CMH Pub 75-18 the Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877

8/20/2019 CMH Pub 75-18 the Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877

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The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

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CMH Pub 75–18

Cover: The Freedmen’s Bureau, by Alfred R. Waud (Harper’s Weekly, 25 July 1868)


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by Mark L. Bradley

Center o Military History United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2015

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Introduction

Although over one hundred fify years have passed since thestart o the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues tomatter. Te orces unleashed by that war were immensely destruc-tive because o the significant issues involved: the existence o the

Union, the end o slavery, and the very uture o the nation. Tewar remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with oversix hundred thousand killed in the course o the our-year struggle.

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the AmericanCivil War was no exception. Te seeds o the conflict were sownin the earliest days o the republic’s ounding, primarily over theexistence o slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict canbegin without the conscious decisions o those engaged in the

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way topaper over the division o the country into two camps: one thatwas dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limitits spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “hal slaveand hal ree,” and that could not stand.

Regardless o the actors tearing the nation asunder, thesoldiers on each side o the struggle went to war or personalreasons: looking or adventure, being caught up in the passions

and emotions o their peers, believing in the Union, avoringstates’ rights, or even justiying the simple schoolyard dynamico being convinced that they were “worth” three o the soldierson the other side. Nor can we overlook the actor that some wentto war to prove their manhood. Tis has been, and continuesto be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the proes-sion o arms. Soldiers join or many reasons but ofen stay in thefight because o their comrades and because they do not want to

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues o national impact shrinkto nothing in the intensely personal world o cannon shell andminié ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly andonly culminated with the conquest o the rebellious Conederacy,


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the preservation o the Union, and the end o slavery. Tesecampaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared incommemoration o our national sacrifices, seek to rememberthat war and honor those in the United States Army who died topreserve the Union and ree the slaves as well as to tell the story othose American soldiers who ought or the Conederacy despitethe inherently flawed nature o their cause. Te Civil War was ourgreatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study andcontemplation.

RICHARD W. SEWAR, PH.D.Chie o Military History


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The Army and Reconstruction1865–1877

Strategic Setting

Within two months o Conederate General Robert E. Lee’ssurrender at Appomattox Court House on 9 April 1865, theConederacy had collapsed, and its armed orces had ceased toexist. Te systematic destruction o the South’s transportation,manuacturing, and industrial acilities during the closing months

o the war had ensured the utility o urther armed resistance. Italso made a swif economic recovery next to impossible, leavingex-Conederates destitute and bitter over their harsh ate. Tebloodiest war in U.S. history—final death toll estimates range rom600,000 to over 800,000 fighting men—had settled the criticalissues o secession and slavery but lef much else unresolved, aboveall the ormer slaves’ civil, political, and economic status in thepostwar South.

In the spring o 1865, the U.S. Army aced the unprecedentedtask o occupying eleven conquered Southern states duringpeacetime and administering “Reconstruction”—the processby which the ormer rebellious states would be restored to theUnion. wo decades earlier, the Army had perormed occupation

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duty in Mexico both during and afer the Mexican War, but thatwas on oreign soil, and Reconstruction was never a part o theArmy’s mission there. Te postwar occupation o Caliornia andNew Mexico did provide Army officers with some experience in“nation-building,” requiring them to draf laws and constitutionsor the territories recently annexed rom Mexico.

During the Civil War, the Army oversaw wartimeReconstruction in areas o Virginia, ennessee, Louisiana, andArkansas, giving it invaluable experience in the kind o stabiliza-tion and peacekeeping missions it would later perorm across theentire South. On 24 April 1863, the War Department issued GeneralOrders 100, the Union Army’s official code o conduct in the field.

Drafed by Francis Lieber, an eminent legal scholar, and a panel oArmy officers, “Lieber’s Code” induced several European nations todraf similar documents or their armies. For all its virtues, Lieber’sCode exerted little influence on the Union Army’s conduct duringthe Civil War, in part because the Army operated under the assump-tion that such matters should be lef to the local commanders’discretion. Given these circumstances, it is hardly surprising thatthe Army entered its postwar occupation duties with neither a plan

nor a doctrine to govern its actions. (See Map 1.)Worse yet, the U.S. Constitution provided no guidance on

how the rebellious states should be restored, provoking heateddebate as to what Reconstruction entailed. On 8 December 1863,President Abraham Lincoln issued his Proclamation o Amnestyand Reconstruction, offering a ull pardon and restoration o rightsto persons who resumed their allegiance to the Union by takinga loyalty oath and pledging to support the abolition o slavery.

Te proclamation excluded only a ew classes o high-rankingConederate civilian and military leaders. When those taking theloyalty oath in any Southern state amounted to 10 percent o the votes cast in 1860, the loyal minority could establish a new stategovernment with representation in Congress, provided its consti-tution abolished slavery.

Deeming Lincoln’s “en Percent Plan” too lenient, theRadical Republicans in Congress introduced their own plan—

known as the Wade-Davis bill—in July 1864. Under its provi-sions, Reconstruction would not start until the majority o astate’s white male voters pledged to support the U.S. Constitution.Only then could a state hold an election or delegates to a consti-tutional convention, with voting restricted to those who could


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take the Ironclad Oath affirming that they had never willinglysupported the Conederacy. Lincoln killed the bill with a pocket veto, earing that it would compel him to repudiate the Southernstate governments established under his en Percent Plan. Henever intended his plan to serve as a blueprint or postwarReconstruction, but an assassin’s bullet killed him beore hecould develop such a program.

Lincoln’s sudden death and the recess o Congress untilDecember 1865 thrust that responsibility on the shoulders o theallen president’s successor, Andrew Johnson, a ennessee poli-tician who had remained loyal to the Union. During the war hehad first served as a U.S. senator and then as military governor

o the Volunteer State beore his election to U.S. vice president inNovember 1864. His declaration, “reason must be made odious,and traitors must be punished and impoverished,” indicated thatJohnson avored a rigorous approach to Reconstruction. At first,his actions appeared to confirm his image as a hard-liner. In April1865, he had rejected as too generous the terms o surrenderthat Union Maj. Gen. William . Sherman initially had offeredConederate General Joseph E. Johnston, and in May, he ordered

the arrest and imprisonment o numerous ormer Conederate offi-cials, including the ex-president, Jefferson Davis. But it remainedto be seen what Johnson’s Reconstruction plan would be, or heseemed in no hurry to act.

Operations

MILITARY GOVERNMENT BY DEFAULT

In the meantime, Army commanders in the South had toimprovise their own occupation policy, a responsibility theypreerred to leave to the authorities in Washington, D.C. On 5May 1865, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, the commander o theDepartment o North Carolina, expressed his rustration in aletter to his immediate superior, General Sherman. “I hope theGovernment will make known its policy as to organization o Stategovernments without delay,” Schofield wrote. “Affairs must neces-

sarily be in a very unsettled state until that is done. Te people[o North Carolina] are now in a mood to accept almost anythingwhich promises a definite settlement.”

When that guidance ailed to materialize, Schoieldpresented his own Reconstruction plan to Lt. Gen. Ulysses S.


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Grant, the general in chie o the U.S. Army. he departmentcommander recommended appointing a military governor whowould declare the state’s antebellum laws in orce i they didnot conlict with the Constitution or the president’s wartimeproclamations. In addition to commanding the occupationorce or North Carolina, the military governor would appointtemporary sheris and other oicials, and call an election ordelegates to a state convention. Schoield would require theconvention to repudiate secession, abolish slavery, resumeederal-state relations, and order the election o a governorand state legislature. he acts o the convention would thenbe submitted to the people or ratiication. Should the conven-

tion ail to accomplish its requisite tasks, Schoield recom-mended dissolving it and placing the state once more undermilitary government “until the people should come to theirsenses.” Grant agreed with Schoield’s plan but noted that Armycommanders could only act as peacekeepers until the presidentunveiled his Reconstruction policy.

Schofield, however, decided that the situation called or imme-diate action. During his month-long tenure in North Carolina, he

established an ad hoc recoveryprogram that provided rationsand transportation or paroledConederate soldiers, ed andsheltered reugees o both races,loaned draf horses to destitutearmers, ormed local policecompanies, created a bureau o

reedmen’s affairs, and issuedguidelines or reedpeople andtheir ormer masters.

Similarly, Maj. Gen.George H. homas, thecommander o the Departmento the Cumberland embracingennessee and parts o

Georgia, Alabama, andMississippi, permitted judges,sheris, and other local oi-cials to continue perormingtheir duties according to the

General Schofield (Library of Congress)


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state laws in eect beore secession. As or vacancies, homasencouraged “the loyal people o the neighborhood” to holdelections and select worthy candidates.

Although Tomas’ policy met with some opposition amongSouthern Unionists, it remained in orce, but President Johnsonwould not allow Southern governors or state legislatures to remainin office. Acting under Johnson’s orders, Army officers arrestedtwo o the more prominent ex-governors—Joseph E. Brown oGeorgia and Zebulon B. Vance o North Carolina—and sent themto Washington, or incarceration.

PRESIDENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION

On 29 May, President Johnson issued two proclamationsoutlining his Reconstruction policy. Given his prior actions andstatements, the conditions were surprisingly lenient. Te firstproclamation granted amnesty to all ex-Conederates except thosewho ell into ourteen classes, but the excluded persons could applyor a presidential pardon. Te second proclamation appointedWilliam W. Holden the provisional governor o North Carolina. Inaddition to being the longtime editor o the Raleigh-based North

Carolina Standard , Holden had been the unsuccessul candidate othe state’s peace action in the 1864 gubernatorial election againstthe popular incumbent Vance. Although an outspoken opponento the war, Holden had stopped short o calling or North Carolina’sreturn to the Union. Even so, Johnson regarded him as the arHeel State’s most reliable wartime Unionist.

Te president’s second proclamation also provided a mecha-nism or the state to resume its ormer relations with the ederal

government. Holden would first call a convention consisting odelegates elected by loyal citizens “or the purpose o altering oramending” the state constitution. At minimum, the conventionhad to declare the secession ordinance null and void and to abolishslavery. Te proclamation required all voters and electors to takean amnesty oath and to meet the qualifications set orth by the stateconstitution in orce beore 20 May 1861, the day North Carolinapassed its secession ordinance. Tis meant that no reedmen

could vote or delegates. Te proclamation officially restored theauthority and unctions o ederal law, ederal tax and customscollectors, ederal courts, and the U.S. Post Office in the ar HeelState. Aside rom Johnson’s appointment o a civilian governor, hisReconstruction plan was almost identical to Schofield’s.


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Te paragraph regarding the military’s role in PresidentialReconstruction was brie. Te department commander and histroops were to “assist the said provisional governor in carrying intoeffect this proclamation.” Tey were also “to abstain rom in anyway hindering, impeding, or discouraging the loyal people romthe organization o a State government as herein authorized.” Tatwas all—Johnson’s proclamation was silent on martial law andlacked a clear definition o the Army’s role in Reconstruction. Tepresident’s vague instructions all but ensured a conflict betweenthe provisional governor and the military commander over theirrespective powers. Lacking specific guidelines, the departmentcommander regarded his authority as supreme in North Carolina

pending the resumption o civil government. In the coming weeks,Johnson issued similar proclamations or Alabama, Florida,Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and exas, leaving intact theloyal governments established in Arkansas, Louisiana, ennessee,and Virginia under Lincoln’s en Percent Plan.

While President Johnson unveiled his Reconstruction plan,General Grant ocused his attention on the volatile situationin exas. As o mid-May, the Conederate rans-Mississippi

Department had not yet surrendered, and French imperial orcesoccupied Mexico in violation o the Monroe Doctrine. Teprevious year, the Archduke Maximilian had declared himselemperor o Mexico and had established cordial relations with theConederate government. Te Union general in chie sought tocompel the surrender o the rans-Mississippi Conederates anddrive the French Army rom Mexico. On 17 May, Grant sent histrusted subordinate, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, west to take

charge o the newly established Military Division o the Southwest,which included exas, southwestern Arkansas, the Indianerritory, and most o Louisiana. Grant considered the situation inexas so urgent that he denied Sheridan’s request to participate inthe Grand Review on 23–24 May. In the Lone Star State, Sheridanwould have at his disposal three inantry corps and two cavalrydivisions—over 30,000 troops in all.

By the time he reached his headquarters at New Orleans,

Louisiana, Sheridan discovered that the situation in exas hadchanged drastically. General Edmund Kirby Smith had surrenderedthe Conederate orces there on 2 June, resulting in the collapse ostate and local authority. For weeks, lawlessness prevailed in the LoneStar State, as ormer Conederate troops plundered and vandalized


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with impunity. In mid-June,Union orces began to arrive ineastern exas and quickly restoredorder there, but owing to the vastness o the state and the lack ocivilian law enorcement, stabilityoperations had to take prece-dence over Reconstruction in thecoming months. In the meantime,the War Department assignedSheridan to a new geographiccommand, the Military Division

o the Gul, encompassing Florida,Mississippi, Louisiana, and exas.

Elsewhere in the South,the occupation orce executed arapid demobilization in accor-dance with a plan drawn up by

the War Department and approved by Secretary o War EdwinM. Stanton and General Grant. On 29 April 1865, the aggregate

strength o the Army stood at 1,052,038 officers and men, with622,102 present or duty. By November 1865, the War Departmenthad mustered out and sent home more than 800,000 troops, orin the case o the regulars and still-serving volunteers, transerredthem elsewhere. From June 1865 to January 1866, the occupationorce in the South shrank rom roughly 270,000 to 87,550 soldiers.

o reduce the high cost o upkeep, the War Departmentwasted no time in disbanding volunteer cavalry regiments. In early

May, while Conederate orces in the rans-Mississippi remainedin the field, the adjutant general issued an order to muster out allcavalrymen whose enlistments would expire within our months.By the all o 1865, only a handul o cavalry regiments remained inthe Southern states. Tis lef occupation commanders at a decideddisadvantage when responding to emergencies. An Army officerin South Carolina reported that inantry stationed there “show a very credible efficiency but they requently have to march long

distances to quell disturbances and ofen arrive too late to do good.A small orce o cavalry would be o infinite service.” An Armycaptain serving in Arkansas described the white population in hisdistrict as “hostile in the extreme.” He claimed that “nothing detersthem rom . . . the oulest crimes, but the dread o our soldiers, or

General Sheridan(Library of Congress)


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whom they entertain eelings o ‘holy horror.’ . . . Te importanceo . . . small orces o Cavalry can not be ully realized until one hashad to do with these hal whiped barbarians.”

In many areas o the ormer Conederacy, the majorityo troops who remained on occupation duty were black, due tothe comparatively late enlistment dates o most U.S. Coloredroop (USC) regiments. White Southerners ound this state oaffairs doubly humiliating, or the presence o Arican Americansoldiers not only remindedthem o their deeat but alsoshattered the amiliar stereo-type o the “servile negro.” In

North Carolina, GovernorHolden appealed to Brig. Gen.Tomas H. Ruger, Schofield’sreplacement as depart-ment commander, on behalo numerous citizens whocomplained o abuses sufferedat the hands o undisciplined

black soldiers. “Now that therebellion has been suppressed,”Holden wrote, “it does seem tome that a great and magnani-mous government like ours,is not obliged to keep coloredtroops in our midst.”

Although Ruger believed that “the acts complained o, i

committed by white troops, would probably not have been thecause o ormal or persistent complaint,” he nevertheless attemptedto comply with Holden’s request by reducing the number o blacksoldiers in the state and stationing the remainder at coastal ortsand other remote locales. On 8 September, the War Departmentordered the discharge o all black regiments raised in Northernstates, a development that no doubt pleased white Southernerseverywhere. By mid-December, the men o thirteen USC regi-

ments stationed in the South had returned home.Another problem arising rom demobilization was the rapidreduction o Army personnel available or duty with the Bureau oReugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands—or the “Freedmen’sBureau,” as it was popularly known. Congress and President Lincoln

General Ruger (Library of Congress)


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had established the bureau as an agency o the War Department on3 March 1865 to protect reedpeople rom injustice, to assist themin finding work and receiving air wages, to provide them with arudimentary education, to aid the destitute o both races, and toadminister Southern lands abandoned by their owners during thewar. Te commissioner—or head—o the Freedmen’s Bureau wasMaj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, and assistant commissioners handledthe bureau’s state-level administration. Local affairs were theresponsibility o field agents, each o whom presided over severalcounties. Due to a lack o unding, most agents were Army officers.

Te assistant commissioner o the Freedmen’s Bureau inNorth Carolina, Col. Eliphalet Whittlesey, soon discovered that his

greatest bureaucratic headache was constant personnel turnoverdue to the continual mustering out o Army officers who servedas his field agents. He complained that his organization had nearlybeen “broken up” three times during its first three months ooperation. In October 1865, nearly hal o all agent posts remained vacant. Whittlesey tried filling the vacancies with civilians but wasdisappointed with the experiment. Most civilian agents expressedopen contempt or reedpeople that boded ill or their ability to

deal airly with their black charges. Compared with active-dutyArmy officers, even ormer soldiers “ail to command respect,”Whittlesey reported. “Tey do not inspire the reedmen withconfidence.” Te Freedmen’s Bureau experienced similar difficul-ties in other Southern states.

In the meantime, news o the Morant Bay Affair in Jamaica,in which rebellious blacks had killed more than twenty whites,ollowed by reports o a oiled insurrection conspiracy in

Mississippi, inflamed ears o racial uprisings across the South.As early as 16 September, Freedmen’s Bureau head GeneralHoward had written the assistant commissioner or NorthCarolina on the subject. While dismissing rumors o an insur-rection as groundless, Howard nevertheless recommended thatGeneral Ruger reassure the white populace by stationing troopdetachments where they most eared an outbreak. As had ofenbeen the case with purported slave rebellions, rumor had it that

the insurrection would occur between Christmas and New Year’sDay, so Ruger deployed troop detachments at several locationsalong the coast—where the state’s largest proportion o blackslived—during the holidays. Te period was ree o disturbances,so Ruger returned the detachments to their permanent posts


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on 3 January 1866. Ruger’s opinion regarding the insurrectionscare maniested itsel in the steady reduction o troop strengthin his department until just three volunteer regiments—twowhite and one black—remained at the end o 1865. BetweenJune and December 1865, roughly 42,000 troops departed romNorth Carolina, leaving Ruger with an occupation orce o 2,209,a reduction o 95 percent. With the exception o exas—wherethe Army had to patrol the western rontier and the border withMexico—the occupation orce in the rest o the South experi-enced a comparable downsizing.

As the Army’s presence steadily shrank during the summerand all o 1865, the Southern provisional governors called

conventions and the voters elected delegates—mostly UnionWhigs—who then met to amend the state constitutions. As thepresident had directed, the conventions voted to declare seces-sion null and void and to abolish slavery, though not withoutconsiderable debate. In October, Johnson added a third condi-tion: repudiate the Conederate war debt. Tis triggered such a violent reaction among delegates in the North Carolina conven-tion that the president sent a pointed message to the assembly

ordering the debt to be repudiated “finally and orever.” Tenext morning, the chastened delegates passed the repudiationmeasure by a voice vote.

Having ulfilled the requirements o Presidential Recon-struction, the Southern states then elected governors, state legisla-tors, and U.S. congressmen. In the Upper South, the voters chose amixture o wartime Unionists and ex-Conederates, but in the lowerSouth, nearly all those elected were ormer Conederate office-

holders. In many Southern states, it appeared that the old rulingelite had returned to power. When the Tirty-ninth Congress met inDecember 1865, the Republican majority in both houses demandedunmistakable proo that the South accepted the consequences odeeat, but the recent elections indicated that the ormer Conederatestates remained openly defiant. In addition, numerous reports romthe South indicated that Northerners and native Unionists werebeing persecuted and that violence against blacks was on the rise. As

a result, the Republicans in Congress reused to seat the Southernrepresentatives and instead established a Joint Committee onReconstruction to investigate conditions in the postwar South.

While Congress deliberated, the Southern state legislaturesenacted a series o laws known collectively as “Black Codes.” Aimed


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at the reedpeople, the Black Codes conerred certain legal rights,but the laws also discriminated against them in such matters asmobility, vagrancy, apprenticeships, contracts, weapons owner-ship, criminal prosecution, and testiying in court. Te intent othe laws was to keep the black workorce under a condition asclose to slavery as the Southern legislators dared.

In early 1866, the Republican majority in Congress respondedwith two bills designed to protect the reedpeople rom Southernwhite oppression. Te Freedmen’s Bureau bill extended the lie othe agency and authorized military tribunals to try cases involvingblacks who were denied rights enjoyed by whites or who acedunequal punishment or the same offense. Te Civil Rights bill was

even more ambitious, conerring citizenship on all native-bornAmericans except Indians and defining their rights under ederalauthority. Te bill authorized judicial and law enorcement officersto prosecute state or local authorities suspected o denying citizenstheir rights. President Johnson vetoed both bills on the groundsthat they were unconstitutional and because the bills would require“a permanent military orce” in the South to enorce them. Te vetoes all but guaranteed a bitter struggle between the president

and congressional Republicans over Reconstruction policy.One week afer the Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil Rights bills

reached the Senate floor, the War Department issued GeneralOrders 3, instructing commanders in the South to protect Armyand Freedmen’s Bureau personnel and native loyalists rom prose-cution or acts committed under military authority. Te order alsoincluded blacks “charged with offenses or which white persons arenot prosecuted or punished in the same manner or degree.” Te

Army was urther charged with protecting the rights enumeratedin the two bills.In the meantime, the Congressional Joint Committee on

Reconstruction conducted its hearings on conditions in the South.Te committee interviewed 144 witnesses, including some Armyofficers, and it received plenty o unsolicited advice via the U.S. mail.In one letter, a ormer Union colonel named George F. Grangerurged Republican committee member Rep. Taddeus Stevens o

Pennsylvania to ignore white Southerners’ appeals to withdraw themilitary and restore civil law. “In my humble opinion,” Grangerwrote rom North Carolina, “no law can be Established here atpresent except that law which is enorced by United States troops,at the point o a bayonet.” Te committee evidently agreed with


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Granger, concluding that the Southern states could not be trustedto manage their own affairs.

While the president and Congress split on Reconstruction,the civil authorities and military commanders in the Southclashed over their respective powers. In August 1865, ProvisionalGovernor William L. Sharkey o Mississippi issued a call or militiawithout inorming Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, the senior Armyofficer in that state. Five days later, Slocum canceled Sharkey’sproclamation because he believed that the state authorities woulduse the militia companies to control the black workorce, much asthe slave patrols had unctioned beore the war. Slocum’s actionled the governor to protest to the president that the Union occupa-

tion orce in Mississippi—which numbered about 14,000 soldiersat the time—was inadequate to maintain law and order. AlthoughJohnson advised Sharkey to call on Slocum or ederal troopsinstead, the War Department directed Slocum to rescind the orderprohibiting the ormation o militia companies.

Another source o riction was the appointment o localofficials. o expedite the restoration o civil government in SouthCarolina, Provisional Governor Benjamin F. Perry issued a proc-

lamation in July 1865 enabling men who had held office at the endo the war to resume their duties afer taking a loyalty oath. But thecommander in the Palmetto State, Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore,canceled Perry’s initiative because he believed the governor hadexceeded his authority. As or elections, the Army attemptedto remain in the background unless called on by civil officialssuch as Provisional Governor William G. “Parson” Brownlow oennessee. Concerned that the western and middle sections o the

state had been rebel hotbeds during the war, the loyalist Brownlowrequested that troops be stationed in strength there to deter distur-bances during the July 1865 elections. Te presence o ederalsoldiers had the desired effect, but much to Brownlow’s chagrin, voters chose conservative candidates or most o the offices.

Department commanders closely monitored Southern news-papers or “seditious and treasonable language” and suspendedpublication in the more extreme cases. In North Carolina, General

Ruger ordered the Salisbury Union Banner to shut down its presseson 21 July 1865, because o a “disloyal” editorial that accused himo assuming “the power to say what we shall drink and wear.” Teaccusation reerred to Ruger’s orders prohibiting the wearing oConederate insignia and regulating the sale o alcohol. An indig-


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nant Ruger dismissed the editorial’s assertions as “alse,” notingthat an order “prohibiting the wearing o insignia and badges orank, by persons lately officers o the insurgent orces, and one orthe prevention o the sale o liquor, as a police regulation, cannothonestly be construed as assuming ‘the power to say what weshall drink and wear.’” One week later, the owner o the Bannerinormed Ruger that his son-in-law was the editor o the paper andhad published the editorial without his knowledge. He assured thegeneral that the incident would not be repeated. Ruger acceptedthe owner’s explanation and lifed the suspension on 31 July.

o prevent urther misunderstanding, the departmentcommander issued an order reminding North Carolinians that

the state remained under martial law. “Until the restorationand ull operation o civil laws,” Ruger announced, “publisherso newspapers, as well as public speakers, will be subject to therestrictions existing under military rule, and will not be permittedto discuss and criticise the acts o the military authorities withthat reedom allowed where civil law is in ull operation.” In themeantime, Ruger arrested several newspapermen or violatinghis restrictions, including the editor o the Charlotte Carolina

imes, who declared that the South was languishing “under amore grinding despotism than has heretoore ound a place uponthe ace o the earth.” In February 1866, General Grant assumedthe responsibility o censoring Southern newspapers, relievingRuger and other department commanders o an unpleasant andthankless task.

No less unpleasant were the Army’s efforts to administer justice in the occupied South during Reconstruction. Te Army

employed three types o courts. Te court-martial tried militarypersonnel accused o criminal offenses under the Articles oWar and the rules and regulations o the Army. Acting under theauthority o martial law, the military commission tried civilians orwar crimes as well as or violations o state and local laws in areaswhere the civil courts either had not been re-established or hadailed to dispense justice impartially. Te provost court derived itsname rom “provost marshal,” the name or the Army’s military

police commanders, and its purpose was to lighten the militarycommissions’ caseload by handling lesser criminal charges. Aourth type o tribunal over which Army officers presided wasthe Freedmen’s Bureau court , which adjudicated disputes betweenblack laborers and their employers.


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Te use o military commissions to try civilians soon led to aconflict between generals and governors as state and county offi-cials re-established civil courts in the Southern states. In NorthCarolina, the controversy began in late July 1865, when Rugerdenied Governor Holden’s request to turn over three white menaccused o assaulting a reedman. “Tis is a matter in which Iconceive the civil courts have sole and exclusive jurisdiction,”Holden wrote, “and I have every confidence that strict and impar-tial justice will be administered.” Ruger took a different view o thematter. He maintained that martial law remained in orce in NorthCarolina, and until the “complete restoration” o civil law, “militarytribunals have jurisdiction in all that relates to the preservation

o order, including the trial and punishment o those guilty oacts o violence.” Ruger noted that beore the Army’s arrest o thethree assault suspects, “no civil court had taken cognizance o thematter.”

Te two men managed to reach an agreement on the juris-diction o civil and military law in the ar Heel State. Until theGeneral Assembly revised the state law to admit reedpeople’stestimony in trials involving white citizens, military commissions

would try cases involving blacks, while the civil courts would trycases involving only whites. Ruger’s superior, Maj. Gen. GeorgeG. Meade, approved the compromise and assured Holden, “Whenever the laws o the state and the practice o the courts are such asto leave no doubt the reedman will have justice done him[,] therewill be no occasion or the use o military courts, except or purelymilitary offenses.”

One o the most notable military commissions was a war

crimes tribunal held in Raleigh. Te deendant was John H. Gee,a ormer Conederate major and commandant o Salisbury Prisonin central North Carolina. Gee was charged with murder and violating the laws o war in his mistreatment o more than 10,000Union prisoners who had jammed the six-acre stockade in late1864. One appalling statistic looms above all others: just over one-third o the inmates at Salisbury had died within its walls. No otherCivil War prison could match that horrific mortality rate—not

even the notorious Andersonville prison in Georgia. Tis chillingact seemed to augur that Gee would share the ate o Capt. HenryWirz, the ormer commandant o Andersonville. Afer a militarycommission in Washington had convicted him o war crimes,Wirz was hanged on 10 November 1865.


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Gee’s trial began on 21 February 1866 and consumed fify-seven days over a our-month span, during which the prosecutionand the deense cross-examined more than one hundred witnesses.Te testimony generated almost 4,000 pages o handwrittentrial transcripts. Afer weighing the evidence, the commissionunanimously acquitted Gee o all charges and specifications. In itsfindings, the commission attached no responsibility to Gee “otherthan or weakness in retaining [his] position when unable to carryout the dictates o humanity.” Te commission instead blamedcertain unnamed “higher authorities o the Rebel Government”or the appalling conditions inside Salisbury Prison. Gee thusescaped the ate o the notorious Wirz.

During the Gee trial, a presidential proclamation and a U.S.Supreme Court ruling virtually ensured that military commissionswould no longer try civilians. On 2 April 1866, Johnson declared theinsurrection over and peace restored throughout the United Statessave exas, which he excluded because it had not yet completedthe president’s Reconstruction program. Te proclamation urtherstated that martial law, military tribunals, and occupation orceswere “in time o peace dangerous to public liberty [and] incom-

patible with the individual rights o the citizen,” leading manySoutherners to conclude that Reconstruction was over. Much totheir dismay, they soon learned that Johnson’s proclamation didnot dissolve the Freedmen’s Bureau and end military occupationwith the stroke o a pen. Nevertheless, Army officers in the Southwere uncertain as to how the document affected their jurisdiction.In answer to an inquiry rom the assistant commissioner o theFreedmen’s Bureau or Georgia, Secretary o War Stanton notified

the department commanders in the South that Johnson had autho-rized him “to inorm you that the President’s Proclamation doesnot remove martial law or operate in any way upon the Freedmen’sBureau in the exercise o its legitimate jurisdiction.”

Stanton added, however, that it was “not expedient” or thecommanders “to resort to military tribunals in any case where justice can be attained through the medium o civil authority.” Tesecretary probably issued the above directive in response to the

Supreme Court’s preliminary ruling in Ex parte Milligan, whichprohibited the trial o civilians by military commissions while civilcourts were open. Te Supreme Court’s ruling on the Milligan caseappeared one day afer Johnson’s proclamation and supported hisstatements regarding the jurisdictional limits o military courts


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during peacetime. At Johnson’s behest, Stanton rendered theMilligan ruling official Army policy in General Orders 26.

RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH, 1865–1866Te Army’s most daunting task lay in protecting black people

rom white assailants. From May to December 1865, the Armyin North Carolina recorded 113 crimes committed by whitesagainst blacks, with 14 murders and 62 assaults heading the list.Te bulk o the cases involved individual assailants, but amongthe accused were a Granville County mob that had lynched areedman or rape, and a group o nine men arrested or assaultand breaking up a meeting o blacks in Chapel Hill. Military

commissions tended to punish thef-related crimes committedby blacks against whites more severely than the violent crimescommitted by whites against blacks. In one instance, a militarycommission punished a white woman or murdering a ormerslave merely by fining her $1,000. Within three days o thesentencing, her neighbors took up a collection and paid the fine.General Ruger condemned the military commission’s verdict as“a dangerous precedent to establish . . . that a human lie can be

taken almost entirely without provocation . . . without ear o agreater punishment than a fine.”

Lef largely unchecked, violence against blacks soon esca-lated. By the end o 1865, groups o armed white men who rodein disguise, ofen calling themselves “Regulators,” began to appearacross the rural South. Tey were an outgrowth o the lawlessnessthat had prevailed as the Conederacy collapsed in the spring o1865. Tese roving bands o night riders were orerunners o the

Ku Klux Klan, and they employed similar terrorist tactics againstreedpeople, using thef, arson, and murder to accomplish theirracist agenda. Unlike the Klan, however, banditry was the soleoccupation o many Regulator gangs; in North Carolina, somewere either biracial or consisted entirely o blacks, and ex-Coned-erates numbered among their victims.

Te Republican majority in Congress sought to protect blacksthrough legislation despite President Johnson’s firm opposition. In

April 1866, they passed the Civil Rights bill over a presidential vetoand then passed a revised Freedmen’s Bureau bill over yet anotherpresidential veto two months later. Not content with his veto o theFreedmen’s Bureau bill, Johnson attempted to discredit the agencyby sending two Army officers, Maj. Gen. James B. Steedman and


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Col. Joseph S. Fullerton, on an inspection tour to uncover wide-spread corruption and incompetence within the organization.Te officers’ scathing report led to the dismissal o several bureaupersonnel, but the smear campaign ailed to sway Northern publicopinion against the Freedmen’s Bureau.

Congress’ next assault on Presidential Reconstruction camein June, when it passed the Fourteenth Amendment, which consti-tuted the victorious North’s peace terms to the deeated South.Te first section o the amendment restated the Civil Rights billin terms that established the supremacy o the ederal govern-ment in defining and protecting the rights o its citizens. Tesecond section allowed the states to continue determining voter

eligibility but reduced congressional representation in proportionto the number o adult males denied the ranchise. Te amend-ment thus penalized any Southern state that prohibited reedmenrom voting. Te third section barred rom ederal or state officepersons who had supported the rebellion afer taking an oath touphold the Constitution. Tis affected most o the South’s politicalleadership, or nearly every Southerner who had held any civilor military office beore the war had taken the oath. Te ourth

section renewed the government’s commitment to pay the ederaldebt, repudiated the Conederate debt, and denied compensationor the loss o slave property. Te fifh section granted Congressthe power to enorce the amendment.

Congress’ actions only intensiied the growing unrest. On 1May 1866, white policemen in Memphis, ennessee, attemptedto disperse several recently discharged black soldiers accusedo being drunken and disorderly. Some o the ex-soldiers and

police exchanged gunire, resulting in several casualties oneither side. he disturbance soon escalated into a ull-blownriot. hat evening, an all-white mob consisting o police andcivilians rampaged through South Memphis, the city’s blackresidential area, indiscriminately shooting black men. On theollowing night, the white mob targeted black women andchildren as well as men, and looted and burned numeroushomes, schools, and churches.

At the start o the riot, the sheriff had called on Maj. Gen.George Stoneman, the department commander, or assistance inquelling the disturbance, but Stoneman had reused to comply.He stated that the civic authorities had asked him to remove alltroops rom Memphis because the city police could handle any


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emergency that might arise.Stoneman urther inormed thesheriff “that the question shouldfirst be tested whether theywere capable o taking care othemselves, beore the UnitedStates troops should be called.”Te general had stated that hehad only 150 soldiers availableor duty, barely enough men toguard the government propertyin his care. He also conessed to

ears that i he committed thewhite soldiers, they might jointhe mob rather than oppose it.Stoneman’s reusal to interveneinduced the sheriff to organizea posse o white citizens—withdisastrous consequences or theresidents o South Memphis.

On 3 May, Stoneman declared martial law and his troopssoon restored order, having been reinorced by the Nashvillegarrison. By then, orty-six black people were dead and at leastseventy others were injured. In South Memphis, the mob hadburned our churches, twelve schools, and over ninety homes. Amilitary investigation later estimated that the damages amountedto $72,000. On 5 May, Stoneman issued a stern warning to themayor o Memphis: i the people o that city “cannot govern

themselves as a law-abiding and Christian community, they willbe governed.”Te Memphis riot prompted General Grant to ensure that

Army officers in the South had the authority to protect reed-people rom white aggression without a request to do so romcivil authorities. On 6 July 1866, he issued General Orders 44directing soldiers in the South to arrest persons charged withcrimes against “officers, agents, citizens, and inhabitants o the

United States” when civilian law enorcement either could not orwould not do so. Bearing in mind the intent o General Orders26, Grant made no provision or military tribunals but insteaddirected that suspects be held “until such time as a proper judicialtribunal may be ready and willing to try them.”

General Stoneman(Library of Congress)


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wo months afer the Memphis riot, a major racial distur-bance occurred in New Orleans, Louisiana, that convinced theNorthern public o the necessity or protective legislation. Teincident stemmed rom the passage o the Fourteenth Amendment,which encouraged reedmen and white Radicals in the Bayou Stateto press or amending the state constitution to allow black suffrage.Tis required the president o the constitutional convention o1864 to issue a call or reconvening the original delegates. Whenthe presiding officer reused to cooperate, Radical delegates to theconvention met and elected a president pro tem, who then issueda proclamation calling the convention back into session on 30 Julyat the Mechanics Institute in New Orleans. Te Radicals enjoyed

the support o Louisiana Governor James Madison Wells, a ormerpolitical oe who now advocated disranchising Conederate veterans and giving blacks the vote.

Nearly every other state and local official, includingLieutenant Governor Albert Voorhies and Attorney GeneralAndrew S. Herron, opposed the new convention. Te most voci-erous opponent was the mayor o New Orleans, John . Monroe,a wartime political prisoner who had reused to take the oath o

allegiance to the Union. On25 July, Monroe inormedBrig. Gen. Absalom Baird, thecommander o the Departmento Louisiana, that he intendedto arrest the delegates i theyattempted to meet, because theysought to overthrow the lawul

state government. Baird repliedthat the delegates had a right“to meet peaceably and discussreely questions concerningtheir civil government.” Henoted that his superior, GeneralSheridan, had directed him“to protect those who, having

violated no ordinance o theState, are engaged in peaceulavocation”—a pointed reer-ence to General Orders 44.Baird assured Monroe that

General Baird (Library of Congress)


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ederal troops would be available should the convention becomedisorderly or come under attack and the police prove unable toquell the disturbance.

On the evening o 27 July, the Radicals held a mass rally inNew Orleans to promote the cause o black suffrage. Alarmed bythe opposition’s strong showing, Mayor Monroe and LieutenantGovernor Voorhies called on Baird, requesting that he allow thesheriff or the police to arrest the convention delegates. Te generalreiterated his intention to prevent the arrests unless the presidentordered him to step aside. Voorhies and Attorney General Herronthen telegraphed President Johnson, describing the conventionas an illegal assembly bent on overthrowing the legitimate state

government. Tey then asked i he intended to allow General Bairdto interere with the civil judiciary. Johnson sent the two officialsan immediate reply: the Army “will be expected to sustain andnot to obstruct or interere with the proceedings o the courts.”Baird received no copy o the president’s telegram; when the textappeared in the local papers, he ound it “ambiguous as to thewishes o the [Federal] government in relation to the convention.”He thereore wired Secretary o War Stanton or guidance but

received no reply. Regardless o Stanton’s reasons or not sendinginstructions, the secretary lef Baird ree to act according to hisown judgment.

On 29 July, Baird placed a regiment each o black troops andwhite troops on standby, ready to move at a moment’s notice. Hemet again with Voorhies at 1100 on 30 July and assured him thatthe Army’s mission was simply to keep the peace. Te lieutenantgovernor conceded that perhaps Baird should station a small

detachment o soldiers at the Mechanics Institute, but the generalstated that he planned to hold our companies at the Canal Streetwhar a ew blocks rom the convention site, where they would beless conspicuous. When Baird returned to his headquarters, he wasshocked to discover that the convention had begun at 1200—as thelocal newspapers reported—rather than at 1800, as he erroneouslythought. In short, his troops were not posted where they shouldhave been—a blunder that would have atal consequence or many

o the convention delegates and their supporters.Soon afer his arrival, Baird received word rom Voorhiesthat a large crowd o reedmen and whites was converging on theMechanics Institute. Te general ordered the our companies enroute to the whar to proceed directly to the institute, but they


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took a detour that doubled the distance they had to travel. In themeantime, the situation at the convention site rapidly deterio-rated. About 1300, a procession o more than one hundred blacksarrived to lend their support to the convention. A crowd o whiteonlookers—including a sizeable contingent o heavily armedNew Orleans police—conronted the marchers, and the two sidesbegan to exchange taunts and then blows. As the police openedfire, the outgunned marchers fled into the convention centerand barricaded the doors. Afer the whites had surrounded thebuilding, the police broke through the barricades and fired intothe delegates and their supporters, many o whom attemptedto escape into the street. Te violence continued or more than

an hour, with the police briefly halting at one point to replenishtheir ammunition. By the time Baird’s our companies reachedthe Canal Street whar at 1440, the shooting had ceased. Tesoldiers proceeded up Canal Street to the institute, dispersingthe lingering crowds along their route. Te Army reported 38killed and 147 wounded; most o the casualties were black. Tepolice-led contingent sustained just one atality.

On the evening o 30 July, Baird declared martial law, posting

two inantry regiments and one artillery battery in New Orleans.When General Sheridan returned to the city on 1 August, he oundthat the troops had restored order but recommended maintainingmartial law until the Army had ully investigated the riot. Laterthat day, he wired Grant that the New Orleans police had acted“in a manner so unnecessary and atrocious as to compel me tosay that it was murder.” Te receipt o additional inormation on 2August led Sheridan to conclude: “It was no riot; it was an absolute

massacre by the police which was not excelled in murderouscruelty by that o Ft. Pillow.”Sheridan’s allusion to the “Fort Pillow Massacre” was apt. On

12 April 1864, roughly 2,000 Conederate cavalry under Maj. Gen.Nathan Bedord Forrest had captured Fort Pillow, ennessee, andhad proceeded to shoot or bayonet most o the ederal garrison,which consisted o 600 black artillerymen and white ennesseecavalrymen. Te racial violence in New Orleans had likewise been

ruthless and overwhelmingly one-sided, with the police—mostlyConederate veterans—giving no quarter to the conventionsupporters, many o whom were ormer Union soldiers. Likewise, just as the rallying cry “Remember Fort Pillow!” had spurred war-weary Northern civilians into renewing their support or the Union


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Army, so too did the Memphis and New Orleans riots convinceNortherners that President Johnson’s Reconstruction policy wastoo lenient. It is ironic—but hardly surprising—that just threeweeks afer the New Orleans riot, Johnson chose to declare theinsurrection over in exas and civil authority restored throughoutthe United States.

In September 1866, Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, the commandero the Department o the South (then embracing the Carolinas),reacted to the growing disorder by issuing General Orders 7 prohib-iting ad hoc “organizations o white or colored persons bearing arms”rom acting as paramilitary units or exercising extralegal authority.Te order warned that the Army would treat Regulators as guer-

rillas and summarily punish them upon capture, and it authorizedpost commanders to use civilian posses to apprehend the bandits.In eastern North Carolina, General Orders 7 ailed to intimidate theoutlaws. I anything, they became even bolder. Among other crimes,one gang burned a cotton gin and thirty bales o cotton belonging toa Northern planter, and a second band raided the Greene County jailat midnight, kidnapped six black men and one white man chargedwith raping a white woman, and murdered them.

Te debate over Reconstruction greatly affected the allmidterm elections. In an effort to orge a bipartisan coalition omoderates and conservatives, Johnson ormed the National UnionParty to oppose the Republicans in the all midterm elections. oattract Northern voters, he undertook a late-summer campaigntour o eastern and midwestern cities. Johnson’s three-week “Swingaround the Circle” was a fiasco, his speeches ofen degeneratinginto incoherent diatribes. Although the president’s tirades cost him

at the polls, they did not determine the outcome o the election.Instead, the results indicated Northern voters’ dissatisaction withPresidential Reconstruction and their belie that the FourteenthAmendment offered the best hope or a just and lasting peace inthe South. In the election o 1866, the Republicans secured betterthan a two-thirds majority in both Houses o Congress, more thanenough to override Johnson’s vetoes and supplant the president’sReconstruction program with their own.

MILITARY RECONSTRUCTIONOn 2 March 1867, the Republican-controlled Congress

launched a new chapter in Reconstruction by passing the FirstReconstruction Act. Imposed over Johnson’s veto, it placed ten


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ormer Conederate states under military rule—the penalty or thestates’ ailure to ratiy the Fourteenth Amendment and to protectblacks and loyal whites rom the kind o organized violence perpe-trated by the Regulators as well as the Memphis and New Orleanspolice. ennessee was exempted because it had already ratified theamendment and rejoined the Union. Te act divided the Southinto five military districts and directed the president to appoint anArmy general to command each district. Each commander receivedsweeping powers to protect persons and property, to replaceincompetent or disloyal public officials, and to transer cases romcivil courts to military tribunals. Te affected state governmentswere merely provisional and subject to Army rule until they could

establish “loyal, republican governments.” In addition, a rider tothe Army Appropriation Act o 1867 disbanded the white militiasin all o the ormer Conederate states except ennessee ( Map 2).

Opponents o the Reconstruction bill noted that itprovided no mechanism or ending military rule. On 23March, Congress thereore passed the Second ReconstructionAct over a presidential veto, speciying the procedure thatthe ten Southern states had to ollow to rejoin the Union.

he act authorized district commanders to call elections ineach o the states they controlled to establish conventionsor drating new state constitutions. he commanders wouldoversee voter enrollment, monitor elections, and convenethe constitutional conventions. he law granted surage tomales twenty-one or over, excepting those disqualiied by theFourteenth Amendment or a elony conviction. All voters hadto take an oath airming their qualiications. he law urther

mandated that the new constitutions must guarantee surageor reedmen. Once the state had ratiied the constitution andthe Fourteenth Amendment, Congress would review its action.I approved, that body would seat the state’s U.S. representa-tives and senators, signiying readmission to the Union. Atthat point, Congress would declare Military Reconstructioninished in that state.

His vetoes o the Reconstruction Acts notwithstanding,

Johnson appointed five Army generals as district commanders:General Schofield, the First Military District (Virginia); GeneralSickles, the Second Military District (North Carolina and SouthCarolina); Maj. Gen. John Pope, the Tird Military District(Georgia, Florida, and Alabama); Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, the


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Fourth Military District (Mississippi and Arkansas); and GeneralSheridan, the Fifh Military District (Louisiana and exas). O thefive generals, Schofield, Sickles, Ord, and Sheridan had consider-able experience as occupation commanders in the South—thelatter two also happened to be Grant protégés—while Pope wasa relative newcomer. Tese five men would supervise the lawenorcement, political process, and administration o justice intheir respective districts. I the powers that Congress had vested inthe district commanders were great, the orces granted them werewoeully inadequate. Tey had about 20,000 soldiers to police anarea roughly the size o Western Europe with a total population oover 8 million.

he shortage o occupation troops resulted in numerousincidents o violence against blacks and white loyalists acrossthe South, as the Freedmen’s Bureau’s monthly reports oracially motivated murders and assaults amply attested. Evenso, the presence o Army units in the principal towns and citieso the region—combined with the ability o commanders toact on their own initiative—helped to keep a lid on large-scaledisturbances.

Te only major disturbance under military rule occurredat Mobile, Alabama, on 14 May 1867. Tat evening, localRepublicans gathered at a busy intersection in downtown Mobileto hear a speech by Congressman William D. Kelley, a RadicalRepublican rom Pennsylvania. Te atmosphere was highlycharged ollowing several incidents that had induced the localpost commander, Col. Oliver L. Shepherd, to issue an orderrecommending that blacks not ride the city streetcars to avoid

clashes with ex-Conederates.Kelley heightened tensions to the breaking point by exhortinghis black listeners to ignore Shepherd’s advice as an inringementon their civil rights. During Kelley’s speech, white hecklers hurledabuse at the speaker and called out, “Pull him down!” Kelleyreplied, perhaps unwisely, that the ederal soldiers stationed nearbywere his guarantee o ree speech. In the meantime, the police chietried to arrest a heckler, and during the ensuing scuffle, the latter

fired an “errant” shot at the speaker’s stand, ollowed by severalmore shots rom an unknown source aimed in the same direction.Heavily armed blacks in the audience fired their pistols in the air inan apparent attempt to intimidate their white antagonists. Chaosreigned as the crowd panicked and fled the scene. During the mad


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scramble, one white man and one reedman were shot to death,and several others were wounded.

Colonel Shepherd was present and immediately summonedhis troops, who were stationed about a mile and a hal rom town.Te soldiers arrived soon aferward, having ridden part o theway on horse-drawn streetcars, and they quickly restored order.Shepherd kept three eight-man squads on hand to maintainorder and ensure the sae departure o Congressman Kelley.Te colonel also reported the disturbance to his superior, Maj.Gen. Wager Swayne, commanding the Department o Alabama.Swayne directed Shepherd to suspend the civilian police orce,to keep troops posted in the city to maintain order, and to

summarily punish agitators. Secretary Stanton responded to theMobile riot by instructing the district commanders to preventdisturbances by stationing troops in towns and cities rather thanon the periphery, where they would be less visible and slower toreact to crises.

Stanton’s directive prompted General Pope, whose districtincluded Alabama, to issue General Orders 25, speciying theprocedure or holding political rallies. Post commanders were to

ensure that mayors and policechies received advance notice orallies, and that they provided asufficient orce to prevent distur-bances. For rallies outside citylimits, sheriffs were to assembleposses or the same purpose.Should the situation require it,

the post commanders were toaugment civilian law enorce-ment with ederal troops. Popeclosed his order with a warningto civil officials that, in the evento a riot, i they ailed to perormtheir ull duty—which includedbeing present at the rally—“such

officers will be deposed romtheir offices” and otherwise heldaccountable or any negligenceor wrongdoing on their part. Hemade an example o the mayor

General Pope(National Archives)


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and the police chie o Mobile, directing Swayne to remove themor their culpability in the 14 May riot.

In ennessee, where civil government held sway, a riotoccurred at Franklin on 6 July 1867, when ex-Conederatesopened fire on a procession o black Union Army veterans, whoreturned the fire. During the exchange, one man was killed andover thirty were wounded. Te local authorities took no action,but the commander at Nashville sent a detachment to Franklinthe next day, only to find that peace had already been restored.Had the incident occurred in one o the military districts, themayor and the police chie probably would have been dismissedor ailing to intervene.

As commander o the Fifh Military District, Sheridanlabored under no such disadvantage, and he made ree use othe removal power. On assuming command o the district, thegeneral had announced his intention to avoid the wholesaleremoval o civil officials unless the authorities ailed “to carry outthe provisions o the law or impeded reorganization.” But he soondecided that a number o officials had to go. Displeased with thecivil authorities’ handling o the New Orleans riot the previous

summer and their ailure to bring the perpetrators to justice,Sheridan dismissed Mayor Monroe, State Attorney GeneralHerron, and Judge Edmund Abell rom office and replaced themwith Republicans whom he believed would aithully executetheir duties. He also removed an aide to the New Orleans policechie or intimidating black voters and annulled a law designedto prevent ormer ederal soldiers rom serving on the NewOrleans police orce, stipulating that in the uture one-hal o the

policemen be Union Army veterans.In the meantime, Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin, commanding theDepartment o exas, inormed Sheridan that he deemed it neces-sary to remove “the chie civil officers o this state” on the groundso disloyalty, starting with Governor James W. Trockmorton.Griffin complained that he had repeatedly notified the governoro “outrages and murder on loyal men,” but had yet “to ascertain asingle instance in which the offender has been punished.” Sheridan

orwarded Griffin’s letter to Grant along with the comment that henot only concurred with Griffin but also believed that he wouldhave to depose Governor Wells o Louisiana, because he was“impeding me as much as he can.” Grant cautioned his impetuoussubordinate against removing the governors due to the question-


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able legality o the removal power. Soon aferward, Grant recon-sidered and decided that district commanders could remove civilauthorities but should do so sparingly. On 3 June 1867, Sheridandeposed Governor Wells due to his ongoing recalcitrance. But thegeneral chose to leave Trockmorton in office or the time being,mindul that the president’s hostility to Military Reconstructioncould result in his own ouster.

In the Second Military District, General Sickles also removed

a number o civil officials—including the mayor and nearly everyother officeholder at Fayetteville, North Carolina, or obstructiono justice in a controversial murder case. Te resulting trial led tothe conviction o three white men or the murder o a reedmanindicted or attempting to rape a young white woman. Despiteabundant eyewitness testimony to the contrary, the verdict othe coroner’s inquest was that the victim had been killed “by thehands o some person unknown to the Jury.” Te civil authori-

ties o Fayetteville made no urther investigation o the murder,prompting Army officers and Freedmen’s Bureau officials to bringthe case beore a military commission. Afer a lengthy trial, thecommission ound three o the deendants guilty and sentencedthem to hang, but they were reed by a presidential pardon.

General Griffin(Library of Congress)

General Sickles(Library of Congress)


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Sickles also issued a series o orders that indicated a willingnessto intervene in matters unrelated to Military Reconstruction. GeneralOrders 3 established a quarantine o all ports in the Carolinas, whileGeneral Orders 25 prohibited the manuacture—but not the sale orconsumption—o grain alcohol within the Second Military District.He based both orders on sound reasons: the ormer to prevent thespread o inectious diseases, and the latter to lessen the hardshipresulting rom a poor grain harvest the previous year. For all oSickles’ good intentions, the two orders met with a hostile recep-tion—especially the ban on alcohol production, which proved bothdifficult and dangerous to enorce in some areas. Claiming that itwas “altogether unsae to attempt breaking up” illegal stills in his

district, the collector or the Bureau o Internal Revenue in westernNorth Carolina requested—and promptly received—a detachmento the 5th U.S. Cavalry to assist him.

wo more o Sickles’ orders provoked bitter controversy anddivided Carolinians along both class and racial lines. In GeneralOrders 10, Sickles introduced several ar-reaching economic andlegal changes that ranged rom debt relie to gun control. Te orderalso abolished the death penalty or burglary and larceny and

prohibited “the punishment o crimes and offences by whipping,maiming, branding, stocks, pillory, or other corporal punishment.”General Orders 32 was no less sweeping. Te order removed allproperty qualifications or public office and made all taxpayerseligible or jury duty i they were not disranchised under theReconstruction Acts. Perhaps the most controversial regulation oall prohibited racial and class discrimination on public transporta-tion, rendering violators liable to civil lawsuits and trial by military

commissions.o underscore the supremacy o his edicts, Sickles declaredin the final paragraph o General Orders 10 that any civil lawin orce in his district “inconsistent with the provisions o thisGeneral Order, is hereby suspended and declared inoperative.”Many Carolinians shared the viewpoint o ormer North Carolinastate legislator John M. Perry regarding Sickles’ assumption olegislative authority. “All our laws are only laws as ar as Gen.

Sickles chooses,” Perry lamented, “and I coness that I don’t careto participate in legislation that may be annulled at the caprice othe military.”

In response to the actions o Pope, Sheridan, and Sickles,President Johnson directed U.S. Attorney General Henry Stanbery


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to draf an opinion defining the powers o the district commandersin the South under the First Reconstruction Act. Stanbery issuedhis opinion on 12 June 1867. He argued that the act merely granteddistrict commanders the power to maintain law and order andpunish criminals by means o civil courts or military tribunals.But he contended that the actions o some o the commandersindicated that they believed the act endowed them with unlim-ited authority. “Te military commander is made a conservatoro the peace, not a legislator,” the attorney general wrote. “He hasno authority to enact or declare a new code o laws or the peoplewithin his district under any idea that he can make a better codethan the people have made or themselves.”

Both Stanton and Grant regarded Stanbery’s opinion as justthat—a mere opinion lacking the orce o law. Sickles neverthelessbelieved that the attorney general’s ruling rendered his positionuntenable, or it challenged his authority to remove recalcitrantpublic officials. “Te military orce under my command is insu-ficient to meet the essential requirements o the ReconstructingActs,” Sickles maintained, “unless by the exercise o control overall civil unctionaries I can have their prompt and certain coopera-

tion.” On 19 June, Sickles asked to be relieved o command, andhe demanded a court o inquiry to answer the accusations madeagainst him in Stanbery’s opinion. For reasons known to himalone, Johnson passed up the opportunity to replace Sickles witha more acceptable general. Instead, he directed the Army adjutantgeneral to reject Sickles’ resignation and to deny his request or acourt o inquiry.

In another opinion on the Reconstruction Acts issued in

May 1867, Stanbery ocused on voter registration. He limiteddisranchisement to a relative ew ormer Conederate high offi-cials and ruled that registration boards could not challenge voters’qualifications. Te opinion appeared afer Generals Ord, Pope,and Sheridan had already issued orders denying the ranchise topersons the attorney general deemed qualified to vote. In a publicletter to Republican Senator Lyman rumbull, the chairman o theSenate Judiciary Committee, Sickles explained the dilemma that

he and other district commanders aced: “I I proceed now anddisregard the instructions o the President,” he wrote, “my actionwould be regarded as insubordination. I I ollow [his] instruc-tions, many would probably be registered [who are] not eligibleaccording to the true interpretation o the acts o Congress.”


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Sickles proposed a simple solution: “declare Universal Suffrageand Universal Amnesty. . . . Now, more than ever,” he argued, “meno ability & experience in public business are needed or the Stategovernment[s] in the South.” Although Southerners applaudedSickles’ proposal, rumbull and the vast majority o his Republicancolleagues in Congress chose to ignore it. Te general thereoredelayed voter registration in his district pending congressionalresponse to Stanbery’s opinions.

Sickles did not have long to wait. On 19 July 1867, Congresspassed the Tird Reconstruction Act over Johnson’s veto. Telegislation overruled Stanbery’s narrow interpretation o thefirst two Reconstruction Acts by speciying what the previous

acts had merely implied. Te Tird Reconstruction Act declaredthe Southern state governments established during PresidentialReconstruction illegal, yet it retained them on a provisional basisunder the supervision o Congress and the district commanders.As agents o congressional authority, the district commanderscould remove civil officials and appoint replacements. Te actlisted a broad range o ormer officeholders who were ineligible to vote or serve in public office, and it authorized registrars to reject

anyone suspected o perjuring himsel under the oath specifiedin the Second Reconstruction Act. o orestall uture legalisticassaults, the act declared that neither the district commandersnor the registration boards were bound “by any opinion o anycivil officer o the United States.” Sickles and his ellow districtcommanders could thus conduct voter registration without ear opresidential intererence.

In their haste to emasculate Stanbery’s legal opinions, the

authors o the Tird Reconstruction Act neglected to insert aclause that made the president’s appointment and removal odistrict commanders contingent on Senate approval. Keenly awareo the omission, Johnson sought to weaken the impact o the TirdReconstruction Act by suspending Stanton, the chie architecto the act—which he did on 12 August 1867—and by removingthe district commanders most likely to exploit it. In July, Johnsonsent Brig. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau to New Orleans as his special

representative—in effect serving notice that Sheridan was underpresidential scrutiny.Despite Rousseau’s menacing presence, Sheridan continued

to exercise his authority as he saw fit. On 30 July, he removedGovernor Trockmorton o exas and replaced him with


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Elisha M. Pease, the Unionistgubernatorial candidate that“Trocky”—so dubbed by hisRepublican opponents—hadrouted at the polls a ew monthsearlier. Nor did Sheridan stopthere. In just over a week, heremoved twenty-two NewOrleans city councilmen andthe city treasurer, installed aormer Union Army officer aspolice chie, and dismissed the

mayors and other civic officialso Lake Charles and Shreveport.Fearing that Sheridan intendedto depose every public officialunder his authority, on 17August, Johnson relieved thegeneral as commander o theFifh Military District over the strenuous objections o General

Grant, now the acting secretary o war as well as general in chie.Sickles’ dismissal ollowed on 26 August, the result o his

decision to uphold a subordinate’s directive prohibiting a deputyU.S. marshal rom enorcing a ederal court order that conflictedwith Sickles’ debt relie regulation. President Johnson replaced himwith Brig. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby, who had run aoul o Sheridanwhile commanding the Department o Louisiana. Tis act alonemay have impressed Johnson that Canby was the right man or the

job. But Canby soon disappointed both the president and NorthCarolina Governor Jonathan Worth, who branded the general “anextreme Radical” or reusing to revoke several o Sickles’ moreobjectionable orders.

Likewise, the situation in the Fifh Military District remainedlargely unchanged ollowing Sheridan’s departure. His replace-ment, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, appeared to be inno hurry to assume command there, no doubt due to a recent

outbreak o yellow ever. Tat lef General Griffin in charge tempo-rarily, and he wholeheartedly supported Sheridan’s Reconstructionpolicy. But Griffin succumbed to yellow ever on 15 September,and his sudden death lef Col. Joseph A. Mower in command. Itsoon became apparent that “Fighting Joe” Mower and Sheridan

General Canby (Library of Congress)


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were alike not only in tempera-ment but also in their activistapproach to Reconstruction.During the vote or theconstitutional convention inlate September, Mower senttroop detachments to severalLouisiana parishes to preserveorder at the polls and prevent voter intimidation. He alsoremoved a host o Democraticcivil officials including the

lieutenant governor, the secre-tary o state, and the statetreasurer on the vague chargethat they were “impedimentsto Reconstruction.” Te actingdistrict commander’s actionsprompted Louisiana governorBenjamin F. Flanders to appeal

to Grant, who then ordered Mower to suspend all removalspending General Hancock’s arrival. Mower duly complied with thegeneral in chie ’s order.

Hancock assumed command o the Fifh Military District on29 November 1867. On the same day, he issued General Orders 40,announcing that “the military power should cease to lead and the civiladministration resume its natural and rightul dominion.” Tis simpledeclaration indicated that Hancock, a Democrat firmly opposed to

Military Reconstruction, intended to bring his district more in linewith President Johnson’s plan o Reconstruction. Not surprisingly,the order made Hancock extremely popular with most o the whitecitizens o Louisiana and exas. His subsequent actions only increasedhis popularity. He proceeded to revoke a Sheridan order that allowedblacks to qualiy as jurors i they were registered voters, asserting thatsuch matters should be lef to the state legislature. Hancock nullifiedanother Sheridan directive on voter eligibility intended to prevent as

many ex-Conederates as possible rom voting in order to strengthenthe Republican Party. Longstanding ears o black insurrections atChristmastime spurred whites to appeal to Hancock or protection,and he in turn requested that Grant send at least a regiment o whitesoldiers to keep the peace. “Black troops,” Hancock maintained, “are

Colonel Mower, pictured as amajor general

(Library of Congress)


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unsuited or the perormance othis peculiar service.” Much toHancock’s chagrin, Grant senthim just three companies o whitesoldiers rom the Tird MilitaryDistrict.

Hancock also sought tominimize Colonel Mower’sinfluence. He requested thatCol. Robert C. Buchanan, thecommander o the 1st U.S.Inantry, replace Mower as the

commanding officer in Louisianaand the state superintendent othe Freedmen’s Bureau. Grantauthorized Hancock’s request, andBuchanan assumed command atNew Orleans on 2 January 1868.Mower nevertheless remained inLouisiana as commander o the

39th U.S. Inantry, a regiment o black soldiers. Hancock also had anopportunity to appoint a new governor o Louisiana afer the incum-bent, Governor Flanders, resigned when it became apparent that heand the new district commander could not get along. Te generalchose Joshua Baker to replace Flanders. Baker was a conservativeUnionist and a supporter o Johnson’s mild Reconstruction program.

Hancock clashed with Grant over the removal o two whiteand seven black New Orleans city councilmen—all Sheridan

appointees—or violating the Second Reconstruction Act. Aferinitially permitting the ouster, Grant reconsidered and orderedHancock to reinstate the deposed councilmen. Hancock compliedbut requested that he be transerred rom the Fifh MilitaryDistrict afer Grant reused to reverse his decision. Te generalin chie—who incidentally continued as acting secretary o war—was only too happy to oblige him. Beore departing New Orleanson 16 March 1868, Hancock directed Col. Joseph J. Reynolds,

commanding the Department o exas, to replace him until thepresident could appoint a permanent successor.Nevertheless, Hancock had been less than pleased with

Reynolds’ handling o affairs in the Lone Star State. BetweenGriffin’s death and Hancock’s arrival, Reynolds had removed

General Hancock (Library of Congress)


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400 Democrats rom office and replaced them with Republicans.Bombarded with complaints rom angry exas conservatives,Hancock had ordered Reynolds to explain his actions and makeno more removals. Reynolds had justified his course by citingSheridan’s injunction o 27 August 1867 to Griffin to remove alldisloyal men rom office. However, beore Reynolds could under-take a similar purge o Democratic officeholders in Louisiana,orders rom Washington arrived placing Buchanan in temporarycommand o the Fifh Military District. Contrary to Hancock’sbelie, Buchanan was senior to Reynolds.

Te 57-year-old Buchanan proved to be an effectivecommander at a crucial time in the Bayou State’s history. In April

1868, the colonel held an election or numerous local, state, andnational offices, and to decide the ate o the new Louisiana stateconstitution. o preserve order, Buchanan kept troop detachmentsnear the polls, including the three companies on loan rom theTird Military District. Te voters elected a fiery young Radical,Henry Clay Warmoth, governor and gave him a Republicanmajority in both houses o the state legislature; they also ratifiedthe new constitution. While there was a large turnout o black

voters, there were ew disturbances. Several days afer the election,Buchanan directed the troops rom the Tird Military District toreturn to their permanent posts.

By the end o 1867, Johnson had decided to remove Poperom command o the Tird Military District. Te president hadbeen contemplating such a move or some time. Te tipping pointcame when Pope authorized the Georgia constitutional convention’srequisition o $40,000 on the state treasury to cover its expenses,

but State reasurer John Jones reused to issue payment withoutGovernor Charles J. Jenkins’ endorsement, which Jenkins withheldon the grounds that the convention itsel was illegal. In April, Popehad nearly removed Jenkins over his public opposition to theReconstruction Acts, but the governor had pleaded ignorance andpromised to be more cooperative in the uture. Once again, Jenkinshad taken an obstructionist stance, but Pope hesitated to act or earthat deposing the governor might well result in his own dismissal. On

26 December 1867, Pope appealed to General Grant or guidance,warning that “without the means to pay its daily expenses, thereis every probability that the Convention must dissolve.” But thetime or advice had passed. On 28 December, the War Departmentremoved Pope rom command o the Tird Military District.


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As had happened in the removal o Sheridan and Sickles,President Johnson replaced Pope, only to be disappointed by hissuccessor, General Meade. Te conservative Meade must havestruck Johnson as a sae choice, but the new district commandersoon displayed a willingness to topple high-ranking officials that lefthe president “mortified and chagrined.” On 8 January 1868, Meadeissued General Orders 12 removing Jenkins, Jones, and the Georgiastate comptroller rom office or obstructing the ReconstructionActs. In doing so, Meade had Grant’s ull support—something thatPope had seldom enjoyed. o ensure cooperation, Meade replacedthe civil of

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CMH Pub 75-18 the Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877

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