the donor countries don’t want the donor countries don’t want the poor countries’ citizens to starve.poor countries’ citizens to starve.

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Monetary Policy Rules Monetary Policy Rules

a. Constant money supply growth rate advocated by Monetarists stabilizes aggregate demand only

if velocity is stable

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Monetary Policy Rules Monetary Policy Rules

b. Target growth rate of nominal GDP automatically increase money

growth whenever nominal GDP grows slower than targeted; decrease money growth when nominal GDP growth exceeds target.

a. Constant money supply growth rate

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Monetary Policy Rules Monetary Policy Rules

c. Target the inflation rate automatically reduce money

growth whenever inflation rises above the target rate.

Many countries’ central banks now practice inflation targeting, but allow themselves a little discretion.

a. Constant money supply growth rate

b. Target growth rate of nominal GDP

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Monetary Policy Rules Monetary Policy Rules

c. Target the inflation rate

a. Constant money supply growth rate

b. Target growth rate of nominal GDP

d. The “Taylor Rule”Target Federal Funds rate based on inflation rate gap between actual & full-

employment GDP

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The Taylor RuleThe Taylor Rule

Nominal Fed Funds Rate = Inflation + 2.0

+ 0.5[Inflation - 2.0] - 0.5[GDP Gap]

where the implied real federal funds rate is 2.0%and the target rate of inflation is 2.0%.

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Does Greenspan follow the Taylor Rule?Does Greenspan follow the Taylor Rule?

The Federal Funds RateActual and Suggested

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002

Percent

Actual

Taylor's rule

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Central Bank IndependenceCentral Bank Independence

A policy rule announced by Central Bank will work only if the announcement is credible.

Credibility depends in part on degree of independence of central bank.

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Inflation and Central Bank Independence Inflation and Central Bank Independence

Index of central-bank independence

Averageinflation

4.543.532.521.510.5

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

Spain

New ZealandItaly

United KingdomDenmarkAustralia

France/Norway/Sweden

JapanCanadaNetherlandsBelgium United States

SwitzerlandGermany

Average inflation

Index of central bank independence

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Chapter summaryChapter summary

1. Advocates of active policy believe: frequent shocks lead to unnecessary

fluctuations in output and employment fiscal and monetary policy can stabilize

the economy

2. Advocates of passive policy believe: the long & variable lags associated with

monetary and fiscal policy render them ineffective and possibly destabilizing

knowledge is incomplete and inept policy increases volatility in output, employment

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CHAPTER 14CHAPTER 14 Stabilization Policy Stabilization Policy slide 42

Chapter summaryChapter summary

3. Advocates of discretionary policy believe: discretion gives more flexibility to

policymakers in responding to the unexpected

4. Advocates of policy rules believe: the political process cannot be trusted:

politicians make policy mistakes or use policy for their own interests

commitment to a fixed policy is necessary to avoid time inconsistency and maintain credibility

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CHAPTER 14CHAPTER 14 Stabilization Policy Stabilization Policy slide 43


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