I LEGISLATIVE LIBRARY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
~33298003105476
THIS DOCUMENT IS CLASSIFIED AS “PROTECTED A”
AND MUST NOT BE PHOTOCOPIED t”~ (:~
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FINAL REPORT
CO-ORDINATEI) LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT (CLEU)
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AUGUST 9, 1993
DOCBCZR1992P6
R4 31993c.2
— LEGESLATIVE LI~RARY\VICTORIA, BC VSV IX4~
4025 White Rock StreetVictoria, B.C. V8N 4M4
August 9, 1993
The Honourable Mr. Justice Wallace T. OppalCommissionerPolicing in British Columbia InquiryRoom 155 (Plaza Level)800 Hornby StreetVancouver, B.C. V6Z 2C5
Dear Mr. Justice Oppal,
Re: Contract No. 93-005-NLCo-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit
In accordance with the terms of our contract, I respectfully submit my final report of myreview of the Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit, which is due on August 9, 1993.
The information on which the report is based has been obtained from a number ofdocuments provided to me by the Director, CLEU Policy Analysis Division, all of which areclassified at the level of “Protected A”; and a number of interviews I have conducted with selectedmembers of the CLEU Policy Board, past and present; Joint Management Teams of Vancouverand Vancouver Island Joint Forces Operations; Joint Force Operations Commanders; UnitCommanders; Field Investigators and selected members of the Policy Analysis Division, includingthe Director.
I also visited the Commanding Officer and staff of “D” Division, RCMP in Manitoba; theChief of Police and staff of the Winnipeg Police Department; the Commanding Officer, “0”Division, RCMP and staff; London, Ontario; the Commissioner,. Ontario Provincial Police; theChief, Metropolitan Toronto Police and his senior stafl and the Chief and staff of the PeelRegional Police Force, Brampton, Ontario.
I have received friendly and useful co-operation from all I have interviewed. In Manitobaand Ontario, CLEU’s reputation as a trail blazer in the fight against organized crime preceded me.
As I mentioned in my covering letter of the Interim Report, I would still like yourauthority to discuss this report with the CLEU Policy Board. I also ask again that the confidentialnature of this report be protected from public disclosure. I would like an opportunity to discusswith you the manner in which you plan to report on CLEU, given the sensitive nature of itsactivities.
Yours sincerelyO~!~NAL SIGNED ~.Y
R. R. BOUR)~
Robert P. (Robin) BourneTelephone: 721-4395
Attach.
FiNAL REPORT
A REVIEW OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIACO-ORDINATEI) LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT
PART ONE
ORGANIZATION, ROLE AND RESPONSIBUJTIES
The Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit in the Ministry of Attorney General was established in
1974 in response to a rapid rise in criminal activity in British Columbia in the late 1960s and early
1970s. The creation of this unit was one of a number of reforms brought about by the Provincial
Government to improve the administration ofjustice.
At the time, in 1974, there was not a consistent standard of police training, police equipment and
operational policies among municipal police forces in British Columbia Standards in the
administration of courts vaned widely There was no Provincial prosecution service
Prosecutions were carried out by over two hundred ad hoc counsel appointed for individual cases
In remote communities, RCMP officers prosecuted their own ca~es in magistrate’s courts. The
problem of increased crime was compounded by the fact that there was no common information
base with which various agencies of the criminal justice system could measure their effectiveness
in dealing with nsmg criminality It became clear to the Government that major changes to the
administration ofjustice had to be made.
These major changes included the take-over by the Province of the forty-four courts which were
administered by the municipalities and the establishment of one uniform but regionalized court
service; the formation of a Provincial crown counsel system and the assumption by the Province
-2-
of the responsibility for prosecuting all offences, except those in Federal Government jurisdiction;
the establishment of a Police Commission to be responsible for standards of police service
delivery, research, recruitment, training and the adjudication of disciplinary matters; and the
establishment of a British Columbia Police Academy.
A Provincial Sheriffs Service was formed in order to free police officers from excessive
administrative responsibilities, such as the service of criminal documents, court administration and
security and the escort of prisoners. The large numbers of police officers which then became
available for operational police work provided the manpower which made the creation of a Co
ordinated Law Enforcement Unit (CLEU) Joint Force Operation possible. The concept of joint
force operations was not new. It had been tried in Ontario and in British Columbia, on an ad hoc
basis, when additional police manpower and equipment were required to target criminal activities
which crossed police jurisdictional boundaries. The idea of a permanent Joint Force Operation
(JFO) structure, however, was somewhat novel at the time.
In its original structure, CLEU consisted of three divisions, the investigative division (IFOs), the
legal division, and a policy analysis division The investigative division comprised a permanent
JFO structure, involving RCMP and mumcipal police officers, and was managed by a Joint RCMP
- Vancouver Police command system. The policy analysis division comprised non-police research
officers under the direction of a senior public servant. The legal division, conceptually, was to
comprise crown prosecutors assigned permanently to CLEU who were expected to be closely
involved in JFO investigations and who would prosecute CLEU cases in court. The whole
structure was designed to be directed by, and accountable to a CLEU Policy Board, chaired by
the Deputy Attorney General. Members of the Board were the Commanding Officer, “E”
Division, RCMP, the Chief Constable, City of Vancouver, the Director, Policy Analysis Division,
and, at the insistence of the Attorney General of the day, three influential private citizens.
-3-
The total CLEU effort was directed at major crimes committed by “Organized Crime”. It was
inten~ded by the Attorney General and his Deputy that the CLEU Policy Board, which brought
together senior police officers, public servants and private citizens, would collectively be able to
select criminal targets for investigation by the iFOs and prosecution by the legal division. The
policy analysis division was to explore strategies, particularly regulatory measures, for dealing
with organized crime and to research issues which were of concern to the Policy Board.
The concept was bold and imaginative but immediately ran into difficulties. The establishment of
the legal division was criticized by both the police and the legal establishment. It was felt that the
idea of prosecuting attorneys working closely with the police, and being involved with
investigations, was contrary to the important principle that the police fimction and the
prosecutorial ffinction should be separate. It was not long before the concept of having a
dedicated legal division was abandoned.
The police expressed concern that they did not have sufficient control over the targeting decisions
which were made by the Policy Board. This concern was overcome by including, as members of
the Policy Board, the senior operations officers from the RCMP Division and Vancouver Police
Department. As time went on, however, the police became increasingly uneasy with the fact that
there were private citizens on the Policy Board. There was a reluctance to share sensitive criminal
inteffigence with those who were not sworn police officers. The police view prevailed and again it
was not long before the private citizens were dropped from the Policy Board.
The obvious location for the CLEU JFOs was the lower mainland and they were established there
in 1974. In 1975, however, since criminal activity on Vancouver Island was often linked with the
mainland, it was decided to form an investigative JFO in Victoria, utilizing personnel from the
RCMP detachments of the Victoria Sub-Division and the five municipal police departments. An
additional Vancouver Island joint management team was also established.
-4-
In the early planning for CLEU, it was decided that an effective way to ensure the best possible
co-operation among police of various jurisdictions and, particularly, between the police and the
Policy Analysis Division, was to give to the Director, Policy Analysis Division, control of the
Provincial share of the budget. The Province’s share of the funding for CLEU was substantial and
initial police resistance to the concept of CLEU was largely overcome by the generosity of the
Province in providing ftinds for operations, specialized equipment and accommodation.
Today, nineteen years later, CLEU continues in basically the same configuration. There continues
to be a Policy Analysis Division and Joint Force Operations in Vancouver and on Vancouver
Island. The CLEU Policy Board remains virtually unchanged except for the addition of the senior
lawyer from the Federal Department of Justice Vancouver Office and the Assistant Deputy
Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Justice Branch (Provincial Prosecutors). From 1981
until this year, the Assistant Deputy Minister, Police Services Branch, also sat on the CLEU
Policy Board. In fact, during those years, CLEU was a part of the Police Services Branch.
Recent re-organization of the Ministry of Attorney General now has the Director, CLEU Policy
Analysis, reporting directly to the Deputy Attorney General.
The nature of organized crime has changed over the years. CLEU’s annual reports to Policy
Board indicate that most major criminal activity has its roots in the importation, manufacture and
distribution of prohibited drugs, particularly cocaine, heroin and marijuana. The increase in the
Asian population of the Province has manifested itself in the proliferation of criminal gangs,
whose activities, including drug trafficking, extortion, assaults and murder, have necessitated the
creation of.a South East Asia Crime Unit in CLEU IFO. There is ongoing concern, also, about
the criminal activities of the Hell’s Angels motorcycle gang and evidence that the traditional
Italian-based organized crime of the sixties and seventies is re-emerging in Vancouver.
-5-
The evidence, found in nineteen years of annual reports to the CLEU Policy Board, indicates
convincingly that the CLEU experiment has been a success. Approximately 2000 criminals have
been arrested and charged by CLEU iFOs since 1974.
-6-
CHART 1
ORGANIZATION ANT) STRUCTURE OF CLEU
Vancouver PD/RCMPWest Vancouver PD Saanich PD/RCMPDelta PD Victoria PD, Oak Bay PD,New Westminster PD Esquimalt PD
VancouverJFO ./ rlnsp ,,~ ~ . ~ I Vancouver Island JFOVancouver PD/RCMP L~°”°~ Analysis Division j lnsp I/C
____________________ ____________________ Saanich PD
Legend:
Operational Reporting
Financial Reporting
- Administrative, clerical, analytical, technical andsystems support
-7-
CHART 2
CLEU POLICY BOARD
ProvincialRepresentatives
FederalRepresentatives
MunicipalRepresentatives
- Deputy Attorney General, Chair- Director, CLEU Policy Analysis, Secretary- Assistant Deputy Attorney General,
Criminal Justice Branch
Regional General Counsel,Federal Department of Justice
- Commanding Officer, “F’ Division,Ràyal Canadian Mounted Police
- Officer-in-Chargé, Criminal Operations“E” Division, Royal Canadian Mounted Pohce
- Chief Constable, Vancouver Police Department- Deputy Chief Constable (Operations)
Vancouver Police Department- Chief Constable, Saanich Police Department *
* Alternates with Chief Constable, Victoria Police Department
CHART 3
CLEU POLICY BOARD - TERMS OF REFERENCE
1. Establishes goals and priorities for the organization, including the selection ofgeneral groups and assigns priority to proposed research, intelligence,enforcement, communications, public education and/or training initiatives
2. Receives regular reports from the Joint Management Teams and the Director,CLEU PA on progress made in achieving established goals.
3 Reviews and assesses the results of completed PA projects and associatedproposals for follow-up action and either approves or recommends to theAttorney General how to proceed in each case
4 Reviews and discusses key police and law enforcement issues which mightonly be indirectly relevant to CLEU, but of major concern to the AttorneyGeneral, or particular Board members.
-9-
CHART 4
MISSION STATEMENTS
CO-ORDINATED LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT (CLEU)
The mission of CLEU is to develop and co-ordinate efforts to identifS’,prevent and suppress organized and major criminal activities inBritish Columbia.
JOINT FORCES OPERATION
The mission of the Joint Forces Operation is to suppress the power andinfluence of organized and major crime in British Columbia and bring allthose involved in organized criminal activity before the courts.
POLICY ANALYSIS DIVISION
To. strengthen legislative, regulatory and criminal law enforcement actionthrough the acquisition, dissemination and use of knowledge aboutorganized and major crime.
- 10 -
PART TWO
LEGAL AND FINA_NCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
There are two principle concerns about any organization such as CLEU whose activities are not in
public view. These are,
(1) Are the activities legal?
(2) Is public money being properly spent?
In other words, what provisions have been made to ensure that the organization is accountable for
its activities and its expenditures?
The files indicate that this question has been raised periodically about CLEU as management
information systems improve and senior managers in the Ministry ofAttorney General change.
Operational Control
The key to legal or operational accountability of CLEU is the CLEU Policy Board (see Charts 2
& 3). The investigative priorities are set by the Policy Board and the entire CLEU operation is
accountable through the Deputy Attorney General to the Board. Operationally, the Joint Forces’
investigations do not take place until Joint Management Teams (see Chart 1) have reviewed and
approved detailed operational plans which describe the objectives of the investigation, the
techniques to be used, the personnel and technical resources required and the projected costs and
time table. Each project is reviewed monthly, or more often if necessary, to assess progress and
conformity with the initial plans and to approve any changes recommended. Detailed annual
—11— -
reports are made by the Joint Management Team to the Policy Board, through the Deputy
Attorney General.
When Policy Analysis Division staff are seconded to JFO teams for specific projects to provide
analytical support, the terms of reference, work plans and time frames for the secondment are
developed jointly by the JFO team and the Policy Analysis section affected and sent forward for
review and approval by the JFO Inspector and the Director of Policy Analysis. In addition, these
secondment agreements provide another means of periodic review and project assessment when
the project is terminated.
Research and analysis projects by the Policy Analysis Division alone are only done at the direction
of the Board. The Board may approve a research initiative proposed by Policy Analysis or it may
initiate a project itself: Progress of major projects is monitored by the Policy Board and decisions
are made on completed projects.
The CLEU Policy Board, a multi-jurisdictional organization, is fully in the picture at afl times.
It is also noted that recent efforts have been made to making more of CLEIYs work accessible to
the public, and particularly to other Government Ministries. This has involved the preparation of
special reports and sanitized versions of classified reports, making video presentations and giving
briefings to interested parties. The object is to make ministers, senior officials and selected
members of the public more aware of the threat of organized crime in British Columbia and the
contribution CLEU is making to its control. A good example of this initiative is the work of
Vancouver JFO in making presentations about South East Asian criminal activities. Some forty-
eight presentations were made last year to such diverse groups as: the Chinese Commerce
Association; Criminology classes at Simon Fraser University; Wholesale Warehouse Alliance; Fire
Underwriters Insurance Bureau; and Greater Vancouver High School administrators and staff
- 12 -
With respect to collecting evidence for criminal prosecutions, the CLEU JFOs are accountable
and subject to the normal safeguards of the court process as are any police forces ofjurisdiction.
Financial Control
With the exception of two matters, CLEU is a full participant in the Ministry of Attorney General
financial and administrative systems. The exceptions are that CLEU vehicles, being of special
purpose, are not purchased by or managed by the Motor Vehicle Management Branch. By
agreement, CLEU has authority to purchase 2’ Class police vehicles and manage its own vehicle
fleet. Secondly, details of some police expenditures are scrutinized internally using a process
approved by government auditors. All other systems are subject to usual controls.
Financing of the CLEU operation is shared among Federal, Provincial and Municipal
Governments. The Municipal Governments which take care of salaries for municipal police
officers assigned to CLEU and the municipal share of RCMP officer salaries, benefits and
overtime costs, pay about 24 percent of the cost The Federal Government which looks after the
Federal share of RCMP officers’ salaries, benefits and overtime and a 50 percent share of certain
operational costs and costs of some accommodation, pays about 14 percent of the cost. The
Provincial Government looks after the rest which amounts to 62 percent of the total cost (see
Chart 5).
The very fact that there are three levels of Government involved in the financing of CLEU is, in
itself; a safeguard for financial accountability. In view of the uniqueness of the organization, it is
unlikely that a better system for accountability could be devised.
- 13 -
CHART 5
Note. For the fiscal year 1993-94, CLEU was required to reduce its budget by over $600,000.
A major part of this reduction is accounted for by the reduction ofPolicy Analysis staff,
and reduced expenditures on building improvements, vehicles, computers and police
FUNDING OF CLEU AND ASSOCIATED INTELLIGENCE UNITS
1992-1993
PROVINCIALGOVERNMENT
$6,810,57661.85%
MUNICIPALGOVERNMENT
$2,681,44524.35%
FEDERALGOVERNMENT
Includes salaries, municipalpolice overtime, facilities inVancouver and Victoria,equipment, communications,surveillance, vehicles andcomputing, and share ofoperational costs.
$1,519,96213.80%
Includes municipal policesalaries and benefits andmunicipal share ofRCMPsalaries, benefits andovertime.
Includes federal share ofRCMP salaries, benefitsand overtime and share ofoperational costs.
Facilities, telephone,computer system support forinteffigence units.
Salaries and operational costsfor inteffigence units.
Specialized equipment.
Salaries, operational costsand rent for intelligenceunits.
overtime.
- 14 -
. PART THREE
CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND EFFECTWENESS ISSUES
Current Activities
Information obtained from Annual Reports of CLEU Policy Analysis, Vancouver and Vancouver
Island Joint Forces Operations and, particularly, from interviews with senior management of the
RCMP and Municipal Police Departments, JFO Jomt Management Teams and supervisors and
detectives of JFO units, indicate that CLEU is a successful and important element of the law
enforcement effort in British Columbia.
Vancouver Island JFO
In the past year Vancouver Island JFO successfully completed a major project targeted against the
receivers of stolen property in the southern part of Vancouver Island. Participating in the
undercover operation were the Victoria, Saanich, Oak Bay and Esquimalt Municipal Police
Departments, all major RCMP’ Detachments on Vancouver Island and at Powell River.
The operation lasted for seven months and resulted in the recovery of approximately $160,000 of
stolen property and the laying of 140 charges against 30 suspects.
This co-ordinated operation is but one example of how CLEU JFO assists the police community
on Vancouver Island.
- 15 -
Vancouver JFOs
On the mainland, Vancouver JFO is fully tasked with projects dealing with organized criminal
activities, massive credit card fraud and violent crimes of murder, assault, extortion and robbery.
One successful recent project was aimed at reducing the enormous loss due to theft of
automobiles. The Auto Theft Project resulted in the recovery of over $800,000 worth of stolen
vehicles and the recommendation to Crown Counsel that 49 charges be laid against 14 individuals.
This project involved the co-operation and assistance of ICBC, the RCMP, Vancouver Police,
and the Policy Analysis Division of CLEU. ICBC has now formed an on-going Task Force with
local law enforcement agencies to control better the sale and registration of salvage vehicles in the
auto-theft business.
Another successful Vancouver JFO project resulted in the conviction of a key union leader for
fraud related to the disappearance of approximately $500,0b0 in Union Funds.
It is important to note that, in addition to its own JFO projects, the CLEU IFOs have provided
assistance, directly, in investigations carried out by a number of units and agencies. These
include: RCMP Specialized Units; Municipal Police Departments; Federal Government
Departments; Provincial Government Ministries; US Federal and State Agencies; Canadian Armed
Forces; and the Royal Hong Kong Police.
During the past year Canada Immigration, Canada Customs and Revenue Canada (Taxation) have
assigned members, permanently, to CLEU JFO Vancouver. US Immigration and US Customs
have also assigned agents to work directly with CLEU JFO.
- 16-
Policy Analysis Division
The civilian component of CLEU, the Policy Analysis Division, continues to provide essential
information to the Government and support to JFO projects. The Director of CLEU Policy
Analysis has always been a civil servant and is not a police officer. He is responsible for financial
controls and for ensuring that the whole CLEU operation functions within the budget. Although
the police community do not like to share criminal intelligence with those who are not sworn
police officers, over the years, by utilizing stringent security clearance procedures and by proving
themselves useful to the JFOs, analysts from the Policy Analysis Division have become accepted.
as members of the CLEU team.
It was intended from the outset that the Policy Analysis Division be the “cutting edge”, the
innovator in the attack on organized crime, particularly in the use of regulatory strategies to
reduce the effectiveness of organized criminal activities. Although the use of regulatory
measures, such as convictions for tax evasion as an alternative to Criminal Code convictions, has
not yet reached its fill potential, the Policy Analysis Division has had some notable successes.
In the early days of CLEU, it was the Policy Analysis Division which persuaded the police to take
action against the criminal activities of the Vancouver “Mafia”, the traditional Italian organized
crime groups. Iii co-operation with the Alcohol and Drug Commission, Policy Analysis Division
established the Federal Drug Strategy Committee and developed the concept which led to the BC
Heroin Treatment Act. A trial tracking project, which followed those who committed drug
offences through the various stages of the Justice System, and illustrated the deficiencies of the
process, led to an awareness of the hard core of drug offenders in British Columbia and the
creation of a successful career criminal project. A study of the criminality of certain immigrants
and refugees, who were entering BC, contributed to amendments to the Federal Immigration Act.
At EXPO 86, a joint project with the Ministry of Finance to prevent “skimming” at cash
- 17 -
repositories saved both the BC Government and the Federal Government hundreds of thousands
of dollars in tax revenue. A study by the Drug Strategies Section of cocaine use in British
Columbia illustrated for the first time where in the Province the heaviest illicit drug use was taking
place. An early report on h*YacuzaH, the Japanese organized crime conspiracy is now being dusted
off and re-read in the light of recent Yacuza activities in BC. Excellent work is being done by
Policy Analysis on detecting bid rigging, a conspiracy on the part of certain government
contractors to keep tenders for work at an abnormally high level.
One of the most successful of the Policy Analysis Division’s on-gomg activities is the Open
Source Data Bank, operated by the Open Sources Section. In the fiscal year ending in March,
1992, there were 1,137 requests for information from law enforcement agencies all over North
America and in other parts of the world.
Policy Analysis Division’s Computer Services Section is equipped with the most modern
equipment and has the responsibility for training all members of iFOs and Policy Analysis in the
effective use of computers for crime analysis. A new software program called Special
Investigative Unit Support System (S~LTSS) recently introduced at CLEU, has the potential to
revolutionize the analysis of evidence for crime solving.
Finally, CLEU is a warehouse of sophisticated police and communications equipment for loan to
domestic and foreign police and other law enforcement bodies. In the year 1992-93, 1,115 items
of specialized equipment were loaned for 17,829 days of use.
Effectiveness Issues
After reading Annual Reports and interviewing many members of CLEU at all levels of seniority,
one is ready to conclude that the CLEU initiative has been successful. Certainly, CLEU is
- 18 -
regarded by a number of Canadian and US law enforcement bodies as the leader in the attack on
organized crime and a model of police-civilian co-ordination and co-operation. Many of those
interviewed, however, have raised issues which affect the smooth. and efficient running of CLEU
and the morale and effectiveness of its members.
These issues are:
(1) Lack of support from the Courts•(2) The dual management structure of CLEU JFOs(3) Lack of priority in staffing CLEU JFOs(4) Level in the criminal hierarchy of targets assigned to CLEU(5) Productivity of Criminal Intelligence organizations associated with CLEU
Lack of Support from the Courts
Organized crime is a criminal conspiracy. Yet it is becoming virtually impossible for the police to
take conspiracy charges through the courts. A number of court decisions, based on the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, have seriously curtailed the use of electronic eavesdropping for obtaining
criminal intelligence. Of particular significance are: Regina V. Duane (January 1990); Regina V.
Wong (1990); Regina V. Gsrofoli (November 1990); Regina V. Wise (February 1992).
Information used to obtain an authorization under Part VI, CC, is often produced by informants.
Yet new disclosure rules make it very difficult to protect the identity of informants (Regina V.
Stinchcombe). Even to obtain a search warrant, police claim they no longer need provide
“reasonable and probable grounds”. They are expected to produce “proof positive”. It is the
opinion of members of CLEU that these developments have reduced CLEtJs effectiveness in
controlling organized crime.
- 19 -
The DuaI-Mana2ement Structure of CLEU JFOs
When CLEU was first established, the principle components of the Joint Forces Operation were
members of RCMP “E” Division and the Vancouver Police Department. Sensitive to the rivahy
between these two forces and being aware that both operated under the guidance of different
policies and procedures, the creators set up a dual system of management and command (see
Chart 6). There were two Officers-in-Charge, Vancouver JFO, one RCMP Inspector and one
Inspector from the Vancouver Police Department. Each operational unit was commanded by one
RCMP Staff-Sergeant and one Vancouver Police Staff-Sergeant. The integrated inteffigence unit
was commanded by one RCMP Inspector and one Inspector from the Vancouver Police
Department.
Some have argued that the dual management system is not efficient. It is a form of “rule by
committee11 and decisions take a long time to make. Often it is difficult to know who is in charge
and the antipathy between the RCMP and Vancouver Police is exacerbated by having the two
organizations constantly on display. All agree that whether the system works at all depends
almost entirely on the compatibility of the personalities of those in charge. If the senior members
of the RCMP and the Vancouver Police do not get along then the effectiveness of the unit is in
serious jeopardy.
- 20 -
CHART 6
VANCOUVER JFO SKELETON ORGAMZATION
JOrNT MANAGEMENT TEAM
JFO OFFICERS JJC
Inspector, RCMPInspector, Van PD
UNIT
Commanders:
S/Sgt, RCMPS/Sgt, Van PD
Field Supervisors
Sgt, RCMPSr Det, Van PD
Investigators
4xRCMP4xVanPD
- 21 -
Others disagree. They have argued that, short of designing operational rules and procedures
specific to CLEU JFO, the dual system does work and to a certain extent provides operational
advantages. A method of operating, designed specifically for CLEU, is not considered a practical
proposition as long as those assigned to CLEU JFO are drawn from the RCMP and Municipal
Police Forces, all of whom have been trained in their parent force procedures. The advantages of
the dual system are seen in the choice available to the unit commanders as to whether to adopt
RCMP rules or Vancouver Police rules fOr any particular operation. There is also benefit to be
derived from compromise solutions since all involved parties have some claim to the result.
An alternative to the dual management system for Vancouver IFO is found in the single
management organization of the Vancouver Island JFO. On Vancouver Island, the JFO is
commanded by a municipal police inspector. He has an RCMP Sergeant as Operations NCO and
a municipal police Sergeant as Administration NCO. The system works for Vancouver Island.
How well it works depends almost entirely on the competence and the personality of the
municipal police inspector who is assigned to the JFO.
In Vancouver, a single management system, with the Officer-in-Charge alternating between the
RCMP and the Vancouver Police every three or four years, was suggested as a possibility. It was
not looked upon with favour. The general opinion seems to be, “if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it.”
A related issue, which is consistently raised by certain senior police officials, is the fact that the
Director of CLEU Policy Analysis is a civilian and not a police officer. In the view of some police
officers, this leaves the organization vulnerable to possible use of sensitivepolice information for
political purposes. The line of thought is that since the Director is not a sworn police officer and
owes his job to the Government of the day, the Director might pass on information to the
Attorney General, which could then be used in an inappropriate manner. These police officers
would prefer to appoint a senior police officer to the position of Director of Policy Analysis..
- 22 -
Some have even suggested that a police superintendent direct the entire CLEU operation,
including the associated criminai intelligence organizations.
There are several arguments against this proposal, some of which were put forward by police
officers themselves. It should perhaps be made clear at the outset that, in its nineteen years of
existence, there is no information on record which would indicate that inteffigence obtained by
CLEU Policy Analysis has ever been used for political purposes. An Attorney General who
allowed this to happen would put his political career at serious risk.
More telling, however, is the argument that it is of great advantage to CLEU as a whole that the
Director of Policy Analysis be a senior public servant who is known by senior Government
officials and is completely familiar with the workings of Government. One of his important
functions is to ensure that full support fOr the attack on organized crime is forthcoming and that
appropriate resources are allocated to this task. To place the operation totally in police hands
might limit the breadth of Government support and narrow the focus of activity to the point that a
broad, strategic approach to the control of organized crime is jeopardized.
Lack of Priority in Staffln~ of CLEU IFOs
Staffing of CLEU JFOs has not always been given a high priority. It was readily acknowledged
that, over the years, there have been times when CLEU was used by both the RCMP and
Vancouver City as a repository for police officers who were nearing the end of their careers, or
who had lost the incentive to excel, or who were difficult to handle. On the other hand, some of
the best detectives in the Province have done assignments at CLEU. In view of the emerging
crime situation, it was recently agreed by senior management that every effort should be made to
staff CLEU IFO. with the best detectives available. Recent changes in RCMP rank structure in
Vancouver JFOs have made it simpler to assign younger and more ambitious investigators; and
-23-
the introduction of the ten hour shift system to CLEU JFO has made an assignment to CLEU
more attractive to municipal police officers; A recent increase in applications, from police officers
wanting to be assigned to CLEU, is encouraging and is indicative of a recent enhancement of
CLEU1s reputation as a prestigious place to work.
Level in the Criminal Hierarchy of Targets assi2ned to CLEU
Of major concern is whether CLEU JFOs are assigned targets at a high enough level in the
criminal hierarchy. Conceptually, CLEU is a specialized unit, well equipped and reasonably well
financed, designed to control organized crime. Street level crimes should be the business of
police forces of jurisdiction. CLEU should be free to target those, behind the scenes, who are
controlling the street level criminals.
Experienced detectives have explained that continuous contact with street level criminals is
essential to develop the necessary criminal inteffigence for investigating higher levels of
criminality. It has already been mentioüed, however, that the increased difficulty in obtaining
authorizations for electronic eavesdropping makes it almost impossible to target high level
criminals. The use of informants and keeping them from harm has also been jeopardized by recent
court decisions.
This issue is one which the CLEU Policy Board must address on a continuing basis.
Productivity of Intelligence Organizations Associated with CLEU
In theory, criminal intelligence organizations identifSr criminal activities, which are then worked up
into an operation or project by the JFO for the approval of the Joint Management Team.
- 24 -
At present there are three criminal intelligence organizations associated with CLEU iFOs plus an
additional intelligence network managed exclusively by the RCMP.
Under the direction of the Commanding Officer, “E” Division, RCMP, and the Chief Constable,
Vancouver Police Department, a major review of the criminal intelligence function is currently
underway. The object is to fine tune the provincial organizations and improve the inteffigence
product.
Since the review is ongoing and the subject has high sensitivity, no further comment will be made.
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PART FOUR
JOThJT FORCE OPERATIONS iN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
There are two basic differences between CLEU and the Joint Force Operations in other Provinces
in Canada. The first is the extent to which the Government of British Columbia provides funds
for the CLEU operation compared with provincial funding in other jurisdictions. The second is
the fact that CLEU has within its structure a large component of civilian research officers. Other
police forces employ civilian personnel in their intelligence units but they are part of the police
structure and under police command.
CLEU is a permanent Joint Forces Operation. Although there are permanent IFOs in most
provinces, partiäularly in Ontario, there are also large numbers of ad hoc or “case specific” JFOs.
The principle advantages of case specific JFOs are that there is a clear target; a definite time frame
- a beginning and an end; a specific allocation of funds, personnel and equipment; and in most
cases a clear result. Many senior police managers in Ontario seem to prefer the case specific IFO
to the permanent JFO because its targets are current and appropriate and its results are more
easily measurable.
In Manitoba, the RCMP and the Winnipeg Police established a permanent JFO two years ago
which was targeted against the illegal drug trade. Recent budget reductions by the City of
Winnipeg, however, have caused the Winnipeg Police Department to withdraw its members from
the permanent JFO. At present, only case specific JFOs are used in Manitoba. These consist of
RCMP and Winnipeg City police officers and often include members of Canada Customs. These
JFOs are established by comprehensive written memoranda of understanding among all parties to
the JFO.
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Funding for these iFOs is shared equally among police forces, with the exception of costs of
accommodation which in most cases is paid by the RCMP. There is no funding provided by the
Province ofManitoba for IFOs, on an ongoing basis.
In Ontario, there are five permanent JFOs and a number of case specific IFOs. The permanent
iFOs are targeted against organized crime; Asian crime; outlaw motorcycle gangs; municipal
corruption and major commercial crime. There are also integrated intelligence JFOs, and a JFO at
the Pearson International Airport. These permanent JFOs comprise members of the RCMP,
Ontario Provincial Police, Metropolitan Toronto Police and other Municipal and/or Regional
Police Forces as appropriate.
As in Manitoba, funding is shared among police forces, with the costs of accommodation being
provided by the police force on whose premises the JFO is housed. There are funds available,
however, in the budget of the Ministry of Solicitor General of Ontario for special JFO operations
targeted at major criminal activities or serious crimes. These funds are provided, on approval of
the Minister, if specific criteria are met.
Concerns expressed in Ontario about permanent JFOs were similar to issues raised about CLEU.
Permanent JFOs become stale after a period of time and personnel assigned lose their energy and
focus To monitor this failing, steering committees and Joint management teams must maintain
continual vigilance. They should meet frequently and ensure that non-productive personnel are
re-assigned.
Problems were also experienced in Ontario with rivalry among police forces and the mixing of
different operational policies and procedures. All JFOs have a single management system. The
officer-in-charge is selected after consultation among the forces participating in the JFO.
Experience has shown that if the police officer in charge of the permanent JFO is a strong leader,
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a competent investigator and is professional in his dealings with the other members of the JFO,
the parent unit of the officer in charge is soon forgotten. In other words, if the right man is
chosen to lead the JFO, the inter-force aspects become a non-issue.
In Manitoba and Ontario, the problem of lack of support from the Courts does not seem to be so
acute as it is in British Columbia. It was acknowledged that much greater care must now be taken
in the preparation of court documents and that this was time consuming.
In Metro-Toronto, much progress has been made in creating a co-operative attitude among the
prosecutors and the police by the establishment of a “Justice Liaison Committee”. This is ,a
committee chaired by Metro-Toronto Police and comprising supervisors from the offices of both
the Federal and Provincial Crown prosecutors; police officers from the RCMP, Ontario Provincial
Police, and Metro-Toronto; and other municipal and regional police forces as required. The
Committee meets monthly to discuss the impact of recent “Charter” decisions on the preparation
of cases for Court and how to deal with them. For example, much time has been saved with
respect to the. new disclosure rules by establishing a disclosure control office in Court Houses,
managed by a police officer, and by providing the defence attorneys with computer discs of
evidence instead of large volumes of paper.
In spite of the stated advantages of ad hoc, short-term, case-specific iFOs, there are a number of
reasons why JFOs targeted against organized crime should be of a permanent nature:
• Organized crime investigations often take years to complete. Permanent JFOs are designed to
provide a platform for long term investigations through continuity of assignments, case
records management and analytical and systems support.
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• A permanent JFO provides a neutral base of operations for police from different jurisdictions.
This, in turn, fosters a shared sense of identity, reduces inter-agency rivalry and increases co
operation. It also promotes team building, mutual confidence and effective working
relationships among investigators.
• Police investigators are not taken away from their regular duties to participate in a JFO. The
JFO is their regular duty.
• Investigators from other Federal and Provincial agencies, such as Customs, Immigration and
Revenue Canada, can use the permanent JFO as a firm base from which to launch joint
investigations with the police. This ensures better long term co-ordination and co-operation
• and communication among the police and all federal and provincial agencies affected.
• A permanent organization of skilled mvestigators can provide mvestigational assistance to
jurisdictional police forces when major crimes are committed. Sophisticated equipment which
is beyond the budget capabilities of smaller police departments can be kept in a pool by the
permanent JFO and loaned when required;
• Specific to CLEU, and unique in Canada, is the large component of civilian analysts which not
only provides analytical, technical, administrative and systems, support to JFO teams but, also,
provides a corporate memory with respect to organized crime, criminal groups, crime trends
and prevention and enforcement strategies which have been tried in the past. The civilian
component is uniquely placed as a research resource to provide the Provincial Government
with advice on the control of organized crime.
On balance, it can be concluded that short-term, case specific JFOs are an effective way to
investigate criminal activities which take place in several jurisdictions simultaneously, and do not
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involve complicated criminal conspiracies. They require strong leadership, a commitment to
teamworlç and strong co-ordinated support from senior management of parent departments.
They are relatively inexpensive.
For long term criminal conspiracies, a permanent JFO structure is desirable. it is essential,
however, that joint management teams and steering committees meet frequently, once a month is
not too often, to ensure that objectives and goals, originally agreed upon are reviewed and
updated and that JFO performance is assessed on a regular basis. These IFOs are expensive and
should not be allowed to outhve their usefulness.
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PART FIVE
~ CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
For reasons of security, it has not been possible to include a criminal intelligence threat
assessment with this report. Suffice it to say that the threat from South East Asian crime,
traditional organized crime, outlaw motorcycle gangs, criminal gangs and the illegal international
drug trade continues in British Columbia. The reasons for the creation of the Co-ordinated Law
Enforcement Unit (CLEU) in 1974 are valid today.
RECOMMENDATION ONE
It is recommended that a Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit be continued as an essential
element of the Government’s effort to control organized crime in the Province.
The structure of CLEU requires “fine tuning”. The management structure of the Vancouver
JFOs, whereby there is a parallel Vancouver PoIIceIRCMP command structure, is no longer
required. It is wasteflul of senior personnel. It slows down the decision-making process. It
emphasizes the differences between the RCMP and the Vancouver Police Department instead of
the more desirable objective of minimizing them.
RECOMMENDATION TWO
It is recommended that the Vancouver JFO be placed under the command of one Inspector, to be
provided alternately, every three years, by the RCMP and Vancouver Police Department; that, at
Unit level, one of the Staff Sergeant positions be eliminated and each Unit be commanded by a
Staff Sergeant from either the RCMP or the Vancouver Police Department; that, at Squad level,
-31-
one of the RCMP Staff Sergeant or Vancouver Police Senior Detective positions be eliminated
and each squad be commanded either by an RCMP Sergeant or a Vancouver Police Senior
Detective; that in selecting Unit Commanders and Squad Leaders, a balance be maintained
between the numbers ofRCMP personnel and Vancouver Police personnel; and that, for the sake
of consistency, the officer in charge of the Vancouver Island JFO be alternated every three years
between the RCMP and Municipal Police Departments.
The difficulties in receiving support from prosecutors and the Courts for investigations into
organized crime at an appropriately senior level of the criminal hierarchy must be overcome if
CLEU is to continue to be an effective law enforcement tool.
RECO?vIMENDATION THREE
It is recommended that British Columbia benefit from Ontario’s experience and that Justice
Liaison Committees be established in appropriate jurisdictions to facilitate better co-operation and
understanding among Federal and Provincial Prosecutors, the RCMP and Municipal Police
Departments and to decide jointly how best to deal with “Charter” decisions from the Courts.
It is essential that CLEU JFOs continue to be staffed with the most experienced and effective
police officers available. The emerging violent crime situation makes it essential that CLEU
becomes increasingly effective in its efforts to control organized crime.
RECOMMENDATION FOUR
it is recommended that the CLEU Policy Board and the Joint Management Teams commit
themselves to a staffing policy which accepts only the best available personnel for assignment to
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CLEU IFOs and to a performance evaluation policy which maintains a continuous high standard
of police work.
The debate as to whether the Director of CLEU Policy Analysis should continue to be a public
servant or a senior police officer raises a number of issues. The intention of the creators of
CLEU, in 1974, was that the civilian component, under the direction of an experienced academic
researcher, would provide a general overview of organized crime activities in the Province but
would also be the “cutting edge” in the formulation of regulatory strategies to control organized
crime. It was not intended that the Policy Analysis Group be a support group for JFOs.
Over the years it has become the practice to assign civilian analysts to assist in sorting out the
evidence in complicated JFO investigations and this has proven to be a useful initiative.
Nevertheless, CLEU Policy Analysis continues to be a Government resource, not a police
resource, for obtaining information. Its Mission Statement makes this clear:
“To strengthen legislative, regulatory and criminal law enforcement action throughV the acquisition, dissemination and use of knowledge about organized and major
crime.” V
Policy Analysis Division’s latest work on the detection of “Bid Rigging” is a case in point.
There is no doubt that there are, within the police community, certain well qualified police
officers, who could effectively direct the Policy Analysis Division. The danger, from the point of
view of the Government, is that the work of the Division might become too narrowly focused and
become only an information and intelligence resource for the JFOs. From the Government’s point
ofview this is not desirable.
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The question of the reliability of the Director, because he is a civilian and not a police officer, has
also been raised. This has nothing to do with the present incumbent. It has to do with the fact
that he is a civilian. The possibility that information obtained by CLEU might be used for
“politiãal” purposes is of concern to senior police officers. As noted earlier, there is no evidence
that information obtained by CLEU has ever been used improperly. A casual examination of
information leaks in British Columbia over the past few years indicates that civilians have no claim
to be the only perpetrators These concerns are misplaced
RECOMMENDATION FIVE
It is recommended that the Director of the civilian component of CLEU, the Policy Analysis
Division, continue to be a senior public servant; but that, in the future, when it becomes necessary
to select the next Director, the police community be consulted and take part in the selection
process.
PROTECTED “A”
RESEARCH PROJECT
CO-ORDINATED LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT
LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED
* Brian Neal, Deputy Attorney General and Chair, CLEU Policy Board
* Peter Engstad, Director, CLEU Policy Analysis Division
Allan Williams, QC, Former Attorney General ofBritish Columbia
Inspector AW.H. Hickman, Saanich PD, OIC Vancouver Island JEFO
Sergeant Ken Rogers, Victoria PD, NCO IJC Administration, Vancouver Island JFO
Sergeant Gary Spence, RCMP, NCO I/C Operations, Vancouver Island JFO* Chief Constable W.O. Nixon, Saanich PD, Joint Management Team Vancouver Island
* Assistant Commissioner Frank Palmer, OIC Operations, “E” Division, RCMP
Mr. Justice David Vickers, Former Deputy Attorney General* Chief ConstableBill Marshall, Vancouver PD
Superintendent Dick Wailer, OIC Victoria SubfDiv, RCMP, Joint Management TeamVancouver Island
Inspector Paul Cheney, Ops Offr, Victoria Sub/Div, RCMP
Chief Constable Doug Richardson, Victoria PD,. Joint Management Team, VancouverIsland
Dr. Malcolm Matheson, Former Director, CLEU Policy Analysis
Inspector Carson Turncliffe, OIC Vancouver JFO, Vancouver PD
Inspector Doug Ewing, OIC Vancouver JFO, RCMP
Ray Waters, Computer Services Section IC, CLEU PA
Staff Sergeant Greer, Vancouver JFO, Vancouver PD
Constable Dean, Vancouver )FO, West Vancouver PD
Constable Howman, Vancouver JFO, RCMP
Staff Sergeant Nimmo, Vancouver JFO, Vancouver PD
Constable Liu, Vancouver JFQ, RCMP
Sergeant Connolly, Vancouver IFO, RCMP
Detective Pascuzzo, Vancouver JFO, Vancouver PD
Dr. Beverly Riddell, CLEU Policy Analysis
Julie MacDonald, CLEU Policy Analysis
Dean Benson, Ministry of Attorney General, Police Services
• PROTECTED “A”
RESEARCH PROJECT
• CO-ORDrNATED LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
Vancouver Island Jomt Forces Operations Annual Reports
Vancouver Joint Forces Operations Annual Reports
Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit Background Information, February 1993
CLEU Policy Analysis Division Annual Reports
Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit Orientation Handbook, 1991
CLEU Vancouver Island JFO Procedure Manual, 1992
CLEU Justice Administration Act Employee Handbook, 1993
Project Reports CLEU Policy Analysis Division
Police Studies, Volume 5, No. 2, Summer 1982“The Co-Qrdinated Law Enforcement Unit - A Canadian Strategy Against Organized Crime” byTonita Murray. V
Ontario Provincial Police, “Joint Force Operations”, July 1993
-2-
LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED (continued)
Kevin Begg, Ministry of Attorney General, Police Services* Deputy Commissioner Dennis Farrell, Commanding Officer, “E” Division, RCMP
Judy Reykdai, Ministry of Attorney General, Police Set-vicesRobert Chamberlain, Director, Law Enforcement Services, ManitobaChief Dale Henry, Winnipeg PD, Winnipeg, ManitobaDeputy Chief Joe Gallagher, Winnipeg PD, Winnipeg, ManitobaAssistant Commissioner Richard Bergman, Commanding Officer, “D” Division, RCMP1Winnipeg, ManitobaA/Deputy ChiefRon Dick, Metro-Toronto PD, Toronto, OntarioStaff Inspector Ron Sandeffi, Metro-Toronto PD, Toronto, OntarioDeputy Chief James Wmgate, Peel Regional Police Force, Brampton, OntarioCommissioner Thomas O’Grady, Ontario Provincial Police, Toronto, OntarioDetective Chief Superintendent Gary Wood, Ontario Provincial PoliceDetective Inspector Mike Connor, Ontario Provincial Police, Toronto, OntarioAssistant Commissioner Hap Armstrong, Commanding Officer, “0” Division, RCMP,London, OntarioStan Shillington, Policy Analysis Division, VancouverHelen Arnett, Policy Analysis Division, Vancouver
* CLEU Policy Board Member