Date post: | 10-Apr-2018 |
Category: |
Documents |
Upload: | german-marshall-fund-of-the-united-states |
View: | 217 times |
Download: | 0 times |
of 40
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
1/40
CLIMATE & ENERGY PAPER SERIES 09
CLIMATE POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS:TEN INSIGHTS FROM EUROPE ON THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM
MIChAEL GRUbb
Chief Economist, Carbon Trust; Chair, Climate Strategies
ThOMAS L. bREwER
Research Director, Climate Strategies
MISATO SATO, Doctoral Student, London School of Economics
RObERT hEILMAYR, Research Analyst, World Resources Institute
DORA FAzEkAS, Research Manager, Climate Strategies
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
2/40
Tis paper would not have been possible without unding rom the ransatlantic Climate Bridge, an initiative jointly
launched by German Foreign Minister Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier and German Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel to
connect and support those working to address the challenges o climate change, energy security, and economic growth at
the local, the state, and the ederal level in the United States and Germany.
Te writing o this report was supported in part by a grant rom the Norwegian Royal Ministry o Foreign Aairs.
Climate Strategies aims to assist governments in solving the collective actionproblem o climate change. It connects leading applied research on international
climate change issues to the policy process and to the public debate, raising the
quality and coherence o advice provided on policy ormation. It convenes inter-
national groups o experts to provide rigorous, act-based, and independent assessments o international climate change
policy. o eectively communicate insights into climate change policy, Climate Strategies works with decision-makers in
government and business, particularly, but not restricted to, the countries o the European Union and the EU institutions.
www.climatestrategies.org
Te Carbon rust was set up by the U.K. government in 2001 as an independent company to ac-
celerate the move to a low-carbon economy. Its mission is to accelerate the move to a low-carbon
economy by working with organizations to reduce carbon emissions now and develop commer-
cial low-carbon technologies or the uture. www.carbontrust.co.uk
2009 Te German Marshall Fund o the United States. All rights reserved.
No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any orm or by any means without permission in writing
rom the German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to:
Te German Marshall Fund o the United States
1744 R Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
1 202 683 2650
F 1 202 265 1662
Tis publication can be downloaded or ree at http://www.gmus.org/publications/index.cm. Limited print
copies are also available. o request a copy, send an e-mail to [email protected].
GMF Paper Series
Te GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety o transatlantic topics by sta, ellows, and partners o the German
Marshall Fund o the United States. Te views expressed here are those o the authors and do not necessarily represent the
views o GMF. Comments rom readers are welcome; reply to the mailing address above or by e-mail to [email protected].
About GMF
Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grant-making
institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North America and Europe.
GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss
the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety o
global policy challenges. In addition, GMF supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies.
Founded in 1972 through a gi rom Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a
strong presence on both sides o the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven ofces in
Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
3/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:en Insights rom Europe on the
EU Emissions rading System
Climate & Energy Paper Series
July 2009
M Gbb, C E, Cb ; C, C S*
L. Bw, R D, C S*
M S, D S, L S E*
Rb H, R A, W R I*D Fzk, R M, C S*
*C S wk . T wk k . A wx .
*M Gbb UK Cb . I , C S, z q Cb U, U K. P, M. Gbb w R I I Af, b b I C, L.
*T Bw C S b Gw U W,DC. H w , ,
.*
*M S P.D. L S E, ESRC C C C E P.H bz b .
*Rb H W R I (WRI), W, DC, w U.S. wb . H wk U.S. , b , b w.
*D Fzk C S, w j. M. Fzk b P.D. EU E S H.
Ex S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
C C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
C: W Rk? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O P k Cb Lk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
I R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Ax: C D E I Ex . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
4/40
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
5/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System3
U.S. C b .
Wx-Mk b w b H
R J 6, ,
S k b x
. E
x w -
- , U.S. k
k x k
. F
, , .
x x
E U E S (EU
ES) k
U.S. b, w ,
w:
1. Emissions trading works
MI EU ES
E b 13
b x (MCO)
, 5 ,
x w. I
k
,
w
() E
b x.
Recommendation: D
EU x.
2. Everyone will learn
C b x b bj
bb; ,
, w b b.
N b
w w b b . EU
ES b
, w w
,
.
Recommendation: B
x
.
3. Prices can be volatile and affected by
numerous unforeseen factors, which to date
have reduced prices below expectations
EU ES b q
k b w x.
w
b j.
O ,
wb , CO .
W j,
b w--x
w-b
. Db
b w bk w b b
k b .
Recommendation: C
EU x
b
j, b
,
b
.
4. GDP impacts are small
, EU ES b b
bj
bw j,
1 EU
(GDP). M,
Executive Summary
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
6/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States4
x w-b ,
b
.
Recommendation: D
b
. E
b j.
5. Industry can profit
E b
. I, EU ES,
E
x. W ,
,
, (
R 7).
Recommendation: R b
xz ,
b
.
6. International competitiveness impacts are
limited to a small number of industry sectors
F ,
b
w b
b.
b
, x, x
. A ,
b w
, ,
. Hw, b-
, .
Recommendation: C b
w x . F ,
b .
7. Free allocation introduces risks of windfall
profits
A , b
b ,
q , . S
b b b
bk, b
w
k.
Recommendation: D z
b
b , w b
b
. C b bw
.
8. Free allocation can also degrade program
efficiency
I b
, -b
k -:
w
, b
. EU k
j -b
b x ,
, .
Recommendation: A b bw b
-b
z w
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
7/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System5
w . b bw w
b , x
k,
b
, b,
.
9. There is a compelling economic rationale to
maximize auctioning
A
, ,
w-b . I
b b
w-b ,
b
b , /
.
Recommendation: Mxz .
10. Unilateral border adjustments may be a
politically appealing way to respond todomestic pressures from special economic
interests, but they risk serious problems in
the international trading system
b b j
b w E, b
. A
, k
b b .
k
. S b j
w
k, w b
. I
b qb w
.
Recommendation: N
b j, z k, w
b b .
k
EU ES. A ,
w EU
ES x U.S.
k. F x, EU ES
w-
,
q b
b
w ( b
w b
b ).
EU U.S.
- w
b , j -
b EU x
q .
P (-), EU ES
w b b U.S. x
.
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
8/40
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
9/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System7
A C E S A , kw Wx-
Mk b,
(GHG) -- . A b
U.S. H R
S ,
k
, w
q
.
Q b U.S. b .
q
w . C
b jb. O
, k bj b
jb w-b , b b
b q
b, w
. k
jb b ,
b .
w q. C
CO w b 1,
w b U S E
U b x
x. b
E E U
E S (EU ES) w
b 5.
M U.S. kw b
EU ES, b ,
, w b .
Y EU ES .
, w
w, , ,
b k -- .
I w b b x
EU ES. I b
b ES b
w Wx-Mk b.
, q
ES b EU
x k
(P I). I b EU
j CO w- k
, ES
. S P II b w P
III w 1, w C
.
E x w ES
U.S. k
U.S. --
.
Section2outlinesbroadlessonsconcerning
- -
- .
Section3analyzesingreaterdetailthe
, .
Section4focusesonwhichindustriesaremost
b
-- ,
.
Section5discussesthepolicytoolsthatare
b
k .
C z
b .
Introduction1
Questions about
the effects on
the international
competitiveness
of U.S. industry
... acquire aparticularly sharp
edge if there
is a prospect
of companies
relocating to
other countries
without similar
regulations.
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
10/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States8
The EU experience
to date is that
cost projections
are frequently
overstated and
caps have proven
easier to achieve
than anticipated.
Key issues or U.S. legislation
S , b
w,
-- . I
. I
, b w
x
x ,
w. EU
x j
q
.
A U.S. k b
w b ,
b b,
j ,
b b .
Wx-Mk b b U.S. H R J
6 GHG
b C
.
I b Wx-
Mk -- EU ES .
R 1, EU b
5 w U S
( C 1 ). EU ES
,
, b w . Wx
Mk b, b ,
, ,
, w
x 87
U.S. .
Caps and Costs2
Box 1. Emission caps in Waxman-Markey and the EU ETS
Chart 1. Proposed emission reductions under the Waxman-Markey bill
Chart 1 shows U.S. emissions in 1990 and 2005, and the reductions proposed in the Waxman-Markey bill. These targets
would cover most of the U.S. economy. By contrast, the EU ETS caps industrial emissions (including electricity production),
representing about half of the EUs CO2 emissions and over 40 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions (see Chart
2), and other sectors are addressed through different policies.* Emissions from the EU ETS sectors have been declining,
and are generally projected to be cheaper to control, while those covered by other policies have been rising. Chart 2
shows this division and the proposed total caps for 2020, which are set within EU goals to achieve 20 percent reductions
(relative to 1990 levels) by 2020 unilaterally, or 30 percent if there is an effective international treaty.
* F x, bj x x qb , wk . E C E Pk b Mb S . S: CS
2050204020302020201220051990Baseline
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Waxman-Markey,HR 2998,Upper range
Waxman-Markey,HR 2998,Lower range
Businessas usual
emissions
GtCO2
e
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
11/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System9
The emission
targets outlined
in the Waxman-
Markey bill as
passed by the
U.S. House of
Representatives
are some of the
most aggressive
GHG goals of any
proposal serious
considered by
Congress in
recent years. EU ES
, b b
. EU
ES b , b w w 5.
Wx-Mk b 5.
I ,
bw EU ES Wx-
Mk :
TheEUETSisaninternationaltrading
, 7 b
E U. Lk
U S,
z w k
b b
, E w
w wk b .
B , EU ES
z ,
b w b
w , N A
P, bj b E
C.
TheEUETSwasfromtheoutsetdesigned
. P I, 57,
w -
bq
j b w
bq . P II,
81, w
EU K P
. P III w b
13.
, b N A P
z , EU
D Db 8.
Chart 2. EU greenhouse gas emissions, 19902020, and the EU ETS component
Source: Carbon Trust, Cutting carbon in Europe: The 2020 plans, June 2008
EU-27
GtCO2
e
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2025Review of cap
2020E2020E
Post-Kyoto agreement?
Baseline
-8%
58%
42%
20051990
No -20%
61%
39%
Yes -30%
Emissions
outside of
the EU ETS
Emissionsinside of
the EU ETS
Non EU ETS
-10% to -17%
or more on
2005
EU ETS
-21% to -30%
or more on
2005
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
12/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States10
Withineachphase,allowancesarefixedexcept
w . F x,
b b j
.
D w ,
b w
EU x.
Caps have been easier to achieve than
originally projected
B , EU ES . b w
b .
C 3
k E Aw U
.1
I P I (57), b
bk , b
1 I , b x . Ow, x, -
x U.S. , $1.484 (k J 6, ) .
b w.
P I b bq
(w bk w w)
- . A b
P I w ,
w z.
Hw, w k
w P II (81) w
k . P II b
8, , b
w .
x. U.K.
, w w
bk; b
b
w b , .
U.S. R G G I (RGGI)
,
,
w , w
.
35
30
25
20
Euro
s
perton
15
10
5
0
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
MtCO
2
Dec 2007 Dec 2010
OTC volume
Exchange volume
Dec 2009
Dec 2008
Q1 Q2
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Chart 3. European Allowance Units prices and volumes 200509
Source: Point Carbon
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
13/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System11
There has been both over-allocation and
signiicant emissions abatement
U.K. ES EU ES P I
b b x
b w x
b . S
q .
MI- b E
B (8), w w .
b EU ES
(C 4), w w
EU ES x 1 b .
A ,
w
b
.
B EU ES .
. I b
w b
b $3 CO (CO)
. A (D, V,
D, 7) EU ES
w b 88 M 5 M
w 5 6, ,
w b E
B. b
. Ab EU ES
w b 51 MCO/
, b .55 ,
b E B
EU ES EU b 13 MCO
,
.
EU ES P II 8.
A, b x
j b, .
x 8
.
E
. A,
C D M (CDM), K
P j
, b
.3 U.S. RGGI k
I b b / -w b /. I // w , b
. O //k w , .
3 D ww b j , j K (81) 18+/ MCO j j . S Cb (), The GlobalCarbon Mechanisms: Evidence and Implications.
Studies suggest
that the EU ETS
its first two years
cut emissions by
50100 MtCO2/
yr, or by around
2.55 percent.
Chart 4. Potential emissions and
the impact o the EU ETS
Source: Ellerman and Buchner (2008)
MtCO
2e
BAU
Emissions
Growth?
BAU
Emissions
Growth?
20062005Historic(2002)
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
+2.0% p.a.
+1.0% p.a.
+2.0% p.a.
+1.0% p.a.
Veried
Emissions
2005
EU ETS
Baseline
Emissions
Veried
Emissions
2006
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
14/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States12
In stark contrast
to the strong
industrial
opposition to
the EU ETS
before it was
launched, the
evidence is that
companies in
all participating
sectors have
actually profited
to date.
Robust institutions with a legal basis have
been required to strengthen the system
P II EU ES
(81) w z
w k, w P I
w
w, b ($8
b) P II. N
, w bj
bb . M N A
P (NAP) w b
w b
P I b S 6.
U EU ES D,
E C w j NAP
- w
w K . P
II NAP w b w K ,
w
bw b-- j. I
Nb 6, C j
NAP q. B j
b , E C k
b .
5
5 5 . I , k
b bk w
EU ES.
I , C
E b 1
NAP.
w b CO
P II w b .
P II
w w, k P I, b ,
w w b
bk w w
P III .
x w w .
All participating industrial sectors have
proited rom the EU ETS
I k
EU ES b w ,
EU ES
b ,
.
w . O
w. A x w
b b w, w x
b ( Bx ).
P b x
w, w.
b b
w, (b x)
w k ( Bx ).
Wx-Mk b w
w b w w
b , w b
. w , b
b w b
.
Hw, Wx-Mk
w w EU ES
x w w ( -
b ). EU ES w
w; Wx-Mk
w w
. b
EU x w
b .
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
15/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System13
BOX 2. Windall profts and opportunity cost
Emissions trading can either increase or reduce firm profits, depending on the extent to which a sector (i) has free
allocation, (ii) passes through costs to product prices, and (iii) undertakes abatement. The power sector in the EU ETS
Phase 1, for example, profited considerably by passing through CO2 prices to consumers while receiving allowances
for free. This increased revenues far more than any allowance shortfall raised costs. The EU ETS experience has thus
confirmed a general economic principle illustrated in Chart 5 below: companies may profit from emissions trading, to
a degree that depends on the extent of free allocation (vertical axis) and how much carbon costs are passed through
(horizontal axis).
Chart 5. Proft and loss as a unction o ree allocation and cost pass-through
(proft margin and price increase correspond to steel in Europe at 30/tCO2)
In competitive markets, profit-maximizing companies will tend to set price in relation to short-run marginal operating costs.
In such markets, the cost of producing an extra unit is balanced against the value of the additional sales. Emissions trading
increases this marginal cost, since companies either have to buy allowances or forego the opportunity to sell allowances, to
cover the extra emissions. Providing all directly competing companies face the same incentive, they will tend to raise prices
to reflect this opportunity cost. In the absence of any output-based compensation, this will tend to the full carbon price.
It is much as if energy prices rose and fed through the economy, but governments then compensated companies with
cash transfers. However, irrespective of free allocation, companies will still then strive to reduce their emissions as long
as the costs of doing so are lower than the market price of an emissions allowance.
A foundational report on this topic (Carbon Trust 2004), which included modelling of five industrial sectors, first predictedthat most sectors would profit from the EU ETS; this has been borne out by experience. Capping carbon means
that emitting it is no longer free: emitters and consumers can and should pay for it. The impact on firm profits and
competitiveness will depend upon who gets the resulting economic rents, and free allocation enables business to benefit
from this (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006, explain the mechanisms further). It is estimated that power generators in Europe
have profited by many billions of euros from the EU ETS, and this reality has underpinned a wholesale move to auctioning
allowances to generators in Phase III of the scheme. The underlying principles however apply to any competitive market,
subject to constraints of competition from countries without carbon pricing.
ProtMargin
0%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
15%
100%
End-use price increase
%ofop
portunit
ycostp
assedon
toprice
10%5%
90%
39%
0%
Current prot margin
%o
fallowances
receivedforfree
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
16/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States14
The sequential
design of the
EU ETS, as the
worlds first major
greenhouse
gas trading
scheme, enabled
policymakers
to revise the
design in light of
experience.
Centralizedallocationrules
EU b . G
,
k.
k, b
j
w
. B b
b bk
, EU-w .
Amovetoauctioningasthedefault,withno
morefreeallowancesforthepowersector
W x E
E b , w w
b w
13.
w b
b P III ,
w b b, 5 .
I , EU ES
b z ,
z
-- .
k
b .
Learning by both policymakers and
businesses has been extensive and valuable
and has led to major improvements in design
or Phase III
q EU ES w wk
-
b, b b ,
w j ,
b k
x. P I b k
b
b w ,
b b -,, w . P II
,
q w
k x, j
b .
W - P II, EU
k k w .
P III w:
Steeperemissioncutbacks
b , wb EU
b 3 bw 1 .
M,
, w w
5. E kw
bz:
C , w
kw w b
b w .
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
17/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System15
While a specific
allocation
method may
be appropriate
for one sector,
it may have
more adverse
consequences
for distribution,
efficiency or
incentives for
innovation in
another.
w , bw w
k b k (
S 5). F
k
x ,
bk .
Wx-Mk b
w w
x EU.
S:
Forthepowersector,allowanceswouldbe
b
w
w ,
,
k b b. I, w
w x E
w k.
Output-basedformulasforallocationto
w b w
w .
k w , w
-.
Hw, w U.S. k
w x EU,
-b w
b. I - (
w b , w
) -
x . I , xb b bw. EU
b -
b , -
w w
, w
O , k w w .
A w EU,
w
x, , bj bb
. A
x w
,
b q. M
EU b , w
. W
b w,
b EU U S.
Allocation methods need to be adapted to
sector-speciic characteristics
A k
, w w z b
, w ,
. EU ES
w
w, b w
. W
b ,
q b,
.
A w
EU ES .
I P I, w b
bw . Pw
w , b
CO. I P II, b
b w b
, w w
w . P III k
Allocation and Incentives3
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
18/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States16
Losing such
opportunities
for low cost
abatement and
incentives for
innovation will
increase the
overall cost of
the program.
b bj .
Wx-Mk b b
w
.
Hw,
w-
. k
w b x-
b,
kW, b z
b. S, -
k , w
b w b
b
b . L
w- b
w .
Pk b w
b k w
.
Eiciency matters and perverse incentivesare possible
k , b-
- . W
b
,
b k, w
q .
I
q
. ,
w ,
b
, b k
.
I ,
w w b
(b ) w
(M, 17). E
w,
b w
b k ,
b z
. W U.S.
SO NOx
,
b .
A w
,
z b
GHG. F, w
,
w
k,
b x
b . S, GHG b , b b
b b , b k
. , b
b , ,
bk b
b , b
x.
M, EU b ,
, w
k, k x . G
w, xb b
,
b ,
b k b.
O , w
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
19/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System17
w k
. b
w
b wbk ww w
( )
. G w b-
w
w-b . E
x , w
, x
w .
, k
, z
b 1. A, w
b,
. G w b ( w
)
, b . Hw,
w
, k b
.
Benchmarking can retain incentives or irms
to invest in energy eiciency measures, but
is complex
I k
, b bk (
w b b ),
b
.
k ,
Table 1. Pyramid o inefciencies rom ree allowance allocation
Impacts on Increase plant operation
More expenditure on
extending plant life relative
to new build
Less Energy efficiency
investments and demand
substitution
Allocation Method Distortions
Bias toward
dirtier plants
Encourages
operation
Discourage
plant closure
Bias toward
dirtier plants
Reducesincentives for
consumers
Reducesincentives for
producers
Auction
Grandfathering with
Benchmarking
Capacity only X
Capacity by fuel/
plant typeX X
Grandfathering
with updating from
previous periods
Output only X Y X
Output by fuel/plant
type*X X X X X
Emissions X X X X X X
Output-based *
(undifferentiated)allocation or rebates
Final product X X XX
Intermediate product(e.g. clinker)
X X XX XX
S: A N (8)
* O-b , w b , k w .
N: X .
XX .
Y /.
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
20/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States18
Efforts to avert
windfall profits
risk solving
one problem
at the expense
of creating
another
reduced
economic
efficiency.
. I w , w
() k k
,
bk . S EU
b bk w
P II EU ES.
Hw, bk
b x, w
. Cx
w k
b, w b
x
.4 xb
b k-b
.
D , w b
bk P II,
EU k x b
w bk P III.
Free allocation based on outputs poses
dierent issues.D b
(.. ), q
b , Wx-
Mk b.
b b
k x
. P b bk
,
w w
b- ,
b b w
. S
w w w, -b
4 EUMb S w EU ES bk b w b b .
j
b. B
b , -b
,
b .
I, b
-b .
S b b
. I ,
b
, b b .
,
-b ,
x S 4 5.
The unavoidable tradeo points to a bigger
role or auctioning
O EU ES, k
w b w z
U S.
w , w, k b x
. I , k
- .
bj b,
b w b
b
b
.
EU
b b
w (w b b ). R
,
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
21/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System19
Consequently,
there is an
underlying
economic
rationale to
maximize
the role of
auctioning
as a default
to create a
robust, fair, and
transparent
market
framework.
b ( b).
Cq,
xz
b, ,
k wk. A
, ,
w-b . I
b b . S
b ,
w-b , b b
,
x
. B ,
b
x b w ,
, z
b .
A
k k 1
w b b , k
b w k
w b .
Wx-Mk b
w
( b ).
I , - ,
w b
b b w
w.
, b bk .
O b z b
z, w
q
b . O
b b
w , w
b
. A ,
b ,
b b .
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
22/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States20
Cost differentials
due to labor and
other input costs
for most sectors
far outweigh any
international
differences in the
cost of carbon.
Competitiveness: Whos at Risk?4Macro-level GDP impacts are modest
S b
b b
. S w
x E U
S.
j
b x
b ,
w .
S, E C (8)
EU ES .3.7 GDP, q w
w . M,
x w-b
( x),
b
.
N b
b . E ,
b
w b. b
, x,
x- . N
k b
b,
.
There are wide variations in impacts across
speciic sectors
b
w b
. , w
x. C 6
b k U.S.
b , b
,
, b GDP. ( Ax q
U.K. G.)
bw
k, b -
.
x
b . B b
, Cb (8) x
b b
, - U.K. :
Ironandsteel
Aluminum
Nitrogenfertilizers
Cementandlime
Basicinorganicchemicals(principallychlorine
k)
Pulpandpaper
I b U.S. U.K. ,
.5 GDP .
G, b
w bw GDP. F
, $/CO b
b
1 -.
B , GDP b
, U
S. Hw,
w , b
x. A $/CO
x . O
. Cb
(8) ,
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
23/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System21
Chart 6. Relative cost-sensitivity o U.S. manuacturing activities to CO2 pricing(6 digit NACE sectors)
Source: Data from Houser, Trevor, Heilmayr, Robert and Werksman, Jacob, Peterson Institute for International Economics
and World Resources Institute, forthcoming.
Notes: The vertical axis shows the implied cost increase if sectors pay the full cost of CO2 at $20/tCO2 as a percentage
of the sector value added. The horizontal axis indicates the scale of the activitys contribution to U.S. GDP. The area of
each column is proportional to total CO2 emissions. The blue bars show the cost of carbon that would be paid through
higher electricity prices (the majority of CO2 costs are passed through by the electricity companies, which would be largely
avoided under the Waxman-Markey proposals). The gray bars show the direct cost due to the carbon emitted through
direct fossil fuel consumption and manufacturing processes.
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
% U.S. GDP
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
45
40
Value
atstake
(CO
2
costincreas
e
relative
to
value
added)
Cement
Lime (51%)
Other basicorganicchemicals Secondary aluminum smelting
Industrial
gas
Flat glass
Other basic inorganic chemicals
Carbon black
Bricks & tiles
Alkalies & chlorine
Wet corn millingPlastics material& resin
Glass containers
Petroleum reneries
Blown glass
Alumina rening &primary aluminum
Nitrogenous fertilizers (57%)
PaperboardIron & steel& ferroalloy
Pulp mill
Direct CO2
impact
Indirect CO2 impact
b x
b , w k , , .
, b
x x $1/CO. (S b k
U.K. .)
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
24/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States22
Even small
shifts overseas
are politically
sensitive, and all
the more so if they
are associated
with carbon
leakage and thus
undermine the
environmental
benefits of the
cap and trade
program.
International trade eects are immaterial or
most sectors
Ex w , , b
w
. Cb w b
b, , . -- x , x, b
5 bw 1 6, w
b
w b b j b
.
F k ,
x, w
. A b S ,
b
x w () , ()
, ()k b. S w b
b b , b
,
k k
. P
. b ,
b .
I ,
b b
. F x,
b , b
b. F
. A
z b
wk
. b
w
(..
b ).
Evidence o impacts to date is nebulous
I
EU ES, b b b
EU b
x . W Bk (8)
x
w
Table 2. Impact o a 20/tCO2 carbon price on major U.K. energy-intensive productsMaximum
value at stake
at 20/tCO2
Minimum value
at stake at
20/tCO2
Trade intensity
(non-EU) Employment
Implied average product price
rise to offset 20/tCO2
Manufacturing Activity
0% free
allocation
100% free
allocation % % UK
0% free
allocation
100% free
allocation
Cement 33.9% 2.0% 1.8% 0.02% 14.54% 0.86%
Basic iron & steel and
ferro-alloys26.4% 2.4% 17.4% 0.08% 4.28% 0.39%
Refined petroleum products 12.3% 1.4% 19.3% 0.04% 1.07% 0.12%
Fertilizers & nitrogen compounds
inc. ammonia11.6% 5.7% 13.2% 0.01% 1.96% 0.96%
Aluminum 10.4% 9.3% 23.2% 0.04% 2.07% 1.85%
Other inorganic basic chemicals 9.0% 5.8% 20.6% 0.02% 2.36% 1.52%
Pulp, paper & paperboard 8.8% 3.4% 15.1% 0.06% 1.98% 0.76%
Source: Carbon Trust (2008), EU ETS Impacts on Profitability and Trade, Table 2.
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
25/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System23
EU b . I, W Bk
b , bb
-
. w
-
EU ES .
Hw, x k
b ,
w q b k,
. M EU w b , ,
k EU
k b b , b b
(Cb
8). A q U S
b b (A Pz,
) :
... CO $15/CO w 1.3
U.S. , b
.6 .
.7
. b
w w
x 1
w x b
,
.
Hw,
,
w b k
b --
. b b
k ,
x .
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
26/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States24
There are only
three fundamental
options to address
competitiveness
concerns.
M b . W
,
b . Hw, ,
, . I
b w b
, ,
. P (1) k
b ;
() b
q b; (3) w
b.
Leveling up is the best option in principle
A
b w , ,
w w j
b ,
x.
w b w b
w b
. Hw,
. P, z w
q
b b b
bz . M,
b . A w
w ,
w w b.
, z w
k,
w ( w,
w b)
b , .
Free allocation has been the deault option in
the EU, but it is being drastically reduced in
Phase III o the ETS
EU b
b . I P I
, P II , w
. M
j
(w q b
x, ) w
b w k .
Hw, k
b ,
wbk ,
S 3. (.. Gbb N
6)
P II, j
P III.
A P III w
. I w
kw ,
b
w , w
: , w
k ; () b k.
P III, 13,
, C 7. W
,
:
Powergeneration
, w b
E E
- ( k x
w b ).
Options and Prospects for Tackling
Carbon Leakage5
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
27/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System25
( )
w , w
b b
w . Hw,
w -
k ,
b
b , bj EU
.
Manufacturing, ,
,
b 57
.
w 13 8
, 3
b . w
.
Sectors b k
b k 1
. C 7
.
b
w, k
: EU ES w
Chart 7. Allocation and emission in the EU ETS
EUA
(1000s)
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
202020192018201720162015201420132012201120102009200820072006
Phase I
(20052007)
Phase II
(20082012)
Phase III
(20132020)
2005
Auctioning
Manufacturing at 100% of share
Manufacturing at declining level of share
NMS Power Sector free allocation
Free allocation to Industrial sectors
Free allocation to combustion installations
Cap
Veried Emissions
Veried emissions combustion installations
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
28/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States26
Leveling down
costs is either
ineffective at
tackling carbon
leakage, if it
is not aligned
with production
and investment
decisions, or it
starts to negate
more of the
incentives to
decarbonize along
the economic
system.
6 w 13, 785 b . A k
q k
k, b w
.5
Hw, w Wx-
Mk b b
b w -.
But ree allocation may not solve the leakage
problem, or may do so at a high cost
EU b (w -b )
k b k.
Ww w
. b w
w , w , k
b . B
w w
x
, w
,
w. -b b Wx-Mk b.
5 D b b b b, . M b - b k b , b b w b- , , . b w b E -, w w b k w w w 8 13. O w b b k b k - w k b . wk b , b b (N ).
. k b k b w,
b b k
k . B
w, b
, w
. w :
w k
b k, w
,
bz
. C x b ( Bx 3).
, w
w b
.
Unilateral border adjustment measures are
problematic and potentially counterproductive
D b j E
b b x b
, b w
. w w
EU ES P III
x (
EU D b
b j ).
Hw, z
, F
,
w
. B
b EU EU ES P III
b C .
b bj
b j, w k
b ,
w -
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
29/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System27
, w W
Oz (WO)
,
k z b
. M, x
b
- b ,
w q b
b, ,
bb .
BOX 3. Cement: A chunky problem
Cement production in the EU emits about as much CO2 as steel, and much more than international aviation.
It has received relatively little attention, but it poses a thorny problem for CO2 control that illustrates key
dilemmas in policy design.
Cement is a relatively simple product involving a few key steps. The basic process bakes limestone in a
kiln to produce nodules called clinker; the combination of raw fuel and CO2 driven off from the limestone
accounts for most of the CO2. The clinker is then crushed and blended to produce cement.
Studies with U.K. and German data find that carbon costs have a higher impact on U.K. cement costs,
relative to value added, than for almost any other activity (Climate Strategies 2008; see Appendix). Cement
is not cheap to transport overland, but it can be shipped in bulk, and carbon costs of $20/tCO2 would
create differentials sufficient to start overcoming international transport costs.
The impact of CO2 controls on cement may be corresponding diverse. Current European proposals to
classify cement as a sector at risk of carbon leakage, correspondingly granted 100 percent of its potential
share of the EU cap, would probably result in large windfall profits to inland producers protected by overland
transport costs. Yet at the same time, coastal producers could choose to reduce output from cement plants,
import cement instead, and cash in their allowances. The result would be windfall profits combined with
carbon leakage.
The Waxman-Markey bill proposals for output-based compensation are intended in principle to address
problems of both windfall profits and carbon leakage. Unfortunately the fact that most of the CO 2 comes
from production of clinker, as an intermediate input, risks making this ineffective. Cement producers could
produce cement so as to claim their compensation, but if they are near ports, they could still displace
domestic clinker production by imports and sell the resulting surplus allowances, again combining windfall
profits with carbon leakage.
Changing the provisions to compensate on the basis of clinker production would solve this, but exacerbate
the efficiency losses further. After power production, the cement sector has been the biggest source of
emission reductions in Europe, largely because operators have found ways to produce cement with less
clinker input. Radical innovations that would cut out the need for clinker entirely, including using some of the
waste products from steel mills, and wholly new chemical processes, are at the pilot stage. Compensating
clinker production would undermine all these potential sources of emission reductions. This is an extreme
form of the underlying principle that output-based compensation negates incentives to use the product
efficiently.
Practical options for the cement sector will be discussed in a forthcoming Carbon Trust report (Tackling
Carbon Leakage, September 2009).
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
30/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States28
There is a crucial
difference
between
pursuing border
adjustments
unilaterally, by
regions seeking
to protect their
industries, or
though multilateral
engagement.
q , b j
w w GA
b WO. I ,
-. w x
b j x
x. Lk w,
bk ,
WO A P, k
. b j w
b w
w ( xz b wWO ), q,
j b .
Border adjustments may take dierent orms
Different types of border adjustment by carbon-
capped regions
j
b .
k WO-b.
b w b j b
b WO-b. C
w b b -,
b bj,
q w
(C S: D , ). Hw,
,
k q
- .
A crucial and often overlooked point about
border measures is their interaction with freeallocation decisions
B j b b
.
, b
j, w b
WO . ,
, w b -b , b j
b k .
Use of export adjustments by exporting regions
I w b b
b
x x b . I
C
VA j, x x
- ,
. S b
w WO. Hw, b
k b k
b. M, w
b x
z .
Unilateral versus multilateral
bw
b j , b k
,
. A k C
S k Cb Lk b j b
x w
b b b j.
b,
k WO.
F
. Ob, w,
x k b .
Comparative approaches
F, b j
w b k k b EU
U S, , :
Becausefreeallocation(aspertheEUETS)
b k ,
( )
w ,
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
31/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System29
The scale
of adverse
competitiveness
or leakage
impacts are
clearly limited,
by sector and
time, in ways
that should make
the challenge
manageable.
. Hw x b b q -
, , ,
k
. EU
w -
b j, k
--k P
III .
Output-basedrebates,aspertheWaxman-
Mk b, w
w b
. Hw,
w b
. b
qk w
,
b b b . b
w b
-b , w
b x
- bj. Cq,
Wx-Mk
w w b-b b
j.
w
b k
b U.S.-EU w b b. F,
k
, b ,
w k b.
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
32/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States30
A Ex S:
1. Emissions trading works
Recommendation: D
EU x.
2. Everyone will learn
Recommendation:B
x .
3. Prices can be volatile and impacted by
numerous unforeseen factors, which to date
have reduced prices below expectations
Recommendation:C
EU x ,
b
j, b ,
b .
4. GDP impacts are small
Recommendation:D b
, E
b j.
5. Industry can profit
Recommendation: R b
xz ,
b
.
6. International competitiveness impacts arelimited to a small number of industry sectors
Recommendation: C b
w x . F ,
b .
7. Free allocation degrades efficiency andintroduces risks either of windfall profits
Recommendation: D z
b
b , w b
b
. C b bw
.
8. or additional inefficiencies
Recommendation: A b bw b -b
z
w w . b bw
w
b , x
k,
b
.
9. There is a compelling economic rationale to
maximize auctioning
Recommendation: Mxz .
10. Unilateral border adjustments may be a
politically appealing way to respond to
domestic pressures from special economic
interests, but they risk serious problems in
the international trade system
Recommendation: N
b j, z
k, w
b b .
Insights and Recommendations6
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
33/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System31
x b E
b ,
b
. C 8
w U.K.
. w b w x
(-) U.K. ;
. Ex wk w
w U.K. -
b EU ES.
I , w
15 b- ( S
I C 4- ). B
CO (b )
w . K ,
Appendix: Comparative Data on
European Industries Exposure7
Chart 8. U.K. Manuacturing activities most cost-sensitive to CO2 pricing
Source: Climate Strategies: Hourcade, Neuhoff et al. (2007)
Notes: The vertical axis shows the implied cost increase if sectors pay the full cost of CO2 at 20/tCO2 as a percentage
of the sector value added. The horizontal axis indicates the scale of the activitys contribution to the U.K.s GDP. The area
of each column is proportional to total CO2 emissions. The blue bars show the cost of carbon that will be paid through
higher electricity prices (equivalent to 10/MWh at 20/tCO2). The gray bars show the cost due to the carbon emitted
through direct fossil fuel consumption and manufacturing processes.
Valueatstake(CO
2
costincreaserelativetovalueadded)
Cement
Basiciron&
steel
Lime (MVAS 63%)
Fertilisers & Nitrogen
Aluminium
Other inorganicbasic chemicals
Pulp &
Paper
Malt
Coke oven
Industrialgases
Non-wovens
Rened petroleum
Household paper
Hollowglass
Finishingof textiles
Rubber tires& tubes
manufact.
Copper
Casting of iron
UK GDP
Flat glass
Veneer sheets
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0%
4%
2%
50%
60%
Starches & starchproducts
Preparation of yarn
Other textile weaving
Retreading/rebuilding tires
Impact from direct emissions
Impact from indirect emissions (electricity)
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
34/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States32
, b
w .
A /CO, w
4
- ( bw
) b w
(1 ),
b U.K. GDP .5
, b 5 U.K.
.
x x
C . Sx w b
bj b
x
. A U.K. -
, b x
.
F k x x
b ;
x.
A -
x, w 51
(GVA) $1/CO,
b .
- w
b z, b
, - , ;
b (b )
.
A G
(C 1) w b
, k
G w
GDP .6
A, G -
b b w
b (
, ).
I b G U.K.
- x, b
w
b 36 GVA z,
b , .
b ,
w b b
$14/CO , w
b b
b
( x -CO ) .
, b 1
q /CO
, b -
.
q x x -
, w w
. G ,
b, j b
b, x
w.
Cb b ,
, w
6 N b, . F x, Ck, (SIC 3) - G. S, , b (SIC 1.1) 3- U.K.
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
35/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System33
Chart 9. Trade intensity and value at stake (relative to GVA) or top 25 U.K. sectors in 2004
Notes: Trade intensity here is defined as (value of exports to non-EU + value of imports from non-EU)/(annual turnover +
value of imports from non-EU).
This data reflects U.K. data in the context of the EU ETS. The vertical axis shows potential impact of carbon costs on
sector input costs as a proportion of sector value-added, prior to any mitigation or other response. The upper end of each
bar shows impacts with no free allocation of allowances (maximum value at stake). Under the Waxman-Markey bill output-
based compensation would tend to drop the top of the bar towards the lower end to a degree that depends on the degree
of overall free allocation to the sector. Here, the lower end corresponds to free allocations covering all direct emissions,
leaving residual impact of increased electricity costs (net or minimum value at stake). Under Waxman-Markey the electricity
price impact (bottom of bar or NVAS) would be largely removed. Here, data are shown for an allowance price of 20/tCO 2, a
corresponding 10/MWh electricity price increase, and negligible impact on other input costs.
The horizontal axis shows U.K. non-EU trade intensity, defined as (value of exports to non-EU + value of imports from non-
EU)/(annual turnover + value of imports from EU + value of imports from non-EU).
For consistency given incomplete availability of more recent data, trade data are mostly for 2004.
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Malt
Household & toilet paper
Industrial gases
Hollow glass
Flat glass
Lime
Coke oven products
Potential Net and Maximum Value at Stake
Textile nishing services
Casting of iron
Rubber tires and tubes
Aluminum & productsPulp, paper and board
Preparation of yarn
Copper
Nonwovens and articles except apparelBasic iron & steel
Other basic organic chemicalsStaples
Fertilizers & nitrogen compoundsCement
Retreading & rebuilding of rubber tires Veneer sheet, plywood, laminboard etcRened petroleum products
Non-EU trade intensity
Value
atstake
(CO
2
co
stincrease
relative
to
value
added)
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
36/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States34
k .7 F EU , 5
- b q
x $4/CO,
b b w b EU
b .5
; w
b 5 (Carbon Trust,
2008).
k E Climate
Strategies: D ().
7 I -, / x k w EU EU. Y b w , .. - b - b- Nw I. F k k - , .
Q k x b
b (
), b
w w b
( w ) .
C 1
( GVA) b
b. I ,
b , w b
b, ( ),
w (
).
Chart 10. Germany industry cost impacts and GVA
Source: Graichen et al (2009)
0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5%
% of German GDP
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Value
atstake
(CO
2
costincrease
relative
to
value
added)
Cement
Lime
Other basic inorganicchemicals
Starches & starch productsFlat glass
Pulp
Other basic organic chemicals
Ceramic tiles & ags
Bricks, tiles & construction products
Hollow glass
Sugar
Veneer sheets;plywood, laminboard;particle & bre board
Plastics
Processedpotatoes
Glass bres
Household &toilet paper
Other glass,processed
Aluminum
Fertilizers &nitrogen compounds
Paper & board
Othermineralproducts
Basic iron & steel
Copperproducts
Direct CO2 costs (0100% free allocation)
Indirect CO2
costs (pass-through electricity)
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
37/40
Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness:
en Insights rom Europe on the EU Emissions rading System35
A, J. E. Pz, W. A. (). TheCompetitiveness Impacts of Climate Change
Mitigation Policies. A, V: Pw
C Gb C C, .
Cb (4). EU ETS Impacts on Industrial
Competitiveness. L: Cb .
Cb (6).Allocation and
Competitiveness in the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme. L: Cb .
Cb (8). Cutting Carbon in Europe:
The 2020 Plans. L: Cb .
Cb (8b). EU ETS Impacts on
Profitability and Trade: A sector-by-sector
analysis. L: Cb .
Cb (). The Global Carbon
Mechanisms: Evidence and Implications. L:
Cb .
D, E., V, K., D, W.
(7). F w
EU ES: Rw .
Sb Journal of Energy Engineering
ASCE, M 7.
D, D., H, J. C., N, K., S,
M. (). D D
EU ES C I, S
R. Cb, U.K.: C S.
D, S. (). k Lk W
Uq Cb P, S R.
Cb, U.K.: C S.
E, D. B, B. (8). O-A O Ab? A P
A EU ES B 56
E D. Environmental and Resource
Economics, 41, .
E C (8). Q Aw C
, P R, MEMO/8/34, J
3, 8. Ab : ://.//
RA.?=MEMO/8/3
4=H
G, V., S, K., M, F. C., M,
L.,D, V., S, J., Dk, J.
(8). I EU
G, Ok I R. Ab :
://www.w./bk/-/365.
Gbb, M. N, K. (6). A
C EU E
S: P Ow. Climate Policy, (6) .
73.
L, J. H, R. (8). Comparison of
Legislative Climate Change Targets. W,
DC: W R I, 8.
L, J. H, R. (). Emission
Reductions Under The American Clean Energyand Security Act. W, DC: W
R I, .
M, W. D. (17). Mk
.
Journal of Economic Theory 5(3): 35418.
N, K. (8). Tackling Carbon. Ab :
://www.....k/w-/
//3/k-b__38.
N, K. (). I EU ES P III, I O B.
Cb, U.K.: C S.
References8
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
38/40
he German Marshall Fund o the United States36
N, K. M, F. (8). R A E , S
R. Cb, U.K.: C S.
O, M. (165). The Logic of Collective Action.
Cb, MA: H U P.
W Bk (8). International Trade and
Climate Change. W, DC: W
Bk.
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
39/40
8/8/2019 Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System
40/40
Off i c e s
Washington Berlin Bratislava Paris