EuroMedMig Policy Paper Series Number 1, December 2019

Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Mediterranean Migration: Premises for Shaping

Future Policies

Prepared by Ricard Zapata-Barrero, Karina Melkonian

and Gülce Şafak Özdemir EuroMedMig, GRITIM-UPF, Barcelona, Catalonia,

Spain

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Contents I. Conceptual framework of the meeting: A much needed debate on climate change,

environmental degradation and Mediterranean migration ....................................................... 3 1. Premises guiding the debate .......................................................................................... 4 2. Mapping the terms of the debate within Mediterranean migration studies .................... 5

II. Meeting summary: Guiding arguments ............................................................................. 7 1. Lack of evidence linking migration and climate change, and lack of evidence on

climate change and its policy effects ............................................................................. 7 2. Distinctive features of the Mediterranean as a region affected by climate change and

environmental degradation ............................................................................................ 8 3. Climate change and environmental degradation as induced drivers of Mediterranean

migration: Multi-causality and mixed migration ........................................................... 8 4. Development, resilience and Mediterranean migration as an end stage process of the

response to environmental degradation ....................................................................... 10 5. The governance of climate change and human Med-mobilities: Multi-variable and

multi-scale approaches are necessary .......................................................................... 11 III. Concluding remarks: Final recommendations ................................................................. 12 IV. References ....................................................................................................................... 13 V. Expert Meeting’s agenda ................................................................................................. 18 VI. List of Experts (presented in alphabetical order) ............................................................ 19

Suggested citation:

Zapata-Barrero, R., Melkonian, K. and Özdemir, G.S. (prepared by) (2019) “Climate Change,

Environmental Degradation and Mediterranean Migration: Premises for Shaping Future Policies.”

EuroMedMig Policy Paper Series, no. 1 (December): http://hdl.handle.net/10230/43617

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-

commercial 4.0 International License. Click here to view a copy of this

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This Policy Paper is the summary of an Expert Meeting on the “Deep roots of migration, environmental

and climate change: Exploring emerging drivers of human mobility in the Mediterranean” co-organized

by the Union for the Mediterranean and GRITIM-UPF (EuroMedMig) on December 17th 2019, and held

at the Union for the Mediterranean´s Headquarters in Barcelona (the agenda and list of participants are in

sections V and VI). We have added a conceptual framework of the debate (you may find the references in

section IV). During the meeting, Experts and Scholars exchanged their research agenda on both

Mediterranean migration (MedMig, from EuroMedMig Network) and climate change (from the network

of Mediterranean Experts on Climate and Environmental Change; network of Mediterranean Coastal

Cities; Partnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area; Global Institute for Water,

Environment and Health).

Through facilitating knowledge exchange, the event produced a better definition, assessment and

identification in relation to climate change and environmental degradation as possible future drivers of

MedMig. The objective of this Policy Paper is to summarize the premises put forward during this meeting

with the purpose of sharing what was considered as substantial policy-relevant arguments with a larger

audience.

The views and opinions reproduced do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Union for the

Mediterranean and of the Experts.

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I. Conceptual framework of the meeting: A much needed debate on climate

change, environmental degradation and Mediterranean migration

There are many forces driving migration including economic, political, social,

demographic, conflict-related and environmental factors. As it was highlighted during the

Expert Meeting, considering environmental degradation and climate change as the only

reasons for migration is highly challenging because this concept is implicitly or explicitly

inter-related to other factors such as socio-economic stability, conflicts and human

security. These factors should be addressed in the major subregions of the Mediterranean,

in line with the Valetta Declaration on Innovation and Research in the Euro

Mediterranean region (Ministerial meeting 2017), approved by UfM Ministers of

Research, which upheld “the key role that research and innovation play in developing an

understanding of the root causes of migration and the inter-dependencies between

different drivers of migration including economic, political, social, demographic,

conflict-related and environmental drivers.”

In this context, there is a need to deepen the understanding of the potential impacts of

environmental degradation and climate change on human migration behavior, particularly

spatial mobility within the Mediterranean. At this point, we should shed light on some

facts regarding environmental changes to have a clear understanding of why people

migrate. While the forecast for the sea level is up to 1 meter (or more), the anticipated

temperature increase is 2.2°C above pre-industrial levels.

The sea level and temperature are projected to increase by 2100 in the

Mediterranean.

Urban populations in countries around the Mediterranean Sea increased from

152 million to 315 million between 1970 and 2010 (an average rate of 1.9 %

per year). It is expected that by 2030, the Mediterranean Basin will be the

global biodiversity hotspot with the highest percentage of urban land (5%).

As the last point explicitly shows, environmental factors evolve in relation to other

elements such as the rapidly growing urbanization (city growth) of the Mediterranean

coasts, notably in the South and the East. Therefore, as it was mentioned in the Expert

Meeting, before cross-border migration, the general pattern is that people tend to migrate

internally. This internal migration from rural to urban areas is directly and/or indirectly

related to environmental changes. In this sense, sustainable development as a regional

solution to understanding the deep roots of human displacement should increasingly focus

on placing the people and their demands at the heart of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

In addition to focusing on migration and integration within the Euro-Mediterranean area,

coordinated and collaborative approaches among Mediterranean cities and sub-regions in

the Mediterranean should also be encouraged.

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1. Premises guiding the debate

Recently, climate change and environmental degradation are at the top of uncertainty

and risks for personal and mass displacements in the Mediterranean. This emerging issue

is slowly penetrating into most of the Mediterranean Migration (MedMig) research

agendas today.

One of the great features of climate change is that it forces us to think of MedMig in a

long-term perspective. Today, most of the research is contingent upon policy agenda and

trapped by urgent challenges. Climate change and environmental degradation motivate

us to work with an anticipatory logic, following a scenario-building methodology. To this

end, it provides us with an opportunity to incorporate this issue into current MedMig

policies at the EU, Mediterranean states/regions and city levels.

What also becomes important is that the Mediterranean is definitively incorporated as

a category of analysis in its geographical, regional and even geo-political dimension. In

this sense, MedMig thinking involves speaking about trans-Med mobility, Med-

population distribution and Med-reconfiguration. The interest is in exploring how climate

change may have an impact on social, political and economic change, and on how

societies incorporate this new environmental factor into their everyday agenda and social

behavior.

Since today, climate change and environmental degradation are definitely one of the

main factors of uncertainty in MedMig governance. Their incorporation into MedMig

studies compels migration scholars to address some substantial methodological and

epistemological issues related not only to the objectivity of data, but also on how to

produce quality-related knowledge on climate change and environmental degradation in

migration studies.

Another preliminary premise is that the Mediterranean is/will be a regional issue of

undisputable common concern. However, as it always happens, sharing a common

concern does not necessarily mean sharing a common diagnosis and solution. This is why

the promotion of debates and research is necessary, to continue preparing the path of

anticipation and reflection, and see what future scenarios we can expect.

Recently, migration studies are exploring whether there is a link between climate

change, environmental degradation and migration. Human migration is potentially

influenced by environmental factors, but ultimately shaped by a complexity of forces

including social, economic and cultural processes. The common assumption is that it is a

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multi-causal phenomenon with high “cascade effects” at the social, economic and

political levels.

This debate is no older than 10 years. The Conference of Parties to the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Cancun (COP 16) held in

December 2010, was a key moment in placing this issue into the Global Agenda with a

first recognition of the potential impacts of climate change on people’s mobilities. The

Convention signatory governments were invited to implement the following adaptation

initiatives: “measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with

regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where

appropriate, at national, regional and international levels” (§ 14(f)). Even if we may

acknowledge everything is already included in this declaration (induced displacement,

planned relocation, coordination and cooperation, and multi-scale approach), the multi-

faceted view of this issue, combining all the areas of social sciences (social, political,

legal and anthropological points of view, including economy) would also be required to

complete the first framework for a debate.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014) identified the

Mediterranean region as a climate change “hot spot,” with most countries of the Eastern

Mediterranean already experiencing temperature rises, accompanied by growing rates of

desertification, increases in freshwater scarcity, forest fires, and an increase in the

frequency of droughts. Thus, we need more scientific data to better asses how this Med-

ecosystem change may affect Med-societies and Med-governments, while searching for

anticipatory policies to prevent potential negative effects such as increasing inequalities

between countries. In this respect, the Global Compact on Migration (GCM, 2018)

follows the two main approaches to deal with climate change-related human

displacements: “adaptation” and “protection”.

What also became assumed in the meeting is that climate change puts human security

at the top of the MedMig agenda, together with refugees. The Northern/Southern and

Eastern/Western cleavages again become an analysis criterion to distinguish sub-regions

and vulnerabilities in terms of adaption and survival capacities in increasing hostile

environments.

2. Mapping the terms of the debate within Mediterranean migration studies

In thinking about emerging drivers of Med-mobility, the resource-based approach

must prevail over any other considerations. This approach might allow us to better handle

this new issue, since there is not one, but many complex inter-related factors inducing

people to migrate.

This view also enables us to build a subsistence narrative. What are the minimum

resources needed for human subsistence? Some studies refer here to Nussbaum’s (2012)

theory as a framework to develop the research tools since it sets up ten central capabilities,

which are the foundations for the development of human beings in the space in which

they live, move and socialize. A ground theoretical framework emerges from this

question: What is needed for a dignified life? This issue is at the core of these debates,

since people do not leave their region of origin as long as they are leading some sort of a

dignified life.

The complexity of the nexus between climate change and mobility has obvious

implications in finding governance solutions. Human displacement can assume different

forms (e.g. forced or voluntary, internal or cross-border, temporary or permanent) and

requires a wide range of cross-sectorial policy responses (migration, climate change,

development, human rights disaster management and humanitarian relief) at national,

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regional and international levels. It also includes all the phases of migration: pre-

displacement (actions to mitigate climate change and strengthen the adaptation capacities

of communities), displacement, and return or resettlement.

At the level of solutions, there is a certain trend in the debate claiming on the need to

establish a global international legal mechanism to provide a legal status and protective

rights to the displaced people on the grounds of climate change and environmental

degradation, as well as a burden-sharing system for resettlement programs.

Finally, the city approach becomes prominent since according to initial studies, the

first effect of environmental degradation is the displacement of people from rural to urban

areas within their countries. By mapping the key issues in this context, we cannot leave

aside social class dimensions at the city level. Thus, cross-border migration is generally

the next step but the last in personal decisions. But as O. Barba insisted in his speech, in

general there is a lack of implication of cities in the creation of framework to find

solutions.

Here we frame what has always been a concern within the debate on environmental

degradation and climate change. In the words of Sobczac-Szelc, solutions must focus on

developing policies to improve living standards and offer alternative sources of income,

involve women in the labour market, improve irrigation techniques, prevent reservoir

situations and invest in health and education. Additionally, we must stress that all actions

should be preceded by public consultations and knowledge exchange while respecting the

traditional local and domestic strategies taken by local communities to face limited

environmental resources.

From a legal and political point of view, there is no mutually accepted designation for

people whose decision to migrate was induced by climate change or environmental

factors by international organizations and academia. This is because it is difficult to

isolate environmental factors from other drivers of forced migration (sudden-onset

events, e.g., flood, earthquake) versus voluntary migration (low-onset events, e.g.,

drought, sea level rise). IOM and the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF 2008)

identified three categories: “environmentally-motivated migrants”, “environmentally-

forced migrants” and “environmental refugees”. Furthermore, since its proposal in 2011,

the IOM defined environmental migrants in its Glossary on Migration as “persons or

groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the

environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their

habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move

either within their country or abroad” (Perruchoud, & Redpath-Cross, 2011).

Related literature also shows the difficulty of isolating climate change as a unique

driver of migration. It is assumed that the effects of climate change on the increasing

international and regional human displacements and large-scale international population

movements will primarily be felt in the developing world, “therefore unlikely to occur in

the EU” (EC, 2013, p. 34), justifying to some extent the EU’s focus on the external

dimension of migration to deal with the linkage between “climate change” and human

displacements.

We cannot escape from Eurocentrism in this matter, since there is a certain approach

that needs to be avoided: the fact that most debates focus on the effects of climate change

in Southern and Easter Mediterranean countries on migration pressures to Europe in terms

of national security.

Traditionally, the EU has addressed the impact of climate change on migration patterns

as part of its humanitarian and development policies. More recently, the issue has also

been calling the attention of security and defense policies, which might be beneficial,

since climate-security hinges upon few key directions, which are multi-level governance,

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new energy pathways and climate management. We assume that multi-level governance

is crucial for climate change mitigation.

II. Meeting Summary: Guiding arguments

1. Lack of evidence linking migration and climate change, and lack of evidence

on climate change and its policy effects

Involuntary migration has been a defining feature of the Mediterranean region these

last decades. However, policy makers have placed more attention on displacement due to

conflict rather than on climate change and environmental degradation. Thus, we do not

have neither empirical evidence nor conceptual tools to state whether or not climate

change leads to involuntary displacement. In fact, a debate is both conceptually and

empirically very complex. However, experts have warned that portraying climate change

as an apocalyptical threat might securitize the relationship between migration and climate

change for political reasons; it becomes a significant concern especially in the North, to

give grounds for their more restrictive policies and reactive political systems to limit

migration.

Furthermore, more research in the Mediterranean is needed to examine whether or not

there is a causal relationship between environmental threats and social/political conflict.

As V. Koubi stated in her intervention, the existing literature has not detected a robust

and direct effect linking climate to conflict onset. Substantial agreement exists that

climatic changes contribute to conflict under some conditions and through certain

pathways. In particular, the literature shows that climatic conditions breed conflict in

fertile grounds: in regions dependent on agriculture and in combination and interaction

with other socioeconomic and political factors such as a low level of economic

development and political marginalization. V. Koubi insisted that what is needed is that

future research continues to investigate how climatic changes interact with and/or are

conditioned by socio-economic, political, and demographic settings to cause conflict and

uncover the causal mechanisms that link these two phenomena.

However, specialists have argued that when studying the effects of climate change on

involuntary migration in the region, we need to take into account the weak

political/governance systems which not only worsen the effect of climate change, but also

give room for local parties to misuse the climate change to advance their own political

agenda. As T. Fakhoury illustrated in her intervention, one of the core demands of the

current protesters in Lebanon who are asking for a new government is to have

environmental justice. Thus, in order to better understand the relationship between

climate change and migration, we also need to consider the existing socio-political

situation and the governance system in the Mediterranean, which, all together combined,

lead to conflict and become a driver of migration.

We need data saturation at the micro-level so we can tease out to what extent

environmental/climatic factors affect people’s migration decision and behavior. The lack

of objective data linking migration and climate change is particularly paramount at the

micro level. If we are to understand its effects on migration decisions, we need to pay

serious attention to what Geddes called in his brief speech the 3 D’s: distance (most of

them are internal, only some are international), direction (people sometimes do not

necessarily move away from one form of environmental risk to another, where they are

exposed to environmental hazards) and duration (permanent/temporary). The ecological

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characteristics of the Mediterranean region need to be combined with the social, political

and economic characteristics of migration.

2. Distinctive features of the Mediterranean as a region affected by climate

change and environmental degradation

H. Boubakri exemplified in his intervention that historically, the droughts of the Sahel

area in the 17th and 18th century demonstrated that the African population’s movement

was driven by three main factors: ineffective operations, ecological problems and limited

natural resources. Within this framework, researchers should address the complexity and

causes and dimensions of Mediterranean migration dynamics due to climate change.

Climate change has then, to some degree, influenced migration flows in the

Mediterranean. However, there is a decreased reliance in the 20th century on agricultural

production specially in the North which does not easily allow us to detect the causality

between climate change and migration.

In order to understand MedMig, we should also look at pollution and overfishing in

this region. It is also important to look at the agricultural changes and food export.

Therefore, irrigation gains importance, especially in rural surroundings. Furthermore, the

growing number of population in the Mediterranean leads to food scarcity. In fact, this

region was long known for exportation practices of its agricultural products, but now

more than 50% of its food is being imported due to food scarcity. When it comes to

improving sustainable agricultural practices, biodiversity loss should be mitigated both in

sea and land.

Regional warming is 20% faster in the Mediterranean than global rates. In recent years,

the average sea level has risen by 6 cm. As far as future scenarios, it is important in any

migration discussion for climate change mitigation to be the key necessity for world

leaders, especially since it is predicted for this region’s warming to continue to exceed

global rates.

The population dynamics in the Mediterranean are substantial. People living close to

the sea level will in turn be affected by rising sea levels. Today, the Mediterranean region

is a hotspot for a number of real and potential climate risks, such as heat waves, droughts,

desertification, wildfires, soil and coastal erosion, as well as flooding. Thus, sustainable

development and coastal management are important. By the end of the current century,

the coolest summer month in Mediterranean cities will be warmer than today’s warmest

summer month, which will have a direct impact on these people’s health and livelihood.

Also, diseases carried by for example tiger mosquitos will have a greater ease of spreading

across the region.

As V. Koubi stated, according to the World Bank Report 2018 entitled “Groundswell:

Preparing for Internal Climate Migration”, under a BAU scenario (i.e., high GHG

emissions and unequal development), 143 million people will migrate in sub-Saharan

Africa (86 million), South Asia (40 million) and Latin America (17 million). Furthermore,

V. Koubi affirmed that the report did not include predictions for the Mediterranean region

and hence, she stressed the need for more rigorous research on the topic of

environmental/climate-induced migration in this specific region.

3. Climate change and environmental degradation as induced drivers of

Mediterranean migration: Multi-causality and mixed migration

Climate change by itself is not to be taken in isolation as a driver, but along with the

vulnerability of people, their capacities, and also economic, social and political drivers.

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Vulnerability includes individuals’ exposure to climatic events, their sensitivity to these

events, and their ability to adapt. For instance, high exposure to climatic events (e.g.

floods) and processes (e.g. droughts), combined with low resilience / adaptation capacity

and low levels of development, accelerate vulnerability. To this end, migration can be a

strategy to reduce vulnerability in two ways. (1) Migration as a survival strategy (2)

Migration as an adaptation strategy. And so, in these affected areas, people who cannot

move may be trapped, so their vulnerability should be highlighted as well. This also

shows that there is a lot of focus on how climate change induces migration, however how

and why questions of the reaction of populations to environmental degradation, limited

resources and climate change are undermined.

We might argue about the multi-causality of the necessity to move, but we cannot get

away from the significant reduction in the potential to live and to produce in the

Mediterranean. There were significant droughts between 1988-1993 and 1998-2000

which affected the agriculture in the region which highly depends on it, but these were a

precursor of much more significant events that could happen in the future. Thus, we need

to provide better interventions (mitigation and/or adaptation measures) based on scientific

results. And we should not fall into the trap of looking at climate change alone and

overlooking the other factors.

What actually causes human suffering or limits our prospects of survival? It is always

a combination of climate change and other factors (e.g. pollution and overfishing). It is

the same for agriculture: unsustainable agricultural techniques are affecting food

production, but climate change is adding substantial weight to it, that affects both the

quantity and quality of food produced. This lowers the capacity to produce food which in

turns affects the capacity to export food to other regions. This reduction will increase the

prices of imported agricultural products from the Mediterranean.

Induced migration is increasing societies’ vulnerabilities in terms of the daily life,

destruction of basic survival assets and of poor basic resources of the main rural areas. In

this way, we should be aware of the livelihoods and quality of life of rural populations.

This means that rural communities are the most vulnerable because of their limited

resources. But cities also need to be targeted. As K. Hassan illustrated in his speech,

almost 60% of the Egyptian population lacks access to improved sanitation, in addition

to the absence of solid waste management in the country, leading to the generation of 52

million tons of solid waste per year.

Moreover, as K. Sobczak-Szelc stressed in her intervention, similar environmental

conditions do not necessarily create similar adaptation and coping strategies. Depending

on the scale of the environmental changes and possibilities to mitigate its limitations,

environmental conditions may either force or motivate people to migrate, as seen in the

comparison of two oases Mhamid (Morocco) and El Faouar (Tunisia). Even if

environmental degradation gives strong reasons to migrate, other factors such as financial

possibilities, social capital, family traditions, social connections and sometimes just good

fortune, are not less important. In fact, relations with neighboring countries, human

resources (physical ability and willingness), financial resources and access to new

technologies may affect people’s decision to migrate.

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4. Development, resilience and Mediterranean migration as an end stage

process of the response to environmental degradation

The real challenge or root cause is not climate change as such. As I. Martín underlined

in his intervention, the real issue is the lack of development in the Southern and Easter

Mediterranean countries which truly determines the climate change-migration nexus. No

researcher, policy maker or analyst has predicted a massive migration flow away from

the Spanish, Italian or even Greek coastal and rural areas as a consequence of climate

change. It is the lack of development and real convergence across the Mediterranean

which puts climate change at the spotlight as a possible driver of migration. In any case,

to the extent that this is recognized as a common challenge, it should be addressed on the

basis of shared responsibility in the Mediterranean, and this means mobilizing common

resources to implement common solutions. Thus, an integrated response is needed. In

other words, we should get rid of the Eurocentric view which links climate change to

migration in the Mediterranean.

The most appropriate focus for framing research and policy is thus climate change and

its link to lack of development which then leads to migration. This also needs to be

combined with micro actions, since resilience is a survival strategy and requires ad hoc

interventions and micro actions. However, development requires a more structural action.

At the global policy level, experts have called to look at migration driven by climate

change not as a security threat, but rather as an adaptation strategy that many will be

resorting to in the future. Displacement and involuntary migration can be an indication of

climate change vulnerability since being exposed to climatic events without having a

proper or any adaptation strategy combined with low preparedness to deal with climate

change, gives people no choice other than moving. What this tells us is that

underdevelopment and inequalities must be considered as the main cause of climate

change-induced migration. Paths to reduce induced migration remain to be developed. In

this regard, O. Quintana argued that the sustainable development goals of the 2030

Agenda adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015 must be incorporated as a

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framework for action to address climate change and environmental degradation in the

Mediterranean. (Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 2020). In this

framework, it is advisable to work on building innovation capacity and also introducing

the circular economy approach in local projects by conducting research focused on the

preservation of resources. In so doing, while minimizing externalities and valorizing

waste, and by creating an interlinkage between the areas being addressed, our attention

will be on the socio-economic and scientific impacts of these projects, in order to boost

the local economic development, while bridging the Northern and Southern parts of the

Mediterranean.

The fact is that the most vulnerable communities are the rural ones because their main

resource is the environment, like the land. The impact of environmental degradation also

affects Mediterranean cities. The environment plays there a role in the previous processes

of migration decisions, and often it is unconscious. But most potential Med-Movers are

not yet aware and have difficulties articulating a narrative on climate change when they

have to justify their spatial mobility. For instance, it is still very difficult to find objective

answers to; at what point will households become unable to find an adaptation technique

on site without moving, or when will they stop wanting to move even if they are able to

do so. As a result, migration can become a way to minimize the exposure of these

populations to climate change and can increase their resilience towards risks. Thus,

resilience is seen as the capacity to adapt to complex environmental events instead of

migration. Resilience is a survival strategy in emergency situations.

5. The governance of climate change and human Med-mobilities: Multi-

variable and multi-scale approaches are necessary

Governments in the Mediterranean have not addressed much climate change in their

agenda, which is clearly reflected in the very low budgets dedicated to their

environmental ministries. Furthermore, it has become challenging to open the agenda of

“climate refugees” in the region when many of the states are non-signatories to the 1951

refugee convention, and when the region has been witnessing ongoing conflicts which

obliges humanitarian organizations and UN agencies to allocate their budget to immediate

vulnerabilities arising from geopolitical conflicts.

Climate change alone is not an isolated driver of migration; political and economic

governance play a significant role as well (such as corruption), mainly as an accelerating

driver of migration initiated by climate change as seen in the Sahel communities.

Finally, the high influx of “environmental migrants” might cause conflict in the

receiving areas by establishing “unstable” ethno-political balance and burdening limited

resources. Furthermore, other studies show that one of the factors which caused the start

of the Syrian civil war was drought-induced migration, and on a regional level, the

increase of food prices contributed to the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011.

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III. Concluding remarks: Final recommendations

More rigorous research is advisable: (1) collect better data on migration and climatic

processes (2) establish better modelling techniques to predict future Mediterranean

migration flows (3) make micro-level analysis to identify the climatic and non-climatic

determinants of individual migration decisions (4) have deep insight on the compound

effects of both slow-onset and sudden-onset climatic events on migration (5) examine

adaptation options at both micro and macro levels (6) explore the implications of

migration on vulnerability especially in the case of rural-to-urban migration (7)

investigate immobility and trapped populations (8) draw attention to the climate-

migration-conflict relationship.

When it comes to exploring the mechanisms underlying this relationship, we find out

that a limited number of studies examine the reason behind and the way in which climate

change affects Mediterranean migration, rather most studies focus on whether or not this

relationship exists. Some studies at the macro level try to differentiate the effect of this

relationship based on socio-political factors, but more research needs to be done to

observe this kind of trigger. We also need to find ways to measure environmental

degradation and its response in terms of migration or resilience. The root cause approach

should not solely focus on climate change, but also on other factors that play an important

role in migration.

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V. Expert Meeting’s agenda

Expert Meeting on the occasion of the launch of EuroMedMig Working Paper Series

Deep roots of migration, environmental and climate change: Exploring emerging drivers

of human mobility in the Mediterranean

Location: UfM, Palacio de Pedralbes. Pere Duran Farell, 11. 08034 Barcelona

9.30 Opening

Itaf Ben Abdallah, Higher Education and Research, UfM, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain

Ricard Zapata-Barrero, EuroMedMig, GRITIM-UPF, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain

10.00 - 11.30 Session 1 – Climate change and environment within the Mediterranean migration

research agenda

- Research on Mediterranean Migration (UfM activities so far; work by EuroMedMig)

- Presentation of EuroMedMig Working Paper Series.

Introduction: Ricard Zapata-Barrero, EuroMedMig, GRITIM-UPF, Barcelona, Catalonia,

Spain

Moderation: Zouhair El-Hairan, EuroMedMig, GRITIM-UPF, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain

Tamirace Fakhoury, EuroMedMig, Institute of Social Justice and Conflict Resolution at the

Lebanese American University, Beirut, Lebanon

Vally Koubi, MedECC, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain

Hassen Boubraki, EuroMedMig, University of Sousse, Tunisia

Andrew Geddes, European University Institute, Florence, Italy

12.00 - 13.30 Session 2 – Future and current scenarios related to climate change and

environment

- Climate change and socioeconomic drivers (climate change, desertification, water scarcity,

rural-urban drivers)

Introduction and Moderation: Arnault Graves, Energy and Climate Action, UfM, Barcelona,

Catalonia, Spain

Wolfgang Cramer, MedECC, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain

Karolina Sobczak-Szelc, Associated EuroMedMig Member, Centre of Migration Research,

University of Warsaw, Poland

Oriol Barba Suñol, MedCities, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain

Hocine Labdealoui, Associated EuroMedMig Member, University of Algiers, Algeria

13.30 - 14.30 Lunch

14.30 - 16.00 Session 3 – Building resilience for a prosperous Mediterranean

- Tools for building resilience through development (possible solutions based on Sustainable

development water, circular economy, rural development, etc).

Introduction: Alessandra Sensi, Water, Environment and Blue Economy, UfM, Barcelona,

Catalonia, Spain

Moderation: Giuseppe Provenzano, Higher Education and Research, UfM, Barcelona,

Catalonia, Spain

Octavi Quintana, PRIMA Foundation, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain

Kareem Hassan, Benaa Foundation and Global Institute for Water, Environment and Health,

Cairo, Egypt

Iván Martín, Associated EuroMedMig Member, GRITIM-UPF, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain

16.00 - 16.15 Conclusions

Giuseppe Provenzano, Higher Education and Research, UfM

Ricard Zapata-Barrero, EuroMedMig, GRITIM-UPF, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain

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VI. List of Experts (presented in alphabetical order)

Barba Suñol, Oriol – Director of MedCities, Member of the Territorial Resilience to

Climate Change Hub of the Center for Mediterranean Integration and the Water Experts

Group at the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain.

Benabdallah, Itaf – Senior Advisor for the Higher Education and Research Division at

the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain.

Boubakri, Hassen – Member of the EuroMedMig Steering Committee, Professor of

Geography at the University of Sousse and Chairman of the Centre of Tunis for Migration

and Asylum (CeTuMA), Tunisia.

Cramer, Wolfgang – Coordinator of the network of Mediterranean Experts on Climate

and Environmental Change (MedECC), Professor of Global Ecology, Research Director

(CNRS) at the Mediterranean Institute for Biodiversity and Ecology, Aix-en-Provence,

France.

Fakhoury, Tamirace – Member of the EuroMedMig Steering Committee, Associate

Professor in Political Sciences and International Affairs in the Department of Social

Sciences and Associate Director of the Institute of Social Justice and Conflict Resolution

at the Lebanese American University (ISJCR), Beirut, Lebanon.

Geddes, Andrew – Member of the EuroMedMig Steering Committee, Director of the

Migration Policy Centre (MPC) and Chair in Migration Studies, Florence, Italy.

González Afonso, Isidro – Deputy Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean

in charge of Water, Environment and Blue Economy (UfM), Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain.

Graves, Arnault – Senior Climate Adviser at the Secretariat of the Union for the

Mediterranean (UfM), Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain.

Hassan, Kareem – Director of Youth and Innovation at the Global Institute for Water,

Environment, and Health (GIWEH), Managing Director of BENAA Foundation, Lecturer

and Researcher at Zewail University for Science and Technology, Cairo, Egypt.

Koubi, Vally – Professor at the Center for Comparative and International Studies at the

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, and the Institute of Economics at the

University of Bern, Switzerland.

Labdelaoui, Hocine – Associated EuroMedMig Member, Professor of Sociology at the

University of Algiers 2, Team Leader in International Mobility and Migration at the

Research Center in Applied Economics for Development (CREAD), Algiers, Algeria.

Martín, Iván – Associated EuroMedMig Member, Economist and Associate Researcher

at the Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration at the Department of Political

and Social Sciences at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (GRITIM-UPF), Barcelona, Catalonia,

Spain.

Mastrojeni, Grammenos – Deputy Secretary General at the Secretariat of the Union for

the Mediterranean (UfM), Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain.

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Provenzano, Giuseppe – Expert in the Higher Education and Research Division at the

Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain.

Quintana, Octavi – Director of the Partnership for Research and Innovation in the

Mediterranean Area (PRIMA) Foundation, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain.

Sensi, Alessandra – Head of Water, Environment and Blue Economy at the Secretariat

of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain.

Sobczak-Szelc, Karolina – Associated EuroMedMig Member, Assistant Professor in the

Centre of Migration Research (CMR), University of Warsaw, Poland.

Zapata-Barrero, Ricard – EuroMedMig Coordinator, Full Professor and Director of the

Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration at the Department of Political and

Social Sciences at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (GRITIM-UPF), Barcelona, Catalonia,

Spain.