Climate Change, Migration and Conflict: Receiving Communities under Pressure?

8/9/2019 Climate Change, Migration and Conflict: Receiving Communities under Pressure?

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Summary: This paper analyzes the

likely intersections between climate

change, migration and conict. The

paper identies some of the most

relevant factors that might turn envi-

ronmentally induced migration into

a source of conict and hold major

implications for receiving areas.

Scientic literature is still inconclusive

about the conict potential of environ-mentally induced in-migration and the

mechanisms potentially linking it to

conict onset. In general, such mecha-

nisms tend to apply more often in

cases of conict induced as opposed to

environmentally induced migration. In

a possible chain of events leading from

environmentally induced migration to

conict in a receiving area, a host of

other factors comes into play, including

the causes and type of migration and

responses to and perceptions of migra-

tion. The impacts of current and future

climate trends are likely to increasethe pressures that trigger environmen-

tally induced distress migration and

migration as a means of adaptation

to environmental change. At the same

time, climatic and non-climatic factors

further strain governance capacities

and weaken the stability and the natu-

ral resource base of receiving commu-

nities, thus making it harder for them

to respond to migration appropriately.

Consequently, governments and

donors need to invest in (a) extending

the knowledge base, for instance byconducting long-term case studies, and

(b) supporting mechanisms for receiv-

ing communities in devising migration

governance strategies based on this

knowledge.

1744 R Street NWWashington, DC 20009 1 202 745 3950F 1 202 265 1662E [email protected]

Study Team on Climate-Induced Migration

In predictions and scenarios onpotential security risks arising romclimate change, large-scale population

movements and their consequencesor receiving areas gure prominentlyamong the assumed threats. As earlyas 1985, El-Hinnawi listed large-scale distress migration as one othe oremost potential security risksresulting rom anthropogenic climatechange.

While it is generally acknowledgedthat each o the actors might in turnreinorce or exacerbate the others,

several authors have sought to identiydirect and indirect linkages betweenenvironmental change, migrationand conict more specically. Teso-called direct pathway assumes thatenvironmental stressors might causelarge-scale displacements therebygenerating conicts in receiving areas.By contrast, the indirect pathway positsthat environmental stressors mightlead to conict which in turn causesmigration and the export o the con-ict to receiving areas (Gleditsch et al.,2007; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2000;Suhrke, 1997).

Most o the existing research hasocused on linkages between envi-ronmental triggers (including climatechange) and migration in the sendingareas. In this context, it is also impor-

tant to note that migration in responseto climate change is an important andoen positive adaptation strategy or

aected communities. For instance,it can help diversiy the sources ohousehold incomes, which wouldotherwise mainly or exclusively de-pend on their surrounding habitat.

Te ollowing paper takes the sug-gested direct pathway as a startingpoint and seeks to disaggregate thenexus between environmentallyinduced migration and the scope orconict in receiving areas. It is based

on the assumption that both the scopeor conict and, more specically, thepropensity or violence in receivingareas are contingent upon a varietyo accompanying actors, includingthe dierent types and determinantso environmental migration as wellas contextual actors and adaptivecapacities in receiving areas. Followinga review o the existing research andconceptualizations on environmentalmigration and conict in receivingareas (section 1), the second sec-tion will identiy and discuss actors,conditions and capacities that mightinuence the propensity or violence.Te paper concludes with an assess-ment o potential challenges associatedwith uture climate change and theirlikely impact on the overall stability inreceiving communities.

Climate Change, Migration and Conict:Receiving Communities under Pressure?

by Andrea Warnecke, Dennis Tnzler and Ruth Vollmer

June 2010


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Environmental migration and conict: empirical

evidence and the state of research

Notwithstanding the existence o some estimates on envi-ronmentally induced migration, one o the major challengesstill lies with the identication o receiving communitieswith large numbers o immigrants who migrated mainlydue to environmental reasons, as opposed to other pushactors. According to Reuveny, migration which has (interalia) been induced by environmental change is likely to bemost prevalent in areas that are at the same time aected bysevere environmental problems and are highly dependenton the environment or livelihood, such as in develop-

ing countries in Asia, Arica and Latin America (Reuveny,2007). Based on existing data on environmentally inducedmigration, it can be assumed that large-scale orced ordistress migration related to environmental change to datetends to be internal, regional and temporary (Kolmannskog,2008: 21). Recently, there is also an increase in rural-urbanmigration, o both a temporary or permanent nature. Bycontrast, international migration as a result o natural disas-ters is possible but less prevalent (Raleigh et al., 2008: 2).

Some studies have argued that there is a potential orconict over scarce resources in the wake o environmental

migration. According to Homer-Dixon, population growthand resource depletion resulting rom large-scale environ-mentally induced immigration might oset existing (ethnic,political or economic) balances and increase the propensityor armed violence especially in weak or ragile receivingstates (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994). Te argument has alsobeen supported by Matthew according to whom migra-tion poses a key linkage between the scarcity o renew-able resources and the risk o violent conict (Matthew,2008). Likewise, the German Advisory Council on GlobalChange (WBGU) highlights the potential o environmen-tally induced migration to oster conict by contributing toethnic imbalances and resource depletion in receiving areasespecially in cases o large-scale, rapid population inuxes(WBGU, 2007; see also Black and Sessay, 1997 and the

UNHCRs Environmental Guidelines, 1996). In the interna-

tional political discourse on climate change, the so-calledmigration link between climate change and increasedconict risks has repeatedly been alluded to as one o theoremost threats to human and state security.1

Notwithstanding the prevalence o resource scarcity andcompetition in many aected areas, several researchers havequestioned to what extent scenarios regarding environ-mental migration and conict are sufciently backed up byempirical evidence. In a paper commissioned by the WorldBank, Raleigh et al. emphasize that [m]uch o the availableliterature exaggerates the impact o environmental actors

in causing or exacerbating conict and that [a]lthoughmigrants are requently cited as catalysts, instigators or vic-tims o conict, case study literature is inconclusive regard-ing the propensity o migrants to exacerbate tensions andconict (2008: 34). From a methodological perspective, itis extremely difcult to identiy migrants that have le theirhomelands solely due to environmental stressors. While di-erent denitions and conceptualizations o environmentalmigrants or environmental displacees have been put or-ward,2 environmental stressors are rarely to be understoodin isolation as causes or movement (A and Warner, 2008Reuveny, 2007; Homer-Dixon, 1999) and thus have to be

careully balanced with additional concurring actors.

Conict potentials in receiving areas

Most research that has been carried out on mechanismspotentially turning migration into a cause o conict inreceiving areas ocuses on reugees role in the spread ocivil war. Here, too, empirical evidence on increased conictpotentials in receiving areas is rather ambiguous, especiallywith regard to the exact mechanisms at play. Salehyan andGleditsch (2006) identiy three conict-generating mecha-nisms:

1. Resource competition between reugees and localcommunities,

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1 Cf. among others former Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett (UK), according to whom an unstable climate risks some of the drivers of conict such as migratory pressures ()

getting worse (quoted in Kolmannskog, 2008: 18); and Perhaps the most worrisome problems associated with rising temperatures and sea levels are from large-scale migra-

tions of people both inside nations and across existing national borders, Campbell, Kurt M. et al., (2007) The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security

Implications of Global Climate Change, Center for a New American Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies, available online via http://csis.org/les/media/csis/

pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf.2 Renaud, Fabrice et al. (2007) Control, Adapt or Flee. How to Face Environmental Migration?UNU EHS InterSecTions 5 (2007), available online via www.ehs.unu.edu/lehp?id=259;

Biermann, Frank. (2001) Umweltchtlinge. Ursachen und Lsungsanstze. Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung: Bonn.


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2. Ethnicity and cultural dierences between reugees

and local communities and

3. Reugees as active or passive resources or parties othe conict in cases where reugee camps are used asrecruitment base or hiding ground or combatants.

In sum, Salehyan and Gleditsch have ound statistically sig-nicant evidence or an increase in the onset o conict byone-third in receiving communities in Arica hosting largenumbers o civil war reugees rom neighboring countries.In their statistical assessment o individual mechanismslinking reugee camps to conict onsets in Arica, Weid-

mann et al. (2007) have not ound any empirical evidenceto link the increased risks or conict in receiving areas tothe direct involvement o reugees. With a view to Salehyansand Gleditschs ndings, Weidmann et al. recommendincluding additional mechanisms at the micro level such asethnicity, type o reugees in a camp, militarization amongreugees, and so orth in uture assessments. Likewise,Lischer (2002) suggests addressing additional inuencingactors based on her comparison o violent and non-violentreugee situations, including the level o political cohesionand militancy among the reugees; the capacity and will othe host country government to demilitarize camps; and the

extent to which third parties provide resources to militantreugee groups (quoted in Whitaker, 2003: 214).

Specifying the role of environmentally induced

migration

Based on a comparative assessment o 38 cases o envi-ronmentally induced migration in the second hal o the20th century, Reuveny (2007) ound that hal o the casesdid not display any sign o violence or conict, while theother hal resulted in some kind o violence, i oen ratherunorganized or partly attributable to non-migration orces.Similar to Salehyan and Gleditsch, Reuveny argues thatconict in receiving areas is more likely when environmen-tal migration is coupled with one or more o the ollowingmechanisms: competition or resources and economic op-portunities, distrust between the area o origin and the hostarea as well as the exacerbation o socioeconomic ault lines(Reuveny, 2007: 659). According to his research, existingtensions or conicts between social groups and additionalauxiliary conditions, i.e. political (in)stability and thecapacity to manage migration and absorb migrants in the

receiving areas, play an important role as well (ibid.; see

below, section 3). Reuveny concludes that severe environ-mental problems play a role in causing migration, which,at times, leads to conict in receiving areas. (ibid.: 657).Although this statement is very careully put, Reuvenys casestudy assessment does not account or the relative impor-tance o additional conict causes or intervening actors.

Diffusion and escalation

In an eort to urther rene existing conceptualizations,Whitaker (2003) points out that most analyses all short oully articulating the mechanisms through which each con-

tributing actor leads to the spread o conict (ibid: 213).For this reason, she suggests a comprehensive categoriza-tion o the potential interlinkages between in-migration andconict by distinguishing between diusion and escalation.Diusion describes changes in the balance o power withinthe receiving country through in-migration, or instance,by altering the ethnic composition o the population oraecting access to resources and land. Escalation summa-rizes the processes through which a conict in the sendingstate can spread into or aect the receiving area, e.g. whencombatants use migrant-inhabited areas or retreat andmobilization. According to this categorization, the indirect

pathway between environmental change, migration andconict presented above exemplies a process oescalation,while the direct pathway exemplies a case odiusion, i.e. apossible disturbance o ethnic, religious and other balancesor increased competition over resources, participation andland in the wake o large-scale environmental in-migration.

Patterns of conict

Another methodological and conceptual issue reers to theneed to distinguish dierent incidences o (violent) conictemanating rom large-scale orced or distress immigra-tion according to their requency, intensity and persistence(Lischer, 2002). As early as 1994, a team o researchers atEH Zrich pointed out that the type o conict potentiallyinduced by environmental ight largely depends on di-erent actors, such as the number o people aected, theirroutes and their destinations (Bchler and Rittri, 1994).

In addition, it is important to note that conict patternsresulting rom political or conict-induced migration,such as in the cases o Burundi, Colombia or Sri Lanka, are

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markedly dierent rom the kinds o violence or conict

that might stem rom large-scale environmentally inducedmigration (Gleditsch et al., 2007: 5-6). While there are somedocumented incidences o reugees or migrants importingconicts into their receiving community, especially in thecase o movements between neighboring countries, envi-ronmental migrants appear to be considerably less likely toget engaged in organized violence. In contrast to intensiedor organized armed violence related to conict-inducedmigration, recent studies suggest that environmental migra-tion will most likely lead to short-term sporadic tensionsand low-intensity orms o violence (Gleditsch et al., 2007:6). In this context, Martin (2005) highlights the relevance o

mutual perceptions among host and reugee communitieswhen trying to assess the likelihood o (violent) conict inreceiving areas. He particularly warns o simply presuppos-ing causal relationships that are exclusively based on an as-sessment o actual benets or disadvantages or the aectedcommunities.

o date, insufcient empirical data on these accompany-ing actors and determinants has hampered a sound andthorough appraisal o the security implications emanatingrom environmentally induced migration. Bearing in mindthese limitations, there is a need to rame uture trends by

providing an overview o the dierent repercussions thatclimate change in combination with other actors may yieldin receiving communities. o begin with, we outline whichcapacities, responses and ramework conditions in receivingcommunities as well as the relevance o host and migrantrelations in receiving areas need to be considered when thelocal repercussions o migration ows under climate changeconditions are assessed.

Doubtlessly, migration is one o several possible alternativesthat people can resort to when aced with environmentaldegradation or disasters that threaten their livelihoods.However, it is yet unclear what orm such migrations willtake (Raleigh et al., 2008: 1). Tis depends inter alia onregulations regarding land use, migration policies, and mi-grant assistance in receiving areas as set up by governmentsand international agencies (ibid.). In act, in the literatureon the repercussions o environmentally induced migrationon receiving areas, it is quite common today to note thatthe conict potential o migration depends to a signicantdegree on how the government and people in the place o

transit, destination or return respond, as Kolmannskog

says (2007: 21). For this reason, the ollowing chapter willprovide an overview o the types and orms o environ-mental migration as well as the capacities and responses inreceiving areas, all o which might mitigate or exacerbatethe propensity or violence.

Political stability, governance capacities and the avail-

ability of resources in receiving areas

o accommodate large-scale migration movements, a num-ber o prerequisites are considered to be essential (WBGU,2007: 119): the overall political stability, governance capaci-

ties and the availability o resources, as well as a host oadditional actors, such as demographic trends, migrationnetworks and ethnicity. Tis already indicates that capacityhas to be considered as a ramework concept that needs tobe urther specied.

Te assessment o political, social and economic capacitiesto deal with crisis events has gained some prominence inthe course o the overall debate on climate change adapta-tion (see aenzler et al., 2008). In general, dierent sourceso capacities and sensitivities need to be taken into accountto assess the overall susceptibility o states to crisis events.

In this view, capacities depend on the interplay o a numbero elements such as the social reach o governments, theirproblem-solving capacities, wealth, economic sensitivityor the degree o social integration. Livelihood sources opoorer communities are usually limited and more climate-sensitive than those o wealthy or industrialized states.Societies have begun to develop a number o mechanismsto cope with extreme weather events they occasionally ace.Examples o such coping strategies are the precautionarystorage o ood, trade but also migration itsel.

Political stability and history of conict

Te issue o political capacity is closely related to the aspecto stable political aairs and the discussion o weak or evenragile states (Schneckener, 2004). Fragile states are oenconsidered to be barely capable o perorming key stateunctions and displaying only very limited governance ca-pacities. Te extreme case o the ragile state is the collapsedor ailed state, one that has come to represent only a geo-graphical entity. Most oen these states are associated with

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an existing history o conict. In an atmosphere o mistrust

towards state institutions, societal groups are more likely toregard violence as a more expedient strategy than peaceulconict transormation. States in post-conict or crisis situ-ations are most vulnerable to escalating conicts.

Whitaker (2003) also reers to the overall political stabilityin an analysis o the likelihood o conict resulting rommigration processes. On the basis o case studies o theDemocratic Republic o Congo (DRC) (the ormer Zaire)and anzania in the 1990s, she compared the situation inboth countries when reugee ows rom Rwanda had tobe accommodated. In DRC, the collapsing political system

acilitated a climate in which opposition groups and rebelmovements could easily gain momentum to struggle againstdictator Mobutu. By contrast, in anzania economic reormand political democratization processes had been initiatedwhich acilitated widespread legitimacy o the government.As a result, anzania was more capable o providing a stablepolitical environment or reugees than the DRC. O someimportance in this context was also the ethnic dimension,since the case o the DRC also indicates a high level opoliticization o ethnic identities in the host country whichmay contribute to violence and instability in the course olarge-scale immigration.

Governance capacities

Already today, many potential receiving areas suer romweak capacities to provide key services to their population.In this regard, health and education as well as access to a-ordable and reliable energy and water services are essentialand decits are accordingly considered incidents o poorgovernance (see, e.g., Brown, 2008; Carius et al., 2008: 17,32). I governance is poor, socially exclusive or not gearedtowards development, building purely technical capacitiesmay have scarcely any positive eect. On the contrary, i itbenets only limited parts o society it may trigger socialtensions. Tere are examples o violence in connection withmigration movements, e.g. in Bangladesh (Chittagong Hillracts) in the 1980s, or in Mali and Mauritania (SenegalRiver Valley) in 1989-1990, indicating that the state avoredmigrants over other social groups, thus uelling conictinstead o ostering accommodation (Suhrke, 1997: 264-26 quoted in Haldn, 2007). However, this seems to be theexception rather than the rule.

The case of Mali

As Christian Aid has illustrated, receiving communities

sometimes need to deal with considerable numbers of mi-

grants (Christian Aid, 2007). In the case of Mali, decreasing

and less predictable rainfalls have led to worse harvests.

The farmers turn to the countrys cities in search of a job,

especially to the nations capital, Bamako, led to a popula-

tion increase from 600,000 around 20 years ago to roughly

2 million nowadays. The precarious conditions of the new-

comers signicantly contribute to overall insecurity and the

spread of diseases such as HIV.

Additional overstretch of institutional governance struc-

tures in developing countries is likely to be a prime effect ofclimate change (Carius et al., 2008: 32-33). This diminishes

the capacity of societies to steer policy processes and ham-

pers the execution of elementary state tasks. Particularly

if disastrous events occur, there is an additional risk of the

loss of legitimacy of state institutions.

As a result, state performance in general and mechanisms

of civil conict transformation in particular are weakened.

o nd employment, aordable housing, and access to so-cial services such as health care are major challenges to both

displaced and receiving communities. For displaced popula-tions it is even more difcult to provide adequate medicalcare and vaccination programs. As a result, inectious dis-eases pose a greater risk and are more likely to end deadly.Displaced populations are usually more likely to suer romthese conditions than settled populations.

Availability of natural resources

Climate change impacts, population dynamics, as well asmigration can aect the availability o natural resources dueto additional stress on already degraded lands and competi-tion or scarce resources in both rural and urban settings.Many regions throughout the world are likely to ace severeresource degradation due to unsustainable resource usein combination with population growth and urbanizationpatterns, e.g., in coastal areas. One side eect o this de-velopment is the expansion o slums without appropriateinrastructure. Tese areas are oen reerred to as breedinggrounds or conict and organized crime. However, urbanslums are seldom places witnessing large-scale collective

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violence. Te rapid migration to mega-cities around the

world is nevertheless a major barrier to development.Reugees living in urban areas are highly susceptible to theimpacts o climate change, especially to extreme weatherevents, such as ooding or storms due to the marginalizedsituation (Haldn, 2007: 277).

Slow vs. rapid-onset of environmental stressors

Finally, the capacities in receiving areas to deal with migra-tion ows are likely to be inuenced by the nature o the en-vironmental disruption. Bates (2002: 469-470) distinguishesbetween three categories: disasters, expropriations and

deterioration. Climate change impacts can mainly be relatedto the rst and the third category. According to Bates de-nition, disaster reugees either ee rom natural disasters ortechnological accidents. Deterioration reugees migrate asa result o gradual, anthropogenic changes in their environ-ments, i.e., rom ecosystems that have gradually degradedto a degree that makes survival based on the local resourcebase impossible. Similar to Bates, but reerring particularlyto environmentally induced migration, Lonergan (1998)distinguishes between rapid- and slow-onset events. Ac-cording to his conceptualization, rapid-onset events are,or instance, natural disasters such as ooding, volcanoes,

earthquakes and droughts in sending areas. On the otherhand, slow-onset changes are environmental processes oc-curring at a slower rate which might additionally interactwith human activities, such as deorestation, land degrada-tion, erosion, salinity, desertication or climate warming.Most recently, the EACH-FOR project has taken up earliercategorizations suggesting a general distinction betweenslow-onset environmental stressors such as water scarcity,desertication, soil degradation or deorestation, and rapid-onset environmental stressors including extreme weatherevents such as ooding and cyclones (EACH-FOR, 2008: 3).

Whether an instance o environmentally induced migra-tion is triggered by a rapid- or a slow-onset event is likelyto hold implications or receiving areas. Te type o stressorpartially determines the degree o voluntariness o the moveand the duration o stay, as well as the size and dimensiono a migratory movement (Gallagher, 1994). Tese actorscan be related to the propensity or violence and conict inreceiving areas; thereore, they also play a role in deningthe appropriate response. Against this background, gov-ernments should take into account the types o stressors

and how they rame migratory movements when assessing

their capacities and developing their strategies to manageuture environmentally induced migration. Climate changewill cause rapid and slow onsets o environmental stressorsalike. Scenarios suggest that a number o regions will beaected by ongoing land degradation and a more requentand more intensive occurrence o extreme weather events atthe same time.

Presenting the case o Western anzania, Berry (2008) il-lustrates how large-scale dislocation o people can adverselyimpact the environment in the receiving areas. Tis isespecially due to the scale and suddenness o reugee ows

which can rapidly change a situation o even relative abun-dance o local resources to one o acute scarcity. Althoughenvironmental management protection projects wereconducted in Western anzania, the long-term presence omore than 400,000 reugees has contributed to widespreaddeorestation, depletion o water resources, soil erosion andthe loss o wild animal habitat. A urther example in thisregard is the case o the Petn region in Guatemala whichreceived substantial migrants rom elsewhere in Guate-mala resulting in massive deorestation in that region sincethe 1970s. Te migrants cleared large parts o the orest inorder to establish new subsistence armland (IOM, 2009:

157). Such a diminishing resource base can create tensionsbetween host and reugee communities a trend addition-ally triggered by more requent incidence and longer dura-tion o droughts and in regions where local inrastructures,employment opportunities and social services are alreadystretched.

Future trends: climate change and beyond

As shown above it is important to avoid one-dimensionalcausal explanations when assessing whether there will be anincrease o tensions or even violent conicts due to environ-mentally induced migration in receiving areas. At the sametime, the existing empirical evidence or violent conse-quences o migration as a result o environmental degrada-tion is only o limited explanatory value when it comes tothe assessment o the likelihood o uture conict constel-lations under changing climate conditions (Haldn, 2007:130). Te German Advisory Council on Global Change(WBGU) assessment in Climate change as a securityrisk, suggests that climate-induced environmental stressis increasing to a considerable extent. Tis brings about a

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number o consequences or human livelihoods, which can

mutually reinorce one another. Te massive impacts oclimate change on the availability o water and on ood pro-duction as well as the impacts o extreme weather events,i.e., rapid as well as slow onset o environmental stressors,will result in ar-reaching migration ows (e.g., CSIS, 2007;Haldn, 2007: 120-132).

It is worth briey describing to what extent some o themain drivers inuencing global, social and economic devel-opment are going to change in the upcoming uture in orderto illustrate the scope o the challenge ahead. Te potentialimpacts o climate change as outlined in the most recent

IPCC report rom 2007 are likely to reach a undamentallynew quality with respect to water availability, agriculturalproductivity, and the requency and intensity o extremeweather events (IPCC, 2007). Some o the most worrisometrends are summarized in the box below:

Selected future climate change trends

The availability of water will decrease in absolute terms

as a result of global warming. By mid-century some

regions, including the MENA region and southern Africa

will see a decline of between 10% and 30% (IPCC

2007: 5; IPCC 2007: 183). Figures for the proportionof the worlds population that will suffer as a result of

water stress range from 262 million to approximately

three billion by 2080 (IPCC 2007: 194).

Extreme weather events will cause considerable

economic damage (WBGU 2007: 69) and may also

have a negative impact on water quality and contribute

to the spread of epidemics (IPCC 2007b: 179). This

could reach a level at which local water supplies will

no longer be suitable for use as drinking water without

technical and nancial input (IPCC 2007: 187). Addi-

tionally, sea-level rise will lead to groundwater and river

water salinity in coastal regions.

Food availability will decrease. If global warming rises

to 3C it is likely that the number of people suffering

from hunger will increase by 250 million to 550 mil-

lion (Stern 2006: 72). Over the course of the coming

decades, there will be a substantial decline in food pro-

duction. Prices will rise as a consequence of this (IPCC

2007: 276, 300; WBGU 2007: 94). In the long term,

there may be an increase in land use competition be-

tween food and energy crops (IPCC 2007: 278, 281).

All these trends are likely to also aect the overall capaci-

ties in receiving areas and may diminish the ability to ac-commodate migration ows eeing rom environmentaldegradation or due to other reasons. At the same time, thechanges o environmental conditions are not the only worri-some trend orecasted or the next centuries. Te signi-cance o impending climate change in terms o securitypolicy and its conict relevance only ully comes to lightthrough the interplay between the environmental develop-ments described above and other global trends. In particu-lar, population growth, urbanization and global economicdevelopment will occur alongside climate change and mayin some cases have a markedly intensiying impact on exist-

ing and uture conict constellation also in receiving areas.Accordingly, a number o sectoral developments need to beconsidered i the potential eects o migration in receivingareas are to be assessed appropriately.

The danger of converging trends

Climate changes, as outlined in this chapter, may multiplythe menacing eects o decits such as social and economicinjustice, little or no rule o law, and so on. A plausibleresult is that countries and regions that are themselvesaected and weakened by climate change have to accom-

modate sizeable displaced communities. Most likely, theymay ace the difculty o both accommodating reugeesand providing a stable political environment. Tis, howeverdoes not mean that such trends will automatically lead toviolent conicts especially when measures to counter suchtrends will be taken in due time.

Demographic trends: Population growth will lead toa world population between 8.7 and 9.3 billion peopleby 2050 at the latest. In regional terms, this will bereected particularly in the population dynamics inArica, which is set to grow rom 900 million (2005)to nearly 2 billion (2050), and in Asia, where thepopulation will grow rom 3.9 to 5.2 billion (UnitedNations Population Division (UNPD), 2006).

Urbanization: By 2030, up to 60 percent o the worldspopulation could be living in cities. Te largestgrowth in city populations nearly 50 percent isexpected to occur in Arica and Asia (UNPD, 2006).In 2005, 72 percent o the urban population o Sub-Saharan Arica and 56 percent in South Asia lived

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in slums (UN Population Fund (UNFPA), 2007: 16).

Every third city dweller will be orced to live in slumsin the year 2030 according to UN Habitat: this meansup to 2 billion people without an adequate basicinrastructure (UN Habitat, 2003: 1, 24).

Conclusions

o sum up, previous research suggests that reugees andmigrants create new alignments and transorm old oneswhen entering into an established political setting in receiv-ing communities (Whitaker, 2003). Conict results in somecases, while in others it does not. In other words, a worsen-

ing o situations and the triggering o conicts as an indirectresult o climate change is only one possible scenario: thepeaceul avoidance o new conict situations is another,especially when migration in receiving areas is properlymanaged.

In addition, it is important to note that violent conictis usually a result o several interrelated causes and canhardly be traced to a single causal explanation. Especiallyin cases o large-scale migration, additional exacerbatingactors are o utmost importance, which might serve todiuse or escalate conicts in receiving areas. For instance,

as argued above, large-scale migration can aect the bal-ance o power within the receiving country, or conict inthe sending state can spread to the receiving area. In thelight o climate change orecasts and other major globaltrends, past evidence may not be a useul guide or re-sponses to uture challenges. At the same time, there is aneed to conceptualize security in the broader sense o hu-man security to rame the adaptation and accommodationneeds in politically unstable regions. Building on existingempirical evidence, dierent possible pathways can beidentied. Migration and conict, the capacities in receiv-ing areas to manage large-scale migration, as well as uturetrends in climate change, will inuence these pathways.Aer reviewing existing knowledge, the ollowing priori-ties appear to be essential or uture research and policydevelopment:

1. Tere is a strong need to identiy those regions that willmost likely be a receiving area in the uture and thatalready today ace highly volatile situations with respectto conicts and tensions. Tey may themselves be sub-

ject to increased environmental stresses and have only

limited capacities to deal with large-scale migrationows. For this reason, long-term case studies that takeinto account both the specic challenges arising romenvironmental migration and the absorption and governance capacities o individual receiving areas should beundertaken.

2. Receiving communities need to be supported whendevising strategies that aim to control and manage ris-ing migration ows. rends o rapid and slow onsetso environmental stressors will possibly occur at thesame time. Accordingly, dierent kinds o response

mechanisms (e.g., disaster management vs. long-termadaptation planning) need to be established in the re-ceiving areas. International donors need to address thechallenges to provide a sustainable management o thenatural resource base, to avoid risks o instability in theuture, and to control the costs needed or appropriatecapacity building. Tese eorts demand political leader-ship and nancial assistance to build up the institution-al and bureaucratic capacities.

3. Te establishment o a global adaptation regime underthe ramework o the UN climate negotiations is only

one step in this direction. In addition, the challenge oaccommodating uture migration ows in receivingcommunities under the conditions o climate changeneeds to be addressed by the international donor com-munity in general.

References

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Change, Alexandria, VA.

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reugee and host communities,Journal o Peace Research,42(3): 329-346.

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Renaud, Fabrice, Janos J. Bogardi, Olivia Dun and KokoWarner (2007) Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environ-mental Migration?UNU EHS InterSecions 5 (2007), avail-able online at www.ehs.unu.edu/le.php?id=259 (December

20, 2009).

Reuveny, Raael (2007) Climate change induced migrationand violent conict, Political Geography, 26: 656-673.

Salehyan, Idean (2008) From climate change to conict?No consensus yet,Journal o Peace Research, 45(3): 315-326.

Salehyan, Idean, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2006)Reugee ows and the spread o Civil War, InternationalOrganization, 60(2): 335-366.

Schneckener, Ulrich (Ed.) (2004) States at Risk: Fragile Sta-atlichkeit als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem, Berlin:Stiung Wissenscha und Politik.

Stern, Nicolas (2006) Te Economics o Climate Change:Te Stern Review, available via http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_cli-mate_change/stern_review_report.cm (October 30, 2009).

Suhrke, Astri (1997) Environmental degradation, migra-tion, and the potential or violent conict, in N.P. Gleditsch(Ed.), Confict and the Environment, Te Hague: Kluwer.

nzler, Dennis, Alexander Carius and Achim Maas (2008)Assessing the susceptibility o societies to droughts: A po-litical science perspective, Regional Environmental Change,8(4): 161-172.

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able at http://www.unhcr.org.

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Weidmann, Nils B., Patrick Kuhn and Varja Nikolic (2007)Reugees as local catalysts o conict? A statistical assess-ment, paper presented at the 48th ISA Convention, Chi-cago.

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conict: Contrasting cases in Central Arica,Journal oArican and Asian Studies, 38: 211-231.

Andrea Warnecke is a Senior Researcher at the Bonn International Center for Conver-

sion, Germany; Dennis Tnzler is a Senior Project Manager at Adelphi Research, Berlin;

Ruth Vollmer is a Research Assistant at the Bonn International Center for Conversion,

Germany.

The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) is an independent, non-prot

organization dedicated to promoting and facilitating peace and development through

research, advisory services, and training.

Adelphi is a leading think tank for policy analysis and strategy consulting, offering

creative solutions and services on global environment and development challenges for

policy, business and civil society communities.

PHOTO CREDIT: Floods in Ifo refugee camp, Dadaab,Kenya, UNHCR: B. Bannon, Decem-ber 2006.

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Study team members

Susan Martin, Institute or the Study o International Migration, Schoolo Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC (Co-Chair)

Koko Warner, Institute or Environment and Human Security, United

Nations University, Bonn, Germany (Co-Chair)

Jared Banks and Suzanne Sheldon, Bureau or Population, Reugees andMigration, U.S. Department o State, Washington, DC

Regina Bauerochse Barbosa, Economy and Employment Department,Sector Project Migration and Development, German echnicalCooperation (GZ), Eschborn, Germany

Alexander Carius, Moira Feil, and Dennis nzler, Adelphi Research,Berlin, Germany

Joel Charny, Reugees International, Washington, DC

Dimitria Clayton, Ministry or Intergenerational Aairs, Family, Womenand Integration, State o North Rhine-Westphalia, Dsseldor, Germany

Sarah Collinson, Overseas Development Institute, London, UnitedKingdom

Peter Croll, Ruth Vollmer, Andrea Warnecke, Bonn International Centeror Conversion, Bonn, Germany

Frank Laczko, International Organization or Migration, Geneva,Switzerland

Agustin Escobar Latapi, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superioresen Antropologa Social (CIESAS), Guadalajara, Mexico

Michelle Leighton, Center or Law and Global Justice, University o SanFrancisco, San Francisco, Caliornia and Munich Re Foundation-UNUChair in Social Vulnerability

Philip Martin, University o Caliornia, Migration Dialogue, Davis,

Caliornia

Heather McGray, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC

Lorenz Petersen, Climate Change askorce, German echnicalCooperation (GZ), Eschborn, Germany

Aly andian, Groupe dEtudes et de Recherches sur les Migrations(GERMS), Gaston Berger University, Senegal

Agnieszka Weinar, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security,European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

Astrid Ziebarth, German Marshall Fund o the United States, Berlin,Germany.

List of papers

Developing Adequate Humanitarian Responsesby Sarah Collinson

Migration, the Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence

by Frank Laczko

Climate Change and Migration: Key Issues or Legal Protection oMigrants and Displaced Personsby Michelle Leighton

Climate Change, Agricultural Development, and Migrationby Philip Martin

Climate Change and International Migrationby Susan F. Martin

Climate Change, Migration and Adaptationby Susan F. Martin

Climate Change, Migration and Conict: Receiving Communities underPressure?by Andrea Warnecke, Dennis nzler and Ruth Vollmer

Assessing Institutional and Governance Needs Related to Environmental

Change and Human Migrationby Koko Warner

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Transatlantic Study TeamsTe GMF Immigration and Integration Programs ransatlantic Study eams link the transatlantic debate on inter-national migration ows with its consequences or sending and receiving regions. Trough compiling existing data,policy analysis, and dialogue with policymakers, selected study teams gather acts, convene leading opinion leaderson both sides o the Atlantic, promote open dialogue, and help to advance the policy debate. Study teams are chosenby a competitive selection process, based on the overall quality o their proposal, its policy relevance, institutionalstrength, sustainability, and potential or synergies. Te ransatlantic Study eam 2009/2010 is investigating the impacto climate change on migration patterns. Environmental deterioration, including natural disasters, rising sea level,and drought problems in agricultural production, could cause millions o people to leave their homes in the comingdecades. Led by Dr. Susan F. Martin, Georgetown University, and Dr. Koko Warner, UN University, the team consists oscholars, policymakers and practitioners rom the migration and environmental communities.

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grantmakinginstitution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe ontransatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlan-tic sphere, by convening leaders and members o the policy and business communities, by contributing research andanalysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to oster renewed commitment to the trans-atlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972through a gi rom Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presenceon both sides o the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven ofces in Europe: Ber-lin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.

Te Institute or the Study o International Migration is based in the School o Foreign Service at Georgetown Universi-ty. Staed by leading experts on immigration and reugee policy, the Institute draws upon the resources o Georgetown

University aculty working on international migration and related issues on the main campus and in the law center. Itconducts research and convenes workshops and conerences on immigration and reugee law and policies. In addition,the Institute seeks to stimulate more objective and well-documented migration research by convening research sympo-sia and publishing an academic journal that provides an opportunity or the sharing o research in progress as well asnished projects.

Te UN University established by the UN General Assembly in 1973, is an international community o scholars en-gaged in research, advanced training and the dissemination o knowledge related to pressing global problems. Activi-ties ocus mainly on peace and conict resolution, sustainable development and the use o science and technology toadvance human welare. Te Universitys Institute or Environment and Human Security addresses risks and vulner-abilities that are the consequence o complex environmental hazards, including climate change, which may aect sus-tainable development. It aims to improve the in-depth understanding o the cause eect relationships to nd possibleways to reduce risks and vulnerabilities. Te Institute is conceived to support policy and decision makers with authori-tative research and inormation.

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Climate Change, Migration and Conflict: Receiving Communities under Pressure?

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