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COIN: The Way Ahead
Richard J. Campbell
Foreword By: Ryan T. Smith, MAJ, USA
Edited By: Edward A. Herty, LCDR, USN
4 July 2012
Disclaimer: The opinions and conclusions in this report and slide set are that of the author and the authors alone.
They do not represent the opinions and conclusions of NATO, NTM-A, ISAF, CTC-A, or the U.S. Government. Nor do
the represent the opinions and conclusions of any private contracting company affiliated with any of the above
mentioned agencies, offices, or organizations. You the reader and end user are responsible for determining the value
and / or worth of the information contained in this document and the relationship the content has to your specific
environment, position, job, and assigned tasks, duties, and responsibilities.
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Foreword
Ryan T. Smith, MAJ, USA
NATO Training Mission, Counterinsurgency Training Center - Afghanistan
Right now the United States faces some enormous challenges. Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade
(Jenkins, 2010) 1 , a range of asymmetric challenges in as many as 24 different countries (DSB
TF, 2011) 2, an enormous budget deficit with 31.3 % more spending today as compared to a
year ago (Louis, 2012) 3, the possibility of unseen nuclear proliferation, or the misuse of state
sponsored WMDs (Moroney, 2011) 4, military developments in China (OSD, 2011) 5, and the
monitoring of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia (Woolf, 2011). 6 The
United States, like other countries, is also seeing dwindling resources and an ever increasing
population. Right now there are some difficult decisions on the table. This paper looks at just
one of these decisions. Whichever way it goes, in the end, it’s hoped that rational minds, good
leadership, clear facts, and an understanding of the intent are used to shape the way ahead.
1. Jenkins B. M. (2012). Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade. Santa Monica CA, RAND Corporation.
2. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence (2011) (DSF TF). Counterinsurgency (COIN)
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations. Washington D.C., Department of Defense.
3. Louis, M. (2012). U.S. Budget Deficit Widened To $124.6 Billion In May. New York City, New York, Bloomberg L.P.
4. Moroney, J. D. P., et. al. (2011). Assessing the Effectiveness of the International Counterproliferation Program. Santa Monica CA.
RAND Corporation.
5. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2011) (OSD). Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China. Washington D.C., Department of Defense.
6. Woolf, A. F. (2011). Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union. Washington
D.C., Congressional Research Service.
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COIN: The Way Ahead
On 27 March 2012 Seth Jones, a RAND Corporation associate, testified before the House
Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. Mr. Jones
is considered an expert witness by the House Committee. He began his testimony by saying
“Over the next decade, the United States (U.S.) will likely face a range of irregular warfare
challenges” (pg. 2). He went on to say that the challenges would include threats from non-state
actors like terrorists, drug-trafficking organizations, violent global activists, states that would
create irregular challenges, and irregular threats would be caused by weak governments. He
discussed some of these threats in detail, mentioned countries that have problems now, and
named some countries that he thought would have problems is the future. He continued his
testimony by outlining some Irregular Warfare (IW) strategies. The idea of dealing with IW
threats in other countries before the problems spill over to the U.S. is a well known concept.1 He
next talked about the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police model which is being
used in Afghanistan today.
He concluded his testimony by listing four specific “issues that should be considered” (pg.
8). The first issue was U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) be assigned as the lead
for counter terrorism (CT), insurgencies, and other IW threats. The second was that the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) should continue improving physical and mental health programs
for soldiers and families. The third issue was, improved training and education for all aspects of
IW. He said this particular area should not only be improved, but expanded, “especially for
conventional U.S. forces” (pg. 9) since he felt training was “ad hoc” at best (pg. 9).
1. The Quadrennial Review (Feb. 2006) mentions how DoD must, “remain vigilant in an era of surprise and uncertainty and prepare
to prevent, deter or defeat a wider range of asymmetric threats.” (pg. 1); The Irregular Warfare Special Study (Aug. 2006) “provides
study results, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations concerning doctrinal implications of Irregular Warfare as introduced /
described in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report and the subsequent IW Roadmap.” , The IW Special Study was
requested “via a memorandum approved by the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), Subject: Request
for Irregular Warfare Special study, dated 5 June 2006.” ; The Irregular Warfare Roadmap (Sep. 2006) was discussed before the
House Armed Services Committee in 2006. Topics included prevention, and the direct and indirect approaches to IW.
4
The last item Mr. Jones suggested was an assessment of inter-agency cooperation and
synchronization. He felt this area could also be improved with observations and lessons learned
(pg. 4, 9).
This report will examine the first, third, and fourth items that Mr. Jones mentioned. That is,
USSOCOM be made lead for IW, improved training and education, and improved inter-agency
cooperation and synchronization. The author of this report believes these three issues are
actually connected. The second issue Mr. Jones mentioned, improved physical and mental
health programs, is outside the scope of this report. There are six specific arguments that
support the first, third, and fourth suggestions. This report will examine the six arguments one
by one and present and discuss the evidence that supports the recommendations. Below is the
first reason why the three recommendations should be adopted.
1. Importance of IW:
For some time now various departments of the U.S. Government and various U.S. leaders
have emphasized the importance of understanding irregular threats and stressed the
importance of understanding counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations (SO). In fact, IW
and COIN are mentioned in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (2009), our
National Security Strategy (2010), the Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint
Operations Concept (JOC) paper (2010), the Homeland Security Quadrennial Report (2010),
the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011), and a recent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Notice (2011).2 COIN and SO are also at the forefront of debate. For example, recently
several key individuals discussed the current COIN efforts in Afghanistan and future COIN
2. Historically speaking, terms such as; Irregular Warfare; indirect and direct "approach"; asymmetric threats; deter, deterrence,
interdict, prevent, and disrupt, and nation states, failed states, and non-state actors can be traced back to the following documents:
National Strategy For The United States Of America (2002); Capstone Concept for Joint Operations version 2.0 (2005); National
Security Strategy Of The United States Of America (2006). These documents introduce the language and terms that are found in
later documents such as the ones mentioned on page 2 of this paper and referenced in note 1.
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challenges before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Some of the individuals
that testified were General John Allen (2012), Admiral William McRaven (2012), and Colonel
Robert Killebrew (Ret.) (2012).
When the documents and testimonies mentioned above are examined we can see why IW
and COIN are important and why and how they tie into U.S. policy and strategy. For instance,
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was cited in a January 2009 Foreign Affairs article. He said,
“As secretary of defense, I have repeatedly made the argument in favor of institutionalizing
counterinsurgency skills and the ability to conduct stability and support operations” (CCJO,
2009, pgs. 28-29). Institutionalizing COIN and SO related skills means, permanent schools and
courses, with core competencies, for all levels and grades, based on sound doctrine. The 2010
National Security Strategy repeats this theme. For instance, the document says; “We will
continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency,
stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats” (pg. 14). In the DoD
publication titled Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats JOC (2010), the relevancy of
COIN and SO for IW is also stressed and explained in more detail. The JOC paper mentions
“five activities or operations that are undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form in a
coherent campaign to address irregular threats: counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare
(UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO)”
(pg. 4).
The Homeland Security Quadrennial Review (2010) discusses “deter and disrupt
operations” as a way to effectively mitigate terrorist attacks (pg. 21). The 2011 National Strategy
for Counterterrorism (CT) also emphasizes the “disrupt and deter” or prevention model that is
addressed in each of the references listed above (pg. 6). The National Strategy for CT further
explains how the CT strategy will focus on a “collection of groups and individuals who comprise
al-Qa’ida and its affiliates” (pg. 3). It says insurgency is seen as a way for al-Qa’ida to advance
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its goals in some countries with the help from other groups, like al-Shabaab. A Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice (2011) titled 2012 – 2015 Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance, also
lists COIN, SO, and CT as “High Interest Training Issues” and explains how DoD “envisions
institutionalizing these areas as core competencies in the joint force to foster effectiveness in
these complex mission areas” (pg. A-1). COIN, CT, and SO all are being used right now in
Afghanistan and are seen as a-part of the larger deter, disrupt, and interdict strategy that is in
place today. During the research phase of this report there was no document that was
examined that countered the idea that COIN, SO, and CT are in important and that training for
these areas should be institutionalized. However, these topics are not embedded as core
competencies and it is unclear why. This is the first reason why USSOCOM should be made
lead in these areas. Next is the second reason why.
2. Current and future COIN challenges:
With emphasis being placed on COIN at multiple levels, one would think that COIN doctrine
and training would be standardized and COIN operations would be problem free. Unfortunately
this is not the case. When COIN operations in Afghanistan were scrutinized by a Defense
Science Board (DSB) Task Force (TF) several important issues were discovered (2011). For
example, the DSB TF was asked to examine COIN Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) operations and “identify how DoD intelligence can most effectively
support COIN operations” (DSB TF, MEMO, 2011). They were also asked to provide information
that would influence investment decisions about COIN ISR. With these goals in mind, the TF
talked with 100-plus senior and mid level officials and representatives from DoD, the intelligence
community, commercial industry, non-profit organizations, and academia who were involved in
COIN, ISR, and IW. They also reviewed current literature on COIN, IW, and COIN ISR. The
7
DSB TF report contained observations, significant findings, and associated recommendations.
The DSB TF reported the following nine items;
1. DoD lacks a common understanding of COIN.
2. DoD has assumed responsibility for COIN ISR by default.
3. DoD ISR is narrowly interpreted to mean technical intelligence collection by airborne
platforms.
4. ISR capabilities have not been applied effectively against COIN operations that deal with
populations in part because a comprehensive set of intelligence requirements for COIN does
not exist.
5. The U.S. Government is not investing adequately in the development of social and
behavioral science information that is critically important to COIN.
6. ISR support for COIN is currently being overshadowed by counterterrorism and force
protection requirements.
7. Increasing the focus of ISR for COIN on incipient insurgencies would provide more whole-
of-government options and reduce the need for major commitment of military forces.
8. New S&T solutions must address the crisis in processing, exploitation, and dissemination
(PED) and associated communications caused by the deluge of sensor data.
9. New and emerging technologies and techniques can be employed to improve our
understanding of COIN environments (DSB TF, MEMO, 2011).
The DSB TF determination DoD had inherited COIN ISR by default since the Department of
State (DoS) had not pursued any type of partnership with any one agency or agencies within the
U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) for the purpose of COIN ISR (DSB TF, 2011, pg. vi). There are
16 different agencies that make up the U.S. IC. The responsibility that DoS has to COIN
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operations is though the Security Force Assistance (SFA) program. SFA has four components
which are international military education and training, foreign military sales, foreign military
financing program, and peace operations. These four areas can be broken down further into
programs and operations. They are; Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, Foreign Internal
Defense (FID), Internal Defense and Development (IDAD), and security sector reform. The U.S.
DoS is responsible for foreign relationships and DoS establishes the policies for the SFA
program. If U.S. Forces are assisting another country with an insurgency, or stability operations
both of these areas fall under FID, which falls under the SFA program, which is a DoS
responsibility.3
With further research, one might suggest three more reasons why the DoS could not and
therefore did not assume the lead on COIN ISR. The first reason is that DoS does not have the
capability, capacity, or the expertise to plan, coordinate, disseminate, and asses COIN ISR
operations and / or outcomes. The second reason may be based on the fact that even though
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) develops and oversees the execution of the annual
budget for the National Intelligence Program (NIP), 80% of the IC budget is allocated to DoD
(Gaines & Kappeler, 2012, pg. 211).4 The third reason is, each of the agencies in the IC, to
include DoS, have distinct roles to play when it comes to designated intelligence related roles
and responsibilities. The DoS intelligence unit is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research which
concentrates on country and area studies. They look at political, social, and economic issues
and intelligence. An important piece of COIN ISR is Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection,
3. U.S. Code, Title 10, section 2067 and 1208 are the laws that regulate Security Force Assistance. National Security Presidential
Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, and DoDI Directive 3000.5, Military
Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations provides details about stability operations. U.S. Joint
Publication 3-29 (2009) explains Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) and discusses how U.S. Forces providing FHA usually do
so in support of either U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), or Department of State (DoS). FHA operations could
include simultaneous military, stability, nation assistance, humanitarian, civic, security, and Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
4. Gaines and Kappeler (2012) also mention the complexity of the current Intelligence Community (IC) roles and responsibilities as
they relate to Counterterrorism (CT) and terrorism related intelligence collection, sharing, production, and dissemination. For
example, each of the 16 agencies in the IC is responsible for collecting, sharing, production, and dissemination of terrorist related
intelligence. No one agency in the IC is solely responsible for these activities (Chapter 8), so there are redundancies and overlaps.
9
on a large scale. Conducting HUMINT, as part of a COIN operation, in another country would be
difficult for DoS or for any of the other IC agencies.
During their study of COIN ISR the TF “discerned two imperatives” (pg. 14-15). The first
was that the conflict in Afghanistan should be given top priority and the second was that after
Afghanistan there would be emerging COIN challenges that could be worrisome. They felt these
challenges should be planned for now. The TF concluded that engagement in any particular
future COIN would be a political decision, but felt engagement was a certainty (pg. 14-15). The
TF also presented a list of what they referred to as “Possible COIN Challenges” (pg. 16). The
report explains that the list is not based on National Strategy, but on the possibility of one or
more of the following problems; “economic crises, climate change, demographic pressures,
resource scarcity, or poor governance could cause these states (or others) to fail or become so
weak that they become large targets for aggressors / insurgents” (pg. 16). The TF list of
problems is very similar to the items mentioned by Mr. Jones.
The DSB TF went on to mention that they felt that a weak, failing, or failed state or when a
states is not able “to exercise sovereign prerogatives in important regions, including border
areas” would allow insurgents to gain control in those areas. This point is worth dwelling upon
for just a moment. Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010) in Rethinking Violence, claim that a
“number of leading studies have linked state weakness to a rise in intrastate violence” (pg. 7).
In fact they believe, “empirical finding appears fairly robust: weak, poor, underdeveloped states
are far more likely to experience violence than wealthier states” (pg. 7). 5 Traditional forces are
not able to train, support, or access weak, failing, or failed states whereas SOCOM Forces are.
____________________________________________________________________________
5. Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010) in “Rethinking Violence” cite Fearon and Laitin “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” ; and
Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, “Ethic and Nationalist Violence,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24 (Aug. 1998) ; I. William
Zartmen ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder Colo. Lynne Rienner (1995) ;
Robert I. Rotberg, ed. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press (2004) ; M. A.
Kocker, “Insurgency, States, Capacity, and the Rural Basis of Civil War”, Yale University, (Oct. 2007) ; Gaines and Kappeler,
Homeland Security (2012), list http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/guevara.pdf for more information about guerilla warfare.
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3. Added ISR requirements for COIN:
ISR requirements in an insurgency are not the same as ISR requirements in traditional wars.
As stated in the TF report, “all-source and multi-INT intelligence is essential for achieving the
persistent, predictive, activity-based ISR required to successfully counter an insurgency” (DSB
TF, pg. 27). In fact, one of the most perplexing problems in a COIN operation is that no single
intelligence discipline or single intelligence source can effectively dominate the complex
environment. Traditional wars require observation of an area, or multiple areas to discover
enemy strengths, movements, and enemy activities. The enemy can usually be identified.
Sensors and other technological devices like low level and high level aerial observation
platforms play an important part in this process. As compared, COIN operations require a focus
on the entire population because it is not easy to identify the enemy. In COIN the entire
population in an area with an insurgency is suspect and it’s difficult to weed out the few
insurgents from the general population. The enemy could be anyone such as, taxi drivers,
elected officials, shop owners, school teachers, farmers, healthcare workers, power brokers,
host nation military and police, visitors from other countries, business men, and intellectuals and
so on. Therefore, information and intelligence about the country’s economy, social-structure,
culture, politics, the military and police, history, trends, social hierarchy, gender issues, racist
agendas, governance strengths and weaknesses, and social behavioral as well as movements,
locations, activities of individuals and groups is needed. This complex, multi-layered, in-depth
approach from many perspectives is unavoidable in COIN. Because of these characteristics
HUMINT is the best method to collect information, but a blending of intelligence is needed to
provide “activity-based intelligence” (DSB TF, pg. 27-29). USSOCOM forces are taught the
importance of information collection and HUMINT, traditional forces are not. As an example,
currently there is no standardized format for the collect of information in doctrine. This is another
deficiency. Appendix A contains a recommended format.
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4. Difference between traditional war and COIN:
Another reason why USSOCOM should be made lead is based on the differences between
irregular and traditional warfare surveillance. Slide number 7 of the slide set has a chart from
the DSB TF report (pg. 28). On the left side of the chart is a list of topics. The center column of
the chart shows how these topics manifest themselves in traditional warfare. The right column
shows how these topics manifest themselves in IW. Please take a moment to review the chart
and compare the two columns of topics and see how they differ. It is clear that the two types of
warfare are not the same. USSOCOM specializes in most aspects of IW surveillance.
5. DOTMLPF 6 solutions standardization, QC and QA:
The U.S. Army COIN Center is located at Ft. Leavenworth Kansas and is subordinate to the
Irregular Warfare Center Fusion Cell which is subordinate to the U.S. Army Combined Arms
Center (CAC). TRADOC Regulation 350-70 (2011) defines U.S. Army training policy and gives
CAC the following responsibilities:
“CAC designs, integrates, and oversees implementation of leader development and the
Army Leader Development program; executes Mission CoE and proponent responsibilities;
develops and integrates current and emerging doctrine; and supports and integrates Army
training and education support across all cohorts in support of Army ARFORGEN to
dominate in FSO in a JIIM environment” (pg. 13).
This would include evaluation, standardization, Quality Control (QC), and Quality Assurance
(QA) for COIN related programs of instruction (POI), training support packages (TSPs),
instructor development, and integration of best practices, observations, and lessons learned.
6. DOTMLPF stands for; doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities.
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Even though the U.S. has been involved in two major COIN conflicts recently and several in
the past, and even though there is a strong emphasis being placed on COIN knowledge and
application from multiple levels, there are still a number of COIN related areas of concern. They
include COIN foundation documents, COIN strategy, standardized terms and definitions, and
the resultant language that is used to express the commanders’ intent, provide feedback, and
report outcomes. Plus, the role of security force assistance teams, training development,
standardized metrics, the information collection processes, interoperability and synchronization
of COIN strategy, and COIN operations, missions, support, and enablers. Added to this,
descriptive terms like whole-of-government, comprehensive COIN campaign, population centric,
and direct and indirect approach for COIN are being used without any clear doctrine based
explanation, or if you will, reconciliation of the terms with existing doctrine. Many publications as
already mentioned, see COIN as a subset of IW. Some individuals would argue this point.
Inadequate progress in several DOTMLPF areas is the fifth reason why USSOCOM should be
made the proponent of IW.
6. Overlap, redundancies, complexities, oversight and lessons learned:
Another justification why USSOCOM should be made lead is connected to overlap,
redundancies, complexities, oversight, and lessons learned. Since 2007 the COIN Training
Center-Afghanistan (CTC-A) has been responsible for teaching COIN to Coalition Forces,
Afghanistan National Security Forces, Ministerial Advisors, AFPAK Hands, and USAID and
Stability Operations Information Centers (SOIC) staff. The two primary courses taught in Kabul
at CTC-A is the COIN Leaders Course (CLC) and District Stability Framework (DSF). One of the
topics emphasized during CLC is Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) which is
different for COIN as compared to traditional warfare. The DSF course teaches the methodology
currently being used by USAID worldwide. COIN doctrine today contains little or no specific
13
guidance about the roles, responsibilities, relationships, and deliverables in COIN operations
and little guidance about the interoperability between military, stability, COIN enablers, and
support elements. Because of this, it’s difficult to develop COIN related training. The gaps in
doctrine and unclear and confusing guidance in areas that relate to the roles of the military and
support and stability organizations have been researched by CTC-A staff. Several papers about
these topics have been published on the Joint Center for International Security Force
Assistance (JCISFA) website.7
SOIC, as mentioned above, is a part of the Afghan Civil-Military Integration Program
(CMIP). CMIP has a number of different elements within the program. For instance, CMIP
provides oversight and guidance to; the Consolidated Stability Operations Center (CSOC), the
Atmospherics Program-Afghanistan (AP-A), the Human Terrain System (HTS) Afghanistan, the
SOICs in each region, and Unity Net. CSOC concentrates on producing finished intelligence
products, AP-A passively gathers and analyzes atmospheric information, HTS conducts social-
cultural research and analysis, the SOICs provide focused information in support of regional
commanders, and Unity Net supports regional Village Stability Operations (VSO). A DoD Office
of the Inspector General, Review of Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan
(DoD, FOUO, 2012) 8 discusses some issues with the overall program. The report details some
controversies related to training, overlaps, redundancies, complexities, oversight, and lessons
learned.
CAC COIN, CTC-A, and SOIC are not the only organizations involved in COIN in
Afghanistan. Another program working on COIN is the COMISAF COIN Advisory Team (CAAT).
7. COIN Training Center-Afghanistan (CTC-A) documents published on the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
(JCISFA) website include; CTC-A Records of Proceedings for COIN Training Center-Afghanistan Curriculum Review Board (Aug.
2011) ; Murray, M. G. ed. CTC-A Doctrinal Gaps in COIN / Stability Operations (Sep. 2011) ; Murray, M. G. ed., R. J. Campbell
author, CTC-A Analysis of COIN Doctrine, METLs, Training, PowerPoint slide set (Aug. 2011) ; M. G. Murray ed., R. J. Campbell
author (Jan. 2012) FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Revision Pre-analysis; Campbell, R. J. (2012) Small Wars and Big
Armies ; Campbell, R. J. and R. T. Smith ed. (2012) DoD Inspector General Response Letter.
8. Depart of Defense Office of the Inspector General, (FOUO) Review of Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan,
Project No. D2011-DINT01-0123.000 (Draft Report, Mar. 2012).
14
CAAT is headquatered in Kabul and has teams in each of the regions that advise and assist
regional commands on COIN related subjects. CAAT is made up of both contractors and
multinational military members. The following is a job description for CAAT as taken directly
from their website:
“The CAAT originated in August of 2009 as a result of a request to the U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense via the CENTCOM Commander and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. The intent of the request was to provide COMISAF with a 'directed telescope' that
would help him operationalize his intent for the COIN campaign at the tactical level.” 9
At one point CTC-A provided COIN training to a larger audience. This included Ministerial
Advisors, AFPAK Hands, and SOIC. Currently these three organizations provide COIN training
to their own personnel. This division of effort may be creating problems. For instance, CTC-A
contractors are from one company, SOIC contractors are from four different companies, CAAT
contractors are from two companies, and MAC and AFPAK Hands COIN training contractors
are from separate companies all together. None of these important COIN elements have the
same contracting company, so the training is not the same and CAC COIN does not monitor
any of these training programs for standardization, QC, and QA. Therefore, contractors from
these various companies, may not receive any training at all, or receive training that is
completely different in quality, quantity, scope, and context. Additionally, there are no
established standards for contractors that provide COIN training development, subject matter
expertise, or COIN training and instruction to the military.
Another up-coming issue is COIN integration and awareness training for the DoS worldwide
Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, as part of a larger strategic plan. A deter, disrupt,
9. https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/CAAT/SiteAssets/CAAT_Welcome_page.aspx
15
and prevent approach suggests that insurgencies are caught early-on in the proto stage, that is,
before they become full-blown insurgencies. Local police from the host nation and information
about the population are the best preventative medicine at this early stage. Insurgencies are
notorious for having elements of terrorism, organized crime, and opportunistic activity. Again
policing and police intelligence is the best measure to control and defeat these elements early
on. A preventative approach sees drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, human trafficking, and
money laundering as precursors for insurgencies.
For that reason, DoS along with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers program
(FLETC) are establishing several more international training centers to train police and
counternarcotics agents. The COIN piece of this training focuses on the criminal gangs, money
laundering, and criminal patronage networks that support and / or run these underground
activities. At this point, even though it’s already underway, it’s unclear whether the FLETC COIN
training is based on the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009), U.S. Military
doctrine, or the Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats Handbook (2009) (FOUO)
published by John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. This generates more issues
since the definitions are different and since there seems to be little coordination between the
military and DoS in de-conflicting these documents. The COIN ISR piece and the confusion
between DoS and DoD and the responsibility and oversight of COIN ISR have already been
discussed. These issues need to be sorted out. It is believed that USSOCOM is the best
organization to provide COIN related support, doctrine clarity, training development, and training
at the FLETC programs because of the units’ history and experiences with IW.
6. Complexities
By now the complexities that make up and characterize an insurgency and COIN
operations should be obvious. However, these complexities are worth taking another look at
16
from the operational perspective. Theory is one thing and application on the ground is yet
another. Slide number 10 of the slide set provides an expanded look at some of the topics that
have been analyzed, managed, and developed to help with the COIN efforts in Afghanistan.
Each topic very likely could produce many studies and reports which some have, and cost a
considerable amount of money which some have, and most of these topics can take a
significant measure of time to figure out the solution which again some have. The list is by no
means complete. Traditional forces deal with traditional warfare from small scale conflicts to
large scale wars in a capable manner. Traditional forces can and do proficiently deal with
humanitarian crises such as emergency evacuations, and emergency shelter, food, water, and
security needs. However, traditional forces have not mastered the ability to adequately deal with
a small scale or large scale insurgency. Insurgencies require units that can conduct special
types of missions such as IW, SO, CT, and COIN. The complexity of COIN in IW is yet another
reason why USSOCOM should be appointed lead in this area.
6. Oversight & Lessons Learned
Thus far, the topics that have been addressed are; the importance of COIN, Afghanistan,
future COIN challenges, COIN ISR requirements, the difference between IW and traditional war,
lack of progress in DOTMLPF areas, and overlaps, redundancies, and complexities. It is
believed that if there were adequate oversight in these areas, these areas would not have
issues. There is no element, agency, department, section, or center that has reached out to the
COIN community at large and tried to coordinate efforts. In fact it is just the opposite. COIN
elements such as training centers, Civ-Mil programs, and COIN schools have had to examine
the problems and try to fix them basically on their own. With this list of issues the same answer
keeps coming up time and time again. USSOCOM should be made the lead proponent for all
aspects of IW which would include all DOTMLPF functions.
17
What makes USSOCOM a strong lead for IW? Admiral W. H. McRaven, the current
USSOCOM Commander said it the best during his testimony to The 112th Congress Senate
Armed Services Committee (2012). For instance, he pointed out that;
o USSOCOM is unique in that it has agency like-like responsibilities
o USSOCOM is a functional Combatant Command with global responsibilities
o USSOCOM is the lead Combatant Command tasked with synchronizing the
planning of global-operations against terrorist networks
o It provides training and recommend sourcing solutions for SOF forces supporting
Geographic Combatant Commands’
o USSOCOM executes global operations against terrorist networks when directed
by the President or Secretary of Defense
o It is responsible for strengthening the role of NATO SOF HQ and special
operations capabilities within NATO
o USSOCOM is also empowered by unique legislated budget and acquisition
authorities in Major Force Protection Program-11 (pg. 2-3)
Besides having unique responsibilities, USSOCOM is diverse in it’s’ makeup and therefore
versatile. Versatility, or adaptability and flexibility make it well suited for complex one-of-a-kind
missions that characterize irregular threats and IW. Currently there are about 66,100 personnel
in USSOCOM assigned to five different subordinate commands. This will grow to 71,100 by
2015. The largest of the components is the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC) which has about 26,000 personnel. It is made up of, HQ USASOC, the U.S. Army
JFK Special Warfare Center and School, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, 75th Ranger
Regiment, U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 528th
18
Sustainment Brigade, and the 4th Military Information Support Operations Group. Another
component of USSOCOM is the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command which maintains
about 8,900 personnel. The breakdown is as follows; 2,400 Special Warfare Operators
(SEALS), 700 Special Warfare Boat Operators (SWCC), 700 reserve personnel, 4,100 support
staff, and 1,100 civilian personnel. Air Force Special Operations Command consists of several
Special Operations Wings and two Special Operations Groups. They provide USSOCOM with
Combat Controllers (CCTs), Pararescuemen (PJs), Special Operations Weather Team Airmen,
and Tactical Air Controller Party Operations. The U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations
Command (MARSOC) is about 2,500 personnel. MARSOC consists of the Marine Special
Operations Regiment (MSOR), the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Marine Special Operations Battalions
(MSOABs), the Marine Special Operations Support Group (MSOSG), and a Marine Special
Operations Intelligence Battalion (MSOIB). Another component is Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) which is a sub-unified command of USSOCOM. The task of JSOC is to study
special operations requirements, ensure interoperability, and equipment standardization, plan
coordinate and develop joint special operations tactics.
19
Summary:
The following is an excerpt from Vice Admiral E. T. Olson’s testimony to the Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives, on September 27, 2006. The hearing was about
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities. Vice Admiral Olson explains what IW is,
he also explains what IW isn’t, and he explains why USSOCOM is “uniquely suited” to lead
many of the IW missions (pg. 3). Please note the testimony took place six years ago.
“The key words in the working definition of irregular warfare are that irregular warfare is a
form of warfare. It is not a list of units that conduct irregular warfare. It is not a list of capabilities
for irregular warfare. It is not a list of weapons systems for irregular warfare.
Instead, it is more an approach. It is a set of activities. It is what we do with the capability
and with the units and the systems, not those things themselves.
Irregular warfare does include aspects of insurgency and counter insurgency, guerrilla
warfare, unconventional warfare asymmetrical warfare and much more. There can be irregular
warfare activities conducted in a regular or a major warfare campaign. Irregular warfare
activities may include direct action and indirect action approaches.
But irregular warfare is certainly not just about a range of military actions or military options.
One tends to think about irregular warfare as something other than direct force-on-force
confrontation between uniformed armies extending to other less kinetic actions by the
Department of Defense, and that is true.
But it is also important to know that irregular warfare activities include many of those
activities that are squarely in the domain of other agencies of our government and in the domain
of coalition forces and coalition nations in a global campaign.
Irregular warfare is clearly bigger than the Department of Defense, and although the
Department of Defense (DOD) does have a key role in leading and conducting many irregular
20
warfare activities, it is certainly not confined to DOD. And even within the Department of
Defense, irregular warfare is much bigger than the United States Special Operations Command,
although United States Special Operations Command has a history and a culture and a maturity
of thought and actions that make Special Operations Command uniquely suited to leading
Defense Department efforts in many of the areas of irregular warfare.
The nine core activities of Special Operations Forces have significant overlap with the
activities of an irregular warfare campaign, those being: counter proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction; combating terrorism; direct-action special reconnaissance; unconventional
warfare; foreign internal defense; civil affairs; psychological operations; and informational
operations; and synchronizing Department of Defense activities for the global war on terror. But
irregular warfare activities, of course, include activities beyond the range of Special Operations
activities” (pg. 3-4).
Six years ago the suggestion for USSOCOM to lead DoD efforts in IW was a bit
controversial. Today, Mr. Jones’s recommendation for USSOCOM to lead IW efforts is not at all
controversial. Demonstrated behaviors, proven accomplishments, and of course time have a
way of proving some ideas more worthy than others. This is one of those ideas.
When the proposal is adopted there will be more work. Not more work for more people in
general, but more work for the people that the decision directly affects. For example, there will
be funding and organizational questions, control issues, and specific tasks, duties, and
responsibilities will have to be identified and defined, and perhaps some laws will even have to
be reviewed. Plus, the decision will create changes in several departments and agencies to
include the National Security Council, DoS, Homeland Security, DoD, USAID, USSOCOM, and
the IC. USSOCOM will have more work on its’ plate, not less.
21
On the other side of the coin, improved interagency cooperation and synchronization will be
a by-product, as well as, improved doctrine, analysis, validation, training development,
dissemination, standardization, and QC and QA. The decision itself will bring with it clarity and
focus, higher standards, and professionally constructed longer-lasting results. It should be
stressed that the intent of the suggestion to make USSOCOM lead is not a political decision.
The intent of the decision is to provide the sharpest minds, most dedicated individuals, and most
advanced techniques in response to a continuum of complex real-world IW related challenges
and threats.
The individual members of USSOCOM conceptualize the intent and understand the
significance of the decision. They have demonstrated in the past with individual and unit
behavior that they will also relish the challenge. A nonbiased examination of the various U.S.
agencies and departments that have been involved in IW for the last six years will in fact
support the recommendation.
In summary, this narrative is right back where it started. Whichever way it goes, in the end,
it’s hoped that rational minds, good leadership, clear facts, and an understanding of the intent
are used to shape the way ahead.
22
Appendix A
The U.S. Army COIN manual FM 3-24 (2006) recommends the use of ASCOPE as a format
to analyze information (pg. 3-3). COIN doctrine currently does not provide a standardized
method for the collection of information. ASCOPE should be taught not only as a method of
analysis, but also as a collection format. The collection, analysis, display, verification, and
dissemination of intelligence are time consuming processes. The ASCOPE format could reduce
this time by presorting a vast amount of information into usable categories. This will also enable
soldiers from the U.S. and other contributing nations, to start collecting information in a targeted
manner from their arrival in any operational area. A standardized collection format for COIN will
also facilitate analysis and fusion, and enhance the use of data-mining search engines /
databases such as CIDNE and Nexus 7. A primary complaint of CIDNE and NEXUS 7 users
and programmers is that the information feed into these search engines and data bases is in
many different formats. This makes it very difficult and time consuming to sort out the good
information from the bad information. Presorting at any level would help immensely.
Population-centric information and knowledge and understanding of the civil considerations,
as they are called in U.S. doctrine, is paramount and cannot be overstated or underestimated.
The lack of a standardized collection format is a complaint that is heard quite often and so far
the issue has not been officially addressed. A solution is the use of ASCOPE as a collection
format. For example, the 5 Ws (who, when, what, where, why, how and how long) can be
utilized for each letter of the ASCOPE mnemonic. This would greatly improve the quantity and
quality of gathered information and presort literally millions of bits of gathered information into
COIN specific categories, saving valuable time and man-power. The following is an example of
the format and explanation (Campbell, 2012, Figure: 1).
23
Area
Structures
Capabilities
Organization
People
Events
Who What When Where Why How & How Long
Figure 1: ASCOPE Collection Format
Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organization, People & Events.
With the ASCOPE collection format each letter of ASCOPE uses who, when, what, where,
why, how and how long. When the ASCOPE format is used, information about the civil
considerations is preprocessed at the lowest level. Every patrol report, AAR, BDA, and SITREP
that contains any information about the civil considerations should report the information in the
same manner. The most important information is up front, the name of the person or persons
involved, when is next, or the time date group, since information in COIN is perishable. Then
details about what occurred, or what was observed, where it happened, why, and how it
happened, and how long has it been occurring. The ASCOPE format is not an algorithm. It does
not have to be followed step by step like a math problem. If there isn’t any information about a
24
certain part or parts of the format, it can be skipped and gathered at a later date. Every section
of format does not have to be filled out every time it is used in the field. The format is flexible. An
extended explanation is next and examples of questions that would be asked while using the
format are presented.
A = Area: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?
S = Structure: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?
C = Capability: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?
O = Organization: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?
P = People: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?
E = Event: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?
A = Areas are localities or physical terrain that have direct impact on the population and its
activities. Examples include tribal regions, police districts, political boundaries, religious
boundaries, territorial boundaries, military boundaries, polling stations, and government centers.
Areas are where the population congregates (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12).
Who lives there or uses the area, areas, or physical terrain? Who owns the area? Who moves
through the area? Who will not go through the area? When do they live there? When did they
get there? What are the exact boundaries, limits, or markings, and what is the direct impact on
the population? Where did they come from and where are they now? Why do they live there,
and? Why did they leave the area? How do they secure the area? How long has the area been
used, how long has the population lived there, how long are they expected to stay, and how
long has the area or terrain had a direct impact on the population?
25
S = Structures are existing important infrastructure. Examples include hospitals, bridges,
communications towers, power plants, dams, jails, warehouses, schools, television stations,
radio stations, and print plants. For COIN, some cultural structures may be even more vital,
such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and museums. Analysis of these structures
includes determining why they are important with respect to their location, functions,
capabilities, and application (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12).
Who uses the structures? Who built the structure? Who owns the structure? Who provides
security for the structure? When are they used? When were they built? When were they
destroyed? What are the locations, functions, capabilities, and application of the structures?
What are the significance of the structures? Where are they in relations to other structures and
areas? Why are the structures important to one group and not other groups? Why does a group
use them? How long have the structures been there? How long have they been inoperable?
C = Capabilities are key functions and services and include, but are not limited to,
administration, safety, emergency services, food distribution, agricultural systems, public works
and utilities, health, public transportation, electricity, economics, and commerce. Sewage, water,
electricity, academic, trash, medical, and security (SWEAT-MS) are the essential services local
authorities must provide. This analysis must include who is officially and unofficially responsible
for these functions and services (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12).
Who is officially and unofficially responsible for these functions and services? What makes
them key functions? When are the capabilities available, functional hours, days, and dates and
so on? What are the limitations of the capacities, capabilities, and limitations of the capabilities?
Where are the capabilities? Why are they key functions? How do the capabilities impact the
26
community or area? How are the capabilities secured? How are the capabilities paid for? How
long has this capacity been available? Or how long has this function not been available?
O = Organizations can be religious, fraternal, criminal, media, patriotic or service, and
community watch groups. They include media, IGOs, NGOs, merchants, squatters, and other
groups. Counterinsurgents must understand what organizations are important (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-
12).
Who, belongs to the group? Who doesn’t belong to group? Who funds the group? When, does
the group meet? What, does the group do or what do they represent? What is the goal of the
group? What is the history of the group? Where, does the group meet and how often? Why,
was the group formed? Why does the group stay together? How, did the group form? How
long has the group been formed? How long have certain people been in the group?
P = People include all nonmilitary personnel in the AOI. Analysts must consider historical,
cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors when examining a given
population. Any affiliations may have tremendous effect on the local population’s support to an
insurgency, including areas where people and insurgents may transit, retreat, evade, or hide. In
addition to sociocultural factors, JIPOE must determine how people communicate, who are key
communicators, and other formal and informal processes used to influence the population (JP
3-24, pg. VIII-12).
Who are those people? Who is that person? Who is that person related to? What, does that
person do? When, did that person move here? When did that person leave here? What is that
person’s position in the community? What tribe is he from? Where did he move from or come
27
from? Why is he the head of the community? Why, is he or she here? How, did he get here?
How did he become the head of the community? How long has he been here? How long has
he been gone?
E = Events are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that significantly affect the
OE. Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, changes in government, key
leader succession, economic reforms, political reforms, holidays, observances, anniversaries of
key historical events, riots, and trials. Events may spur an increase or decrease in insurgent
attacks. JIPOE must determine when events are occurring and analyze the events for their
political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12).
Who, goes to, or attends the events? Who benefits from the event, or who does the event
support? Who arranged the event? Who supports the event? When, does the event occur, or
how often does it occur? Where, does the event take place? What is the significance of the
event? What is the reason for the event? Where are the boundaries of the event? Where is the
event in relationship to other events or activities? Why, is the event important? Why is the event
taking place where it is and when it is? And how, is the event organized? How is it funded?
How is it provided logistical support? How long has it been a routine? How long does that
event or holiday take?
The ASCOPE collection format can easily be incorporated into the U.S. Army Soldiers Manual
of Common tasks (SMCT), the Universal Task List, and into any MOS task list. The ASCOPE
mnemonic, as an information collection format, helps a person, or unit organize a large amount
of detailed information. The presorted information assists the fusion of the intelligence and it
saves man hours. The format also standardizes civil considerations reporting, so every report is
28
in the same format; no matter how the report is submitted i.e. written, verbal, digits, or
PowerPoint. The ASCOPE format standardizes collection, and incorporates quality control and
quality assurance into training. The format synchronizes collection at the lower levels with
information processing at higher levels.
Observations of commanders in the field in Afghanistan support the idea that an improved
collection process is needed. It has been reported that commanders “appear overwhelmed”
when it comes to detailed knowledge of their Area of Operation (AO) and internal & external,
military and non-military enablers and partners in their battle-space. They simply don’t know
what CF and host nation enablers are available, the role of the enablers, who is responsible for
them, and the capabilities of those enablers. Utilization of the ASCOPE format can be the first
step towards improved Situational Awareness (SA) of enablers and partners in a battle-space.
In particular, under the “O” for organizations, the “C” for capabilities, and the “P” for people. If,
the ASCOPE format is adopted as a collection format.
29
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