Closing the Nuclear Trapdoor in the U.S.-Turkey

“Model” PartnershipOpportunities for Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Jessica C. Varnum

turkey project policy paperNumber 1 • June 2013

policy paperNumber 1, June 2013

About CUSE

The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings fosters high-level U.S.-European dialogue on the changes in Europe and the global challenges that affect transatlantic relations. As an integral part of the Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Center offers independent research and recommendations for U.S. and European officials and policymakers, and it convenes seminars and public forums on policy-relevant issues. CUSE’s research program focuses on the transformation of the European Union; strategies for en-gaging the countries and regions beyond the frontiers of the EU including the Balkans, Caucasus, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine; and broader European security issues such as the future of NATO and forging com-mon strategies on energy security. The Center also houses specific programs on France, Italy, and Turkey.

About the Turkey Project

Given Turkey’s geopolitical, historical and cultural significance, and the high stakes posed by the foreign policy and domestic issues it faces, Brookings launched the Turkey Project in 2004 to foster informed public consideration, high‐level private debate, and policy recommendations focusing on developments in Turkey. In this context, Brookings has collaborated with the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) to institute a U.S.-Turkey Forum at Brookings. The Forum organizes events in the form of conferences, sem-inars and workshops to discuss topics of relevance to U.S.-Turkish and transatlantic relations. The Turkey Project also produces a range of policy-relevant publications to encourage independent thinking and debate on how the United States should engage this pivotal country. With this goal in mind, the Turkey Project Policy Paper Series publishes quarterly reports on a range of issues that are shaping U.S.-Turkish relations.

Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities sup-ported by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and recom-mendations of the Institution’s scholars are not determined by any donation.

ACrONyMS ANd AbbreviATiONS

123 Agreement bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement concluded between the United States and a foreign country under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act

AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

AP1000 Advanced pressurized water reactor, Westinghouse designed

BOO build-own-operate

BOT build-operate-transfer

CSO civil society organization

DOE Department of Energy (United States)

EDAM Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (Turkey)

ENR enrichment and reprocessing

EU European Union

EUAS Electricity Generation Company (Turkey)

EXBS Export Control and Related Border Security Program (U.S. State Department)

HEU highly enriched uranium

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IGA Intergovernmental Agreement

INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

JUST Jordan University of Science and Technology

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MWe megawatt electric

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration (United States)

NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon State

NPP nuclear power plant

NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group

MEPhI National Research Nuclear University (Russia)

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

TAEK Turkish Atomic Energy Authority

TC Technical Cooperation (in reference to the IAEA TC Programme)

TSS technical support services

TUSIAD Turkish Industry and Business Association

VVER Abbreviation for a Russian series of pressurized water reactors

WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

Closing the Nuclear Trapdoor in the U.S.-Turkey “Model” Partnership: Opportunities for Civil Nuclear CooperationThe Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings – Turkey project

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iNTrOdUCTiON: Why Civil NUCleAr COOPerATiON?1

The strategic partnership between Turkey and the United States remains vital to both coun-

tries, but has struggled to adapt to a post-Cold War world. Under the ruling AKP (Justice and Devel-opment Party), Turkey has developed an assertive and increasingly independent voice on the interna-tional stage, articulating views that do not always align with U.S. preferences. Recognizing the need for a new bilateral paradigm, in 2009 the Obama Administration called for a “model partnership” to broaden and deepen cooperation. Civil nucle-ar issues are currently a trapdoor in this “model partnership,” through which fall many unexploited opportunities for enhanced bilateral cooperation.

Given a plethora of common concerns—from free trade to the crisis in Syria—why focus finite resources on nuclear cooperation? Civil nuclear issues are uniquely salient to the health of the al-liance, yet there is little positive bilateral engage-ment on these issues. In 2008, a U.S.-Turkey 123 nuclear cooperation agreement to enable bilateral nuclear trade entered into force, but so far very lit-tle cooperation has occurred. Meanwhile, some of the more serious bilateral disputes in recent years

have involved so-called “peaceful” nuclear uses, because Ankara and Washington embrace sepa-rate and contradictory interpretations of the Nu-clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Like many non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), Turkey believes the NNWS possess an inalienable right under Article IV to nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, including enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies. The United States believes the NPT grants NNWS a right to peaceful nuclear appli-cations, but interprets this to mean fuel cycle ser-vices, not technologies. Fundamental to Turkey’s perennial defense of Iran’s “right” to uranium en-richment is the precedent it might set for Ankara’s nuclear program. Although Turkey has no near-term interest in ENR, it wishes to preserve all op-tions. Accordingly, Ankara stood up to the United States in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to ensure the NSG did not pass what it saw as over-ly restrictive technology transfer rules.2 In light of these and other differences, the relative absence of positive civil nuclear engagement undermines U.S.-Turkey relations.

The U.S. government has good strategic reason to support Turkey’s nuclear energy ambitions. Do-ing so would benefit bilateral relations, and lend credibility to the U.S. claim that it supports the

Closing the Nuclear Trapdoor in the U.S.-Turkey

“Model” PartnershipOpportunities for Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Jessica C. Varnum

Closing the Nuclear Trapdoor in the U.S.-Turkey “Model” Partnership: Opportunities for Civil Nuclear CooperationThe Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings – Turkey project

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responsible spread of nuclear energy in accor-dance with the NPT. Ankara has demonstrated a consistently robust commitment to nonprolifera-tion, as a party to all relevant treaties and regimes and a member of voluntary mechanisms such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Unlike those energy-rich countries considering nuclear power, whose motivations may seem questionable, Turkey needs nuclear power to address chronic energy insecurity; the country’s “increasing rate of demand for natural gas and electricity [which nearly doubled in the past decade] is topped only by China.”3 Prime Minister Erdoğan cites nuclear power as the key to transitioning Turkey from its staggering 72% energy import dependence (pri-marily on Iran and Russia), into a country with “…the potential to export energy.”4

This paper therefore explores opportunities for the United States and Turkey to forge a new narrative

of cooperation rather than conflict in the civil nuclear arena. Examining Turkey’s decades-long nuclear power ambitions, the paper finds that U.S.-Turkish civil nuclear cooperation has a lengthy but inconsistent history. For primarily commercial reasons, U.S. industry is not current-ly involved in Turkey’s first nuclear power plants (NPPs). U.S. industry disinterest is mistakenly perceived by many in Turkey, however, as evidence of U.S. distrust of Ankara’s program. This misper-ception contributes to a difficult official-level dy-namic, often overshadowing bilateral cooperative programs on nuclear nonproliferation, security, and safeguards. As such, the paper first considers cooperation challenges and opportunities for the U.S. government, but concludes by examining un-exploited opportunities for industry, universities and civil society organizations to lead new nucle-ar cooperation initiatives in support of realizing a true “model partnership.”

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bACkgrOUNd: TUrkey’S ONCe ANd FUTUre NUCleAr POWer PrOgrAM

in 1955, enthusiastic about sharing “peaceful” nuclear technology, the United States concluded

a 123 agreement with Turkey.5 Soon after, Anka-ra established the earliest version of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), founded nu-clear training centers, and imported its first U.S. research reactor. Aiming to acquire a power re-actor by 1977, Turkey commenced nuclear power studies in 1965.6 Three tenders ran from 1977 to 1990; 1996 to 2001; and 2008 to 2009; the first two encompassed years of slipped deadlines.7

Five decades later, Turkey still has “plans—but no plants.”8 First and foremost, domestic factors ex-plain Ankara’s repeated failure to acquire NPPs.9 To trace the history of the nuclear program is to encounter a string of unstable governments; mil-itary coups (in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997); and successive economic crises. None of this was con-ducive to implementation of a multi-billion dollar infrastructure project. Additionally, Turkey alien-ated vendors with its inconsistent commitments and the commercially untenable terms of its ten-ders. Beginning in the 1980s, Ankara insisted ven-dors fully finance nuclear plants on a “build-oper-ate-transfer” (BOT) model, absent any sovereign guarantees, terms unacceptable to otherwise seri-ous prospects such as Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.10

Did the United States play a role in the failures of Turkey’s nuclear energy program? Leading Turkish expert Mustafa Kibaroğlu argued in 1997 that “the most significant hurdle [to Turkey’s nuclear pow-er ambitions] has been the Western countries’ fear of a retransfer of nuclear material and technology

from Turkey to third parties.”11 In addition to un-derplaying the central role of domestic instability in Ankara’s failed tenders, however, this analysis conflates correlation with causation. While some U.S. policymakers worried about the proliferation implications of Turkey’s close ties with Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s, their concerns do not ap-pear to have influenced the tenders. Even those vendors with extensive government backing had solid commercial reason to reject fully financing a reactor in a country so plagued by political and economic crises.

While the U.S. government played little or no part in Turkey’s failed tenders, it began to manifest waning enthusiasm for nuclear cooperation after India’s 1974 nuclear test. Increasingly concerned about proliferation, the United States established stricter preconditions for all new and renewal 123 agreements.12 The reforms boxed the U.S. exec-utive branch into changing the terms of the 123 agreement with Turkey when it came up for re-newal in 1981. Unable to achieve consensus on the revisions, both sides allowed the 123 to lapse. Eventually, partly because Westinghouse was in-terested in bidding on the 1997 tender, the Clinton Administration pursued a new agreement. Having committed since 1981 to a range of nonprolifera-tion measures, the Turkish government accepted the updated 123’s terms, and both sides signed the agreement in July 2000. Ultimately, however, the Clinton administration did not send the 123 to Congress for ratification; in light of information implicating Turkish nationals in the AQ Khan net-work, the U.S. intelligence community had raised concerns about Ankara’s export controls.13

Subsequently, Turkey improved its export con-trols and border security with U.S. assistance, joined PSI, and signed a bilateral nonproliferation

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agreement in 2005. However, the U.S. government was slow to reconsider the 123 agreement, partly because the Turkish government refused (for do-mestic legal reasons) to disclose elements of the relevant nuclear trafficking prosecutions while the cases remained ongoing. Finally, in 2008 Presi-dent Bush transmitted the agreement to Congress,

indicating “that the pertinent issues have been suf-ficiently resolved,” and the agreement entered into force after sitting before Congress for 90 days.14 Unfortunately, the eight-year delay confirmed many Turks’ longstanding perception of the Unit-ed States as an obstacle rather than a partner in Turkey’s nuclear ambitions.

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PUTTiNg The CArT beFOre The hOrSe? STATUS ANd NeedS OF TUrkey’S CUrreNT PrOgrAM

in 2008, Turkey issued a new nuclear tender, but unexpectedly received only one bid. Moreover,

the Russian consortium in question proposed an above-market electricity price, and subsequently revised the price downward after the tender’s close. A Turkish administrative court therefore invali-dated the tender, forcing the government to cancel it in 2009.15 Finally, Turkey conceptualized a win-ning strategy—following a successful 2010 inter-governmental agreement (IGA) with Russia, the government indicated “All NPPs will be installed by means of IGA.”16 IGAs afford the government greater flexibility than tenders, as the latter must legally meet certain fair competition criteria.

Russia’s Rosatom is expected to break ground on an ~25 billion USD project at Akkuyu in 2015, pend-ing receipt of a construction license from TAEK; the Akkuyu site itself was licensed in 1976.17 Ak-kuyu will be the world’s first “build-own-operate” (BOO) project and will consist of four Generation III + VVER-1200 reactors, generating 4800 MWe total.18 Rosatom has also guaranteed spent fuel take-back.

Ankara announced in May 2013 that it had grant-ed exclusive negotiating rights for its second plant at Sinop to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries-AREVA, which proposed a first-of-its-kind design, the At-mea 1.19 GDF Suez will operate the plant. Turkey asserts both Akkuyu and Sinop will be online by 2023, in conjunction with the much-anticipated centennial of the modern Turkish republic.

No U.S. firms bid on the 2008 tender or subse-quently attempted to sell reactors to Turkey, baf-

fling and offending the Turkish government. In April 2013, Minister of Energy and Electricity Taner Yıldız asserted, regarding Turkey’s second nuclear plant, that [U.S. officials] “…told us that the project was not feasible. It may not be feasible, but it is strategic. [Making] this strategic contri-bution falls upon Washington. …Not making an offer for this project means not [giving the real meaning] to the model partnership.”20

What seems to have gotten lost in translation be-tween Minister Yıldız and his counterparts is the fact that the U.S. government has no special in-fluence over industry’s decisions. U.S. firms have found it infeasible for standard commercial rea-sons to supply reactors to Turkey. Specifically, U.S. industry’s diminished global role, difficulty competing with state-backed competitors such as Rosatom, and negative memory of past Turk-ish tenders have precluded a leading role in either Akkuyu or Sinop. A U.S. nuclear industry execu-tive observed that for those firms who bid on past tenders, “it was like pouring water on the ground,” because enormous expenditures are required to bid a project, and Ankara ultimately selected no one.21 Some vendors chose not to participate in the 2008 tender because during peak interest in a “nuclear renaissance,” difficult decisions had to be made concerning how many projects they could bid. U.S. vendors were also deterred by the cost of bidding Akkuyu, as expensive “major seismic studies” would have been required.22 A GE-Hita-chi-led consortium intended to submit a bid, but could not logistically do so because the Turkish government refused to extend its deadline.23 Many vendors have also found Turkey’s financing pre-requisites infeasible, from the fixed per kilowatt hour price to the requirement for reinvestment in a decommissioning and spent fuel storage fund.

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Relative to the scale and timing of its nuclear am-bitions, Ankara faces serious infrastructure and human resources deficits. Principally, Turkey lacks the regulatory capacity to evaluate critically its nuclear projects. TAEK’s limited staff and inex-perience with power plants is further exacerbat-ed by the fact that neither of Turkey’s two design choices is currently in operation anywhere in the world. As such, there will be significant “regula-tory-operator asymmetry risk,”24 wherein: (1) the companies responsible for building and operating the plants will better understand the designs than TAEK; and (2) TAEK staff likely will have to learn how to license the designs from persons affiliated with the vendor, who may have conflicts of inter-est. Furthermore, as a subsidiary of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and the Prime Minister’s office, with a chairman appointed by the Prime Minister, TAEK is not independent. TAEK also has internal conflicts of interest, being respon-sible for both regulation and promotion/R&D for nuclear power. A robust and independent nuclear

regulator is essential to setting and enforcing nu-clear safety and security standards, yet creating one will be particularly challenging given the AK government’s recent decree laws (643 and 649) that removed much of the financial and decision-mak-ing autonomy of Turkey’s independent regulatory authorities.25

In addition to needing increased numbers of reg-ulatory staff and nuclear operators, Turkey has human resource deficits in safeguards, nonprolif-eration, and nuclear security. Many nuclear new-comers mistakenly see nuclear security as synon-ymous with nuclear safety, and may even use the same word to refer to both concepts.26 Because Turkey has historically only engaged in nuclear research, nuclear security challenges involving fissile materials and facilities have to-date been minimal.27 A more robust nuclear security infra-structure, particularly in terms of human and in-stitutional capacity, will therefore be a vital dimen-sion of developing the nuclear power program.

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OPPOrTUNiTieS FOr The MOdel PArTNerShiP iN The Civil NUCleAr reAlM

Closing the civil nuclear “trapdoor” in the “model partnership” will require simultane-

ous initiatives to be led by the U.S. and Turkish governments, industry, universities, and civil so-ciety. This approach will decrease the likelihood that difficulties faced by any one project will derail cooperation. In structuring efforts for maximum efficacy, three universal cautions apply.

First, new projects should complement rather than compete with existing initiatives. Ankara’s most significant partners in the nuclear area are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union (EU), and its nuclear vendors (Russia, and possibly Japan/France). The IAEA’s Technical Cooperation (TC) Programme is the ca-pacity-building provider of first resort for nuclear newcomers. In 2013 alone, Turkey is participating in eleven TC projects.28 Additionally, Ankara has requested an IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastruc-ture Review Mission, planned for November 2013, and committed to completing an IAEA Interna-tional Physical Protection Advisory Service fol-low-on mission. The EU primarily engages Turkey on nuclear safety.29 Russia and the yet-to-be-deter-mined vendor for Sinop will train Turkish person-nel to work at the first two plants. Under the IGA with Russia, “600 Turkish students will be trained in the Russian National Research Nuclear Univer-sity (MEPhI).”30 However, gaps remain. Develop-ing a robust regulatory, safety, and security culture will require Turkey to diversify its education and

training programs beyond its vendors. Addition-ally, few existing cooperative programs address is-sues such as nuclear security.

Secondly, new projects relying on official cooper-ation are likely to encounter difficulties engaging relevant Turkish participants. In the wake of Tur-key’s rapid transition from military to civilian con-trol, U.S. policymakers have struggled to identify, and exclusively focus diplomatic efforts on, the ap-propriate counterparts. Bridge-building is far from straightforward. Much of the Turkish bureaucra-cy (other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), is insular and “by default suspicious of international cooperation,” and in particular of “the U.S. agen-da” in pursuing cooperation.31 Furthermore, the rigidly hierarchical nature of the bureaucracy, and Prime Minister Erdoğan’s central decision-mak-ing role, means most cooperation is only feasible through top-down initiative. “The implication for outreach activities,” according to one Turkish colleague, is that you “have to think imaginatively [beyond exclusively government-to-government cooperation] to overcome suspicion.”32

Third, periodic bilateral disputes endanger proj-ects relying on Turkish government participation. For example, Ankara withheld cooperation on a number of bilateral nonproliferation and nuclear security projects in the mid-2000s when the Unit-ed States was slow to seek entry-into-force of the 123 agreement. Awareness of such issue linkage challenges can inform program structure, and also highlights the need for collaboration beyond the official level.

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OFFiCiAl-level COOPerATiON

While the U.S. government is supportive of Turkey’s nuclear energy ambitions, this mes-

sage is blurred by some policymakers’ assumptions that Ankara’s program is a strategic hedge against Iran.33 Turkish counterparts find the label of “like-ly nuclear proliferation domino” insulting, given their overall stellar nonproliferation credentials. When asked whether Turkey would consider nu-clear weapons in response to a nuclear-armed Iran, one Turkish colleague said [having been asked multiple times by U.S. colleagues]: “Stop asking that question, it’s insulting.”34 Another found the U.S. assumption that Turkey would go nuclear if Iran did “disturbing,” since Turkey is protected by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and wondered: “When asked this question by a U.S. official, should I be worried about the cred-ibility of the NATO guarantee?”35 Many Turkish policymakers incorrectly attribute deficits in bilat-eral cooperation—such as the lack of U.S. indus-try involvement in the nuclear program—to U.S. proliferation fears. As a first overall step towards improving cooperation, U.S. policymakers should tone down their “proliferation domino” rhetoric.

Most bilateral nuclear cooperation to-date has oc-curred directly between the U.S. and Turkish gov-ernments. Export controls have been a focal point since the 1980s.36 Turkey currently works with the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Secu-rity Administration (DOE NNSA) and the State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS). EXBS Turkey spends ap-proximately $800,000 per year training Turkish law enforcement personnel in radiation interdiction and providing related equipment.37 Overall, bilater-al export control cooperation is effective, although the programs have experienced politically-based implementation delays and are sometimes nega-tively perceived in Turkey. One Turkish interlocu-

tor indicated U.S. programs to counter trafficking are suspected in Turkey of being motivated by a “U.S. desire to have a more active presence in the Black Sea area with its military activities.”38 Turkish interlocutors have also asserted that export control cooperation would be more effective if the United States agreed to greater intelligence sharing.39 For its part, the Turkish government could considerably assuage remaining U.S./EU concerns about its ex-port control system by advancing a 2008 draft law still before the Prime Ministry “that would tighten Turkey’s export control loopholes by creating a na-tional export control list and a centralized export control enforcement authority.”40

Because nuclear trafficking transcends borders, Turkey is well-positioned to lead regional nuclear security efforts—particularly vis-à-vis the “Turk-ish” states.41 Such a role would be highly compatible with the AKP’s foreign policy activism. To encour-age Turkish regional leadership, the United States should consider advocating the establishment of a Nuclear Security Center of Excellence in Turkey.

DOE NNSA leads most other relevant bilateral pro-grams. While the 2005 Non-Proliferation Agreement created a framework for cooperation, bilateral en-gagement to-date has been limited. Most significant-ly, as part of global highly enriched uranium (HEU) minimization efforts, Turkey agreed to repatriation of its last 5.4 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU in January 2010.42 NNSA’s International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program and international programs through the Office of Emergency Management are highly relevant for possible expanded cooperation. (The national laboratories support NNSA; all of their international work must be coordinated through “headquarters.”) Finally, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Office of International Programs of-fers relevant collaborations, particularly through its International Regulatory Development Partnership.

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OPPOrTUNiTieS FOr iNdUSTry

U.S. industry has not found it commercially feasible to supply reactors to Turkey, but this

does not preclude other involvement in Ankara’s nuclear program. For example, U.S. firms are mar-ket leaders in nuclear consulting services. Turkey is likely to require such services for both plants as well as its overall nuclear program. TAEK needs assistance reviewing construction license applica-tions for the plants, and EUAS (Turkey’s Electricity Generation Company) may need site assessment/selection consulting services. While TAEK can-celled a technical support services (TSS) tender in March 2013 for a firm to assist in the “proper handling of its first NPP licensing activity,” other tenders are likely forthcoming.43 In a report on reg-ulatory capacity-building, the IAEA suggests that “augment[ing] the regulatory body’s staff with con-sultants” would be an acceptable practice provided “they are effectively independent of the operator or its contractors.”44 One of the principal challenges will be that neither the VVER-1200 or the Atmea-1 is in operation anywhere, and anyone qualified to evaluate either design likely has a conflict-of-inter-est relationship with the vendor.45 To avoid a con-flict-of-interest, Turkey could hire a third-country consulting firm with expertise in pressurized water reactors; while both TAEK and the firm would face a steep learning curve, this could ensure an unbi-ased and thorough licensing review.

U.S. firms also produce high value-added com-ponents for pressurized water reactors. If Turkey selects the Atmea 1 for Sinop, U.S. suppliers that

produce components for Mitsubishi Nuclear En-ergy Systems’ Advanced Pressurized Water Reac-tor or Westinghouse’s AP1000 could conceivably be part of the supply chain. Interested firms might seek U.S. Export-Import Bank financing, as they did with the UAE/South Korea reactor compo-nents and services deal.46

If U.S. industry does not obtain near-term ser-vices or consulting contracts in Turkey, however, there are other possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation. Turkey and the United States might engage in peer assistance visits under the auspices of organizations such as the IAEA, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), or the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). Peer-to-peer bilateral engagement, involving best prac-tices sharing between a U.S. operator and a Turkish counterpart, is also worth exploring. Such engage-ment generally occurs between operators using the same technology—e.g., operators of the AP1000 in two different countries. However, as one U.S. nu-clear industry executive put it, there would be “val-ue for the Turks in looking at what U.S. operators look like regardless of the technology.”47 The ben-efits for U.S. operators are less obvious, but some might find it valuable from a benchmarking per-spective to see how new build construction proj-ects run in other countries. In this vein, an August 2012 article cites U.S. Southern Company as “fol-lowing developments [in Turkey’s nuclear power program] and may be interested in sharing best practices at some point.”48 Southern is building the AP1000, another Generation III + pressurized wa-ter reactor.

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OPPOrTUNiTieS FOr UNiverSiTieS

Compared to other nuclear newcomers, Ankara has an impressive educational infrastructure.

According to one estimate there are “11 universi-ties that have significant teaching and/or research experience relevant to the development of nuclear power,” others that “appear to have some kind of relevant expertise,” and “eight national research institutions or facilities of potential relevance to a nuclear power program.”49 Hacettepe University offers the only undergraduate nuclear engineering degree, boasting approximately 300 graduates.50 However, Turkish Energy Minister Yıldız an-nounced a localization goal for the third nuclear plant of 80-85% Turkish content, meaning Turkish universities will need to significantly expand rele-vant degree offerings.51

U.S.-Turkey university collaborations represent a promising untapped source for bilateral nuclear cooperation, as they could play an important role in Turkey’s ongoing capacity building. Everything from informal exchanges to “joint undergraduate/graduate level programs” is conceivable.52 As a lead-er in nuclear education, the United States would be a natural partner. Precedent for educational col-laborations with Turkey exists; for example, MIT’s Sloan School of Management and Sabancı Univer-sity established a dual degree program.53

Around 12,000 Turks study in the United States each year.54 Thanks to these student flows, strong informal links exist between U.S. and Turkish uni-versities—at Koç University, for example, as many as “95 percent of the faculty [in all fields] received their Ph.D.’s from American universities.”55 Dr. Şule Ergün, an Assistant Professor in Hacettepe’s Nu-clear Energy Engineering Department, indicated that four out of the six faculty in her department

obtained U.S. PhDs, and a large number of Hac-ettepe’s graduates pursue advanced study or ca-reers in the United States.56 Dr. Ergün believes that more formal cooperation with U.S. universities could be mutually beneficial. Hacettepe recent-ly began pursuing memoranda of understanding (MOUs) outside of Turkey, concluding agreements with South Korea’s Hanyang University and Korea Electric Power Corporation.57

Across-the-board, U.S. and Turkish professors interviewed for this study indicated they would welcome increased cooperation, from hosting/sending visiting delegations; to exchanging facul-ty/staff/students; to collaborating on education/training/research programs through more formal mechanisms such as MOUs.58 Additionally, as Turkish universities add curricula in fields such as nonproliferation and nuclear security, U.S. uni-versities can be important resources. For example, Hacettepe’s Dr. Şebnem Udum, who teaches one of Turkey’s only classes on nuclear nonproliferation, indicated that she sees a need for nuclear security educational capacity-building. According to Dr. Udum, “Since nuclear security is a rather new con-cept for the Turkish technocrats and academics, only a few people know what nuclear security is, in part because the Turkish word ‘security’ may also mean ‘safety.’ It has been used as a technical term by TAEK, thus most people mean safety when they say nuclear security.”59 She indicated U.S.-Turkish cooperation could be helpful in raising awareness of the need for nuclear security education.60

U.S. universities also have incentives to pursue col-laboration. MIT’s Dr. Alan Hanson asserts there is “a broad humanitarian concern that if countries do nuclear power, they must do it right; that doesn’t necessarily only mean doing nuclear power the same as the United States, but it does mean adopt-

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ing high standards for safety, security, and eth-ics.”61 U.S. universities can learn as much from in-ternational collaborations as their partners. North Carolina State’s Dr. Ayman Hawari speculated that it “would be useful to look at how technical and engineering principles we hold true [in running a nuclear power program] might change in a dif-ferent country.”62 Existing programs offer insights into what is possible. In collaborative coursework with North Carolina State, students at the Jordan University of Science and Technology (JUST) gain virtual experience operating NCS’s research reac-tor.63 Texas A&M’s Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute undertakes international outreach, and MIT runs an International Nuclear Leader-ship Education Program. The author’s institution, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, of-fers capacity-building through visiting fellows and “train-the-trainers” programs in nonproliferation and export controls.64 While some universities of-

fer ongoing partnerships, others provide one-time training that participants use to establish programs in their home countries.

Given interest on both sides in exploring collabora-tion, what are likely obstacles? First, as Dr. Hawari observes, “any exercise must be supported some-how financially.”65 Texas A&M’s Dr. Paul Nelson indicates that many state universities “have limited resources to enable international collaborations,” and as such a “significant deciding factor often is, ‘what will external entities such as the federal gov-ernment fund us to do?’”66 Finally, U.S. institutions should be aware of the need to put some types of collaboration through university-level export control compliance review, to determine whether planned activities require an export license. Many programs, however, are likely to fall under the Na-tional Security Decision Directive-189 fundamen-tal research exemption.67

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Civil SOCieTy ANd TrACk 2 diPlOMACy

Civil society organizations (CSOs) can play a central role in U.S.-Turkey nuclear cooper-

ation by facilitating Track 2 and Track 1.5 dia-logues.68 Dialogue projects build person-to-per-son contacts, and cultivate respect and empathy concerning differences of opinion. They are also well-suited to initial bilateral conversations on topics not yet ripe for official-level progress. For example, the 123 agreement proposes cooperation on “multilateral approaches to guaranteeing nu-clear fuel supply,”69 but Lorenz and Kidd acknowl-edge, “The general consensus in the decision-mak-ing corridors of Turkey seems to be that it is too early to think about multilateral nuclear approach-es...”70 This is partly because Turkey’s nuclear pro-gram has more pressing priorities. More funda-mentally, Ankara is skeptical of initiatives to date in this area, and would only support approaches that are nondiscriminatory and respectful of NPT Article IV rights. As such, this is one area of the 123 well-suited to Track 2 foundational dialogues.

In seeking dialogue partners, U.S. CSOs should be aware that the development of Western-style CSOs in Turkey is largely a phenomenon of the past de-cade, in response to liberalization of the Associa-tions Law in 2004.71 Prior to these reforms, the gov-ernment tightly controlled CSOs’ activities. Still in their infancy, most organizations have limited resources and independence. It is also crucial to be aware of how particular organizations are viewed by the government if the goal of the dialogue is to influence the official level. For example, the Turk-ish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) has a tumultuous relationship with the AKP.72 Additionally, the majority of Turkish CSOs working on nuclear energy are one-dimensional protest organizations, and therefore poorly suited to projects intended to support Turkey’s nuclear program. The Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) is a key exception, having released major objective reports on the program.

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CONClUSiONS

Civil nuclear issues represent a significant “trap-door” in U.S.-Turkey relations, but a wealth of

opportunities exist, particularly beyond traditional government-to-government engagement, to board up that trapdoor. While the United States and Turkey have deeply held ideological differences in the civil nuclear realm, both also have compelling common interests. Neither country would find the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran acceptable. Both view a healthy NPT regime as important, al-though they differ over how best to uphold Article IV of the treaty. And both the United States and Turkey would like to ensure that emerging nucle-ar energy programs in Turkey’s region—including Ankara’s—develop in a safe, secure, and safeguard-ed manner. Some may question the wisdom of ini-tiatives that encourage Turkey’s rush to nuclear power; however, unlike most countries listed as possible “nuclear newcomers,” Ankara’s near-term acquisition of NPPs is an all but foregone conclu-sion. Playing a positive role in Turkey’s program is a strategically wiser path for the United States than ignoring its existence.

Important progress has been made at the official bilateral level, but reviewing government-to-gov-ernment nuclear cooperation to-date exposes its limitations. Official cooperation is hindered by weak ties between the U.S. and Turkish bureau-cracies, and is easily hijacked by politics. Steps can and should be taken to improve Track 1 in-teractions. For example, the United States should tone down its proliferation domino rhetoric and consider ways to engage Turkey as a true partner in addressing regional challenges such as nuclear

security. Additionally, both governments should support the use of CSO-led Track 1.5 and 2 dia-logues as confidence-building measures, as these are often also effective mechanisms for improving official-level cooperation.

However, thinking creatively beyond exclusively government-to-government cooperation holds the key to establishing a “model partnership” on nucle-ar issues. Some of the most promising unexploited opportunities exist in the university, civil society, and private sectors. Successful collaboration in these areas would likely have positive spillover effects—at least in the medium to long term—on government-to-government relations. More fun-damentally, such collaborations would positively contribute to the development of a safe and secure Turkish nuclear program. As such, the U.S. gov-ernment may find it useful to focus outreach on support of these communities, for example by: (1) promoting U.S. nuclear services and components exports; and (2) providing robust grant-based sup-port to U.S. university and CSO-led engagement of nuclear newcomers such as Turkey.

Ultimately, bilateral civil nuclear engagement is highly desirable because it will establish per-son-to-person relationships where few exist; con-tribute to the responsible development of nuclear power by a key U.S. ally; create new stakeholders in favor of U.S.-Turkey relations in both countries; and foster improved understanding of bilateral differences of opinion such that they are less like-ly to derail the alliance. As such, enhanced nucle-ar cooperation has the potential to meaningfully contribute to the development of a true U.S.-Tur-key “model partnership.”

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eNdNOTeS

1. Note on Sources: This paper relies extensively on 2012-2013 interview research conducted by the author in Istanbul, Ankara, Washing-ton, DC, and Vienna, as well as via phone and e-mail communication. Interviewees includ-ed current and former U.S. and Turkish gov-ernment officials; U.S. and Turkish university and non-governmental organization experts; experts from relevant international organiza-tions; and individuals affiliated with the global nuclear industry. While some interviews are cited, others were conducted on a not-for-at-tribution or background research basis. Some material is also drawn from an unpublished Track 2 dialogue paper: Jessica C. Varnum, “U.S.-Turkish Cooperation to Strengthen the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Re-gime and Other Institutions,” Working Paper, “U.S.-Turkey Dialogue,” October 31-Novem-ber 2, 2012, Istanbul, Turkey.

2. Elaine Grossman, “Turkish Opposition Pro-longs Deadlock on Proposed Nuclear Trade Guidelines,” Global Security Newswire (July 7, 2010), www.nti.org.

3. Senada Sokollu, “Turkey invests big in nuclear power,” Deutsche Welle (DW) (May 20, 2013), http://dw.de/p/18ank.

4. Ibid.5. “Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil

Uses of Atomic Energy Between the Govern-ment of the United States of America and the Government of the Turkish Republic,” (June 10, 1955), http://photos.state.gov/libraries/turkey/461177/pdf/T3320.pdf.

6. Erkan Erdogdu, “Nuclear Power in Open En-ergy Markets: A Case Study of Turkey,” Energy Policy 35, no. 5 (May 2007): 24.

7. Aaron Stein, “Turkey’s Nuclear Energy Am-bitions: Big Plans, Little Progress,” (February 2012), http://edam.org.tr/disarmament/EN/documents/Nuclear%20Energy%20Ambi-tions.pdf.

8. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Correspondence: Turkey Had Plans—But No Plants—to Benefit from Nuclear Energy,” The Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 3 (November 2010).

9. See, for example: Aaron Stein, “Turkey’s Nu-clear History Holds Lessons for the Future,” WMD Junction (May 13, 2013), http://wmd-junction.com/130513_turkey_nuclear_histo-ry.htm.

10. Stein, “Turkey’s Nuclear Energy Ambitions: Big Plans, Little Progress.”

11. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peace-ful Nuclear Power,” The Nonproliferation Re-view (Spring-Summer 1997): 33.

12. For more on the U.S. approach to nuclear co-operation under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, see: Jessica C. Varnum, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation as Nonprolifera-tion: Reforms, or the Devil You Know?,” Issue Brief for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (Novem-ber 27, 2012), http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/us-nuclear-cooperation-nonprolifera-tion-reforms-or-devil-you-know.

13. Sammy Salama and Cameron Hunter, “Com-panies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components,” Issue Brief for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (March 1, 2005), www.nti.org.

14. “Presidential Message to Senate Foreign Re-lations Committee Transmitting the Agree-ment for Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Ener-gy,” (January 23, 2008), http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/StateandTurkeyPeacefulNuc2000.pdf?_=1316627913.

15. “Turkey Scraps Nuclear Power Plant Tender,” (November 20, 2009), Agence France-Pres-se, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jq9j9w-jkSU1yUWbWIQsi-8DjPULQ.

16. Salih Sari, “Current Nuclear Power Situation in Turkey,” Technical Meeting on CNPP (March 18-21, 2013), http://www.iaea.org/Nuclear-Power/Downloadable/Meetings/2013/2013-03-18-03-21-TM-NPE/22.sari.pdf.

17. Turkish Investment Support and Promotion Agency, “Akkuyu Nuclear Plant May Cost USD 25 Billion,” (July 10, 2012), http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/news/Pages/akkuyu-nuclear-plant-may-cost-USD-25%20billion.aspx.

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18. “Appendix 1: Agreement Between the Govern-ment of the Republic of Turkey and the Govern-ment of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Relation to the Construction and Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant at the Akkuyu Site in the Republic of Turkey,” ed. Sinan Ulgen, The Turkish Model for Transition to Nuclear Pow-er (Istanbul: EDAM Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, December 2011), http://www.edam.org.tr/EDAMNukleer/ap-pendix1.pdf.

19. Selcan Hacaoglu and Tara Patel, “Mitsubi-shi, Areva Sign $22b Turkish Nuclear Plant Deal,” Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-03/mitsubishi-areva-set-to-sign-turkish-nuclear-plant-deal-today.html.

20. “Turkey Dismayed at lack of US partnership on second nuclear plant: Minister,” Hurriyet Daily News (April 6, 2013), http://www.hur-riyetdailynews.com/turkey-dismayed-at-lack-of-us-partnership-on-second-nuclear-plant-minister--.aspx?pageID=238&nid=44390.

21. U.S. Nuclear Industry Executive, interview by Jessica Varnum, April 2013.

22. U.S. Nuclear Industry Executive, interview.23. Lars Paulsson, “GE-Hitachi Likely to Miss

Turkish Nuclear Deadline (Update4),” Bloomberg News (September 4, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsar-chive&sid=a_07JeeV7TDI.

24. John P. Banks, Kevin Massy, and Charles K. Ebinger, “Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States: Case Studies from the Middle East, “ (Washington, DC: the Brookings Institution, November 2012), 34.

25. Işık Özel, “The politics of de-delegation: Reg-ulatory (in)dependence in Turkey,” Regulation & Governance 6, no. 1 (March 2012): 120.

26. The IAEA defines nuclear security as “the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, ille-gal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substanc-es or their associated facilities.” By contrast, nuclear safety is “the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents and mitigation of accident consequences, re-sulting in protection of workers, the public

and the environment from undue radiation hazards.” See: “Nuclear Safety & Security: Con-cepts and Terms,” International Atomic Ener-gy Agency, http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/concepts-terms.asp, last updated May 29, 2012.

27. The NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index ranks Turkey 33 out of 144 in the category of countries with “less than one kilogram of weapons-usable nuclear materials or none at all.” See NTI Nuclear Security Index, accessed June 1, 2013: http://www.ntiindex.org/coun-tries/turkey/.

28. “Technical Cooperation: Information Records on Turkey,” International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed May 19, 2013, http://tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/ProjectInfoByCountry.asp?cid=TUR.

29. European Commission, “Turkey-EU Positive Agenda Enhanced EU-Turkey Energy Coop-eration,” (June 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/en-ergy/international/bilateral_cooperation/doc/turkey/20120622_outline_of_enhanced_co-operation.pdf.

30. Salih Sari, “A Review of Akkuyu NPP Proj-ect in Turkey After Fukushima Daiichi Ac-cident,” (June 2012), http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/Infrastructure/meetings/2012-06-18-20-TM-Vienna/11.Re-view_of_Akkuyu_NPP_after_Fukushima.pdf.

31. Turkish Interlocutor, “U.S.-Turkey Dialogue,” October 31-November 2, 2012, Istanbul, Tur-key.

32. Turkish Interlocutor, “U.S.-Turkey Dialogue,” October 31-November 2, 2012, Istanbul, Tur-key.

33. For analysis of why Turkey is unlikely to pur-sue nuclear weapons, even if Iran acquires them, see: Jessica C. Varnum, “Turkey in Tran-sition: Toward or Away from Nuclear Weap-ons?,” in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 2, A Comparative Perspective, ed. William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-versity Press, 2010).

34. Turkish Interlocutor, “U.S.-Turkey-Dialogue,” October 31-November 2, 2012, Istanbul, Tur-key.

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35. Turkish Interlocutor, “U.S.-Turkey Dialogue,” October 31-November 2, 2012, Istanbul, Tur-key.

36. “Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement: Pursuant to Section 123 a. of the Atomic En-ergy Act of 1954, as Amended, With Respect to the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” (June 2000), http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/StateandTurkeyPeaceful-Nuc2000.pdf?_=1316627913.

37. Embassy of the United States in Turkey, “Polit-ical-Military Section,” http://turkey.usembas-sy.gov/political_military_section.html.

38. Turkish Interlocutor, “U.S.-Turkey Dialogue,” October 31-November 2, 2012, Istanbul, Tur-key.

39. Turkish Interlocutor, “U.S.-Turkey Dialogue,” October 31-November 2, 2012, Istanbul, Tur-key.

40. Aaron Stein, “Alcohol and Export Controls: Turkey Moves in Slow Motion,” Turkey Wonk (May 27, 2013), http://turkeywonk.wordpress.com/.

41. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, “Co-operation with the Turkish States,” http://www.taek.gov.tr/en/international/coopera-tion-with-the-turkish-states.html.

42. U.S. National Nuclear Security Administra-tion, “NNSA Announces Highly Enriched Uranium Removed from Turkey,” (2010), http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressre-leases/01.12.10.

43. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), “Technical Specifications for Call for Tender to Procure Technical Support Services During Review And Assessment Of Construction Li-cense Application for Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant,” July 2012, http://www.taek.gov.tr/eng/documents/func-startdown/615/, 2. See also: “Announcement of Cancellation of Tender No: 2012/190420 ,” (March 22, 2013), http://www.taek.gov.tr/en/latest-news/1042-an-nou nc e me nt - of - c anc e l l at i on - of - te n -der-no-2012-190420.html.

44. “Training the staff of the regulatory body for nuclear facilities: A competency framework,”

IAEA-TECDOC-1254 (November 2001), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publica-tions/PDF/te_1254_prn.pdf.

45. For more on this point, also see: Banks, Massy, and Ebinger, “Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States: Case Studies from the Middle East.”

46. K. Steiner-Dicks, “Can U.S. Nuclear Supply Chain Compete and Win Abroad? ,” Nuclear Energy Insider (September 12, 2012), http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/new-build/can-us-nuclear-supply-chain-compete-and-win-abroad.

47. U.S. Nuclear Industry Executive, interview.48. Albert Bozzo, “Nuclear-Plant Plan May Test

Turkey’s Trade-Diplomatic Balancing Act,” CNBC (August 15, 2012), www.cnbc.com.

49. James M. Acton and Wyn Q. Bowen, “Atoms for Peace in the Middle East: The Technical and Reg-ulatory Requirements,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Working Paper (Septem ber 24, 2008), http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Atoms__for_Peace_in_the_Middle_East-The_Technical_and_Regulatory_Requirements_(FI-NAL).pdf.

50. Banks, Massy, and Ebinger, “Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States: Case Studies from the Middle East,” 28.

51. Humeyra Pamuk and Orhan Coskun, “Turkey aims to build home-grown nuclear industry, expertise,” Reuters (May 8, 2013), http://uk.re-uters.com/article/2013/05/08/turkey-nucle-ar-technology-idUKL6N0DP39X20130508.

52. Ilhan Or, Hasan Saygin, and Sinan Ulgen, “A Study on the Security and Safety Aspects of Switching to Nuclear Power in Turkey,” in The Turkish Model for Transition to Nuclear Power, ed. Sinan Ulgen (Istanbul: EDAM (Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies), De-cember 2011), 45.

53. D. D. Guttenplan, “An Old Ally Sends Droves of Students to U.S.,” New York Times (April 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/world/europe/08iht-educlede08.html?page-wanted=all&_r=0.

54. Institute of International Education, “Open Doors Fact Sheet: Turkey,” Open Doors 2012 (2013), http://www.iie.org/.

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55. Guttenplan, “An Old Ally Sends Droves of Stu-dents to U.S.”

56. Dr. Şule Ergün, Assistant Professor, Hacettepe University’s Nuclear Energy Engineering De-partment, telephone interview by Jessica Var-num, May 2013.

57. Ibid.58. Numerous Turkish and U.S. nuclear engineer-

ing professors, interviews by Jessica Varnum, May 2013.

59. Dr. Şebnem Udum, Department of Interna-tional Relations, Hacettepe University, tele-phone interview by Jessica Varnum, May 2013.

60. Ibid.61. Dr. Alan Hanson, MIT Department of Nuclear

Science and Engineering, Executive Director Nuclear Leadership Education Program, tele-phone interview by Jessica Varnum, May 2013.

62. Dr. Ayman Hawari, Professor and Director of Nuclear Reactor Program, Nuclear Engineer-ing Department, North Carolina State Univer-sity, telephone interview by Jessica Varnum, May 2013.

63. “An International First,” North Carolina State Engineering (Spring 2011), http://www.engr.ncsu.edu/magazine/spring2011/first.php.

64. See: “Visiting Fellows Program,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/programs/edu/visiting_fellows.htm.

65. Dr. Hawari, interview.66. Dr. Paul Nelson, Associate Director for Inter-

national Programs, Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI), Texas A&M University, telephone interview by Jessica Var-num, May 2013.

67. National Academy of Sciences, “Examining Core Elements of International Research Col-laboration: Summary of a Workshop,” eds. Susan Sauer Sloan and Tom Arrison, (2011), http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13192.

68. Track 1 “official-level” interactions involve only government representatives; Track 1.5 dialogues involve both serving officials and non-governmental experts; and Track 2 dia-logues involve exclusively non-governmental participants (though many are former officials with links to the official level, and it is com-mon practice to include serving officials as observers).

69. “Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nu-clear Energy,” (2008), http://www.nti.org/me-dia/pdfs/StateandTurkeyPeacefulNuc2000.pdf?_=1316627913.

70. Thomas Lorenz and Joanna Kidd, “Turkey and Multilateral Nuclear Approaches in the Mid-dle East,” Nonproliferation Review Volume 17, no. No. 3 (November 2010): 518.

71. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “NGO Law Monitor: Turkey,” (February 20, 2013), http://www.icnl.org/research/moni-tor/turkey.html.

72. See: “PM meets with TÜSİAD after more than a year,” Today’s Zaman (May 10, 2013), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-315077-pm-meets-with-tusiad-after-more-than-a-year.html.

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The AUThOr

Jessica C. Varnum is the Nuclear Threat Ini-tiative Project Manager and a Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, where she has worked since 2006. Varnum is an expert on Turkey, and regularly lectures, writes, and contrib-utes to research and dialogue projects on U.S.-Tur-

key relations. Varnum also specializes in nuclear energy policy. She focuses in particular on chal-lenges for nuclear newcomers, and on managing the proliferation, nuclear security, and safeguards risks of civil nuclear technologies. An Adjunct Professor at the Monterey Institute of Internation-al Studies, she teaches in the MA Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies program.

Closing the Nuclear Trapdoor in the U.S.-Turkey

“Model” PartnershipOpportunities for Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Jessica C. Varnum

The Turkey Project at Brookings1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW

Washington, D.C. 20036brookings.edu