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CNDI 2010 Turkey NegHuston/Shackelford

Turkey TNWs Neg

Turkey TNWs Neg........................................................................................................................................................................1***CASE ANSWERS***.............................................................................................................................................................2A2: Terrorism Advantage .............................................................................................................................................................2A2: Russia Advantage ..................................................................................................................................................................3

A2: Russia Advantage ..................................................................................................................................................................4A2: Russia Advantage Relations ...............................................................................................................................................5Solvency Frontline ........................................................................................................................................................................6***Turkey Proliferation*** .........................................................................................................................................................7Turkey Proliferation 1NC .............................................................................................................................................................7TP Uniqueness...............................................................................................................................................................................8TP Links .......................................................................................................................................................................................9TP Links......................................................................................................................................................................................10TP Internal Middle East Instability .........................................................................................................................................11TP Impact Turkey/Greece War................................................................................................................................................12TP Impact Arms Race .............................................................................................................................................................13***NATO Cohesion***..............................................................................................................................................................14NATO Cohesion 1NC.................................................................................................................................................................14

NATO Uniqueness......................................................................................................................................................................15NATO Links Commitment ......................................................................................................................................................15NATO Links Unilateralism .....................................................................................................................................................17NATO Key to Afghan Success....................................................................................................................................................18NATO Key to Afghan Success....................................................................................................................................................19NATO Terminal Impact..............................................................................................................................................................20NATO Impacts Prolif ..............................................................................................................................................................21NATO Impacts Terrorism .......................................................................................................................................................22NATO Impacts Central Asia ...................................................................................................................................................23***OFF-CASE LINKS***.........................................................................................................................................................24Politics Link ................................................................................................................................................................................24Consult NATO Solvency Cards..................................................................................................................................................25***AFF ANSWERS SUPPLEMENT***...................................................................................................................................26Answers to Turkey Proliferation ................................................................................................................................................27Answers to Turkey Proliferation ................................................................................................................................................28Answers to Turkey Proliferation ................................................................................................................................................29Answers to CONSULT NATO...................................................................................................................................................30Answers to NATO Cohesion ......................................................................................................................................................31Answers to NATO Cohesion .....................................................................................................................................................32

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***CASE ANSWERS***

A2: Terrorism Advantage

Terrorist theft not likely with TNWsWilliam Potter- Prof and Director of James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies- 9

Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, (research assistant / Professor and Director / research assistant)December 2009, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, James Martin Centerfor Nonproliferation Studies / Monterey Institute, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf

TNW, like other nuclear weapons, are virtually unusable, vis-a vis the most likely form of externalsecurity threat, international terrorism. The challenges of fighting terrorist organizations in Afghanistanand Pakistan testify to the problems inherent in the application of nuclear capabilities to this type ofcontingency.

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A2: Russia Advantage

Russia isnt concerned with TNWs in Europe, conventional weapons are perceived as a greaterthreat, plan doesnt lead to Russian cooperationWilliam Potter- Prof and Director of James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies- 9

Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, (research assistant / Professor and Director / research assistant)December 2009, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, James Martin Centerfor Nonproliferation Studies / Monterey Institute, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf

If a direct military threat to European NATO materializes in the future, it is far from obvious that theUnited States will resort to nuclear weapons at all, including tactical weapons. US and NATOconventional forces are the most advanced in the world and can address ever or nearly every imaginable contingency without crossing the nuclear threshold. In any event, it is difficult to envision asituation when nuclear weapons are engaged promptly after a conflict starts, because no threat on thehorizon appears to be as overwhelming and immediate as the Soviet threat was perceived to be. Indeed,Russian military strategists probably are more concerned about US/NATO advanced conventional armsthan they are about a small number of TNW that remain on the European continent.

United States withdrawal does not cause Russian reciprocationYOST Professor of National Security Studies Naval Postgraduate School 2001[Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities ]

Nor is it clear that a unilateral withdrawal of the remaining U.S. NSNF in Europe would, in the words of Potter and Sokov,"help to revive the spirit of the parallel 1991 initiatives." The spirit of the 1991-1992 initiatives was hopeful improvisation during a period of uncertainty and

perceived urgency, in view of events in the Soviet Union and the difficulties in devising a formal NSNF arms control regime. In retrospect ,Russians generally dismiss the hopefulness of the early 1990s regarding Russian cooperation with theUnited States and the West as a whole as "romantic" and "naive."91 In the intervening period, Russianconventional forces have drastically deteriorated, and the utility of NSNF in Russian eyes hascorrespondingly mounted. It is therefore doubtful whether a unilateral removal of the remaining U.S.

NSNF in Europe would somehow "jump-start" negotiations with Russia about its NSNF.It is far more likely that the Russians would simply "pocket" the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. NSNFas something they had always demanded. Under both Soviet and Russian rule, Moscow has considered the U.S.nuclear presence in Europe not simply threatening to its security, but politically illegitimate, a symbol of U.S.intrusion into Moscow's rightful sphere of influence .92 From a Russian perspective, the unilateral withdrawal ofthe U.S. nuclear presence in Europe would be rectifying an old injustice and imposition, rather thanoffering a signal for Russian NSNF disarmament. For the Alliance, even if Russian NSNF numbers could thereby benumerically reduced, there would be little or no strategic gain. Russia would then hold a monopoly on NSNF from the Atlantic to the Chinese border.Moscow's NSNF holdings would be unverifiable, but would probably remain in the thousands. If drastic reductions in NATO NSNF since 1991 have not ledMoscow to resolve the massive uncertainties in the West about Russia's NSNF, why should it be expected that complete withdrawal (entirely removing theAlliance's leverage) would bring about a response that NATO could regard as satisfactory? 144-145

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A2: Russia Advantage

Russia needs TNW to compensate for conventional weaknessMILLAR Senior VP Fourth Freedom Forum 2002Arms Control Today May 2002

Russias reluctance to restrict further its tactical arsenal stems more from demonstrable military need.Russias economic straits have made the cost of maintaining conventional military hardware andsupporting personnel unmanageable, and Russias military may be further stressed by future rounds of NATO expansion. Russia has sought tomake up for the qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in its military forces by, in 1993, officially abandoning its pledge not to use

nuclear weapons first in a conflict and, in 2000, placing increased emphasis on the combat role its tactical nucleararsenal would play in a defense of Russia. Russian defense analysts have articulated a number of rolesfor tactical nuclear weapons, including compensating for weaknesses of conventional forces brought on by economic retraction,serving as placeholders of Russian status and prestige in the post-Cold War world, preventing regionalconflicts, and serving as deterrents against strategic escalation.14

Removal of Weapons causes Russia to seek more weapons as well as other hostile countries

McNamara and Spring, 2010 [Sally and Baker, March 4, President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weaponsfrom Europe, The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/03/president-obama-must-not-remove-nuclear-weapons-from-europe]

The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons could also encourage a hostile nation to seek similarweapons if it perceives Americas indifference to the transatlantic alliance . Russia and rogue states suchas Iran and Syria could be emboldened by Americas retreat from its security commitments to Europe.Russia has already proved itself to be an authoritarian power, seeking to regain influence over its formersatellites. In short, the ramifications of this measure are unpredictable and likely to be contrary toPresident Obamas goal of nuclear disarmament.

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A2: Russia Advantage Relations

1. Relations are resilient-a. Obama and Medvedev secured relations while eating hamburgers-

Cooperation on intelligence, counterterrorism, and economic ties.Kent Klein, 6/24/10 (VOA Correspondent, based in Washington, D.C. Obama, Medvedev Say They Have Reset US-Russia Relations)http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/usa/Obama-Medvedev-Say-They-Have-Reset-US-Russia-Relations-97108014.html

U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev say they have succeeded in resetting their countries'relationship, which had drifted in recent years. The two leaders discussed trade and security at the White House Thursday, aftergoing out for hamburgers. Presidents Obama and Medvedev say the United States and Russiawill broaden their cooperation onintelligence and counterterrorism, and have improved their economic ties. Mr. Obama told reporters he and Mr. Medvedev have puttheir countries' relationship on a firmer footing, despite disagreeing about Russia's tensions with Georgia. "Our two countries continue to disagreeon certain issues, such as Georgia, and we addressed those differences candidly," he said. "But by moving forward inareas where we do agree, we have succeeded in resetting our relationship, which benefits regional and globalsecurity." The president said he and his counterpart have moved beyond only discussing the issues covered in most previous U.S.-Russian meetings.

b. New mindset encompasses more than just security and arms- overcomes anychallenges to relations- no risk of brink

Kent Klein, 6/24/10 (VOA Correspondent, based in Washington, D.C. Obama, Medvedev Say They Have Reset US-Russia Relations)http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/usa/Obama-Medvedev-Say-They-Have-Reset-US-Russia-Relations-97108014.html

"Because 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-Russian relationship has to be about more than just security and armscontrol," he said. "It has to be about our shared prosperity, and what we can build together."President Obama said he will speeddiscussions on Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization. U.S. support for Moscow's joining the WTO has come with conditions in thepast. But Mr. Obama says most of the differences have been resolved, and he believed the rest will be soon. "Russia belongs in the WTO," he said. "That is

good for Russia, it is good for America, and it is good for the world economy." Mr. Obama said a major hurdle was cleared when Moscowagreed to lift a six-month ban on the sale of U.S. poultry in Russia. Mr. Medvedev said he believes the obstacles to his country joiningthe WTO can be removed in the next few months. "There are some remaining technical minor problems, and our teams have been instructed to work as fast aspossible," he said. "We hope, and we have stated this, that their work will be finalized by the end of September this year." President Obama said hisreplacement of his top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, with General David Petraeus will not slow U.S. efforts to win the Afghan war. He

said Petraeus helped to shape the U.S. strategy there. Mr. Medvedev was asked whether he had given Mr. Obama advice on Afghanistan,which the former Soviet Union had invaded in 1979 with disastrous results. He said he supports the U.S.-led invasion if it can lead to abetter life in Afghanistan. "Having an effective state and a modern economy, which requires toiling more than a year," the Russian president. "But thisis the path to guarantee that the gravest scenarios of the last time will not repeat. Mr. Obama said he and Mr. Medvedev agreed to coordinate humanitarian aidto Kyrgyzstan, where about 2,000 people have died in violence after the president was removed from power. This was the seventh meeting between the two

leaders, who will go to Toronto, Canada for the G20 economic summit, which begins Friday. After their meetings at the White House, Mr.Obama took his Russian visitor to lunch at a hamburger restaurant near Washington. Mr. Medvedev said the beef-and-cheesesandwiches were probably not very healthy, but quite tasty, and part of the spirit of America.

2. Insert Heg Bad impacts

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Solvency Frontline

Turn: Removing weapons from Turkey crushes the alliance, and cripples deterrenceMcNamara and Spring, 2010 [Sally and Baker, March 4, President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weaponsfrom Europe, The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/03/president-obama-must-

not-remove-nuclear-weapons-from-europe]

This week, President Obama reaffirmed his commitment to reducing Americas nuclear stockpile, stating that he wants to see

transformational change in the U.S. nuclear posture. However, his policy preferences should be only one part of the equation.

The position of Americas friends and allies, the strategic concept of the NATO alliance, and transatlantic stability should

also factor into his decision.

Strategically, eliminating the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe cripples deterrence, stripping away animportant pillar of transatlantic security and placing European force posture at a disadvantage. Calls byGermany and other pacifistic and demilitarized European nations to denuclearize the continent fail to take intoaccount the growing threat of rogue states and the reemergence of old strategic competitors, and it maycondemn to history the worlds greatest military alliance.

Reducing weapons will not solve for Russia, contain other countries from proliferation or increaseNPT credibilityBlechman 09 (1/21. Barry M, the co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and a Stimson Distinguished Fellow focused on nucleardisarmament; founder and former president of DFI International Inc., a research and consulting company in Washington, DC; Dr.Blechman has more than forty years of distinguished service in the national security field and is a frequent consultant to the USGovernment on a wide range of subjects. Dont Reduce the US Nuclear Arsenal Unilaterally: We Need Levers to Move the World TowardDisarmament.http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=734)

Unilateral reductions of the magnitude being discussed also would reduce President Obamas leveragewith Russia when negotiating potential mutual restraints on arsenals .Russian and US arsenals compriseroughly 95 percent of the worlds nuclear weapons. It is evident that deeper reductions on their part are an essential next stepon the road to eliminating nuclear weapons world-wide. But why should Moscow agree to limits on its own forces when the

US is already stripping its arsenal unilaterally?Russian military doctrine values short-range, or tactical

nuclear weapons to offset Western conventional superiority. Persuading Russia to include these shorterrange weapons in future agreements will be difficult without having anything significant to trade.

Nor would a unilateral reduction help the US contain proliferation. Iran and North Korea will pursuetheir weapon programs depending on broad strategic, economic, and political considerations, whetherthe US has 1,000 or 5,000 weapons. In either case, they would be helplessly outnumbered and woulddepend on a US unwillingness to sustain even a single nuclear blast on its territory to deter American involvement ina regional crisis.

There would be no gain at the NPT Review Conference either. The US nuclear stockpile has been reduced by three-fourths since 1989, butthere is nary a mention of that in the records of the NPT proceedings other than those inserted by US representatives. Instead, the nations dissatisfied withthe Treaty focus solely on the Bush Administrations attempts to develop two new warheads, which have been denied repeatedly by the Congress

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***Turkey Proliferation***

Turkey Proliferation 1NC

Turn Turkey Prolif

A. Plan causes Turkey to proliferate.Oliver Thranert, "U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet", December 10, 2008,p.http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22533&prog=zpg&proj=znpp

The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe was always intended to prevent nuclear proliferation within theAlliance. Without a clearly demonstrated nuclear deterrent provided by U .S. nuclear weapons based at Incirlik,Turkey could have further doubts about the reliability of NATO's commitment to its security. Turkeyalready feels let down by NATO's ambivalent response to its calls for support in the Iraq wars of 1991 and2003. Sitting on the outer edge of the alliance , facing a nuclear-weapon-capable Iran , and possibly feelingthat NATOs nuclear security guarantee would not actually be extended to it in a crisis, Turkey couldseek to develop countervailing nuclear capabilities of its own.

B. Turkish proliferation sparks a Middle East arms race.P.D. Spyropoulos, Boston Globe, December 9, 1999, p.http://www.ahmp.org/bosglob8.html

Many are now convinced that a nuclear Turkey, already among the most highly militarized states in the world, will bethe surest way to usher in a nuclear arms race in the Balkans and Mideast , two of the world's most volatileregions, and both at Europe's doorstep. Turkey's military adventurism in the Balkans, Cyprus, Central Asia andthe Middle East should further underscore the fact that placing nuclear power into the hands ofgovernments that have not yet developed the maturity to harness it can soon develop into the greatestglobal security threat of the coming century .

C. That ends in global nuclear war.Steinbach 02 (John, DC Iraq Coalition, ISRAELI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A THREAT TO PEACE,March 2002,http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html)

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has seriousimplications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war.Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again ,... or should any Arab nation firemissiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort,would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue isgaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union haslong been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan

Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S.nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israelinukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least,the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for

their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refiningits weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- thedeepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

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TP Uniqueness

Uniqueness Turkey is not seeking nuclear weapons now because of US nuclear umbrellapresence.

NTI 09 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, Turkey Profile, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.html, UpdatedJune 09)

Turkey signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon statein 1969, ratifying it in 1980, and is subject to extensive IAEA compliance monitoringthrough both its ComprehensiveSafeguards Agreement and its voluntary membership in the Additional Protocol. Ankara has also ratified the ComprehensiveNuclear Test Ban Treaty, and participates in nuclear export control efforts such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)and

the Zangger Committee. As part of NATO's nuclear umbrella, Turkey continues to host approximately 90U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base.[4] There is some speculation in the Turkish pressregarding possible conflict between Turkey's leaders and the United States should President Obama'scommitment to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" lead to the near-termwithdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey.[5] While the weapons serve little strategic purpose,they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security.

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http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.htmlhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/npt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/npt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/iaea_dept_of_safeguards.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/iaea_dept_of_safeguards.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/ctbt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/ctbt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/ctbt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/nsg.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/nsg.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/zang.pdfhttp://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.htmlhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/npt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/iaea_dept_of_safeguards.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/ctbt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/ctbt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/nsg.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/zang.pdf


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TP Links

Removing TNWs from Turkey will lead to Turkey proliferationLavoy and Walker 06(Peter and Robin, Director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the NavalPostgraduate School's Department of National Security Affairs,

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/NuclearWeaponsProliferation2016Jul06_rpt.asp)

Europe is a unique case in that, while only three countries are actual nuclear weapons states, five non-nuclear weapons states have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory and a nuclear securityguarantee covers 26 countries. Many countries have been tempted to develop nuclear weapons in thepast, primarily the three neutral countries not in either NATO or the Warsaw Pact , but the NATO nuclearguarantee was useful even to neutral countries such as Sweden. Those conditions and institutions still exist today, but theWarsaw Pact no longer exists as a threat, and NATO has enlarged, reducing European fears ofinsecurity.While Tertrais stressed that nuclear proliferation of any sort is unlikely in Europe, he identified Turkey as the biggestlong-term threat, with Ukraine and Serbia as even more unlikely and an EU member dismissed as wild speculation. If

Turkey were to move toward nuclear weapons it would be in a post-2010 timeframe and follow thecontinued breakdown of U.S.-Turkey relations.Catalysts for Turkish proliferation would include failureto be accepted into the European Union and the continued progress of Irans nuclear weapons programand would be exacerbated by a breakdown of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the United Stateswithdrawing the nuclear weapons it has based in Turkey.

Removal of TNWs from Turnkey would Cause It to Pursue Nuclear Weapons.Matishak 09 Martin 8/5 Global Security Newswire, U.S. Could pull back Europe-based Nukes,State Department Officials SaysHttp:www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw/20090805_4929.php

The military value of the Europe-based tactical weapons has "dropped precipitously since the days of theCold War," Einhorn said. However, they continue play a role in the "cohesion" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,he added without elaborating.

In addition, "at least one" ally country believes the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on it soil reduces theincentive for it to acquire its own nuclear weapons capability, Einhorn told the audience. Kristensen told GlobalSecurity Newswire yesterday in a telephone interview that Einhorn was referring to Turkey.

Turkey will perceive the plan as the United States abandoning it and supporting the Kurds, leading toweapons build upKibaroglu 05 (Mustafa, 2/9/ The Washington Institute, Beyond Iran: the Risk of a NuclearizingMiddle East

A fourth reason is that, a huge number of Turks are unhappy with the policies of theUnited States toward the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, a region that was ruled by the Turksfor centuries and then lost to the British after the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Manybelieve that the US is helping the Kurds to build an independent state, regardless of what theAmerican diplomats are asserting publicly. Some even argue that a confrontation with the USover northern Iraq is not a far-fetched scenario. Having heard what was said and written in theUS media after the failure of the troop basing resolution in the Turkish Parliament on March1, 2003, many Turks maintain that Turkey must be powerful against the US. 5

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TP Links

Removal of TNWs leads to Turkish proliferationMcNamara and Spring, 2010 [Sally and Baker, March 4, President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weaponsfrom Europe, The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/03/president-obama-must-not-remove-nuclear-weapons-from-europe]

The vast majority of Americas allies in Europe have not sought to join the club of nuclear weaponspowers, largely because they enjoy the comfort of the U.S.s nuclear umbrella. However, Americasunilateral nuclear disarmament may prompt some nationsparticularly Poland in light of Moscows war gaming and

Warsaws general sense of a transatlantic distancingto seek alternate security insurance. Indeed, Turkey and countlessother non-nuclear powers under the NATO umbrella could further be tempted to fill the security vacuumcreated by Americas unilateral disarmament by seeking their own weapons or forming alliances withother nuclear powers.The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons could also encourage a hostile nation to seek similarweapons if it perceives Americas indifference to the transatlantic alliance. Russia and rogue states such asIran and Syria could be emboldened by Americas retreat from its security commitments to Europe. Russia has already

proved itself to be an authoritarian power, seeking to regain influence over its former satellites. In short,the ramifications

of this measure are unpredictable and likely to be contrary to President Obamas goal of nucleardisarmament.

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TP Internal Middle East Instability

The consequences of Turkish proliferation will cause a breakdown in Turkey and the Middle EastUdum 07 (Sebnem, Department of International Relations at Bilkent University, ISYP Journal on Science and WorldAffairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007 57-65 //www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/Vol3No2_Sebnem.pdf)

On the other hand, a decisionfor Turkeysacquisitionof nuclearweaponswouldnot be a nal choice: if Turkeywoulddecideto go nuclear,

internationalpressurewould be intense. Turkeyis alreadya candidateto theEU, and has a membershipperspective, which ties Turkey

firmly to the West and the Westernliberal zone. BecominganEU/ECmemberhas beena state policy, basedon the modernisationprocess

dating back to the Ottomantimes.Turkeys nuclear aspirations would jeopardise this process and would havehigh political costs. Likewise, it would have adverse effects on relations with the United States, which isan indispensable ally despite all the tensions. Economicsanctionswould be appliedto the alreadysensitive Turkisheconomy,whichwould impair micro and macrobalances.Condemnationand isolationfromthe international communitywould be

unbearablemilitarily, politically and economically. What is more,the place of nuclear weapons in the military strategy isdoubtful, that is, against which country would Turkey use it or threaten to use it? If it were Iran, thereare other more powerful international and regional actors. Turkey has other leverages that it could useagainst Iran in diplomatic relations. Last but not least, it would make Turkey a target [20].

What would draw Turkey into making a choice would not only be questions on its alliances and threatperceptions. Turkeys differencefromthe other states in the Middle East, which are concernedabout Irans nuclear program,is its EUperspective. Turkeyis materially and ideationally betweenthe East and the West. Its EUprospectskeep the country in cooperative

mechanismsto addresssecurity issues. If this perspectiveis lost, it is highly likely that it will be drawninto the Realist zone of international

security in the East, and could base its security policy on material capabilities. Considering the status of relations with theUnited States and the instability in the region, the country could be motivated to seek self-sufficiency,and perhaps to seek a nuclear weapons capability. Most of the issues that are brought forward in theUnited States and the EU accession negotiations touch upon Turkeys national security referents,basically social and territorial integrity, which lead the country to take a defensive position and toprioritise its security interests over political goals. Thus,it is integral to understand Turkeys securityconcerns, and to keep it in the Western liberal zone of security.

Turkey plays a crucial role in maintaining Middle Eastern relations and stabilizing the regionThe Daily Star 09 [Why is Palestine a big deal for Turkish diplomacy?, February16,https://www.lexisnexis.com.hal.weber.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/]

Turkey has gained strategic depth in the Middle East and ever-increasing support among Arabs andIranians. Turkey acquired this position without posing a threat to Israel. It maintains good relations withIsrael while registering progress in its relations with Israel's regional enemies. Indeed, Turkey has accessto and dialogue with all countries and important actors in the area. Turkey's rising profile gives it anintegral role in Middle East peace efforts. Erdogan will exploit his leverage over Hamas to transform that movement,reconcile Palestinian groups and prepare the groundwork for peace. Erdogan's attitude toward Israel will be determined to a

considerable extent by Israel's response to his regional peace efforts.

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TP Impact Turkey/Greece War

Turkey-Greece war will destroy relations with the US and NATO, destabilize the Balkans anddrag in Russia, Syria and Iran

Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian Lesser and Stephen Larrabee, "The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a StrategicPlan", 2000, p. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1241/MR1241.chap4.pdf

There may be little strategic rationale for conflict between Greece and Turkey, but the risk of anaccidental clash, and the potential for escalation touches directly on U.S. interests .The United States has anobvious stake in preventing conflict between two close allies. More significantly, the United States has a stake in preventing

conflict that could negatively affect the geostrategic equation in Europe and the Middle East. Possible broaderconsequences of a clash over Cyprus or the Aegean include the open-ended estrangement of Turkeyfrom Western institutions, making Ankara a far more difficult partner for Washington to engage in anyform (this could include the loss of access to Incirlik airbase ); casting of a shadow over future NATOenlargement and adaptation; and the deepening of civilizational cleavages in the Balkans and aroundthe Mediterranean. Russia, Syria, and Iran could also become involved in ways that would work against

U.S. security interests in the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. Even continuedbrinkmanship in the region, short of actual conflict, complicates the outlook for improved U.S.-Turkish relations across theboard. Thus, second only to promoting the stable, internal evolution of Turkey, Washington has a key enabling stake in riskreduction and strategic dialogue between Greece and Turkey.29

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TP Impact Arms Race

Turkey would cause an arms race in the Middle EastBarkey 2009, [Henry, TURKEYS PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISARMAMENT, NuclearSecurity Series,http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Nuclear_Turkey.pdf]

The likelihood that Turkey would seek its own path to a nuclear capability, however longthis might take, would increase in the event of such a regional nuclear arms race. Domesticpolitical pressure and the regions anarchic character would be sufficient to propel any

Turkish government to begin its own program. In the meantime, the presence of USweapons on its soil would serve as a security bridge.

On the other hand, were the United States to remove its nuclear weapons from Europealtogether, Turkish calculations would be altered drastically. Their presence, as David Yostpoints out, has helped Europe, especially Turkey, to connect to NATO strategy and

contribute to collective decision-making.19Their removal therefore could severely shakeconfidence in the concept of extended deterrence. In the eyes of experts and European

security officials, weapons based in Europe are considered far more important to maintaininga deterrent posture than weapons on US soil or at sea.20

Turkish nuclearization guts Mideast stabilityDeliso, 2005 [Christopher, Plame Pakistan, a nuclear turkey, and the neocons, November,http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=8091]

The way Turkey's other external relationships are handled in the coming months will also play a role indeciding the direction of future trends. The European Union recently began candidacy negotiations with Turkey,something about which large sections of the European public have deep misgivings. It's hard to see how they will become

more eager to welcome Turkey aboard after having seen the rioting of Muslim immigrants that swept France and neighboring

countries in recent weeks.

The issue of the EU is controversial not only in Europe, however; nationalist and religious-minded Turks do not want to

make the sometimes humiliating concessions and "reforms" Brussels is requesting of them. That the Iraq war added tothe volatility of the Middle East, rather than to its stabilization, goes without saying. But Turkey's suddendrop in the estimation of U.S. policy planners and its arm's-length treatment from the EU can only increase feelings of

frustration and alienation among the general populace, strengthening the religious-based parties and go-it-alone nationalist

sentiment alike.

Proud Turkey has always wanted to be seen as an important country. Were it to declare itself a nuclearone, it would become, for a time at least, the most important country in the world. The entire balance ofpower in Europe and the Middle East would be radically altered overnight, and the overall side resultswould not at all be positive for Turkey or anyone else except of course for those cashing in on illicitnuclear sales. Nevertheless, the country is probably technologically capable by now. A new question that has thus arisen,

as articulated recently by Turkish scholar Mehmet Kalyoncu on Balkanalysis.com, is the following: "If the U.S. and the EUdo not approve of Turkey having nuclear weapons, what do they have to offer Turkey instead?"

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***NATO Cohesion***NATO Cohesion 1NC

Turn NATO CohesionA. Withdrawing TNWs will undermine NATO cohesion, jeopardizing the mission in Afghanistan.

Oliver Thranert, "U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet", December 10, 2008,p.http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22533&prog=zpg&proj=znpp

So, should U.S. nuclear forces be removed from Europe soon, or should they stay for some more years? The next step onthe road to "Global Zero" will be a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to benegotiated between Washington and Moscow. It should not only include low limits for strategic systems , but alsomove toward including non-strategic systems within lowered limits on total forces, without yet removing all U.S.nuclear forces from European territory. These negotiations can be expected to become extremelycomplicated. But including non-strategic weapons into formal arms control treaties is inevitable. As history has shown,unilateral reductions, such as those undertaken by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991 for non-strategic weapons, donot provide for the transparency needed. Some believe that even high-level officials in Moscow have no idea howmany tactical nuclear weapons there are on Russian territory. A START follow-on that reduces both strategic andnon-strategic weapons but does not force NATO to end nuclear sharing would avoid bitter discussionswithin the Alliance that would run the risk of dividing NATO into nuclear supporters and nuclearopponents. Such a debate would weaken the Alliance at a time when it has to tackle complicated taskssuch as the military engagement in Afghanistan.

B. NATO capabilities are key to Afghanistan success.Cem Birsay, Daily News, October 7, 2009

In conclusion, the U.S. fight against terrorism in Afghanistan by means of military instruments has set almost impossible

goals for NATO. Establishment of stability and security in Afghanistan is only possible through utilizationof NATOs existing facilities and capabilities . Expansion of the relative security established in citycenters to the nationwide is a difficult goal. Talibans ideological goals and NATOs military fight have turned outto be a kind of shadow play. Therefore, counter-acting Talibans economic, social and ideological structure can

only be possible through a multilateral cooperation with NATO in the hub . Development of the projectsfocusing on the development of the Afghan economy by the Western countries will highly serve to this end. As McChrystalwho is the top level U.S. general in Afghanistan, said, the use of military methods alone serves nothing but to lose the fight

against the Taliban. A potential failure in Afghanistan will jeopardize transatlantic cooperation.

C. Afghanistan instability causes a nuclear Indo-Pak war.

Joshua Foust, "The Case for Afghanistan: Strategic Considerations", August 27, 2009. http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/08/27/the-case-for-afghanistan-strategic-considerations/

And lest anyone think it is appropriate to write off the India-Pakistan conflict as somebody elses problem, it is never

somebody elses problem when nuclear weapons are involved. As Jari Lindholm reminded , India and Pakistan havecome a hairs breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. And like it or not, it is a compelling and

vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asiawhich makes fixing Afghanistan insome way also a vital American interest. Regional security is one of those topics that gets mentioned casually bymany pundits but never really articulated. It is by far Ahmed Rashids most convincing argument, that supporting stabilityin Central and South Asia is a compelling interest not just for the U.S., but for the West in general.When it comes to Pakistan, the big danger is not in a Taliban takeover, or even in the Taliban seizure of nuclearweaponsI have never believed that the ISI could be that monumentally stupid (though they are incredibly stupid for letting

things get this far out of hand). The big danger , as it has been since 1999, is that insurgents, bored or underutilizedin Afghanistan, will spark another confrontation between India and Pakistan, and that that confrontationwill spillover into nuclear conflict. That is worth blood and treasure to prevent.

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NATO Uniqueness

NATO supports the mission in Afghanistan now

AP 2009 [NATO moves toward more troops for Afghan war", October 23]

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gatessaid Friday that NATO allies are moving toward sending more troops andcivilian aid to Afghanistan.Gates said he was "heartened" by allies' commitment to the 8-year-old war even as the Obama administration mulls whetherto order tens of thousands more U.S. troops to the fight.

The Pentagon chief cited a long-term commitment by NATO partners to remain in Afghanistan until theconflict is successfully resolved.At a meeting of 28 NATO defense ministers in Bratislava, Gates said he did not seek specific promises of military assistance,and none was given. He described, however, "a renewed determination to see this through."

"There were a number of allies who indicated they were thinking about, or were moving toward,increasing either their military or their civilian contributions, or both," Gates said at a news conference. "And Ifound that very heartening."

NATO supports Afghanistan nowRTT New, 7-1-10 [ New NATO Commander Vows To Minimize Civilian Deaths In Afghanistan,http://www.rttnews.com/Content/TopStories.aspx?Id=1349439&SimRec=1&Node=B1]

During the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the alliance's top decision-making body , NATO Secretary-GeneralAnders Fogh Rasmussen pledged "full support" to the General, the Afghan mission and the current ISAFstrategy.Gen. Petraeus takes over as top U.S. commander in Afghanistan from General Stanley McChrystal, who was removed after he and his aides mocked andcriticized senior U.S. officials in a magazine article.Afghan government had repeatedly raised concerns over the killing of its civilians in pre-emptive raids by foreign forces, who target Afghan villagers'houses in the country's southern and eastern provinces in search of suspected insurgents and those whosupplythem with weapons.

NATO still committed to Afghanistan, even after McChrystalReuters, 6-23-10 [NATO chief says strategy for Afghanistan unchanged,http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65M4XN20100623]

I have taken note that General McChrystal is stepping down as Commander of the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. Whilehe will no longer be the commander, the approach he helped put in place is the right one," Rasmussen saidin a statement.

"The strategy continues to have NATO's support and our forces will continue to carry it out ."Naming General David Petraeus to replace McChrystal, Obama also said the shift did not reflect a change in policy.McChrystal's dismissal follows remarks he and his aides made in a magazine article that disparaged the U.S. president and

other senior civilian leaders.In his statement, Rasmussen said NATO's top diplomat in Afghanistan Mark Sedwill will continue to oversee politicalefforts.

"Our operations in Afghanistan are continuing today, and they will not miss a beat," he said.

NATO Links Commitment

The US nuclear commitment to NATO alliance is key.

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CNDI 2010 Turkey NegHuston/ShackelfordNATO OTAN. January 2008. NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environmenthttp://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/sec-environment.html

The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces that remain is political: to preserve peace and preventcoercion. NATO's nuclear forces contribute to European peace and stability by underscoring theirrationality of a major war in the Euro-Atlantic region. They make the risks of aggression againstNATO incalculable and unacceptable in a way that conventional forces alone cannot. Together with anappropriate mix of conventional capabilities, they also create real uncertainty for any country that might contemplate seekingpolitical or military advantage through the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against the Alliance.

The collective security provided by NATO's nuclear posture is shared among all members of the Alliance, providing

reassurance to any member that might otherwise feel vulnerable. The presence of U.S. nuclear forces based inEurope and committed to NATO provides an essential political and military link between the Europeanand North American members of the Alliance. At the same time, the participation of non-nuclear countries in theAlliance nuclear posture demonstrates Alliance solidarity, the common commitment of its member countries to maintaining

their security, and the widespread sharing among them of burdens and risks.

Political oversight of NATO's nuclear posture is also shared among member nations. NATO's NuclearPlanning Group provides a forum in which the Defence Ministers of nuclear and non-nuclear Allies alike participate inthe development of the Alliance's nuclear policy and in decisions on NATO's nuclear posture.

NATO must retain - and must be seen to retain - a core of military capabilities with an appropriate mixof forces affording it the basic military strength necessary for collective self-defence. NATO's nuclearforces remain an essential element of that core capability. At the same time, the dramatic changes in thesecurity environment since the Cold War have allowed NATO to undertake equally dramatic reductionsin its nuclear posture and in its reliance on nuclear weapons.

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NATO Links Unilateralism

Unilateral reductions hurt unityHamilton et al 9 [Daniel, Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century,February,http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/NATO-AllianceReborn.pdf]

D. Nuclear Forces. We support the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. None of our considerationscontradict initiatives such as Global Zero. Yet when it comes to practical implementation, it is important to keep in mind that

historically, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has been a preeminent symbol couplingEuropean and North American security. For this reason, a unilateral U.S. decision to withdraw its nuclearweapons could be seen in Europe as a U.S. effort to decouple its security from that of its allies and thusquestion the very premise of the Atlantic Alliance. If such a step is to be considered, therefore, theinitiative should come from Europe. If European allies are confident that European and North American security issufficiently coupled without the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, the U.S. is unlikely to object to their removal.Alliance discussion of NATOs choices should be framed by the following:Careful consideration of future requirements in terms of theater nuclear delivery capabilities, i.e., the appropriate number

of dual capable aircraft (DCA) and the number of devices to be prudently associated with them.Close and reflective negotiations among all allies, but especially those who store these weapons. Allies should keep in

mind that once withdrawn, it will be all but impossible politically to return them. Redeployment in time of tension wouldreadily be seen as an act of war.

If reductions or even elimination is considered, NATO needs a strategy for negotiating an equivalentreduction by Russia, the other holder of such weapons.

Turkey build up would destroy NATOKibaroglu 05(Mustafa, 2/9/ The Washington Institute, Beyond Iran: the Risk of a Nuclearizing Middle East

The second reason why Im against the idea that Turkey should develop nuclear

weapons capability is that, I dont think Turkey needs to possess nuclear weapons to protectitself from its rivals. Not only will this lead to the closure of NATOs nuclear umbrella, whichis, to me, still a credible deterrent, but also, such an eventuality can cause a spiral effect in theregion and bring a lot more trouble to Turkey in the future rather than solutions to itsproblems.7 I can discuss this issue at length during the Q&A session.

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NATO Key to Afghan Success

Afghanistan=top priority cohesion key to successMcNamara, 2009 [Sally, Priorities for Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO's New Secretary General,July 28]

Outgoing Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has used his departure tour to send a strong message to NATO'sEuropean allies that they need to assume a greater share of the burden for the mission in Afghanistan. Hehas also sought to convey that Afghanistan continues to be a mission of necessity, rather than of choice.[2]This messagesets the tone for NATO'stop priority issue: gaining alliance-wide support for the new comprehensive"surge" strategy for Afghanistan.Although NATO is an intergovernmental organization and the secretary general cannot demand the deployment of more

combat troops from member states or lift their nationally-imposed operational caveats, he can make the public case for the

mission and outline exactly what is at stake. Inequitable sharing of the burdens and risks threatens not only operational

success in Afghanistan, but also as the House of Commons Defence Committee has pointed out, the viability of the alliance

as a whole.[3]

Cohesion key to AfghanistanHamilton et al 9 [Daniel, Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century,February,http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/NATO-AllianceReborn.pdf]

Unfortunately, recognition of the risk of failure is not shared across the Atlantic. Without such a sharedunderstanding, a more cohesive, determined approach will remain elusive. Although NATO invoked its mutual defenseclause Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time on September 12, 2001 in response to the September 11 attacks plotted from Afghanistan,

NATOs engagement in Afghanistan has not been formally designated as an Article 5 mission. Yet it is critical to generate greaterunderstanding among parliamentarians and publics that NATOs engagement in Afghanistan follows from theinvocation of Article 5. European efforts in Afghanistan are necessary not as a gesture of support for Americans, but because Europeans aredirectly threatened as well.

The central objective of our effort must be to create an environment in which Afghans are able to exorcise terrorists and govern themselves.

Successful counterinsurgency efforts hinge on the competence of local security forces, not international ones. Much greater effort needs tobe invested in the generation, organization, training and recruitment of gendarmerie or carabinieri types of police forces. Strong andcapable Afghan security forces are critical for Afghanistans stability. Until this is achieved,international forces will be needed in Afghanistan.

There can be no security in Afghanistan without successful civil reconstruction, however, and great challenges remain: the opium

economy, endemic corruption, weak governance. NATO offers the essential framework for our military efforts, but itis not equipped to advance the range of civil efforts, from economic development to police and judiciary training to voter registration, thatwill ultimately determine success.Afghanistan offers compelling evidence of the need for a comprehensive approach that brings both civil and military capabilities to bear,across the range of international institutions, on the full range of problems inherent in dealing with conflict in a failed or failing state. Yetcurrent military and civil structures are a shaky patchwork.

More effective and integrated international coordination among NATO, the EU and the UN, preferablythrough each organizations senior civilian representative on the ground, working alongside U.S. andNATO military leaders, and working from the Afghan governments priorities, should be central. In linewith the Declaration of the June 2008 Paris Conference, the Afghanistan Compact needs to be extended, expanded and properly funded,with an emphasis on better promotion of good governance. The new strategy should distinguish between al-Qaeda, which is aninternational terrorist organization, and different elements within the Taliban. The new approach should encourage practical arrangementswith tribal leaders willing to join a new political process and exclude terrorists and insurgents from their territory.

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NATO Key to Afghan Success

Now is critical to determine success of mission in AfghanistanAlbright 10/7 edition - http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/1007/p09s02-coop.html Albright: Iran nuclear shift showsObama's policy is working. Madeleine Albright is a former US secretary of State. Oct. 6.)

Albright:Neither the US nor NATO can be responsible for Afghanistan for the rest of our lives. Thebottom line is that the Afghans have to be able to operate on their own. But we have to help them getthere training the Afghan Army and police forces, as well as providing reconstruction assistance and aviable governing structure. We need to have this debate now so the American public understands what isat stake. Eight years have been wasted and there is no more time to waste. We've got to chart a courseand stick to it.

NATO presence in Afghanistan crucialNordeng 7(Torill, Nato Must not give up on us http://www.afghanistanembassy.no/detail.asp?CatID=4&ContID=61 AD: 10/15/09)

NATO must stay in Afghanistan in the years ahead. Anything else would lead to chaos and mean victoryfor the terrorists, says the Ambassador of Afghanistan in Oslo.Torill Nordeng/ AftenpostenAfghanistans Ambassador in Norway, Jawed Ludin, thinks it is only hypothetical that the NATO-lead ISAF force that fights Taliban and Al-Qaida in hishomeland can withdraw now.

- It would destroy all that is build up, tear down NATOs credibility and make the terrorists stand forth asthe victorious part, says Jawed Ludin to Aftenposten.

He thinks that a UN-force as a replacement for NATO will not be able to do anything. It is NATO that hasthe muscles and the capacity, which can assure that Afghanistan becomes a strong, stable anddemocratic state - strong enough to resist the terrorist cells.

But even if the US has the largest resources, the European NATO-countries cannot be sitting in the backseat. They must be in the front seat with USA, headds.

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NATO Terminal Impact

India Pakistan War leads to extinctionGertz, Staff Writer at the Washington Times, 2001(Bill Gertz, Staff writer at the Washington Times 12/31/2001,India, Pakistan prepare nukes, troops for war, Lexis)

Pakistan and India are readying their military forces - including their ballistic missiles and nuclearweapons - for war, The Washington Times has learned. U.S. intelligence officials say Pakistani military moves include large-scale troopmovements, the dispersal of fighter aircraft and preparations for the transportation of nuclear weapons from storage sites. India also is moving thousands ofits troops near the border with Pakistan and has dispersed some aircraft to safer sites away from border airfields, say officials familiar with intelligencereports of the war moves. Pakistan is moving the equivalent of two armored brigades - several thousand troops and hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles -near the northern part of its border with India. Indian and Pakistani troops exchanged heavy mortar fire over their border in southern Kashmir today, AgenceFrance-Presse reported. Five Indian soldiers were seriously injured in the heaviest shelling in four months, a senior Indian army official said. More than1,000 villagers were evacuated from their homes overnight for the operation, according to the report. Officials say the most alarming signs are preparationsin both states for the use of nuclear-tipped missiles. Intelligence agencies have learned of indications that India is getting its short-range Prithvi ballisticmissiles ready for use. The missiles are within range of the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. Meanwhile, Pakistan is mobilizing its Chinese-made mobile M-11missiles, also known as the Shaheen, which have been readied for movement from a base near Sargodha, Pakistan. Intelligence reports indicate that Indiawill have all its forces ready to launch an attack as early as this week, with Thursday or Friday as possible dates. Pakistan could launch its forces beforethose dates in a pre-emptive strike. Disclosure of the war preparations comes as President Bush on Saturday telephoned leaders of both nations, urging them

to calm tensions, a sign of administration concern over the military moves in the region. The administration also fears thata conflict between

India and Pakistan would undermine U.S. efforts to find terrorists in Afghanistan. U.S. military forcesare heavily reliant on Pakistani government permission to conduct overflights for bombing and otheraircraft operations into Afghanistan, primarily from aircraft carriers located in the Arabian Sea. With tensionsgrowing between the states, U.S. intelligence officials are divided over the ultimate meaning of the indicators of an impending conflict. The Pentagon's JointStaff intelligence division, known as J-2, late last week had assessed the danger of conflict at "critical" levels. Other joint intelligence centers outside thePentagon, including those supporting the U.S. military forces responsible for the Asia-Pacific region and for Southwest Asia, assess the danger of an India-

Pakistan war as less than critical but still "serious." Intelligence officials are especially worried about Pakistan's nucleararsenal because control over the weapons is decentralized. Even before the latest moves, regionalcommanders could order the use of the weapons, which are based on missiles or fighter-bombers.

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NATO Impacts Prolif

Nato is critical to prevent a number of scenarios for extinction including; wmd prolif, terrorismand warRobertson 03, [Speech at 9th Conference de Montreal,

http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030506a.htm]

In our increasingly globalised world, instability cannot be confined to the areas in which it originates. Itaffects us all, wherever we live. Take Afghanistan. Under the Taliban, it exported instability to its neighbours, drugs toEurope, terrorism and refugees throughout the world. And if the international community does not remain fully engaged, we

can expect the same symptoms of overspill to reappear.The scale of threats has also increased. Today terrorism ismore international, more apocalyptic in its vision, and far more lethal. And despite the best efforts of ourdiplomats and counter-proliferation experts, the spread of bio-chemical and nuclear weapons is already adefining security challenge of this new century. If not addressed, it will put more fingers on moretriggers. And because not all of these fingers will belong to rational leaders, traditional deterrents willnot always deter.All this adds up to a guaranteed supply chain of instability. It adds up to a securityenvironment in which threats can strike at anytime, without warning, from anywhere and using any

means, from a box-cutter to a chemical weapon to a missile. In the months leading to Prague, NATOs 19member countries demonstrated that they understood the nature of this challenge and were united in a common response to it.

What this has meant in practice for the Alliance can be summarised under three headings: new roles, new relationships and

new capabilities.

NATO is worth retaining only if it is relevant . It evolved successfully in the 1990s to engage former adversariesacross the old Soviet bloc and then to deal with instability and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.

Now NATO is radically changing again to play important new roles in the fight against terrorism andweapons of mass destruction.It already provides the common glue of military interoperability without which multinational operationsof any kind would be impossible. Canadas Joint Task Force 2 and Princess Patricias Canadian Light Infantry wereable to operate effectively against the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan only because of decades of cooperation in NATO.

After 9/11, NATO also played a supporting role in actions against Al Qaida. Most importantly, however, NATO at Prague

became the focal point for planning the military contribution against terrorism, a major new role and one which no other

organisation in the world could play.

In doing so, we have put an end to decades of arid theological debate about whether the Alliance could operate outside

Europe. NATO now has a mandate to deal with threats from wherever they may com e.

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NATO Impacts Terrorism

Strong NATO is key to solve WMD terrorismBereuter & Lis, 2003[Doug Bereuter, Chair of the House International Relations Committee and President of theNATO Parliamentary Assembly, and John Lis, Senior Policy Adviser for transatlantic relations, 2003 WashingtonQuarterly]

To be certain, security threats have changed dramatically during the past half century. NATO was founded

to deter a Soviet-led military invasion. Today, its members face threats from international terrorism,WMD, states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate WMD, and the conjunction of thesechallenges: the horrifying prospect of these states providing WMD to terrorist groups to use against ourcountries and to kill our citizens. Senator RichardLugar (R-Ind.) has cited the need for NATO to play the lead

role in addressing the central security challenge of our time.16Althoughrecognizingthat collectivedefense

remainsthe core missionof NATO,Lugar wrote:If we fail to defend our societies from a major terrorist attackinvolving WMD, the alliance will have failed in the most fundamental sense of defending our nations.17

NATO members and Obama wont remove TNWs from Europe in fear of dividing NATOAlmond and Ingram 09, Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states

NATOs member states have reached an impasse on the future of nuclear sharing in Europe, andcurrently appear to be operating on the assumption of business as usual through fear of change. Whilethere would be mainstream support on both sides of the Atlantic for the practice to end,governments are reluctant to take action that may appear to challenge the relevance or

the future of the NATO Alliance. Even under an Obama Administration, the United States may bereluctant to remove forward-based tactical nuclear weapons from Europe for as long as alliedgovernments wish them to remain, in order to be seen as fulfilling commitments to NATO collectivesecurity.1 Likewise, European host states will be reluctant to suggest that the United States removethem if the removal were interpreted to be anti-American or reflect a reduced commitment to NATO.

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NATO Impacts Central Asia

AFGHANISTAN KEY TO CENTRAL ASIAN STABILITYLal, 2006(Rollie, Central asia and its asian neighbors: security and commerce at the crossroads,online, p. 22,

http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A450305&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

The U.S. interest in preventing a return of militant training campsand groups such as the Taliban and al Qaeda indicates that a continuedU.S. militarypresence in Afghanistan is necessary in the near term to help maintain stability.The government of Hamid Karzaihasrepeatedly requested a larger U.S. and international presence to assistin maintaining security and in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. As stability of thecentral government in Kabul is critical to the security ofits neighbors, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstanhave also emphasized that acontinued international presence in Afghanistan would be beneficial, and an early withdrawal disastrous.16

While problems persist in the region despite U.S. presence and assistance, the countries of Central Asiahave noted that they would be even less capable of preventing the growth of illegal trade and extremistgroups throughout the region in the absence of a U.S. role in Afghanistan .17 Thus, it is likely that these states, theUnited States,and other countries such as Russia and Iran, who share an interest inpromoting peace and security in Afghanistan, will have reasons and

arenas in which to cooperate.

INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA = NUCLEAR WARAhrari, professor of national security and strategy @ Armed Forces Staff College, 2001(M. Ehsan, Jihadi groups, nuclear Pakistan, and the new great game, August, online, p. 41www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=112)

South and Central Asia constitute a part of the world where a well-designed American strategy mighthelp avoid crises or catastrophe. The U.S. military would provide onlyone component of such astrategy, and a secondary one atthat, but has an important role to play through engagementactivities and

regional confidence-building. Insecurity has led the states of the region to seek weapons of mass

destruction, missiles, and conventional arms. It has also led them toward policies which undercut thesecurity of their neighbors. If such activities continue, the result could be increased terrorism,

humanitarian disasters, continued low-level conflict and potentially even major regional war ora thermonuclear exchange. A shift away from this patterncould allow the states of the region to become solid economicand political partners for the United States, thusrepresenting a gain for all concerned.

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***OFF-CASE LINKS***

Politics Link

Obama will face in-fighting on all nuclear weapons policiesButfoy 9 (Andy Butfoy. 25 September 2009. Obama versus the Pentagon. Inside Story | Current affairs and culture.http://inside.org.au/obama-versus-the-pentagon/)

PRESIDENT Barack Obama is learning that opponents can be found in many different places, from themountains of Afghanistan to the corridors of the Pentagon. His enemies in Afghanistan are well known,but this week it was reported that some American defence officials are opposing Obamas promise of aradical reshaping of US nuclear weapons policy. His reaffirmation of the promise in the United NationsSecurity Council on Thursday suggests we may be in for some interesting Washington in-fighting.

Unilateral nuclear weapons changes cost political capital make him look weak on defenseBlechman 09 (1/21. Barry M, the co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and a Stimson Distinguished Fellow focused on nucleardisarmament; founder and former president of DFI International Inc., a research and consulting company in Washington, DC; Dr.Blechman has more than forty years of distinguished service in the national security field and is a frequent consultant to the USGovernment on a wide range of subjects. Dont Reduce the US Nuclear Arsenal Unilaterally: We Need Levers to Move the World TowardDisarmament.http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=734)

Unilateral reductions of the magnitude being discussed also would reduce President Obamas leverage with Russia when negotiating potential mutual restraints on arsenals. Russian and US arsenals compriseroughly 95 percent of the worlds nuclear weapons. It is evident that deeper reductions on their part are an essential next stepon the road to eliminating nuclear weapons world-wide. But why should Moscow agree to limits on its own forces when theUS is already stripping its arsenal unilaterally? Russian military doctrine values short-range, or tactical nuclear weapons to offset Westernconventional superiority. Persuading Russia to include these shorter range weapons in future agreements will be difficult without having anything significantto trade.

Nor would a unilateral reduction help the US contain proliferation. Iran and North Korea will pursue their weapon programs depending on broad strategic,

economic, and political considerations, whether the US has 1,000 or 5,000 weapons. In either case, they would be helplessly

outnumbered and would depend on a US unwillingness to sustain even a single nuclear blast on its territory todeter American involvement in a regional crisis.

There would be no gain at the NPT Review Conference either. The US nuclear stockpile has been reduced by three-fourths since 1989, butthere is nary a mention of that in the records of the NPT proceedings other than those inserted by US representatives. Instead, the nations dissatisfied withthe Treaty focus solely on the Bush Administrations attempts to develop two new warheads, which have been denied repeatedly by the Congress.

President Obama also should be aware of the political implications. The announcement by a new president that he is makingsignificant unilateral reductions in US nuclear forces, in the hope the Russians will follow suit, would play into the hands ofthose seeking to tar him and his party as weak on defense.

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http://inside.org.au/obama-versus-the-pentagon/http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=734http://inside.org.au/obama-versus-the-pentagon/http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=734


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Consult NATO Solvency Cards

Not consulting NATO results in Turkish proliferationWilliam Potter- Prof and Director of James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies- 9Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, (research assistant / Professor and Director / research assistant)

December 2009, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, James Martin Centerfor Nonproliferation Studies / Monterey Institute, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf

The only possible exception to the limitations in TNW is for weapons deployed in Turkey where U.S.TNW are seen in the context of the suspected Iranian nuclear weapons program . While their military utility isdebatable given the distance between Turkey and Iran and it is difficult to conceive of a scenario in which Iran undertookmilitary action against Turkey, nevertheless Turkish officials are not eager to part with the weapons and routinely invoke the

Iranian threat in discussions with visiting Americans. On occasion, they also raise the specter that the withdrawal ofU.S. TNW might push Turkey to pursue its own nuclear weapons option, despite studies casting doubton the likelihood of such an event. 28 Therefore, withdrawal or retention of these assets must be a matterof a political decision for NATO made in a broader context of alliance security policy.

We must consult NATo before we remove TNWs from Europe, thats key to the AllianceKulesa 09 (Lukasz, March, Reduce US Nukes in Europe to Zero, and Keep NATO Strong (and

Nuclear). A View from Poland. http://www.pism/;l/zalaczniki/Strategic_File_7.pdf)

Assuring the cohesion of the Alliance when such a change is agreed upon would remain the toppriority. In practice, this calls for close consultations between the two sides of the Atlantic during allstages of the process.There should be a common assessment that the positive consequences of thediscontinuation of the nuclear sharing arrangement will outweigh the negative ones, and that the otherelements of NATOs nuclear policy will remain valid. It would be damaging for the Alliance to createthe impression that the US weapons are being pushed out of Europe by pacifist Europeans, or that theUS is weakening its commitment to NATO by initiating changes in the nuclear strategy without properly

consulting its allies.

TNWs play an important role in NATO have to consult firstPifer 09 (Steven, May, Beyond Start: Negotiating the next step in U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear

Arms Reductions)

In view of the increasing importance of tactical nuclear weapons for Russia and the largeimbalance in numbers, negotiating reductions in and limits on tactical nuclear weapons will provedifficult. The primary U.S. bargaining chip would be a readiness to withdraw its nuclear weapons fromEurope and agree that U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons would not be deployed outside ofnational territory.

Given the important role that nuclear weapons have played in NATOs deterrent posture, such aproposal could only be put forward after close consultations within the Alliance.

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http://www.pism/;l/zalaczniki/Strategic_File_7.pdfhttp://www.pism/;l/zalaczniki/Strategic_File_7.pdf


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***AFF ANSWERS SUPPLEMENT***

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Answers to Turkey Proliferation

Turkey wont build arms they wont risk EU membership over itNTI 09 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, Turkey Profile,http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.html, Updated June09)

Turkey is not known to possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or weapons programs, and is a member in good

standing ofall of the major treaties governing their acquisition and use. Turkey is also active in proliferationprevention efforts such as the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).[1] While Turkey is situated in anotoriously "dangerous neighborhood"[2] and is often mentioned as a possible proliferation domino should Iran acquirenuclear weapons, it has relied for its security on the nuclear and conventional deterrence provided by U.S./NATO security

guarantees for more than half a century. Turkey's dedication to the nonproliferation regime is further solidifiedby its commitment to the European Union accession process, as prospects for Turkish EU membershipwould be gravely diminished should Turkey choose to develop nuclear, chemical, or biologicalweapons.[3] Thanks in part to decades of U.S. military aid and cooperation, Turkey has robust conventional defensecapabilities, including short-range ballistic missiles. Ankara is also working to procure advanced ballistic missile defensecapabilities.

And Turkey wont proliferate as long as the government is stable, even without US presenceKibaroglu 05(Mustafa, 2/9/ The Washington Institute, Beyond Iran: the Risk of a Nuclearizing Middle East

This brings me to the second issue that we are asked to discuss today as to under whatcircumstances might some important regional states reconsider whether they should explorenuclear options? Let me first of all state here that, developing nuclear weapons has neverbeen a state policy in Turkey, nor will it be in the foreseeable future so long as thegovernment and the military are in responsible hands. Turkey is a State party to the NPT, andit is one of the very few states that voluntarily ratified the Additional Protocol of the IAEA,

not to mention its membership in the international nonproliferation initiatives such as the

Nuclear Suppliers Group. There is, therefore, good reason to believe that Turkey will not benext proliferator.4

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http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.htmlhttp://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.htmlhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/turkey.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/turkey.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/turkey.pdfhttp://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1b4_6.htmlhttp://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1b4_6.htmlhttp://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.htmlhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/turkey.pdfhttp://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1b4_6.html


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Turkey wont seek out nuclear weapons, theyll view the plan as a strengthening of the NPTcurbing their own desires to engage in the nuclear marketKibaroglu 05

(Mustafa, 2/9/ The Washington Institute, Beyond Iran: the Risk of a Nuclearizing Middle East

First of all, Turks have seen that the much-publicized opposition of the US to NorthKoreas nuclear weapons program did not prevent that country from advancing itscapabilities. It is believed by many experts that North Korea has either already manufacturedseveral nuclear weapons or is able to do so on a very short notice. The concerned body ofintellectuals in Turkey think this is because of a lack of commitment of the US to uphold theprinciples of the nuclear nonproliferation regime due to its excessive engagement in the waragainst terror sending wrong signals to the aspiring states.Strengthening the nonproliferation regimes, however, has been the key issue in Turkeysofficial stance toward the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the possibility of

the NPT becoming an ineffective treaty, stands out as the second reason why some in Turkeyespouse the idea of having at least the basic infrastructure for nuclear weapons capability.These people quickly come to the conclusion that no international treaty should constrainTurkey anymore if Iran follows the example after North Korea in evading its obligationsunder the NPT by simply walking out with a unilateral declaration.

And even if you win a link, well win that the impacts of the affirmative will happen before Turkeycan even build weapons and wont seek weapons because of treaty obligationsBarkey 2009, [Henry, TURKEYS PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISARMAMENT, NuclearSecurity Series,http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Nuclear_Turkey.pdf]

However, in the absence of any nuclear weapons of its own, when it comes to contemplating threats fromnuclear-armed nations, Turkey has little else to rely on other than NATOs guarantees. This might berelevant in considering the possibility of a revanchist Russia, or scenarios in which Iran and/or Syria acquire nuclearweapons. Hence, despite the discordant voices emanating from various groups, Turks continue to rely on the Americansecurity umbrella. Ankara has always stressed the importance of its NATO commitments.

Moreover, as will be discussed below, there is no easy way for Turkey to obtain such weapons, even assumingit was willing to forsake its alliance and treaty pledges. It currently has no nuclear power plants andonly the beginnings of a research/technical infrastructure.What has made the Turkish military a potent force has been its NATO links. The combination of NATO, a robustarmy, and a willingness to take security seriously has served effectively as Turkeys primary form ofdeterrence.

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http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Nuclear_Turkey.pdfhttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Nuclear_Turkey.pdfhttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Nuclear_Turkey.pdf


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Non-Unique: Ankara is already asking the United States for the green light to develop their ownweaponsKalyoncu, July 2, 2010 [Mehmet, Why, when and how Turkey becomes a nuclear power, Todays Zaham,

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=153561]

Consequently, Ankara is intensifying its lobbying in Western capitals, most notably in Washington, toget the green light to develop nuclear weapons. Ankara presents itself as the most viable nuclear powerin the region to counterbalance the nuclear Iran, pointing out that

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