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COLLABORATION AS AN ORGANIZATION DESIGN FOR SHARED PURPOSE Paul S. Adler (Univ of Southern California) Charles Heckscher (Rutgers) Forthcoming in Research in the Sociology of Organizations: “Towards permeable boundaries of organizations” edited by: Petra Hiller, Leopold Ringel, and Charlene Zietsma Dec 24, 2017 Abstract “Shared purpose,” understood as a widely-shared commitment to the organizations fundamental raison d’être, can be a powerful driver of organizational performance by providing both motivation and direction for members’ joint problem-solving efforts. So far, however, we understand little about the organization design that can support shared purpose in the context of large, complex business enterprises. Building on the work of Selznick and Weber, we argue that such contexts require a new organizational form, one that we call collaborative. The collaborative organizational form is grounded in Webers value-rational type of social action, but overcomes the scale limitations of the collegial form of organization that is conventionally associated with value-rational action. We identify four organizational principles that characterize this collaborative form and a range of managerial policies that can implement those principles. Keywords: Purpose; value-rationality; organization design
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Page 1: COLLABORATION AS AN ORGANIZATION DESIGN … AS AN ORGANIZATION DESIGN FOR SHARED PURPOSE ... form is grounded in Weber’s value-rational type of social action ... Value-rationality,

COLLABORATIONASANORGANIZATIONDESIGNFORSHAREDPURPOSE

PaulS.Adler(UnivofSouthernCalifornia)CharlesHeckscher(Rutgers)

ForthcominginResearchintheSociologyofOrganizations:“Towardspermeableboundariesoforganizations”editedby:PetraHiller,LeopoldRingel,andCharleneZietsma

Dec24,2017

Abstract

“Sharedpurpose,”understoodasawidely-sharedcommitmenttotheorganization’sfundamentalraisond’être,canbeapowerfuldriveroforganizationalperformancebyprovidingbothmotivationanddirectionformembers’jointproblem-solvingefforts.Sofar,however,weunderstandlittleabouttheorganizationdesignthatcansupportsharedpurposeinthecontextoflarge,complexbusinessenterprises.BuildingontheworkofSelznickandWeber,wearguethatsuchcontextsrequireaneworganizationalform,onethatwecallcollaborative.ThecollaborativeorganizationalformisgroundedinWeber’svalue-rationaltypeofsocialaction,butovercomesthescalelimitationsofthecollegialformoforganizationthatisconventionallyassociatedwithvalue-rationalaction.Weidentifyfourorganizationalprinciplesthatcharacterizethiscollaborativeformandarangeofmanagerialpoliciesthatcanimplementthoseprinciples.Keywords:Purpose;value-rationality;organizationdesign

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Underbothcompetitiveandsocial-culturalpressure,manyenterprisesattempttocreateandsustainasenseofsharedpurpose(Hollensbe,Wookey,Hickey,George,&Nichols,2014:1228).Sharedpurposecanbeparticularlyusefulinlarger,morecomplexorganizationsfacingdynamicenvironments.Here,membersneedtocollaborateacrossinternalorganizationalboundariestodefineintermediategoalsandtoresolveproblemsinpursuingthosegoals.Butsuchsettingsalsoposedistinctivedifficultiesforcreatingandsustainingsharedpurpose.Thispaperattemptstocharacterizetheorganizationaldesignthatcanovercomethosedifficulties.

Letusbeclearaboutwhatwemeanbyasharedcommitmenttotheorganization’spurpose.Byorganization’spurposewerefertotheorganization’sfundamentalraisond’être,theultimatereasonfortheorganization’sexistence—whatitcontributestosocietyinexchangefortheresourcesitrequires—asdistinctfromthegoalspursuedbytheindividualsinit.Bycommitmenttothispurpose,wemeana“volitionalpsychologicalbondreflectingdedicationtoandresponsibilityfor”thispurpose(Klein,Molloy,&Brinsfield,2012).Bysharedcommitment,werefertothecommitmentexperiencedbyalargeproportionoftheorganization’smembers:thedegreeofsharingmayvary,butataminimum,itgoesbeyondthetopmanagementteam.Forsimplicity,werefertothisconstructsimplyassharedpurpose.

Sharedpurposemaybeexalted(“Weaimtocurecancer”)ormundane(“Wemakegreatcheapshoes”):ineitherform,itcanvaluableinprovidingmotivationanddirectionforemployees’efforts.Inthis,sharedpurposeissimilartothejobcharacteristicsmodelconceptof“tasksignificance”—thefeelingthatone’sjobwillhaveanimpactonthewell-beingofothers(Grant,2008;Hackman&Oldham,1976;Humphrey,Nahrgang,&Morgeson,2007).Ourfocushere,however,isnotonwhatIdoorontheeffectofmyindividualeffortsonotherpeople:itisonwhatwedoasanorganizationandontheimpactofourcollectiveeffortsonthebroadersociety.Ourfocalquestionisnotaboutmotivationandtask-designenablersatanindividuallevel(importantthoughtheseare),butaboutcollectivemotivationanditsorganization-designenablers(Chen&Kanfer,2006).Sharedpurposeinoursenseismorecloselyrelatedtoconceptssuchasorganizationalmission—whattheorganizationdoestofulfillitspurpose;organizationalvision—whattheorganization(orthesocietyitserves)willlooklikeifitspurposeisfulfilled;andorganizationalidentity—thecentral,enduring,anddistinctivefeaturesthatdefinewhoweareandwhatwedowhenwepursuethispurpose.

Usingsharedpurposeinthissense,BillGeorge,formerMedtronicChairman,expressedhisviewofitsimportancetomotivationthisway:

“Everyonewantstobefairlycompensatedforhisorherefforts.Butthatisnotenough[…][R]ealmotivationcomesfrombelievingthattheirworkhasapurpose,andthattheyareapartofalargerefforttoachievesomethingtrulyworthwhile.Whenacompanyoffersthemthissenseofpurposeconsistentlyoveralongperiodoftime—withoutdeviatingandwithoutvacillating—thenemployeeswillbuyintothecompany'smissionandmakethecommitmenttofulfillingit.Theywillgotheextramiletoservecustomers.Thatmaymeanworkingwellintothenightoracceleratingthetimetableforacrucialnew-productintroduction”(George,2001).

Sharedpurposemattersfordirectionaswellasmotivation.Nordstrom’spurpose—“provideafabulouscustomerexperiencebyempoweringcustomersandtheemployeeswhoservethem”—helpsorienteverydayproblem-solvingatalllevelsoftheorganization(Ross,Beath,&Sebastian,2015).

Thankstoanearliergenerationofresearch—mostnotablybySelznick(1957)—weunderstandtheimportanceofsharedpurposetoorganizationalperformance,andwehavesome

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insightintothepathwaysforitscreation.Selznick’sbasicargumentwasthattheformalrationalityprovidedbybureaucracycannotbyitselfprovidetheunityofactionandinstitutionalrobustnessthatisaffordedbythe“infusionofvalue”andthecreationofsharedpurpose(1957:21).Inverystablecontexts,sharedpurposemaynotbeessentialfororganizationalperformance:here,topmanagementcanspecifytheorganization’sgoals,translatethemintooperationalprocedures,andhirepeoplesimplytoimplementtheseprocedures.But,Selznickargues,inmoredynamiccontexts,lower-levelmanagersandemployeesneedtobeabletoadapttheirbehaviortochangingcircumstances,andtheorganizationaleffectivenesswillbegreateriftheselower-levelmembersusetheirunderstandingoftheorganization’spurposetoguidethisadaptation.Heoutlinedaportfolioofleadershipactionsthatcaninfusevalueandcreateunityofpurposeacrosslarge,complexorganizations(seeKraatz,2015fordiscussionsofSelznick'scontemporayrelevance).

However,whileSelznick’sresearchhelpsusunderstandwheresharedpurposemattersandtheroleofleadershipininfusingit,heofferslittleguidanceonthespecificfeaturesoforganizationdesignthatwouldsupportitsemergenceandmaintenance.Indeed,sharedpurposeposesapuzzlefororganizationdesign.

Tosummarizetheargumentwedevelopfurtherbelow,thepuzzleliesinthefollowingconundrum.Ontheonehand,indynamicallychangingcontexts,organizationaleffectivenessisenhancedifboththemeaningoftheorganization’spurposeandhowbesttoachieveitareconstantlyreevaluatedbymembersateveryleveloftheorganizationintheirdailywork.Suchcontexts,wewillargue,callforanorganizationdesignthatinstitutionalizesasmodal,normativelyexpected,aformofsocialactionthatWeber(1978)called“value-rational.”Value-rationality,explainsWeber,isatypeofsocialactionthatischaracterizedby“theconsciousbeliefinthevalue,foritsownsake,ofsomeethical,religious,political,aestheticorotherformofbehavior,independentlyofitsprospectsofsuccess”(Weber,1968,p. 24).Itisbasedon“clearlyself-consciousformulationoftheultimatevaluesgoverningtheactionandtheconsistentlyplannedorientationofitsdetailedcoursetothesevalues.…[T]hemeaningoftheactiondoesnotlieintheachievementofaresultulteriortoit,butincarryingoutthespecifictypeofactionforitsownsake.”(Weber,1978:Vol.1,p.25).

Butontheotherhand,thereisconsiderabledoubtthatvalue-rationalitycanbesuccessfullyinstitutionalizedinlarge,complexenterprises.Value-rationalityismorereadilyinstitutionalizedinsmallerorganizationsthattakewhatWebercalleda“collegial”form.Here,smallscaleandsharedsocializationsupportahighlyegalitariandecision-makingstructureorientedtoasharedultimatevalue(Satow,1975;Waters,1989;Weber,1978,pp.263,271-82,994-98,1089-90).Thisgivesthecollegialorganizationgreatflexibilityinrespondingtochangingcontexts.However,Weberhimselfandmanysincehimhavearguedthatonceorganizationsgrowinsizeandininternalcomplexity,organizationaleffectivenessdemandsthatvalue-rationalitygivewaytoinstrumental-rationality;thecollegialorganizationdesignmutatesintobureaucracy;andtheorganization’sabilitytorespondtoadynamicenvironmentishobbled.Selznickarguedthatwiseleadershipcanhelporganizationsavoidthisfate;butheofferedlittleinsightintotherequisiteorganizationdesign.

Wearguethatthispuzzlecanberesolvedinanorganizationaldesignthatwecall“collaborative”incontradistinctiontoWeber’scollegialmodel.SinceWeber’stime,sustained,albeitdispersed,effortsbypractitionersinmanyorganizationshavegivenrisetoafamilyofnewmanagerialtechniquesthatenablethescaling-upofvalue-rationalitysothatitcansupportnotonlyresponsiveadaptationtoadynamicexternalenvironment,butalsounityofpurposeacrossacomplexdivisionoflaborinlargeorganizationsunderperformancepressure.Weidentifyafamilyofinnovativetechniquesinstrategyprocesses,operationalsystems,reportingstructures,aswellasskillformationandcompensationpoliciesthattogetheryieldamutationthattakesusfromWeber’scollegialitytothishistoricallynew,collaborativeorganizationdesign.

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Thiscollaborativeorganizationaldesign(orformormodel—wewillusethetermsinterchangeably)sitsuneasilywithintheprofitabilityconstraintsofthebusinesssector.Whilethoseconstraintssometimesencouragetheemergenceofthecollaborativeform,theysometimesundermineit,inparticularbypushingexecutivestomakedecisionsthatreinforceemployees’instrumental-rationalityintheirrelationtotheorganizationorthatcontradictemployees’understandingoftheorganization’spurpose.Asaresult,theimplementationofthiscollaborativemodelisprecarious,evenasthemodelitselfhasbeenprogressivelyrefinedthroughthesevariousmanagementinnovations.Thisprecariousnesshasrenderedalmostinvisiblethatprogress.Weaimtoremedythisinvisibilitybyshowinghowthesevariousmanagerialinnovationsresolvethefundamentalchallengesinvolvedinscaling-upvalue-rationalityforlarger,morecomplexorganizations.

Webeginbyclarifyingfurthertheconceptofsharedpurposeandbyidentifyingthekeypracticalimpedimentstoachievingit.Wethenexplainwhyvalue-rationalityprovidesthefoundationforsharedpurposeinorganizationsfacingdynamicallychangingenvironment.Thesubsequentsectionidentifiesfourkeyorganizationalchallengesfacingeffortstoscaleupvalue-rationalityinlarge,complexorganizations.Wethenidentifytheorganizationaldesignprinciplesthatcouldovercomeeachofthosechallenges,andidentifyseveralmanagementtechniquesthatembodyeachofthoseprinciplesandthatjointlycharacterizetheemergentcollaborativedesign.Weconcludebydiscussingthecostsandbenefitsofthiscollaborativedesignandsomedirectionsforfutureresearch.

SHAREDPURPOSEANDITSIMPEDIMENTS

Theideaofsharedpurposehasonlyrecentlyresurfacedinmanagementdiscourseafteralongperiodofneglect(Singleton,2014;Singleton,2011).MaryParkerFollettwrotein1927:

“Theleaderreleasesenergy,unitesenergies,andallwiththeobjectnotonlyofcarryingoutapurpose,butofcreatingfurtherandlargerpurposes.AndIdonotmeanherebylargerpurposesmergersormorebranches;Ispeakoflargerinthequalitativeratherthanthequantitativesense.Imeanpurposeswhichwillincludemoreofthosefundamentalvaluesforwhichmostofusagreewearereallyliving”(Follett,Metcalf,&Urwick,1942:168).

Adecadelater,ChesterBarnardfurtherdevelopedthisidea,arguingthatformalorganizationsweredefinedbytheconjunctionofsharedpurpose,participantswillingtoservethatpurpose,andacommunicationsystemtyingtheireffortstogether(Barnard,1938:82).UnlikeFollettorsomecurrentproponents,Barnardsawsharedpurposeasauniversalrequirementinbusiness—notassomethingreservedfororganizationspursuinganunusuallyexaltedmission.Hepostulatedthatnoorganizationcouldbeeffectiveunlessitfunctionedasa“cooperative”system,bywhichhemeantthatallitspersonnelwerewillingtosubordinatetheirpersonalneedsandpreferencestothecooperativepursuitofthatpurpose.Theprimaryfunctionofthecommunicationsystemwasnottocommunicatemanagementordersdownward,butratherto“inculcate”thissenseofpurposeacrosstheentireorganization:“Theinculcationofbeliefintherealexistenceofacommonpurposeisanessentialexecutivefunction”(Barnard,1938:87).

Barnard’sworkwasdeepenedandextendedinPhilipSelznick’sclassicworkonLeadershipinAdministration(Selznick,1957).Selznickheredistinguishedthe“technical”fromthe“institutional”dimensionsoforganization.Thetechnicaldimensioncallsfordeploymentofformally-rationalbureaucraticstructures.Theinstitutionaldimensionrequiresthe“infusionofvalue”viathe“institutionalembodiment”ofsubstantiverationality,expressedinasharedsenseoftheorganization’spurpose.Byinstitutionalembodiment,Selznickreferredtothedeploymentofbothformalandinformalstructuresandprocessesbytheorganization’sleaderstoconsolidate

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boththesalienceofthefocalvalueandthesharedcommitmenttothispurpose(Besharov&Khurana,2015;Hinings&Greenwood,2015;Kraatz&Flores,2015).

SinceSelznick,somepopularbusinesswriterscontinuedtohighlightthecentralityofsharedpurpose.PeterDrucker,forexample,arguedthatthepurposeofthefirmcouldonlybetomeetacustomer’sneeds;thatthispurposeshouldtakeprecedenceoverthesearchforprofits;thatthislogicalorderingwouldbethebestwaytoassurelong-termprofitability;andthatthecustomer’sneedsshouldguidethedailyworkofeveryoneintheorganization(Drucker&Maciariello,2008:101).Morerecently,severalpractitioner-orientedwriters(Bushe&Marshak,2014;Collins&Porras,1996;Laloux,2014;Meyer,2016;Porras&Collins,1997)havesoughttomaketheconceptofsharedpurposecentraltothetheoryoforganizationalandstrategiceffectiveness.

Incontrasttothesepractitioner-orientedwriters,scholarlywritershavebeendeeplyskeptical.Theyhavebeencriticalofwhattheyseeasthesimplisticandunrealisticdeploymentoftheconceptofsharedpurpose.AsnotedbyMarchandSutton(1997):

“Organizationsarecommonlydefinedasinstrumentsofpurpose.Theyareseenascoordinatedbyintentionsandgoals.Suchaformulationhasoftentroubledstudentsoforganizations.Itisnotclearthatorganizationalpurposecanbeportrayedasunitaryorthatthemultiplepurposesofanorganizationarereliablyconsistent.Itisnotclearthatasingleconceptionofpurposesissharedamongparticipantsinanorganization”(March&Sutton,1997:698).

Letusbrieflyreviewthemainreasonsforthisskepticism.Theyfallintotwoclusters:lackofpurposeandmultiplicityofpurposes.

First,somescholarsarguethatbusinessenterprisestodayarestillmostlybasedonwage-labor—alternativegovernancestructuressuchasself-employmentandcooperativesarerelativelyrare—andinsuchorganizations,employees’relationstotheenterpriseareessentiallyinstrumental.Thisviewissharedbybothstandardmicro-economictheoryandalonglineageofcriticalsociology(Bendix,1956;Etzioni,1975;Marx,1990[1867]).Employeesworktoearnawage,nottoparticipateinthepursuitofanycollectivepurposethattheirmanagersmighthaveinview.Inthissamelineofreasoning,manyarguethateveniftheideaofsharedpurposeisattractiveformotivationalreasons,managersofbusinessorganizationsmustfirstandforemostsatisfythedemandsofinvestorsforthehighestpossiblefinancialreturns:iftheultimatepurposeofthefirmistoenrichinvestors,suchapurposeisunlikelytogarnerthecommitmentofmanyemployees(Marens,2009).

Thesecondreasonforskepticismisthatinanygivenorganizationwearelikelytofindseveralcompetingpurposes.Indeed,withinthecapitalistfirm,thereareoftenmultiple,competingpurposesintensionwitheachother.“Maximizingourinvestors’profits”canindeedfunctionasasharedpurposeinsomesettings.Torealizeanyprofits,however,thefirmmustprovideuse-valuesdesiredbyitscustomers,andmustmaintainenoughsociallegitimacytoassureitslicensetooperate.Puttingasideanyethicalconsiderationsandadoptingapurelypracticalviewofthematter,theseotherstakeholders’expectationsoftenimposethemselvesasimportanttoo.Butthegoalofmaximizingprofitsisnotalwayseasytoreconcilewithgoalsofcustomersorcommunity.1

1Thedebatebetweenthosewhoseethefundamentalpurposeofthefirmascreatingshareholderwealthandthosewhoseeitasmeetingtheneedsofcustomersandotherstakeholders(forexampleFreeman,Wicks,andParmar(2004);SundaramandInkpen(2004))seemstoustomisstwoessentialpoints.First,itisdifficult,althoughnotimpossible,toestablishmaximizingshareholderwealthasasharedpurpose.Eveniftopmanagersmightembraceitassuch,forlowerlevelsintheorganizationitappearsmostoftenasanexternalconstraintratherthanaconsummatevalue.Second,thecapitalistfirmischaracterizedpreciselybythe

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Moreover,ontheuse-valuesideofthistension,therearetypicallymultipledimensionsofqualitywhoserelativeimportanceiscontestedandnoteasilycommensurated.Notsurprisingly,therefore,weoftenfindthatdifferentgroupswithintheorganizationattributetotheorganizationdifferentpurposes.Inahospitalforexample,wemightfindthatdoctors,nurses,patients,andadministratorshavedifferentviewsofultimatepurposeoftheorganization(e.g.Morgan&Ogbonna,2008).

Notwithstandingthechallengesinvolved,someexecutivesseethepotentialbenefitsofsharedpurposeassufficienttowarrantseriouseffortstomovefroma“contested”or“estranged”relationshipamongcompetingvaluesandpurposestoan“aligned”relationship(BesharovandSmith2014);fromsegmentingorcompromisesolutionstocreativeintegrationandsynthesissolutions(BattilanaandLee2014,PrattandForeman2000);andfrommultiple,competing,materialgoalstoasharedpurpose(BartlettandGhoshal1994,2002;Cartonetal2015).

Weconcludethateffortstoinfusevalueandcreatesharedpurposeencounterimportantpracticalimpediments,butthattheseimpedimentsdonotdetereveryonefromtrying.Thosewhowouldtry,however,needmoreguidance.

FOUNDATIONSOFSHAREDPURPOSE

Assuggestedearlier,Selznick’sclassicworkonLeadershipinAdministration(Selznick,1957)isakeystartingpoint.Herewefindacompellingargumentthatanorganizationdeployingformalrationalityinitsstructureandprocessesneednotdepriveitselfofthebenefitsofsubstantiverationalityifleadersinfusetheorganizationwithasharedcommitmenttothosesubstantivevalues.Selznick’saccount,however,isthinontheorganizationdesignfeaturesthatmightberequiredtosupportthateffort.

Tosharpenouraccountofthisorganizationdesign—andtopinpointthepuzzleitmustresolve—wecontrastitwithseveralotherorganizationdesignoptions.OuraccountoftheseoptionsbuildsonWeber.Weberarguedthatsocialaction—ourinteractionswithotherpeople—canbecharacterizedintermsoffourbasictypes—instrumentally-rational,traditionalistic,affectual,andvalue-rational(Weber,1978:24ff.).AsWeberandmanysincehaveargued,eachtypeofsocialactioncanserveasthegroundingforadistinctivetypeoforganizationdesign,insofarasthistypeofactionbecomesinstitutionalizedasthemodal,legitimatetypeofactionamongmembersoftheorganization.(Onthemacroandmicroprocessesthatcontributetolegitimationandinstitutionalization,see(Bitektine&Haack,2015);onWeber’slinkageoftypesofactiontotypesoforganizationsee(Weber,1978:pp.212-213).)Aswithotherideal-typeformulations(Doty&Glick,1994),ourworkingassumptionisthatanygivenorganizationwillembodyamixoforganizationalideal-types.

Considerfirstinstrumentally-rationalaction.Thistypeofsocialactionisorientedtoselectingthemostefficientmeansforachievingagiven,taken-for-grantedend.Toinstitutionalizeinstrumentally-rationalactionispreciselytoobviatetheneedforsharedpurpose.Herethe“master”oftheorganizationsetsitspurposeandspecifiesoperationalmeansthatareinstrumentally-rationalinachievingthispurpose;thepurposeandmeansaretobetakenforgrantedbythemembers;indecidingontheircourseofactionineverydaywork,membersneednot

tensionbetweenthesetwopurposes,whichwecantheorizeasexchange-valueversususe-value.Thereisnoshareholderwealth(exchange-value)createdexceptbyofferingaproductorservicewhoseutility(use-value)isvaluedenoughbycustomers.Thesetwotypesofgoalssometimesreinforceeachother,butsometimesnot.Thedisjunctionbetweenthetwotypesisnotonlyacontingentresultoftheconfrontationofthecomplexityoftheworldwithhumanfrailties—forexample,inourdifficultyseeinghowtoreconcileshort-termandlong-termgoals—butastructuralfeatureofourcapitalisteconomies,afeaturethatgivesitbothitscharacteristicdynamismanditsmarketfailures.

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interrogatethemeaningofthatpurpose:inthelanguageofSimontheybecometaken-for-granted“decisionpremises”(Simon,1947[1997]).Membersrelationshiptotheorganizationisitselfmerelyinstrumentaltotheirownindividualmaterialends.

Suchinstrumental-rationalitycanbeinstitutionalizedbyeitheroftwoorganizationalforms—thelegal-rationalbureaucracyorthecompetitivemarket.First,institutionalizedinabureaucraticorganizationalform,thepurposeoftheorganizationmightbe“todeliverefficientlyourfast-foodproductstoourcustomers”(or,forapublic-sectoranalogue,“todeliverefficientlydrivers’licensestoourclients”).Employeesarenotaskedtoponderwhat’sonthemenu,orwhattheproductsaremadeof,orhowtheyshoulddeliverthoseproducts:thosearequestionsreservedfortopmanagementandtheirstaffexperts.Employeesaretotaketheorganization’spurposeasgiven,andtobehaveinaninstrumentally-rationalway:iftheywanttokeeptheirjob,theyaretoimplementthecorrespondingproceduresasefficientlyaspossible.Suchaninstrumentally-rationalbureaucracywouldbeeffectiveinacontextthatwasstableenoughtoallowtopmanagerstodesignefficientworkprocedures;wheretheycouldrelyonfinancialincentives(eitherasbonusesorpromotions)todriveemployeestoconformtothoseprocedures;andwheremereconformancetoproceduresandcommandswassufficienttoassureadequateorganizationalperformance.Whileweshouldnotunderestimatethecreativitythatdedicatedbureaucratscanbringtotheireffortsatsuchconformance(duGay,2000),thisrule-baseddesignhasproveninsufficientlyresponsiveinmoredynamicenvironments.

Second,instrumentally-rationalactioncouldbeinstitutionalizedbyamarketformoforganization,wherethepurposeoftheorganizationmightbesomethinglike“tomaximizeourinvestors’returns.”Here,employeesarenotaskedtoponderwhetherinvestorsreallycareonlyaboutfinancialreturns,noraboutwhattypeofinvestorthefirmaimstoattract:thosearequestionsreservedfortopmanagement.Employeesaretotakethispurposeasgiven,andtokeeptheirjobs,theyaretousetheircreativityandinitiativetogenerateasmuchprofitaspossible.Suchamarket-typeofinstrumentally-rationalorganizationdesignwouldbeeffectivewheretasksareindependent;goalscanbecloselyspecified;performanceoutcomescanbecloselymonitoredandfinanciallyrewarded;andwhereasaresult,employeescanbeleftautonomousintheirchoiceofmeans.Thismarketformcouldleadtohighperformancewheretheexternalcontextisdynamicbuttheinternalcontextissimpleandtheorganizationsmallenough(oritcanbebrokenupintosmallenoughindependentunits)toallowthemanagerssimplytoorderemployeestochangedirectioninresponsetoenvironmentalchanges.Thismarketconfigurationwouldfail,however,toprovideeffectivemotivationanddirectioninmorecomplexorganizations,whereactivitiesareinterdependentratherthanindependent.

Suchbureaucraticormarketorganizationdesignsaimtoeliminatetheneedforsharedpurpose.Assuchtheycouldbeeffectiveinonlyaverynarrowrangeofcircumstances,atbest.Wherecontextsareevenalittledynamicorwheretheorganizationisevenalittlemorecomplex,theorganization’sperformancewillsufferunlessitincorporateselementsofoneormoreoftheotherthreetypesdiscussedbelow.Moreover,inpractice,membersofsuchorganizationsstrivetogivetheirwork-livesmoremeaning,andthisgivesrisetoahostofinformalorganizationalfeaturesreflectingthoseotherthreetypes.

Considernextthetraditionalistictypeofaction.ForWeber,socialactionis“traditional”(traditionalisticwouldbealessambiguoustranslation)whenitisguidedbyreverenceforestablishedcustoms.Traditionalisticactioncanbeinstitutionalizedinthe“clan”typeoforganization(seeOuchi(1979:838);OuchiandJaeger(1978:307)).Here,thepurposeoftheorganizationmightbeunderstoodas“Ourorganizationisdedicatedtothepreservationofourpreciousculinarytraditions.”Awidelysharedcommitmenttosuchapurposecanengendergreatorganizationalcohesionandstabilityeveninthecontextofalargeandcomplexorganization;but

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thisconfigurationprovidesaweakfoundationforflexibleandinnovativeadaptationtoadynamicexternalcontext.

Nowconsidertheaffectualtypeofsocialaction,whichisorientedbyemotionalattachments.Weberwrites:“Actionisaffectualifitsatisfiesaneedforrevenge,sensualgratification,devotion,contemplativebliss,orforworkingoffemotionaltensions(irrespectiveofthelevelofsublimation)”(Weber,1978:Vol.1,p.25).Affectualaction,likethevalue-rationaltypeofactionwediscussbelow,isorientedbyafocusonitsendsratherthanitsmeans;but,unlikevalue-rationalaction,itisnon-rationalinitschoiceofbothmeansandends.Affectualactioncanbeinstitutionalizedinthecharismaticformoforganization,whichisbasedonmembers’devotionalconnectiontoinspiringleadersandtheirvision.Sharedpurposeheremightbe,“OurorganizationaimstobringMichaelKors’revolutionaryvisionoffashiontonewmarkets.”Thecharismaticorganizationalformrequiresasmaller,simpler,moreorganically-structuredinternalorganizationalcontext(Pillai&Meindl,1998).Suchorganizationscanbeeffectiveinconfrontingadynamicexternalcontextwithradicallycreativeandrevolutionarychange(Howell&Avolio,1993;Jyoti&Dev,2015).Butthistypeofsharedpurposeandorganizationalformareill-suitedtothecontextoflarger,morecomplex,businessenterprises,especiallythosewhoseenvironmentsdemanddisciplinedefficiencyandtimeliness(Weber,1978:Vol.2,Ch.III).

Finally,considerthevalue-rationaltypeofaction.Value-rationalsocialactionisuniquelysuitedtodynamiccontextsbecausesuchcontextscallforthecontinualandrationalconsiderationofultimatevaluesinchartingtheappropriatecourseofconductinchangingcircumstances.Oneexample:tobemaximallyeffective,doctorsmustcontinuallyorienttheiractionbyexplicitreferencetotheultimatevalueofrestoringthehealthofthepatient.Doctorswillbefarlesseffectiveiftheiractionisdrivenprimarilybyfinancialincentives,bybureaucratically-definedprocedures,bytradition,orbyemotion(James,2012).Thisputsthemsquarelyinthecategoryofvalue-rationalsocialaction.Value-rationalactioncanbeinstitutionalizedinthe“collegial”formoforganization—agroupofequals,makingdecisionsbasedonconsensus,boundtogetherbytheircommoncommitmenttothatultimatevalue(Waters,1989).Doctorswhoworkinacollegialmedicalofficecanrelyonthiscommonpurposetoenablesmoothintegrationoftheirvariouseffortsastheyworktogethertodiagnoseandcureapatient.

Here,however,wefindourselvesconfrontingthecentralpuzzlethatmotivatesourpaper:canthevalue-rationaltypeofsocialactionbeininstitutionalizedinlarger,morecomplexorganizations?AswenotedintheIntroduction,Weberdoubtedit.Inhisview,collegialstructureslackedafeatureessentialforadequateperformanceinsuchcontexts,namely“legitimatedomination”andtheassociatedcapacityforimperativecommand.Indeed,aswehavejustseen,undervalue-rationality,eachindividualactor’sbehaviorisorientedaboveallbyhisorherpersonalcommitmenttotheultimateend-values.Inasocialorderbasedonvalue-rationality,actioniscoordinatedamongactorsnotbycommandsbutbydialogueunderpinnedbytheirsharedcommitmentthoseend-values.SuchasocialorderisthereforeapoorinstrumentforHerrschaft—unsuitableforimplementingthedominatingwillofamaster.Astheygrowincomplexityandscale,andastheycomeunderperformancepressure,collegialorganizationsmust,toavoidfailure,inevitablymutateintobureaucracies(Mommsen,1974;Waters,1989).Perhapsitisthisskepticismthatexplainstheabsenceofreferencestovalue-rationalityinSelznick,Etzioni(1975),andMintzberg(1989).2

2IntermsofWeber’stypology,Selznick’sportraitofpurposereliesonamixoftraditionalistic,affectual,andvalue-rationalactionoperatingalongsidetheformalorganizationalstructure.Selznick’stextmakespassingreferencetosituationsthatseemtoimplicatedifferenttypesofaction—traditionalistic(p.17),affectual(p.18)andvalue-rational(p.57)—butnevercallsoutthesetypesasdistinct.Theclosesthecomestoanydifferentiationisonp.102wherehequotesKatzsuggestingthatearlyinthelifecycleofaninstitutionthe

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FOURCHALLENGESINSCALING-UPVALUE-RATIONALITY

AfewothersociologistssinceWeberhavebeenmoreoptimisticaboutthepossibilityofscalingupvalue-rationality,thinkingofthetaskascreatingnotaformofadministrationthatwouldsustainHerrschaft,butaformofself-governmentbyacollectivity.Thesescholarshaveclaimedthatvalue-rationalityfunctionsasthecentralorganizingprincipleofsuchlarge-scalecollectivitiesasideologically-drivenpoliticalparties(Willer,1967),constitutionalstates(Spencer,1970),autonomousprofessionalorganizations(Satow,1975),andsome“alternative”cooperatives(Rothschild-Whitt,1979).HeckscherandAdler(2006)extendthismoreoptimisticaccountwithasetofcasestudiesthathighlighttheemergenceofthevalue-rationalforminthecontemporarycorporatesector.

Theskepticscounterthatinthesecases,truevalue-rationalityistypicallyprecarious.Evenradicalpoliticalpartiesoftensuccumbtothe“ironlawofoligarchy”(Michels,1966).Constitutionalstatesoftenbecomeauthoritarianwhentheirdominantpowersarechallenged(Schmitt,1988).Liberalprofessionsoftendevolveintoself-interestedmonopolies(Brint,1994;Waters,1989).Andcooperativeundertakingsoftenreverttohierarchicaldomination(Freeman,1972).

Synthesizingthisskepticaltradition,wecantracethechallengesinscaling-upvalue-rationalityinfourdimensionsoforganization.3Werevieweachbrieflynow,andthesubsequentsectiondiscusseshowtheymightbeovercome.

leader“mayemphasizeinitiative,creativity,daringandtosomeextentarejectionoftraditionalpathwaystogoalsandevenareformulationoforganizationalgoals”(withechoesofcharisma),whereaslaterinthelifecycletheemphasismightshiftto“conformitytotradition,anemphasisontraditionalpathwaystoconventionalgoals”(withechoesoftraditionalism).ButSelznickdoesnotbuildonKatz’sideainanysystematicway.Nowhereinthisvolumenor(asbestwehavebeenabletoascertain)inhislaterworkdidSelznickrefereitherexplicitlyorimplicitlytovalue-rationalityorcollegiality,norindeedtoeitheroftheothertwotypes.Instead,hisaccountmarriesallthreeasformsof“substantiverationality”intheircontrastwiththe“formalrationality”ofbureaucraticstructure.AsnotedbyKrygier(2012:71-72),Selznick’sbasicargumentwasthattheideal-typesofsocialactionandorganizationwhichWeberdifferentiatedsocarefullywereofteninpracticecombined,anditwaspreciselythiscombinationthatSelznicksoughttohighlight.WenoteinpassingthatEtzioni’s“normative”typeoforganization(contrastedwithhisutilitarianandcoercivetypes)isevennarrower,relyingentirelyonaffectual-action-basedcharismaasthesourceofthesharednormsandgoals(Etzioni,1975:XII,XIII).Mintzberg’s“missionary”typeisinthisrespectidenticaltoEtzioni’snormativetype(Mintzberg,1989:ch.12).3WetakethesedimensionsforParsons.Parsons(1971)arguesthatanyenduringsocialsystem—includingorganizations—mustsatisfyfourfunctionalimperatives:Latency,Integration,Goalattainment,andAdaptation.Latency,orlatentpatternmaintenance,referstothecapacityofthesocialsystemtotransmitvaluesandbeliefsystemstonewmembers.Integrationreferstotheestablishmentofbehavioralexpectationsthatallowforthecomplementarityofdifferentiatedroles.GoalAttainmentreferstothecapacityofthesystemtosetgoalsandpursuethemsystematically.Adaptationreferstothecapacityofthesystemtodrawrequisiteresourcesfromitsenvironment.Parsonsarguesfurtherthatincomplexsocialsystems,thesefunctionsaretypicallydistributedacrossdifferentiatedsubsystems.Withinorganizations,Latencyisassuredbysystemsthatfosterinternalizedvaluessharedacrosstheorganization;Integrationisassuredbytheinteractionalnormsthatsetbehavioralexpectationsforrelationshipsamongpeopleplayingspecializedroles;Goalattainmentisassuredbytheauthoritystructureofleadershipandreportingrelationshipsthatallowsittoformulateandpursuegoals;andAdaptationisassuredbythecapabilitiesthatallowtheorganizationtorespondtochangesintheexternalenvironment(Heckscher,2009).WeshouldnotethatParsons’isnottheonlyframeworkwecoulduseforthepurposesofthetheoryweaimtodevelopinthisarticle;butithastheadvantagesoftheoreticaldepth,generality,andparsimony.Moreover,itskeyconstructsoverlapwithothersintheorganizationtheorytool-kit:Latency/valuescorrespondstowhatmuchorganizationalresearchcalls“culture;”Integration/normsoverlapsmuchoftheconceptualterritoryof“organizationalclimate;”Goal-

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Values:fragmentation

Valuesplaythepivotalroleinvalue-rationalaction,andsharedvalues—intheformofsharedpurpose—playthecentralroleinassuringthecohesionofacollegialstructure.Butthiscohesiondependsonsharedoccupationalsocialization,andasaresult,collegialstructuresrelyonoccupationalhomogeneity.Howthencanasenseofsharedpurposebecreatedandsustainedacrossalarge,complexenterpriserequiringthecoordinatedeffortsofmultipledifferentoccupations?More:eveniftheyshareacommonoccupationalbackground,oncepeopleareemployedbytheenterpriseandassignedtoadistinctsubunitwithaspecificsetoftasks,new,distinct,subunitsub-culturesemerge:howcanthatsharedvaluecommitmentbesustainedinthecontextofsuchsubunitdifferentiation?Howcansharedpurpose’ssaliencebemaintainedgiventhecentripetal,fragmentingforceofdiverseinterestsandidentities(Alvesson,2012;Martin,1992)?Norms:goaldisplacement

Normsarethebehavioralexpectationsmembershaveofeachotherinthespecializedrolestheyplayatwork.Anylarger,morecomplexorganizationunderperformancepressurewillneedtostandardizeandformalizesomeofthesenorms(forexample,as“bestpractice”procedures)inordertoachieveacceptablelevelsofefficiencyandcontrol.TheresultingchallengeisonedescribedbyMerton(1940)as“goaldisplacement”:insteadoforientingtheirconducttowardtheultimatepurpose,memberswillorientthemselvestotheirsuperiors’demandforconformancewiththeseprocedures.Authority:centralization.

Atasmallscale,thecollegialstructure—aflatstructurecharacterizedbymutualadaptationamongpeers—sufficestocoordinateaction.Butatlargescaleandwithfunctionallydifferentiatedsubunits,organizationsunderperformancepressurecannotoperateeffectivelywithoutahierarchyofauthoritythatenablesthe(selective)centralizationofdecision-making(Jaques,1989).Thishierarchicalauthoritystructureinturnchallengestheveryfoundationofvalue-rationalaction,whichisactionwhereactorsdecideforthemselvesonthemostappropriatecourseofconductasafunctionoftheirowncommitmenttotheultimatepurpose. Capabilities:specialization.

Larger,complexenterprisesrelyonspecializedskillsandonsubunitsthatgrouptogethersuchspecialties.Thisspecializationposesintegrationchallenges,notonlybecausevaluesandnormsbecomedifferentiated,butalsobecauseactors’skillsetsarenarrowed,andactorsthuscometoinhabitdifferentiated“thoughtworlds”(Dougherty,1992).Thebest-practicemechanismsforcoordinatingthesesubunits—standards,plans,andspecializedintegratingroles—areeffectivepreciselybecausetheyobviatetheneedforwidely-sharedpurpose,leavingthegreatermassofmembersfreetocultivatetheirspecializedskillsandtofocusonsubunits’localgoals(Galbraith,1973;Grant&Baden-Fuller,1995).Whengreatertaskinterdependencerequiresmoreintensivecross-unitintegration,theappropriatemechanismisthecross-functionalteam(Lawrence&Lorsch,1967;VandeVen,Delbecq,&Koenig,1976);buthereorganizationsencounteraseveretradeoffbetweenbreadthanddepthofskills.Thistradeoffisfurthersharpenedbytheorganization’scompensationpolicies:thesepoliciesneedtosupportthedevelopmentanddeploymentofeitherbroadskillsrequiredforeffectiveparticipationincross-functionalteamsorthedeeplyspecializedskillsrequiredinacomplexdifferentiatedorganizationalstructure(Kretschmer&Puranam,2008).

attainment/authorityandAdaptation/capabilitiesarewidelyacknowledgedaskeydimensionsoforganizationdesign(Galbraith,2002;Heckscher,2009;Jones,2012).

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FROMCOLLEGIALITYTOCOLLABORATION

Theprevioussectionexplainedwhythecollegialmodeldoesnotscaletosupportthecollaborationrequiredwhenspecializedgroupsengageininterdependentactivityorientedtoadynamicallychangingexternalenvironment.4Tosustainvalue-rational-basedsharedpurposeinsuchcontexts,weneedaneworganizationalformthatdoesnotpresupposehomogeneityofbackgroundortasks.

Ourthesis,asnotedintheIntroduction,isthatthepersistentneedforsuchcollaborationinindustryhaspromptedrepeatedeffortstobuildsuitableorganizations,andthatevenwithoutthebenefitofatheoreticalmodeltoguidethem,theseeffortshavegivenrisetoafamilyofmanagerialinnovationsthat,takentogether,havebeguntogivebodytoanovelorganizationdesign.

Takingcognizanceofthispracticaleffortinspiresustothecorrespondingtheoreticalproject.ItisinthisspiritthatweproposetobuildonWeber’sconceptofvalue-rationalitytoarticulatetheorganizationalprinciplesthatwouldcharacterizethiscollaborativeform,andthenusetheseinsightstobringintofocusthedeepersignificanceofthesevariousmanagerialinnovations.

Ourunderlyingtheoryisthateachoftheprinciplesundergirdingthecollaborativeformaddressesoneormoreofthekeychallengesthatweidentifiedintheprevioussection.Figure1showshowtheefforttocreatedsharedvalue-rationalpurpose,underconditionsoflargesizeandcomplexity,encounterthesechallenges,andhowthecollaborativeorganizationalformovercomeseachofthese.Aswenotedearlier,ourworkingassumptionisthatanygivenorganizationwillembodyamixoforganizationalideal-typesandforms:thecollaborativeformmightbeabsent,dominant,orpresentbutovershadowedbyothers.Wepostulatethatthemorepronouncedthecollaborativefeatures(inabsolutetermsandrelativetootherforms),thegreaterwillbethelarge,complexorganization’scapacityforsustainingthekindofvalue-rationalityandsharedpurposethatarerequiredforhighperformanceindynamiccontexts.

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InsertFigure1abouthere

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4Thechallengehereconcernsthecollaborationneededtointegrateunitaryorconjunctiveefforts,asdistinctfromcooperationneededtointegrateadditiveeffortsorthecoordinationneededwhereeffortsaredisjunctive(Steiner,1972).AccordingtotheprimarymeaningsgivenintheMerriamWebsterOnlinedictionary,coordinationisthe“harmoniousfunctioningofpartsforeffectiveresults;”cooperationmeansan“associationofpersonsforcommonbenefit;”andcollaborationmeans“toworkjointlywithothersortogetherespeciallyinanintellectualendeavor.”ThesedefinitionssuggestaGuttmanscalethatparallelsThompson’s(1967):pooledcoordinationviastandards,sequentialcooperationviaplansandschedules,andreciprocalcollaborationviamutualadjustmentandteamwork.Alongthisscale,thereareincreasinglevelsandscopeoftaskinterdependence,andmorejointeffortrequiredtodeterminemeansandendsoftheactivity.Mostcritically,coordinationandcooperationassumethattheends(goals)oftheactivityaregivenattheoutset,wherecollaborationischaracterizedbyjointefforttodefinenotonlymeansbutalsoends. ThischaracterizationfitstheuseofthetermcollaborationinkeystudiessuchasMartinandEisenhardt(2010),Thompsonetal.(2009),andWood&Gray(1991).LikeLindenbergandFoss(2011)welinkcollaborationto“jointproduction,”thatis,“anyproductiveactivitythatinvolvesheterogeneousbutcomplementaryresourcesandahighdegreeoftaskandoutcomeinterdependence(thus,contextsinwhichworkeffortsareseparableandautonomousfalloutsidetherealmofouranalyses).”

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Values:Institutionalizinganethicofcontribution

Whenorganizationsattempttoscaleupvalue-rationality,thekeychallengeinthevaluesdimensionisthatofavoidingfragmentation.Thecollaborativeorganizationalform,wesubmit,canmeetthischallengebyinstitutionalizinganethicofcontribution.Anethicofcontributionisasharedconvictionthatthemostimportantvirtueiscontributingtotheachievementtheorganization’spurpose.Thesalienceofthissharedpurposecanmotivateandguidedecision-making.TwocomplementaryfamiliesofmanagementtechniqueshaveevolvedsinceWeber’stimethatinstitutionalizesuchanethicandtherebycreateacontextthatsupportsvalue-rationalcollaborationincomplexorganizations.

Thefirstfamilyoftechniquesallowsthecollaborativeformtoforgeandsustainasharedpurposeagainstthefragmentationpressurescreatedbythecombinationofadynamicenvironmentandadiversityofmemberbackgroundsandroles.Toachievethisgoal,weneedtechniquesthatextendWeber’sconceptionofvalue-rationalityinthedirectionproposedbyHabermas(1992):thecollaborativeorganizationmustbeoneinwhichbothend-goalsandmeansforachievingthemremainsubjecttodiscussionbasedonpublic,discursivestandardsofvalidity,ratherthanrevertingtobureaucraticauthority,traditionalisticstatus,orcharismaticleadership.WhereWeberassumedthatvalue-rationalityreliedonnon-rationalcommitmentstotheultimatevalues—Nietzscheanactsofwill(Hennis,1988)anddevotiontoquasi-religious“deities”(Friedland,2013)—Habermasandlaterscholarshaveidentifiedarangeoftechniquesformakingvalue-rationaldiscoursemorethoroughlyrationalthroughanoperationalizationofthe“idealspeechsituation”(Habermas,2001).Thesetechniquesincludetheparticipativestrategyprocess(Forester,1999),thestrategicfitnessprocess(Beer,2011),searchconferences(Emery&Purser,1996),andbeyondtheorganizationalboundaries,multi-stakeholderstrategydialogues(Roloff,2008;Zadek,2008).

Oneexampleofthisdiscursiveapproachtovalue-definitionhasbeentheseriesofemployee“Jams”atIBM.In2003,allIBMpersonnelwereinvitedtodiscussontheintranetthecorecompanyvaluesanditsultimatepurpose.Over3,700employeesparticipatedinavigorousdebatecenteredonwhetherthevaluesdefinedthefoundersweresuitableforthenewera.Ayearlaterover13,000participatedinasecondJamabouthowthecorevaluesshouldguidetheirdailywork.AnalysisoftheseJamsshowsaremarkablyhighlevelofHabermasiandiscourse:higher-levelmanagersdidnotdominate;lowerlevelsdidnothesitatetodisagreewiththeirsuperiors—oftenvehemently;andthediscussiongraduallydevelopedandclarifiedacomplexsenseofpurposethatappearedtobesharedbythebulkofparticipants(Heckscheretal,2017).

Thesecondfamilyoftechniquesaimsensurethesalienceoftheultimatepurposeasasuperordinategoalineverydaydecision-making(Sherif,1958).Theyhelpfocusinternaldiscussionsonthecontributiontheorganizationmakestothebroadersocietyandtounfoldtheimplicationsofthatpurposeformultiple,lower-level,shorter-termlocalgoals.NumerouscompanieshaveadoptedtechniquessuchasQualityFunctionDeployment(Akao,2004),theBalancedScorecard(Kaplan&Norton,2001),andtheHoshinKanriplanningprocess(Cole,1999)inordertotranslatecustomerneedsandtheorganization’smultidimensionalvalueprioritiesintotermsthatcanguideevery-day,localdecision-makingthroughouttheorganization.Thesetechniqueshaveblossomedinrecentdecadesascompaniesorientthemselvesawayfromcommodityproductsandtowardscustomer-specific,integratedsolutions.Thesetechniqueshelpthecollaborativeorganizationformensurethattheorganization’spurposeisatthecenteroforganizationallife:thepurposeispersonallymeaningful,andeachmembercanrefertothoseultimatevaluestochooseappropriateactionswhenfacedwithnewandunforeseencircumstances.

Thechallengeoftranslatingpurposeintodailydecision-makingwasverysalientatonehealthcareorganizationwehavestudied—KaiserPermanente.Kaisersoughttoovercomethe

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values“segmentation”thatiscommoninhealthcare,wherethehospitalmanagersandinsuranceplanmanagersoperateunderinstrumentally-rationalmarket-orientedvalueswhilethedoctorsrelyonverydifferent,professionalvalues.AtKaiser,managersanddoctorsalikewereexpectedtoconsiderbothpatientclinicaloutcomesandtheeconomicconsequencesofclinicaldecisions.Thisrepresentedadeepchallengetovaluesthattraditionallyprevailedamongdoctors.Indeed,considerationofcostshadlongbeenconsideredunethicalamongdoctors(Angell,1993).ToensurethatacommitmenttoKaiser’ssharedpurposewasmeaningfulindoctors’dailywork,thesecost/qualitychoicesandtheassociatedresearchwerediscussedinweeklyormonthlymeetingsofphysiciansatthemedical-officebuildinglevel,inmonthlymeetingsofphysiciansintheirspecialtydepartments,andinbi-monthlyoff-siteretreatsfordoctorsfromtheentireservicearea.Medicaldepartmentsregularlyreviewedun-blindedcomparisonsofdoctors’outcomes,inordertopromptdiscussionabouthowtomitigateanytradeoffs.Norms:Interactiveprocessmanagement

Thekeychallengeinthenormsdimensionisgoaldisplacement.Inasmall,collegialgroup,interactionalnormscanremaininformalwithoutlosingtoomuchefficiency;butacrossalarger,heterogeneousorganization,efficientcollaborationrequiresmoreformalizednorms.ThisformalizationwasamajorfactormotivatingWeber’sskepticism:hefearedthatformalizationwouldbetheoccasionforspecializedstaffstoimposeproceduresontheoperatingcore.Formalizationwouldthusunderminethesalienceoftheorganization’sultimatepurpose,displacingtheethicofcontributionwithabureaucraticethicofinstrumental-rationalconformance.

Forvalue-rationalactiontoprevailatscale,thecollaborativeorganizationmustinstitutionalizeameta-normofinteractiveprocessmanagement.Weusethislabeltorefertoideathatworkanddecision-makingprocessesaremanaged—designedandimplemented—throughinteractionamongalltheinterestedparties,ratherthanundertraditionalistic,charismatic,orbureaucraticauthority.Thisprinciplecanbeoperationalizedandtheorganizationcanavoidgoaldisplacementiftheorganization’sformalizedprocedures(a)aredesignedtosupportdialogueaimedatdecidinghowbesttopursuethesharedpurpose,ratherthanreplacingthatdialoguewithblindrelianceonpre-establishedrules,and(b)arethemselvestheproductofdialogueaimedatdecidingwhichproceduresmightbestachievethisgoal,ratherthanimposedbystaffonlinepersonnel.

SinceWeber’stime,afamilyofmanagementtechniqueshavebeendevelopedtosupportsuchinteractiveprocessmanagement.Proceduresforkaizen,processmapping,brainstorming,participatorymeetingmanagement,decision-makingwithmultiplestakeholders,andprojectmanagementnowallowthecollaborativeorganizationtomobilizesizeablecross-functionalandcross-organizationalteamsbothinmanagingtheircurrentinterdependenciesandindesigningformalproceduresthatcanfacilitatethatmanagement.

Theformalizationoftheseproceduresgeneratesnormativesystems—bothinformalandformalized—thatareexperiencedas“enabling”ratherthanascoercivelyimposedormerelyceremonial(seeAdler,1999a;Adler&Borys,1996,buildingonGouldner's(1954)distinctionbetweenrepresentative,punishment-centered,andmockbureaucracy).Theyfacilitatethefluidmovementofpeopleamongprojectsinordertobringspecializedknowledgetobearattherighttimesandplaces,andthefluidformationofprojectteams(seeforex.Geraldi,2009;Mom,VanDenBosch,&Volberda,2009).Suchnormsfacilitatecollaborationbyprovidingaplatformforthedeliberateandcontinualrenegotiationofworkingrelations;theymakeitpossibleforpeopletoadjusttheirexpectationsofeachotherastaskdemandsshift(Juillerat,2010).

Inhealthcare,clinicalguidelinesillustratethedifference.Wheremanydoctorsinprivatepracticechafeunderthebureaucraticconstraintsofmedicalguidelinesimposedbygovernmentor

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insurancecompanies,KaiserPermanente’sdoctorscollaboratewiththeirKaiserpeersandwithotherclinicalandnon-clinicalpersonneltodefineguidelines.Whentheactivityisentirelywithinpurviewofamedicalspecialty,therelevantgroupofdoctorswilldeveloptheseguidelinesthemselvesorreviewandadaptnationally-establishedguidelines.Whentheactivityinvolvesmultiplespecialtiesandotherstaff,theseguidelinesaredevelopedandrefinedwithinputandparticipationofabroaderrangeofoccupations(Whippyetal.,2011). Authority:Participativecentralization

Intheauthoritydimension,itiscentralizationthatposesthegreatestchallengeinscalingupvalue-rationality.Large,complexbusinessorganizationsunderperformancepressuretypicallyrequirethecentralizationofatleastsomedecisions.However,theconceptofvalue-rationalactionseemstoprecludearoleforcentralizedauthority,sinceinvalue-rationalactioneachactordecidesontheircourseofactionasafunctionoftheircommitmenttotheultimatevaluesratherthansubmittingtoanyoneelse’scommand.

Thecollaborativeorganizationalformmeetsthischallengebyensuringthatauthorityflowstothoserecognizedasbeingbestpositionedtocontributetothesharedpurposeoftheorganization.Authorityhereisendorsedfrombelow—notdelegatedfromaboveandacceptedinutilitarianexchange,noracceptedpassivelyastraditional,norderivedfromaffectual,charismaticbonds.Regardlessofthedegreeofcentralization—whetherauthorityis“distributed”(Cullen&Yammarino,2014),centralized,ordual(asinmatrixforms)—authorityflowstothosewhoarewidely-acknowledgedasbestabletocontributetotheorganization’ssharedpurposes(assuggestedbyAime,Humphrey,DeRue,&Paul,2013).

Thisidealisoperationalizedinthecollaborativeformthroughtheprincipleofparticipativecentralization.Underthisprinciple,centralizationisparticipativeintwosenses:(a)thedegreeofcentralizationisdecidedparticipatively,and(b)whereandinsofarasauthorityiscentralized,itneverthelessfunctionsinaparticipativemanner.Ifmemberssharethepurposesoftheorganization,theresultingauthoritystructure(whethermoreorlesscentralized)willnotbeexperiencedasalienating,butinsteadwillsupportvalue-rationalcollaboration.

Muchofthescholarshipinourfieldwouldbeskepticalofanyconceptthatpurportstocombineparticipationandcentralization,assumingthatcentralizationandparticipationarepolaropposites(e.g.McCaffrey,Faerman,&Hart,1995).However,astheseconstructshavebeendefinedmorepreciselyinorganizationalresearch,theyshouldnotbetakentobemutuallyexclusive.Thedegreeofcentralizationisassessedbyascertainingthelowesthierarchicallevelatwhichadecisioncanbemadewithoutpriorconsultationwithasuperior(Pugh&Hickson,1976).Thedegreeofparticipationisassessedbyascertainingthelowesthierarchicallevelatwhichrealinfluenceonthedecisionisexerted(Hage&Aiken,1970).Whereascentralizationandautonomyareinacleartrade-offrelation,centralizationandparticipationarebetterconceptualizedasindependent,orthogonaldimensionoftheauthoritystructure.Thecollaborativeorganizationis,weargue,highonbothdimensions.

Thematrixtypeofauthoritystructureisonekeyinnovationinmanagementtechniquethathasoperationalizedcontribution-baseauthorityandfacilitatedparticipativecentralization.Whenorganizationsrelyonthefamiliarmonocraticcentralizedhierarchyofauthority,theresultisthatlocalactorseitherdefertotopmanagement’sauthorityornarrowtheirvisiontolocalgoalsattheexpenseoforganizationalpurpose.Collaborationacrossinternalboundariesoftenrequiresamatrixstructurewithmultipledimensionsofaccountability,wheredecisionsonthelocusofauthorityarecontingentonthenatureoftheoperationaldecisionsthatneedtobetaken(Galbraith,1994).

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Matrixstructuresarenotoriousforthechallenging“organizationalpolitics”engenderedbytheirmultiplereportingrelationships,andasaresult,thesestructuresaredifficulttosustainandimplementationfailuresarecommon(Burns,1989;Larson&Gobeli,1987).Nevertheless,competitivepressureshavepushedfirmstopersistintryingtomasterthesechallenges;andaswereadthevariousaccountsoftheirefforts,manyhavesucceeded.Theirsuccessinthisbothreliesonandstrengthensthecollaborativeethicofcontribution.Itisthisethicthatenablesindividualcontributors,functionalmanagers,andprojectmanagerstofindcommongroundintheirdecision-making.Andinsodoing,theygivesubstancetotheirsharedpurpose.Wherethathasbeenachieved,thematrixstructureisseenaseffective,andithasbecomealegitimatefeatureoftheworkplace.Inreality,matrixstructureshavebecomeincreasinglycommon,assomanypeoplefindthemselvesworkingsimultaneouslyonmanyteamprojectswithdifferentleaders.Indeed,therehasbeenanevolutionovertimetowardmatrixstructureswithmorethantwodimensions(Galbraith,2008;Heckscher,2007;Strikwerda&Stoelhorst,2009)andagrowingnumberoffirmsattempttorestructurethemselvesasmatrixed“front-back”organizationstructure(Brady,Davies,&Gann,2005;Galbraith,2002).Capabilities:T-shapedskills

Thekeychallengeinthecapabilitiesdimensionliesinspecialization.Asorganizationsgrowinsizeandcomplexity,tasksbecomespecializedandvalue-rationalactionstumblesforlackofthecapabilitiesrequiredforeffectivecollaborationacrossthesedifferentiatedskillsandmind-sets.

Thecollaborativeorganizationisdistinctiveindeliberatelyfosteringthedevelopmentofthecapabilitiesthatactorsneedinordertocontributetotheorganization’spurpose.Insteadofleavingmembers’freetodeveloptheirskillsinwhateverdirectionappearstothemasinstrumentallyrationalinpursuitoftheirindividualcareerandlabor-marketgoals,thecollaborativeorganizationdeliberatelyplansmembers’skilldevelopmenttosupporttheirabilitytocontributetotheorganization’sultimatepurposes.(SeealsoLindenbergandFoss(2011)p.509ontheimportanceof“Trainingschemesthatincreasetheunderstandingofhowsub-goalachievementhelpsrealizehigher-ordergoalsinthefirm.”)

Thecollaborativeorganizationalformsystematicallycultivates“T-shaped”skills(Hansen&VonOetinger,2001;Iansiti,1993;Leonard-Barton,1995).T-shapedtechnicalskills—deepknowledgeinone’sownspecialtycombinedwithbreadthofknowledgeoftherelatedtechnicalspecialties—facilitatetheemergenceofthe“commonground”thatiscriticaltolearningfromandcollaboratingwithothers(Puranam,Singh,&Chaudhuri,2009).Thesetechnicalskillsmustbebuttressedbysocialskillstoenableeffectivecross-functionalteamwork(Cordero,1999;Kang&Snell,2009).Thecollaborativeformthusrejectstheolderideaof“expertise”(describedbyWeberinhistreatmentofinstrumentalrationalityinbureaucracy),inwhichspecializedknowledgeisappliedseparatelyandautonomouslybyeachactortoproblemswithinhisorherdomain(or“office”).Instead,thecollaborativeformrequiresthatallactorslookforwaystocombinetheirspecializedknowledgewithothers’withanintentionalfocusonthesharedpurpose.

Thecollaborativeorganizationalformbuildsthesecapabilitiesthroughbothpersonnelselectionandskillformation.Asconcernsselection,thecollaborativeorganizationselectspeoplewiththeappropriateT-shapedskillsandteamworkpropensitiesinsofarasthisunusualcombinationisavailable.Avastportfoliooftechniques(andanassociatedfieldofscholarship—industrial/organizationalpsychology)hasemergedsinceWeber’stimetoassistorganizationsinselectingpersonnelwhofitsuchdemands(see,forex.,Schmidt&Hunter,1998).

Asconcernsskillformationtrajectories,collaborativeorganizationsleveragetheethicofcontributiontoorientskillformationtowardstheorganization’spurposes,withpoliciesthatencouragemembersbothtodeepenandtobroadentheirskillsthroughaplannedsequenceof

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trainingprograms,projectexperiences,andcross-functionalassignments.Andtheresultingskillsallowtheorganizationtosustainmembers’commitmenttoitscollaborativepurpose.OrganizationssuchasToyotamobilizethissenseofsharedpurposetoassuretheirworkers’buy-intothefirm’sformalized,comprehensive,andlong-termskill-developmentpolicies(Adler,1999b;Brown&Reich,1997).Bothmanagementandshop-floorpersonnelaresystematicallyrotatedthroughvariousdepartments,progressivelybroadeninganddeepeningtheirskills.

Ahostofnewmanagementtechniqueshaveariseninthepastfewdecadestoidentifyandplanforthedevelopmentofvariouswork-relatedcompetencies(Dubois,1998,2010;McClelland,1973).Today,wehavemanyinformation-technologytoolsthatsupportallaspectsofcompetencymapping,diagnosis,developmentplanning,andmonitoring(Draganidis&Mentzas,2006).Informationtechnologyalsocontributesmoredirectlytotheorganizationalcapabilitiesrequiredbycollaborationwhenitisdeployedintheorganization’soperatingcoretostretchoutwardthetrade-offfrontierbetweencost-efficiencyandflexibility,reducingminimumefficientscaleandreducingthegapbetweencustomizationandmassproductionbydeployingmasscustomizationtechniques(Pine,1993).

ToensurethatskillsaredevelopedanddeployedinthisT-shapeddirection,thecollaborativeformrequiresadistinctivecompensationapproachthatrewardscontribution.Thecollaborativeorganizationmaydifferentiatecompensationamongindividualsbasedonperformance,butitdoesnotdosothroughtheusualpay-for-performanceapproach,whichrewardspeopleformeetingindividualtargetssetbyhigherauthorities.Instead,thekeycriterionistheindividual’scontributiontothecomplex,multidimensionalorganizationalpurpose,thusbothleveragingandbuttressingtheorganization’sethicofcontribution(seeLindenbergandFoss2011,p.512,ontheimportanceof“Grouprewardsthatemphasizethecontributiontocommongoalsatahigherorganizationallevelthanthegroupitself”).Organizationshavedevelopedinnovativewaystoassessandreinforceorientationtoteamworkandtohelpingothers(Gittell,2000;Rubinstein&Kochan,2001).Just“doingagoodjob”isnotsufficient;therewardsystemencouragesindividualstothinkandactbeyondtheirjobsandtoavoidthedysfunctionsofinappropriaterule-conformance.Becauseformalsupervisorscannotbeawareoftheentirerangeofactivitiesoftheirsubordinateswhentheselatterareengagedonmultipleprojectsandarecontributingoncross-cuttingdimensions,collaborativeorganizationsusesystemssuchas360-degreefeedbacktodevelopandvalidatereputationalinformation(Bracken,Timmreck,Fleenor,&Summers,2001;Peiperl,2001).

Toreturntotheexamplereferredtoearlier,IBMbeganin2004reorientingitsperformancemanagementsystemsaroundthevaluesdefinedinthediscursiveJamprocesses—innovation,clientsuccess,andpersonalresponsibilitytoothers.Butthecompanyencounteredgreatdifficultyindefiningcorrespondingperformancemetricsandinaligningrewardswiththesepurposes.Around2016,seniormanagersconcludedthatitwasimpossibletodefinesuitableshort-termmeasures,andinsteadtheyshiftedtowardsamoreconversationalapproach.Inthisnewapproach,managerssetperformancegoalsandassessedperformanceinfrequentdiscussionswiththeirsubordinatesratherthaninthetraditionalannualreviewmeeting:thesediscussionsfocusedontheircontributionstothecoreorganizationpurposes,anyimpedimentstheyencountered,andhowtheseimpedimentscouldbeovercome.Thischangecreatedambiguityandtensionformanyemployeesandmanagers;butithadtheadvantageofsustainingthefocusonthesharedpurposesoftheorganization.

DISCUSSIONANDCONCLUSION

Thispaperaimedtocharacterizetheorganizationalformthatcouldcreateandsustainawidely-sharedcommitmenttotheorganization’sultimatepurposeinlarge,complex,businessenterprisesfacingdynamicenvironments.Weshowedthatvalue-rationalactionprovidesthemost

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appropriatefoundationforsucha“collaborative”typeofpurpose,andweidentifiedfourkeychallengesfacingeffortstoscaleupvalue-rationalitybeyondsmall,homogeneous,collegialgroups.Weidentifiedfourorganizingprinciplesthatcouldovercomethesechallengesandtherebycreate,notwithstandingWeber’sownskepticism,avalue-rational-basedorganizationalformthatwelabeled“collaborative.”

Inthisconcludingsection,weaddressinturnthemoderatorsthatconditionthevalueofcollaborativepurpose.Wethenturntosomelimitationsandpossibleextensions.Moderatorsandboundaryconditions

Taskscharacteristics.Theachievementofsharedpurposeofanykindisnotauniversalrequirementforeffectiveorganizationalperformance.AsSelznick(1957)noted,wherecoretasksaremoreroutineandlessinterdependent,employees’conformanceismoreimportantthantheirdiscretionaryeffort,cooperation,andcreativity,andsharedpurposeislessnecessary.Heretheappropriatedesignofextrinsicrewards,sanctions,formaloffices,andclearhierarchieswilllikelybemorecost-effectivethanthecreationandongoingmaintenanceofasenseofsharedpurpose.Thetaskcharacteristicsthatdeterminethepotentialvalueofsharedpurposedependinpartontheindustrysetting,theorganization’ssizeandcomplexity,anditsstrategy.

Wehavearguedthatthecollaborativeorganizationdesignismorecost-effectivewheretheorganizationislargeandcomplexandtheenvironmentisdynamic.Thecostaspectshouldbeunderscored.Thecollaborativeorganizationcostlytocreateanddifficulttomaintain.Itdependsonreliablemechanismsforestablishingandupdatingreputations;butweknowthatthesemechanismsarevulnerabletoopportunisticmanipulation.Thehighlevelofparticipationincollaborativeorganizationsrequiresconsiderablemeetingtime;butsuchmeetingsarecostlyandburdensome.Thecollaborativeformrequiresopennesstodiversity,difference,anddisagreement;butitofferslittleassurancethesewillnotexplodethecollectivityorsealtheorganizationofffromtheoutsideworldasaclosedsect.

Externallegitimacy.Thepurposeofthebusinessorganization—insofarasitspeakstowhattheorganizationcontributestosociety—isalwayssubjecttoanexternallegitimacyconstraint.Thisisparticularlychallengingforthecollaborativeorganization,becausethedifferentiatedoccupationalgroupswithintheorganizationoftenbringintotheorganizationcompetingunderstandingsofthekindsofpurposesappropriatetothiskindoforganization.KaiserPermanenteprovidesaniceexample,mostnotablybecausemanydoctorshavebeensocializedtoseeasunethicalanyconsiderationofcostindiagnosticortreatmentdecisions.Sothedevelopmentofacollaborativeorganizationdesignmayrequireactiveengagementwiththeinstitutional,symbolicenvironmentaswellasthetechnical,taskenvironment.

Publicpolicy.Theimportanceoftheexternalcontextextendsbeyondthesymbolic-culturaldimension:thecollaborativeformisfarmorelikelytoemergeandcanonlypersistovertimeiftheorganizationfunctionsinasupportivepublic-policycontext.Inparticular,thecollaborativeformhasmuchgreatersurvivalprospectsifpublicpolicyblocksthefirmanditscompetitorsfromtakinga“lowroad”ofworkintensificationasapathtoprofitabilityandcompetitivesurvival.Aswenotedabove,thetensionbetweenprofitabilityanduse-valuelyingattheheartofthecapitalistfirmrendersthecollaborativemodelintrinsicallyprecarious:toovercomethatprecariousnessandstabilizethatmodelrequiressomekindof“socialization”oftheprofitabilityimperative.Kristensen(2016)discusseshowsocial-democraticDenmarkhassoughttodothat.Hehighlightsformsofintra-andinter-firmorganizationinDenmarkthatappearveryclosetoourvalue-rationalcollaborativemodel,andexplainshowtheseformsareencouragedonthe“supplyside”bygovernmentpoliciesenablinglabortotakeactivepartinshapingenterprises(unionrights,training,child-andeldercare,supportforhousing,etc.)andonthe“demandside”bygovernment

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supportforinvestmentsthatrespondtonewsocietalneeds(suchasenvironmentalprotection,health,andcityplanning).Futureresearch

Empiricaltesting.Ourargumenthasbeenlargelytheoretical,andfutureresearchshouldexaminewhetherthefourprincipleswehaveidentifiedinfactpredictperformanceintheappropriatecontexts.Aspartofsuchastudy,itwouldbeusefultoexplorewhethertheseprinciplesareadditiveormultiplicative,orwhethertheycreatesharedpurposeinvariousconfigurations.

Micro-foundations.Futureresearchshouldalsoaimtoexplicateandtesttheindividualcognition,motivation,emotion,andbehaviorsimplicitinourcausalmodel.Animportantnextstepinthelineofresearchwehaveproposedwouldbetodevelopamulti-levelmodel(perhapsofthekindproposedby(Bitektine&Haack,2015))thatallowsustoseehowthecollaborativeorganizationalformshapescollaborativeindividualbehaviors,andthenhowtheseindividualbehaviorsaggregatetogeneratetheex-postcollaborationinFigure1.

Futureresearchshouldalsoaddresstheroleofleadershipinthiscollaborativemodel.Wehavesoughttodifferentiatevalue-rationality-basedcollegialandcollaborativemodelsfromtheaffectually-basedcharismaticmodel.Butemotionsurelyplaysanimportantrole—albeitasubordinateone—inbothcreatingandsustainingvalue-rational-basedcommitmenttosharedpurpose.

Applicationtoambidexterity.Weconjecturethecollaborativeorganizationalformmightbeacriticalsuccessfactorfororganizationspursuingambidexterity,thatis,simultaneousexplorationandexploitation(March,1991).Thelocusanddegreeoftherequisitecollaborationvariesacrossthevariousambidexterityapproaches;butinallofthem,alltherelevantactorsmustfeelconfidentthatotherswillbeorientedtotheirsharedultimatepurposeevenincircumstancesthatcannotcurrentlybedefinedorpredicted—andthevalue-rational-basedcollaborativeformoforganizationoffersthisadvantage.

Inthefunctionalapproachtoambidexterity,thefirmneedsasenseofsharedpurposeacrossfunctionally-differentiatedsubunitssuchasR&Dandoperations(e.g.Lovelace,Shapiro,&Weingart,2001):theR&Dunitmustbewillingandabletoanticipatedownstreamissues(suchas“manufacturability”),andtheoperationsunitsmustbewillingandabletoembraceratherthanresistthedisruptionoccasionedbytheintroductionofnewdesigns.Inthestructuralapproach,ambidexterityrequiresastrongsenseofsharedpurposewithinthetop-managementteamifitistocombinesuccessfullytheeffortsofexploitationandexplorationbusinesslines(e.g.Jansen,George,VandenBosch,&Volberda,2008;Tushman,Smith,Wood,Westerman,&O'Reilly,2010).Inthecontextualapproach(Gibson&Birkinshaw,2004)itseemslikelythatachievementoftheambidexteritywouldbenefitfromthecollaborativeforminsofarasitwouldhelpactorsmanagetheirinterdependenceunderthestressofjugglingincommensurableexploitationandexplorationgoalsintheireverydayworkactivities.Whenlarger,morecomplexorganizationstrytostrengthentheirambidexterity,weexpectthecollaborativeorganizationdesigntobeparticularlyeffective.

Extendingthetheorytocollaborationacrossfirmboundaries.Supplychains,associations,alliances,andregionalclustersallrelyvariouslyontraditionalistictiesbasedonloyalty,charismatictiesbasedonpersonalappeal,instrumentally-rationaltiesbasedontheconvergenceofmaterialself-interest,orvalue-rationaltiesbasedonsharedpurpose.Thefourprinciplesofcollaborativeorganizationdesigncanbeextrapolatedtothemanagementoftheseinter-organizationalties.Eventhoughsuchcollaborativetiesareoftenunderminedbyinter-firmcompetition,itis,weconjecture,thiscollaborativetypethatoffersthegreatestpotentialforinterfirmnetworksaimingforexcellenceinbothinnovationandefficiencydimensions.

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Applicationtohybridorganizations.Ourargumentmightalsobeextendedtosituationswheretheorganizationfacesmultipleheterogeneousdemandsofvariouskinds.Forexample,manyorganizationstodayareunderpressurebothtoofferhigherqualityproductstotheircustomersandtoreducetheirenvironmentalfootprint.Moregenerally,manyorganizationsareunderpressuretosatisfythedemandsofmorediversestakeholders.Incurrentscholarship,thesechallengeshavebeenaddressedbytheliteratureon“hybrid”organizationsininstitutionaltheory(Battilana&Lee,2014;Greenwood,Raynard,Kodeih,Micelotta,&Lounsbury,2011)orhybrididentities(Albert,Ashforth,&Dutton,2000).Insofarastheseorganizationsaimtosynthesizemultiplepurposes,ourcollaborativemodelprovidesacompassheadingthatcanguidetheirefforts.

Thefutureofcollaboration.Futureresearchmightalsoconsiderwhetherthecollaborativeform,ratherthanbeingjustoneorganization-designoptionamongseveral,representsinsteadanevolutionaryadvancebeyondthoseothers.Inthisperspective,ifasocialinnovationprocesshasyieldednewmanagementtechniquesthatalloworganizationstoinstitutionalizevalue-rationalityinlarge,complexorganizationsfacingdynamicenvironments,perhapsthiscollaborativeformmightbecomeanefficientsolutioninabroaderrangeofsituations.Ifwehavelearnedhowtosustaincollaborativepurposeinlarger,morecomplexorganizations,thenperhapsitbecomescost-effectivetoshiftstrategiesandworkdesignstoallowandleveragemoreemployeediscretionandcreativityeveninsettingswherepreviouslytheotherformsoforganizationseemedoptimal.

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Figure1:Achievingvalue-rationalpurposeinlarge,complexorganizations

Desiredvalue-

rationalpurpose

Complexity,Dynamism

Challengesinscalingupvalue-rationality:• Fragmentation

•Goaldisplacement

• Centralization

• Specialization

Keyprincipleofthecollaborativeorganizationalform:

• Ethicofcontribution

• Interactiveprocessmanagement

• Participativecentralization

• T-shapedskills

Achievedvalue-rationalpurpose

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Table1:Principlesandtechniquesforscalingupvalue-rationalityinthecollaborativeorganizationdesign

Challengesofscalingup

value-rationalityKeyprinciplesofthecollaborativedesign

Managerialtechniques

Values Fragmentation:lossoftheorganization’sabilitytodefineacommonpurposeorpreserveitssalience

Institutionalizeanethicofcontributiontocreatesalientsharedpurpose

Dialogicstrategyprocess,strategicfitness,searchconferences,multi-stakeholderstrategydialoguesSolutions-orientedbusinessmodels,QualityFunctionDeployment,BalancedScorecard,HoshinKanri

Norms Goaldisplacement:conformancereplacespurpose

Institutionalizeameta-normofinteractiveprocessmanagementtoenablecontribution

Protocolsforbrainstorming,participatorymeetingmanagement,decision-makingwithmultiplestakeholders,andprojectmanagementKaizen,Processmapping

Authority Centralization:Delegatedauthoritydisplacesendorsedauthority,andcentralizationunderminesautonomy

Institutionalizeparticipativecentralizationtocreatecontribution-basedauthority

DistributedleadershipMatrixstructures

Capabilities Specialization:createsdifferentiatedsilosandthought-worlds

Institutionalizecontribution-orientedcapabilitydevelopmenttocreateT-shapedcapabilities

AssessmenttoolsDevelopmentplanningtools360reviews


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