Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Cognitive and computational limitations andbounded rationality
Pantelis P. Analytis
April 12, 2018
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
1 Vision
2 The heuristics and biases program
3 Social rationality
4 Multiple selves
5 Memory
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Ambiguous objects
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Kanisza’s triangle
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Muller’s arrows
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Size from context
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Shepard’s tables
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Beau Deeley’s illusions
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Esher’s waterfall
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Vision summary
Vision is among the most (if not the most) valuablecognitive system. Nature had a long evolutionary horizonto perfect it.
The brain interprets and gives meaning to ambiguousvisual inputs and fills in the gaps of visual experience.
Contextual information is crucial for generating meaningand can change the way we see things.
Experienced visual illusions can be very persistent,suggesting that such a perfected instrument such as thevisual system can lead to consistent biases.
These biases were known and exploited by artists andarchitects, in the same way that marketing people exploitchoice biases.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Reasoning: Wason’s selection task
What card or cards do you need to turn over to test the rule ”Ifthere is a K on one side there is a 2 on the other”, to see if it isviolated?
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Reasoning: Wason’s selection task
The problem can be solved by choosing the cards using modusponens and modus tollens.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Heuristics and bias program
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Cognitive biases
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Anchoring and adjustment
What is the freezing point of Vodka?
How long is Mars’ orbit around the sun?
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Anchoring and adjustment
Cognitive load, time pressure and alcohol reduceadjustment (Epley and Gilovich, 2006).Bias increases with anchor extremity (Russo andShoemaker, 1989).Uncertainty increases anchoring Jacowitz and Kahneman,1995).
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Availability of extreme events
Making judgements about the frequency of likelihood ofan event based on the ease with which evidence orexample come to mind.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Representativeness
A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cabcompanies, the Green and the Blue, operate in the city. 85% ofthe cabs in the city are Green and 15% are Blue.
A witness identified the cab as Blue. The court tested thereliability of the witness under the same circumstances thatexisted on the night of the accident and concluded that thewitness correctly identified each one of the two colors 80 % ofthe time and failed 20% of the time.
What is the probability that the cab involved in the accidentwas Blue rather than Green knowing that this witness identifiedit as Blue?
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Representativeness
Most subjects gave probabilities over 50%, and some gaveanswers over 80%. The correct answer, found using Bayes’theorem, is lower than these estimates:
There is a 12% chance (15% times 80%) of the witnesscorrectly identifying a blue cab.
There is a 17% chance (85% times 20%) of the witnessincorrectly identifying a green cab as blue.
There is therefore a 29% chance (12% plus 17%) thewitness will identify the cab as blue.
This results in a 41% chance (12% divided by 29%) thatthe cab identified as blue is actually blue.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Representativeness
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Conjunction fallacy
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. Shemajored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concernedwith issues of discrimination and social justice, and alsoparticipated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Which is more probable?
Linda is a bank teller.
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feministmovement.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Hindsight bias
The hindsight bias is an shortcoming of the availabilityand representativeness heuristics.
It was initially studied by Baruch Fischhof and Ruth Beyth.
In the first experiments participants were asked to judgethe likelihood of US president Richard Nixon’s upcomingvisit to Beijing and Moscow, such as whether Nixon withmeet the Chinese president Mao, whether he will declarethe visit a success, etc. Some time after president Nixon’sreturn, participants were asked to recall (or reconstruct)the probabilities they had assigned to each possibleoutcome, and their perceptions of likelihood of eachoutcome was greater or overestimated for events thatactually had occurred.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
The hot hand fallacy
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Sunk cost fallacy
As president of an airline company, you have received a suggestionfrom one of your employees. The suggestion is to use the last 1million dollars of your research funds to develop a plane that wouldnot be detected by conventional radar, in other words, a radar-blankplane. However, another firm has just begun marketing a plane thatcannot be detected by radar. Also, it is apparent that their plane ismuch faster and far more economical than the plane your companycould build. The question is: should you invest the last million dollarsof your research funds to build the radar-blank plane proposed byyour employee?
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Sunk cost fallacy
As the president of an airline company, you have invested 10 milliondollars of the company?s money into a research project. The purposewas to build a plane that would not be detected by conventionalradar, in other words, a radar-blank plane. When the project is 90%completed, another firm begins marketing a plane that cannot bedetected by radar. Also, it is apparent that their plane is much fasterand far more economical than the plane your company is building.The question is: should you invest the last 10% of the research fundsto finish your radar-blank plane?
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Gambler’s fallacy
At the Monte Carlo Casino on August 18, 1913, when the ball fell inblack 26 times in a row. This was an extremely uncommonoccurrence, with a probability of around 1 in 136.8 million. Gamblerslost millions of francs betting against black, reasoning incorrectly thatthe streak was causing an imbalance in the randomness of the wheel,and that it had to be followed by a long streak of red.
I have seen men, ardently desirous of having a son, who could learnonly with anxiety of the births of boys in the month when theyexpected to become fathers. Imagining that the ratio of these birthsto those of girls ought to be the same at the end of each month, theyjudged that the boys already born would render more probable thebirths next of girls. — Pierre Simon Laplace, 1796.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Regression fallacy
On many occasions I have praised flight cadets for cleanexecution of some aerobatic maneuver, and in general whenthey try it again, they do worse. On the other hand, I haveoften screamed at cadets for bad execution, and in general theydo better the next time. So please don’t tell us thatreinforcement works and punishment does not, because theopposite is the case.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
The endowment e↵ect
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Framing
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Default e↵ects (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003)
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Nudges — Thaler and Sunstein
A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choicearchitecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable waywithout forbidding any options or significantly changing theireconomic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, theintervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are notmandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge.Banning junk food does not.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Decoy e↵ects
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Decoy e↵ects
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Overconfidence
People judgments are often miscalibrated, peopleoverestimate the chances of events when their owncompetences have an e↵ect on the outcome.
Wishful thinking: overestimate the likelihood of an eventbecause of its desirability (see Krizan and Windschitl,2007).
Illusion of control: People may behave as if they havecontrol when they have none (Langer, 1975).
93% of American drivers rate themselves as better thanthe median (Svenson, 1981).
People tend to overestimate their rate of work or tounderestimate how long it will take them to get thingsdone (Buehler et al., 1994).
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Unskilled but unaware of it
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Availability of extreme events revisited
Estimate the expected utility of an action.
Generate samples of the possible outcomes of the actions.
Drawing these samples is costly.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Importance sampling
Lieder, Gri�ths and Hsu (2018)
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Importance sampling
Lieder, Gri�ths and Hsu (2018)
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Anchoring and adjustment revisited
Estimate a quantity based on memory and other cues.
Draw samples using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
The cost increases linearly as a function of time.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Drawing information from memory
Lieder, Gri�ths, Huys and Goodman (2017).
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Drawing information from memory
Lieder, Gri�ths, Huys and Goodman (2017).42 / 54
Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
The evolution of cooperation
Originally framed by Flood and Dresher and formalized byTucker.
Axelrod asked game theorist to submit strategies whichwere translated to computer coded paired randomlyagainst each other in a 200 round competition.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
The evolution of cooperation
Tic-for-tat a simple strategy that retaliated when theopponent did not cooperate dominated the competition.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Ultimatum game
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
The public good game
In the basic game, subjects secretly choose how many oftheir private tokens to put into a public pot. The tokens inthis pot are multiplied by a factor (greater than one andless than the number of players, N) and this ”public good”payo↵ is evenly divided among players. Each subject alsokeeps the tokens they do not contribute.
The group’s total payo↵ is maximized when everyonecontributes all of their tokens to the public pool.
Yet the Nash equilibrium in this game is simply zerocontributions by all.
The actual levels of contribution found varies widely, anddepend on the multiplication factor.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Altruistic punishment
People are willing to forego profits to punish people thatdefect from cooperation, although this is irrational (Fehrand Gaechter
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Roger’s paradox
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Why copy others? — Rendell et. al 2010.
100-armed multi-armed bandit with exponentiallydistributed pay-o↵s.
The environment was non-stationary and there was a smallprobability that they pay-o↵s would change.
Submitted strategies could either innovate, observe orexploit.
Evolutionary dynamics were realized by killing 1/50 of theagents and replacing them with o↵spring.
10000 rounds in total.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Ulysses and the sirens
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Cognitive dissonance and sour grapes
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Probing our memory
Nickerson and Adams (1979)
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
Remembering too much
[I]n my country, when they would say a man has no sense, theysay, such an one has no memory; and when I complain of thedefect of mine, they do not believe me, and reprove me, asthough I accused myself for a fool: not discerning thedi↵erence betwixt memory and understanding, which is tomake matters still worse for me. But they do me wrong; forexperience, rather, daily shows us, on the contrary, that astrong memory is commonly coupled with infirm judgment.
Montaigne — essays.
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Cognitive and
computational
limitations
and bounded
rationality
Pantelis P.
Analytis
Vision
The heuristics
and biases
program
Social
rationality
Multiple selves
Memory
More is less in memory: the recognition heuristic
Which German city is larger in population, Leipzig or Jena?
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