Paper to be presented at the
35th DRUID Celebration Conference 2013, Barcelona, Spain, June 17-19
Co-creation in open innovationNina KoivistoAalto University
AbstractI do not want to come - sorry!!!! The time line is bad for me :(
Jelcodes:L21,-
Co-creation in open innovation
1. Introduction
This research is based on 15 qualitative interviews with users and developers of Haka, a service for
universities and polytechnics in Finland, providing a single user identity covering multiple services. The
research studies Haka as a radical innovation. The data is processed and studied from the perspective of
theoretical co-creation. The traditional interpretation of innovation has focused on new technologies and
products in the research and development department. Radical innovation has been associated with
different ways to develop the business opportunities with other external partners, but customers have
been left out of the scope. This research demonstrates that co-creation with customers in open innovation
can lead to great success.
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2. Literature
Innovation can be seen as the successful implementation of creative ideas, and labeled as incremental or
radical. Incremental innovation is also known as competence-enhancing and radical innovation as
competence-destroying (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Anderson and Tushman, 1990). In radical
innovation (RI), the promise of the opportunity is very large, and the concomitant uncertainty of the
opportunity is high, (Leifer et al., 2001; Morone, 1993). Academic literature focusing on the management
processes for radical innovation considers the RI project as the unit of analysis and examines appropriate
project management techniques associated with high levels of uncertainty given the constraints of the
large established firm (Burgelman and Sayles, 1986; Dougherty and Heller, 1994; Jelinek and Schoonhoven,
1993; Kanter et al., 1991; Leifer, 2000; Morone, 1993). RI is often characterized as disruptive, competence-
destroying, or breakthrough, with all these labels sharing the same concept that radical innovation implies
a discontinuity with the past (Garcia and Calantone, 2002). Successful radical innovation is surprisingly rare
and most attempts at radical innovation fail (Sandberg, 2011). Figure 1 shows the relationship between
types of innovation and the degree of newness of technology and markets.
Figure 1: Incremental, discontinuous and radical innovations
As quality of service becomes more important than quality of product in an increasing number of
transactions, the role of customer participation becomes more important to firms (Vargo and Lusch, 2004),
the role of customer participation becomes more important. Traditionally there is no role of customers in
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innovation. This has recently been challenged by various researchers who note that there is also a more
active role of customers in innovation, characteri┣WS WゲヮWIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ H┞ デｴW ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa さIﾗ-IヴW;デｷﾗﾐざ ふJ;┘ﾗヴゲﾆｷ ;ﾐS Kohli, 2006). In this newer, more active process, a firm and its customers co-create new products and/or
services. In this process, the firm and the customers together do the asking, listening, observing, and
experimenting; that is, the firm and the customers engage in learning together. This co-creation process
differs significantly from the process designed to hear the voice of the customer; it requires a very different
mindset on the part of both firm and customers, and calls for a different set of behaviors.
According to Jaworski and Kohli (2006), there are eight ideal types of customer innovation divided into
three dimensions. These dimensions are degree of freedom, degree of collaboration, and new product
development progress (either front or back end). The model is shown in Figures 2 and 3, which together
show the eight types of innovation, described as idea contests, communities of creation, idea screening,
product-related discussion forums, toolkits for user innovation, peer production, toolkits for user co-design
and customization, and virtual concept testing & trading.
Figure 2: Typology of customer innovation at idea phase
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Figure 3: Typology of customer innovation at development phase
Firms generally use customer participation for two different purposes and each one involves different goals
;ﾐS HWﾐWaｷデゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ゲWヴ┗ｷIW ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWヴげゲ ゲｷSW ;ﾐS different motivations and W┝ヮWIデ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲげ side. Customer participation in services can be divided into co-creation, co-development or co-production.
Typically firms use customer participation ｷﾐ けco-productionげ as a way to gain productivity and reduce cost.
However, consumers can also participate in the design, manufacture, and delivery of a product or service
and become a さIﾗ-IヴW;デﾗヴ ﾗa ┗;ﾉ┌Wざ ふBﾗﾉデﾗﾐ et al., 2007). The main difference between co-production and
co-creation is that co-production can always be replicated, but co-creation is generally not substitutable.
Instead, it needs the customer to create the value (one example could be personal training: the customer
does not get the value if not doing their own part of the creation). Such customer participation brings many
benefits to the firm including increased revenue by offering better value-added services and consumers
spending more on products and services (Wind and Rangaswamy, 2001).
In this research, we broadly distinguish customer participation by the role it plays in new service
development. In the case of Haka, the role of customers was very much co-creator and/or co-developer, as
well as co-producer, and customers were involved in both innovation and development phases. The degree
of collaboration I;ﾐ HW I;デWｪﾗヴｷ┣WS ;ゲ さnetworkざ (customer community) (see Figure 2 and 3), and the
degree of freedom is high (creative and open tasks, since the whole service was created through firm and
customers working together).
We studied this service at the level of the whole firm, to confirm empirically the benefits and costs
associated with customer participation in co-creation.
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By participating in the creation of a service, consumers actually co-create value to be delivered. As Bolton
and Saxena-Iyer (2009) put it, さCﾗ-creation refers to [a] process in which customers play a greater role in
デｴW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ﾗa ┗;ﾉ┌W IヴW;デｷﾗﾐざ, and Vargo and Lusch (2008) noted that the role of the customer makes the
value idiosyncratic (Vargo and Lusch, 2008). Another definition is that さ[the v]alue co-creation process
involves the supplier creating superior value propositions, with customers determining value when a good
ﾗヴ ゲWヴ┗ｷIW ｷゲ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWSざ ふV;ヴｪﾗ et al. , 2008; Payne et al., 2008). Haka is, by these definitions, customer
participation in value co-creation. When customer participation is used to co-create value and as a
product/service differentiation strategy through customization or personalization (Song and Adams, 1993),
consumer input (i.e. participation) is directly related to the outcome (i.e. the quality of the service
obtained).
According to Bitner et al. (1997), levels of customer participation can be low (customer presence required
during service delivery), moderate (customer inputs required for service creation), or high (customer co-
creates the service). When the level of customer participation is low, services are standardized; they are
provided regardless of any individual purchase, and payment may be the only required input from the
customer. When the level is moderate, input from the client is used to customize a standard service, and
customer inputs (information or materials) are necessary for an adequate outcome, but the service firm
provides the service. When the level is high, active client participation guides the customized service.
“Wヴ┗ｷIW I;ﾐﾐﾗデ デｴWﾐ HW IヴW;デWS ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ デｴW I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴげゲ ;Iデｷ┗W ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴ ｷﾐヮ┌デゲ ;ヴW mandatory to co-create the outcome.
Innovation requires individuals who commit themselves to the new idea and show a high personal
involvement in the innovation project, and this is especially true with radical innovations. Gemünden et
al.,(2007) and Chakrabarti & Hauschildt (1989) identified six innovator roles showing a positive influence on
innovation success: the power, expert, process, technology-related relationship, and market-related
relationship promoters and leadership experience of the project leader (see Table 1
The roles of promoters are defined by the type of barriers they help to overcome. The power promoter has
the necessary hierarchical power to drive the project and to provide resources needed by the project. The
expert promoter has specific technical knowledge for the innovation process. The process promoter has
organizational know-how and intra-organizational networks, and makes the connections between the
power and the expert promoter, having diplomatic skills to bring together the right people needed in
innovation process. The technology-related relationship promoter is someone who has good relationships
with external partners, improving collaboration and co-operation. The market-related relationship
promoter is the person who promotes the project externally, and has market-related know-how. Both
relationship promoters have strong internal and external personal ties (Gemünden et al., 2007).
Table 1. Different roles in radical innovation process (Gemünden et al., 2007)
Characteristic How this role is expressed in action
Power promoter さぷ“へupports the project above-average
from a higher hierarchical level.ざ
Hierarchical rank of the key person
Expert promoter さぷPへromotes the project by his/her high
technological know-how.ざ
Process promoter さぷKへnows the organizational processes
and campaigns above-average for the smooth
progress of the project.ざ
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さぷAへcts as a link between decision
makers and experts.ざ
Technology-related relationship promoter ざぷHへas good relationships with
important external co-operation partners.ざ
さぷ“へupports the search for external
co-operation partners, information exchange with
co-operation partners and the collaboration with
co-operation partners.ざ
Market-related relationship promoter さぷPへromotes the project by his/her
market-related know-how.ざ
Leadership experience of the project leader Experience in leading previous projects
It is also possible for promoters to have a negative effect. In particular, a strong power promoter can have
a negative effect on radical innovations. This is probably due to the underestimation of technological
uncertainty by power promoters and over-strong promotion of certain projects without strategic fit
(Gemünden et al., 2007). Technological expert promoters can also have a negative effect, perhaps because
of core competencies turning to さcore rigiditiesざ by over-focus on internal company issues (Gemünden et
al., 2007, Assink 2006). Individual expertise on its own can correlate negatively to radical innovation, unless
the knowledge is networked, shared and channeled through relationships (Subramaniam and Youndt,
2005).
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3. Empirical research
Haka is a service co-created by the Company together with all universities and some polytechnics (in
total 50 institutions) in Finland. The idea was for every university in Finland to use the same user
authentication system. The Company realized that, in this way, they could serve more customers with
smaller numbers of servers. Everyone understood that it made no sense that every service needed to
carry out its own authentication, when that is a risky transaction and, of course, crucial to data security.
However, the proposal that a user should not need a new username and password for every service
was new. Under this new proposal, a person uses the same username, supplied by their own university,
to access multiple services, and it is possible to sign in with only one user authentication, independent
of location. This simultaneously improves both usability and data security.
This report is based on 15 qualitative interviews with participants in the development process of Haka.
The initial idea for the project was developed between 1999 and 2002, the project started in 2002 and
the system first entered operation in 2004-2005.
15 interviews from employees of the Company and users of the service in universities, and polytechnics
that were involved in the co-creation process were made between autumn 2011 and spring 2012.
Interview questions were semi-structured and open-ended, since qualitative interviews are particularly
useful for getting the story behind a participant's experiences, and the interviewee can pursue in-depth
information around the topic. All the data was recorded, transcribed and coded by themes with
NVivo9. Each interview took about two hours.
All interview transcripts and notes were first read by the researchers in order to familiarize themselves
with the data to be analyzed. All the notes were grouped and organized into categories. The categories
were labeled to identify patterns or associations and causal relationships in the themes. These results
were interpreted to form the overview that is presented in this article.
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4. Results
Unless otherwise stated, all direct quotations are from the interview transcripts.
4.1. Radicality of the innovation
The interviewees judged Haka to be a radical innovation. Eleven answers were given numerically, and the
mean of the numeric values given for the radicality of the project was 7.9 compared to the value 3 given to
common projects. Some of the interviewees saw the whole concept, technology and market to be novel,
but most agreed that the technique itself was not that radical, but the outsourcing of user authentication
was unprecedented. In particular, the use of the network to get all the universities and polytechnics to use
the same authentication system was perceived to be a radical innovation.
4.2. Benefits
Finland is a small country, and there is a great desire to co-operate seen among the universities. One
person commented さno other country has such a deep wish to co-ﾗヮWヴ;デWざが ;ﾐS ゲW┗Wヴ;ﾉ ｷﾐデWヴ┗ｷW┘WWゲ stated that universitiesげ ability to co-operate was one of the biggest strengths in the project, with
comments including: さO┌ヴ ｪﾗ;ﾉ ┘;ゲ Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐざ, "Understanding was increasing with the co-operation" and
さTｴｷゲ ┘;ゲ [the] aｷヴゲデ ヴW;ﾉﾉ┞ IﾗﾐIヴWデW ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ┘ｷデｴ ┌ﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲ デﾗｪWデｴWヴざく
One interviewee commented さTｴW ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ ┘;ゲ デﾗデ;ﾉﾉ┞ ﾐW┘ ;ﾐS SｷaaWヴWﾐデ aヴﾗﾏ ヮヴW┗ｷﾗ┌ゲざく TｴW aｷヴゲデ ゲデWヮ ﾗa co-creation was to establish a network to create Haka. As one person said, さTｴWゲW aﾗヴ┌ﾏゲ ;ヴW ゲデｷﾉﾉ ;ﾉｷ┗Wざが ;ﾐS デｴWヴW ;ヴW げH;ﾆ; S;┞ゲげ ;ﾐS げICT S;┞ゲげ ﾗﾐIW ; ┞W;ヴ ゲデｷﾉﾉ ｪﾗｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ, so that the network has had ongoing
benefits to the participants. The project leadership expert understood that the vision was デﾗ IヴW;デW ; けtrust
networkげ i.e. a network of universities that share authentication and identification of end-users (students,
employees, and others) as one. Interviewees noted that he ensured that things were done differently from
before, saying さぐ SﾗﾐW デｴｷﾐｪゲ SｷaaWヴWﾐデﾉ┞く HW ┌ﾐSWヴゲデﾗﾗS デｴ;デ デｴｷゲ ｷゲ SｷaaWヴWﾐデぐ Iデ ｷゲ ｴｷﾐSゲｷｪｴデ デﾗ ゲ;┞ ｷデ HWI;ﾏW ; ﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆぐ TｴW┞ SｷS ﾐﾗデ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣W デヴ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ H┌デ ﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆ ﾏWWデｷﾐｪゲざ, and さIﾐ デｴｷゲ ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ｷデ ┘;ゲ ﾐWWSWS ; ﾉﾗデ ﾗa ﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ ゲﾆｷﾉﾉゲが ﾐﾗデ ﾃ┌ゲデ ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ ゲﾆｷﾉﾉゲざ, as well as さTｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ; ﾐWWS デﾗ デｴｷﾐﾆ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐ ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ ヴｷｪｴデ ｷﾐ デｴW HWｪｷﾐﾐｷﾐｪざく
Interviewees felt that communication with customers had been much better than in other long projects of
which they had experience. Comments included さIデ ┘;ゲ SﾗﾐW ゲﾗﾏWｴﾗ┘ ┘Wﾉﾉが ｴﾗ┘ デｴｷﾐｪゲ ┘WヴW ﾏ;SW IﾉW;ヴ and how it was made sure, that it was easy ぷaﾗヴへぐ ┌ﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲ デﾗ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSざ and さ[the] project group
could present デｴｷﾐｪゲ ゲﾗ デｴ;デ ｷデ ┘;ゲ W;ゲ┞ デﾗ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐS デｴW ｪﾗ;ﾉ ﾗa デｴW ヮヴﾗﾃWIデざく
Another important strength, according to interviewees, was the resources given to the project, meaning
that さwhat the Company ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌IWS ┘;ゲ ;ヮヮヴﾗ┗WSざく Also the project had more time than was considered
usual, and さWｴWﾐ ┞ﾗ┌ ｴ;┗W ﾉﾗデゲ ﾗa ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗WSが ┞ﾗ┌ ﾐWWS ヮWヴゲW┗Wヴ;ﾐIWざく One person felt that
this was because of the network: さOﾐW ┘;┞ ┞ﾗ┌ Iﾗ┌ﾉS ゲ;┞が デｴW ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ｴ;S ﾉﾗデゲ ﾗa ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲ ;ﾐS ﾆﾐﾗ┘-how,
since all the universities wWヴW ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗WSざ, and another commented さE┗Wヴ┞ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ SｷS [its] own part as
well as [it] ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉ┞ Iﾗ┌ﾉSざく It was also considered exceptional that the project stayed within the time limit,
and that Haka has been sustained. Haka was a project in which everybody divided costs: さ[A] key attribute
┘;ゲ デｴ;デ ;ﾉﾉ デｴW ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲ ヮ;ｷS デｴW ﾏWﾏHWヴゲｴｷヮ aWW ;デ ﾗﾐIWが W┗Wﾐ ｷa デｴW┞ SｷS ﾐﾗデ ヮ┌デ H;ﾆ; ｷﾐ ┌ゲW ┞Wデざ and
さUﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲ ┘WヴW Hヴ;┗W デﾗ Wﾐｪ;ｪW ;ﾐS ヮ┌デ ﾏﾗﾐW┞ ｷﾐデﾗ デｴW ヮヴﾗﾃWIデざく
Haka was created first of all because of a clear user need. The idea was to get every university in Finland
into the same user authentication system. The Company realized that by doing so, they could serve more
customers with a smaller number of servers. Interviewees applauded this idea: さTｴW ｷSW; ┘;ゲ ﾗa Iﾗ┌ヴゲW デｴW
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need. Everyone understood, that it was insane, that every service must implement this same kind of part,
┘ｴｷIｴ ｴ;ヮヮWﾐゲ デﾗ HW ┗Wヴ┞が ┗Wヴ┞ ヴｷゲﾆ┞が ;ﾐS ﾗa Iﾗ┌ヴゲW Iヴ┌Iｷ;ﾉ デﾗ S;デ; ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ざ. Others commented that it was
a new さ[w]ay of thinking, that user needs not new username ;ﾐS ヮ;ゲゲ┘ﾗヴS デﾗ W┗Wヴ┞ ゲWヴ┗ｷIWざ and さ[A]
person can use the same username ぐ, that was given by [their] own university, to [access] several
ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲざ. Benefits were seen as さIデ ﾏ;ﾆWゲ ┞ﾗ┌ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW デﾗ ゲｷｪﾐ ｷﾐ ┘ｷデｴ only one user authentication. Way of
thinking, ﾐﾗデ SWヮWﾐSWﾐデ ┘ｴWヴW ┞ﾗ┌ ;ヴWく Iデ ゲｷﾏ┌ﾉデ;ﾐWﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ ｷﾏヮヴﾗ┗Wゲ Hﾗデｴ ┌ゲ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS S;デ; ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ざく Iデ ;ﾉゲﾗ solved (secretly) the need to improve university user control, with comments including さUﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲ SｷS ﾐﾗデ kﾐﾗ┘ ┘ｴﾗ デｴW ┌ゲWヴゲ ;ヴWが デｴW┞ ┘WヴW ﾐﾗデ Iﾉ;ゲゲｷaｷWSが ヮWﾗヮﾉW ﾃ┌ゲデ I;ﾏW ;ﾐS ┘Wﾐデざ, and others remarking on
students becoming staff and issues about W┝Iｴ;ﾐｪW ゲデ┌SWﾐデゲく H;ﾆ; ;ﾉゲﾗ けヮヴWゲゲ┌ヴWSげ ┌ﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲ into
developing their own user management, and because of that, universities now have significantly better
management systems than before Haka. Haka provides an external guarantee of quality of management
systems as さYﾗ┌ I;ﾐ Iﾗ┌ﾐデ デｴ;デ ┞ﾗ┌ヴ ﾗ┘ﾐ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲ ;ヴW Wケ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐ ｪﾗﾗS ﾉW┗Wﾉが ゲｷﾐIW ﾗデｴWヴ┘ｷゲW ┞ﾗ┌ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ﾐﾗデ have [been] ;IIWヮデWS デﾗ ﾃﾗｷﾐ H;ﾆ;ざく
It made no sense to interviewees to build services with over 200,000 users in a way that required every
service to manage its own user identifications and passwords. Comments included さAﾏﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ﾗa ┌ゲWヴゲ ﾃ┌ゲデ exploded in a few ┞W;ヴゲざ, さWｴWﾐ デｴW ;ﾏﾗ┌ﾐデ ﾗa ┌ゲWヴゲ ｪヴﾗ┘ゲが デｴW ﾐWWSゲ ;ヴW ｪヴﾗ┘ｷﾐｪぐ WｴWﾐ ; critical mass
ｷゲ ゲ┌ヴヮ;ゲゲWSぐ ┞ﾗ┌ ﾐWWS デﾗ Sﾗ ; ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWぐ aｷヴゲデ ┞ﾗ┌ ｴ;┗W デWﾐゲ ;ﾐS ヴ;ヮｷSﾉ┞ ｴ┌ﾐSヴWSゲ ﾗa ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ ┞ﾗ┌ ﾐWWS デﾗ connect, and all of them have different access control mechanismゲぐ SｷaaWヴWﾐデ ヮ;ゲゲ┘ﾗヴSゲざ, and さWｴWﾐ IヴｷデｷI;ﾉ ﾏ;ゲゲ ﾗa デｴWゲW ﾐWWSゲが デｴW ﾗﾐWゲ ┘ｴﾗ ﾐWWSゲが ｷゲ ゲ┌ヴヮ;ゲゲWSが デｴWヴW ｷゲ ; ﾐWWS デﾗ ｷﾐ┗Wゲデ デｷﾏW ;ﾐS ﾏﾗﾐW┞ざく
The idea that universities test Haka themselves was seen as brilliant, since the Company would not have
had more than 150 users to carry out tests. Mass testing was an important factor ｷﾐ H;ﾆ;げゲ ゲ┌IIWゲゲ.
4.3. Risks
The biggest challenge for the project was seen as the resistance to change involving big and radical
systems. The whole concept was new, and this was thought to have I;┌ゲWS ゲﾉﾗ┘ﾐWゲゲく さIデ デ;ﾆWゲ Iﾗ┌ヴ;ｪW ;ﾐS forgetting to cast out the original idea, and to do something totally different, that was identified as the real
デｴｷﾐｪざく TｴW solution to the problem was totally new, and ざTｴW HｷｪｪWゲデ Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪW ┘;ゲ to create common
┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪざく One person summed it up as さTｴW ヴｷゲﾆ was that the idea would not spread and universities
;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉ┞デWIｴﾐｷIゲ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ﾐﾗデ ﾗ┘ﾐ ｷデざく
Another risk was seen as resources. The project had only a few people involved. If the amount of services
were to increase, maintenance resources would be a problem. One person commented that さ[t]he biggest
surprise was [the] ;ﾏﾗ┌ﾐデ ﾗa W┝デWヴﾐ;ﾉ ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲざく TｴW ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ;ﾉゲﾗ only had a small budget. In the USA,
universities work together with business partners, but in Finland there are no suitable business partners, so
there was a shortage of money. This caused slowness: ざIﾐ デｴW ゲﾏ;ﾉﾉWゲデ ┌ﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲ デｴWヴW ｷゲ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ﾗﾐW IT manager, who has two guys to work for him デｴW┞ Sﾗ W┗Wヴ┞デｴｷﾐｪくざ Considering how big the project was, it
was seen to have been implemented very ケ┌ｷIﾆﾉ┞が H┌デ さUﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲ ヮヴﾗIWWSWS ;デ ゲﾗ SｷaaWヴWﾐデ ヮ;IWが デｴ;デ ｷデ デﾗﾗﾆ ┞W;ヴゲ デﾗ Iﾗ┗Wヴ デｴW ﾐWデざく
A challenge was to generate excitement among universities about the networkく さH;ﾆ; ┘;ゲ ｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデWS with 50 organizations and the challenge was to make them do the same and to engage to common
ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲざく One person felt that さ[i]t would have been good, if Microsoft and Linux-house would have been
デｴWヴW ;ﾉゲﾗざく There was also discussion of whether students should have been involved in the co-
development and whether Haka should be offered to elementary schools. But as one interviewee said:
ざ┞ﾗ┌ I;ﾐﾐﾗデ ゲﾗﾉ┗W ;ﾉﾉ デｴW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲ ;デ ﾗﾐIWざく TｴW ﾉ;Iﾆ ﾗa engagement of top management of universities, as
9
well as human resources departments or student services departments was probably a mistake, but さ[t]he
I;┌ゲW ┘;ゲ ヮヴﾗH;Hﾉ┞ デｴ;デ H;ﾆ; ┘;ゲ ゲWWﾐ ;ゲ ; ヮヴﾗﾃWIデが ﾐﾗデ ;ゲ ; Wﾐｴ;ﾐIｷﾐｪ ﾗa ;Iデｷﾗﾐざく
Universities are also competitors, which were seen as a potential problem, with one person commenting さIa it would have been one university that started the project, say TKK or HY, it would have been much more
difficult, since universities are also competitors to each other. It seems that tｴWヴW ;ヴW ;ﾉ┘;┞ゲ Iﾉｷケ┌Wゲざく E;Iｴ university has its own big departments, so it is not seen as necessary to co-operate. This meant that it had
to be seen as advantageous to join the project.
In particular, there was initially confrontation and distrust between universities and polytechnics, since
universities thought they were too important to associate with polytechnics: さTｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ゲ┌ゲヮｷIｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS sulking. Universities were bit self-WゲデWWﾏざく There were also differences between universities, which created
issues: ざTｴWヴW ┘WヴW ゲﾏ;ﾉﾉWヴ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲぐ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲ デｴ;デ ｴ;S ケ┌ｷデW SｷaaWヴWﾐデ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ H;Iﾆｪヴﾗ┌ﾐSゲ ;ﾐS with shorter historiesぐぷ┘ｴｷIｴへぐ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲWS デｴW Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWざ, meaning that さ[u]ntil the very end there were
デｷｪｴデ ﾐWｪﾗデｷ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ Iﾗﾐデヴ;Iデ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐゲざく
Data security was a challenge, partly because Haka used different systems from those with which users
were familier. One interviewee commented さIデ ┘;ゲ ┌ゲWS デﾗ H;ゲW デｴW S;デ; ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ﾗﾐ aｷヴW┘;ﾉﾉゲぐ ┞ﾗ┌ Sﾗ ﾐﾗデ ﾉｷﾏｷデ ;IIWゲゲ ┘ｷデｴ aｷヴW┘;ﾉﾉゲが H┌デ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ IWヴデｷaｷI;デWゲざ, and another said さIデ ┘;ゲ ゲI;ヴ┞ デﾗ ﾗaaWヴ ;ヮヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ ┗ｷ; ┘WH ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ aｷヴW┘;ﾉﾉゲぐ “Wﾉﾉｷﾐｪ デｴｷゲ ﾆｷﾐS ﾗa ゲﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ ┘ﾗヴﾉS ┘;ゲ SｷaaｷI┌ﾉデぐ ゲﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐゲ ┘WヴW ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ゲﾗﾉS ﾗ┗Wヴ デｴW ヮヴｷ┗;デW ﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆざく One generalized further and said さ[with the u]ncertainty about data security and
users wanted even less opennessく Tｴｷゲ I;┌ゲWS ; ヴWゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW デﾗ H;ﾆ;ざ, and another noted that there was a
さ[g]eneral risﾆぐ ┘ｴWﾐW┗Wヴ ┞ﾗ┌ Sﾗ Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ デﾗ ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ デｴ;デ ;ヴW IﾗﾐﾐWIデWS デﾗ ;IIWゲゲが ┞ﾗ┌ I;ﾐ ﾗヮWﾐ ┘ｴ;デW┗Wヴ H┞ ;IIｷSWﾐデざく
Interviewees felt that the interpretation of personal data and cover laws had been difficult, and these laws
had driven the Haka project. Sometimes, they noted, the project had to wait for the law to change before it
could proceed. On the other hand this was mentioned as strength too, since it gave project members more
time to consider.
One interviewee noted that universities had generally found it difficult to prepare for Haka, and that their
early preparation had been insufficient: さFｷヴゲデ ヮヴWヮ;ヴｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ commissioning ┘;ゲ デﾗﾗ ﾉｷデデﾉWざく H;ﾆ; ｷゲ only a
transmission technology, but each university had to do a certain amount of preparation. The identification
management system of every joining university had to be mature enough to operate the required systems,
but they were found to be in a much worse state than expected. This work was done by learning and with
institutionsげ own money. The problem was not just the systems; this was a change of the whole process.
Haka influenced the whole system: さFヴﾗﾏ ﾐW┘ ゲデ┌SWﾐデ[s] ﾗヴ ゲデ;aa Iﾗﾏｷﾐｪ ｷﾐぐ [to] porter[s]ぐ W┗Wヴ┞ ﾐW┘ ﾗヴ ﾉW;┗ｷﾐｪ ヮWヴゲﾗﾐぐ デｴW ┘ｴﾗﾉW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ｴ;S デﾗ HW IｴWIﾆWSざく One person summed up the process as さ[The
p]rerequisite[s] from organizations joining Haka were high, and the challenge was to make participants do
デｴW Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ ;ﾐS ヴW;Iｴ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWﾏWﾐデゲざく
The technology and market was totally new, which created its own problems, including さHﾗ┘ デﾗ Iﾉ;ヴｷa┞ first
ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲが ┘ｴWﾐ デｴW デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ｷゲ デﾗデ;ﾉﾉ┞ ﾐW┘いざ In addition, the demanding change happened relatively
quickly, and it was felt that these kinds of leaps in technology do not happen often, causing other issues:
さTWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ デｴWゲW ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲが ┘ｴWヴW Iﾗﾏヮﾗﾐents are located in many places, are extremely difficult to
debug. It is really difficult to find the people who have the knowledge, and reach them about the same
デｷﾏWざく
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The fear was that there would not be a suitable service offering, and some interviewees noted that it was
only a start, which had led to concerns about whether to pay upfront. Comments along these lines
included: さH;ﾆ; ｷゲ ｴｷｪｴﾉ┞ ┘ﾗﾐSWヴa┌ﾉ デｴｷﾐｪが H┌デ ｷデ ｷゲ ﾃ┌ゲデ デｴW HWｪｷﾐﾐｷﾐｪく Nﾗ┘ ｷデ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ デﾗ ヮヴﾗS┌IW ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ デﾗｪWデｴWヴざ, さAデ デｴW HWｪｷﾐﾐｷﾐｪ デｴW ゲWヴ┗ｷIW ﾗaaWヴｷﾐｪ ┘;ゲ W┝デヴWﾏWﾉ┞ aW┘ざ and, さUﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲ thought, that because there were no services, why ぐ ヮ;┞ aﾗヴ H;ﾆ;ざ. However, one person said さTｴW ﾗﾐﾉ┞ デｴｷﾐｪ ﾏｷゲゲWSが ┘;ゲ デﾗ Sﾗ デｴW デｴｷﾐｪ W┗Wﾐ HｷｪｪWヴぐ ｷSW; ﾗa ヮﾗﾉ┞デWIｴﾐｷIげゲ Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ AIデｷ┗W SｷヴWIデﾗヴ┞ざく
B┌デ ｷﾐ デｴW WﾐS さI ゲデｷﾉﾉ I;ﾐﾐﾗデ ゲデﾗヮ ┘ﾗﾐSWヴｷﾐｪが デｴ;デ H┌ﾐIｴ ﾗa ┞ﾗ┌ﾐｪ ┘ｴｷヮヮWヴゲﾐ;ヮヮWヴゲが ┘ｴﾗ ｴ;S ; ヴ;SｷI;ﾉ ｷSW;ぐ ;ﾐS ゲデｷﾉﾉ デｴW┞ ┘WヴW ヴWIWｷ┗WSぐ ;ﾐS デｴW┞ ┘WヴW ﾐﾗデ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa デｴW Iヴﾗ┘Sぐ デｴW┞ ┘WヴW ﾏ┌Iｴ ﾏﾗヴW ﾐW┌デヴ;ﾉ than old farts of the Company ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ｴ;┗W HWWﾐが ゲｷﾐIW デｴW┞ ┘WヴW デﾗデ;ﾉﾉ┞ ﾐW┘ ｪ┌┞ゲざく So even if project
ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ ┘;ゲ ﾏ┌Iｴ ┞ﾗ┌ﾐｪWヴ ;ﾐS けﾗ┌デゲｷSWヴゲげ デﾗ ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ IﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWが デｴW┞ ｴ;S デﾗデ;ﾉ デヴ┌ゲデ ﾗa ｷデく
4.3. Roles
When considering the different roles in a radical innovation process (Table 1), it is possible to distinguish
four different people acting as promoters in the Haka project.
The process promoter was the project manager. At the start of the project, he was working at a university
(TTY), but was hired by the Company as the project manager for the Haka project. He still worked on the
university premises and because of that it was easy for him to meet people who worked there, and to see
けHﾗデｴ ゲｷSWゲ ﾗa デｴW ゲデﾗヴ┞げ ｷﾐ デｴW ﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆく BWI;┌ゲW ﾗa ｴｷゲ ヮ;ゲデが ｴW ┘;ゲ ゲWWﾐ ;ゲ けﾗﾐW ﾗa ┌ゲげ ｷﾐゲデW;S ﾗa けﾗﾐW ﾗa デｴW Cﾗﾏヮ;ﾐ┞げ by university and polytechnic members of the network, and so both parties trusted him.
The power promoter was identified to be a man who had a great impact on the project from behind the
scenes. He took care of thW aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷﾐｪが ;ﾐS さｷデ I;ﾐ HW ゲ;ｷSが デｴ;デ ｴW IﾗﾏHｷﾐWS SｷaaWヴWﾐデ ;Iデﾗヴゲく He was [an]
active person, who made things happen. He drew the big picture and was a member of [the] executive
committee of the Companyざが said one interviewee.
Leadership experience was provided by the project manager of the previous project (that failed to solve
the problem that Haka finally solved). He, together with the project manager of Haka, understood that
things must be done totally differently; that they needed a network to create Haka. He himself said さAﾉﾉ these policies creating a network were [a] デﾗデ;ﾉﾉ┞ ﾐW┘ ﾆｷﾐSざく
The Market-related relationship promoter was identified as an IT manager of one university (TTY). He
established デｴW けHaka IﾗヴW ｪヴﾗ┌ヮげ デｴ;デ IヴW;デWS the Haka project. He described to other university IT
managers how Haka could solve the problems of universities, ;ﾐS HWI;┌ゲW ｴW ┘;ゲ げﾗﾐW ﾗa デｴWﾏげ, he could
けspeak the languageげ for managers. Once the core group started to work full time, he movWS aヴﾗﾏ デｴW げH;ﾆ;
IﾗヴW ｪヴﾗ┌ヮげ デﾗ デｴW H;ﾆ; SｷヴWIデﾗヴゲげ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮく
The Technology-related relationship promoter was the ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴく ざAﾉﾉ デｴW ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲ ｪﾗデ ﾉﾗデゲ ﾗa good contacts in technical aspects from the Companyざが SWゲIヴｷHWS ﾗﾐW ｷﾐデWヴ┗ｷW┘WWく さXくXく ぷデｴW ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴへ ｴ;ヮヮWﾐWS デﾗ HW デｴW aｷヴゲデ ﾗﾐW ｷﾐ Fｷﾐﾉ;ﾐS ヴW;Sｷﾐｪ ;Hﾗ┌デ “ｴｷHHﾗﾉWデｴざ, noted another interviewee.
The expert promoter was also the project manager. さXくXく ぷデｴW ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴへ ﾏ;SW IﾗヴヴWIデ IｴﾗｷIWゲざが described one interviewee. さXくXく ぷデｴW ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ manager] was doing his masterげs thesis about the subject. I
ゲヮﾗﾆW ぐ ┘ｷデｴ ｴｷﾏが ;ﾐS ┌ﾐSWヴゲデﾗﾗS デｴ;デ ┘W ﾏ┌ゲデ ｴ;┗W ｴｷﾏ ｷﾐ デｴW ヮヴﾗﾃWIデが ゲｷﾐIW ｴW ｴ;S ; ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ ;Hﾗ┌デ ｷデざが said the previous project manager.
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As can be seen, three out of the six roles were filled by the project manager. This can be seen as either an
advantage or a disadvantage. On the one hand, there could have been more suitable people for some roles
found in the network, but on the other hand, it meant that the project manager had a strong
understanding throughout the project of what was going on. It is no wonder some interviewees called him
けMヴく H;ﾆ;げく
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5. Discussion
It is fair to say that Haka was seen as a radical innovation. The technique itself was probably not that
radical, but the outsourcing of user authentication was a new approach to a known challenge. In particular,
the idea of getting all the universities and polytechnics to use the same authentication system was a radical
innovation.
Haka was a co-creation process, where customer participation had a key role in the creation of the service.
One key issue was to recognize that Haka is not a けprojectげ ;ゲ ゲ┌Iｴ, but a けtrust networkげく Aゲ the starting
point of the project was a customer need, there was an understanding from the beginning that the project
should fully involve customers, in a co-creation style. Haka took the same length of time to create as much
smaller projects and the efficiency came from co-operation.
According to Gilbert et al (1984) and Quinn (1985), organizations lack patience in terms of converting
investment of time and resources into profits due to the pressures of equity markets, yet radical innovation
can require more than a decade of investment before financial returns are seen. One interviewee
commented that ざIデ Iﾗ┌ﾉS ｴ;┗W ﾐﾗデ ゲ┌IIWWSWS ;ﾐ┞┘ｴWヴW WﾉゲW H┌デ ;デ ┌ﾐｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞く Ia ｷデ [had] been a public
sector project, it would have never succeeded. [In the] private sector there would not have been enough
similar actors. So the ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ┘;ゲ Hﾗヴﾐ ┌ﾐSWヴ ｴ;ヮヮ┞ ゲデ;ヴゲざく Another said さTｴWヴW ﾏ┌ゲデ HW ヮWヴゲW┗Wヴ;ﾐIW to
move a large amount of actors. You could not see the benefit of Haka at first, but in the end it has been
W┝デヴWﾏWﾉ┞ HWﾐWaｷIｷ;ﾉ aﾗヴ デｴW ┌ゲWヴざく
Experience accumulation is described as a critical building block for developing any new dynamic capability
(Zollo and Winter, 2002). In this way, it was a good thing that the law had to be changed, which slowed the
project down, as it allowed user experience to accumulate in the meantime.
A dedicated organization that accumulates common experiences can compensate for the ease of forgetting
that may occur when routines are simple and when there is little structure for managers to grasp (Argote,
1999; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). According to Floyd and Wooldridge (1999) and Kogut and Zander
(1992), large established companies offer the slack and room to learn and experiment with new routines
that start-ups cannot afford. E┗Wﾐ ｷa ┌ﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲ ;ヴW ﾆｷﾐSゲ ﾗa けﾉ;ヴｪW Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴWS Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐｷWゲげが ｷﾐ Haka project:
ざTｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗ IﾉW;ヴ ｪﾗ;ﾉ H┌デ ┘W ｷﾐ┗Wゲデｷｪ;デWS ｷa ｷデ ｪﾗWゲ ;ﾐ┞┘ｴWヴWざ, so the project was driven like a start-up.
According to Tushman and Nadler (1986), since organizational elements often display high levels of
coherence, changing one element of a system can often mean Iｴ;ﾐｪｷﾐｪ ﾗデｴWヴゲく さTｴW ｷSW; ﾗa H;ﾆ; ┘;ゲ デｴ;デ ｷデ ｷゲ ｪﾗｷﾐｪ デﾗ HW ┌ゲWS H┞ ;ﾉﾉ ┌ﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲざ, and the challenge was that the change was demanding and
needed to happen quickly. The challenge was not the technical requirements, but the changes required
from organizations, because さTｴWゲW ﾆｷﾐSゲ ﾗa デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾉW;ヮゲ Sﾗ ﾐﾗデ ｴ;ヮヮWﾐ ﾗaデWﾐざ, and this is typical for
radical innovations.
According to Dougherty (1995) and Leonard-Barton (1992), an identifiable organization is needed to allow
appropriate competencies to develop without being stamped out by reified rules. Interviewees noted that
さUﾐｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞ IﾗﾗヴSｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW ゲデ;ﾐS;ヴSｷ┣WS ｷﾐ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉW┗Wﾉ ┘ｷデｴ the Company ﾗヴ ﾗデｴWヴざ and さthe
Company has guarded that organizations engage the ヴ┌ﾉWゲ ﾗa aWSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐざ, thus allowing the universities to
develop the necessary competencies as if a single organization.
Radical innovation takes firms into high-uncertainty technical and market environments (Lynn et al. 1996;
MW┞Wヴゲ ;ﾐS T┌IﾆWヴが ヱΓΒΓき ;ﾐS OげCﾗﾐﾐﾗヴが ヱΓΓΒぶく In this case, さIﾐ ; ┘;┞ デｴW ヴ;SｷI;ﾉぐidea [was] that all
13
┌ﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉ┞デWIｴﾐｷIゲ ;ヴW ｷﾐ デｴW ゲ;ﾏW ;┌デｴWﾐデｷI;デｷﾗﾐが ﾐﾗデ ゲﾗ ﾏ┌Iｴ ｷﾐ デｴW デWIｴﾐｷケ┌Wざ, thus making
デｴW ｷSW; ゲﾉｷｪｴデﾉ┞ けゲ;aWヴげ aﾗヴ デｴW I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴs to consider and accept.
Radical innovation also IヴW;デWゲ ;ﾐ WﾐデｷヴWﾉ┞ ﾐW┘ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ;ﾐS H┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ ﾗヮヮﾗヴデ┌ﾐｷデｷWゲ ふMﾗヴﾗﾐW ヱΓΓンぶく さH;ﾆ; ｷゲ ┘ﾗﾐSWヴa┌ﾉ デｴｷﾐｪが H┌デ ｷデ ｷゲ ﾃ┌ゲデ デｴW HWｪｷﾐﾐｷﾐｪく Nﾗ┘ ｷデ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ デﾗ ヮヴﾗS┌IW ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ デﾗｪWデｴWヴざ,
noted one interviewee. Haka made it possible to think about services being offered to all universities in
Finland: ざBWaﾗヴW H;ﾆ; デｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗ ┘;┞ [for] universities [to] recognize who users from different
universities are. With Haka you can find out if user is student or something else. If you want to serve
ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ デﾗ ﾏﾗヴW デｴ;ﾐ ﾗﾐW ┌ﾐｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞が デｴｷゲ ｷゲ デｴW ┘;┞ざ, and さB┞ デｴW ┞W;ヴ ヲヰヰヴ ┘W ｴ;S ｷSWﾐデｷaｷWS ; ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ﾗa ンヰヰがヰヰヰ ｷSWﾐデｷaｷWS ┌ゲWヴゲざく
Radical innovation is an arena in which technical and market uncertainties are large (Ansoff, 1957; Booz,
Allen and Hamilton, 1982), and ざ[t]he whole concept of Haka was totally new, both technology and
ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲざく
It can be argued that the inability of firms to manage RI as an internally consistent system due to the lack of
organizational identity explains why RIs are so often introduced by new entrants, who have developed
appropriate processes that incumbents cannot adopt in mainstream organizations (Utterback, 1994). In
order for Haka to happen, there was a need for a new actor (the Company) and a new employee (the
project manager) both of whom could think differently.
Some argue that the organizational entity responsible for RI must be physically and culturally separated
from the mainstream organization that is pressured to deliver immediate results with great efficiency
(Benner and Tushman, 2003; Campbell et al., 2003; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Kanter, 1985). The Haka
project manager had been on the university payroll for a long time. He was therefore not seen as part of
the Companyが H┌デ けゲWヮ;ヴ;デWSげ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ヴWゲデ ﾗa デｴW ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ, which may have been crucial to acceptance
of the project by both universities and the Company.
Individual radical innovation projects may succeed or fail for any number of reasons, but factors often cited
for success in coping with internal けorganizational antibodiesげ include strong senior-level patrons and highly
motivated, persistent champions (Howell and Higgins, 1990; Madique, 1980; Pinchot, 1985). In this case,
the power expert had connections in the hierarchy and the project manager was considered to have made
the right choices and had the persistence to drive the project through to conclusion.
The diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers 1962, 1983, 1995) seeks to explain how innovations are taken
up in a population. In this theory, diffusion of innovations is seen to proceed through groups of customers
with different characteristics. To successfully bring an innovation to market, a company should identify
these different customer segments and match the marketing of its innovation in each stage of the
ｷﾐﾐﾗ┗;デｷﾗﾐげゲ ﾏ;デ┌ヴｷデ┞ デﾗ デhe fitting customer group. The first segment of the diffusion of innovations curve,
デｴW さｷﾐﾐﾗ┗;デﾗヴゲざが ｷゲ Iヴ┌Iｷ;ﾉ HWI;┌ゲW the innovators validate the functionality of the innovation, and also the
basic existence of the markets for a new technological innovation (Agarwal & Bayus, 2002).
According to one interviewee the result was only possible because the co-creator was the universities (who
;ヴW ゲWWﾐ ;ゲ けｷﾐﾐﾗ┗;デﾗヴゲげぶく AIIﾗヴSｷﾐｪ デﾗ デｴW Sｷaa┌ゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｷﾐﾐﾗ┗;デｷﾗﾐゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞が けｷﾐﾐﾗ┗;デﾗヴゲげ ;ヴW willing to take
risks; they have high risk tolerance, so will adopt technologies which may ultimately fail but they are willing
to do so because they have the financial resources to help absorb these failures. Besides technological
sophistication and knowledge, innovators differ from the majority in their price sensitivity, which is much
14
lower than in other segments. Iﾐﾐﾗ┗;デﾗヴゲげ ability to understand technological foundations, to tolerate
unreliable products, and prefer functionality over easiness of usage, is much higher than for the later
customer segments in adoption dynamics. Finally, the theory states that marketing communications,
product designs and advertising messages, among others, should be different for the innovator segment
when compared to mass markets later in the innovation adoption.
Iデ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW ｷﾐデWヴWゲデｷﾐｪ デﾗ ﾉﾗﾗﾆ ;デ ┌ﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲ ;ゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa デｴW けｷﾐﾐﾗ┗;デﾗヴゲ ゲWｪﾏWﾐデげが ;ﾐS デﾗ ﾉﾗﾗﾆ ;デ ﾗデｴWヴ successful radical innovations, and see if radical innovations are only or mostly successful, when the
けｷﾐﾐﾗ┗;デﾗヴ ゲWｪﾏWﾐデげ ｷゲ デhe first segment.
15
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