Collected Writings of Gordon Daniels

COLLECTED WRITINGS OF GORDONDANIELS

Collected Writings ofGORDON DANIELS

The Collected Writings of ModernWestern Scholars on Japan

Vol. 12

Edition Synapse

JAPAN LIBRARY

The Collected Writings of Modern Western Scholars on Japan, Vol. 12

COLLECTED WRITINGS OF GORDON DANIELS

© Gordon Daniels, 2004

This co-edition first published by Japan Library and Edition Synapse, 2004

Japan Library is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

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ISBN 0-203-59779-6 (Adobe eReader Format)ISBN (J.A.A.Stockwin) 1-903350-15-8 (Print Edition) (vol. 10)

(J.Thomas Rimer) 1-903350-16-6 (Print Edition) (vol. 11)(Gordon Daniels) 1-903350-17-4 (Print Edition) (vol. 12)

Vols. 10–12 ISBN 1-903350-18-2 (Print Edition) (3-vols. Set)

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available from the British Library

Edition Synapse2–7–6 Uchikanda

Chiyoda-kuTokyo 101, Japan

ISBN (J.A.A.Stockwin) 4-901481-29-0 (Print Edition) (vol. 10)(J.Thomas Rimer) 4-901481-31-2 (Print Edition) (vol. 11)(Gordon Daniels) 4-901481-30-4 (Print Edition) (vol. 12)

Vols. 10–12 ISBN 4-901481-28-2 (Print Edition) (3 vols. Set)

Contents

Introduction: Japan, Japanese History and JapaneseStudies, 1941–2000

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PART I: BAKUMATSU AND MEIJI: ANGLO-JAPANESERELATIONS AND WESTERNERS IN JAPAN

1. The Japanese Civil War (1868)—A British View ModernAsian Studies (1967)

2

2. Review of I.H.Nish: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance ModernAsian Studies (1967)

23

3. The British Role in the Meiji Restoration: A Re-interpretative Note Modern Asian Studies (1968)

25

4. Introduction to Sir Ernest Satow: A Diplomat in Japan(OUP reprint 1968)

45

5. Review of Grace Fox: Britain and Japan, 1858–83 Journalof Asian Studies (1970/71)

51

6. Review of RHP Mason: Japan’s First General Election,1890 Modern Asian Studies (1970)

53

7. Illusions About El Dorado of Untapped Bullion Japan andBritain Supplement, The Times (1975)

55

8. E.H.House—Japan’s American Advocate BAJSProceedings (1980)

58

9. Sir Harry Parkes and the Meiji Government, 1868–1883Japan Society Proceedings (1990)

66

10. Foreigners in Meiji Japan Cambridge Encyclopedia ofJapan (1993)

75

11. Review of C.L.Yates: Saigo Takamori—The Man Behindthe Myth Japan Society Proceedings (1995)

77

12. Review of A.Swale—The Political Thought of MoriArinori: A Study of Meiji Conservatism Japan SocietyProceedings (2003)

79

13. The British Press and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1923 (STICERD, LSE, 2003)

82

PART II : JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC WAR: SOCIETY, CULTURE,BOMBING AND THE UNITED STATES STRATEGICBOMBING SURVEY

14. The Great Tokyo Air Raid, 9–10 March, 1945 Beasley (ed)(1975)

92

15. Evacuation of Schoolchildren in Wartime Japan, BAJSProceedings (1977)

111

16. Taira: A provincial city in the Pacific War BAJSProceedings (1978)

125

17. Introduction to G.Daniels (ed) A Guide to the Reports ofthe United States Strategic Bombing Survey (1980)

137

18. Before Hiroshima: The Bombing of Japan, 1944 HistoryToday (Jan. 1982)

153

19. Japan at War, 1937–45 Cambridge Encyclopedia of Japan(1993)

159

20. Japan Domestic life, economy and War Effort; Defenceforces and Civil Defence; Culture Oxford Companion tothe Second World War (1995)

170

PART III: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION, 1945–52, REFORM,INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES AND BRITISH POLICIES

21. Nationalist China in the Allied Council; Policies TowardsJapan Hokkaido Law Review (1976)

188

22. The British Parliament and Occupied Japan, 1945–52Japan Society Proceedings (1981)

204

23. Britain’s View of Postwar Japan, 1945–49 Nish (ed)(1982)

214

24. Social Reform in Postwar Japan; British Perspectives onEducation and Land Reform Burkman (ed) (1982)

232

25. The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–52, AReassessment Japan Education Journal (1982)

241

26. Asakai Koichiro and Occupied Japan EAJS, The Hague,(1982)

247

27. New Zealand and the Occupation of Japan—The BritishCommonwealth and the Occupation of Japan ICERD(1983)

254

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28. The American Occupation of Japan Ion & Prete (eds)(1984)

268

29. The Reeducation of Imperial Japan Pronay & Wilson (eds)(1985)

286

30. From Benevolence to Enmity: Britain and JapaneseCommunism, 1945–50, Zinbun, Kyoto University (1985)

301

31. The Social History of Occupied Japan: Some Sources andProblems STICERD (1990)

316

32. When Did the American Occupation of Japan Really End?Japanese-American Relations, 1952–60 Japan SocietyProceedings (1996)

323

PART IV: JAPANESE HISTORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY ANDHISTORIANS

33. Major American Publications on Japanese History, 1970–75, and their Postwar Setting BAJS (1975)

333

34. The History of Kyoto for Foreigners (Jinbun 1985) 341

35. Japanese Historiography Cannon (ed) (1988) 343

36. Rethinking Japan, 1937–45 History Today (1990) 347

37. Sir George Sansom (1883–1965), Historian and DiplomatCortazzi and Daniels (eds) (1991)

354

38. The Historiography of Postwar Japan: A Survey of SurveysJapan Society Proceedings (1995)

367

PART V: POSTWAR JAPANESE FOREIGN RELATIONS AND EURO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

39. Foreign Relations—(Japan, Miracle ’70—A BusinessGuide) Financial Times (1970)

375

40. Japanese Foreign Policy and its Problems Shiratori (ed)(1982)

379

41. Japan in the Postwar World—Between Europe and theUnited States Daniels & Drifte (eds) (1986)

391

42. EC—Japan: Past, Present and Future Lodge (ed) (1989) 402

PART VI: CINEMA, SPORT AND THE MASS MEDIA

43. The BBC and Japan, 1925–45 Japan Society Proceedings(2001)

410

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44. Japan and Indonesia, 1940–46, Film Evidence andPropaganda ICERD (1979)

426

45. Japanese Broadcasting in the Pacific War BAJSProceedings (1981)

441

46. Tradition and Modernity in Japanese Film Propaganda;Nippon Nyusu, 1940–1945 O’Neill (ed) (1981)

449

47. Japanese Domestic Radio and Cinema Propaganda, 1937–1945: An Overview Short (ed) (1983)

456

48. Japanese Sport, From Heian Kyo to Tokyo OlympiadBinfield and Stevenson (eds) (1993)

477

49. Japanese History as Film, Japanese Film as History JapanSociety Proceedings (2003)

492

PARTVII:

JAPANESE STUDIES, JAPANESE LANGUAGE TEACHINGAND INTERNATIONAL ACADEMIC COOPERATION

50. Japanese Studies in Anglo-Japanese Cultural RelationsAnglo-Japanese Mixed Cultural Commission (1986)

506

51. The Future of Japanese Studies in Britain Foreign andCommonwealth Office—Parker Report (1987)

509

52. Japanese Studies in Britain, 1945–88 British Library(1990)

513

EPILOGUE

53. Elites, Governments and Citzens: Some British Perceptionsof Japan, 1850–2000 Daniels & Tsuzuki (eds) (2002)

522

Bibliography 535

Film Index 536

Index 538

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Introduction

AS A CHILD living in South Yorkshire during the Second World War, I heardlittle of Japan. Yet the little I heard left deep and lasting memories. A few daysafter Christmas 1941, when I was less than five, I accompanied my parents on avisit to my uncle and aunt’s home in nearby Mexborough. Japan’s recent entry intothe war was a prominent subject of adult conversation and my aunt dramaticallydeclared: ‘Isn’t it terrible, the Japanese have bombed Pearl Harbor; they say it’s abeautiful place.’ Clearly, my aunt knew nothing of Pearl Harbor’s militaryinstallations. Nor did I.

I simply concluded that the Japanese were barbaric people who haddeliberately destroyed a place of unique beauty. Having a rather vividimagination I presumed that Pearl Harbor was an atoll made of pure pearl. Thosewho had attacked it were unquestionably beings of unique malevolence. It musthave been in the same weeks that I heard my parents speaking in hushed tones ofthe sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse —but I was unaware of whichAxis Power had successfully attacked them. Soon, my notion of the nefariousJapanese was supported by more immediate experience. During preparations forone wartime Christmas my mother clearly explained the differing characteristicsof British and Japanese products. Of our Japanese Christmas tree lights, whoseglass forms were copied from Ch� chin, she commented: ‘These don’t workproperly—the Japanese always make things like that.’ I simply assumed that thefailings of these decorations were the result of deliberate Japanese intent—another example of malevolence. In contrast, British-made Christmas lights weredescribed as reliable—reflecting the upright character of their makers.

Nevertheless, in these childhood years I could also be perplexed byrepresentations of things Japanese. On a visit to our house my Mexborough auntdid once refer to Japanese atrocities against babies in Hong Kong or Singapore;but my children’s books included surprisingly picturesque depictions of Japaneselife and culture. One story was set in a plate-sized, miniature Japanese garden—replete with red torii and lightly arched bridges. I felt distinctly uneasy at thisbook’s picturesque illustrations. Why—I asked myself, did its author choose thenefarious Japanese as subjects for a story? and, more specifically, why did thebook present a Japanese garden as something attractive and picturesque?Similarly, when I studied the section on Japan in one of my children’s reference

books I was puzzled and almost horrified. Once again there were colourfuldepictions of picturesque Japanese gardens. There were also reproductions ofJapanese art works, and photographs of Japanese women in attractive kimono.As the Japanese were profoundly evil I felt deeply troubled by these favourabledepictions. Was this, I wondered, the result of some form of subversion ofBritish publishing houses?

For much of the war one heard far less about the war in Asia than the conflictin Europe and North Africa, but one cinematic experience reinforced my notionsof Japanese barbarity. Each week my parents studied the descriptions offorthcoming films in the local newspaper—hoping to find something educationalor enlightening that we might see. Late in the war an American propaganda film,The Purple Heart, which proclaimed the bravery of American servicemen in thewar with Japan, was to be shown at the Empire Cinema in Mexborough. Myparents thought that this would be a suitable film for me to see and my mothertook me to the shiny black art deco cinema.

Unfortunately, we had mistaken the dates when The Purple Heart would beshown, but we did see its trailer. Like all trailers this was brief and dramatic. Infact, it was so frightening that my mother and I agreed that the complete filmwould not be suitable for family viewing. Perhaps because of the trailer’seffectiveness a fragment of it remained in my mind into adulthood. In this scenea Japanese interrogater, confronting a captive American, declared: ‘We arewilling to sacrifice one hundred million men—how many men is the white manwilling to sacrifice?’ Once again the concept of Japanese barbarity was confirmed—as the makers of The Purple Heart had certainly intended. I recall little more ofJapanese matters in these years, though on one occasion my mother asked myfather whether Britain would regain Singapore and other Japanese-occupiedcolonies after an Allied victory. My father replied, optimistically, in theaffirmative.

In early August 1945 I spent a short holiday with a friend and his mother attheir seaside bungalow near Bridlington. The European war had ended in Maybut my friend and I spent lazy afternoons watching Mosquito aircraft carrying outbombing practice over the North Sea. Presumably, this was a form of preparationfor future action in the Pacific. Life in the cliff top bungalow was extremelysimple. We had no radio or electricity and it was only infrequently that we learntanything of the outside world. One day we went into the nearby village ofSkipsea and bought a newspaper. Its headlines celebrated the success of Alliednuclear attacks on Japan. In this strangely isolated and tranquil setting this newshad an unusually powerful effect. For boys brought up to admire more and morepowerful British and American weapons news of the atomic bomb seemed acause for happiness. In contrast my friend’s mother was more reflective, andquestioned whether mankind would be able to control such powerful weapons ina humane and responsible way.

Some days later war in the Pacific ended, and on returning home I andmy parents celebrated victory over Japan. On one evening we lit our own VJ

x

bonfire in the back garden. We had already decided that an effigy of a Japaneseleader should be burnt—in the Guy Fawkes manner, but the question arose‘who?’. My mother provided the answer ‘Tojo’, though I am sure that she hadlittle idea of his political role—or that he had been removed from office in July1944. It is interesting that the Emperor Hirohito was never mentioned as acandidate for burning.

Soon after the end of the Pacific War the so-called Cold War began and fearof atomic war became a widespread concern. In this setting Japan briefly becamea focus in the junior school which I attended. Our headmaster, Frank Ward, aman of military background, devoted a good deal of class time over severalweeks, to reading aloud extracts from John Hersey’s Hiroshima. This book gavea clear and detailed account of the effect of nuclear attacks on civilians. In theseclasses little emphasis was placed upon the sufferings of these Japanese victims.

In the early post-war years Japan scarcely impinged upon my consciousness.In one fireside discussion with my cousin, of industrial cartels, my father referredto American Occupation policies. He mentioned General MacArthur’s attempt tobreak up Japanese industrial combines (zaibatsu), but, with an air of resignationconcluded ‘now they are all coming together again’. But this was a commentmade in isolation. Even during the Korean War Japan’s significance in theconflict never seemed to merit a mention: though my father once recounted, withdisapproval, a conversation with a young soldier, who had enjoyed the attentiveservice of Japanese bar hostesses when on leave from the Korean front.

What is most remarkable about my Mexborough Grammar School educationbetween 1948 and 1956 was the almost total absence of Japan from thecurriculum. In first-year art classes some pupils chose to paint the Amethystincident in the Chinese Civil War, but our teachers never mentioned Japan,except in a single Geography lesson. On this occasion our teacher, Mr Orme,describe Japan with much disdain, as an industrial copier, which he claimed hadrenamed a village ‘Usa’ so that it could mark its export products ‘Made in USA’.Continuing in the same vein he denounced Japan as an expansionist state whichhad claimed to be overpopulated but had failed to develop and populateHokkaido to its maximum extent. Clearly, wartime attitudes were still in vogue.

Despite these unfavourable images by the time I entered the London School ofEconomics, in the autumn of 1956, my family had opened a significant contactwith Japan. This would ultimately shape my academic career. In the early 1950smy sister briefly took an interest in philately, and my father sought to expand hercollection by writing to the daughter of my grandfather’s cousin, DorothyBritton, who lived in Japan. As a result of my father’s letter a large number ofmint Japanese stamps arrived, and a link was created which has continued intothe twenty-first century. At that time I had no understanding of why my relativehad chosen to live in what appeared to be a profoundly unpleasant society.

Within a month of arriving at the London School of Economics I had met aJapanese for the first time. This was Wakaizumi Kei who was asomewhat reserved postgraduate student living in the same LSE Hall of

xi

Residence. Of greater importance was a long Sunday afternoon meeting in MaidaVale with Dorothy Britton, her American mother and the distinguished Japanesecomposer the late Dan Ikuma. Our conversation that afternoon ranged broadlyover Sh� wa history, particularly the political assassinations of the 1930s, and theOccupation years (1945–52). In various forms these are historical themes whichhave fascinated me ever since. Throughout these conversations two questionsseemed uppermost; how far was the political violence of the pre-war years theproduct of unsophisticated army groups’ envy of internationally-minded businessand political leaders? and, to what extent had left-wing members of MacArthur’sown Occupation staff sought to undermine Japan’s business elite? In thesediscussions all I could do was listen and ask questions, but my interest intwentieth-century Japanese history was aroused that afternoon by hearing ofthese issues from people who had direct experience of pre-war and post-warJapan. Towards the end of these exchanges Dorothy suggested that at some stageI should visit Japan, but this was an idea which seemed both impractical, andunattractive.

Nevertheless, the significance of Japan was now partially established in mymind, though it had little place in academic or student discussion at LSE. TheMiddle East, disengagement in Central Europe, Kashmir, nuclear disarmament,and issues of ‘underdevelopment’ and decolonization were frequent topics ofstudent conversation; but Japan was never mentioned. A student from Singaporeonce recounted his lurid experiences in Tokyo’s demi-monde, and a popularlecturer, Dr Northedge, addressed a student meeting on the Japanese-Sovietagreement of October 1956, but beyond these brief appearances post-war Japanscarcely seemed to exist.

When I came to specialize within the International History degree syllabus Idid however opt for a course in which Japan was a major element. In fact themost detailed course which I took at LSE was ‘The Manchurian Crisis, 1931–33’. This attracted me because of its Japanese content and because it focusedupon the League of Nations; an organization which seemed a key element in thecollapse of interwar peace and stability. I found the Manchurian Crisis itself andthe exemplary lectures by George Grün deeply fascinating; though Japan’sconduct in Manchuria seemed to have little to commend it. Among the bookswhich I read for this course the most memorable was G.F.Hudson’s The FarEast in World Politics. This brief survey brought an elegance and precision to itsanalysis which was rare in studies of East Asia at that time.

Although by 1959 I had a clear intellectual interest in East Asia my professor,W.N.Medlicott, suggested that I might focus my doctoral work on Anglo-American relations in Latin America and the West Indies. During an academicyear (1959–60) at Brown University in Rhode Island I found little material onthis theme—either in the Department of State Archives or the UniversityLibrary’s collection. However, a touristic visit to the American West Coast in thesummer of 1960 brought Japan into surprisingly sharp focus. In those days itwould have been difficult to find many admirers of Japan in Britain, or for that

xii

matter many individuals with a serious interest in Japanese affairs. But inWashington, Oregon and California the mood was very different. My host inSeattle not only spoke enthusiastically of the efficiency and courtesy of Japanese-American gardeners but proudly mentioned the recent construction of a Japanesegarden in the city. In Portland it was even more surprising to see Japanesewarships in port on a goodwill visit. In San Francisco I was taken to the ‘Yamato’restaurant for a sukiyaki lunch. During a conversation with the kimono-cladwaitress we were told that business had slackened due to adverse reaction to theanti-Security Treaty demonstrations in Tokyo. These demonstrations were acommon topic of conversation among many of the West Coast Americans whomI met. More than once I was asked why anti-Americanism had erupted in Tokyo—as America’s post-war Occupation had been benign. My response— based onnegligible knowledge, was that such demonstrations might reveal theeffectiveness of post-war American liberalization.

By this time I had decided to carry out postgraduate research on East Asiandiplomatic history at St Antony’s College, Oxford. G.F Hudson, whose writingsI had admired, was my formal supervisor, but my decision to work on Anglo-Japanese relations owed most to warm encouragement from Richard Storry, afellow South Yorkshireman. Initially, I hoped to study the political role of Britishcompanies in nineteenth-century Japan, but after visiting the City offices ofmany banks and trading houses it appeared that surviving archives were too fewto make satisfactory research possible. In early 1961, after especially helpfuladvice from Professor W.G.Beasley of the School of Oriental and African Studies,I began doctoral research on Sir Harry Parkes, Britain’s diplomaticrepresentative in Japan from 1865 to 1883. Even in St Antony’s, which had a FarEast Centre, the postgraduate study of Japan was an especially small-scaleactivity. There were no formal training programmes, and academic supervisionwas aristocratically casual. Even the seminar programme of the Far East Centreincluded few presentations on Japan.

As a result, broadening one’s knowledge of Japan was far from easy. Iregarded myself as someone chronically lacking in linguistic talent so the studyof the Japanese language appeared extremely forbidding. Following mysupervisor’s advice, I did contact the only lecturer in Japanese language inOxford to seek some elementary tuition, but he merely suggested that I buyElisseef and Reischauer’s wartime textbook; and proposed that we should ‘keepit informal’ and ‘meet in pubs’. This sounded an unlikely prospectus foracquiring a difficult Asian language. I bought the textbook but no tutorialmeetings materialized. However, in my third and final year in Oxford Ibenefited, indirectly, from being one of a tiny minority of doctoral students inBritain working on Japanese themes. When the Macmillan Government decidedto implement the recommendation of the Hayter Committee on non-EuropeanStudies, new academic opportunities were opened. As part of a programme ofestablishing a series of Area Studies Centres the distinguished geographerProfessor Charles Fisher obtained funds to establish a Centre for Japanese Studies

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at Sheffield University. After meeting Professor Fisher at the Association ofBritish Orientalists Conference in Oxford, and submitting my curriculum vitae, Iwas appointed to an Assistant Lectureship in Modern Far Eastern History, withspecial reference on Japan. The Hàyter Committee had advocated the acquisitionof necessary language skills so funds were available for a period of training inJapan. I began substantial language study in my first two years in Sheffield. Inpart this was under the direction of a retired Foreign Office official, HenrySawbridge who was briefly Deputy Director of the new Centre. However, by farthe most valuable aid to colloquial language study at that time was EleanorJorden’s new textbook Beginning Japanese. This had been developed from StateDepartment materials and was accompanied by a very systematic series of audiotapes. The linguistic theories which underlay this course are now outdated, butits early sections provided valuable model conversations which enabled one tocarry out many daily activities. These included telephoning, asking directionsand buying railway tickets.

In the early 1960s British popular attitudes to Japan were very different fromtoday. On hearing that one was studying on teaching about Japan, someindividuals merely expressed their hatred of all things Japanese. In contrast, the1964 Tokyo Olympiad did much to persuade many British people of Japan’smodernity and new internationalism. The so-called ‘Bullet Train’ which ranbetween Tokyo and Osaka and Tange’s Olympic Pool became symbols of a newJapan. More important to day-to-day experience in Britain was the appearance ofJapanese decorative and electronic goods of advanced design. Even in provincialSheffield the most avant-garde design store (in Broomhill) mounted a largeexhibition of contemporary Japanese household and decorative products.

To anyone in Britain beginning research on Japanese history in the early1960s it was clear that the United States was the effective centre of Japanesestudies in the West. New monographs were few but the works of Albert Craig,Marius Jansen and John Hall set especially high standards. Their works nolonger viewed Japanese society as homogenous but showed the significance ofindividuals, provinces and localities in historical processes.

Perhaps my own research on Sir Harry Parkes illustrated the limited knowledgeof Japanese history in Britain at that time. Previously there was an accepted beliefthat the transition from the Tokugawa shogunate to the Meiji Government hadbeen a smooth and almost peaceful process. My close reading of Britishdiplomatic correspondence showed that the Civil War of 1868–69 had at timesbeen extremely violent, and that large sections of Japanese society had been inturmoil until 1877.

In the summer of 1965 my wife and I travelled to Japan for my year ofintensive language training. We made brief stops at Istanbul, Bangkok and HongKong en route to Tokyo. This routing helped demonstrate Japan’s economicsuccess, when compared with conditions in other regions of Asia.

Despite a mood of post-Olympic pride Japan in 1965–66 left deeplycontrasting impressions. The Ginza’s futuristic Sony building suggested Japan’s

xiv

accelerating technological progress, but much local retailing remainedtraditional, with open-fronted shops, and the occasional passing of Chindonya,playing morose celebratory music. In our middle-class suburb, Musashi Sakai,ikebana and piano-playing were important leisure activities. In contrast, youthfulmales challenged one’s tranquillity with their ereki— electric guitars. Despitethese irritations, daily life in Greater Tokyo was improving. The extension of theUnderground into the Western suburbs made central Tokyo more accessible,while in our locality, bottled gas was replaced by a regular mains supply.

To a British observer Japan at this time seemed psychologically much closerto the Vietnam War than did Britain. NHK’s television coverage of the conflictwas more vivid than that of the BBC. Even more marked was the violent natureof Japanese photo journalism in covering events in Saigon and its hinterland.Colour photographs of bloodied corpses were profoundly shocking, and SouthVietnam’s rulers were depicted as cruel and decadent enemies of the people. TheVietnam War also affected life at the International Christian University where Istudied. Many Japanese students were passionately opposed to the war, andvainly exhorted American members of the university staff to endorse a statementcriticizing President Johnson’s policy. In contrast, an American student, whosefather worked in the United States Embassy, described Ambassador Reischauer’sattitude to the war as, at best equivocal.

The treaty establishing formal diplomatic relations between Japan and theRepublic of Korea was a further focus of widespread criticism in 1965. Oneweekend I was guided by Watanabe Etsuji, a historian of the S� d� mei TradeUnion federation, to witness a large, but totally peaceful demonstration againstthe treaty. This culminated in a rally at Harumi. ‘Nikkan J� yaku Hantai’ (…Oppose the Japan-South Korea Treaty) was the single chanted refrain.

Autumn 1965 saw the mounting of a major British Trade Exhibition nearTokyo Bay. Although I had only been in Japan for a short time, I was sufficientlyaware of the high standard of Japanese exhibition design to find the Britishexhibition deeply disappointing. The products which were exhibited wereprobably Britain’s best, but their presentation was random and ill-coordinated.The exhibition suggested that British export promoters had little understandingof the sophistication required to appeal to the post-war Japanese public.

We did little travelling during this first year in Tokyo; but in the spring of1966 we visited Inuyama, Ise, Kyoto, Koya-san, Nara and Osaka in oneconcentrated sightseeing tour. Our visit to Kyoto was especially rewarding as ourhosts Mr and Mrs Kawai were warm and unconventional. Mrs Kawai was apowerful and dynamic businesswoman and she and her husband were enthusiastsfor Noh drama. During this visit we were fortunate to see some historical andreligious sites before commercialism engulfed them. At the Teradaya inn inFushimi we were greeted with immense courtesy, and in a tranquil atmospheresaw the room which had been used by the shishi Sakamoto Ry� ma. Our visit toRy� anji one evening was also profoundly memorable. We were alone except fortwo Buddhist nuns who prayed, silently, by the sand garden.

xv

By the summer of 1966 I had given a short after-lunch speech in Japanese atHosei University. Some weeks later I spoke in Japanese at a wedding receptionat the Ozaki memorial hall. Whatever my inadequacies the course atInternational Christian University had enabled me to make significant progress.

I returned to England in July 1966. My main regret was that I could not spenda further year in Japan to continue my language studies. In October the Centrefor Japanese Studies in Sheffield (under Professor Geoffrey Bownas) enrolled itsfirst three undergraduate students to take the new dual degree courses combiningJapanese language with modern history or a social science discipline. At thattime the creation of these courses marked a major innovation, as virtually allprevious Japanese degree programmes had linked language with literary studies.

Besides helping to monitor students’ work in the new language laboratory Ialso taught a popular second-year course on the History of the Far East. Theselection of textbooks for this course had been one of my concerns during mystay in Japan. Following visits to the Kinokuniya bookstore in Shinjuku I hadchosen two American texts. This was a further indication of the dominance ofmajor American universities in Western Oriental Studies. These survey historiesEast Asia: The Great Tradition and East Asia: The Modern Transformation byE.O.Reischauer, J.K.Fairbank and Albert Craig had evolved from courses taughtat Harvard University. Almost unconsciously I absorbed these authors’historiographical standpoint which used the concept of ‘modernization’ as itsmajor intellectual tool in interpreting the history of China, Korea and Japan.Indeed, in the mid-1960s the search for a non-Communist model ofmodernization had become a major influence in the evolution of Japanese studiesin the United States.

Another indication of the vigorous growth of Japanese studies in some majorAmerican Universities was the publication of the Papers on Japan by HarvardUniversity. This series contained research essays by postgraduate students.Among these contributors John Dower, Akira Iriye and John J.Stephan becamemajor scholars in later years. More than anything else Papers on Japan showedhow effectively programmes of postgraduate training had been developed in IvyLeague institutions.

In the late 1960s the Centre for Japanese Studies at Sheffield University was asmall-scale institution, but, indirectly, the Cold War gave it a distinct andmemorable atmosphere. In the fields of modern history and the social sciencesmany prominent Japanese scholars were Marxists, ex-Marxists or had present orprevious connections with the Japan Communist Party. As a result many suchscholars could not enter the United States or did not wish to do so. Perhaps theelection of a Labour Government in Britain, in October 1964, made BritishUniversities seem particularly attractive destinations for ‘progressive’ Japanese.As a new institution the Sheffield Centre sought to develop a wide network ofJapanese contacts and warmly welcomed such Japanese visitors. Professors suchas Shiota Sh� bei and Taguchi Fukuji had Communist links or leanings, whileothers such as Fujita Sh� z� were more independent left-of-centre scholars. All

xvi

were deeply critical of the Liberal-Democrat regime and its close political andeconomic links with the United States. Virtually all of these visitors saw theEmperor system as a negative undemocratic force in Japan’s moderndevelopment. It is undeniable that the presence of these scholars significantlyinfluenced the staff and students of the Centre at a time when Japanese economicprogress was being achieved with little consideration for its social andenvironmental costs.

Of the Japanese scholars who spent time in Sheffield during the late 1960s themost memorable was Fujita Sh� z� . Professor Fujita of Hosei University had adistinguished reputation as a scholar of the Emperor system, but was remarkablymodest and generous in his attitude to Centre staff and students. He and I metalmost weekly for a free-ranging discussion of history, politics and literature.Professor Fujita had spent his early life on a small island in the Inland Sea andhis memories of the Pacific War included seeing refugees who were victims ofthe nuclear attack on Hiroshima. My conversations with him led me to empathizewith Japanese civilian victims of war in a way which would have been quiteunimaginable in my childhood.

In the late 1960s these were virtually no elementary-level Japanese languagetextbooks which did not make extensive use of Roman script in place of kanaand Chinese characters. As a result students could be plagued by difficulties ofpronunciation which the use of the Japanese script would have avoided. Toresolve the problem Graham Healey and other colleagues in the Centre convertedthe Romanized Jorden text into Japanese script. This was an extremely laboriousand time-consuming process. Despite these considerable difficulties youngmembers of staff were driven by a strong sense of mission, to spread knowledgeof Japan and its language. For the few students such as Janet Hunter and LesleyConnors who embarked on those new Japanese ‘dual degrees’ there werecompensations: staff-student relations were close and in 1970 all third-yearundergraduates were able to spend several months in Japan, working in theBritish Pavilion at the World Fair in Osaka.

In the summer of 1970 we travelled to Japan for my second year of languagetraining and historical research. Our circumstances during this stay were verydifferent from in 1965–66. Instead of life in suburban Tokyo we experiencedconditions in a far less fashionable area, Yutaka-ch� close to Togoshi Ginza inShinagawa. Here we saw a far less affluent community living in crampedhousing along noisy crowded streets. It was an area where Soka Gakkai wasactive and seemed to be gaining support.

In 1970 and 1971 the environmental and human damage resulting fromunrestrained economic growth was not only a subject of conversation, itpreoccupied the news media. Photo-chemical smog was discovered when a groupof schoolgirls collapsed during a sporting event. Smog warnings were postedoutside police boxes, and dense car fumes were also a threat to health.Newspapers, magazines and television programmes carried repeated stories ofsoil, air and sea pollution. It was against this background that the leftist

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Governor of Tokyo Minobe Ry� kichi was re-elected and took significantsymbolic steps to improve environmental conditions. The most striking of thesewas the transformation of major shopping areas, such as the Ginza, into traffic-free ‘pedestrian heavens’ on Sundays.

During 1971 international relations often dominated public debate. Japandeveloped a trade surplus with the United States which generated new diplomaticfriction. This culminated in American measures to protect her domestic textileindustry. Another source of media and intellectual disquiet was Prime MinisterSat� ’s policy of continuing to recognize the Kuomintang Government in Taiwanas the Government of China. In contrast Canada and France gave diplomaticrecognition to the People’s Republic in Beijing. This led to considerableJapanese embarrassment. Discomfort was further intensified when HenryKissinger made a secret visit to Beijing in July 1971 to meet the Chinese PremierChou-En-lai. This was the first of the so-called ‘Nixon shocks’ which, brieflyseemed to threaten Japan’s close ties with Washington.

By 1970 and 1971 the violent student protests of the late 1960s had passedtheir peak, but they were not over. H� sei University, where I received muchacademic help from Narusawa Akira, was often occupied by student radicals.Even in the midst of heavy traffic one often saw small phalanxes of helmetedrevolutionary students trotting and shouting slogans. Besides their physicalpresence in universities and major thoroughfares student radicals had animportant impact on the staff of major universities. Academics were oftendivided in their response to the various revolutionary factions and their activities.These divisions led to bitter antagonisms among professors and the breakdownof relationships. As a result one’s links with one group of scholars might lead todifficult relationships with another.

In 1970 and 1971 travel in Honshu brought me rewarding experiences as ahistorian. In Kakunodate we saw streets of samurai houses in a carefully plannedcastle town. In Sakai an official of the Imperial Household Agency allowed us towalk to the moat edge of Emperor Nintoku’s vast tomb. In the Nara Hotel wediscovered the bronze bust of Joseph Laurel, wartime leader of the Philippines,who had taken refuge there in the final stages of the Pacific War. In contrast tothese rewarding experiences travel also produced disappointments. On oneoccasion we took a slow train all the way from Nagoya to Tokyo on the oldTokaido line. At several points we passed towns or sites illustrated inHiroshige’s prints but none of their former beauty remained. Everywhere seemedblighted by characterless, unplanned development.

Academically this year brought a widening range of academic contacts. Ijoined Professor Oyama’s diplomatic history seminar at Meiji University andgave a series of Japanese-language talks on British politics at the sameinstitution. In the summer of 1971, I presented a paper, in Japanese, on thedevelopment of the Sheffield Centre to a specialist audience at Kei� University.Yet to obtain instruction in reading difficult historical texts was at best a hand-to-mouth affair. The distinguished work of the American Inter-University Language

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Center was scarcely known to me, and no arrangement seemed to exist forBritish scholars to participate in its programme.

On my return to Sheffield in the summer of 1971 not only had undergraduatenumbers expanded but several Foreign and Commonwealth Office trainees hadjoined our intensive Second Year language course. These included StephenGomersall and Robert Cooper, both of whom were to become influential figuresin British diplomacy. Even more striking was the temporary presence of Sir FredWarner who had been appointed as the next British Ambassador to Tokyo. Thenew Ambassador received individual instruction in Japanese language, history,politics and society and brought much intellectual stimulus to all who taughthim. His knowledge of contemporary American art, opera and British politicalpersonalities made him a brilliant and extraordinary student. Theindustriousness, talent and commitment of all the Foreign Office trainees set newstandards in linguistic achievement and probably raised the academic ambitionsof undergraduate students. A further impressive contributor to the intellectualexcitement of that time was Professor Ujihara Sh� jir� of the Social ScienceResearch Institute (Shaken) of Tokyo University. Professor Ujihara spent morethan a year in Sheffield and later gave invaluable help to Sheffield postgraduatestudents. Like many Japanese scholars who had experienced the Pacific WarProfessor Ujihara brought important fragments of historical experience to manyconversations. On one occasion he recalled reading a copy of the BeveridgeReport during the war, apparently brought to Japan by a German submarine.

The early 1970s saw a rapid increase in Japanese industrial exports to WesternEurope. This brought Japanese fears that protectionist policies might be adoptedby European governments, or officials of the European Economic Community.These fears led to cultural countermeasures which were designed to generategreater understanding and sympathy in Europe. In 1973 the Japan Foundationwas established to promote cultural exchange and the growth of Japanese Studiesacross the world. In the same year Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to PrimeMinister Heath produced a large grant to encourage Japanese Studies in BritishUniversities.

This grant, formally known as the Japan Foundation Endowment Fund,enabled the relatively small number of undergraduates studying Japanese tospend a period experiencing life in Japan. As important as the direct financialimpact of the ‘Tanaka fund’ was its influence on cooperation betweenJapanologists in British Universities. The availability of new financial resourcesled to discussion of national action in planning their use. To me the logicalimplication of national cooperation, was the creation of a nationwide associationof university scholars researching and teaching about Japan. I may or may nothave been the first person to suggest the establishment of the British Associationfor Japanese Studies, but I was certainly one of the earliest proponents of theidea. After several planning meetings the Association’s first conference was heldat Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in the Spring of 1975. For this meeting I hadbeen asked to write a brief paper on recent American publications on Japanese

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history. In compiling this, a striking feature of Japanese historical studies in theUnited States became evident. Graduate students often wrote conference papers,which in turn were published in volumes addressing a particular historicaltheme. These publications were often important initial steps in the careers ofyoung scholars. Drawing on this model I suggested that BAJS conference papersshould be published in some simple form to stimulate the circulation of ideas,and advance the careers of graduate students. My suggestion was warmlyreceived and in 1976 the first issue of the Proceedings of the British Associationfor Japanese Studies appeared. By the late 1980s the Proceedings had evolved intothe journal Japan Forum which is the only British academic journal totallydevoted to Japan.

During the first half of the 1970s cooperative activities by BritishJapanologists were not confined to the successful creation of anational organization. In the spring of 1973 the Oxford conference on ModernJapan was organized by scholars from the School of Oriental and AfricanStudies, Oxford and Sheffield. Participants included researchers from Israel,Norway and Austria as well as British academics. It was at this meeting that thefirst steps towards the founding of the European Association for JapaneseStudies were taken.

In preparing a paper for this conference I was partly inspired by a smallJapanese book Tokyo Daik� sh� (The Great Tokyo Air Raid) by SaotomeKatsumoto which I had bought in Tokyo two years before. I was also aware thatWestern scholars had largely neglected the study of social conditions in wartimeJapan. As a small step in remedying this neglect I presented a paper on theTokyo air raid of 9–10 March 1945, which demonstrated that vast civiliancasualties had been inflicted with deliberate intent. Much of my paper was basedon reports published by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey shortly afterJapan’s defeat. To deepen my research I planned in future to consult theunpublished archives of the Survey which were available in the NationalArchives in Washington.

In the autumn of 1975 I travelled to Japan via Washington DC to spend eightmonths attached to the Law Faculty at Hokkaido University. During five weeksspent in the National Archives I made much use of unpublished USSBSdocuments and received help from archivists—notably John E.Taylor—whichwas remarkable in its warmth and commitment. Mr Taylor introduced me toAndrew Kuroda and other staff members of the Library of Congress’s Japanesesection and guided me to intelligence materials of great historical value. WartimeJapan was a little studied field in the West but archivists in Washington seemedeager to promote it—and to communicate information about related research inNorth America and Japan. Between Washington and Sapporo we were warmlyreceived by Professor Roger Hackett at the University of Michigan. The work ofProfessor Hackett and his colleagues clearly demonstrated the confidence, rangeand vitality of American studies of modern Japan.

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My months in Sapporo proved to be an especially rewarding period ofacademic life. My host Professor Matsuzawa Hiroaki was deeply committed tointernational intellectual exchange and gave me much encouragement, as well asproviding major challenges. Perhaps the greatest of these was to deliver twolengthy research papers in Japanese to University seminars. ProfessorMatsuzawa also introduced me to the nuances of social life in the Faculty of Law.One could not but be impressed by the quasi-egalitarian character of manyfeatures of faculty society. These conflicted directly with simplistic notions of ahierarchical order. Virtually every day the Dean, Professor Kogure, spent hislunch hour playing sh� gi with clerks in their large open-plan office. At the NewYear party porters and secretaries joined distinguished academics in sake—lightened conversations.

By 1976 the socio-political mood in Japan was distinctly different from fiveyears earlier. The dominant issue of the time was the so-called ‘Lockheed scandal’involving the acceptance of American bribes by leading political figures. Thepress and television response to these irregularities was, perhaps, less fierce thanit might have been in Britain but widespread public criticism of the LiberalDemocratic Party government showed that if passivity had been a characteristicof the Japanese electorate that passivity was now reduced.

A further change that was apparent by the mid-1970s was the higher prioritywhich was attached to social and environmental issues. Improvements in Japan’shealth and welfare system were under way and the preservation of culturalproperties was given a new importance. Even on the Hokkaido Universitycampus an early experimental barn was carefully restored.

One of the highlights of the Sapporo winter was the annual Snow Festival.Clearly, this was a touristic attraction but its semi-political significance gave it aspecial fascination. The Self-Defence Force played a major role in constructingthe vast snow effigies, and the second site of the festival was a military base onthe outskirts of the city. At this site one saw the strange juxtaposition of snoweffigies of Disney characters a few yards from a military museum describingsome of the bitterest battles of the Second World War.

Although Hokkaido lacked any concentration of ancient buildings itsmuseums and historic sites could be profoundly atmospheric. In Otaru, whereRichard Storry had taught English in the 1930s, the room where Japan’s frontierwith Tsarist Russia had been negotiated in 1905 was dustily preserved, in asomewhat malodorous museum; as if anything connected with military victorywas reluctantly remembered. In contrast the opening up of Hokkaido by Japanesepioneers was commemorated in an ultra-modern museum sited majestically in apine forest.

In 1976 when we returned to Britain Japanese Studies were in a moreoptimistic mood than ever before. The BAJS had held its first fully academicconference and its leaders such as Ian Nish, Peter Lowe, Louis Allen and RichardStorry saw academic cooperation as a virtue, rather than an uncompetitive vice.

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The Japan Foundation’s new London office also organized social events whichpromoted links among the community of Japanologists.

By 1977 the BAJS conference had become a significant academic event whichattracted scholars from Japan and Australia. Japanese studies also gained vitalityfrom the increasingly open-minded views of Japanese cultural agencies. ThePacific War, which in the past had seemed an almost forbidden subject, formedthe focus of a symposium at the Oxford BAJS conference. Among contributorsto the symposium Ben-Ami Shillony gave a revisionist view of wartime Japan,suggesting that spontaneous intellectual support for the war had been widespread.In contrast to past official attitudes, this symposium was praised by the JapanFoundation’s London representative. Yet despite these important improvementsthe British Japanese Studies community still appeared to lack financial andintellectual security. Consequently the presence of Japanese diplomats at BAJSconferences was, seen as a valuable support of an academic minority.

Despite Japan’s growing economic importance the advent of the ConservativeGovernment in 1979 brought no increased British official support for JapaneseStudies. Rather, it was left to Japanese private companies and Governmentagencies to sustain new developments. In the longer term, knowledge of Japanwas also widened and deepened by the initiation of the Government-to-Government scheme to enable British graduates to teach English in Japaneseschools. Such graduates (known as JETs) provided a new source of potentialteachers and researchers in the field.

Another significant example of semi-official support for Anglo-Japaneseacademic cooperation was the holding of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on theSecond World War in the summer of 1979. Much of this meeting was devoted tothe diplomatic antecedents of the war, and its aftermath, rather than to theconflict itself. Nevertheless it marked a major academic milestone. The Foreignand Commonwealth Office reception which followed the conference suggestedthat Anglo-Japanese academic relations now had a greater political significance.Although the 1979 conference was an Anglo-Japanese venture an Americanmodel was also influential. One of its major objectives was to emulate a similarAmerican-Japanese meeting at Lake Kawaguchi.

For the London conference I prepared a paper on British responses to Japan inthe immediate post-war period. This research indicated that despite much anti-Japanese feeling politicians such as Bevin and Cripps, and commentators such asBarbara Ward saw Japan’s post-war prosperity as essential to the stability ofEast Asia.

By this time the Sheffield Centre not only accepted increasing numbers ofundergraduates but a significant group of postgraduate students were benefitingfrom government grants awarded in the Wilson and Callaghan years. Amongthese were Hamish Ion, John Crump, Lesley Connors and Ian Gow who laterbecame established academics. A graduate research seminar was a valuableinnovation at Sheffield at this time, a further attempt to raise the level ofacademic training.

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In 1979 I was elected Secretary of the BAJS and organized the 1980conference in Sheffield. It was perhaps symptomatic of a time—when tradedisputes and cultural misunderstandings seemed intertwined—that the mainsymposium of the conference addressed the topic of ‘mutual perceptions’.Another attempt to reduce the perceived element of misunderstanding in Anglo-Japanese relations was a bilateral conference held in Sheffield and organized byProfessor Shiratori Rei of Dokkyo University. The theme of this meeting was‘Japan in the 1980s’. This conference was notable for the participation of Dietmembers representing virtually all political groups. Among these perhaps the mostdistinguished was Kaifu Toshiki who was to become Prime Minister in 1989. Myown contribution to this conference was a paper indicating that Japan had aforeign policy quite distinct from that of the United States; something which,though obvious was not sufficiently recognized at the time.

My most memorable academic experience in 1980 was participation in aconference on ‘The Occupation of Japan, Educational and Social Reform’ at theMacArthur Memorial in Norfolk Virginia. This conference was notable for thevitality of its academic debate, a vitality which was rarely found in Britain.Debate was also enriched by the presence of scholars (both Japanese andAmerican,) and Occupationaires. The MacArthur Memorial meetings were littleknown in Britain but in their efficient use of time and academic rigour they weremodel historical conferences. If the Norfolk meeting left a singlehistoriographical impression in was that SCAP policy had been very seriouslyaffected by internal rivalries and domestic pressure groups—and was far frombeing an exercise in ‘planned political change’. The more I read of this periodthe more I sensed that the achievements of MacArthur’s policies had contributedto the international confidence which had lain behind America’s unsuccessful‘nation building’ venture in South Vietnam. Also particularly memorable was theapparently pro-Japanese mood of Virginia notables and American academics.When the Mayor of Norfolk referred to ‘our great ally Japan’ in an after-dinnerspeech the audience broke into loud applause.

A conference held in 1982 which, in retrospect, seems redolant of the timewas one which I attended at the Graduate School for International Studies inGeneva. This addressed the relatively neglected theme of Japan’s post-warrelations with Europe. European speakers expressed a profound lack ofconfidence regarding Europe’s economic efficiency. In contrast some Japanesespoke of being unfairly ‘scapegoated’ by Europeans. At this time Japan’s latereconomic difficulties, and the mature relationship which developed betweenJapan and the European Union were beyond anyone’s imagination. Despite theinterest of this 1982 meeting a conference held in Sheffield in the following year(1983) may have been more novel. In co-operation with Tokai University, Iorganized a conference on Japan and Euro-Japanese relations. Tokai’s founder,Matsumae Shigeyoshi sought improved relations between Japan and the Sovietbloc and Tokai representatives seemed eager to invite scholars from EasternEurope to our meeting. Unfortunately the Soviet destruction of a Korean airliner

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had led to Western sanctions on Aeroflot but scholars from Hungary, Poland andthe Soviet Union managed to attend. The only Soviet participant ProfessorLvova, proved to be a scholar of great intellectual distinction who made oneaware, for the first time, of the long rich tradition of Russian Japanology whichthe Cold War had erased from our consciousness. It seemed little short of anintellectual tragedy that political factors had made links with such culturedscholars virtually impossible.

By 1984 it was eight years since I had spent a significant period of time inJapan, but in that year I was invited by the Research Institute for HumanisticStudies in Kyoto University to spend a year as a visiting fellow. In many ways thisacademic year (1984–85) was the most deeply stimulating and rewarding periodin my academic life.

The Institute was a research centre free from the pressures of undergraduateteaching, which were increasing in British Universities. Even more importantwas my good fortune in experiencing the academic culture of the Institute underthe directorship of the late Professor Yoshida Mitsukuni. Professor Yoshida wasa scholar of great warmth, humanity and intellectual breadth. His interests rangedfrom Kyoto handicrafts to Chinese science and Iranian civilization. His regularseminar entitled ‘Information and Social Change in the Nineteenth Century’ wasunknowingly a post-modernist endeavour. At a time before the term ‘post-modernism’ was widely used the Yoshida seminar engaged with a variety ofapproaches which extended to subtle areas of culture and values. ‘The Romanticaura of victims of tuberculosis in nineteenth-century Europe and Japan’, ‘Thechanging Japanese perception of mountains’, ‘Mourning customs among Edosamurai’ are examples of papers which the seminar discussed. For the Yoshidaseminar history could embrace everything and anything, concrete or abstract.Nothing was too small or too vast to escape its parameters. If it had a basicpresumption it was that Japan’s modernization was no different from similarphenomena in Eastern Europe or Latin America. However, the virtues of theYoshida Mitsukuni Kenky� kai were not limited to its formal intellectual content.It constituted a community of scholars who both collaborated and competedtolerantly in the exploration of history. Above all, the conversations whichcontinued over dinners, drinks and refined refreshments were more equable,enlightened and varied than anything one might experience in virtually anyBritish university. The diversity of these conversations was based on manydiverse experiences in the Andes, the Australian outback, China, Paris andCambridge, Massachusetts.

The richness of the Institute experience was augmented by contact withvisiting American academics. Among these George Macklin Wilson of IndianaUniversity was particularly congenial. We met weekly for lunch over severalmonths and I learnt much of the intellectual conflicts between Chicago andHarvard historians of Japan. These were almost unknown in Britain.

Japan in 1984–85 was experiencing a gilded if not a golden age. Its industrieswere overwhelmingly successful, its society remarkably stable while the

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development of a ‘third sector’ bridging public and private spheres seemed aninnovation of potential value to many advanced societies. Japan’s improvedrelations with China were evident in the sympathetic coverage of Chinese newsby television reporters, and the ‘Ron-Yasu’ relationship between PresidentReagan and Prime Minister Nakasone suggested stable links with the UnitedStates.

This Japanese prosperity and stability was reflected in a remarkable array ofcultural projects including the creation of new museums which set new standardsin innovative design and the re-use of historic buildings. One remarkable modernmuseum was set in rice fields near Tsuruga and vividly presented new evidenceof J� mon agriculture.

While living in Kyoto for a year one became aware of its half-forgotten history—distinct from the picturesque world of shrines, temples, palaces and historicgardens. Though no Japanese ever mentioned it Kyoto had been a major focus ofterrorism and murder in the 1850s and 1860s, when supporters and enemies ofthe shogun struggled for control of the city. Memorials commemorating the‘martyr’s death’ of Sakamoto Ry� ma and other samurai were to be found in asurprising number of streets. As in Hokkaido certain fragments of the pastappeared to be reluctantly remembered. A large monument to a founding fatherof modern Japan, Kido K� in looked sadly neglected, and the house of anotherMeiji statesman Iwakura Tomomi was silent, dusty and almost bereft of visitors.

In 1985 I returned, reluctantly, from Kyoto having edited a volume on Euro-Japanese relations during my stay. By 1986 the mood in Japanese studies inBritain was more expansive than before. The Sasakawa Foundation was a newsource of grants, Cambridge had appointed its first Professor of Japanese Studiesand the Parker report suggested that the expansion of Japanese language trainingwas desirable. Furthermore, the establishment of the UK-Japan 2000 Groupcreated a high-level organization profoundly sympathetic to the study of Japan.All these developments reflected a widely held view that Japanese dominance inmany fields of industry and technology was an almost permanent feature of theinternational economy. Consequently many believed that a closer relationshipwith Japan was essential to Britain’s economic future.

In 1986 I was elected president of the British Association for Japanese Studiesand during my year in office tried to promote three significant objectives: thetransformation of the Proceedings into a professionally published journal, thepresentation of the academic case for the expansion of Japanese Studies to theUniversity Grants Committee, and the development of the BAJS as a seriousforum for discussion of its academic field. All these campaigns achieved ameasure of success. More specifically I presented the expansionist case, and thecase for Anglo-Japanese academic cooperation to the Mixed Commissionmeeting in Edinburgh. In 1987 I repeated these messages at a meeting held at theForeign and Commonwealth Office which was convened by the UK-Japan 2000Group. Following this presentation I was invited by Sir Peter Parker to join a sub-committee of the UK-Japan 2000 Group which aimed to promote the expansion

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of Japanese studies. This sub-committee was chaired by Dr Stan Ridgwell,formerly of ICI, who pursued its objectives with great energy and strategic skill.The sub-committee’s main victory was in successfully presenting the case forimproving Japanese language training for businessmen to Lord Young, theSecretary of State for Trade and Industry. As part of the presentation of this caseI and Dr Phillip Harries of Queen’s College, Oxford, were commissioned by theDTI to prepare a report on current trends in Japanese language teaching. In the latesummer of 1988 Dr Harries and I visited major Japanese, American andEuropean-linked institutions engaged in practical language training, andcollected all available teaching materials. Among several schools which wevisited in Japan the most effective and memorable was the American Departmentof State’s language centre in Yokohama. The courses which it provided forAmerican, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand diplomats concentrated on thecareful use of courtesy language, and the development of reading skills in fieldssuch as contemporary political and economic affairs. What was most striking inthe State Department school was the clear direction of teaching to preciseobjectives—a feature often absent from purely academic programmes. Incontrast the Executive Training Programme (ETP) in Tokyo, which wassupported by the European Community, seemed comparatively expensive, andless effective.

In the United States we were most impressed by Dr Heller of StanfordUniversity who was planning the construction of a mini-campus for engineersand technologists in Kyoto. Stanford also planned a scheme of placements fortechnology students in high-tech companies in the Kansai. This new linkage oflanguage study with technology was also an important feature of special coursesat the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); within these, workexperience programmes in Japanese research institutes had been carefullydeveloped. The application of new technologies to language teaching seemedmost advanced in the intensive FALCON programmes at Cornell University. Bythis time Eleanor Jorden had produced new textbooks which were used inconjunction with video discs, to teach both colloquial Japanese and socialetiquette.

Our joint report Japanese for Industry and Commerce appeared in 1989 andwas well received. In parallel the DTI made a generous grant to establishprogrammes of Japanese language teaching for businessmen. Unfortunately, thefashionable ideology of ‘competition’ impaired rather than strengthened theresulting programmes. I had envisaged the creation of a single world-class coursein a world-class British university such as Cambridge or SOAS—to enable suchprogrammes to be effective and permanent. Instead, grants were scattered overnumerous institutions some of which were barely capable of providing effectivecourses. As a result no permanent programmes resulted.

Soon after the publication of Japanese for Industry and Commerce the head ofthe Japanese section of the British Library Mrs Yu-ying Brown asked me tochair a newly-created international organization, The European Association of

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Japanese Resource Specialists (EAJRS) for a three-year term. This new groupaimed to unite scholars, librarians, archivists and information technologyspecialists to improve the supply and circulation of data regarding Japan. Theorganization’s conferences were generously supported by the Japan Foundationand were also helped by the active cooperation of Japanese informationagencies. Financial support from European institutions was notably lacking.

As memorable as the academic success of these meetings, held in Budapest,Berlin and Leiden, was their changing political context. When the Associationwas established in 1989 Berlin was still a divided city. By 1991 the Soviet systemhad almost disintegrated. As a result East European academics were increasinglyfree to attend our meetings, and we became deeply aware of the high quality ofRussian and Czech scholarship which had survived decades of post-wardictatorship.

Japanese agencies not only provided essential financial support for the workof the EAJRS, they also funded what was probably the largest Anglo-Japaneseacademic project of the post-war years. In 1995, fifty years after the end of thePacific War, the Japanese Government launched its ‘Peace, Friendship andExchange Initiative’. Within this Professors Ian Nish and Hosoya Chihiroestablished the Anglo-Japanese History Project. This was designed to re-examinethe entire history of the Anglo-Japanese relationship from 1600 to 2000. As partof this research scheme Japanese and British scholars invited me to be jointconvenor (with Professor Tsuzuki Chushichi,) of the Cultural and Social sectionof the project. Between 1996 and 2002 the Cultural and Social Section organizedcontinuous research cooperation between British, Japanese and Canadianscholars. This cooperation reached its high point in 1999 at a ‘workshop’ held atthe International House of Japan. During three days of intense discussion eachmember of the research group reviewed another’s paper, before the opening ofcollective discussion. The outcome of this cooperative process was the formationof a broad interdisciplinary interpretation of Anglo-Japanese culturaldevelopments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This recognized, thegreat importance of nationalism in many aspects of Japanese cultural innovation.The final outcome of these six years of cooperation was the publication of anEnglish-language volume of almost 400 pages, which appeared in 2002.

In contrast to the successful intellectual cooperation epitomized by the Anglo-Japanese History Project, the tide of Japanese studies in Britain ebbed in theclosing years of the last century, and the first years of the new millennium.Programmes and centres in Newcastle, Essex, Winchester, Stirling and Durhamwere terminated as accounting rather than academic criteria shaped decision-making. In part this contraction represented an exaggerated response to Japan’srecent economic difficulties. This deliberate short-termism contrasted with thepowerful element of continuity in Japanese studies across the United States.Overall British Japanology has been weakened by government and universityexpectations of rapid profit-making, and a failure to recognize Japan’spermanent economic, political and cultural significance. In some spheres

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Japanese achievements continue to suggest alternative paths to a pluralistic,prosperous society. Sadly, current British policy towards Japanese studies isstrangely negligent in both vision and economic practicality.

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Part I

Bakumatsu and Meiji: Anglo-JapaneseRelations and Westerners in Japan

First published in Modern Asian Studies, II, 4 (1968), pp. 291–313

1The Japanese Civil War (1868)—A British

View

IN THE LATE AUTUMN of 1868 political events in Japan were no longerfocused exclusively on Edo, � saka and the lands of the south-western han; all ofwhich could be easily visited by British sailors and diplomats. The Imperialarmies had won important victories at Fushimi and Ueno but they had still notgained control of the whole of Japan. The last Sh� gun had retired from theconflict but his supporters still mounted stubborn military resistance in NorthernHonsh� .2 At this stage it was important for Britain to know the state of this civilwar and its likely outcome.

At the beginning of this struggle in January 1868 Sir Harry Parkes, the BritishMinister in Japan, feared the probable consequences of the Western powersbecoming involved. He had grimly noted the recent attempts of the FrenchMinister, Léon Roches, to monopolize the affections of the Tokugawa,3 and,should there be competitive intervention in the emerging war, fighting mightwell be protracted. In such a situation Japan might well fall victim to predatorypowers. Also on a popular level; should Western states openly associatethemselves with the conflicting parties, in future it might well be impossible forthem to be broadly accepted in Japan. To deal on the basis of Western unityobviously promised a more stable future than to deal on a basis of each power toits own client. If the civil war was drawn out British businessmen would suffer;4

instability might produce a return to anti-foreign terrorism.5

To prevent any such unsavoury developments, Parkes persuaded the Americanand European diplomats to issue a declaration of neutrality and non-interventionin February 1868.6 And despite his sympathy for the Emperor, which grew as thenew government showed itself friendly and reliable,7 the British Ministermaintained a stance of non-involvement. Even so, from the point of view of bothParkes and the new regime the sooner relations could be normalized the better.

In October 1868, with the Imperial armies still marching northward, it wasdifficult for Parkes or any other European to have a clear impression of thepolitical and military situation. Several factors made foreigners’ knowledgeinadequate and confused. The battlefields were far distant, some two hundredmiles away, to the west of Japan’s difficult central mountain chain. The linksacross the country were fragile; tracks and roads which were amongst the worst

in the world, and news was carried on foot by Japanese runners. Besides this it waslikely that the new government would conceal any news of reverses for fear oflosing face among foreigners. Any information, therefore, that came from thescene of conflict would be hard to assess, particularly as foreigners had nevervisited the area and did not know the simple facts of its geography.

At this stage it is worth recalling that Victorian self-interest was not withoutsome constraints of morality, and some British activities in Japan in the closingmonths of 1868 provide a fine example of self-interest, the profit motive, andhumanitarianism inextricably interwoven. On 2 October Higashizuke Michitomiwrote to Sir Harry Parkes asking if he would release William Willis, a legation

THE JAPANESE CIVIL WAR (1868)—A BRITISH VIEW 3

doctor and Vice-Consul, to travel to the West coast, to give medical treatment towounded members of the Imperial army.8 The new regime had probably beenconvinced of the superiority of European medicine by the successful treatmentWillis had given to wounded Satsuma troops at Ky� to at the outset of the civilwar.9 Parkes had taken the opportunity to send as well Ernest Satow,10 his chiefscholar of Japanese, to sound out opinion and to speed up negotiations on thepunishment of Bizen officers who had recently ordered an attack on Europeansat Hy� go (K� be).

Parkes now agreed to send Willis on the condition that he should treat thewounded ‘regardless of…party’,11 that is, he should treat both Northern prisonersand the Emperor’s men. This condition can probably be ascribed to threemotives: a desire to keep up an appearance of non-involvement, purehumanitarian sentiment, and a desire to gain popularity for foreigners amongJapanese by helping as many men as possible. Certainly, from the wide scope ofWillis’ reports on his journey, it is clear that it was not purely an errand of mercy;though his restless exertions in difficult conditions show that he took thehumanitarian side of his mission very seriously. In Willis, as in Parkes, therewere genuine humanitarian sentiments, but this mission would provide a perfectopportunity to see at close hand what the situation was over large tracts ofpreviously unknown territory, and in the more immediate combat area.Furthermore, there might be opportunities to see the economic potential of theseunknown areas and to persuade the Japanese of Parkes’ basic philosophy. This wasthat if the Japanese saw Western medicine, inventions, commerce and transport atwork they would be easily persuaded of their superiority, and realise that to takeover the good things of Europe would lead to a stabler, richer and happiersociety.12 Such a society would, of course, offer extensive markets for Britishgoods, be a safer place for foreign residents, and stimulate the production of silk,the commodity which British merchants found highly profitable.

On 5 October 1868 William Willis, with his Japanese teacher, two Japanesedoctors, his cook and a guard of twenty-five men from the Ky� sh� fief ofChikuzen, left Edo for the west.13 He rode in a litter which was carried by localcoolies. Their route lay over three distinct areas—the rich Edo plain, the centralmountains, and the narrow coastal lowland on the shore of the Sea of Japan. Thiscrossing was slow and arduous. Winter was approaching and rains were so heavythat the roads had become a morass while the rice, wheat, bean and cotton cropshad been ruined. Rivers were overflowing and flooding was widespread. Williswrote of his route:

I…observe the great want in Japan of a real central government. There areno public works of any importance, in places close to Edo the roads werethe worst I had ever seen. The mud was knee deep and with the utmosteffort it was in places impossible to get over twenty miles a day. Therewere no bridges of any importance spanning rivers, all traffic…dependingupon ferries of the most primitive character.14

4 COLLECTED WRITINGS OF GORDON DANIELS

Still, if the physical discomforts of travel were endless the population and hisescort were friendly. Village officials welcomed him in ceremonial dress,provincial check points were thrown open and he was warmly received at innspreviously the sole preserve of travelling daimy� and their followers.

However, the bulk of Willis’ report on his journey to Takada through landsfree from any sign of war damage was devoted to popular feeling and the impactof foreign trade. From the standpoint of the British who longed for stablegovernment and flourishing trade there was much that gave cause for optimism.No one Willis and his Japanese teacher interviewed seemed cold or hostiletowards the new government, though reactions differed according to social class.The innkeepers and shopkeepers, though looking back nostalgically to the ‘goodold days’ when the daimy� and their spectacular cavalcades spent money freelyon their way to Edo, voiced no sympathy for the old government. In the silkproducing areas of the Edo plain it was said ‘the money that changes hands is soconsiderable that innkeepers speak of it as…compensating for the old traffic’.15

Among the farming community, too, opinion, though varied, was generallysympathetic towards the new rulers. The tenants of the large landowners seemedsomewhat indifferent to recent changes but those who had rented fields from theTokugawa hatamoto were very favourably inclined to the new rulers. For themconditions had been so severe under the Shogunate that things could hardly havebeen worse, so any change was probably a cause for optimism. After theoppression and injustice of their old landlords the new government was thoughtlikely above all to secure ‘more uniformity and justice in the amount of tributeassessed on government land’.16 It appeared that even though many of thesetenant farmers had not been actively bearing arms for the Imperial army therewere at least strong passive supporters of its cause. Good reports were alsoreceived of the state of affairs further west. In fact, by all accounts, theTokugawa backwoodsmen were merely fighting for terms.

From Willis’ observation there seemed to be an economic, social and climaticdividing line across Japan which was marked by the Usui Pass. To the east of it silkproducers looked to Yokohama as the best outlet for their goods, to the west silkfarmers looked forward to the opening of Niigata when they would be able tosend their crop by boat down the River Shinano to be marketed. This seemed topromise well for future foreign merchants at that port. The western highlands,Willis recorded, were a good 10°F colder than the Edo plain but the populationof the chillier west seemed handsomer than that of the lowlands, of which hewrote: ‘The women are ugly and the men…weak and stupid looking’.17 As thisindicated, Willis did not look upon the Japanese with the sweet and sourromanticism of many European writers. He found most villages ‘more repetitiousof each other’, with a ‘stench…offensive to a degree’.18 As a Victorian broughtup on the virtues of cleanliness, he was depressed by the Japanese ‘greatindifference as regards air and water’ to which with their ‘comfortless housesand poor diet’ he ascribed the ‘sickly looks’ of many people.19 In the richlowland province of Musashi the change of regime seemed to have produced an


outbreak of lawlessness and a breakdown in the police system. Now an attemptwas being made to restore order through meting out heavy sentences.

Still, the future of the all-important staple, silk, seemed highly promising. Inthe Edo plain the areas under silk had doubled in a few years, while in the lastdecade the price ‘had risen five and six fold’.20 ‘The silk farmers seem to havegood times of it’21 wrote Willis, and in their areas many substantial houses wereto be seen. Unfortunately for the merchants at Yokohama who made contracts inadvance, prices at the source of supply were now higher than the prices at whichthey had promised to sell. This apart, the silk trade seemed to have a rich futureahead, a future which Willis thought could be even more golden if more landwere devoted to mulberries and less to rice. In this he seems to have beenthinking more of the profits of his countrymen than of the food needs of theJapanese.

If the export trade looked healthy, there was also evidence of a widerdistribution of imports. For in many towns and villages along his route foreigntextiles could be seen on sale. This and the fact that ‘all but the most primitive’household utensils in dwellings along the road came from Edo or Ky� to seem toshow there was a considerable amount of internal trade in objects that were notbulky; coolies and animals could hardly have taken larger loads.

On the arduous twelve-day journey to Takada, Willis’ party were so slowed byweather and terrain that they could cover only some twelve miles each day.Fortunately only three towns of any size lay on their route— Takasaki, Ueda andZenk� ji (Nagano), and none of these held much to delay the travellers. It wasalso a compensation that Willis’ escort were so co-operative. The officers of theold Tokugawa administration had usually been evasive and obstructive but thepresent guards gave him every aid in pressing his enquiries. For he wrote: ‘Allwho accompanied me obtained for me any information that I required’.22 He wason occasion embarrassed at not being able to pursue his investigations alone, forthe presence of soldiers may well have cowed some people into silence. But thisdrawback was certainly outweighed by the tact and industry of the doctor’sJapanese teacher. Without him, as Willis admitted, ‘it would have beenimpossible or impolite to make certain enquiries that only a native could makequietly and with considerable circumspection’.23 And to him Willis was ‘muchindebted’ for what he learned on the way.

On 17 October Willis and his companions arrived at Takada, which heremembered as one ‘interminable street’ with vast overhanging roofs to keep offthe winter snows.24 Here, close to the sea, the serious part of the doctor’s workbegan; in screened-off sections of Buddhist temples were four hundred sick andwounded troops awaiting treatment. As the local doctors were for the most part,practitioners of Chinese medicine, no operations had been carried out, and no‘mechanical appliances’,25 which invariably meant splints, had been applied intreatment. Consequently many men had died unnecessarily and the condition ofothers had worsened. The most immediate task was to operate on the most seriousvictims of gunshot wounds; and the best part of three days was taken up with


amputations and the removal of bullets and bone fragments from the limbs of thewounded. The acquiescence of patients in operations, which had no place intraditional medicine, was almost certainly due to the relative painlessness of thetreatment, for chloroform was administered in most cases. If this treatment wasto have a lasting effect, and if future cases were to be dealt with properly, thelocal doctors had to be instructed in the rudiments of Western first aid. Willisdevoted much time to this and to bringing some order and system to these ad hocdressing stations. The wounded were chiefly from Ch� sh� and Satsuma and a listwas prepared of all who were strong enough to be sent home by steamer. Duringhis nine days at Takada, the British Legation Doctor worked tirelessly to easesuffering and to make provision for more effective care of the wounded.Certainly he was deeply moved by their plight and was far from being a detachedforeign observer.

Though the sufferings of the Imperial troops take up a large part of Willis’reports of these days, he was still trying to keep track of military developments.Although much news was vague and contradictory, he did secure someilluminating news from a native doctor freshly returned from the front. It wasnow said that Aizu, the leader of the Northern daimy� , would fight on bitterly tothe end and probably commit harakiri. The fighting had now passed the stagewhere his forces could sue for terms or reach a compromise, for on 11 Octoberthe Southern armies, ten thousand strong, had forced their way in Aizu’sterritory, and advanced to within ten miles of his last stronghold, Wakamatsu.26

The prospect was now of a bitter and costly final battle; for though the defenderswere a mere thirteen-hundred men they held formidable heights commanding theroad to Aizu’s castle. Meanwhile in Wakamatsu many buildings were being firedin preparation for a final determined stand. Aizu’s demise would probably markthe end of Northern resistance, but it was important that his capital should becaptured quickly for winter was approaching and then campaigning would beextremely difficult.

The movement which had overthrown the Tokugawa drew its strength fromthe power and vitality of the Southern han and the prestige and dignity of theImperial Court. This alliance was clearly represented in the forward armymarching on Wakamatsu, for its effective leader was Yamagata Ky� suke,27 aGeneral from Ch� sh� , while the nominal Commander was a member of theKy� to Court. The force itself was drawn from some ten clans but ‘the bestdisciplined and most steadfast troops’ were those from Ch� sh� , one of the threemost active han in the partnership against the Shogunate. Similarly, the inabilityof the Tokugawa’s supporters to come to terms with the new ideas flowing fromthe open ports was made clear by their performance in combat. Willis’ informantstressed that the Aizu men were unskilled in the use of firearms, the new weaponswhich had transformed the techniques of war. As a result Northern units wereeasily overcome in open ground. The superior organization of the Imperial armywas also clear to Willis from what he could see around him. The rice producedaround Takada was now controlled by the Imperial command for its own use;


none could be exported to other Japanese provinces. As a result its price wasonly about half of what it would have commanded at Yokohama. But theSouthern officers were quite conscious of the need to stand well with publicopinion. When one of the Ch� sh� wounded tried to extort money by threats fromlocal townspeople he was summarily executed and his head was exhibited as awarning to his colleagues.28

One thing did cause Willis great unease about the army he was serving. Therewere no prisoners among the men he treated. He mentioned his disappointmentat this, and heard that captives, without exception, were killed. Officers of theImperial army explained that no other course was possible as Aizu prisoners, farfrom acknowledging the Imperial authority, insulted it in the foulest language.

Other news added to Willis’ alarm. Over eight hundred Northern woundedwere lying in Wakamatsu and, should present policy be continued, these toomight be slaughtered when the town fell. These unhappy conjectures combinedto impress Willis with the need to intervene in this matter and to try and persuadethe Southern commanders to show mercy. Once more the role of political agentand humanitarian happily coincided. For Willis’ desire to move closer to the hubof conflict could be well satisfied by his agreeing to the Japanese request to treatcasualties further North. On 26 October with a fresh guard of Takada troops hebegan his journey along the shore to Kashiwazaki.29 The thirty miles to this‘poor shabbily built… fishing village’ was covered in less than a day andrevealed the ‘only evidence…of war since… Yedo’.30 This was charred ruins ofa village destroyed five months earlier when fighting had first begun in the area.At this stage it is clear that the sentiment uppermost in Willis’ mind was hishorror of Japanese warfare in which the wounded died unnecessarily, villageswere burnt and all opponents exterminated. It was a time when he declared hischief aim to be ‘to read a few lessons of humanity’ wherever he went.31 And ifthe results of the fighting were grisly, the fierce weather must have added to thedoctor’s depression and discomfort. In fact, heavy gales and snow falls were nowmaking the movement of wounded extremely difficult. So much so that whenKashiwazaki was reached Willis found not the expected two hundred woundedbut less than one hundred and fifty men of whom only half had war injuries. Asbefore, the time was divided between treating the sick, instructing local doctors,and selecting cases for evacuation.

After nine days at Kashiwazaki, Willis was asked to move yet again, this timeto Niigata, much nearer to the vanguard of the Imperial army. He agreed forreasons chiefly of charity, but partly of policy. If troops with fractured limbs hadto travel to him in winter weather their condition would worsen, whilst a visit toNiigata could be used to spread medical knowledge and to engender good will. Themost important of Willis’ philanthropic aims was his desire to meet high officersof the Imperial forces and plead for mercy for captured men. In Kashiwazaki hewas too far from commanders with enough power to decide such an importantchange of policy, but Niigata might well give him the opportunity he desired.


While it would be cynical to doubt the sincerity of Willis’ concern for thewounded of both armies, he did not neglect the search for political facts. Andalthough Kashiwazaki was agog with soldiers passing to and fromthe battlefields it seemed impossible to gather much reliable information there.There were rumours that the anti-Tokugawa army had entered Wakamatsu buthad not stormed the castle. It was heard that the Emperor now had thirtythousand men under arms; but as for learning the true state of the war, Willisagain felt he would be much more successful at Niigata.

Willis and his retinue left Kashiwazaki on 4 November. Their route againfollowed the shore line with, for most of the way, a screen of hills on theireastern flank. Here there was further grim evidence of past fighting, with moreruined villages and several abandoned hill forts. But despite this, the localresidents had suffered little ‘pillage or violence’ from the retreating Aizu army;and while there had been some cases of extortion, ‘in general no-one spoke ill ofthem’ and Willis ‘did not think there was much wanton injury by either party’.32

On his arrival at Niigata on 5 November, Willis was pleasantly surprised. Sofar, the towns he had passed through had been squalid, drab and uninteresting,but he wrote of his new base:

as a town it…surpasses any place… I have seen since I left Yedo, thepeople seem well-to-do and, from its position at the mouth of theShinnano…which flows through the extensive plain that lies inland it mustbe by far the most important place on the West coast as a site for foreigntrade.33

In summertime junks from such distant points as Shimonoseki and Hakodate putin there, and the sailors sustained a number of prostitutes ‘out of all proportion tothe population’.34 Not only did Niigata seem to promise well for business but itwas attractive too, for the streets crossed tidily at right angles and there werewillow-lined canals ‘which in summer doubtless give a picturesqueappearance’.35

There was unfortunately little time to dwell on the delights of the picturesquefor the hundred and fifty wounded who awaited his attention had injuries whoseseverity ‘excelled anything’ he ‘had yet seen’. Seven days were passed ‘workingfrom morning till late at night’36 attending to the most urgent cases, and for thefirst time, we hear of personal difficulties. Usually ‘a perfectly goodunderstanding’ had existed with his Japanese colleagues, but here there werecases where he ‘differed with them on plans for treatment’. More important still,their sympathy towards the sick was often offset by their lack of ‘discipline andorder’37 which stemmed chiefly from an inter-han rivalry which was so strongthat it not only made ‘combined action difficult’, but it made Willis for the firsttime pessimistic about the future of the new regime. For he noted, ‘it appearssuggestive of difficulties that the government of the Mikado will have to contend


against if other departments of government are influenced in a similar degree tothe medical by local jealousies’.38

Though his colleagues’ want of co-operation gave rise to worry about eventsnear at hand, there was a spate of welcome news from the front line. Word camethat on 5 November the Prince of Aizu and five Kar� had left Wakamatsu castle,swordless, and ‘in a suppliant posture’ surrendered to the besieging force.39 Theyhad pleaded for mercy for the women, children and old men huddled inside thebeleaguered keep, and its four thousand occupants had been allowed to leaveunmolested. Now the Aizu leader was in a nearby temple waiting for theSouthern officers to decide his fate. Wakamatsu was to be garrisoned and thebulk of the Imperial forces would then move North to attack Sakai’s castle,reputedly the sole remaining rebel strong point now that Sendai, Yonezawa andYamagata had abandoned resistance.40 It was believed that the conquest of thisfinal area would be difficult as it was rugged territory and r� nin from manyregions had collected there to put up a last ‘desperate resistance’. If Sakaicontinued his fight it was unlikely he would be defeated before the close of1868, as winter, rough country, and wild seas would present major obstacles tothe attacking forces. Willis collected a good deal of fresh information about theforthcoming assault from a doctor who was soon to join the expeditionaryforce.41 It appeared that one force would strike along the coast whilst othercolumns would invade simultaneously from other directions. From what Williscould gather it certainly looked as though it could be no more than a matter ofmonths before the war would be brought to a decisive end.

In Niigata and its hinterland, political stability seemed to have been fullyrestored and ‘the authority of the Mikado’s Government…fully established’.42

The town was ‘administered by three chief officials, two Ch� sh� and one Satsuma’and ‘good government’ seemed to prevail everywhere.43 Each day the threeofficers met in the old governor’s residence to discuss the administration of thearea. Here too there were clear attempts by the Imperial Government to woo thelocal population and proclamations had been posted all over the town expressingthe sorrow of the Emperor at having to go to war, and his sympathy with hispeople’s difficulties. The edict ran ‘he condoles as a father with the hardshipsimposed upon the people of these parts…and he remits for the year half of therevenue which they should pay.’44 This concession was presumably to act as anincentive to hard work and continuing loyalty. Though from the British viewpointthings were now going well, with an Imperial victory almost assured, Dr Williswas still deeply committed to continue his travels further. There were still manydetails he wished to know of recent events in Aizu; and so far, he had faileddismally in his efforts to persuade Southern officials to spare the lives ofprisoners. Although these efforts at persuasion were unsuccessful they are notlacking in historical interest, for they took a form which was then almoststandard in British overtures to the Japanese. If Britain wanted a Japanesegovernment to amend its policies or institutions there was one simple technique—an appeal to its pride. The Japanese would be told ‘that all the great countries of


the world would hear with horror’45 of their present ways; while the steps Britainproposed would be described as noble, modern, enlightened, and likely to raisethe reputation of Japan in the councils of the world. Willis pleaded for the lives ofcaptives in these same tones.

After the unhappy frictions at Niigata, Willis found his next journey and itsoutcome pleasant and highly rewarding. The one day trek to Shibata lay throughprosperous rice country, with the roar of the sea resounding in the distance, andhis stay there could hardly have been more successful or satisfying. In the matterof medicine, things went very well, for in his treatment of forty wounded men hereceived every possible help from local doctors. ‘The best understanding existedbetween them and me’46 he wrote. However, he was much surprised by theincompetence of the Dutch-trained physicians from Nagasaki. They had beentrained in such a confusing manner that they used a bizarre medley of Dutch,Latin and Japanese medical terms. Certainly they were no more able to cope withthe situation than the majority of the Japanese doctors who had been devotees ofclassical Chinese medicine. Apart from this one qualification, Willis was muchpleased by the enterprise and intelligent curiosity of the Shibata doctors, and itled him to make what, by the standards of his day, must have been a very boldstatement. ‘I think I may venture to state that under careful tuition Japanesepupils in medicine would reach an ordinary European standard.’47

In military matters too the news could hardly have been better, for on 9November a decisive event had taken place: Sakai had surrendered. Now allsignificant mainland opposition had collapsed and it would no longer benecessary for the Southern army to carry out its elaborate and costly strategyagainst Sakai’s castle at Sh� nai (Tsuruoka).48

The crowning achievement of Willis’ stay at Shibata lay in his efforts tomoderate the savagery of Japanese warfare. Two days after his arrival theImperial Prince49 who was the Commander-in-Chief of the local army, sentNakano Zenjir� to Willis to express his gratitude for his medical help. TheBritish doctor seized this opportunity to have his views on prisoners of war putbefore a figure of real power. He emphasized to Nakano the ‘compassion shownin enlightened countries to wounded men—even if enemies’,50 and to captives ingeneral, and boldly contrasted this with government-sanctioned slaughter inJapan. He said he would be glad if the present regime would change its ways, sothat he could commend their humane conduct to the outside world. Nakanopromised to consult his fellows and evidently kept his word; for the next day theImperial prince sent a messenger to Willis to invite him to his headquarters. Likemost Europeans at this time, Willis was concerned lest he be humiliated in theceremonials involved in meeting a royal personage; so he proposed to pay thePrince the same respects as would be due to an Englishman of equivalent rank. Thiscaused no delay, and with an escort of twenty of the prince’s guards he visitedhim in Shibata castle. What initially pleased Willis most about his interview wasthe austere and efficient air of his host and his entourage. For he commented‘There was nothing grand in the quarters occupied by the prince, there was


however an air of business about the place which pleased me…some werereading long documents, others conversing in earnest tones.’51 In the obscurelight of the chamber Willis was able to pick out the handsome and intelligentlooking prince with two courtiers, a general and a doctor in attendance. After anexchange of bows the British doctor explained that he had said all he had to sayregarding prisoners the previous day. Then followed a few brief, tactful remarksfrom Willis in which he expressed his hope that the fighting was really over andthat the union of Japan was accomplished. Finally he recalled that he had treatedthe first men wounded in the civil war and said he hoped he would be able totreat those injured in the final skirmishes. There was no positive response to allthis from the Prince or his advisers, and no real sign that they had been moved byhis appeal. In fact, their only friendly gestures were a brief apology for theinconveniences of Willis’ journey and the gift of a length of silk.

The stolid air of the authorities at the castle was, however, deceptive. Earlynext day, Willis received a letter which not only gave him cause for satisfactionbut also marked a real, if small, instance of human progress. The prince invitedWillis to visit Wakamatsu to treat the wounded of both sides;52 then he was toreturn to Kashiwazaki where many wounded had been gathered to benefit fromits mild winter. After the previous vacillations and coldness this marked a changein Imperial policy which was clearly for the better. The new mood was alsoevident in the helpful desire the Japanese showed to ease and speedcommunications between Willis and Parkes.

Several motives lay behind the doctor’s resolve to accept this new commission.Uppermost, no doubt, was a simple desire to help men in acute pain; but he hadother interesting intentions. The most striking of these was his hope that his workwould lead to favours being granted to Britain. For he wrote that in view of ‘thevery great success of the Mikado’s Government… I met their wishes morereadily, for if one good turn deserves another my stay beyond the timecontemplated may be turned to useful account.’53 The military details of therecent campaign were also a focus of his interest for he was keen to see whatdifficulties the Southern units had had to surmount. Finally he saw his visit toAizu as an occasion on which he might do something to improve the relationsbetween samurai and foreigners. In the past this group had contained many menwho were bitterly anti-Western and had attacked and killed several Europeans.Willis believed that if he went, at the Government’s invitation, to towns wherethere were large numbers of samurai, it would be made clear that the Emperorlooked upon foreigners kindly, and the chief basis of two-sworded attacks wouldbe removed.

Evidence was daily accumulating of the greatly superior élan of the Imperialforces, for Shibata was full of troops passing south after the successfulcampaign, and they left a favourable impression on Willis. Many of them worean imitation of Western military uniform and he wrote of them ‘such troops as Ihave seen were well armed, marched in tolerable order to the music of the fifeand drum, and were not badly clad.54 In contrast he heard that as the defeated


Aizu men had retreated home they had become ‘a disorderly set of ruffians,robbing, murdering and committing rape along the lines of their retreat’.55

Evidently by the time they had passed near Shibata their discipline hadcompletely broken down. It was not therefore surprising that the inhabitants ofthe surrounding area had no sympathy whatever for the Northern army and spokeof it ‘as a blessing that order and good government had been established oncemore’.56

The day after the prince’s message, Willis left for Wakamatsu with an escort ofthirty-four local troops.57 His fifty-mile journey was for the most part over hillyand difficult country, though his destination lay in a plain surrounded by steepmountains. The details of the next winter march left little impression on Willis,but his stay at Wakamatsu was highly eventful, and from it he produced amasterly survey of local conditions.

When Willis reached the Aizu capital, it was a sad spectacle ofdestruction. sickness and disorder. Four-fifths of it had been burned to theground and only the central buildings of the castle remained; even theseremnants of the wood and plaster keep had been ‘riddled with roundshot and riflebullets’.58 Here he set about treating some seven hundred Aizu casualties and thewounded of the victorious army. If the pattern of treatment was the same asbefore, the conditions of work were in many ways more trying. The Aizuwounded, who included many women and old men, were scattered in sevenvillages round the capital; consequently, Willis had to travel a great deal insnowstorms and intense cold. Furthermore the Aizu wounded were in a far worsestate than the Imperial troops he had attended earlier; and though in the past hehad been depressed by the plight of Southern casualties, here, by comparisonwith the enemy, they seemed well cared for. The ‘sick of the Mikado’s army’ hefound, ‘were provided with all the ordinary wants of Japanese, and…cared for asfar as could be expected considering the imperfect discipline and want ofknowledge.’59 But he wrote of the wounded of the Aizu clan ‘When I visitedthem they were in a deplorable state of filth and wretchedness, andexcepting aration of rice, nothing else was allowed them.’60 It was understandable thatImperial officers, having seen Aizu atrocities, gave scant attention to enemycasualties; but some blame for the plight of the local wounded must fall upon theincompetence of the defeated regime. In all branches of government it had showna cruel conservatism and it had cared little for medicine, or the needs of thepeople.61 Dr Willis remedied this by persuading the occupying army to providemedical supplies for the sick of both sides.

In less than a fortnight at the scene of feudalism’s last stand, William Willisgained a thorough understanding of how the final battle had been waged, andwhy Aizu had been routed. The general failure of the local army had stemmedfrom weaknesses of numbers, strategy, and popular support.

If the men of Wakamatsu were outnumbered they were also outmanoeuvred intheir last campaign. When they held good mountain positions they oftenabandoned them and foolishly ventured into villages and open ground. There


their small numbers and clumsiness with firearms ensured quick defeat. Incontrast, the Imperial army followed a strategy designed to make the most of itssuperior numbers. Troops ‘entered the province by all main roads, and smallbodies of men were pushed forward even by mountain paths’62 so that at everypoint the defending forces were outnumbered and under pressure.

The final capture of Wakamatsu provides an ideal example of the skill andboldness with which the Southern army was directed. During the second week inOctober an Imperial regiment marching from the south-east had been blocked ata difficult mountain pass. After a struggle the defenders were routed and theImperial officers launched a brilliant strike at the Aizu capital. To take advantageof the clear road, this unit made a forced march of twenty-three miles through thenight and reached the suburbs of Wakamatsu at daybreak.63 The garrison wascompletely surprised and unprepared and ‘a terrible scene of confusion ensued;numbers of townspeople were shot down in the street whilst attempting to flee,and the place was fired in different directions.’64 Throughout that day streetfighting continued but by sunset Aizu’s forces had withdrawn into the castle. Therest of the town was in Imperial hands.

For almost a month a bitter siege followed; but once more superior numbersand sound tactics inevitably triumphed. Aizu’s fortress was commanded by a hilla mere half mile away, and from this Southern batteries carried out a tellingbombardment. The castle was not even shot-proof, and so desperate was theposition of its garrison that women took a significant role in the final defence.‘They cut off their hair, busied themselves in preparing food, nursing thewounded, and in not a few instances shouldered the rifle and bore a share in thefatigues of watching.’65 Even this unusual bravery did not long postpone thecastle’s surrender.

Besides its disadvantage in numbers and skill, Aizu’s army was decisivelyweakened by its lack of local popularity, for there was no feudal loyalty and noguerilla resistance against the invading forces. This surprised Willis, who hadexpected Aizu, like a Jacobite rebel, to have ‘a peasantry possessing the robustconstitution of highlanders and strongly attached to their chief. Instead he foundthe local farmers weak, half-starved men who looked upon their daimy� as‘identified with a system of cruel and rapacious oppression’.66 From his detailedenquiries he soon received a vivid picture of the old regime which made thereasons for its unpopularity obvious.

In the six years before his fall, the lord of Aizu had held the resplendent titleof ‘protector of the Emperor’67 at the Ky� to Court. This, though it had broughthim fame, brought his people hardships. Life at Court was expensive and he wascalled upon to provide guards at the palace. This was a costly privilege, forwhich in the end his subjects paid. At home, too, his regime had been extravagant;‘the official class far exceeded legitimate proportions’;68 so much so, in fact, thatit occupied two-thirds of the houses in the capital. To support this host ofbureaucrats ‘everything was appropriated or taxed’,69 and all rice was seized astribute. Not only were these officials numerous, but they operated a corrupt and


cruel administration which frequently extorted forced loans and gave worthlesspromises in return. Altogether the han officials Willis met left a veryunfavourable impression. Doctors were uninterested in new methods,administrators were indifferent to anything outside their province, and all spoke‘in more narrow and bigoted circles than the corresponding classes in otherprovince.’70

With wealth squandered and innovation ignored, it was not surprising thatAizu had become a place which Willis thought was the poorest in Japan, andwhere the population were ill-clad, ill-housed, undersized and, naturally,resentful. The daimy� ’s unpopularity was not merely shown in his subjects’failure to take up arms; for when he was taken under guard from the ‘small dirty,uncomfortable’ temple where he had been a prisoner, there was almost completepublic apathy. The scene, atmosphere, and public feeling when the captive lordleft for Edo were sharply caught in Willis’ notes:

Not a dozen spectators had assembled to witness the departure of theformer master of the…province. On all sides a cold indifference wasshown, and not even the peasants at work in the…fields turned aside towitness the departure of the once renowned prince…Outside theofficial class I failed to elicit any…sympathy…for the daimy� or his chiefadvisers…the…opinion being that they had caused a cruel and unnecessarywar and…as they had failed to perform harakiri in… defeat they hadforfeited all title to respect.71

The departure of the swordless, dejected prince from Wakamatsu did not itselfremove all sources of grievance from his former subjects; in fact, the interludebetween the old and new administrations, before Imperial rule had beenconsolidated, was a time when rural discontent could show itself openly, withoutfear of repression. During his frequent visits to the sick in villages nearWakamatsu, Willis saw at first hand the frightening lack of order in thecountryside and the seriousness of peasant unrest. On one occasion while stayingat the mayor’s house in a rural hamlet he was dissuaded by the local chiefofficial from travelling to the next village. Farmers were rioting and the situationseemed dangerous. Later that day there were obvious signs and sounds ofdisorder in the distance; for not only were there ‘large fires in differentdirections’ but on all sides Willis ‘could hear the wild uproar of themultitudes’.72 As the crowd of peasants gradually drew nearer with a ‘constantwild cry’ the local chief official became concerned for Willis’ safety, and said ifthey were attacked he could no longer protect him. By ten o’clock that night thecolumn of peasants had reached a village less than a mile away and set fire to thehouse of the chief official there. Willis did not, under any circumstances, want atroublesome incident with the local population, so he borrowed two horses forhis baggage and struggled through the dark and snow to Wakamatsu. On this


nightmarish journey he could see how very widespread the peasant movementwas, for blotches of fire lay all along the horizon.

The next morning, when darkness and the rioters had disappeared, Willisreturned to the hamlet where he had been staying. There he met the chief villageofficial and heard the story of the night’s events. Less than half an hour afterWillis had fled, four to five hundred farmers, ‘many of whom had saws,hatchets, and other cutting implements’73 had come to the mayor’s house andsacked it. They had then broken into the storehouse nearby, dragged out all thedocuments ‘and burnt them in great piles in front of the house’.74 The localofficial now pointed dramatically to the ashes and told Willis they were the causeof the disturbances. These papers had been the records of land assessment infeudal days. He explained that now the farmers had become tenants of theEmperor they wanted a new and fairer estimate of land tax. To achieve this theyplanned ‘to destroy in every village all…documents connected with the landtax’,75 so the new government could not consult the assessments of the old regime.The movement was active over the entire Aizu province; and in areas safelydistant from the capital it was carried on in open day, not just under cover ofdarkness. Everywhere the pattern of events was the same; the peasants destroyedthe houses of village mayors and made a bonfire of the land records. This wasclearly not a political revolt aiming at power, for no attempts were made to stealarms or capture strongpoints. Furthermore, papers and houses were all thatsuffered at the hands of the peasants; no-one was killed save a few rioters whowere cut down by their own side for being over-violent. Occasionally theproperty of Aizu mayors was divided among the farmers, but that seems to havebeen their most extreme activity. After his alarming experience of seeing theexcited peasants in action, Willis was surprised to discover the state of popularopinion. Even outside the agricultural community there was a ‘universal feelingthat the farmers had right on their side’.76 Aside from officials of the feudalregime, everyone described the daimy� ’s rule as corrupt, violent, oppressive, and‘squeezing’, and most people felt that the farmers had been goaded into revolt bythe corrupt and dishonest behaviour of local mayors. In fact, so thorough-goingwas the hatred of the ex-daimy� that, had he been pardoned, his subjects wouldhave rejected him.

On 2 December 1868, Dr Willis left Wakamatsu and began his journey back toEdo. Previously travel had been slow and tiring; now it became an unbrokenordeal; for although the Imperial officers were helpful and considerate, weatherand transport were outside their control. ‘The country was covered with snow’and the cold was so severe that the Japanese travelling with Willis were soon‘ailing from exposure’77 and finding movement difficult. Icy roads and inferiorfood slowed and weakened the party, while peasant rioting produced an evenmore harrassing problem. In normal times local farmers would act as porters forpassing travellers, but now most of them were thoroughly absorbed in themovement to destroy every symbol and record of the old regime. As a resultWillis found it increasingly difficult to find enough coolies to carry his litter and


transport his baggage; and only twelve miles from Wakamatsu it becameimpossible to engage any further porters.78 From this point Willis continued onfoot and abandoned his baggage to be brought on later; for over twenty miles thedoctor pressed forward and eventually arrived, cold, wet and exhausted, at thetown of Tsugawa. Here, fortunately, he was warmly received by the localBuddhist priest who produced hot tea and sake and lent Willis a change ofclothes. The doctor stayed overnight in the Tsugawa temple and soon becamevery friendly with his host; for the priest answered frankly every question that heasked and showed a lively interest in foreign developments. Before he left,Willis invited the priest to visit him in Edo the following summer, as he wantedto repay the kindness that had been shown and continue their fascinatingconversations.

As land transport in Aizu had proved almost impossible, Willis and hiscompanions now abandoned the road and took river boats to Niigata. This wascertainly a more reliable means of transport, but it was slow and circuitous. Itwas over forty miles by river to Niigata, and this, added to the earlier problem ofcoolies, made the journey from Wakamatsu to the coast take almost five days.Willis was certainly cheered when he at last approached Niigata, for not onlywas there a break in travelling, but after the poverty and suffering he had seen inAizu the people here seemed prosperous and lived ‘in comparative comfort andaffluence’.79

Cold and discomfort certainly depressed Willis but he was never diverted fromhis serious duties. While sailing the final eight miles into Niigata he carefullytook soundings, and, with an eye on future trade, pronounced the Shinano Riverdeep enough for navigation by light draught steamers.

The only casualties now remaining at Niigata were those who were still too illto be moved to winter quarters further south. Most of these were men sufferingfrom the after-effects of amputations which had worsened through lack ofattention. Willis’ previous advice had either been forgotten or disregarded, forthese wounds had not been properly strapped or dressed and he found ‘the nativedoctors deficient in this knowledge which is absolutely necessary for the successof all large operations.’ Willis also saw several open wounds that would havebeen healed already if they had been properly treated. A whole day was spent inthe dressing and care of dangerous wounds. Though in this brief time he hadlittle opportunity for political enquiries, Willis noted the speed at which Niigatawas being rebuilt and the good administration which was evident everywhere.

The next stage of Willis’ route was the three and a half day journey toKashiwazaki. This, apart from the discomforts of winter, was a relatively trouble-free period, and its sole interesting feature was a courtier travelling a short wayahead. This official was Shij� Dainagon, a provincial governor in the newregime, and his behaviour, at this stage, showed little evidence of the whirlwindof change and reform that was shortly to transform Japan. For ‘the road had beenprepared for his passing by being swept and having little conical piles of sand


placed at intervals along the entire way. The Kuge rode on horseback, hisfollowers shouting as he passed, calling… Be Low.’80

At Kashiwazaki, where the Imperial wounded had been collected for the winter,there were over five hundred casualties. Willis devoted four days there to treatingthe most serious cases, and once more repeated his instructions on dressings tohis Japanese colleagues. Here he also began planning his journey to Edo, for theJapanese capital was to be opened to foreign residents on 1 January 1869 and hewanted to arrive in good time, so that he could attend seriously to his duties asvice-consul there.81 If he could have returned by an entirely new route a delaywould have been justified, for then he would have been able to see more of Japanand the whole scope of his mission would have been widened; however this wasimpossible. Many roads were blocked with snow and in provinces off the mainroad it might be difficult to hire coolies in winter.

While he was on the West coast Willis continued to size up carefully thepolitical views of the Japanese around him; and his conclusions about opinion inKashiwazaki, written shortly before he left, were highly optimistic;

All classes speak of the Mikado as the natural and lawful sovereign ofJapan and many speak hopefully of the future of the country when all‘hearts’ are united.82

Furthermore, he never stopped trying to persuade the Japanese to centralize andreform their country in the way Sir Harry Parkes believed would be best foreveryone. He wrote:

I have as often as occasion suited spoken of the advantages that wouldaccrue to Japan by having a strong, central, controlling government…andall manner of public works which would lead to the development of thecountry and promote the comfort and welfare of Japanese of all classes.83

Unfortunately he left no record of the Japanese response to these suggestions.On 16 December Willis set out from Kashiwazaki and retraced his steps down

the coast.84 At Takada he stopped for half a day to see if any serious cases werestill there, and then he recrossed the mountains to the Edo plain. He arrived backat the Japanese capital on 28 December 1868, having covered 600 miles sinceleaving less than nine weeks before. Throughout his journeys he had neverenjoyed the luxury of riding on horseback; every mile was covered on foot or inan uncomfortable litter.85

Finally, what was the significance of this journey and its findings in the courseof British policy and the events of the Civil War? The evidence of Imperialsuccess and the new regime’s popularity helped convince Parkes that it was nowtime to withdraw the proclamation of Western neutrality. It took some weeks topersuade all his colleagues that this was the course to take but in early Februaryagreement was universal and Britain withdrew her recognition of the Northern


forces as belligerents in the Civil War.86 However, the fighting did not end atWakamatsu; in October 1868 the Sh� gun’s naval forces had escaped to Hakodateand captured it in a surprise attack. Here they held out until June 1869,87

attempting to enlist British diplomats as mediators in negotiation with the newgovernment.88 The aim of these last rebels, led by French officers, was a specialstatus for the island of Hokkaid� as a vast family estate for the Tokugawa familywhere its retainers could still be samurai, owing a loose loyalty to the Emperor.89

Needless to say, Britain ignored these overtures, for a return to confederatedestates was the last thing that Sir Harry Parkes desired, as it ran exactly counterto his vision of a consolidated and modernized Japan.

NOTES

1 The Author is extremely grateful to Professor Oka Yoshitake of Tokyo Universityfor his help and advice in the preparation of this article. Professor Oka hasdescribed Willis’ role in Japan in Reimeiki no Meiji Nihon, (Tokyo, 1964), pp. 171–305.

2 W.G.Beasley: The Modern History of Japan, (London, 1963), p. 99.3 For Anglo-French rivalry see M.Medzini: Léon Roches in Japan in Papers on

Japan, No. 2 (Harvard East Asian Research Center), Cambridge, Mass., 1963.4 Short as it was the civil war was something of a hindrance to trade, e.g. Jardine

Matheson papers (Cambridge University Library), Hy� go (21), 1 November 1868,Storm to Keswick ‘As soon as our currency is settled and an end made to thefighting, we may look for a large business being done here.’

5 Hammond papers FO 391/14, Osaka, 5 January 1868. Parkes to Hammond ‘there isalways the danger of many civil passions being let loose when once the sword isdrawn especially in a semi-civilized country.’

6 E.M.Satow: A Diplomat in Japan, (London, 1921), p. 332.7 J.R.Black: Young Japan, (London, 1881), vol. 2, p. 155.8 FO Japan 97, enclosure 1, in no. 240, Parkes to Stanley, 7 October 1868,

Higashikuze to Parkes.9 FO Japan 91, no. 41, Parkes to Stanley, 25 February 1868.

10 FO Japan 91, no. 42, Parkes to Stanley, 25 February 1868.11 FO Japan 97, enclosure 2, in no. 240, Parkes to Stanley, 7 October 1868, Parkes to

Higashikuze. 12 e.g. F.V.Dickens, Life of Sir Harry Parkes, Vol. 2 (London, 1894), p. 157.13 FO Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private, 4 November 1868. Memorandum of Dr

Willis of a journey from Yedo to Takata made at the instance of the JapaneseGovernment to render medical assistance to wounded men, 17 October 1868.

14 Ibid.15 FO Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private, 4 November 1868. Memorandum of Dr


16 Ibid.


17 FO Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private, 4 November 1868. Memorandum of DrWillis of a journey from Yedo to Takata made at the instance of the JapaneseGovernment to render medical assistance to wounded men, 17 October 1868.

18 Ibid.19 Ibid.20 Ibid.21 Ibid.22 FO Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private, 4 November 1868. Memorandum of Dr


23 Ibid.24 FO, Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private, 4 November 1868. Memorandum of Dr

Willis on the occasion of his visit to Takata to render medical assistance towounded Japanese, 25 October 1868.

25 Ibid.26 FO Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private, 4 November 1868. Memorandum of Dr


27 Later to become Yamagata Aritomo.28 FO Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private, 4 November 1868. Memorandum of Dr


29 FO Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private, 9 December 1868. Memorandum of DrWillis on the occasion of his visit to Kashiwasaki to render medical assistance towounded Japanese, 3 November 1868.

30 Ibid.31 FO Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private, 2 December 1868, Willis to Parkes, 3

November 1868.32 FO Japan 100, memorandum by Dr Willis on the occasion of his visit to Niigata to

render medical assistance to wounded Japanese, 13 November 1868.33 FO Japan 100, memorandum by Dr Willis on the occasion of his visit to Niigata to

render medical assistance to wounded Japanese, 13 November 1868.34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 Ibid.37 Ibid.38 Ibid.39 Ibid.40 Ibid.41 FO Japan 100, memorandum by Dr Willis on the occasion of his visit to Niigata to

render medical assistance to wounded Japanese, 13 November 1868.42 Ibid.43 Ibid.44 Ibid.45 Ibid.46 FO Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private of 2 December 1868. Memorandum by

Dr Willis on the occasion of his visit to Shibata to render medical assistance towounded Japanese, 18 November 1868.


47 Ibid.48 Ibid.49 Ninnaji no Miya (a chizi of the Gummukan).50 As note 46.51 As note 46.52 Ibid.53 FO Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private of 2 December 1868, Willis to Parkes,

18 November 1868.54 FO Japan 98, enclosure in Parkes, Private of 2 December 1868. Memorandum by

Dr Willis on the occasion of his visit to Shibata to render medical assistance towounded Japanese.

55 Ibid.56 Ibid.57 FO Japan 106, enclosure 1 in no. 17, Parkes to Stanley, 26 January 1869.

Memorandum by Dr Willis on the subject of his visit to Takata, Kashiwasaki,Neegata, Shibata, and Wakamatsu to render medical assistance to woundedJapanese, 23 January 1869.

58 FO Japan 106, enclosure 1 in no. 7, Parkes to Stanley, 26 January 1869.Memorandum by Dr Willis on the subject of his visit to Takata, Kashiwasaki,Neegata, Shibata, and Wakamatsu to render medical assistance to woundedJapanese, 23 January 1869.

59 Ibid.60 Ibid.61 Ibid.62 FO Japan 106, enclosure 1 in no. 17, Parkes to Stanley, 26 January 1869.

Memorandum by Dr Willis on the subject of his visit to Takata, Kashiwasaki,Neegata, Shibata, and Wakamatsu to render medical assistance to woundedJapanese, 23 January 1869.

63 Ibid.64 Ibid.65 Ibid.66 FO Japan 106, enclosure 1 in no. 17, Parkes to Stanley, 26 January 1869.

Memoranduirn to Dr Willis on the subject of his visit to Takata, Kashiwasaki,Neegata, Shibata, and Wakamatsu to render medical assistance to woundedJapanese, 23 January 1869.

67 Ky� to-Shugoshoku.68 FO Japan 106, enclosure 1 in no. 17, Parkes to Stanley, 26 January 1869.

Memorandum to Dr Willis on the subject of his visit to Takata, Kashiwasaki,Neegata, Shibata, and Wakamatsu to render medical assistance to woundedJapanese, 23 January 1869.

69 Ibid.70 Ibid.71 FO Japan 106, enclosure 1 in no. 17, Parkes to Stanley, 26 January 1869.


72 Ibid.73 Ibid.


74 Ibid.75 FO Japan 106, enclosure 1 in no. 17, Parkes to Stanley, 26 January 1869.


76 Ibid.77 FO Japan 100, memorandum by Dr Willis on the occasion of his visit to

Kashiwasaki to render medical attendance to wounded men, 12 December 1868.78 FO Japan 100, memorandum by Dr Willis on the occasion of his visit to

Kashiwasaki to render medical attendance to wounded men, 12 December 1868.79 Ibid.80 FO Japan 100, memorandum by Dr Willis on the occasion of his visit to

Kashiwasaki to render medical attendance to wounded men, 12 December 1868.81 FO Japan 106, no. 17, Parkes to Stanley, 26 January 1869.82 FO Japan 100, memorandum by Dr Willis on the occasion of his visit to

Kashiwasaki to render medical attendance to wounded men, 12 December 1868.83 FO Japan 100, memorandum by Dr Willis on the occasion of his visit to

Kashiwasaki to render medical attendance to wounded men, 12 December 1868.84 Ibid.85 FO Japan 106, enclosure 1 in no. 17, Parkes to Stanley of 26 January 1869.

Memorandum by Dr Willis on the subject of his visit to Takata, Kashiwasaki,Neegata, Shibata, and Wakamatsu to render medical assistance to woundedJapanese.

86 E.M.Satow: A Diplomat in Japan, (London 1921), pp. 405–408.87 W.G.Beasley: The Modern History of Japan, (London 1963), p. 99.88 FO Japan 106, no. 23 Parkes to Stanley, 27 January 1869.89 FO Japan 106, enclosure 3 in no. 23 of 27 January 1869. Petition of Tokugawa

Kerai to the Mikado.


First published in Modern Asian Studies, 1.3 (1967), pp. 304–5

2The Anglo-Japanese Alliance— The

Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894–1907By Ian H.Nish. Athlone Press: London, 1966

THIS IS ALMOST certainly the definitive study of the phase of Anglo-Japaneserelations which stretches from the end of extra-territoriality and the Sino-Japanese war, through the negotiation of the first alliance, to the militaryconsultations which followed the amended agreement of 1905. In the preparationof this monograph Dr Nish has used not only all available British departmentalpapers but has fully utilized the relevant archives of the Japanese ForeignMinistry on microfilm and published in the Nihon Gaik� Bunsho series;furthermore, he has dipped deeply into the private papers of many importantparticipants in the diplomacy of this period.

The great value of this book, however, is not confined to the richness of itssources, for both the depth of its treatment and the processes it reveals hold muchof interest alike for the student of diplomacy and the specialist in Japaneseaffairs. This study is far more than an authoritative account of the diplomacy ofthis period, for it pushes well back into the domestic political scene in both‘island empires’ and shows something of the public and press reaction whichrippled out from the decisions of diplomats and military advisers. Moreover, inthe discussion of the negotiations preceding the first alliance, one is given anexcellent case study of the decisive way in which the Japanese Genr� , or Elderstatesman, interceded between politicians and diplomats on the one hand and theEmperor on the other in the Japanese political system of the late Meiji period.

At the beginning of this study Japan, though victorious over China, was tooweak to withstand the joint veto of Russia, France and Germany to her claims onPort Arthur, and for some years she concentrated on modernization and onstrengthening herself militarily. Britain meanwhile preferred Russian expansionin the Far East to rumblings on the frontier of her Indian Empire.

With the seizure of Chinese ports by Russia and Germany and the subsequentBoxer rising the danger of Russian expansion at the expense of China becameever more menacing. Germany seemed indifferent, and this, combined with theSouth African entanglement, made Britain feel increasingly exposed. Japan onthe other hand, helped to drive the Boxers from Peking, while she herself couldgain no suitable accord with Russia over Korea. All these factors helped to setconditions fair for Anglo-Japanese agreement, and in the face of the Franco-

Russian alliance and Britain’s need for a Far Eastern naval ally the negotiationsof 1901–1902 came to fruition.

This treaty provided for joint action against a two power aggression and aconsiderable degree of naval co-operation. Within this setting Japan could safelygo to war with Russia to establish her position in Korea. Simultaneously Britainagain came to fear for the security of her Indian colonies and, with the issue ofthe Russio-Japanese war still unclear, a new agreement was signed widening thealliance to include India, providing for collaboration against a single attacker andgiving British acquiescence in the ending of Korean independence. With Japan’sdefeat of Russia and Britain’s movement towards the ‘triple entente’, the anti-Russian basis of the alliance and the idea of Japanese help on the Khyberdisappeared.


First published in Modern Asian Studies, II, 4 (1968), pp. 291–323

3The British Role in the Meiji Restoration: A

Re-interpretive Note

IT IS AN HISTORICAL commonplace that the renewal of Western diplomaticcontact with Japan, after the Tokugawa seclusion, seriously disturbed theJapanese political system, and contributed to the Meiji Restoration. Undoubtedlyforeign demands for commercial and diplomatic privileges, combined with thepresence of warships and military garrisons, cut sharply into the minds of allpolitically conscious Japanese, and added to the bitterness of internal conflict.But in the past numerous historians have gone much further than these generalstatements, and drawn far more specific conclusions about the policies andimpact of Britain in these crucial years.

According to the familiar version of the history of the period 1864–68,Britain’s role went much further than mere involuntary influence, and includeddeliberate moral and material support for the proponents of an ImperialRestoration.1 This interpretation, based largely upon the memoirs of two juniorofficials in the British Legation,2 has had an understandable appeal for two distinctsets of interested people. To Englishmen, Satow’s claim that Britain supportedthe Imperial camp has provided welcome evidence for a belief in Britishperspicacity and shrewdness. For many Japanese, on the other hand, the view thatBritain played a decisive role has provided grounds for righteous indignationover the extent of a foreign intervention which, it was alleged, extended tosupplying useful weaponry to the triumphant activists.

It has always seemed plausible that Victorian Britain, taut with expansivenessand eager for markets, should have been quick to see the need for Britishtechniques and goods and hence to support the forces which turned Japantowards modernization, but this superficially attractive thesis is scarcely borneout by a close examination of British aims and activities as revealed in Britishprivate and official documents.

There is undoubtedly one point on which one can readily agree with the termsof this familiar rationalization: Britain’s prime objective in Japan was certainly toobtain an expanding trade and safe conditions for British merchants. But thepolitical conclusions which the Foreign Office drew from this position were verydifferent from those of Satow and Mitford whose memoirs have influenced somuch historical writing.

Successive British governments always viewed Japan as an area of far lesscommercial potential than China and consequently were unwilling to commitarmed forces to action there in anything but the most extreme circumstances. In1863 and 1864 the Royal Navy was used to bombard recalcitrant Japanese fiefs,in the first case to demand redress for the killing of a British national, and in thesecond to reopen the Shimonoseki Straits, but ever afterwards the Foreign Officemade it clear that force was only to be resorted to in response to a clear threat toBritish lives and property. This tight restriction on the local use of force alwayslimited the actions of British Ministers in Japan and, although the Royal Navyplayed an important role as a means of transport for diplomats, a source ofintelligence, and a means of adding emphasis to British requests, it could never befreely used by British Ministers to intervene actively in Japanese internal events.

As a support for this basically civilian approach to Japan the Foreign Officehad a quiescent attitude to relations with other Western powers in the region.From the opening of the British Legation in Japan in 1859 the continuous themeof advice from London was co-operation with other European powers. The aimwas to confront anti-foreign Japanese with a united front, and although from timeto time Britain did see Russia and France as threats to her interests, these fearsnever changed her first objective of quiet constructive solidarity with otherEuropean powers.3

The most obvious motive for concerted action was the defence of Britain’streaties, for these constituted the fundamental legal basis of her diplomatic andcommerical position in a country which was unused to diplomacy and suspiciousof the outside world. Furthermore treaties were not only a means of preventing aJapanese relapse into isolation but were also the means which Britain used toobtain ever greater diplomatic privileges.

These predominantly commercial and civilian attitudes, which were all gearedtowards trade, also dictated the political objectives of the Foreign Office.Needless to say, the desiderata of an expanding trade were low tariffs, openports, and access to the Japanese interior. But all these advantages, once gained,would be of little value without political stability and civil order. If there werecivil war Westerners might be involved, and commerce might be disrupted, andas long as there were anti-foreign zealots merchants would never live in safety orfeel able to move freely in pursuit of trade. Thus the first objective of ForeignOffice policy was to prevent civil war, or anything that might lead to politicalviolence. The philosophy of free trade was seen as a complementary element inthis policy for it was believed that the basic conflict in Japan, between Shogunand dissatisfied daimyo, was the result of the Tokugawa monopoly of foreigntrade; and therefore, if unrestricted commerce were allowed between all Japaneseand the outside world, political discontents would evaporate.4 All of thesenotions were permeated by the desire to avoid turmoil and strife, and as forseeking to support rebellious daimyo in a violent attempt to overthrow theBakufu, nothing could have been further from the basic aims and methods ofBritish policy.


In July 1865, Sir Harry Parkes arrived in Yokohama to take charge of theBritish Legation. He bore with him instructions from London which, far fromsuggesting any break with Whitehall’s traditional approach, merely confirmed it.

At this point the euphoria which followed the successful bombardment ofShimonoseki was still at its height. It was assumed that all Britain’s mainproblems in Japan had been overcome, and that Parkes’s basic role would be tomaintain things as they now were. Perhaps this complacent tone wasunderstandable, for officials in London believed that one fundamental problemhad now been surmounted. Previously it had been feared that many Japanesemight question the legality of western treaties since these had been signed by theShogun but not by the Emperor. However, in the aftermath of the ShimonosekiExpedition, the Bakufu had undertaken to obtain Imperial ratification of foreigntreaties, and it was assumed that if this had not been achieved, the Emperorwould have at least acquiesced in complete Tokugawa control of foreignrelations. Certainly there were no grounds for serious dissatisfaction with theexisting Japanese regime, as was clear from the central maxim of Parkes’sinstructions which urged ‘firm but conciliatory’ behaviour towards the Bakufu.5

By August 1865 the attitude of the Foreign Office towards events in Japan hadbecome somewhat sceptical and concerned. The Shogun had failed to obtain theEmperor’s ratification of the treaties or his agreement of the Bakufu’s control offoreign relations. What was more, a Satsuma agent had visited London, and ifnothing else had ensued from this encounter its very occurrence and friendlyatmosphere had clearly demonstrated that all the Shogun’s earlier statementscould not be trusted. In the past Tokugawa officials had always maintained thatevery han was uncompromisingly anti-foreign, and they had often cited this as areason for refusing to open further ports.

The Satsuma interview, along with the Shogun’s broken undertaking, certainlydamaged the Foreign Office’s trust in the latter’s word. But at this point suchsmouldering suspicion of the Edo government was far from being the mostserious of the British Government’s worries. It was now believed that Japan wasclose to civil war, the thing most likely to jeopardize the whole British positionin the treaty ports, and the Foreign Office’s response to this danger was to repeatits old free trade credo that, if only the daimyo were granted commercial freedom,the prospect of violence would probably diminish.6 Fortunately another turn inJapanese government policy provided a ready aid to this British objective. In thespring of 1865 the Bakufu had requested an extension of the period in which theywere to pay the second instalment of the Shimonoseki indemnity and, althoughthis might appear a sign of unwelcome evasiveness, in British eyes financialcompensations were always less desirable than commercial opportunities. Indeed,the substitution of the latter for the former was not only desirable in itself, butsomething which could contribute to improving Japanese stability. At the sametime this conciliatory element in British policy was balanced by an element offirmness; for if the Japanese rejected the alternative of commercial concessions

THE BRITISH ROLE IN THE MEIJI RESTORATION: A RE-INTERPRETIVE NOTE 27

they were to be denied any extension of the time in which the indemnity was tobe paid.

In the months which followed this despatch there were no major changes inForeign Office policy, but merely refinements and clarifications which explainhow the philosophy of free trade might be applied, and how it might serve Britishpurposes. It was hoped that a thriving trade would produce a Japanese middle-class that would be a source of order and moderate politics.7 And Whitehall’sconcern for the rights of dissatisfied daimyo, along with its fear of civil war,produced a constitutional scheme for resolving Japan’s internal crisis. Londonbelieved that the granting of commercial freedom to the daimyo should beparalleled by the granting of political rights; and that important han should havesome say in national decision making.8 A constituional settlement was clearlypreferable to a violent solution.

This triple concern for trade, a new middle class, and a constitutionalsettlement was clearly British in character, but Whitehall was very well aware ofthe dangers inherent in trying to foster or encourage any alien institutions inJapan. It was recognized that any solution which did not ‘bear the stamp of theJapanese character’ could not be lasting.9 Clearly, any scheme that was known tobe foreign would be suspect in Japanese minds and there was yet another dangerin any whispering campaign in favour of a particular scheme or faction. For ifcivil war did erupt, association with any party would produce a hostile reactionfrom its enemy, and this might well lead to violent outbursts against Britishnationals.

In the final three years of the Tokugawa regime it was clear to officials inLondon that neutrality towards the rival parties was the safest policy. TheBakufu, the daimyo and the Imperial Court were clearly all so strong in terms ofprestige or power that the destruction of any one of them seemed impossible, andthe best hope for the future apparently lay in a reconciliation of all threeelements. For the sake of happy relations in the future, harmonious contacts withall parties seemed the wisest policy. British officials recognized the Emperor asthe sovereign of Japan but they believed that his titular supremacy could not betransformed into full administrative control within the foreseeable future; in thissituation informal relations with the daimyo as well as the customary contactswith the Bakufu seemed both permissible and desirable.

Whatever the policies and opinions of the Foreign Office, in a period of slowcommunications it was almost inevitable that a British Minister in Japan wouldhave some latitude in the mingled process of forming and executing policy.10

Thus it would not be surprising to find a Minister acting in detail in wayscontrary to the principles enunciated from London. Sir Harry Parkes wasundoubtedly an independent-minded and strong personality, but although thesecircumstances pointed towards likely conflicts between London and the EdoLegation, there is no evidence that Parkes’s assumptions or actions ran contraryto those of successive Foreign Secretaries.


Before his arrival in Japan, Parkes’s diplomatic experience had been virtuallyconfined to China, and from these activities he had learned two principles ofaction; first the need for tough and resolute tactics when faced by Orientalintransigence, and secondly, after witnessing the Taiping Rebellion, a strongabhorrence of civil war.11 Both of these axioms were relevant to his action inJapan, particularly in the summer of 1865.

When Parkes arrived at Nagasaki in June 1865 the likelihood of civil warbetween Choshu and the Bakufu appeared to be increasing daily. This ominousdanger, as well as the whole crisis in Japanese politics, was underlined by thecontacts which Parkes had at Nagasaki with the representatives of local daimyo.These men spoke of their desire for free trade and the likelihood of internalstrife, but Parkes counselled restraint and peaceful methods,12 and in subsequentmonths frequently repeated this advice.

In August 1865 Parkes arrived at Edo, and in the following months theprevention of violence and the protection of Britain’s physical position providedthe major themes in his activities. On the side of positive preventive action heunsuccessfully pressed the Japanese to import rice and to buy it through Britishmerchants. Both these acts would remove the danger of high food prices and,incidentally, associate foreign merchants with an improvement in Japanesesocial conditions. He hoped that such a combination of events would remove theroots of urban violence and perhaps contribute to the popularity of Westernersamong the Japanese population.13 On the level of defensive strategy the BritishMinister showed an equally resolute face to both Bakufu and Choshu requestsfor concessions. He rejected a Tokugawa plea for a reduction in the Britishgarrison at Yokohama, and a Choshu demand for permission to remount batterieson the Shimonoseki Straits.14 On these vital matters there was no sign ofsympathy for anti-Tokugawa elements, nor of any concession which mightencourage violence or weaken the British position in any possible civil war.

Parallel to these essentially defensive measures Parkes embarked on a morepositive course in the final months of 1865. On receiving his second major set ofinstructions he was most impressed by the section relating to the Shimonosekiindemnity.15 Winchester, a previous Chargé d’Affaires, had suggested a newapproach to this problem and the Foreign Office had already given its approval.16

His suggestion was that two-thirds of the indemnity should be remitted inexchange for the Imperial ratification of treaties, a lowering of tariffs, and theopening of Hyogo on 1 January 1866. The Foreign Office had unfortunatelyfailed in its attempts to organize international action on this basis, and now askedParkes to consider with his colleagues whether a delay in the indemnity paymentshould be conceded. Parkes misunderstood these instructions, believing that theygave him carte blanche to decide not only whether a delay should be concededbut also the exact terms on which such a concession might be made.

Acting upon these conclusions Parkes gathered the Western representativestogether, and on 30 October 1865 they agreed to carry out the Winchesterproposals. They would collect a joint naval force and sail to Hyogo where all but


one member of the Roju was in residence. Their main aim was to press forwardthe British scheme, but the desire to resolve the indemnity problem was not theonly consideration which suggested the action to the British Minister. Althoughwar had not yet broken out between Choshu and the Bakufu the Tokugawaultimatum to Choshu was due to expire in mid-November and Parkes hoped thatthe Western initiative would provide the Shogunate with a pretext to delay theconflict, if not to seek a compromise solution. Besides this, a naval anddiplomatic initiative would have considerable public relations value. Osaka andHyogo were due to be opened in 1868 and a naval visit would give localinhabitants an opportunity to accustom themselves to foreigners. It wouldprovide an occasion for Parkes to test the truth of Tokugawa assertions ofwidespread anti-foreign feeling and would be a useful demonstration of Westernstrength to the anti-foreign daimyo who were said to be clustered round theKyoto Court.

On 4 November the Western squadron arrived off Hyogo and in the first phaseof the discussions Parkes laid most emphasis upon the need for Imperialratification. He chided the Bakufu for its broken promises, and its failure toadmit daimyo to the profits of foreign trade, and tautened the atmosphere withdirect and indirect hints of moving towards direct negotiations with the ImperialCourt.17 In doing this he sought merely to impose pressure on the Bakufu but hehad no desire to destroy it. He believed that the Shogun, though irresolute, wasacting in good faith and was trying to oppose the conservative elements in Kyoto.18

At the same time Parkes also desired to make clear his neutrality in the disputebetween the Bakufu and Choshu. Obviously the warships off Hyogo weredesigned to put pressure upon the Shogun and the Court, but Parkes feared lesttoo long a stay might be widely interpreted as a commitment to support theTokugawa cause against Choshu. To counterbalance this possibility the BritishMinister threatened to leave Hyogo Bay to visit the Choshu leaders.19

The British approach to the main negotiations became much more urgent on17 November when news came that two moderate members of the Roju, AbeMasato and Matsumae Takahiro, had been dismissed from office. Faced by thissign of anti-foreign success, Parkes and his colleagues forwarded notes identiquesdemanding a clear reply by 26 November to their demands for concessions or theprompt payment of the indemnity. Although military force was not openlyreferred to, the threat that the allies would ‘act as they thought convenient’clearly implied the possibility of naval action.20 This sharp gesture soonproduced the desired effect and on 26 November the Tokugawa officials agreedto future tariff negotiations and presented a declaration of Imperial acquiescencein foreign treaties. The Japanese still claimed that it would be dangerous to openHyogo to foreigners but, as they undertook to pay the whole of the Shimonosekiindemnity, the Western representatives were highly satisfied by the results oftheir endeavours. Two important concessions had been gained and absolutelynothing given in return.


From Osaka Parkes sailed to the Shimonoseki Straits to meet the Choshuleaders; again he emphasized the need for a peaceful solution to the dispute withthe Bakufu, and stressed his hope that the recent Imperial decision would help tobring about national unity. However the British belief that economic frustrationslay at the heart of daimyo discontent was hardly substantiated in theseencounters, for Choshu councillors showed no interest in opening their own portsas they feared that this would alienate their allies and anger extremists amongtheir own followers.21

This pessimistic news of the commercial policies of the southern daimyoreceived further confirmation when Parkes proceeded to Shanghai in December1865. There he consulted with Gower from the Nagasaki Consulate and arepresentative of T.B.Glover and Company, an important trading enterprise inthe same port. Both of these men emphasized that the daimyo had only a verylimited interest in trade, and that they were hostile both to foreign residents andto the opening of their own harbours. This news along with the Shogun’s positiveresponse to the Osaka expedition increased Parkes’s sceptical attitude towardsthe daimyo and strengthened his belief in the importance of the Shogun.22

The British Minister’s main preoccupation in the first half of 1866 was with thenegotiation of new tariffs which had been promised in the Hyogo agreement. Inthese discussions Parkes had two distinct objectives, to remove commercialobstacles, and to draw Japan inextricably into international relations. The latterobjective required freedom for all Japanese to participate in trade with foreignersand, more important, to travel abroad. These provisions were included in theagreement and, along with the narrowly commercial aspects of the treaty, went along way towards drawing Japan permanently into international relations. Thepolitical repercussions of trade were never far from Parkes’s mind and heinserted grain among the agreed list of duty-free imports, thus fulfilling hisearlier project for associating foreigners with the lowering of food prices.23

During the negotiations which preceded the 1866 commercial treaty theJapanese authorities again requested a delay in the payment of the Shimonosekiindemnity. Not surprisingly, Parkes refused to consider such a demand until theBakufu’s attitude towards foreign contacts was clarified by its behaviour in thetariff talks. Fortunately these went well and Parkes was glad to forward theJapanese request to London, recommending its acceptance. There could be noclearer indication of his favourable view of the Shogun’s foreign policy.24

At this stage Parkes was well aware of the difficult political position of theShogun who was apparently threatened both by progressive daimyo who wereinterested in trade, and by highly reactionary elements clustered around theCourt.25 This analysis merely added to the British Minister’s overriding fear ofpolitical violence. He recognized the Emperor as the ultimate sovereign butrealized that his authority was far from effective. In this situation the Shogunappeared the most reliable basis for political stability. The daimyo seemeddeeply divided and unreliable and, although they would form an essential elementin any solution, their internecine rivalry seemed distinctly dangerous. When the


Foreign Secretary wrote to Parkes in the summer of 1866 describing meetingswith Satsuma agents, Parkes countered by emphasizing the deep divisions amongthe councils of the various han, and explained that Satsuma’s interest inacquiring foreign friends was probably due to its political isolation at home.26

Parkes’s belief in the superior importance of the Shogunate did not stop at vagueand indefinite statements of support. In May 1866 he recommended that theBritish government should send military advisers to assist the Tokugawa forces,and in the same month British units participated in a field day with Bakufutroops. The climax to these opinions came in July 1866 when Parkes wroteunequivocally that ‘the Tycoon’s government appears the only power able topreserve general order…we have no desire to see his general authority weakenedor subverted’.27

In the early months of 1866 there was friction between the British Ministerand the Tokugawa authorities, butonlyon a minor scale. Parkes resented theobstacles put in his way when he sought to visit government officials orindependent daimyo. He was disappointed that the Edo authorities did not softentheir attitude towards Choshu, as intransigence might provoke hostilities, butthese minor irritations did not take on a serious turn until August 1866 whenParkes visited the Satsuma capital.

Parallel with his carefully considered attitude towards the Edo Government,Parkes had an extremely sceptical view of the powerful daimyo. There was oftentalk of instability and inter-han rivalry, and in the summer of 1866 Satsuma wassaid to be resisting the opening of Hyogo so as to embarrass the Shogun. TheKagoshima leaders seemed quite prepared to use foreign treaties as a tool in theinternal power struggle, and when Parkes visited Satsuma it was not merely tostate Britain’s policy of an intervention but also to lecture the Kagoshimacouncillors on the dire consequences of any action which might be damaging toBritain’s treaty position.28 During his visit Parkes was convinced by the Satsumaleaders that the Hyogo document, indicating imperial approval of foreign treaties,was not genuine, and had been specially edited for foreign consumption. He wasrelieved when the Satsuma leaders emphasized their lack of hostility towards theBakufu but their revelations about the Shogun’s deceit, linked as they were withnews of deteriorating Bakufu-Choshu relations certainly lowered his estimate ofthe Edo administration. Although Parkes’s fears about Satsuma were allayed byhis visit, he was far from convinced that all daimyo fell into the same‘progressive’ category.29

In July 1866 warfare again broke out between Choshu and the Bakufu andsoon raised a variety of complex questions on which Parkes had to make quickdecisions. The first Tokugawa reaction to the war, though understandable inmilitary terms, merely added to Parkes’s suspicions. Fearing that foreign tradersmight supply Choshu with weaponry, the Bakufu requested that all Westernships should keep clear of the Shimonoseki Straits.30 To Parkes such a requestwas unacceptable, not because he wished to see Choshu victorious, but becausehe regarded the preservation of free navigation as a right which should not be


given up in any circumstances. Britain’s desire to avoid any damage to her tradeor to the interests of her merchants was certainly a key consideration in herattitude towards the civil war, but equally important was her desire to avoid anyaction which might damage relations with either party in the conflict. Parkesrefused to declare the Shimonoseki Straits out of bounds to British ships, but thiswas counterbalanced by his declaration that no British trading vessel shouldanchor in the Straits during the hostilities. Similarly he wished to avoid theinvolvement of British merchant ships in exchanges of fire or any appearance ofdeep commitment to the Shogun’s side. Thus he placed a ban upon the use ofBritish merchant ships for trooping purposes in the Shimonoseki Straits.31 Britishship owners were still permitted to transport Tokugawa troops as far as Osaka,but not to venture nearer the zone of conflict. At the same time, negotiations fora British naval mission to advise the Tokugawa authorities continued withoutinterruption. A naval mission could have no immediate impact on the civil war,and to abandon the scheme might help French influence over the Shogunate tobecome paramount. Parkes’s overwhelming desire at this time was to ‘ensurethat foreigners are as far as possible kept out of these internal conflicts’, and all hisactions appear to have been clearly directed towards this end.32

In describing the collapse of the Bakufu some historians have placedconsiderable emphasis upon the activities of Thomas B.Glover, a Britishmerchant based in Nagasaki, who sold weapons to Satsuma agents who in turnconveyed them to the Choshu armies.33 Parkes was a friend of Glover’s but thisis not to say that he supported this trade with a political objective in view. At thistime the link between Choshu and Satsuma was a well kept secret, and what ismore Parkes believed that Satsuma had no desire to destroy the Tokugawaauthority. Thus acquiescence in arms sales to Satsuma at no stage indicateddesire to destroy the Tokugawa government.34

On returning from his visit to Satsuma Parkes passed through the ShimonosekiStraits and, with the French Minister, enquired whether they might act asmediators in the civil war. This suggestion received no encouragement from thebelligerents, but friendly conversations with Choshu leaders convinced Parkesthat their attitudes were not anti-foreign, and that they had no intention of closingthe Straits. As a result Parkes took no action, save a formal protest against theremounting of the batteries on the Shimonoseki Straits.35 To have resorted toforce would have meant the abandonment of non-intervention and, even moreserious, the likelihood of a clash with the Foreign Office.

The slight cooling of Parkes’s attitude towards the Bakufu which stemmedfrom the onset of the civil war was soon eliminated by the pressure of a yet moreserious event. In August 1866 Shogun Iemochi died, and the consequent politicalvacuum made Parkes fear that a weakening of authority and civil strife mightensue.36 This heightened regard for the importance of the Bakufu was soonreinforced by the heartening news that Yoshinobu had been selected to be thenew Shogun. He was known to be an energetic leader, and the British Legationbelieved that he was disposed to be friendly to the West and agreeable to a


compromise in the Choshu controversy. Beyond the possible cessation of thecivil conflict the British now began to hope that the Shogun’s spirit ofcompromise would also extend to the formation of a new Committee of State inwhich the powers of decision making would be shared with prominent daimyo.37

This optimism was temporarily strengthened by news that an assembly ofdaimyo had been summoned, an act which seemed to presage importantconstitutional changes.

By the close of 1866 an armistice had been signed in the civil war and,although there were again doubts about the Shogun’s constitutional policy, theatmosphere of Anglo-Tokugawa relations remained essentiallyfriendly. Certainly there were no issues which divided Britain and the Bakufusufficiently for Parkes to welcome the disintegration of the Tokugawagovernment.

Although this Choshu armistice and the appointment of Yoshinobu as heirapparent clearly removed some of the principal dangers and uncertainties fromthe situation, new problems followed which stemmed from the power andprestige still residing in the office of Shogun. In early January 1867 Yoshinobuinvited the Western diplomats to visit him at Osaka. Parkes was hesitant to acceptthe invitation, not, as Satow later claimed, because he realized that the Shogun’spower was waning, but because he was concerned with such familiar problemsas diplomatic status and the strict execution of international treaties.38 If theWestern powers accepted Yoshinobu’s invitation before he had been fullyinstalled, they might inadvertently raise his prestige and, what was even moredangerous, he might use such an encounter to declare publicly that the treatyundertaking to open Osaka in 1868 would not be carried out. This would mean ahumiliating loss of prestige at any time, but in the context of a long journey tomeet the new ruler such a rebuff would be particularly damaging. In addition tothese fears there was the usual apprehension that the Japanese might use theoccasion to score diplomatic points by compelling Westerners to undergohumiliating ceremonials. In other words there were strong fears lest Westernersshould suffer at the hands of the relatively powerful Bakufu, rather than anyfeeling that the Shogun’s regime was on the verge of collapse. On 12 January1867 the Western powers met together and, at Parkes’s suggestion, agreed not toaccept this dangerous invitation until preparations for the meeting had been madeat lower diplomatic levels.39 Four basic principles were to underlie the meetingwith the new ruler. No meeting would take place until Yoshinobu was fullyinstalled, the agenda of any conference would be worked out in advance,European court etiquette would be followed on all occasions, and a diplomaticcommitment to carry out the treaties would be demanded in return for visitingthe Tokugawa chief.40

Soon after this international agreement Parkes’s ablest subordinates, Satowand Mitford, visited Osaka to prepare the way for the important meeting. Totheir surprise the Tokugawa officials proved extremely cooperative, and thegeneral air of harmony which was evident throughout the preliminary talks


contrasted not only with the previous behaviour of Bakufu officials,41 but alsowith Satsuma’s statements that the Shogun was basically opposed to the openingof all ports to Western merchants.

Before these successful preliminaries could be brought to fruition, the anti-foreign Emperor Komei died. Court and Bakufu went into mourning, and theinvitation to the Western powers was withdrawn. Parkes was, on balance,pleased at this delay for the longer the meeting was postponed, the greater wouldbe the urgency which he could bring to the negotiations. As the official date forthe opening of Osaka drew ever nearer, the justification for increasing pressurewould become more and more irresistible.42

Much to Parkes’s taste the meeting was delayed until April. Then, with theother European diplomats, a substantial squadron of warships, and an imposingmilitary escort, the British Minister proceeded to Osaka. The technicalnegotiations for the opening of the Kansai cities and the establishment of theforeign settlement were completed speedily and satisfactorily, while both formaland informal meetings with the Shogun were characterized by harmony and goodrelations.43 These latter meetings were just as significant politically as thetechnical discussions on commercial matters. The events of the previous summerhad made Britain doubt the integrity and objectives of the Bakufu, but face toface contacts with the new Shogun produced a rapprochement which raisedAnglo-Tokugawa friendship to new heights. The British Minister was highlyimpressed by the new Shogun’s qualities, for besides his dignified appearanceand great intelligence he expressed political sentiments which coincided withBritish aspirations. He made it clear that he wished to ensure good foreignrelations and, equally important, saw the need to make concessions to the daimyoso as to bring about a peaceful solution to the internal crisis.44 In his main publicspeech Parkes underlined the Shogun’s opinions by emphasizing the need forrespecting international treaties and for proceeding with political and technicalmodernization. Parkes’s belief in Yoshinobu’s good intentions and wisdom wasso great that he declared: ‘I am quite disposed to give him all the support I can inwhatever position he occupies’,45 and he was also ready to accept a Tokugawadenial of earlier Satsuma stories that the Emperor had never ratified Japan’sinternational treaties.46 According to his memoirs, Satow took this opportunity tourge the Satsuma representatives at Osaka not to miss the chance of making arevolution, for he feared the growing strength of the Shogun,47 but in thisinstance as in many others Satow’s activities were hardly representative of theofficial policy of the British Legation.

Just as the summer of 1866 had seen suspicions of the Bakufu mar thegoodwill of the commercial treaty, so the summer of 1867 removed some of theeuphoria of the Osaka rapprochment. The hopes of a domestic political settlementwent unfulfilled, the talk of a daimyo assembly came to nothing, and what wasworse, old irritants returned to damage Anglo-Tokugawa relations. As in thepast, Bakufu officials sought to use insulting forms of address when referring toQueen Victoria. Once more the Shogun, with French support, made claims to be


the supreme ruler of Japan, and yet again the Bakufu sought to limit andmonopolize international trade.48 Britain successfully resisted these lines ofpolicy but two far more important issues arose which provoked long standingdiplomatic difficulties and seriously damaged Parkes’s view of the Tokugawaregime. In August 1867, after visiting the ports of Northern Honshu, the BritishMinister arrived in Nagasaki to find that two British sailors from the ship Icarushad been murdered in the pleasure quarter. Local Japanese officials had failed tofind the men responsible, though suspicion fell upon members of Tosa han.49

This was an issue which directly concerned the safety of British subjects, andParkes devoted great diplomatic efforts towards ensuring that the Bakufu did allit could to arraign the guilty men.

Parkes met the Shogun at Osaka and his pressure produced the dismissal of theNagasaki governor and the arrival of Tokugawa troops at Nagasaki to patrol theforeign quarter. Parkes himself sailed to Kochi, the Tosa castle-town, and usinghis characteristic tactics of violent interrogation tried to identify the criminals.As no Tosa men were guilty of the offence it is hardly surprising that the missionfailed, or that Parkes’s angry enquiries did nothing but create hostility among thehan leaders.50 But the importance of the crime lay not in the details of attemptsat its solution but in the political reaction it provoked. The ineffectiveness ofTokugawa attempts to find the guilty men increased British irritation with thenew Shogun, while the vigorous diplomatic attack upon Tosa demonstrated theoverwhelming importance of day-to-day factors in British policy. Long termpolitical considerations were noticeably absent. Tosa was in fact the one hanfavouring a political solution which was very close to British objectives;nevertheless this similarity of views did nothing at this stage to bring about closerelations between Parkes and Tosa, and nothing to allay British suspicions overthe Icarus affair.

The other new issue which arose in the summer of 1867 was the highlyemotive problem of native Christians. The activities of French Roman Catholicmissionaries near Nagasaki had revealed the presence of Japanese Christianswho had secretly practised their faith since the seventeenth century.Furthermore, the French had recently made new converts, and together theseChristians appeared to many Japanese to pose a threat as an alien and subversivesect. Bakufu plans to destroy the Christian colony by deporting its members, andscattering them over many provinces, provoked a hostile reaction from RomanCatholics in France and Parkes was also concerned at the matter, though forother reasons.51 He feared that missionary activity might provoke a general anti-foreign movement. The persecution of Christians as a religious or theologicalmatter, was of little interest to Parkes, whose concern was almost wholly withthe physical harm which might come to British subjects as an indirect result ofmissionary activity. He was willing to see missionary activity temporarilydiscouraged, and was ready to show great restraint in his reaction to the Bakufu’santi-Christian policy.52


Parkes’s doubts about the Shogun’s qualities, and his criticism of his behaviour,were always freely expressed in times when violence and revolution seemed adistant prospect. But whenever the permanence of the Shogunate seemed inserious doubt, fears of violence restored much more sympathetic emotions to hismind. In October 1867 the British Minister returned from a trip to Mount Fuji, tofind rumours of the Shogun’s abdication circulating widely in Edo. He thoughtthese stories were of doubtful authenticity, but the fear that the prospect ofabdication stimulated, provoked him to record his true feelings towards theShogun. At this stage he was appalled at the prospect of Yoshinobu resigning hisauthority for, conscious of the need for a strong man to ‘prevent a flood ofanarchy’, he felt ‘that it would be a misfortune for Japanese and foreigners if theTycoon gave up his position’.53 Although the September rumours wereunfounded, on 8 November the Shogun did agree to abdicate from his traditionalposition of authority. This abdication was, however, so highly qualified that itappeared to pose no immediate threat to political stability. For the time being theShogun was to retain the decisive authority in domestic and foreign affairs, andwhen he eventually renounced the direction of policy the news was accompaniedby talk of a projected constitution which seemed very close to the British ideal.Under this proposed reform there were to be two elected assemblies, with aSupreme Council headed by the Shogun.54 This appeared to fulfil earlier Britishhopes that the Shogun would lead the liberal movement and produce internalstability by encouraging constitutional reform. Certainly the projectedconstitution was a welcome development, and the British Minister could alwaysconsole himself with the thought that, irrespective of paper constitutions, thesheer wealth of the Tokugawa house would ensure that Yoshinobu woulddominate any government for some time to come, and thus there would be astrong element of continuity.55

No events in December 1867 did anything to disturb this optimistic view ofJapanese political progress. The immediate concern of all the Western powerswas the long-sought opening of Osaka on New Year’s Day 1868. This took placein a festive atmosphere, without any hindrance or obstruction, and the minorirritation of Satsuma and Choshu troops near the foreign settlement was soonremedied by a firm diplomatic protest.

When Restoration forces seized control of the Imperial Palace in Kyoto, on 3January 1868, both Satow and Parkes recognized the danger of civil war erupting,and the British Minister discussed with his colleagues the possibility ofmediating in the conflict.56 At this point the British Minister was committed toneither side in the struggle, and hoped to have friendly relations with both partiesuntil a new government clearly appeared which was worthy of officialrecognition.57 Unfortunately talk of mediation was outpaced by events, for on 7January the Shogun fled to Osaka, dejected and apparently displaced fromauthority. Even at this late stage, however, Yoshinobu still appeared a politicalpersonage of the greatest importance, and when Parkes wrote to him on the sameday, he addressed him as he had always done, with the title Tycoon Denka (Your


Highness the Tycoon). Yoshinobu’s reply acknowledged a decline in his ownpolitical position, for it was signed Uesama, which merely indicated leadership ofthe Tokugawa house, not tenure of the position of Shogun. In his letter,Yoshinobu suggested that Parkes should visit him on 9 January but, on hearingthat the French Minister was to meet the Tokugawa leader on 8 January, Parkesrushed uninvited to the Franco-Tokugawa meeting. The exchanges at thisconference contributed further to Parkes’s growing suspicion, and hisdisillusionment with the ex-Shogun, for although he welcomed the news thatYoshinobu would not resort to force, he was struck by the incoherence of hisstory and the subtlety rather than the boldness of his approach. The ex-Shogunclaimed that he had resigned on condition that the constitutional problem wouldbe dealt with by a daimyo assembly, but that the coup d’état had prevented thefulfilment of this objective. Parkes was by now so distrustful that he suspectedthat Yoshinobu had sought the settlement of the constitutional issue not bygeneral assembly but by a collection of picked followers who would vote in thedirection he ordained.58 Nevertheless, despite these suspicions of the ex-Shogun’s tactics and motives, Parkes was still far from being committed to theRestoration forces. He was still haunted by the fear that the new coalition wouldbe unable to hang together in a unified administration, and he was seriouslyconcerned lest the new leaders should fail to gain support from feudal lords whowere so far uncommitted. In this period of indecision and uncertainty the BritishMinister’s influence among Western diplomats was always devoted to a policyof neutrality in the Japanese conflict.

On 9 January after a long wrangle, the diplomats handed the ex-shogun adeclaration of neutrality and a letter asking where the centre of Japanesegovernment really lay. His reply was temporarily reassuring, for he made it clearthat he would at least continue in charge of foreign relations.59 Soon afterwardshowever he broke his previous undertaking to avoid the use of force, and his armiesmarched north towards Kyoto. With this renewed danger of fighting, and thecontinued absence of any official contact with the party controlling the Emperor,the Western powers again began to consider the possibility of mediating in thedispute.60 As before, events overtook such preliminary discussions; news cameof fighting at Edo, and on 27 January the Tokugawa armies were decisivelybeaten at Fushimi, an important river port south of Kyoto. This defeat threw theBakufu administration into disorder and Yoshinobu left for Edo. Before the lastTokugawa officials abandoned Osaka, they warned the Westerners that theycould no longer protect them, and all the foreign representatives fled to Kobe tothe shelter of their warships.

In the uncertainty and disorder which had characterized the first weeks ofJanuary the British had sought to maintain contact with both parties, and hadtried unofficially to establish relations with the new forces. So far, however,there had been no Imperial response to these overtures and in the absence of anylocal Tokugawa administration there was virtually a vacuum in Anglo-Japaneserelations. In a country where anti-foreign violence was common, and where


armies were now on the march, this was an extremely threatening situation, andthe first confrontation between Westerners and the Imperial forces was hardlyauspicious.

On 3 February a detachment of Bizen troops belonging to the Restorationarmy fired on Westerners in the newly established Kobe foreign settlement.Parkes, the most powerful and vigorous Western diplomat, realized that this wasa crucial incident which could well provide a precedent for all future relationswith the new government. More important, he saw the need to emphasize thepermanence of treaties to the new regime. To emphasize that the Westerners’dispute was not with Bizen alone, but with Japan, the allied military forces seizedfour Japanese steamers, and the next day Parkes approached Satsuma agents andsuggested that the new government should send representatives to discuss thematter.61 Three days later Higashikuze arrived and confirmed that the Emperornow controlled foreign relations, and that the government would protect foreignersfrom all future outrages. He assured the representatives that they would bewelcome to visit the Imperial capital. This meeting marked a decisive turningpoint in the attitude of Britain towards the Meiji Restoration. It made clear thatthe new government was willing to deal fairly with Westerners,62 and in returnthe Europeans returned the steamers which they had commandeered. TheImperial messengers accepted all the Western claims for compensation and whatwas even more significant, they unequivocally announced the Imperialratification of foreign treaties. Just as signs of Imperial friendshipwere increasing, news came from Edo which made Parkes even cooler towardsthe dethroned Shogun. The officials at Edo were now proving even more evasivethan in the past, and were making the elementary mistake of asking for atemporary closure of Osaka and Kobe a concession which was unthinkable inview of the long diplomatic battles which had preceded their opening.63 By nowParkes was so convinced of Imperial goodwill that he regarded the execution ofthe Bizen officers as an unnecessary punishment. He believed that thepublicizing of the government’s pro-foreign policy would do more to influencesamurai behaviour than unnecessary blood letting.64 On this matter the BritishMinister was outvoted by the other diplomats, but his attitude of friendship toKyoto was now virtually unshakable.

On 18 March 1868 eleven French sailors was murdered by Tosa samurai atSakai, and this delayed Parkes’s plan for a visit to the Imperial capital. Naturallyhe showed solidarity with the other Western powers and retreated from Kobe tohis flagship,65 but he was only willing to demand moderate compensation for theoutrage, and his confidence in the new government was hardly affected by theincident. His faith in the new rulers was once again confirmed when theyspeedily gave redress for the Sakai outrage, and less than a fortnight later Parkesarrived in Kyoto in response to an official invitation. Anti-foreign samuraiattacked Parkes on his way to the palace, and compelled a postponement of theImperial audience, but despite the horror of this incident he was verysympathetic towards the embarrassed government officials. He made no demand


for reparations but simply suggested that the government’s disapproval of anti-foreign outrages should be proclaimed on placards, and that the samurairesponsible should suffer a humiliating form of execution. When the proposedaudience with the Emperor finally took place everything went according to plan.Parkes stressed to the Court the need for internal stability and its importance togood international relations,66 and soon after left for Edo.

After his return from the Kansai, Parkes’s commitment to the Imperialgovernment remained unaltered, though the focus of his attention now turned toavoiding the imposition of vindictive terms upon the defeated party. He feared thatfighting might be renewed if harsh terms were imposed and that politicalreconstruction would become extremely difficult. Consequently he devoted agood deal of diplomatic effort to softening Imperial terms, and to avoiding anypersonal victimization of the ex-Shogun.67 Although this British pressure mayhave contributed to saving Yoshinobu’s life, a compromise peace between theImperial armies and Aizu, the most devoted followers of the Tokugawa, provedimpossible. To Parkes’s dismay fighting was renewed in northern Honshu anddragged on into November 1868.

Despite the British Minister’s failure to avoid a renewal of civil war, he wasgenerally agreeably impressed by the first moves that the new goverment madeto reorganize its ministerial structure. These changes seemed to indicate a clearcommitment to reform, and in the provisions for a Foreign Ministry there seemedto be proof of a desire to continue international relations.68

The culmination of British approval of the new regime soon followed in May1868, when Parkes visited Osaka again and handed over his credentials to theyoung Emperor. Even at this stage the British Minister was more concerned withthe realities of political and commercial conditions than with a dogmaticcommitment to the new government. He was still sceptical about the ability ofthe new leaders to maintain their unity, he disliked the presence of conservativecourtiers in the regime, and he continued to be embarrassed by the anti-Christianpolicy of the administration. He was convinced that he would have to educate thenew government a good deal if it was to serve the cause of British interests.69

In October 1868 the Tokugawa fleet which had been anchored in Edo Baysailed for Hokkaido to continue resistance against the Meiji government. TheImperial Navy was still of dubious strength and this new initiative posed asubstantial threat to the new government’s hold over northern Japan. Fortunatelythe land war was going well for the new regime and, equally important, the newleadership had widespread support from public opinion.70 These developmentsconvinced Parkes that the Meiji government had triumphed, and on 9 February1869 after some weeks of persuasion, he convinced his colleagues that theyshould withdraw their declarations of neutrality in the civil war.71 This was ofmore than academic significance, for a large American-built warship, theStonewall, had been ordered by the Bakufu but had been kept in American handsthroughout the conflict. Now the war was legally at an end this vessel was


transferred to the Meiji authorities for use in the closing skirmishes of thecampaign.

Although the legal termination of the civil war added the final touches toBritish commitment to the new government, it did not herald a period ofunruffled Anglo-Japanese relations nor did it change Britain’s fundamentalobjectives or her criteria in evaluating Japanese governments. In April 1869minor anti-foreign incidents again occurred on the Tokaido and diplomaticrelations were suspended.72 In later years rapid Japanese reforms provokedBritish criticism, and Japanese pressure for an end to extraterritoriality met withhostile British reactions. British objectives continued to be political stability,expanding trade, and a safe existence for British merchants, and as in Tokugawadays Japanese resistance to these often produced friction between the twocountries.

From 1865 to 1869 British policy in Japan was marked by consistentobjectives and an overwhelming preoccupation with day to day realities. Japanhad been the scene of too much political violence for any British Minister to riskgiving complete support to any party before the outcome of the crisis was clear.Parkes never expected the Tokugawa house to disappear as rapidly or ascompletely as it did, and the regime which finally emerged from the struggle wasa far cry from that which he and the Foreign Office had tentatively sketched.Satow may have supported Choshu from 1864, and his opinions may haveinfluenced important Japanese, but official British policy was a very differentstory. The Foreign Office consistently supported Parkes’s action and he made nocommitment until February 1868. Afterwards he did all he could to support thenew regime, but far from anticipating events his policy was always cautious. Henever threw discretion to the winds, and only abandoned neutrality when thevital battle was won and the victors had shown themselves worthy andresponsible.

NOTES

1 See e.g., (a) J.K.Fairbank, E.O.Reischauer, A.Craig, East Asia: The ModernTransformation, Boston, Mass., 1965, pp. 222–23, ‘…the French Minister, LéonRoches,…worked energetically for a restoration of shogunal power under Frenchinfluence. As a result of his efforts, a French school was opened at Yokohama, anaval dockyard built at Yokosuka nearby, and large quantities of weapons wereimported. Not to be outdone, the British Minister, Sir Harry Parkes, who hadplayed a large role in the opening of China, supported Satsuma with informationand arms.’

(b) Comité Japonais des Sciences Historiques, Le Japon au XIe CongrèsInternational des Sciences Historiques à Stockholm, Tokyo, 1960, pp. 16o-61, ‘Ithas long been recognized that the Meiji Restoration was influenced and motivatedby foreign relations beginning with the Opening of Japan. Most scholars, however,insisted that it was left to Japan to decide at the time of the Restoration whether she


should have the Emperor or the Shogun as her sovereign. Takashi Ishii has refutedthis theory arguing that the Imperial Rule was established under the stronginfluence of British policy toward Japan.’

(c) E.M.Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, London, 1921 pp. 299–300, ‘On the waywe met the chief, who had come out to have a look at the Tycoon, to whosedownfall he had contributed as far as lay in his power’.

2 See E.M.Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, London, 1921; and Lord Redesdale(A.B.Mitford), Memories, 2 vols., London, 1915.

3 As an example of the suspicions of France and Russia see FO Japan 55, enclosurein no. 108, Winchester to Russell, 23 June 1865.

4 FO Japan 52, no. 10, Russell to Parkes, 23 August 1865.5 FO Japan 52, no. 5, Russell to Parkes, 8 April 1865.6 FO Japan 52, no. 10, Russell to Parkes, 23 August 1865.7 FO Japan 63, no. 30, Clarendon to Parkes, 28 February 1866.8 FO Japan 63, no. 66, Clarendon to Parkes, 9 April 1866.9 FO Japan 63 Confidential Hammond to Parkes, 26 April 1866.

10 In 1865 normal despatches took two months to travel from Edo to London and thenearest telegraph was at Galle in Ceylon.

11 For Parkes’s earlier career see S.Lane-Poole, The Life of Sir Harry Parkes, Vol. I,London, 1894, for his reaction to the Taiping Rebellion see Ibid., p. 426.

12 FO Japan 55, no. 7, Parkes to Russell. 30 June 1865.13 FO Japan 56, no. 24, Parkes to Russell, 11 August 1865.14 FO Japan 57, no. 51, Confidential Parkes to Russell, 30 September 1865.15 FO Japan 57, no. 59, Parkes to Russell, 30 October 1865.15 W.G.Beasley, Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853–68, London,

1955, p. 80.17 The author is extremely grateful to Professor W.G.Beasley and Mr R.L.Sims of the

School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, for their valuablehelp in clarifying the course of the Osaka negotiations. Japanese and Englishversions of the talks differ drastically. For sources which cite a direct threat seeNihon Gaik� Nenpy� Narabini Shuy� Bunsho, Vol. I, Tokyo, 1955, p. 44;Isshinshi, 6 Vols., Tokyo, 1939–41, Vol. 4, p. 275; Ogasawara Iki no KamiNagamichi, Tokyo, 1943, pp. 344–54. For the contrary view see E.M.Satow, ADiplomat in Japan, p. 151; FO Japan 57, enclosure 2 in no. 66, Parkes to Russell,17 November 1865.

18 FO Japan 58, Private Parkes to Russell, 18 November 1865.19 Ibid.20 FO Japan 58, enclosure 1 in no. 68, Parkes to Clarendon, 28 November 1865.21 FO Japan 58, no. 70, Parkes to Clarendon, 8 December 1865. 22 FO Japan 58, no. 70, Parkes to Clarendon, 8 December 1865; and no. 72, Parkes to

Clarendon, 15 December 1865.23 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 27 June 1866.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 FO Japan 68, Private Parkes to Hammond, 29 May 1866.27 FO Japan 69, no. 123, Parkes to Stanley, 24 July 1866.28 FO Japan 67, Confidential Parkes to Clarendon, 28 February 1866; and FO Japan

68, Private Parkes Memorandum on Satsuma-Oliphant Meeting, 29 May 1866.


29 e.g. FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 31 October 1866.30 FO Japan 69, no. 119, Parkes to Stanley, 2 August 1866.31 FO Japan 70, no. 135, Parkes to Stanley, 1 September 1866; and FO Japan 70, no.

147, Parkes to Stanley, 10 September 1866.32 FO 391/I4, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 12 September 1866.33 e.g. see W.G.Beasley, op. cit., note 2, p. 84. See also supra, p. 299.34 e.g. FO Japan, 69, Parkes to Hammond, 2 August 1866.35 FO Japan 72, no. 199, Parkes to Stanley, 1 December 1866.36 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 12 September 1866.37 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 29 September 1866; FO Japan

71, no. 180, Parkes to Stanley, 31 October 1866.38 Cf. E.M.Satow, op. cit., p. 185 and FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to

Hammond, 16 January 1867, and FO Japan 78, no. 1, Parkes to Stanley, 16 January1867.

39 FO Japan 78, no. 1, Parkes to Stanley, 16 January 1867.40 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 16 January 1867.41 E.M.Satow, op. cit., p. 187.42 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 14 February 1867.43 E.M.Satow, op. cit., p. 198; FO Japan 80, no. 74, Parkes to Stanley, 26 April 1867.44 FO Japan 80, Parkes to Stanley, 4 May 1867.45 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 6 May 1867.46 FO Japan 80, no. 92, Parkes to Stanley, 12 June 1867.47 E.M.Satow, op. cit., p. 200.48 FO Japan 81, no. 141, Parkes to Stanley, 18 August 1867; and FO Japan 81, no.

156, Parkes to Stanley, 11 September 1867.49 E.M.Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, p. 252.50 Ibid., pp. 265–67.51 M.Medzini, Léon Roches in Japan in Papers on Japan Vol. 2 (Harvard East Asian

Research Centre), Cambridge Mass. 1963, p. 218.52 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 27 July 1867.53 FO Japan 82, Private Parkes to Stanley, 15 October 1867.54 FO Japan 82, Confidential Parkes to Stanley, 14 November 1867; and FO Japan

82, no. 194, Parkes to Stanley, 27 November 1867.55 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 16 December 1867.56 e.g. PRO 33/15/2 Satow Papers. Diary. 1 January 1868.57 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 5 January 1868.58 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 10 January 1868.59 FO Japan 91, no. 9, Parkes to Stanley, 10 January 1868.60 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 30 January 1868.61 FO Japan 92, nos. 22 and 23, Parkes to Stanley, 13 February 1868.62 FO Japan 92, no. 26, Parkes to Stanley, 13 February 1868.63 FO Japan 92, no. 28, Parkes to Stanley, 15 February 1868.64 FO Japan 92, no. 49, Parkes to Stanley, 11 March 1868.65 FO Japan 92 Confidential no. 55, Parkes to Stanley, 11 March 1868.66 FO Japan 92, no. 66, Parkes to Stanley, 26 March 1868.67 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 14 April 1968; and FO

Japan 92, no. 72, Parkes to Stanley, 9 April 1868.68 FO Japan 93, no. 84, Parkes to Stanley, 18 April 1868.


69 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 13 May 1868.70 See G.Daniels, ‘The Japanese Civil War (1868)—A British View’ in Modern Asian

Studies, 1, 1967, pp. 241–263.71 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Parkes to Hammond, 10 February 1869.72 FO Japan 109, no. 110, Parkes to Clarendon, 14 May 1869.


First published as an Introduction to A Diplomat in Japan (1921) by

Sir Ernest Satow, Oxford University Press Reprint (1968)

4A Diplomat in Japan An Introduction

THE COMPELLING INTEREST of all memoirs lies in their humanity. Each isan essentially personal account of events which, though subjective, may drawone closer to the complexities of reality. Often they have the virtues of freshcolour, sharp emotion, and language free from official monochrome, but they areinvariably scarred by all too human flaws; there are the mistakes and omissionsof erring memories, self-inflation induced by vanity, and self-justificationprovoked by controversy, but above all there is the factor of hindsight whichfrequently distorts the selection and presentation of an author’s recollections.

Ernest Satow’s A Diplomat in Japan is very liberally endowed with all thevirtues of its genre, and though some of its descriptions slightly distort thepattern of events, a reference to contemporary unpublished papers can makethese distortions revealing. A comparative study of the Satow Papers, ForeignOffice Documents,1 and A Diplomat in Japan not only clarifies certain importantincidents but throws additional light on Satow’s rôle in diplomacy, and hisprobable motives in publishing his account.

The main advantage of Satow’s work is its firm foundation of documentaryauthenticity. By and large it is based on the author’s private letters and journalsand though there are divergencies between the book and the original diaries, thetwo correspond so closely that the advantages of publishing the diaries as againstreprinting the memoirs are little more than marginal. Essentially the book and thediaries tell the same story, though at certain points Satow retouched his originalaccount when preparing his memoirs for publication.

Apart from its closeness to the original diaries, A Diplomat in Japan containsmuch material which is intrinsically of great value to students of Britishdiplomacy and nineteenth century Japan.

Above all, it provides a fascinating description of a crucial period in Anglo-Japanese relations, seen from the inside through the eyes of a very talented juniorofficial. Though Satow was junior in years and status, his linguistic skill quicklythrust him into the centre of events, and throughout the years 1862–8 he waspresent at most important negotiations, and played a central role in the collectionof political intelligence. This inside account of Anglo-Japanese relationsprovides a graphic impression of the atmosphere which prevailed at numerousimportant negotiations, something not always obtainable from official

despatches. One is made clearly aware of the aggressive, threatening mannerwhich the British Minister, Sir Harry Parkes, employed when faced by resistance,and in contrast his reasonableness when the Japanese conceded his demands. InNovember 1865 at � saka, and the following year at Nanao, he blazed withanger, but when the Imperial authorities accepted responsibility for the Bizenincident of January 1868 he showed himself sympathetic and conciliatory.Equally interesting is Satow’s account of Got� Sh� jir� ’s hostile reaction toParkes’ blustering at K� chi, when the British Minister wrongly suspected Tosasamurai of the Icarus murders; understandably no word of this is to be found inofficial despatches.

Besides useful descriptions of situations, Satow also provides perceptivesketches of important personalities. He never found relations with his superiorseasy, but his description of Parkes is none the less valuable. He could appreciatehis dynamic zeal for work as well as resent his unnecessary aggression, and hisassessment provides useful evidence to set against the unflagging admiration ofParkes’ official biographers.2 Satow also furnishes useful impressions of Willis,Mitford and other junior officials of the Legation which add a good deal of life tothe hard facts present in the Foreign Office Lists. Beside their inherent interest,these descriptions of colleagues, and talk of friends and rivals, are of additionalvalue for they suggest the pattern of relationships which existed among theLegation staff, knowledge of which is otherwise hard to come by. Perhaps moreinteresting than all these descriptions of greater or lesser Englishmen are Satow’saccounts of politically active Japanese, several of whom rose to prominence inMeiji politics.

Satow describes Saig� Takamori and It� Hirobumi in their formative years,and in contrast gives favourable impressions of the last Sh� gun, a mere ninemonths before his political demise.

Satow’s role as a collector of intelligence adds a further dimension to theinterest of his memoirs. If further evidence were needed, this work effectivelyunderlines the tremendous novelty of Japan as an object of diplomacythroughout the 1860s. Of course, Satow quickly surmounted the problem oflanguage, but in a country with extremely primitive communications the problemof information was always serious. Even as late as 1868 large tracts of Japanwere completely unknown to Westerners, and the only means of collecting thebasic facts of topography and social conditions were journeys of exploration.Satow’s book contains numerous detailed accounts of such journeys which eventoday provide valuable information for the historian, and provide conclusiveproof of the physical problems of Bakumatsu diplomacy.

Behind these direct experiences of overland treks and narrow escapes lay thefar more intellectually demanding task of collecting intelligence from politicallyactive Japanese. This required considerable tact and linguistic skill and was afield in which Satow was particularly successful. His list of acquaintances waswide and provides important evidence of the success of British intelligence, andof the main sources from which political knowledge was derived.

46 A DIPLOMAT IN JAPAN AN INTRODUCTION

Granted all these advantages, what qualifications should one make inaccepting Satow’s work as material for the historian? Firstly one must recognizethe confines of the book, for it is easy to exaggerate its scope and authority.Certainly there is no more detailed account of Anglo-Japanese relations in theseyears, but this does not elevate it to the status of a history of British policy.However sharp and perceptive Satow was, his memoirs remain those of a juniordiplomat who had no decisive voice in the making of policy. And perhaps thisvery lack of influence provides one significant element in the character of thebook, for some of Satow’s critical remarks against Parkes may well be derivedfrom the understandable frustrations of a very brilliant, but junior, official.

Besides the limitations which derive from Satow’s junior status, A Diplomat inJapan also suffers from its author’s deliberate attempts to conceal a good deal ofyouthful indiscretion.3 Understandably, Satow describes his relations withJapanese women in rather sketchy and discreet phraseology, but his omission ofother youthful emotions is of more historical interest. By the time he publishedhis memoirs the days of Palmerstonian diplomacy were long past, Japan hadbecome Britain’s ally, and even China’s international position had undergonesome improvement. In the meantime Satow had served as British Minister inPeking, had become renowned as a distinguished Japanologist, and had finallyretired from the diplomatic service. In view of these changes it is not surprisingthat he sought to eliminate traces of youthful attitudes which had becomeunfashionable. For all his linguistic skill and scholastic verve Satow had, in hisyounger days, shared the attitude of superiority towards ‘Orientals’ which wasthen prevalent among most Westerners, and it is understandable that he sought toconceal this at the close of a prestigious career. In the memoirs he nevermentions kicking his Chinese servant downstairs ‘with two good kicks’ orforcing his way into the Temple of Heavenly Peace,4 or any other gesture lackingcultural sensitivity. Similarly, in his desire to show sympathy for the Japanese hewrites of his burning ambition to visit Japan but omits his diary entry whichdescribed the prospect of leaving Peking for Edo as ‘a bore’ for he was unable‘to go into the country’ or take a trip to the Wall, besides missing a very pleasantwinter.5

Besides concealing youthful waywardness, A Diplomat in Japan also divergesfrom Satow’s diary and other contemporary sources in describing severalimportant events. These discrepancies are of serious interest to the historian.They reveal conflicting opinions within the British Legation, suggest thatSatow’s book misinterprets British policy, and draw attention to the seriousdifficulty of synthesizing Western and Japanese accounts of this importantperiod.

Chronologically, the first major conflict between Satow’s memoirs and othersources concerns the visit of the Western naval force to Hy� go Bay in November1865. According to A Diplomat in Japan and Satow’s diaries, MacDonald, Sieboldand Mermet de Cachon first met the R� j� Ogasawara Iki no Kami and AbeBungo no Kami on 5 November in what was a friendly encounter. Satow wrote

COLLECTED WRITINGS OF GORDON DANIELS 47

that the Japanese listened ‘civilly and even affably to the messages delivered’;but Japanese sources claim that the Westerners created great consternation bybrusquely threatening to deal directly with the Emperor at Ky� to.6 Other Britishdocuments support Satow’s interpretations of this incident, reservingdescriptions of violent exchanges to later meetings, but this example ofconflicting evidence is enough to indicate the serious difficulties of judgingconflicting accounts of Anglo-Japanese negotiations in this controversial period.

A more serious divergence between Satow’s memoirs and other sources is tobe found in conflicting accounts of British policy in the early months of 1867.Unfortunately Satow has left no diary for this period, but in his published accounthe states that Parkes had ‘learnt enough of the internal political condition toconvince him that the Sh� gun’s power was fast decaying’ and ‘hesitated’ toaccept the new Sh� gun’s invitation to meet him at � saka; finally, it was onlywhen he found ‘a majority of his colleagues determined to go’ that he decided tojoin them. This suggests that Parkes thought that the Bakufu was too weak todeserve attention; but this interpretation is hardly justified by his own letters anddespatches.7 Certainly he hesitated to accept Yoshinobu’s invitation but for quitedifferent reasons.

In January 1867 Parkes still believed that the Shogunate was a very powerfulinstitution, and feared that a premature journey to � saka might bring diplomatichumiliation. As yet Yoshinobu had not been formally installed as Sh� gun, and hemight use a visit from foreign envoys to increase his own uncertain prestige.Understandably Parkes disliked the prospect of serving as a pawn in the internalsquabbles of the Bakufu, and there was an even more serious danger. If thedetails of an � saka meeting were not prepared beforehand, the Sh� gun might usesuch an encounter to announce that Japan would not carry out her treatyobligation to open � saka on 1 January 1868, and for Western envoys such agesture would be a humiliating climax to a lengthy expedition. Apart frommisinterpreting Parkes’ motives, Satow’s account also distorts the rôle of theBritish Minister vis à vis his Western colleagues. Satow claimed that Parkeslamely followed other envoys in deciding to go to � saka, but such action ishardly consistent with his assertive personality, or with his dominant positionamong Western diplomats. Certainly most European envoys were eager to acceptthe Sh� gun’s invitation, but far from following their decision, Parkes took theinitiative and pointing out the dangers of precipitate action, convinced them of theneed for preparatory talks.

Preliminary negotiations and then the death of the Emperor K� mei combinedto delay the visit to � saka, but when it came it proved highly successful. Thetechnical problems of the new foreign settlements were easily solved and Parkeswas favourably impressed by the new Sh� gun. Yoshinobu appeared committedto an amicable foreign policy, and equally important, was sympathetic todomestic reform and modernization. After three congenial meetings with theTokugawa ruler, Parkes felt ‘quite disposed to give him all the support he could’


and was now so impressed by Yoshinobu’s sincerity that he no longer believedSatsuma stories of Bakufu duplicity in the � saka talks of 1865.

Parkes’ letters and Satow’s memoirs leave no doubt that Anglo-Tokugawarelations were strengthened by Parkes’ talks with Yoshinobu, but Satow wasapparently unhappy at these developments. According to his memoirs he saw thenew rapprochement as a threat to the ambitions of his Satsuma friends, andpursuing a completely private initiative he ‘hinted to Saig� that the chance of arevolution was not to be lost’, for ‘if Hiogo were once opened then good-bye tothe chances of the daimi� s’. Unfortunately there is no diary entry against whichto check this interesting story, but there seems little doubt that the attitudes ofParkes and Satow towards the south-western han were sometimes far fromharmonious.

Two principal elements may account for the differing sympathies of Parkesand Satow. The British Minister had spent his formative years in China and hadwitnessed the epic devastation of the T’aiping Rebellion. This probably left himwith a revulsion against any movement which sought change by force, forviolence might begin a long cycle of internecine strife. Satow, in contrast, hadnone of this experience and could readily sympathize with Saig� and his restivesamurai.

Besides the shadow of the past, the reality of status probably had a place in theconflicting attitudes of Satow and his chief. As head of the Legation Parkes wasresponsible for the safety of the British community, its property and trade, andwith these he could take no risks. For all its faults the Shogunate representedstability and to encourage rebellion might produce civil war. This would disruptBritish commerce, and even worse, provide anti-foreign samurai with a chanceto exhibit their traditional skills. These dire possibilities were of daily concern toParkes but they were of far less interest to junior members of the Legation. Satowbore far less responsibility than his superior and thus could play a moreadventurous role. It may be true that Satow ‘sympathized more and more withthe daimi� party’ from as early as 1864, and that he disliked the ‘double dealing’of the Bakufu, but his attitudes were never fully shared by Parkes and theForeign Office. Successive Foreign Secretaries and the Minister in Edorecognized the legitimate grievances of the daimy� , but violent change was neverthe objective of their policy. Britain always sought a peaceful solution to Japan’scrisis and hoped that the Sh� gun would give the daimy� a greater say in nationalpolitics. In view of these aims it is not surprising that Parkes, and even Satow,sought to mediate in the Japanese crisis which broke in the first days of 1868.Satow apparently agreed with Parkes at this stage, but by 9 January he was againcritical. In describing the arrival of the dejected Sh� gun at � saka he wrote in hisdiary, ‘we met the chief who had…in bad taste come out to see the Tycoon’.Understandably Satow omitted this insult from his memoirs, but of more interestis the entirely new phrase which he substituted in its place. This asserted thatParkes had ‘contributed as far as lay in his power’ to the downfall of the Tycoon;


at times this may have been Satow’s strategy, but it was never that of the BritishMinister.

Though one must always bear in mind the individuality of Satow’s thoughtsand actions, it is important not to simplify A Diplomat in Japan by over-emphasizing a handful of dramatic statements. Amid the confusion of Bakumatsupolitics no one could prophesy the emergence of the centralized Meijigovernment and no one could have a completely consistent interpretation ofevents. Satow talked of revolution, then mediation, and was clearly swayed by thecourse of the crisis. Certainly he never foresaw the total demise of the Tokugawa,and his famous article Eikoku Sakuron envisaged nothing more radical than aconfederation of daimy� under the Emperor. There is no documentary evidencethat Parkes connived at the publication of Satow’s manifesto, but if he did it wouldnot indicate a belief in revolution or a departure from the constitutionalist policyof the Foreign Office.

Satow’s memoirs reflect the confusion of the moment but also illustrate theforce of hindsight. In converting diaries into memoirs the author clearly sought toemphasize British support for the activists of the Restoration. And though thismay not have been a scholarly endeavour, it is not difficult to suggest a motive.By 1921 the Meiji leaders were revered as the founding fathers of the new Japan,and Japan itself was a world power. This was no time to remind the world of olddoubts about the Meiji leaders; but to trace Anglo-Japanese friendship back tothe ‘good old days’ might not be without advantage.

NOTES

1 The Satow Papers, The Hammond Papers, and the Foreign Office Japan Series, allkept at the Public Record Office, London.

2 For example, F.V.Dickins and S.Lane-Poole, The Life of Sir Harry Parkes, vols.,London, 1894 and S.Lane-Poole, Sir Harry Parkes in China, London, 1901.

3 The best outline of Satow’s life is the Introduction to G.A.Lensen, Korea andManchuria between Russia and Japan, Tallahassee, Florida, 1966. A less criticalaccount is B.M.Alien, Sir Ernest Satow, London, 1933.

4 PRO 30/33/15/1 The Satow Papers, Diary, 22 June 1862 and 29 May 18625 PRO 30/33/15/1 The Satow Papers, Diary, 29 July 18626 The author is grateful to Professor W.G.Beasley for his helpful advice on this

point. See Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, p, 146, Nihon Gaik� Nempy� NarabiniShuy� Bunsho, Vol. I, Tokyo, 1955, p. 44; Isshinshi, 6 vols., Tokyo, 1939–41, Vol.4, p. 275, Ogasawara Iki no Kami Nagamichi, Tokyo, 1943, pp. 344–54.

7 I have given more detailed consideration to the attitudes and policies of Parkes inmy D.Phil. thesis, Sir Harry Parkes, British Representative in Japan, 1865–1883,Oxford, 1967.


Review first in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 30, (1970–71), pp.

191–2

5Britain and Japan, 1858–1883

By Grace Fox. Oxford University Press, 1969

ANY ONE who has faced the great drifts of documents which tell the story ofAnglo-Japanese relations in Bakumatsu and Meiji times must admire Miss Fox’sgrand design and her zeal in its pursuit. She has sought to describe the Britishimpact on Japan in all its aspects and has worked over diplomatic, private,missionary, and commerical archives in Britain and the United States, as well asa wide range of Japanese primary and secondary sources. The final product ofthis marathon of research is graced by cultural sensitivity and much good writing,and will be both a work of reference and a stimulus to research. Faced by thesemany virtues it may seem ungenerous to raise doubts and queries but this work’sscope and title make some reservations unavoidable.

After a brisk and useful survey of Britain and Japan in 1858 the author beginsby discussing the history of diplomatic relations. Ten chapters are devoted to theyears 1858 to 1869 and the final two describe ‘British influence on the JapaneseNavy’ and ‘Britain and early Meiji relations with China.’ There is no narrativetreatment of diplomacy after 1874 and this clearly detracts from the value of thework as a history of relations down to 1883. The Anglo-Japanese friction of the1870s, the problems of treaty revision, and the issue of Korean policy arereferred to but not discussed, and many interesting questions remain open; forexample, what high level discussions lay behind Japan’s tougher policy after theIwakura Mission? And was the harassment of British residents after 1873 theresult of government directives, or merely of spontaneous hostility? The author’sreason for this selective treatment is that the major problems of the 1870s werenot solved by 1883, the end of Sir Harry Parkes’ tour of duty (p. 249); but oneremains dissatisfied with this reasoning and one doubts whether Parkes’departure is a meaningful point at which to close a sweeping study of Anglo-Japanese relations.

For her discussion of Anglo-Japanese diplomacy from 1858 to 1868 the authorhas used much fuller sources than any previous writer, and her account is analmost definitive interpretation of these controversial years. In particular sheemphasises Britain’s prolonged neutrality towards Japan’s internal conflict,aspects of which persisted until February 1868. This reinterpretation effectivelyrebuts Sir Ernest Satow’s suggestion, in A Diplomat in Japan (p. 129) thatBritain aligned herself against the Bakufu from 1864, and points out the absence

of written evidence of official British collusion with the Shogun’s enemies. It isperhaps unfortunate that the Hammond Papers were not used in the preparation ofthis study for they contain Parkes most confidential observations on theRestoration crisis and would have added further clarity and drama to Miss Fox’saccount.

Few will want to challenge the author’s major findings on this phase ofdiplomatic history but some unmentioned passages in Foreign Office despatchesand the Satow Diaries would have thrown yet further light on British policy. Oneregrets the ommission of Parkes consultations in China which were an importantprologue to the commercial negotiations of 1866; and Satow’s idea on NewYear’s Day 1868, of taking the British Minister to Kyoto to mediate between theBakufu and its enemies.

Part II of this work entitled ‘Economic and Technological Developments’begins with a clear and valuable account of the growth of Anglo-Japanese tradeand the rise of the Treaty Ports. Further chapters describe British help withtelegraph and lighthouse construction, while the final sections cover Britishbanking, loans, and the establishment of the Meiji Mint. All these studies provideessential basic material and may well lead the way for more detailed research onJapanese attitudes to some of these developments.

The author concludes with five chapters on ‘British influence on JapaneseCulture.’ These outline the rise of British influence on Japanese newspapers,science and medicine and explore the activities of British missionaryorganizations. These thorough accounts of men and organizations who helpedJapan’s development are all of great value, but again one must question thelimits which the author has set herself. Miss Fox declares that ‘Any appraisal ofBritish policy and influence in Japan…must rest on the contributions of thesemen in authority in the local fields of British activity’ (p. 538), but there weremore potent, subtle and abstract influences. Political ideas, architecture andliterature all played a part in the British impact and the intellectual history ofAnglo-Japanese relations is a horizon still open for exploration.

52 BRITAIN AND JAPAN, 1858–1883

Review first published in Modern Asian Studies (1970), pp. 95–96

6Japan’s First General Election 1890

By R.H.P.Mason. Cambridge University Press: London, 1969

IN RECENT YEARS Western scholars have ceased studying Meiji history ascriminologists, searching for the origins of later militarism and aggression, andhave rooted their enquiries in the sources and values of the nineteenth century.Dr Mason’s valuable contribution to this process of reappraisal is based on athorough reading of contemporary press, party and state materials and avoids thevices of historical hindsight. The author is deeply aware of the complexity andpower of Tokugawa tradition, but far from dwelling on the superficiality ofEuropean influences he emphasizes the considerable extent to which Westernvalues were spliced into the threads of traditional society. He notes the surprisingpersistence of a ‘system entailing parliament…for most of the seventy-five yearssince its introduction’ and throughout, highlights the elements of genuine noveltyas well as tradition in the story of Meiji politics.

The Introduction to this monograph centres upon the currents of sharedexperience which impelled both government and opposition towards thecompromise which was the Constitution of 1889. While the democrats evolvedfrom narrow regional and class preoccupations to broader and more empiricalobjectives, the government strengthened its old interest in constitutionalism andincreasingly saw the advantages of wider popular involvement in reform andreconstruction.

The events of the election campaign underlined these elements in Meijipolitics. The Liberals and Progressives strove hard, if unsuccessfully, to create anational opposition and their manifestos showed increasing signs of moderation.The government administered the election with admirable fairness and used itspower to combat violence and corruption. It may be argued that the governmentrisked nothing in enfranchising less than 2 per cent of its citizens but even thissmall minority could reflect the hostility of public opinion. The oppositioncommanded a majority in the first Diet and the ultra-conservatives were almostcompletely defeated. The electors and the elected both symbolized the changesthat were afoot in nineteenth-century Japan, for among them the most potentforce was the urban and rural middle class which was most associated withpolitical and economic innovation.

It is unusual for publishers to underestimate the market for one of theirpublications. But this is surely such a case; a book of such deep interest to

historians, political scientists, and orientalists is hardly complete withoutelectoral maps, a glossary, and a chronology to assist undergraduates andspecialists in comparative studies.

54 JAPAN’S FIRST GENERAL ELECTION 1890

First published bt The Times (Japan and Britain Supplement) 7 May

1975

7Illusions about El Dorado of untapped bullion

IN 1859 at the opening of Anglo-Japanese diplomacy Britain and Japan appearednatural adversaries. Britain was powerful, expansive and imperial. Japan wasweak and divided, reluctantly emerging from two centuries of detachment fromthe diplomatic world. Vast differences of wealth, culture and organisationprovided ready grounds for mutual suspicion; and ignorance spawned mythswhich increased the danger of violent conflict.

Britain had subdued India and humliated China, and many Japanese fearedthat they would be the next victims of this colonial advance. Parallel with theseexaggerated, if understandable, fears of British colonization were bizarre Britishnotions of the economic potential of the Japanese islands.

Japan could not rival C.hina as a potential market for foreign products but itwas believed to be a glorious El Dorado of untapped bullion. Central control ofgold and silver mines, and offical reluctance to reveal details of their operations,convinced many Englishmen that Japan had gold and silver in abundance. Theseillusions gave added momentum to demands to reside and invest in the interior,and these in turn heightened suspicion of Britain’s intent.

More significant than this notion of gold and silver was Britain’s initialmisunderstanding of the Japanese political system. Its first agreements werenegotiated with the Tokugawa military government, and its representatives wereunaware of the Emperor’s sovereignty and importance. Initially, its treaties werenot ratified by Japan’s sovereign, and in the eyes of many of his subjects they wereillegal and invalid. In part this misunderstanding was the deliberate creation ofthe military government but it also reflected British unpreparedness in this newzone of diplomatic endeavour.

Britain’s first Consul-General, Sir Rutherford Alcock, faced formidableobstacles to the understand of local politics and society. He and his staffpossessed no detailed knowledge of the economy, geography and traditions ofJapan. No Englishman could speak Japanese and negotiations werecarried through the medium of Dutch. No English-Japanese dictionaries ortextbooks had yet been published, and if translated, official statements were oftenobscure.

More serious than these technical barriers to negotiation and reporting was thehuman and psychological state of these isolated diplomats. They lacked the

security of the telegraph or a permanent legation building. On two occasionstheir temporary quarters were raided by anti-foreign swordsmen; members of thelegation staff were wounded, and British and Japanese guards were killed. Fear ofmurder drove some diplomats to carry revolvers and others to suicide.

Agains this chilling background Alcock showed himself to be a diplomat ofremarkable courage and sensitivity. He was a strange representative of animperial power. He despised the coarse aims of British merchants, had sympathyfor the achievements of Asian civilization and doubted the west’s moral claim tosuperiority.

For a man webbed in by dangers and difficulties his achievements wereremarkable. Despite Japanese warnings he travelled overland across Kyushu, andfrom Osaka to Edo (Tokyo). Faced by the blocking of the Shimonoseki Strait heorganised an international force to attack the local batteries. He survived thebleak years of anti-foreign violence and came to understand many of thefundamental rivalries in Japanese politics.

Long before his departure he recognized the importance of the Emperor andthe need for his ratification if treaties were to be observed. The obverse of thisunderstanding was his realization that the authority of the military government wasfar from universal. In addition he developed some understanding of the place offoreign relations in provincial politics; several lords mobilized anti-foreignfeeling to embarrass the military government. It was a handy weapon in domesticrivalries.

In 1864 Alcock returned to Britain to write The Capital of the Tycoon, perhapsthe finest of all diplomatic memoirs. Two things above all had transformedBritish views of Japan from myth to partial reality. The naval bombardmentswhich cleared the Shimonoseki Strait and punished Satsuma for the murder of anEnglishman persuaded young local samurai to recognize British power. Theybought British weapons and supplied valuable information. Furthermore thedevelopment of Japanese studies within the legation brought an impressiveimprovement in British intelligence.

Among the student interpreters of the Alcock years the most dedicated anddynamic was Ernest Mason Satow. He arrived in Japan in September 1862 and inlittle over a year became proficient in written and spoken Japanese. Much creditmust go to his Japanese instructors but no one can deny Satow’s own energy andachievement. His ability to read and translate political documents broughtobvious advantages, but even more important was his ability to mingle and talkwith a wide variety of Japanese.

Satow’s youth and low status enabled him to lead an adventibrous existence.He met samurai and tradesmen, friends and enemies of the TokugawaGovernment. He ate, drank and joked in back street tea-houses and formedfriendships with activist samurai who became future leaders.

All these informal contacts brought invaluable influence and information. Against this background Britain’s second representative, Sir Harry Parkes,

was well placed to develop a realistic and flexible policy amid Japan’s domestic

56 ILLUSIONS ABOUT EL DORADO OF UNTAPPED BULLION

conflict. Unlike his predecessor, Parkes was no sensitive thinker given tophilosophical introspection. He had spent much of his life among the merchantsof the China coast and had no doubt of the superiority of western science andcivilization. He possessed terrifying energy and a lightning temper and wearied hissubordinates with commands. Despite these doubtful qualities Parkes was aremarkable envoy with great gifts of practical imagination.

From his arrival in Japan in 1865 he encouraged his staff in a wide range ofintelligence and academic activities. Satow was sent to Kyushu and Hokkaido tosee conditions at first hand. Other interpreters were encourage to study Japenesereligion, history and geography. Parkes himself played an active part inorganizing the Asiatic Society of Japan which provided a forum for pioneeringstudies. All these activities manifested the confident curiosity of imperialEngland but they had a deep and significant purpose. Parkes believed that allinformation deepened understanding of Japan, and provided the intellectualgirders of British policy.

These rich sources of information established firm foundations for a many-sided policy. Backed by an international squadron he demanded the imperialratification of treaties. He supplied naval instructors to advise the militarygovernment while parallel with this recognition of traditional rulers he developedlinks with the rising western provinces. He and his staff visited semi-independent rulers in Kyushu, Honshu and Shikoku to explain that Britaindesired peace and trade, not territorial acquisitions.

When the Tokugawa Government fell in January 1868 Britain quicklydeveloped relationships with the new regime. Leaders of the new administrationincluded Ito and Saigo, both long-standing contacts of Satow and his fellowinterpreters.

Britain’s increasing understanding of Japan made a major contribution tosmooth relations with its new Government. But Japanese leaders also discardedmyth for reality. As the might of British industry was recognized Japandeveloped deep interest in the sources of British strength. Even before 1868Japanese visited London to study, and toured provincial factories. After 1868 thenew Govermnent turned to Parkes to provide advice on warships, railways andcurrency and other foundations of a modern state.

Britain and the new Government shared a desire for a tranquil and orderlyJapan in which both foreigners and political leaders would be safe fromassassination. Both desired to protect Japan from the encroachment of Russianpower which threatened Japanese territory and British commerce. In the earlyyears of Japan’s new regime British influence was was creative and paramount.

In later years Anglo-Japanese relations have encompassed alliance, war andpeaceful rivalry. Alcock, Parkes and Satow are half forgotten but their passionatecuriosity remains an example to all who seek realistic understanding.


First published in B.A.J.S. Proceedings (1980) pp. 1–10 and 207–

208

8E.H.House—Japan’s American Advocate

BETWEEN the Meiji Restoration and the Boxer Uprising. Japan advanced fromdiplomatic humiliation to a substantial position in international society. In herstruggle for the revision of the unequal treaties, her political and militarysuccesses exerted a direct influence on Western governments, but foreign leaderswere also influenced by pro-Japanese opinion.1 From its early years, the Meijigovernment often sought to influence Western public opinion and in this, as inindustrial modernisation, skilled foreign advisers were essential to the success ofnovel and subtle policies.2

Within this unexplored field of Japanese diplomacy, a largely forgottenAmerican, E.H.House, played a leading role which vividly illustrates theambitious methods of Meiji Japan’s political propaganda. Edward HowardHouse was born in Boston, Massachusetts on 5th October 1836 and by the age ofthirteen had completed his formal education at Chauncy Hall private school.After three years studying and composing music, he joined his father in workingfor the New England Currency Company, but this was no more than anunsatisfactory interlude.3 In 1854, House entered the world of journalism andthis became the main focus of his future career. Initially, he reviewed plays andconcerts for the Boston Courier and the New York Tribune, but he was soonreporting state occasions and major happenings. These experiences quicklycreated a commitment to Japan and a notion of racial justice which were toobsess him until the end of his life.4 In 1860, when a group of Bakufu officials,led by Kimura Kaish� , visited the United States, House was deeply impressed bytheir dignified behaviour and wrote an article entitled ‘Japan’ in The AtlanticMonthly. This essay outlined current knowledge of Japanese history and passedfavourable judgments on Japan and its people.5 At this time, House’s viewscombined farsighted perception and emotional sympathy and, in a comparison ofEast Asian societies he wrote:

On close examination the imagined attractions of China disappear, thoseof Japan become only more definite and substantial.6

To House, China wasa nation so palsied, so corrupt, so wretchedly degraded, and so enfeebled

by misgovernment, as to be more than half sunk in decay.

In contrast, he praisedThe real vigor, thrift and intelligence of Japan, its great and advancing

power and the rich promise of its future…Its wealth, its commercial resources and the quick intelligence of its

people—not at all inferior to the people of the West…give to Japan, nowthat it is about to emerge from its chrysalis condition…an importance farabove that of any other Eastern country.7

House was not to visit Japan for another nine years but his basic political viewswere to be confirmed and developed throughout his extensive travels in Europeand the United States. In the American Civil War, he abandoned routinereporting for the role of battlefield correspondent, and followed Union forcesthrough many of their campaigns.8 For House, as for many other Northerners,this was a war of righteous principle, for justice against injustice, and freedomagainst slavery, and this idealistic view of the central issues of political conflictwas easily transferred to later controversies between Japan and the Westernpowers. With the war over, House spent several years engrossed in theatricalactivities in America and Britain, but even in this unlikely setting, hisassociations confirmed his commitment to the weak against the mighty, which helater projected into East Asian politics. House often collaborated with the Irishplaywright, Dion Boucicault, who was a founder of the Irish Land League and afund raiser for Fenian prisoners.9 The two writers shared ‘a strong anti-imperialist streak’, and their song, ‘The Wearing of the Green’, became ‘theunofficial anthem of the Irish freedom movement’.10

It was in 1869, in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration, that House firstvisited Japan and became one of the first instructors at the Daigaku Nank� whichwas to develop into Tokyo University.11 From 1871, House taught Englishlanguage, history and literature, but while others made teaching the basis forpioneering works of Japanology, House soon made it the opportunity for anoriginal blend of journalistic and political activities. In 1872, when the Japaneseauthorities released over two hundred Chinese coolies from the Peruvian vessel‘Maria Luz’, House visited the ship, then spoke and wrote in defence of Japan’shumanitarian policy.12 This conspicuous championing of Japan’s cause broughthim to the attention of Okuma Shigenobu, whose influence soon enabled him torevert to the role of war correspondent. In 1874, he was permitted to accompanyJapanese forces in their expedition against Taiwan and his front line reports werepublished in the New York Herald.13 In the following year, House drew upon hisrecent experiences to compile a 230-page study of the campaign, The JapaneseExpedition to Formosa. This combined diplomatic history, military analysis andpro-Japanese polemics; and castigated the Chinese for their archaic negotiatingtactics, and the American Minister for ‘throwing impediments in the course of[Japan’s] public spirited…humane enterprise’.14 Finally, House looked forwardto the day when the ‘foreign public sense of justice should revolt’ and ordainJapan’s ‘free acceptance into the community of nations’.15

E.H. HOUSE—JAPAN’S AMERICAN ADVOCATE 59

Following this formidable defence of Japanese aspirations, House publishedThe Kagoshima Affair, a pamphlet which attacked Britain’s bombardment of theSatsuma capital in 1863. Soon after, he issued another pro-Japanese tracts TheShimonoseki Affair, and began a campaign for the return of the indemnity whichhad been exacted after the Western attack on Choshu in 1864.16 Two years later,in 1877, House became involved in what was the most ambitious venture ofJapanese propaganda up to this time, the launching of the Japanese-financedweekly, The Tokio Times, to do battle with existing treaty port newspapers.House edited the new journal and devoted much of its space to the advocacy ofJapanese causes. The main targets of his attacks were the conspiratorial characterof British economic policy, extraterritorial rights and all the iniquities of theunequal treaties.17 By this time, Britain appeared the main obstacle to mostJapanese aspirations and her representative in Tokyo, Sir Harry Parkes, becamethe victim of House’s bitterest assaults. The Tokio Times referred to the BritishMinister as ‘a living and breathing thorn in the side of Japan’ whose career ‘hadbeen one long series of exactions, oppressions, insults and humiliations’ and it isnot surprising that the paper soon became unpopular among British residents.18

House’s criticisms of other diplomats led to his widespread unpopularity inembassy circles, and this growing illwill was probably responsible for the finalclosure of The Tokio Times in June 1880.19

Perhaps this journalistic failure led House to transfer his activities to Europeand North America which were more suitable settings for his political activities.Here public opinion remained largely ignorant of Japan and was less prejudicedthan in the treaty ports. Furthermore, House had personal friends in America andEurope who could aid his political enterprises. On returning to the United States,he published a powerful defence of Japan in The Atlantic Monthly, entitled ‘TheMartyrdom of an Empire’. This likened Japan’s position under the unequaltreaties to that of Ireland and India under British imperial rule and, in explainingJapan’s current plight, observed:

The impetus which kept the empire in motion from the days of therestoration in 1868 has failed. The vital force which animated the wholemachinery of government and society has waned…the nation is destitute ofmoney.20

To House, this sad spectacle was the result of low tariffs which Britain in theshape of Sir Harry Parkes had imposed upon Japan in 1866. British motives wereclear, not only ‘to get English wares admitted upon easy terms’, but to preventthe Japanese ‘from developing their own industries and competing with theproducts which England pours into her ports’.21 To House, a higher tariff wouldnot only assist in the development of Japanese industry, but it would provide avaluable source of revenue. This would enable the Meiji government to lightenthe heavy burden of taxation which, of necessity, had been imposed upon theJapanese peasantry.22 Perhaps justifiably, House denounced Sir Harry Parkes for


his brusque and violent tactics and saw little chance of improving Japan’s abjectplight. His only hope was that ‘America might be induced to stretch a helpinghand across the Pacific’, but he had little confidence in his own government’sdiplomatic resolve.23

After some months in the United States, House visited France and Britain onOkuma’s behalf and presented Japan’s case to notable politicians.24 In Paris, hehad a three-hour discussion with Leon Gambetta, but soon discovered that Japanwas too remote to be of importance to the French leaders. After half an hour’sconversation. Gambetta ‘seemed to enter sympathetically’ into House’s feelings,but afterwards he explained that the turbulent state of French politics made itimpossible to devote great attention to Japan.25 House even sought to appeal toGambetta’s patriotism and ‘lamented the misfortune that France should have noindividual policy in the Far East but should always be blindly following theEnglish course’. Gambetta replied by emphasising the many frictions whichalready plagued Anglo-French relations and declared that ‘many Frenchstatesmen would be glad to find one point on which English and Frenchmovements go together’.26 Following this unsuccessful meeting, House had ‘anequally long and fruitless talk’ with Georges Clemenceau. During this exchange,he was offered free use of the newspaper La Justice, but he considered Frenchpublic opinion too concerned with domestic and colonial issues to justify hisventuring into local journalism.27

Despite these cool rebuffs, House persisted with his unofficial diplomacy. InJuly, he arrived in London and, in his own words, ‘lost no time in putting myselfin communication with those members of Parliament who might be useful inforwarding our interests’.28 Unfortunately, Irish members had obstructedparliamentary business and prolonged the session, and there was likely to beirritation if anyone raised a new issue such as policy towards Japan. Housevisited a pro-Japanese M.P., Sir Edward Reed, at his country house and was toldthat Sir Charles Dilke and Lord Granville ‘had virtually, though not positivelygiven him to understand that, whatever else might happen, at least Sir H. Parkeswould not be sent back to Tokio’.29 Unfortunately, the Japanese Minister inLondon, Mori Arinori, appeared to support an entirely different policy and whenHouse visited Parliament, he ‘learned…from Messrs. Justin McCarthy (of theHouse) Labuchere, Mundella, Lord Dunraven and others’ that he was ‘gettinginto a false position’ as his views ‘were different from the things that theJapanese envoy advocated’.30

On the following day, he clearly learnt that Mori `thought it was for thewelfare of Japan that Parkes should return' to Tokyo31 and concluded that

If I continued to agitate the question of calling Parkes to a reckoning,through friendly members of Parliament, I was liable to be met by theassertion, from the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the accreditedagent of Japan expressed himself perfectly satisfied with Parkes.32


Following advice from House, Sir Edward Reed now limited his parliamentaryaction to an enquiry for ‘papers relating to Japan’. Unhappily. this received ‘acurt and unsatisfactory answer’ from Sir Charles Dilke.33 Nevertheless, whenHouse visited Parliament a few days later, three M.P.s and one member of theHouse of Lords declared their willingness ‘to bring forward a motion forinvestigation of diplomatic relations’. But now House was convinced that it wasnot ‘an advantageous time for commencing such proceedings’ and he dissuadedhis allies from further action.34

In the remainder of his stay in London. House devoted all his energies toexplaining Japanese affairs to powerful and influential figures. Reporting to� kuma, he wrote:

I had the good fortune to gather about me at a little dinner party nearly adozen gentlemen, members of both Houses of Parliament, and editors ofnewspapers which have lately discussed Japanese topics in rather anignorant spirit…and I have the satisfaction of believing that to some extentsome sound and advantageous opinion was planted in the minds of thosewho did me the honour to join me. Before I left I visited the leadingnewspaper offices… It was obvious that hostile hands had been at workwith some of them—notably the Telegraph and Spectator, and I did what Icould to remedy the evil they had sought to create.35

It is clear that House’s foray into parliamentary lobbying had produced short-term disappointment, but his fierce criticism of Sir Harry Parkes had alreadyachieved considerable success in arousing international opinion.36

After leaving Britain, House spent a short time in the United States pressingfor the return of the Shimonoseki indemnity.37 Apparently this campaign alsoachieved a measure of success, for, in February 1883, Congress voted to transferthe $785,000 indemnity to the Japanese government.38 By this time, House hadreturned to Japan and had resumed his position at Tokyo University. Unfortunatelyhe soon became seriously ill. His legs were paralysed and he was unable to ‘goabout or visit anybody it’.39 Now he was forced to abandon teaching and in 1885attempted to return to the United States. In Hong Kong, he became so ill that hewas compelled to rest for several months and only arrived in America in thefollowing year.40

Despite the pain and discomfort which now plagued him, House remaineddevoted to Japan and continued to be an eloquent advocate of its cause. Aboveall, he sought to improve understanding of Japan and wrote

It is important that the American people should be made to comprehendthoroughly what Japan’s necessities are; for in this country the peoplecontrol the Government directly, and the general opinion of the communitycan compel the Government to act as the people wish. My desire is tocreate such a state of feeling as will make it essential for the Government


at Washington to take notice of the affairs of Japan and to proffer aid andencouragement.41

For House, the compelling issue of the day was treaty revision and he called fordrastic action by Japan to end her painful indignities. Of compromise he wrote

From the moment when Inouye and his party declared their intentionto seek the attainment of their purpose by conciliation it was evident in myjudgment that their efforts would ultimately fail.42

In an article in The Atlantic Monthly, ‘The Thraldom of Japan’, he advocated theunilateral repudiation of the unequal treaties.43

In 1888, House stepped aside from normal political journalism and turned tofiction to prosecute Japan’s cause. In a novel, Yone Santo, he described the lifeof a young woman of samurai background and the many hazards she faced as avictim of cultural, sexual and maritime Imperialism. The novel ridiculed bigotedAmerican missionaries for their failure to appreciate the intelligence of theJapanese; and angry missionary organisations vainly attempted to obstruct thebook’s publication.44 House also denounced the carnal exploitation of Japanesewomen by coarse Westerners and wove history into fiction by describing hisheroine’s death from cholera as the result of a German ship breaking throughJapanese quarantine.45

In 1893, House returned to Japan for the last time. In the final years of his life,he devoted most of his energies to directing the Imperial Palace orchestra and in1901 was decorated with the Order of the Sacred Treasure.46 He died at his homein Yotsuya, Tokyo on 18th December 1901. By now, treaty revision had beenachieved and at his funeral Okuma’s private secretary declared that House ‘laid[Japan] under a deep obligation by his advocacy of her cause’.47 It is difficult toassess the effectiveness of House’s political and literary campaigning, but hisrole as pamphleteer, editor and lobbyist illustrates the ingenious diversity ofMeiji diplomacy and Japan’s imaginative approach to contemporary worldopinion.

NOTES

The author would like to thank Professors Oka Yoshitake, Inoh Tentar� andMatsuzawa Hiroaki for their help in obtaining materials for the preparation ofthis paper.

1 For the most recent outline of the treaty revision question, see Gaimush�Gaik� shiry� kan, Nihon Gaik� shi Jiten Hensan linkai: Nihon Gaik� shi Jiten:(Tokyo, 1979), 395–399.

2 For a brief account of the role of foreign employees in Meiji Japan, see ibid., 117–119.


3 The fullest account of House’s career is to be found in Sh� wa Joshi Daigaku,Kindai Bungaku Kenky� shitsu: Kindai Bungako S� sho Dai-5 kan: (Tokyo, 1957)380–416.

4 For a description of House’s political attitudes, see Ebihara Hachir� : ‘E.H.House nitsuite,’ in: Meiji Bunka Keeny� kai: Meiji Bunka Kenky� Dai-1 sh� : Tokyo, 1934),149–150.

5 The Atlantic Monthly V (June 1860), 721–7336 Ibid., 722.7 Ibid.8 As fn.3 supra, 381.9 Letter from Boucicault’s great-grandson, Christopher Calthrop, to the author,

19.ix..1968.10 Richard Fawkes: Dion Boucicault—A Biography: (London, 1979), 157–156.11 For House’s career as a teacher, see fn.5 supra, 382–384 & 394–400.12 Ibid., 392. For a brief account of the ‘Maria Luz’ incident, see fn.1 supra, 893. For

House’s testimony in court, see United States: Department of State: ForeignRelations of the United States 1873: (Washington D.C., 1873), I: 545.

13 D.Malone, ed.: Dictionary of American Biography: (London & New York, 1932),IX: 257–258.

14 E.H.House: The Japanese Expedition to Formosa: (Tokyo, 1875), 231 & 238.15 Ibid., 238.16 E.H.House: The Kagoshima Affair: (Tokyo, 1875) and The Shimonoseki Affair:

(Tokyo, 1875).17 For the financial background to The Tokio Times, see fn.13 supra, 258; for its

political character, see fn.3 supra, 401–402 and the obituary of House in The JapanWeekly Mail, 21.xii.1901, 657.

18 The Tokio Times, 28.xii.1878 & 8.xii.1878. For House’s relations with the foreigncommunity, see The Japan Weekly Mail, 21.xii.1901, 657.

19 As fn.3 supra, 392.20 The Atlantic Monthly XXVII (May 1881), 612.21 Ibid., 615.22 Ibid., 615–616.23 Ibid., 611 & 621.24 E.H.House to � kuma Shigenobu, 1.i.1886 (c335): � kuma Papers, Waseda

University, Tokyo.25 E.H.House to � kuma Shigenobu, 2.ix.l881 (c335, No.18): ibid.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.28 E.H.House to � kuma Shigenobu, 3.ix.l881 (c333, No.19): ibid.29 Ibid.30 Ibid.31 Ibid.32 Ibid.33 Ibid. and Great Britain, Parliament: Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: 3rd Series,

Vol. 264, Cols. 844–5 (4.viii.1861).34 As fn.28 supra.35 Ibid.


36 By 1881, even Ernest Satow felt that Parkes had become ‘the square peg in theround hole’ in Tokyo. See E.M.Satow to F.V.Dickins, 10.x.1881: Satow Papers,Public Record Office, PRO 33/11/5.

For a detailed study of criticism of Parkes’ diplomacy in Japan, see SugiiMutsur� : ‘Paakusu Hinan Rons� ,’ Shirin 4 (1955): 261–287; for House’s role asParkes’ critic, see p.286.

37 E.H.House to � kuma Shigenobu, 7.x.1887 (c336), � kuma Papers.38 United States, Department of State: Foreign Relations of the United States 1883:

(Washington D.C., 1884), 603–607.39 As fn.24 supra.40 Ibid.41 As fn.37 supra.42 Ibid.43 The Atlantic Monthly LX (December 1887): 730–731.44 E.R.House: Yone Santo—a Child of Japan: (Boston, Mass., 1888), 277–280.45 This section of the novel was based upon the ‘Hesperia’ incident of 1879. For a

brief account of the incident, see fn.1 supra, 850.46 As fn.3 supra, 394.47 The Japan Weekly Mail, 28.xii.1901, 684.


First published in Japan Society Proceedings, 1990 (115), pp. 17–

26

9Sir Harry Parkes and the Meiji Government

1868–1883

ON 8 FEBRUARY 1868, a month after the coup which heralded the MeijiRestoration, a historic meeting took place in the Customs House at Kobe. SirHarry Parkes, British Minister to Japan, had his first formal meeting withrepresentatives of the new government. By this time Parkes had spent more thantwenty years in China and his views of East Asians were clearly defined. Hebelieved that most ‘Orientals’ obstructed Western commerce and diplomacy, andwere deserving of a particularly direct and unequal style of negotiation. Morespecifically Japan posed difficulties which were not present in Manchu China. Ithad a confusing duality of sovereignty, and its many fiefs (han) resembledindependent kingdoms rather than obedient provinces. Japanese society was alsostructured in a particularly menacing way. The samurai class was armed anddominant, and its members often used their swords to terrorize British diplomatsand traders. These dangerous contingencies did much to shape Parkes’ views andthose of the Foreign Office in the closing years of the Tokugawa bakufu.Broader concepts of political and economic interest also helped to define Britishpolicy towards Bakumatsu Japan.

For British subjects who sought to trade in Japan’s open ports the so-called‘two-sworded’ class constituted a dangerous anachronism which requiredremoulding into a creative social force. As Britain’s own prosperity was basedupon the vitality of its middle class it was natural that Parkes and his superiorssaw the establishment or expansion of a Japanese bourgeoisie as a majorobjective. This new class would provide valuable trading partners for Britishmerchants and contribute to the creation of a more civilian and civilized society.In fact British officials often saw the anti-foreignism of some powerful daimyoas the simple product of commercial frustration—a direct consequence of theTokugawa shogun’s restrictions on international trade.

Despite Parkes’ commitment to free trade and social reconstruction he wasdeeply aware of the strength of Japanese tradition. He believed thatany encouragement of change should be qualified by consideration for Japaneseculture and sensibilities. Without this British schemes would be counter-productive, and bound to fail. Parkes’ vision of a new Japan was also based upona strong preference for peaceful change. He had no desire for civil war orrevolution, for any outbreak of political violence was likely to inspire anti-

foreign massacres and disrupt trade. Instead the British Minister hoped thatJapan’s discontented lords might be gathered into a national assembly whichwould be headed by an enlightened shogun. This new focus of power wouldcontribute to the welding of a fragmented people into a unified state.

It was against this background that Sir Harry Parkes observed the fluctuatingfortunes of the Tokugawa shogunate, and the warfare which followed the seizureof the imperial palace by Satsuma and Choshu loyalists. At first there was talk ofBritain attempting to mediate between the rival Japanese factions but eventsmoved too quickly for this. With the defeat of the shogun’s forces andYoshinobu’s flight to Osaka fears of massacre and social disorder swept throughthe foreign community. On 4th February 1868 this fear was heightened whenBizen samurai fired on foreigners on the shore at Kobe. The well-known anti-foreign views of many Satsuma and Choshu samurai created further alarmregarding the likely policies of the new government.

Despite these many uncertainties Parkes’ first meeting with representatives ofthe Meiji Government instantly transformed the atmosphere of Anglo-Japaneserelations. The leading Japanese representative Higashikuze Michitomi conveyedan impression of crisp authority, and undertook to compensate foreigners for theBizen attack. Of this meeting Parkes later wrote:

The promptitude…with which the officers of the Mikado have treated thisgrave matter furnished a striking contrast to the dilatoriness and evasionswhich have marked the action of the Tycoon’s Government…in similarcases.1

From this time on the British Minister may have had occasional doubts about theMeiji Government, but he never saw any alternative which could better serve hisgrand design for the modernization and pacification of Japan.

Overall, it was the new government’s air of effective administration whichattracted Parkes’ support during the years from 1868 to 1871. He led theabandonment of foreign neutrality during the Boshin civil war, and chose amoment which was particularly advantageous for the Meiji Government. Ofmore importance was the sympathy which he showed when the newgovernment’s authority failed—through no obvious fault of its own.

In the spring of 1868 Parkes and his retinue were invited to a formal audiencewith the Emperor Mutsuhito at the Imperial Palace in Kyoto. On 23 March theBritish party left their lodgings in the Chionin, and began their journey towardsthe palace. On their way they were suddenly attacked by anti-foreign samurai.These swordsmen took advantage of a cramped thoroughfare to slash and woundmembers of Parkes’ retinue. Contemporary eye-witness accounts have madethese brief violent moments almost unforgettable, but what followed was of evengreater significance. Parkes and his escort returned to their temple lodgings, anddoctors bandaged wounded limbs. However the British Minister made no hastyill-tempered protest. He recognized that the Meiji Government had no


responsibility for the ambush, and the imperial audience was held—withoutincident—three days later.

Even more important was the contribution which Parkes made to the earlystages of building the Meiji state. Soon after the Restoration it was clear that theleaders of the new government had abandoned their earlier anti-foreign slogansand were eager to employ Western experts and equipment in the process ofmodernization. The execution of these policies created a new community ofinterest between the Meiji leaders and members of the British businesscommunity. A stable modern regime would bring greater safety for foreigners,and many of the government’s aims would be assisted by the supply of Britishgoods and expertise.

From the early days of the Meiji state Parkes seized every opportunity—informal conversations with the Emperor, and informal conversations with Iwakura—to encourage political and economic development. If Japan was to have aunified stable government it was necessary to improve all means ofcommunication—so that Tokyo’s will would run throughout the nation. For thisthe building of railways, the creation of a telegraph system and the charting andlighting of Japan’s coasts were all equally essential. Such developments wouldalso increase the incomes of British advisors and exporters, and raise the generalprestige of British diplomacy.

Although such bonds of common interest helped to strengthen Anglo-Japaneserelations, the Meiji Government often seemed fragile in the face of internationaldifficulties. In particular Japan’s northern territories appeared threatened by thelikely course of Russian expansion. Hokkaido, Karafuto and the Kuriles were allundeveloped and thinly populated, and the Meiji Government was ill-equipped todiscover day to day happenings in these distant lands. As a result it was Britishwarships, often with Parkes on board, which scoured the northern seas for signsof Russian political or military activity. These British patrols combinedintelligence gathering with military deterrence and broadly served both Britishand Japanese interests.

Parkes’ interest in these northern lands was never narrowly defined. Then asnow Japan was viewed as part of a continental balance of power in which aRussian advance might threaten Korea, British trade or the frontier ofAfghanistan. In view of these broad considerations Parkes recommended twopolicies to the Meiji Government: the creation of a sea frontier rather than anindefensible line across Karafuto, and the economic internationalization ofHokkaido. The latter scheme implied the opening of further ports to trade so thata coalition of foreign interests would obstruct Russian expansion.Understandably the Japanese Government found this formula unattractive, as itwould impair the very sovereignty which Parkes himself had commended.

A second source of Japanese difficulty was the Roman Catholic minoritywhich was concentrated in Kyushu and the Goto archipelago, The newgovernment continued the anti-Christian or anti-Catholic policies of itspredecessor as it feared the divisive effects of a European religion. This

68 SIR HARRY PARKES AND THE MEIJI GOVERNMENT 1868–1883

policy was announced on wayside noticeboards and Christians were deported todistant provinces. This mass deportation was specifically designed to destroy thefaith and solidarity of Japan’s Roman Catholic communities.

Parkes’ approach to this problem was largely shaped by his hostility to RomanCatholicism, and particularly its Jesuit missionaries. He was also suspicious ofFrance which was the most influential Catholic power in East Asia. Thus heanalysed the problem of Christianity in both political and religious terms. Parkeswas sufficiently apprehensive of French ambitions to advise the Japanese toavoid open prosecution. Yet he also recognized the strength of anti-Christianopinion, and the difficulties which the Meiji Government would face if it adopteda liberal policy. To reconcile these conflicting factors Parkes adopted a complexdual stance. He recommended a more flexible policy to the Meiji Government,and, simultaneously, defended its existing policies against British criticism.

These attitudes were evident in 1872 when representatives of the EvangelicalAlliance protested to the Foreign Office about the Japanese Government’spersecution of native Christians. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville,responded by inviting the protestors to a formal meeting with Sir Harry Parkes.On 9 February Parkes met representatives of the Evangelical Alliance andrebutted their criticisms point by point. On this potentially emotive occasionParkes exhibited qualities which are rarely associated with his East Asiandiplomacy: finesse, sensitivity and extreme courteousness. He countered manycriticisms with simple factual statements, and explained the complexities ofJapan’s religious difficulties. He concluded by urging patience in dealing with anenlightened, well-meaning government.

During this period of home leave Parkes also devoted much time to theIwakura Mission which was touring Britain as part of its survey of Westernsocieties. Parkes escorted the Mission on many of its journeys, and evenaccompanied it to Windsor Castle where Queen Victoria received the Japaneseleaders for ninety minutes. In all these activities Parkes believed that he wasserving both British and Japanese interests. Visits to British factories mightproduce orders for British products which, in turn, would assist Japanesemodernization.

Despite Parkes’ well intentioned policies his relations with Iwakura slowlybegan to cool. Initially the Mission had hoped to press for the revision of Japan’s‘unequal treaties’ with the West, but Parkes rejected such notions. New treatiescould produce higher tariffs on British goods, and legal equality would placeBritish subjects in the hands of Japanese courts. This was a particularly repellantprospect as torture was still an accepted feature of the Japanese legal system.

Perhaps more important than these diplomatic frictions was a broadphilosophical difference which came to separate Britain from the Meiji leaders.Sir Harry Parkes believed that Japanese reforms were well meaning but too hastyand superficial to achieve success. This view not only conflicted with Japaneseopinion it merged into a longstanding conflict between London and Washington.In a sense this was a natural contest between two commercial powers but it was


also the expression of an ideological dispute regarding the nature of trade andeconomic development. On the basis of her own success Britain proclaimed freetrade a suitable policy for all nations, and a panacea for economic problems. Incontrast the United States argued that her own industrial development was theproduct of protectionism, which better suited newcomers to internationalcompetition. Arguments between free trade and protection were often heardduring the visit of the Iwakura Mission, and many Japanese regarded Americanpolicies as particularly well suited to Japan’s economic needs. Japanese andAmericans also shared a common preoccupation with building new structures ofgovernment, and opening new territories. Furthermore both were hostile to theestablished colonial empires of Britain, France and other European powers.These broad Anglo-American frictions were to plague Sir Harry Parkesthroughout the remainder of his service in Tokyo.

After Parkes’ return to Japan in 1873 he was often perplexed by the complexchanges which were taking place around him. Japan was experiencingunprecedented reform and modernization, and confused styles of dress,architecture, food and art probably suggested a deeper turmoil and confusion.Equally disturbing was the speed with which the new flows of information couldtransform estimates of Japan’s potential and future. In 1872, Parkes, like otherforeigners, believed that Japan was richly endowed with mineral resources.When questioned by a House of Commons Committee he declared:

Most of Japan’s wealth is below ground and if they will provide a bettermeans of communication with centres of traffic, and will undertake miningoperations there is no doubt they will produce more largely, and everythingwe will gladly buy, paying them for that produce in our manufactures.2

Three years later, following a British official survey, Parkes accepted thatJapan’s mineral wealth was a myth. He would continue to condemn the obtrusiverole of the state in Japanese mining but from this time on he viewed Japan’smineral potential in more realistic terms.

Uncertainty regarding Japan’s future was further confirmed by new politicaltrends which appeared between 1873 and 1877. From 1874 the MeijiGovernment began the pursuit of international recognition in ways whichprecipitated conflict with Parkes and the foreign community. This policy was mostevident in Tokyo’s concern for the precise interpretation of existing treaties—whenever this served Japanese interests. A small but emotive example was the fateof the stagecoach which regularly transported foreigners from Yokohama toOdawara. By 1874 this was an accepted feature of treaty port life and noWesterner doubted its legality. Suddenly, the Japanese Government declaredsuch travel illegal as the coach exceeded the twenty-five mile treaty limit. Forforeigners this was a troublesome inconvenience, and Parkes protested, butultimately the British Minister had to accept the correctness of Japan’s legalposition.


Other cases of conflict were less clear cut but they also reflected Japan’s risingself-confidence and her marked reluctance to accept Parkes’ opinions. In April1874 Japanese police arrested Ernest Satow’s Japanese servant, Sadakichi, afterluring him from the Legation Compound. Parkes, understandably, protested andfinally secured the prisoner’s release; but only after five weeks of legalisticargument. In May police seized Constable Wood, a member of Parkes’ escortand belaboured him with wooden staves. Once again it required weeks of protestand negotiation before a measure of compensation was obtained.

The most striking features of Parkes’ dealings with the Meiji leaders in theseyears was his failure to gain any significant influence over their policies. The firstsuch failure concerned Japan’s punitive expedition against Taiwan in 1874.Parkes advised against launching this invasion as he feared that it would provokea full scale Sino-Japanese war; such a conflict might well lead to the spread ofpiracy and the destruction of British shipping. However, the Meiji Governmentignored or rejected Parkes’ advice, and successfully prosecuted its invasion. Inthe weeks that followed Britain’s role was narrowly confined to mediation atPeking. During delicate negotiations Minister Wade helped to engineer acompromise, and eventually a major conflict was avoided.

When the successful Japanese negotiator, Okubo, returned to Tokyo Parkeswas invited to the Imperial Palace and formally thanked for Britain’s goodoffices. On the surface all seemed cordial, but Parkes’ behaviour had revealedserious errors of judgement. He had persistently opposed Japan’s basic policy,and had scarcely recognised Okubo’s important role in reaching a settlement.

Parkes also failed in his efforts to secure for foreigners the right to live andcarry on business in the interior of Japan. As a supporter of free trade he believedthat Western activity would bring economic progress and mutual benefit. Incontrast the Meiji Government studied the history of Egypt, India and China andconcluded that political dangers were inherent in foreign economic penetration.Despite Parkes’ repeated requests the Japanese Government always rejected thenotion of free-wheeling Western business activity beyond the treaty ports.

Yet another area of economic activity where Parkes’ policies provedineffective was merchant shipping. By 1876 the Meiji Government haddetermined to support a single Japanese shipping line, Mitsubishi, as its nationalflag carrier. Competition with Western lines was severe so Tokyo resorted to aform of gamesmanship to assist its chosen company. If Japanese citizens showedtheir patriotism by travelling Mitsubishi they experienced no difficulties. If theytravelled by British P and 0 steamer they were subjected to a harrassing and timeconsuming passport examination. Parkes protested against this tactic and calledfor international fair play, but all to no avail. As a result Mitsubishi steamerscontinued to benefit from government intervention.

Equally marked, in the mid-1870s was Parkes’ inability to influence the courseof Japanese domestic politics. From 1873 to 1877 a series of violent revoltserupted in many prefectures. Often these were the result of policies ofmodernization. The land tax, conscription, anti-Buddhist measures and


government centralization all provoked bitter resistance but Parkes showed littlesympathy for the Government in these crises. Previously he had encouragedreform and reconstruction, now he criticized these very policies as too radicaland premature. Predictably his criticisms were ignored. They merely generatedfurther friction with the Japanese Government.

Similar conflicts arose over the Meiji Government’s treatment of foreignexperts and technical advisers. In a private audience with the Emperor in 1871Parkes had recommended that Western experts be allowed to operate freely,without undue Japanese interference. Understandably, Tokyo’s views were verydifferent. When a foreign adviser had transmitted his skills to Japanese workershis contract was usually terminated. After all, expatriates were paid very highsalaries which were a major drain on the Japanese exchequer. Parkes frequentlyattacked these dismissals of Western engineers and teachers, but his harsh wordswere usually ineffective.

Nowhere was the gulf which separated Parkes from the Meiji Governmentmore apparent than in disputes over the revision of the ‘unequal treaties’. ToParkes treaty revision was a process which should proceed at a gradual, organicspeed. This approach not only emanated from his basic philosophy, it coincidedwith the opinions of the British merchant community, which he sought torepresent. Parkes believed that treaty revision would only be acceptable if it wasaccompanied by the internationalization of business activity in the Japaneseinterior. At times Japan suggested that her interior provinces might be opened toforeign entrepreneurs—but these apparent concessions were always accompaniedby unacceptable demands: tariff autonomy and the rapid abolition of extra-territorial rights.

Yet it would be wrong to see Parkes’ relationship with the Meiji Governmentas one of total conflict. Despite his insensitivity to Japan’s new nationalism hebelieved that her basic interests deserved respect and consideration. When aBritish citizen, H.N.Lay profited unfairly from his position as Japan’s financialagent Parkes was severely critical of his behaviour. On numerous occasions herefused to support the merchant community’s exaggerated demands, and workedhard to secure British technical assistance for the infant Japanese navy. Evenmore striking was his support for Japan’s attempts to open Korea to internationaltrade.

Unfortunately Parkes’ style was as important as the content of his diplomacy.He had won his diplomatic spurs outshouting Chinese officials in the late 1850s,and had added to his prestige by ‘rowing’ Tokugawa officials who stood beforehim like guilty children. His coarse and forceful style of interrogating Japanesecontinued into the Meiji period when it was increasingly inappropriate to Japan’schanged condition. As a result, in 1881, Ernest Satow wrote of Parkes:

…you would not credit to what extent he is the bugbear of the Japanesepublic; in the popular estimation he occupies much the same position as‘Boney’ with us fifty years ago. It has been going on for the past ten years…


no one can deny his great qualities and his fitness to meet any dangerouscrisis. His talents are however thrown away here. There is no analogy at allbetween the circumstances here and in China, where he learnt hisdiplomacy…here it is the square peg in the round hole.3

However exaggerated such criticisms were Satow was surely right to concludethat Parkes was not a ‘diplomatist of the Tallyrand type’ able to respond to thenuances and subtleties of Japanese behaviour.

Parkes’ worsening relations with the Japanese Government were dramaticallyreflected in the elaborate means which it employed to embarrass him, and, ifpossible, secure his dismissal. The American journalist, E.H.House wasemployed to write anti-British propaganda, and in a single year, 1875, wrote twopamphlets which were designed to create consternation in the British Legation.Between 1877 and 1880 House received further subsidies to support thepublication of the Tokio Times, a largely anti-British newspaper. This polemicalweekly drew upon a wide variety of international sources to attack British policyand propound the virtues of protectionism in international trade.

In 1881 House even travelled to Britain and France, at Japanese expense, tocontact editors, politicians and men of influence. During his stay in London heexplained Japan’s diplomatic grievances to likely sympathisers and tried toundermine Parkes’ position in British diplomacy. None of these tacticssucceeded in removing the British Minister from Tokyo, but they clearlydistracted him from diplomatic reflection and serious work.

Further high level distractions were provided in 1879 when the JapaneseGovernment invited a series of pro-Japanese personalities to Tokyo to embarrassSir Harry Parkes. The Irish, and fanatically anti-British Governor of Hong Kong,J.P.Hennessy was warmly received and made pro-Japanese speeches. GeneralU.S.Grant was similarly entertained and expressed similar views. Even moregalling was the visit of the Liberal M.P., E.J.Reed, who attacked Parkes in hisbook Japan after his return to London. The scale and ingenuity of thispropaganda campaign indicated the degree to which Parkes’ relations with theJapanese Government had deteriorated, and how far his influence and prestigehad declined. Increasingly he appeared little more than a spokesman for theBritish merchants who inhabited the treaty ports.

Parkes’ failing physical health probably contributed something to hisdiplomatic decline, but the rough manner which he had learnt in China was amore important element in his insensitive behaviour. His final promotion, toPeking, removed a long-standing source of discord from Anglo-Japaneserelations.

What conclusions can be drawn from this unusual diplomat’s relations withthe Meiji Government? Clearly parallels exist between Parkes’ prescriptions forMeiji Japan and those of Douglas MacArthur in the occupation years. Bothsought the material and mental demilitarization of Japan, and its transformationinto a peaceful commercial power. However, Parkes possessed an indifference to


Japanese reflexes which MacArthur generally avoided. Fundamental to Parkes’outlook was a critical view of Japan which failed to take account of itsconsiderable achievements. How far such views were personal or national isdifficult to determine, but aspects of his outlook appear to have been common tomany Englishmen. Such attitudes may have stemmed from Britain’s imperialpower, or the achievements of the industrial revolution, but from the 1870s to the1960s British observers often exhibited an unjustifiable hauteur towards Japanwhich was harmful to amicable relations. In contrast, the shared enthusiasms ofJapan and the United States have frequently been a creative element in trans-Pacific diplomacy.

Despite the obvious differences which separate the diplomacy of the Meijiperiod from that of today some broad parallels remain. Parkes’ vision of atranquil commercial Japan has become a dramatic reality, while the contrastbetween a gradualist Britain and the more dynamic powers of the Pacific remainsa major theme of contemporary diplomacy.

NOTES

1 F.O. 46/92. No. 26. Parkes to Stanley. 13 February 1868. (Public Record Office,Kew).

2 House Minutes of Committee of the House of Commons Enquiry Into theConstitution of the Diplomatic and Consular Services and their Maintenance onthe Efficient Footing Required by the Political and Commercial Interests of theCountry, 1872. Paragraph 1142.

3 P.R.O. 33/11/5. Satow Papers. Satow to Dickins. 10 October 1881 (Public RecordOffice, Kew).


First published in Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Japan. Cambridge

University Press, 1993, p. 79

10Foreigners in Meiji Japan

THE GOVERNMENT and people of Japan were the main architects ofsuccessful modernization, but a number of fellow Asians, Europeans, andAmericans made major contributions too. In the final years of the sh� gunate theTokugawa government began to employ Dutch, French and British officers tomodernize its navy. Europeans were hired to teach in official language schools,and more progressive domains, such as Satsuma, appointed foreign engineers toassist in new industrial ventures. Indeed, by 1868, over 200 Westerners hadserved terms of employment in Japan.

After 1868 the new Meiji government not only extended the contracts of manyadvisers already in post but also began an even more ambitious programme ofappointing ‘hired foreign teachers’ to promote national modernization. At first,great emphasis was placed on improved communications, and British engineers,such as Henry Brunton, were appointed to construct railways, lighthouses and atelegraph system. British advisers were again called upon to modernize the navy,but the reorganization of land forces was largely the work of French, and laterGerman, officers. By contrast, the development of Hokkaid� was modelled onthe opening of the American West, and Americans led by Horace Capron wereappointed to assist the Hokkaid� DevelopmentCommission.

The selection of experts of many nationalities protected Japan fromdomination by any one country but it also brought serious difficulties. Europeansand Americans demanded, and got, high salaries and privileged housing, whichimposed heavy burdens on the Meiji government. In addition, co-operation wasoften hampered by misunderstandings and racial prejudice. It was, however,Japanese organizations, public or private, that retained ultimate control of thepolicies, projects and conditions of service, and incompetent foreigners werebriskly dismissed. Simultaneously, great efforts were made to absorb the skills ofthe foreign experts and, by the late 1870s, they were gradually being replaced bytheir Japanese pupils.

A special feature of this phase was the appointment of specialist lawyersto posts in the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs. Gustave Boissonadehelped shape a new legal code, Hermann Roesler influenced the drafting of thenew constitution, and Henry Denison advised on the revision of the ‘unequaltreaties’. By the 1880s the campaign for treaty revision so dominated foreign

policy that it influenced the selection of foreign employees. As the US andGermany showed increasing sympathy for Japan’s position on the treaties, moreof their nationals were appointed as advisers in such fields as historiography,architecture and modern medicine. Similarly, as early as 1877 an Americanjournalist, E.H.House, was employed by a senior member of the government tolaunch the Tokio Times, an English-language newspaper designed to wininternational sympathy for Japan. Not long afterwards an Englishman, FrancisBrinkley, received financial help when he supported Japanese foreign policy inthe columns of the Japan Mail.

British, American and Canadian missionaries failed to achieve massconversions to Christianity but their support for Western studies and women’seducation had a lasting impact on Japanese life. Amongst their number WilliamElliot Griffis taught science in Fukui and then at the embryonic T� ky�University, Jerome Davis assisted in the establishment of D� shisha University,now the leading private university in Ky� to, and a Canadian methodist, GeorgeCochran, helped found T� y� Eiwa School in T� ky� .

Despite the seriousness of their purpose and their dedication, the missionariesalso brought new forms of relaxation and leisure to Meiji Japan. Americanexponents of muscular Christianity encouraged the spread of baseball amongstudents and an Englishman, Walter Weston, introduced mountaineering to largenumbers of young Japanese. Less athletic missionaries developed Karuizawa as acool summer resort which soon attracted thousands of city-dwellers.

Some of the foreign residents made remarkable progress in the study ofJapanese language and culture. Even before the fall of the sh� gunate, a Germandoctor, Philipp Franz von Siebold, had begun serious research into Japanese floraand fauna, and in the 1860s the young British diplomats Ernest Satow andW.G.Aston, who both acquired an astounding command of the language,pioneered the study of Japanese history and literature and built up superbcollections of Japanese books. In the 186os and 1870s Western diplomatsbelieved that the study of Japanese tradition was essential for an understandingof contemporary Japan and they founded the Asiatic Society in Yokohama to thisend. The Society’s Transactions carried numerous contributions from Satow andAston, and many others, and a parallel German-speaking Society was equallyactive.

These contributions to Western scholarship on Japan did far more. than merelylay the foundations for future academic study. By treating Japan as a cultureworthy of dedicated and disciplined study, they complemented Japan’s ownefforts to raise its cultural and political prestige in the world outside.


Review first published in Japan Society Proceedings, No. 125,

(1995), pp. 119–121

11Saigo Takamori: The Man Behind the Myth

By Charles L.Yates, Kegan Paul International, 1995

AMONG the samurai who shaped nineteenth-century Japan Saigo Takamoriremains the most loved if not the most admired. His statue, in Ueno Park, hasstirred the affections of generations of Japanese and symbolises the richambiguities of samurai virtue. In his pioneering biography Charles Yates seeks topenetrate the myths surrounding this popular hero and creates a study which isboth academic and humane,

Like many Restoration leaders Saigo was born into a samurai household ofindifferent status. However, the geography of his upbringing was more importantthan the limitations of his social rank. In the early nineteenth century hisbirthplace, Satsuma, was a world unto itself. Curtained by mountains, it hadchanged little in three hundred years; its peasants were repressed. and its samuraidivided. Reforms in the 1830s generated a surplus which financed militarystrengthening; nevertheless, deep inequalities remained, and rivalries betweenSatsuma leaders were bitter and lasting. In this unique setting Saigo received atraditional education and later worked, prosaically, in rural administration. Thisadministrative experience aroused his concern for the peasantry which persistedthroughout his later life. This concern stemmed from a profoundly Confucianconviction, that the moral conduct of administrators was crucial to the overallhealth of the society. In 1854 Saigo accompanied his lord, Nariakira, to theShogun’s capital. Here he was drawn into national politics and became attractedto patriotic ideologies which emphasised Confucian virtues of duty and loyalty.Unfortunately Nariakira’s death and the hostility of the Shogun soon drove Saigointo exile. From 1859 to 1865 he lived for long periods in the Southern islands ofOshima, Tokunoshima and Okinoerabujima. In these remote communities hetaught local children and reflected upon ethics and the development of Japanesepolitics. When he finally returned to Kagoshima he was convinced that theShogun was no longer indispensable to Japan’s future.

In the turmoil which preceded the overthrow of the shogun, Saigo gained areputation for integrity and sincerity which brought him increasing influence.Indeed Saigo believed that his own sincerity could be a powerful tool inprocesses of political persuasion. Equally significant were his politicaldiscussions with the Tokugawa official Katsu Kaishu. To Saigo’s surprise Katsuwas less concerned with domestic threats to the Shogun’s authority than the

dangers which Japan faced from the West. As a result Saigo came to favour theconvening of a council of provincial lords to increase the effectiveness ofnational policy making. As months passed Saigo became increasinglydisillusioned with the Shogun’s cruelty and came to support the concept of animperial restoration.

In the late 1860s Saigo’s anti-bakufu activities were imaginative and wideranging. He joined with Okubo Toshimichi in petitioning the court to condemnthe Shogun, used silk battle flags to raise the morale of ‘imperial’ forces and sentagents to Edo to recruit Vagrants, masterless samurai and others’ to underminesocial stability. Parallel with Saigo’s support for imperial restoration was a desireto promote political unity and national healing. In victory he strongly opposedthe imposition of severe punishment on the Shogun’s defeated allies, includingthose who destroyed Satsuma property.

Throughout his life Saigo appears to have been torn between activism and aneed to return to familiar physical and psychological territory. Soon after theRestoration he wrote of political retirement and withdrew to a hot spring to bathe,hunt rabbits and lead his dogs on country walks. Unhappily Saigo was toovaluable a leader to be left to leisurely reflection. In 1870 Iwakura arrived inKagoshima as the emperor’s emissary and persuaded Saigo to return to imperialservice. Amid the high paced reforms of the Meiji government Saigo’s thinkingremained predominantly Confucian. He suspected his colleagues of financialabuses, criticized their dalliance with courtesans and opposed the introduction ofrailways and wholesale Westernization. Somewhat surprisingly he played animportant role in founding a modern police force for the nation’s capital. By1873 he was actively debating foreign relations and offered to risk his life bynegotiating in Korea. Saigo has often been criticized for his aggressive attitudesto the Korean government but this work suggests that Kido was first inadvocating activist measures. Following his defeat in the debates over KoreaSaigo returned to Satsuma where samurai were increasingly at odds with thecentral government. This hostility towards Tokyo culminated in the abortiverebellion of 1877 led by a reluctant Saigo.

Saigo’s death and the destruction of Satsuma autonomy marked the victory ofnationlism over provincialism, a process in which Saigo’s role was creative,complex, and, at times, contradictory. Yates’ effective biography depicts a Saigomore reflective than his heroic image; a samurai who combined moral concern,introversion and intermittent political vitality.


First published in The Japan Society Proceedings, No. 140 (2002)

pp. 87–89

12The Political Thought of Mori Arinori: A

Study in Meiji ConservatismBy Alistair Swale, Japan Library (Meiji Japan Series No. 7) 2000

MORI ARINORI (1848–1888) never attained the rank of Prime or ForeignMinister, nor did he survive to become an elder statesman, but his career vividlyillustrates the eclecticism and vitality of the Meiji elite. Thirty years ago IvanHall’s detailed biography echoed Fukuzawa’s criticism of Mori as a thinker whofailed to achieve ‘true maturity’. Now Alistair Swale’s much briefer studysympathetically explores Mori’s ‘conservatism’ and rebuts accusations that hebecame less ‘liberal’ in his final years.

Like Okubo Toshimichi and Saigo Takamori, Mori was raised in Satsumahan. Despite Kagoshima’s remoteness from Japan’s political centre its schoolsprovided the young Mori with a surprisingly open education. In the early 1850sthe new daimy� , Shimazu Nariakira, launched a sweeping policy ofWesternization, and Mori’s teachers Godai Tomoatsu and Ueno Keikai inspiredhis lifelong interest in Western thought. The military importance of Westernstudies was further dramatized by the Royal Navy’s destruction of Kagoshima inAugust 1863. Two years later Mori travelled to London in a party of Satsumastudents. Here he was not only impressed by the dynamism of Victorian Britain,but began to seek out the mental and spiritual foundations of the industrializedWest. For Mori, the study of law, mathematics and foreign languages was asimportant as a knowledge of technology in understanding Western wealth andstrength. Above all, social cohesion and solidarity appeared essential to theoperations of a modern state. Yet Mori was also aware of the profounddifferences of tradition which separated various European societies. Hence heconcluded that a reform in Japan would be ineffective if it were ‘not in a shapethat accords with our domestic circumstances’. In short, gradualism was the keyto successful enlightened modernization.

In 1867 the Satsuma authorities cut off funds from Mori and his fellowstudents and he travelled to the United States to join Thomas LakeHarris’ religious community at Brocton on Lake Erie. Here Harris’ advocacy ofphysical labour, as a form of spiritual or moral training, appealed to Mori’spuritanical outlook. This in turn contributed to his increasing commitment tophysical training as an important ingredient in national revival. To this was to beadded a curriculum of ‘basic scholarship’ which would help to fashion a modernnational spirit.

In the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration Mori returned to Japan; and twoyears later, at the age of twenty-two, he was appointed Japan’s diplomaticrepresentative in Washington. There he formed links with an impressive range ofEast Coast academics, politicians and industrialists who assisted in thecompilation of his English language work Education in Japan (1873). This, andother English publications, were designed to promote both reform in Japan and ameasure of international understanding.

Deeply influenced by Herbert Spencer’s social evolutionary views, Mori saw astable, rational society, and the development of commerce as the two majorobjectives of a reformed educational system. At its most radical Mori’s desire formodernity was expressed, if briefly, in a proposal to replace Japanese by Englishas Japan’s main language of communication.

Despite Mori’s lasting admiration for many aspects of American developmenthe was disturbed by the growing influence of business on congressional politics.He characterized this as an evil resulting ‘from the misuse of freedom’. Beforereturning to Japan in 1873, Mori visited London to consult Herbert Spencer onissues of national reform. He received what Spencer termed ‘conservative advice’which appears to have weakened his enthusiasm for rapid political change.

On his return to Tokyo Mori soon plunged into serious discussion of nationalimprovement. As first president of the distinguish intellectual society, theMeirokusha, he wrote of his profound belief in the advance of civilization. Moriheld that civilization would be achieved by moral improvement and discipline,against the background of a changing society. Mori also proposed improvementsin marriage arrangements and the status of women. Nevertheless he oftenappeared ambivalent regarding the relative roles of the state and the generalpopulace in creating an enlightened society.

Between 1879 and 1884 Mori served as Japan’s diplomatic representative inLondon, but despite his official duties he continued his broad quest for ideaswhich would strengthen the Japanese state and nation. During these years hecompiled On a System of Representative Government for Japan—a text inJapanese and English which was intended to stimulate national debate. Moribelieved that heads of families, rather than individual citizens, were the mostappropriate units for political representation in Japan. Much influenced bySpencer, he remained sceptical towards anything but a consultative form ofnational assembly. Nevertheless he considered the happiness of his fellowcitizens to be an ultimate objective in any problem of political reform.

Later, as Minister of Education, Mori remained convinced that the Japanesepeople were, as yet, too physically and morally weak to meet the challenges ofthe contemporary world. Hence improved physical training appeared essential tothe creation of an energetic modern nation.

By this time Mori had fully integrated Spencer’s concept of aDarwinian international order into his educational policies. With much foresighthe believed that commercial competition was more enduring than military rivalryin the international relations of modern states. Consequently, decades before the


development of commercial education in Britain, he encouraged businesstraining within Japan’s educational system.

As Minister, Mori was as interested in ‘economism’, or efficiency, as in thebroad direction of state policies. By ‘efficiency’ he implied far more than thenarrow observance of accounting standards. He persistently sought the effectiveaccomplishment of the social objectives of schools, colleges and traininginstitutes.

In a life cut short by assassination Mori blended abstractions, observations andinternational experience into a remarkable sweep of ideas and policies.Constitutional progress, physical and moral improvement, and commercialdevelopment were all explored in Mori’s copious writings. Indeed the scope andcomplexity of his thought defies such simple categories as ‘liberal’ or‘conservative’. National improvement was the common goal of many of Mori’sgeneration. Alistair Swale’s study suggests that the achievements of Meijithinkers should be judged with due recognition of the linguistic, and socialdifficulties which they faced and overcame.

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF MORI ARINORI: A STUDY IN MEIJI CONSERVATISM 81

Paper given at International House, Tokyo, May 2002. First

published in Studies in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–1923)

(STICERD) January 2003

13The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the British

Press

THE BRITISH PRESS—the only significant medium of mass communication inthe alliance years (1902–1923), was then a very different phenomenon fromtoday. Not only were local and provincial newspapers still importantcommentators on national and international events, but the popular daily presswas less pictorial, more literate and less frivolous than in the early twenty-firstcentury. Consequently a comprehensive study of the British press’s treatment ofJapan and the alliance during two decades would be an enormous undertaking.This brief paper is far less ambitious, It is based upon some sampling of localand national dailies and magazines, with particular emphasis on The Times and TheEconomist, and such satirical and illustrated magazines as Punch or The LondonCharivari, The Graphic and The Illustrated London News. However, none ofthese publications were mass circulation dailies or weeklies.1 Despite this caveatone can detect several major themes and features from such a limited survey.

The first conclusion one might reach is that coverage of Japan wassurprisingly full across a wide range of publications. One example is the Londonbased satirical weekly Punch or The London Charivari. In the years 1903 to1905 it published over thirty major cartoons relating to Japan, while in 1904 thetitle pages of two volumes of Punch were devoted to the Russo-Japanese War.2

In the same period issues of The Illustrated London News in which the coverpage was totally devoted to a Japanese theme or personality were alsosurprisingly numerous.3 Density of coverage was often shaped by particular events—such as the Russo-Japanese War, and the Japan-British Exhibition of 1910.4

However it is likely that press interest in Japan in these years was not only thespontaneous product of the alliance relationship.

Influential government leaders were socially linked to leading figures in majornewspapers, and domestic issues probably exerted a degree of influence. Interestin Japan was in part a by-product of multiple crises in British domestic and colonialpolitics and society: the threat of civil war in Ireland, the conflict between the Lordsand the Commons, the prolonged guerrilla war in South Africa, the deploymentof troops in labour disputes, and debates on tariff reform. All combined to makemany aware of real and threatened fissures in the British imperial system.Consequently it is understandable that journalists saw Japan as a significantmodel, or object of study. Above all Japan appeared to suggest positive gains

from government-led social engineering. Furthermore it appeared a state inwhich unity and patriotism were sources of remarkable national achievement.

Indeed even before the formal signature of the alliance on 30 January 1902 ItoHirobumi’s visit to Britain produced reactions indicating remarkable enthusiasmfor Japanese modernization. Of Marquis Ito himself the illustrated weekly TheGraphic declared:

‘to Ito is due more than to any other living man, that remarkabletransformation which in the course of a generation has brought Japan fromthe dark ages and placed her socially and politically on an equality with theGreat Powers of the civilized world. He was really the head and brain ofthe movement which abolished the Chinese Calendar and brought aboutthe adoption of European dress, and generally substituted Western ideasand modes of life for those of the Chinese.’5

Although the adoption of European dress—particularly by the Japanese elite—may appear a relatively superficial aspect of the Meiji achievement, itsimportance in British press coverage was undeniable. In the 1850s and 1860sThe Illustrated London News had dwelt upon Japanese exotic dress and, at times,near-nakedness.6 At the beginning of the twentieth century it dwelt uponJapanese in Western dress in much of its coverage of Anglo-Japanese events.Not only did this include army and navy uniforms but also the dress of British orEuropean high society. Events such as Marquis Ito’s reception at the MansionHouse provided spectacular examples of sartorial Westernization.7 SimilarlyPunch cartoons often represented Japan as a figure in Western military uniform,or Western formal dress—on one occasion even the Emperor Meiji was depictedin European style military costume.8

Such sartorial and social links between Japanese and British elites were oftengiven particular importance by an Imperial or royal dimension. Naval Reviewsoff the English shore, Japanese enthronement ceremonies, Imperial funerals, orthe visit of Crown Prince Hirohito all suggested common points of reference inthe two societies—and possibly a growing convergence.9 The merging ofdiplomacy, royalty and high society in Anglo-Japanese relations gave them aspecial public aura which, arguably, even the improving relationship with theUnited States did not possess. Emphatically this was a diplomatic world whichpopular magazines could effectively portray; what is more, popular illustratedmagazines were probably more widely circulated and retained for longer periodsthan less physically attractive daily newspapers.

If royal, imperial and high society links provided one public dimension of thealliance, another was a tendency to demonstrate the two societies’ sharing ofskills, problems and challenges. Clearly the notion of shared pride in naval power—and of shared admiration of the Nelson touch were present in Naval Reviewsand visits by Japanese warships.10 In the early years of the alliance the conceptof a shared antipathy to Czarist expansionism was also spread in cartoons and


suitably captioned photographs.11 A further common element in the two societieswas suggested by a depiction of the feminist Seit� society in The IllustratedLondon News, at a time when the movement for female advancement wassignificant in British politics.12

A further bond which the press suggested was that of Japan as a specificmodel in military matters. In July 1904 the patriotic cartoonist Bernard Partridgedepicted John Bull—commenting to a kimono clad Japanese woman who wasviewing a map of North East Asia ‘Your army system seems to worksplendidly’. To which the Japanese replied ‘Every man is ready to sacrificehimself for his country and does it’. John Bull’s reflective response was ‘I musttry to introduce that at home’.13 In line with this suggestion of common patrioticideals was the use of Japanese traits to ridicule British left wing pacifism. In July1910 the Labour leader Keir Hardie had suggested that, on retiring from politics,he would like to retire to a rural village in Japan. In response a Punch cartoonist,E.T Reed, depicted Hardie in geta and hachimaki as the ‘Professor of Anti-Jujitsu’—or the ‘noble art of lying down’—the absolute opposite of patrioticBushido.14

Clearly, newspapers and serious weeklies provided accounts and analyseswhich were of greater complexity than anything which appeared in satirical orillustrated magazines. What is more serious newspapers and magazines presenteda mixed response to the signing of the alliance in 1902. Perhaps a small paper inthe North Wales seaside resort of Rhyl—The Rhyl Record and Advertiser—typifies some provincial liberal responses to the agreement. In a leading article itdeclared:

‘We all admire that gallant and progressive country which has known howto raise itself in a generation from a retrograde medieval empire to thestatus of a great power with a formidable army, a liberal constitution andsystems of law and education which in some respects surpass those of anyEuropean power—but the conclusion of a treaty of this kind is very muchmore than a merely sentimental question. We have bound ourselves to thefortunes of a power whose interests are very far from being ours.’15

The London Economist—at that time a less political journal than now—condemned the alliance on quite different grounds. Perhaps being mostconcerned with the maintenance of open trading among European states, andperhaps recalling the international expedition against the Boxers in 1901, itdeclared:

‘Great Britain has quit decidedly…that unwritten alliance of all whitePowers against all coloured races and through which alone the supremacyof Europe over Asia and Africa can finally be established.’

It concluded:

84 THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AND THE BRITISH PRESS

‘The alliance is described as a grand stroke in Asiatic politics…but themore we reflect upon its consequences the more inclined we feel to wish ithad not been struck. The wisest clause in the Treaty is that which limitsits operation to five years.’16

Pursuing a similar theme a British ex-employee of the Japanese Government wasgiven space in The Manchester Guardian to condemn the alliance for linking asuper power to a country of markedly inferior status.

In contrast The Times appears to have been a newspaper which, being close togovernment circles, consistently championed Japan and the alliance— whateverthe circumstances. The Times’ commitment to Japan was most obvious at the timeof the 1910 Japan-British Exhibition when it published a voluminous supplementsurveying many aspects of Japanese civilization.17 But such supplements mayhave been less influential than numerous editorials which used all possibleingenuity to justify Japanese actions. One major example was The Times’response to the Japanese annexation of Korea. Despite some ambiguousreservations it noted that annexation was ‘the only sound solution of the manydifficulties which have arisen’. It continued, in a vein reflecting the notion ofcommon imperial experience, ‘it would ill become the nation which stillreluctantly keeps the ex-King of Upper Burma a prisoner in a small town uponthe West coast of India to offer any opposition’.18 A further example of TheTimes’ complex sympathy for Japan was its treatment of the suicide of GeneralNogi in September 1912—which coincided with the beginning of the EmperorMeiji’s funeral. Its leading article ‘Morals in East and West’ concluded ‘althoughthere is a great difference in conduct between East and West yet there is not thesame difference in moral values. Both value freedom of the spirit and thecourage which secures it’.19

Another earlier occasion in 1912 when The Times led what seems to have beena semi-official response to an event in Japan, was following the death of theEmperor Meiji. At this time The Times’ leader writer admitted no flaw in theEmperor’s character and saw only a bright and ethical future for Japan. Thisleading article affirmed that the Emperor Meiji had ‘a compassion for suffering,and a realization of the privations of his troops in the field which can have onlysprung from a nature touched with true nobility’. Despite lamenting theEmperor’s death the author concluded ‘Under his successor the Japanese Empirewill pursue to high destinies,…faithful to its friends, determined to maintain theplace it has won for itself, but slow to commit aggression’.20

The events of the First World War turned British press attention from Japan tocontinental Europe and the Middle East. However Japanese naval support in theMediterranean and medical support from Japanese Red Cross nurses receivedsignificant attention in articles and photographs.21 Yet it was Japanese actions,only loosely connected with the war, which precipitated most comment andcontroversy. The so-called Twenty One Demands which Japan issued to China inJanuary 1915 split opinion between the quasi-official Times and the more


commercially concerned Economist. In numerous articles The Times questionedthe veracity of reports of the Japanese demands, claiming that Chinesestatements were usually unreliable, and were designed to create diplomaticmischief.22 German mischief making was seen as another possible explanationfor possibly dubious stories. Despite these doubts The Times concluded:

‘We hope that the statesmen of our allies will be careful to avoid givingany reasonable ground for a suspicion so injurious to the fame and to thefuture prospects of their country. We expect that even now…they willexert their high abilities to avert a catastrophe, and to justify once againBritish confidence in Japan and British sympathy with all legitimatedevelopment and expansion of her interests in the Far East.23

In contrast The Economist, perhaps more concerned with conditions of tradeeventually criticized Japanese actions more directly stating ‘Japan cannot affordeither the cost or the discredit of creating by military aggression fresh chaos inChina’.24

By late 1917, despite Japan’s military support against the Central Powers, TheEconomist was expressing clear disquiet at Japanese commercial policiess whichappeared less open than those of Britain. Referring to an article in the Japanesemagazines Taiyo, by a banker named Hayakawa, it commented ‘This littlelecture coming from a Japanese is truly remarkable. In India a Japanese has thesame rights as a British subject’.25 In contrast it noted that no parallel freedomswere available to British subjects in Japanese possessions. In fact by the closingmonths of the Great War The Economist was questioning far more than theopenness of Japanese trade policies. Reflecting on the profits which Japan hadlegitimately made from wartime conditions it declared.

‘…it is not good for any nation to make great profits out of war. The largeindemnity received by Japan as the result of her war with China…gave adecided impetus to militarism… It made Japan more ready to go to warwith Russia.’26

Seeking to condemn the notion that war was financially profitable the articleconcluded ‘With some of Japan’s leading publicists we may hope that thedoctrine has never gained sufficient strength in this country to involve it in sucha catastrophe as has befallen Europe’.27 In fact the choice which existed forJapan between socio-economic progress and military prowess was one whichThe Economist articulated on several occasions.

Nevertheless despite the changing war situation Punch cartoonists continuedto hail Japan as an extremely valuable ally. In August 1918 the rising sun—clearly identified as Japan—was shown as a cleansing light, driving a Bolshevikto flee.28 Another cartoon showed Japan as a barrier to a German advance


towards Siberia and Vladivostok.29 At much the same time The Timescommented favourably.

‘The Japanese have decided to dispatch troops to Siberia, if indeed theirforces are not already on the way. The step, it need hardly be said, has beentaken in consultation with the Allies and with the United States and has theirwarmest sympathy…she is the only power able to act in force with thenecessary promptitude.’30

With the end of war conditions and the approach of the Washington Conferencethe British press appeared to coalesce in supporting a new diplomatic system inthe Pacific region. This concept apparently attracted previous ‘dissenters’ andsupporters of government policies. Following the signing of the Washingtonagreements Punch hailed the United States as the chef of a new peaceful Pacificpudding.31 The Economist also approved the four power pact, writing:

‘To many publicists on the Continent and in Great Britain, Japan hasseemed bent on controlling and exploiting China at once, and all Asia byand by. To American and Australasian observers she has seemed eager toflood America and Australasia with her immigrants, and to have an eye onthe Philippines and other Pacific islands as stepping stones. A GermanProfessor has denounced Great Britain as betraying the white races bypreparing to use the Japanese army for her own ends in the Far East andIndia, and in return to allow Japan to gain a foothoid in China which wouldultimately facilitate British ruin. These suspicions, or some of them, mightconceivably be justified if Japan were entirely controlled by her militantprophets of expansion. The best proof that she repudiates their policy is heracceptance of the substitution of three Powers for one in a pact blocking apolicy of expansion. The Alliance has been beneficial in some respects, butof late it has been a cause of friction, owing to the interpretation placedupon it in America and elsewhere. Its supercession by the new and widerPact—into which both parties enter in company with the United States andFrance is one of the most hopeful symptoms of world politics.’32

To obtain a comprehensive understanding of the British media in the Allianceyears it would be necessary to know much more of provincial newspaper opinion,and the links between British leaders, Japanese leaders and the London press.But on the basis of this limited survey one may argue that in formal or informalways Anglo-Japanese elites shaped much of the metropolitan press to supportJapan and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In contrast many provincial and somemetropolitan journalists favoured free trade and Little Englandism. Consequentlythese writers made cogent criticisms of Japan and the Alliance. Nevertheless theAlliance years were perhaps a golden age of reporting and comment regardingJapan. The journalism of the years 1902 to 1923 may have exhibited complex


biases and failings of judgement but worse was to follow. As the popular pressincreasingly became a vehicle of sensation and entertainment, press interest inJapan often shrunk to little more than floods, earthquakes and other naturaldisasters.33 Profit became an even more powerful driving force in thedevelopment of popular journalism.

NOTES

1 In 1910 the circulation of The Times was approximately 45,000, that of the Daily Mail900,000, that of the Daily Mirror 630,000—information supplied by the BritishLibrary Newspaper Library, Colindale, London, derived from issues ofT.B.Browne’s Advertiser’s ABC.

2 Punch Vol. 126 (29 June 1904) and Vol. 127 (28 December 1904). Bothillustrations were by E.Linley Sambourne.

3 Covers devoted to Japan included that of 23 August 1902 ‘The Naval Review: TheAnglo-Japanese Alliance as Symbolised on Board the Japanese Flag-ship“Asama”, August 16’ (drawn by F.T.Jane and H.C.Seppings-Wright), and that of 7May 1904 ‘General Kuroki: The Victor in the Great Japanese Land Battle at Kin-Lien Cheng, May 1’ (drawn by Percy F.Spence).

4 The Japan-British Exhibition was depicted favourably in ‘Set Fair: May toOctober’ (by L.Raven-Hill), Punch Vol. 138, 11 May 1910, p. 327. TheExhibition’s extensive coverage in The Illustrated London News included ‘AnInformal Royal Tour: The Queen in a Japanese Garden at Shepherd’s Bush’ (drawnby A.Forester) 19 March 1910, p. 416.

5 The Graphic 4 January 1902, p. 22.6 e, g. ‘Characteristics of Japan—the United States Expedition’ The Illustrated

London News 13 December 1856, p. 590, and ‘Scenes in Japan’ The IllustratedLondon News 19 November 1864, p 504.

7 See ‘British Honour to a Japanese Statesman: The Mansion House Banquet to theMarquis Ito, January 3’ (by S.Begg) The Illustrated London News 11 January1902, pp. 56– 57. This illustration showed the high table at which were seated LordRosebery, the Marquis Ito, the Lord Mayor, the Duke of Argyll and BaronHayashi.

8 e.g. ‘How It Strikes an Ally’ (by Bernard Partridge) Punch Vol 125, 21 October1903, p. 27, ‘Too Apt a Pupil’ (by L Raven-Hill), Punch Vol. 142, 3 January 1912,p. 3, and ‘Pour Le Mérite’ (by E.Linley Sambourne), Punch Vol. 128, 8 February1905.

9 For a characteristic depiction of Anglo-Japanese harmony at a Naval Review see‘The King’s Departure for Cowes, August 6,…the Japanese Squadron Saluting HisMajesty…our Japanese Allies at Spithead were the first to accord His Majesty aSalute’. The Illustrated London News, 9 August 1902, p. 199. Royal and navalthemes were effectively integrated in the cartoon ‘A Rough Island Welcome’ (byBernard Partridge), Punch Vol. 160, 11 May 1921, p. 371. This depicted CrownPrince Hirohito in Admiral’s uniform being greeted by John Bull.


10 See the cover to The Illustrated London News 3 March 1906 ‘Togo’s Warriors atNelson’s Tomb: The Japanese Sailors at St. Paul’s Cathedral’ (drawn by MaxCowper)

11 A typical anti-Russian feature was ‘The Russian Convict Settlement in Saghalien’(drawn by R.Caton Woodville) The Illustrated London News 11 October 1902, p.519. The caption stated ‘The officers are brutal and corrupt, and murder is a merecommonplace in the Settlement’. Conversely see ‘An Example to Russia: HouseCleaning by Law, Remarkable Precautions taken Against the Plague in Japan’ TheIllustrated London News 3 October 1908, p. 479.

12 ‘The Women of New Japan: Bluestockings of the Far East’, an eight photographfeature, The Illustrated London News 29 November 1913, p. 887.

13 ‘A Lesson in Patriotism’ (by Bernard Partridge) Punch Vol. 127, 6 July 1904, p. 3.14 E.T.Reed’s cartoon appeared in Punch, Vol. 139, 20 July 1910, p. 50. Hardie’s

fictional words ended ‘Bushido? Bah! Makes me sick!’15 ‘Town and Country Notes’ in The Rhyl Record and Advertiser 22 February 1902,

p. 4.16 ‘The Treaty With Japan’, The Economist, Vol. 60.17 The supplement which celebrated the Japan-British Exhibition was published in

The Times on 19 July 1910. However, significant Japan Supplements were alsopublished by The Times on 15 July 1916, 2 September 1916, 14 October 1916 and16 December 1916.

18 ‘The Annexation of Korea’ (leading article) The Times 25 August 1910. TheIllustrated London News celebrated the annexation unequivocally on 3 September1910, pp. 346– 347.

19 ‘Morals in East and West’ (leading article) The Times 18 September 1912.20 ‘The Death of the Emperor of Japan’ (leading article) The Times, 30 July 1912.21 e.g. ‘Japanese Warships in Mediterranean Accompanied by Aircraft’ The Times, 23

February 1916, ‘The Help of the Japanese Navy’ The Times, 25 May 1917.‘Japanese Aid for Our Wounded, Arrival of Red Cross Contingent’ The Times, 23January 1915,

22 e.g. ‘Japanese Claims on China’ (leading article) The Times, 13 February 1915.23 ‘Another War Cloud’ (leading article) The Times, 7 May 1915 24 ‘China and Japan’ The Economist Vol 80, 20 March, 1915, p 568.25 ‘Japan—Silver Coin Deficiency—Supervision of Exports—Anglo-Japanese

Economic Relations’ The Economist Vol. 85, 17 November 1917, p. 808.26 ‘Japan’s Profit and Loss by the War’ The Economist, Vol. 87, 3 August 1918, p.

141.27 Ibid.28 ‘The Rising Sun’ (by L.Raven-Hill) Punch Vol. 155, 14 August 1918, p. 99.29 ‘The Imperial Bagman’s Joy Ride’ (by L.Raven-Hili) Punch Vol. 154, 6 March

1918, p. 147.30 See the leading article ‘Japan Decides’ in The Times, 5 August 1918.31 ‘Peace Pudding’ (by L.Raven-Hill) Punch Vol. 161, 21 December 1921, p. 483.

American policy had been interpreted as an attack on the Anglo-Japanese Alliancein an earlier cartoon ‘The Washington Hatchet’ (by L.Raven-Hill) Punch Vol. 161,14 December 1921, p 463

32 ‘The Pacific Pact and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty’ The Economist, Vol. 93, 17December 1921, p. 1057,


33 The British popular press’s obsession with Japanese natural disasters is referred toin J.M.R.Pardoe, Captain Malcoim Kennedy and Japan, 1917–1945 (unpublishedPh.D. thesis, 1989, University of Sheffield), pp. 165–166. Kennedy spent the years1925–1934 in Japan as Reuters’ correspondent.


Part II

Japan in the Pacific War: Bombing, Society,Culture & the U.S. Strategic Bombing

Survey

First published in W.G.Beasley (Ed), Modern Japan: Aspects of

History, Literature and Society, Berkeley & Los Angeles,

University of California Press, 1975, pp. 113–131, and 278–280

14The Great Tokyo Air Raid, 9–10 March 1945

IF CURIOSITY DRIVES the historian to investigate the Great Tokyo Air Raidhe is soon aware of the destructive power of his fellow scholars. It is inevitablethat researchers omit and discard much of the human past when transmitting aserviceable version of events to the next generation; but in this instance one isdrawn to analyse the process of selection which has almost removed this incidentfrom historical consciousness. Such an analysis may not only spotlight the eventitself but also amplify the rhythms and dissonances of a whole period.Furthermore, this investigation may further clarify the prejudices and prioritiesof important and influential historians.

If one consults the six most widely used histories of Japan written in Englishone finds scant information on the Tokyo Air Raid. The fullest treatment swellsto some four sentences, but three of the works condense their account into asingle sentence or dismiss it without mention.

Similarly, if one searches for factual or statistical material the results are evenmore disappointing. Three books provide no indication of the fatalities involvedand those books which do, give somewhat different estimates.1 It may betasteless and almost inhuman to discuss the measurement of what ispsychologically and emotionally, immeasurable, but any attempt at sympatheticreconstruction must begin with a keel of fact, a due concern for documentaryprecision.

If the investigator then turns to the work of Japanese historians he will findthem surprisingly similar in their treatment of the event. Professor IshidaTakeshi’s Hakyokyu to Heiwa (1941–52), like T� yama, Imai and Fujiwara’solder Sh� wa shi, makes no specific reference to the March raid, while ProfessorInoue Kiyoshi’s Nihon no Rekishi baldly states that ‘Southern Tokyo received aheavy raid and became a burnt out area’.2 The five authors of the Asahi Shinbunpublication Sh� wa shi no Shunkan omit 10 March from the incidents theydescribe in detail and only refer to its ‘90,000 casualties’ in the context of thequickening policy of evacuation.3 As one might expect, Hayashi Shigeru’s 500-page work, Taiheiy� Sens� , the twenty-fifth volume in the Chu� K� ron Historyof Japan series., gives more spacious coverage to the catastrophe. But thisaccount only amounts to some five and a half illustrated pages entitled ‘Air

Raids’ with the subtitle ‘indiscriminate bombing’.4 It outlines the stages of thebombing campaign, the inconsistencies in civil defence thinking, and popularsuperstitions of the time. Even this narrative is somewhat weak in military andsocial analysis and is less rewarding than the mosaic of documentary materialassembled in the third volume of Nihon no Hyakunen by Tsurumi Shunsuke andhis co-editors.5 This account is of similar scale and scope to the section inTaiheiy� Sens� but gains special vividness from its extracts from official reportsand diaries.

One obvious reaction to these threadbare descriptions and analyses is toquestion why important documents and the deaths of tens of thousands of peoplehave received so little attention from historians on both sides of the PacificOcean. There are perhaps four tests one might apply, in seeking an explanationof this flagrant case of historical negligence. Initially one may query whether theraid was in fact unique or remarkable in the sequence of air assaults on Japan.Despite all the casualties and destruction, if this was merely one of many similarstrikes one may argue that it should be ignored. But this was clearly not the case.This was the first mass incendiary bombardment after some nine months ofpredominantly high explosive bombing. Other ambitious fire attacks followed,but this was undoubtedly the most efficacious.6

A further possibility is that this incident, for all its vast scale and well-recorded effectiveness, was overshadowed by other strikes against the Japanesemainland. This it was, for the nuclear attacks of August 1945 were moredramatically destructive and thus for scientific as well as political reasons havereceived much greater attention in academic and popular literature.

It is also true that the overwhelming majority of historians are more concernedwith the history of politics and society than with the analysis of destruction, andthese scholars may wish to know if this disaster had any important impact on thedomestic policies of the Japanese government, or on Japan’s ability to wage war.A dissection of the immediate aftermath of 10 March indicates that the attackwas a momentous one in all these fields and any broad-ranging political analysiscannot justifiably ignore the effects of this one night’s bombing on Japanesesociety.7

Finally, and most importantly, one must ask if the historiography of this singleincendiary attack can be linked with the general assumptions of historians aboutthe Pacific War. One view which unites virtually all the historians underdiscussion is antipathy or hatred for the men who ruled Japan in the years 1941–5. Japanese .Marxists and American liberals can agree on this object of scornthough they may dislike each other and disagree in their diagnosis of Japanesemilitary rule. Almost all these writers not only object to the authoritariandomestic policies of Prime Minister T� j� and his successors, but they rejoiced inthe total collapse of their expansionist foreign policies. As a result, all of themhave consciously or unconsciously sought to detail the decline and demise ofImperial Japan and have concentrated attention upon events which best mark theprocess of irrational staggering to inevitable collapse. If defeat is to be the leit-

THE GREAT TOKYO AIR RAID, 9–10 MARCH 1945 93

motiv, then perhaps it is understandable if not wholly accurate to dwell uponcertain military catastrophes rather than upon domestic policies or instances ofAmerican failure. Such an approach may well explain the neglect of this incident,which is directly linked to these elements in Japanese war history.8

If American writers lay most emphasis on allied victory and the gashes cutthrough Japan’s defences, Japanese scholars have a somewhat broader focus.They place more stress upon the deprivation and suffering endured by ordinaryJapanese as the result of the stupid acts of their rulers. The kamikaze plane, thesuicidal struggle for Saipan, falling rations and aerial bombardment areunderstandably presented as the outcome of irrational policies, but positivegovernment policies are correspondingly ignored.9

Viewed from the 1950s, the 1960s or the 1970s, the final six months of thePacific War appear as a time when Japan was straining towards inevitable defeat.But in March 1945 American soldiers, sailors and air crews were still sufferingconsiderable casualties and they counted their losses more carefully than theirenemies. To these men the irrationality of Japanese tactics was no consolation; ifanything it added to their difficulties.

Despite costly and exhausting struggles, by March 1945 the United States hadgained important bases in the Marianas. The Japanese air force had made its lastattack on Saipan and B29s based in China had been attacking mainland Japan foralmost nine months. Against this was the surprisingly costly battle for Iwojima,and until this was over there was no completely safe haven for American aircraftbetween their targets and their island bases 1,500 miles to the south. The vitalbattle for Okinawa still lay in the future. In China, Kuomintang forces had failedabysmally against Japan’s Ichi-Go offensive of 1944.10 At this point the outcomeof the war may have been decided, but how long Japan would resist and howexpensive victory would be were serious and depressing enigmas. The historiansof Japan whom I have cited, correctly describe the ever increasing momentum ofAmerican heavy bombing of Japan which had begun with the Superfortress raidon the Yahata steel works on 16 June 1944, but the rising frequency of Americanraids should not be interpreted as a story of unqualified success. The first ninemonths of B29 action were marked by a series of technical problems whichproduced deep exasperation at the inability of this new, expensive plane toachieve what had been hoped. The fast, well-armed, high-flying Superfortresshad been designed for unescorted, daylight precision raids, and this had been itsrole in the first phase of its strikes against Japan.11 Unfortunately, even in thesummer of 1944 the plane’s fuel system was causing repeated problems, andthere were numerous losses due to mechanical faults.12 Its radar system forbomb-aiming was also new and imperfect, while the technical novelties of thiselectronic equipment were further complicated by the vagaries of personnelpolicy in the United States army air force. For several months radar operatorswere chosen from men who had been trained as gunners, a pool of airmen whohad failed to pass aptitude tests for such skilled roles as navigators and radiooperators.13 In other words, advanced, delicate equipment was being handled


rather clumsily and unsuccessfully by men with the least technical ability amongflying crew personnel.

Weather conditions also contributed to a large number of abortive sortiesagainst key military targets. Cloud over Yahata had foiled the first raid on KitaKy� sh� , and damage to the steel plant had been derisory.14 High winds oftenblew bombs off course and added a further margin of inaccuracy to Americanattacks. It required some eight raids to inflict significant damage on theNakajima aircraft fictory on the western fringes of Tokyo, which seemed a poorreturn for all the research and resources which had been invested in America’smost advanced bomber.15 It was against this background that the 10 March raidon Tokyo was conceived, planned and executed.

Despite the trouble and failures which had thwarted daylight precisionbombing it was not easy to embark upon a new policy. The original conception ofthe Superfortress’s role was so deeply ingrained in official thinking that it wasnot a simple matter to reject it for some new strategy.16 Perhaps more importantwas the view that the plane’s unconvincing performance was due to its noveltyand that to change tactics at this stage might create a new range of operatingdifficulties.

Although the idea of a large incendiary raid on Honsh� was clearly theoutcome of previous failures, the notion of fire raids on Japanese cities had beendiscussed in the army air force for some time.17 At first there were surprisingdoubts about the inflammability of Japanese buildings and in 1943 an initialexperiment was carried out. Mock-ups of Japanese houses were constructed atEglin air base in Florida then ignited with incendiary bombs. The results weredeemed to be satisfactory, but before the new weapon could be employed withconcentrated might a more realistic test was thought necessary. The next steptowards the use of incendiaries was taken by General Curtis LeMay, who hadrecently, replaced General Hansell, the unsuccessful commander of the B29 fleetin the Marianas. On 25 February against considerable specialist opposition,LeMay ordered 130 bombers to make a trial raid on Tokyo. Just before 3 on asnowy afternoon incendiaries were dropped and large fires were started. Perhapsbecause this was a daylight raid, casualties amounted only to 640, but a recordnumber of 25,000 buildings were destroyed.18 These results helped LeMay toovercome the sceptics and attempt to repeat his successful Hamburg fire raid overTokyo.

At this point one is led to explore the results which this new policy wasexpected to achieve in terms of the generalities of the Pacific War. First, onemight note that what was now proposed was not a new method of attacking theexactly detailed military targets which had so far been the objectives of UnitedStates’ bombers. There seems no reason to doubt that aircraft factories andmunitions plants were still of great military importance, but now a dramatic shiftof target was envisaged. The destruction of special factories was no longer seenas the overwhelming priority, and attention was turned to the heavily populatedareas of Japanese cities. Here buildings were light, inflammable and tightly


bunched together. Inflammability was probably the chief qualification thesequarters had as targets for fire bombing, but one cannot deny that these areasplayed at least some role in Japanese war production. It is well known that thesegregation of residential and industrial areas in Japanese cities is unclear andoften non-existent. And this is particularly true of areas with large numbers ofsmall and medium-scale firms making components for large and moresophisticated companies. In view of this, the destruction of any thickly peopledshitamachi area would destroy some of the tap-roots of military output, besidesleading to the permanent or temporary absenteeism of workers living in thelocality. If one was to destroy and disrupt the activities of hundreds of smallworkshops and warehouses it was inevitable that residential areas would burnand people die. If this was a military imperative perhaps it was unavoidable, butexperts such as official historians, sympathetic to the Twentieth Air Force, neverpresent the burning of civilians as a necessary evil, secondary to razing minorfactories. Equally important in contemporary minds was the psychologicalimpact of death and destruction. At a time when the Japanese were showingamazing success in gearing their forces to unprecedented self-sacrifice, it seemedimportant to unbalance Japanese morale by a spectacular exhibition of Americanpower. A clear demonstration of the air superiority of the United States couldwell damage the weakening faith of the Japanese in their leaders and help makethe austerities of war unacceptable. In short, aside from physical destruction andfear it was hoped that such a raid would make recent American victories clear tomillions of Japanese people.19 In a strange and macabre sense, it was to be anappeal to the people over the propaganda palisades which protected Japanesefrom news of American triumphs in the Pacific islands. Parallel to these broaderobjectives was probably a somewhat weaker hope that extensive damage to theImperial capital might unsteady the resolve of the Japanese government to carryon the war.

If attention is turned to the domestic politics of the Twentieth Air Force itseems certain that the ineffective programme of precision raids had created astrong head of pressure for some redeeming act which would prove the worth ofthe B29 and remove any suspicion of ineffectiveness surrounding the highercommand.20 It was necessary to show that the Superfortress fleet was making ademonstrable contribution to shortening the war and reducing casualties. It isdifficult to assess the various currents of motivation surrounding the decision tochange the policy, but perhaps both service pride and military considerationsplayed a part in producing the final verdict.

A new choice of target and a new weapon—the incendiary—were not the onlyinnovations which were planned for the great attack. One arresting new featurewas the scale of the force to be launched against Japan’s most populous city.Although the numbers of aircraft involved are a matter of some controversy, it isclear that an unprecedented body of planes bombed Tokyo. On 11 March, theAsahi Shinbun reported that ‘130 B29s carried out indiscriminate bombing of theImperial capital last night’. But these figures were issued by the Imperial


headquarters which probably sought to minimise the attack in information givento the public. The confused condition of Tokyo during the raid may also havemade accurate estimates difficult. The Fire Defence Board (Sh� b� ch� ) laterpublished an estimate of 150.21 This latter figure is frequently cited by Japanesehistorians, but it is difficult to accept.22 The official history of the army air forces,written long before the raid became a matter of moral controversy, states that 334planes made up the raiding force, and contemporary American press accounts allclaimed that ‘over 300’ machines had left their bases.23

The general tactics of the American aircraft could all be summarised under theheading ‘surprise’. Whereas most previous raids had been carried out from highaltltitudes of up to 30,000 feet, in daylight, this was to be a low-level night attack.Apart from the obvious advantages of the cover of darkness, it was known thatJapanese anti-aircraft defences were psychologocally and technically unpreparedfor planes crossing the city at night at low altitudes. If aircraft flew low theycould discard the fuel usually carried for climbing and operating at high altitudesand replace it with a much heavier bomb load. Weight-saving and the advantagesof a surprise attack were valued so highly that the bombers apparently carried noammunition for their ten defensive machine guns. This was also thought to havethe added advantage of avoiding accidental damage to friendly planes.24

Surprise was also evident in the pattern of approach planned for the Americanaircraft. Rather than arriving over the target region in clearly structuredformation, they were to come in small groups, bearing in from different directions.This would make their flight paths unpredictable to defensive forces and enableAmerican crews to single out visually patches of the city which were still freefrom fire.

American commanders knew from trial raids and intelligence of the likelydefensive armament which the Japanese would turn against them in such a raid.Japanese aircraft production had reached its peak in 1944, when 28,000 planeswere produced, but now output was falling and fighters were in critically shortsupply.25 In the spring of 1945 Japan had only two units of effective nightfighters available for action and many interceptor aircraft were being held inreserve to defend Okinawa and the mainland from physical invasion. Japan’santi-aircraft batteries were also poorly equipped to repel a major onslaught on thecapital. They lacked the effective radar-controlled gun-laying system which hadbeen developed in Western Europe and America and gunners relied on search-lights when taking aim. Aircraft batteries were principally deployed aroundheavy industrial areas, and Tokyo had almost none of the 20 mm and 40 mmweapons needed for dealing with low-level raiders.26

In facing the superior population, productivity and resources of the UnitedStates and her allies, it is understandable that Japan’s military defences were inthe end inadequate. But this hardly explains the tardy and ineffectual nature ofher civil defence preparations.

Air raids had originally been regarded by Japanese rulers as part of the new,modern scientific world of the inter-war years. The first recorded air raid drill


took place in Osaka in June 1928.27 This was primarily an exercise inextinguishing lights, but more serious and frequent demonstrations of interestsoon followed. At this stage air-raid precautions were the exclusive concern ofmunicipal not national government, and it is thus no coincidence that the reformof Tokyo administration in 1932 helped quicken interest in civilian defence. Thereform of Tokyo’s government system transformed the eighty-four suburbancities of Tokyo into twenty new wards with a population of three and a halfmillion. These were added to the fifteen wards of the old city making a totalpopulation of 5,500,000. This new municipal authority sought to demonstrate itsmodernity in every possible respect; and air raids appeared to be the most up-to-date city problem that could confront a progressive administration.28 Tokyo nowredoubled its efforts to rouse its citizens to awareness of civilian defence. InAugust 1933 the first major blackout exercise was held in Tokyo and itsubsequently became an annual event. Exhibitions of model planes, First WorldWar bombs and model shelters were often held in department stores toaccompany blackout week, but there was no large expenditure of money orpublic commitment to the programme.

The first government legislation as opposed to municipal action came in April1937 with the enactment of the National Civilian Air Defence Law, whichtransferred responsibilities in this field to national and prefectural authorities.Tokyo’s air-raid measures were to be the model for other large cities.Unfortunately, the effect of the new law was to create confusion, time wastingand conflict. At the national level individual ministries were empowered toconstruct their own regulations with no clear provisions for co-ordination. Ruleswere drafted with little thought to consistency and often produced contradictoryprovisions, In Tokyo this administrative cocktail was even more piquant as theTokyo Municipal office which had created the original programme came intoconflict with the prefectural government. The latter had the legal powers tomanage civil defence but was resisted by the older authority. If this administrativejostling was not enough there was always the Metropolitan Police Board, whichconsidered itself quite independent of the rest of the city’s administration andrefused instructions from any body but the Home Ministry. Such kaleidoscopicrivalry diverted much energy from civil defence to manhandling rival bodies.The end result was delay and maladministration.

Above the internecine strife of administrators the national government dictatedthe broad strategy of all aspects of defence. From the beginning civil defencethinking was swathed in ambiguity and misunderstanding. In the early stages ofthe war military successes and economic needs combined to produceconsiderable complacency. At first, warnings of American aircraft near Wakeisland were transmitted to Tokyo, frequent siren warnings were sounded andworkers left their desks and lathes. This soon proved economically disastrousand Tokyo’s population were subjected to less frequent sirens and a feeling ofsecurity.29


In some senses the ambiguity of policy was deepened by the Doolittle raid ofsixteen B25s on Tokyo in April 1942. Due to mistakes by Japanese observerships, which believed that the bombers’ carrier USS Hornet was too far fromTokyo for an attack to be possible, the attack was a complete surprise. Sirensonly sounded after bombs had fallen. Yet losses were light. Fifty people werekilled, a hundred houses destroyed, fires were easily extinguished, and existingprovisions seemed adequate if not totally satisfactory. The basic premise of theJapanese government was that enemy planes would rarely reach Japan, and thatthose that did would be few in number, seeking out individual buildings. Netswere later used to camouflage the Diet building, but 90 per cent of officebuildings were never camouflaged in any way. The Japanese government feltthat their image of omniscience had been damaged by the Doolittle raid. Threecaptured pilots were executed, but there was no important change in civildefence.30

Between April 1942 and Spring 1945 Japan experienced a depressing series ofmilitary reverses and the realities of air power became unpleasantly apparent.From November 1944 B29s raided factories in the Kant� , and Tokyo citizensreferred to the frequent visitors as ‘Lord B’, ‘okyakusama’ (visitors), and‘regular mail’.31

In response to these developments air-raid counter-policies became moreserious and new lines of action were initiated. In view of Japan’s early interest incivil defence and her own bombing activities in China it is surprising that thesemeasures were so slow to gather impetus and so inefficient in execution.Whatever the chronology of official action, its inconsistencies were so great thatit is impossible to determine at what point most leaders felt genuinely certainthat Tokyo was secure, and when their statements were made to prevent thecorrosion of morale.

Even as early as 1940 there were already deep contradictions in officialstatements. At this point most officials with civil defence responsibilitiesbelieved, on the basis of government statements, that Tokyo was in little seriousdanger from air bombing. In contrast, the undertakers of Tokyo becameconcerned at their likely role in any possible air raid. In the event of such anattack they were to co-operate with the police in gathering bodies and disposingof them in an orderly manner. In order to make appropriate plans they asked thearmy headquarters to estimate the likely number of extra deaths in one year, inthe event of an air war. The official answer to this inquiry was the figure of 30,000.32 This statistic was easily surpassed on 10 March, but that it was presentedbefore Pearl Harbor shows that some military men were hardly confident ofTokyo’s invulnerability.

By the spring of 1945 Tokyo had undergone yet another administrativetransformation. In July 1943 the prefectural and municipal governments werecombined into Tokyo-to, which helped to improve co-ordination in air defence.33

Parallel with this were three main areas of renewed government activity. The firstof these was instruction. By now the 2.75 million citizens organised in a


hierarchy of organisations were receiving increasing training in civil defence.Some 2.5 million people were embraced in the tonari-gumi system, while afurther 32,000 professional and volunteer workers including the police, firedepartment and an emergency public works construction unit were undergoingmore intense instruction on defence against raids.

The second main sphere of central government activity lay in the dispersal ofbuildings, institutions and people. In comparison with the preliminary evacuationof children in Britain at the opening of the European war this policy wasdiscussed and decided at a very late stage in Japan. It was not until after the lionsin the Ueno Zoo had been destroyed for fear of them escaping in an air raid thatthe evacuation of government offices was decided in September 1943.34 Plansfor evacuating important sections of the commu nity were not published untilNovember and no orders were issued until January 1944. By this time from 10,000 to 20,000 people had already left Tokyo voluntarily, but the future pattern ofevacuation was determined by military defeats rather than by an organised plan.With the invasion of Saipan in June 1944 there were efforts to reach a total ofone million evacuees by September. These were primarily people not essentialfor industry. It was not until August that primary school children in the third tosixth forms were moved in groups to country areas. By March 1945 over 1.7million people had left Tokyo, including over 20,000 citizens whose homes hadbeen demolished to create fire breaks. This still left over 6 million people in thecity and there was no compulsory evacuation of any groups apart from part of theprimary school population. In view of the very close ties most Tokyo dwellershad with relatives in safe rural areas it is surprising that no more ambitiousevacuation policy was enforced after November 1944.35 This somewhat cautiousline of action is particularly strange as evacuation is relatively inexpensive incomparison with most other aspects of civil defence and had been widelyemployed in Western Europe.

The third main sphere of civil defence provision was that designed to providephysical protection for people living and working in the city. The most ambitiousaspect of these activities was the provision of shelters of varying types and sizesfor Tokyo residents. This policy, like evacuation, was begun late, and this notonly restricted time for shelter construction but also meant that buildingmaterials were required when resources were short and could not be spared forsuch ‘non-essential’ construction. It is true that by the spring of 1945 everyTokyo citizen was supposed to have a shelter in which to seek refuge, but theirlocation and quality left much to be desired. As Tokyo’s underground wasshallow and her soil relatively unstable they were unsuitable for shelters. Thus themost effective ready-made shelters were in the basements of modern Western-style buildings, many of which had been designed to resist possible earthquakes.Whatever the structural merits of these underground shelters they were mostly tobe found in the business centre, far from the homes of people allocated to usethem. Equally effective structurally were concrete shelters planned by the


authorities, but cement was so scarce that only eighteen were built by the springof 1945 and their total capacity was less than 5,000.36

In other words, the shelter provision for most of Tokyo’.s populatlon washighly inadequate. Trenches, at best covered with a concrete roof but withoutseating, heating or sanitation, were provided for some 2 million people, but theyprovided little protection. Space between houses was often so restricted thatgarden shelters provided little more safety than following the government’s firstinstruction, to hide in the clothes cupboard of one’s own home.37 The next mostprevalent shelter was the tunnel variety, often driven into hill-sides, frequently ata distance from residential areas. These were often provided with equipment andfood, but in the case of sudden attacks they were difficult to reach. In the case ofsmaller tunnel shelters, the occupants were likely to be suffocated if large-scalefires broke out in the immediate area.

Overall it is clear that the statistical balance between citizens and shelter spacein Tokyo was sickeningly deceptive. Modern accessible shelters were negligibleand the distribution of all types of shelters was tragically unsatisfactory. Themain control centre of civil and military air-raild action was in the basement ofan ordinary Western-style building, and hospitals had inadequate shelterprovision in their immediate areas.

To complement their developing shelter policy the Japanese authoritiesrecognised that special measures were needed to protect the densely populatedwarrens of narrow streets and wooden buildings which made up much of thepoorer areas of Tokyo. The main defensive action announced in late 1943 andacted upon the following year was the destruction of lines of buildings to providefire breaks. Had this policy been carried out speedily on a vast enough scale itmay well have done something to contain spreading flames, but this was not thecase. Shortages of men and equipment prevented the fire breaks being developedon a sufficient scale to fulfil their purpose. In many cases houses were evacuatedand demolished but piles of timber were left where the buildings had stood sothat the whole object of demolition was vitiated.38

It was thus against fragile and depleted civilian and military defences that theunprecedented force of B29s was launched on 9 March. Units from the 314thWings 19th and 29th groups took off from Guam, and soon after more aircraftleft Saipan and Tinian. It took some two and a half hours for all the planes totake off with their maximum load of six tons of incendiaries. Oil, phosphorousand M69 napalm bombs were carried, the latter being used by the first group ofplanes to start fires and illuminate the target. This was the Asakusa ward, to theeast of the Imperial Palace (which was clearly designated as outside the targetzone). Besides being a flat area of narrow streets and flimsy structures, it wascharacterised by a very high roof density.39 Its population density was 103,000per square mile. It was approximately 12 square miles in area and some 2,000tons of incendiaries were used for its destruction.

Japanese radar stations in the Bonin islands and observer ships patrolling offthe mainland detected the aircraft before they reached the Japanese coast, but no


warning was broadcast until 10.30 p.m. when the first planes appeared over theB� s� peninsula. Early warnings explained that the bombers were turning away tothe sea but these may well have been decoy aircraft. By 12.08 hundreds ofincendiaries were falling over large areas on both sides of the Sumida river. Theattack warning was not broadcast until 12.15, and the raid continued for twohours.40 During this time fighter planes, anti-aircraft batteries, and over 300 fireengines sought to resist the American planes and the conflagration which theycreated. Some American aircraft reported ‘flak moderate, fighter opposition nil’,but fighter interception developed during the two hours of the attack. Some forty-three sightings of fighters were reported and though American press reports spokeof two or no planes lost the Asahi Shinbun and the official Air Force Historyreport fourteen and fifteen planes brought down by interceptors and anti-aircraftfire.41 Numbers of Japanese fighters were small, there was no low-level anti-aircraft fire and many gun emplacements were overcome by the webs of flamewhich stretched over large tracts of the city. As a result, no military action coulddivert or interrupt the execution of the raid. Tokyo was defenceless.

The technical and military superiority of the United States Army Air Forcecombined with the tinder-like character of Japanese buildings was sufficient toensure a vast destructive fire, with thousands of deaths. But topography andweather conditions transformed the scene into an almost surrealist masterpiece offlame and agony reminiscent of Bosch, Bacon or Goya in their most tormentedworks. Through the two hours of falling bombs a high wind cut through the cityat over forty miles per hour, spurring on the fire, and pressing it well beyond thepredicted target area.42

For residents hoping to flee from the vast red dome which enclosed them thevery rivers and canals which gave commercial vitality to shitamachi Tokyobecame barriers to escape, and many flung themselves into waterways to sidestepthe stampeding fire. Hundreds were drowned as thicker and thicker crowdssought refuge in narrow channels. To hold one’s head above the surface for amoment was often to be choked or burnt to death by smoke and barbs of flame.41

Besides the invincible combination of wind and fire, Tokyo’s citizens werealso threatened by the unscientific instructions propounded in governmentmanuals on air-raid precautions. People had repeatedly been told to keep sandbags and buckets in each genkan, and place sticky tape over glass doors; butmore important than all these had been the emphasis placed on communal effort,resolve and courage. The Air Defence Law forbade essential workers escapingfrom the city during a period of raids, and training had instilled a willingness tofight fires with simple bucket chains and bags of sand.44 The avoidance of panicwhich was often preached was certainly an important virtue, but vain unscientificattempts to fight uncontrollable fires probably caused far more deaths than theyprevented. Tokyo’s fire brigades were hardly well equipped in comparison withmetropolitan forces in North America and Europe, but they received notable helpfrom the forces of nearby Kanagawa, Chiba and Saitama prefectures, and triedcourageously to limit the spreading fires. The experiences of the head of the


Tokyo fire brigade vividly illustrate the impossibility of quenching the fires andthe worsening situation during the first two hours of 10 March. After hearing ofthe fires, Fire Chief Shinoda went by car to Kanda where there were huge fires.At Shitaya his car caught fire, and after this had been extinguished he proceededto Ueno and Honjo where flames again spread to his vehicle. After seeing theroad at Fukugawa blocked with corpses and encouraging some of his men, hereturned to his headquarters, lucky to have survived the twisting course of theconflagration.45 For the thousands of people who were fleeing from the blaze theonly substantial buildings which might afford shelter were schools and theatres.It was in these places that tightly packed masses of people gathered and werecaught by the imcontrollable flames.

Almost every relief service collapsed under the immediate impact of the raid.Of over 250 medical stations operated by the government and Red Cross, 100were destroyed by fire. Already medicine and other supplies were in extremelyshort supply as no one had envisaged such enormous numbers of casualties. Insome cases, doctors were driven to using soiled dressings and the maintenance ofminimum standards of hygiene became almost impossible.46

Perhaps the scale of the fires, which spread far outside the original target area,can best be gauged by the eye-witness accounts of pilots and journaliststravelling in B29s participating in the attack. They reported that Tokyo’s firescould be seen 150 miles out in the Pacific and aircraft over the city werepermeated by smoke rising from the blaze. ‘The plane smelt like the interior of along burnt building’ remarked one journalist,47 and on returning to their bases inthe Marianas the fuselages of the planes were covered with soot which had risenfrom the inferno. Hot air rising from the devastated area created thrusting airturbulence which spun the 90 feet long aircrift 2,000 feet skyward. Pilots hadbeen asked to evaluate their results on a four-point scale—none, small, large andconflagration, and unanimously they reported Tokyo in a state of conflagration.48

The original target area of ten square miles had been easily exceeded by thespreading blaze. The total devastated area was some fourteen square miles inwhich 60 per cent of all buildings were destroyed. The original target had beenastride the Sumidagawa; one-third being to the east and two-thirds to the west.The areas of Asakusa, Honjo, Fukugawa, J� t� and Edogawa had all beendevastated. The stables of the Imperial Palace caught fire and according toJapanese broadcasts blazed until 3.00 a.m. Many other fires continued to blazeand smoulder for twelve hours after the raid had commenced. The scale ofdevastation was made graphic for Americans in the following description in theNew York Times:

‘Imagine Manhattan from Washington Square northward to Sixtieth Streetplus the Borough Hall, Bay Ridge, Greenpoint, Williamsburg and FultonStreet, sections of Brooklyn, add Long Island City and Astoria and StatenIsland burned out so not a roof top is visible and the picture becomes


clearer of the area burned out by the American bombers yesterdaymorning,’49

This was confirmed later by statements by the Tokyo fire chief, who listed overforty-three factories damaged by this single raid.50

Whatever the failures of policy, politics and imagination which hadcharacterised government action before this raid, this overwhelming catastrophe,which was clear to everyone in responsible positions, compelled drastic changesin a whole range of policies. Perhaps equally significant was the great change inpublic mood which accompanied the sight of over a million homeless people, indesperate need of temporary shelter and emergency provisions. Citizens who hadsurvived the fire in Tokyo and residents in nearby prefectures immediately threwopen temples, schools and theatres to accommodate and provide free meals forsurvivors. Several communities even offered survivors free use of their bath-houses until the emergency was over.51

Perhaps as striking as cabinet discussions on relief policy was the manner inwhich the customary cobwebs of Japanese bureaucracy were torn away to allowrapid action. After previous air raids certificates had been necessary to obtainmeals or emergency accommodation. Even more important, they had beendemanded when an air-raid victim wished to travel on trains reserved forevacuees. In the crisis after 10 March all requirements regarding documents werewaived in an all-out effort to relieve suffering.52 Although this implied a sharpreversal of official practice it is doubtful if it led to any widespread abuses. Apartfrom the communal spirit which was fortified by adversity, the highly organisedand integrated character of Japanese society, with its hierarchy of citizens’organisations, made it extremely difficult to pose falsely as a victim withoutbeing discovered. Within five days, when the immediate wave of disaster hadpassed, certificates were again demanded and a frail element of normalityreturned to the situation. Over a million people left Tokyo as a result of the airraid and evacuation took on a solid urgency which had never motivatedgovernment policy in earlier years.

While the survival and evacuation of survivors was the first priority after thiscatastrophe, the disposal of the dead and the restoration of disrupted watersupplies and other public services was also of pressing importance. In both thesefields existing plans and arrangements proved completely inadequate to deal withthe task at hand. Previous plans provided for the orderly collection of bodies,their identification by relatives or the authorities, and burial or cremation inindividual graves. Faced by vast numbers of dead and the lack of means ofidentification of heavily charred corpses, it was decided to bury many in massgraves, with the intention of exhuming them three years later for more orderlyburial. All the remains were not cleared for some twenty days after the raid.

After earlier air raids public authorities had usually been able to repair roads,railways and water supplies with reasonable efficiency and speed. After the raidof 10 March bomb-gouged roads, torn pipes and twisted tram lines took much


longer to repair and in some cases attempts at reconstruction were abandoned. Inthe immediate aftermath of the raid thousands of soldiers combined withvolunteers to clear away wreckage and retrieve corpses, but morale was soshaken and numbers were so great that there was very little co-ordinationbetween repair crews from water, gas and electricity companies, and work oftenhad to be repeated. Perhaps the best indication of the trauma suffered by Tokyopeople lay in the fields of electricity and public transport. In Japan earthquakeswere usually followed by energetic reconstruction, but after 10 March pessimismhalted some activity. Tramway managers refused to repair tracks in some areasas people no longer lived there, and electricity supplies were similarly notrestored where the homes of consumers had been destroyed. This temporarydespair in private and municipal organs was also found in high circles of civildefence administration. Here there was a recognition that all previousprogrammes had been quite inadequate.53 Up to this date the police and auxiliaryservices had operated civil defence schools for training organisers, but followingthe great air raid virtually all activities in these schools were abandoned, andtraining ceased.54

Despite dismay on the part of civil defence planners, the government beganunprecedented action to relieve suffering and to minimise further casualties. Thecabinet created two special committees to co-ordinate relief operations.Emergency stocks of dried tuna fish were distributed as emergency rations tocitizens in large cities, while important industrialists attempted to raise fiftymillion yen for rehousing and relief operations. The Emperor made a personalcontribution of fifteen million yen to this fund and government and private reliefwas co-ordinated.55 Perhaps the most important measures taken in the aftermathof the incendiary raid were redoubled efforts to accelerate evacuation and theclosing of virtually all schools to allow pupils to work in farms and factories.

The dramatic impact of the raid on government policy is clear from one of themost ambitious schemes mooted in these gloomy days. It was proposed thatsome of the million homeless people of Tokyo should be evacuated to Hokkaidoto bring land back into cultivation. In a time of increasing food shortage therewas an attractive if superficial logic in the scheme, but one is tempted to thinkthat the Japanese state machine was too disheartened, exhausted anduncoordinated to carry out any major complex piece of social planning at thistime. Even ignoring such general hypotheses for the failure of the scheme, itshould be noted that the bulk of the people who were to make up this new workforce had no agricultural training and were unwilling to move away from allrelatives and friends.56

The success of the expanded evacuation scheme was based upon the obvioustensions and strengths of Japanese society as much as upon decisive governmentaction. Not only did the destruction of lives and homes create immediate needs,but the obvious inability of the government to protect the capital had beendramatised in an unprecedented way. The spontaneity of the desire to leaveTokyo is clear not only from the vast numbers who co-operated with government


policy, but in the flight of many essential members of Tokyo’s medical servicesfrom the city. The number of nurses and doctors fell drastically immediatelyafter 10 March and this was attributed to flight rather than to casualties. Besides,fear and need, the rural roots of Tokyo’s population made evacuation succeedwithout complex arrangements in the provinces. Over 90 per cent of refugeesfound homes with relatives in nearby prefectures so that the unwillingacceptance of refugees as a result of government order was almost unknown.57

The casualties of the air raid were clearly vast, but the precise statistics areextremely difficult to establish. The Tokyo municipality estimated that over 76,056 people had died as a result of the bombing, while the fire departmentestimated some 82,790 lost. Although American researchers accepted the higherof these figures, it seems likely that they may be inadequate. When unfoundcorpses and information from relatives is taken into account it may well be thatover 90,000 people may have perished in the two hours of the raid.58 At least 40,000 injured were reported to the authorities and the margin between these figuresindicates the impossibility of escaping from the blaze.59

The casualties inflicted in the raid were probably greater than those resultingfrom the great earthquake of 1923 for which the estimated losses in Tokyo were73,000. The casualties were approximately half of those suffered by Hiroshimain the attack of 6 August, but possibly higher than those inflicted on Nagasakithree days later.60 This destruction of life on a scale similar to that of the secondatomic bomb clearly had a deep impact on Japanese morale and diverted energyand resources from military activities.

For the United States Army Air Force the raid provided the spectacularsuccess that it had hoped for. The conflagration and damage had exceeded allexpectations and the planes lost were a mere 4 per cent of the total, lower lossesthan those suffered on most earlier strikes. General Le May’s tactics had beenjustified, and his reputation and that of the B29 were, in a sense, secure.

Some would argue that the element of surprise was so important to the successof this raid that it would have been quite impossible to warn the population ofTokyo by leaflet or broadcast of the coming attack. But one’s analysis of the raidmakes this a dubious if not invalid argument. Japanese resistance may have beenunexpectedly light. The United States Army Air Force may have lacked perfectintelligence on aspects of Japanese anti-aircraft batteries, but there must havebeen a high degree of confidence in Japan’s inability to resist for the bombers tohave carried no ammunition and for so many aircraft to have been risked in theenterprise. Furthermore, test raids had already been carried out which exposedthe vulnerability of central Tokyo to enemy attacks. Perhaps two factors wereuppermost in impelling the Twentieth Air Force to use this tactic in the closingmonths of the war. Vast amounts of money had been invested in the B29 fleet. Itexisted to be used, not to be kept inactive while marginal considerations ofmorality were debated among army, military and civilian leaders. In addition, thewhole character of Japanese warfare, with defiance of international conventionsand suicidal resistance, had blunted moral sensibilities, so that civilian losses


were no longer a serious consideration in a total war where almost all adultsplayed some role in military production. Military leaders facing Governmentswho did not evaluate defeat in the restricted conventional terms of the nineteenthcentury perhaps had little choice but to attack the general morale of an enemy,and in most situations this involved attacks on the civilian section of thepopulation. Japanese writers refer to noncombatants suffering at the hands ofAmerican bombers,61 but in a sense it was the Japanese government more thanany other which had developed the concept of a samurai nation devoted totally tosupporting military success. One cannot escape the further speculation that in awar in which both parties had at various times declared the enemy to be inferioror subhuman, it became reasonable to value one’s own nationals more highlythan those of one’s enemy and to seek any possible way to abbreviate the warand restrict one’s own casualties. One further charge which demandsexamination is the Japanese accusation that this attack was immoral because itwas indiscriminate. It clearly made no attempt to discriminate between civilianand military targets absolutely, but Japanese bombers had bombed civiliantargets in China with equal lack of moral fastidiousness.

Some might respond, with justice, that the West which claimed a superiormorality, should have made at least slightly greater efforts to avoid the excessivecivilian losses of the Tokyo attack.

Japanese charges have recently tended to move from the generalities of theraid to particular excesses of action against the civilian population. Oneeyewitness claims that gasoline was dropped like rain upon the blazing city, butthis seems unlikely as the napalm bombs used would seem to be an even moreeffective weapon.62 A more serious allegation is that Superfortresses machine-gunned civilians escaping from their fire-stricken homes.63 If as Americanwriters claim the bombers were carrying no ammunition this was clearlyimpossible, but one cannot evaluate rival evidence on this point without access toconfidential United States documents.

If one is to venture to pass judgement on military policy towards civilianpopulations in the Pacific War it is impossible to refrain from some mention—of the policy of the Japanese towards their own civilians. The time and effortthey directed towards air-raid prevention was surely wholly inadequate and thefailure to evacuate Tokyo with more urgency, and to devote more resources—when they were still available—to shelters, seems to show culpability of a highorder. That rulers chose their own prestige before the welfare of their owncitizens is perhaps more culpable than the lack of concern of an air commanderwith enemy casualties.

Whatever the findings of future researches it is certain that the raid of 10March was a crucial event in the war experience of the Japanese people. The almosttotal closing of schools, the mass evacuation and the abandonment of civildefence training are but a few examples of the vital impact it had on the policiesof a government drawn irresistibly towards disaster.


NOTES

1 The amplest account appears in J.K.Fairbank, E.O.Reischauer, A.M.Craig, EastAsia. The Modern Transformation (Tokyo, 1965), p. 108, and G.R.Storry, AHistory of Modern Japan (London, 1960), p. 227. Hugh Borton, Japan’s ModernCentury (New York, 1955), p. 384 gives a briefer mention. J.W.Hall, Japan, fromPrehistory to Modern Times (Tokyo, 1971), p, 347, E.O.Reischauer, Japan theStory of a Nation (previously entitled Japan, Past and Present) (Tokyo, 1971), p.214, and W.G.Beasley, The Modern History of Japan (London, 1963), provide thebriefest versions of all. Hall provides the estimate of ‘100,000 deaths’; Fairbank,Reischauer and Craig state that ‘over 100,000’ were killed. Reischauer mentionsthat two great raids on Tokyo together took ‘well over 100,000 lives’. The secondraid referred to here is probably that of 25 May 1945 which is estimated to havedestroyed 16.8 square miles of the city.

2 Ishida Takeshi, Hakyoku to Heiwa (1941–52) (Catastrophe and Peace), NihonKindaishi Taikei (Tokyo, 1968), Vol. 8; T� yama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi, FujiwaraAkira, Sh� wa shi (Sh� wa History) (Tokyo, 1959); Inoue Kiyoshi, Nihon no Rekishi(History of Japan) (Tokyo, 1966), Vol. 3, p. 205.

3 Kat� Hidetoshi, Imai Seiichi, Shiota Sh� bei, Usui Katsumi, It� Mitsuharu, Sh� washi no Shunkan (Moments of Sh� wa History) (Tokyo, 1966), Vol. 2, p. 104.

4 Hayashi Shigeru, Taiheiy� Sens� (The Pacific War), Nihon no Rekishi (Tokyo,1967), Vol. 25, pp. 403–8.

5 Tsurumi Shunsuke, Hashikawa Buns� , Imai Seiichi, Matsumoto Sannosuke,Kamishima Jir� , Kat� Hidetoshi, Hateshinaki Sensen (The Endless Front), Nihonno Hyakunen (Tokyo, 1967), Vol. 3, pp. 307–13.

6 W.F.Craven and J.L.Cate (eds), The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5: ThePacific-Matterhorn to Nagasaki June 1944-August 1945 (Chicago 1953) (hereafterreferred to as Craven and Cate), p. 639. Referring to the raid of 25 May 1945: ‘Theattack was, however, highly successful, Photos showed that the fires kindled by 3,262 tons of incendiaries had destroyed 16.8 square miles, the greatest area wipedout in any single Tokyo raid, though the attack of 9 March had accomplishedalmost as much with about half the bomb weight.’

7 For example, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific War), TheEffects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale (Washington, 1947), p. 3. ‘Themass movement from the cities began after the great fire raids on Tokyo in March1945.’

8 Although Tokyo’s Metropolitan government produced a detailed account of thecity’s war damage over twenty years ago, that is, T� ky� -to Sensai shi (A Record ofWar Damage in Tokyo Metropolis) (1953), organised attempts to collect andcorrelate material relating to Tokyo’s air raids only gained momentum during thepast four years. These activities have been centred on the T� ky� K� sh� o KirokuSuru Kai (The Society for Recording Tokyo’s Air Raids), one of whose members,Saotome Katsumoto, has written the only book devoted to the raid of 10 March1945: T� ky� Daik� sh� (The Great Tokyo Air Raid) (Tokyo, 1971).

9 As yet there is no comprehensive social history of Japan during the Pacific War andno integrated study of government social policy in the period.


10 ‘The East China airfields, constructed with so much backbreaking labour, and atconsiderable American expense, were overrun by the enemy. As the Americansabandoned them one by one, they blew up the expensive equipment and valuablestores brought in ton by ton, by American planes over “The Hump” of the easternspur of the Himalayas. By mid-September 1944, Operation Ichi-go had achieved itsobjectives.’ O.Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China (New York, 1964).

11 Craven and Cate, op. cit., p. 609.12 General Curtis E.LeMay and MacKinlay Kantor Mission with LeMay (Garden

City, New York, 1965) (hereafter referred to as LeMay), p. 329; Craven and Cate,op. cit., p. 101.

13 LeMay, op, cit., p. 345; Craven and Cate. op. cit., p, 576.14 Craven op. cit., p. 101.15 Ibid., p. 573.16 Ibid., p. 571; LeMay, op. cit., pp. 347–8.17 Craven and Cate, op. cit., p. 608.18 Ibid., p. 573; T� ky� K� sh� O Kiroku Suru Kai (The Society for Recording the

Tokyo Air Raids), T� ky� Daik� sh� ten (The Great Tokyo Air Raid Exhibition),Booklet (Tokyo, 1972), p. 4.

19 Craven and Cate, op. cit.. p. 611.20 Ibid., p. 608.21 Saotome, op. cit., p. 202.22 For example Hayashi, op, cit., p. 404.23 Craven and Cate, op. cit., p. 614; New York Herald Tribune (11 March 1945); New

York Times (10 March 1945).24 Craven and Cate, op. cit.. pp. 613–14,. Le.May, op. cit., p. 349.25 T� yama, Imai, Fujiwara, op. cit., p. 188.26 For the limitations of Japanese defences see: Craven and Cate, op. cit., p. 613;

LeMay, op. cit., pp. 346–7; United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific War),The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War AgainstJapan (Twentieth Air Force) (Washington, 1946), pp. 19–21.

27 Kindai Nihon S� g� Nempy� (A Comprehensive Chronology of Modern Japan)(Tokyo, 1968), p. 274.

28 United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific War), Field Report Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, Japan (Washington, 1947), pp. 5–8.

29 Ibid., pp. 14–18.30 Ibid., p. 92.31 Saotome, op. cit., p. 19.32 Field Report Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, p. 78.33 Ibid., p. 6.34 Kindai Nihon S� g� Nempy� , p. 336,35 Accounts of evacuation can be found in T� ky� -to, T� ky� -to Sensai shi, pp. 177–

251; Field Report Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, pp.151–9.,

36 Field Report Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, pp. 137–45.37 Hayashi, op. cit., p. 403.38 Fire prevention is described in: Field Report Covering Air-Raid Protection and

Allied Subjects, pp. 71–4.


39 M.Amrine, The Great Decision, the Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (London,1960), pp. 77–8.

40 Saotome Katsumoto, ‘Sangatsu T� ka Shitamachi Daik� sh� ’ (10th March, the GreatShitamachi Air Raid’), in Asahi Shinbun (Tokyo edition) (18 July 1970).

41 Asahi Shinbun (11 March 1945); Craven and Cate, op. cit., pp. 615–16.42 Field Report Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, p. 183.43 Craven and Cate, op. cit., p. 617.44 Saotome Katsumoto, op. cit., in Asahi Shinbun (18 July 1970).45 Field Report Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, p. 58.46 Ibid., p. 77.47 New York Times (11 March 1945).48 New York Times (10 March 1945).49 New York Times (11 March 1945).50 Field Report Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, p. 183.51 Ibid., p. 160.52 Ibid., loc. cit.53 Ibid,, pp. 90–1.54 Ibid., p. 169.55 Ibid., p. 161.56 Ibid., p. 156.57 Ibid., p. 155.58 Saotome, op. cit., p. 202.59 Field Report Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, p. 3.60 Casualty statistics are very difficult to evaluate. The problem is briefly discussed in

Hayashi, op. cit., p, 416, and Saotome, op. cit., p. 190.61 Hayashi, op. cit., p. 404; T� ky� K� sh� O Kiroku Suru Kai, op. cit. (Foreword);

Saotome, op. cit., p. 178.62 Saotome, op. cit., p. 62.63 Ibid., p. 68.


First published in B.A.J.S. Proceedings (1977). Part One: History

and International Relations, pp. 100–116

15The Evacuation of Schoolchildren in Wartime

Japan

CHILDREN are the living foundations of a nation’s future. All modern statessupplement parental care with welfare and education, and seek to transform theiryoungest wards into effective and loyal citizens. When total war threatens awhole nation government policies become crucial to the survival of all civilians,and are the final defence of a state’s youngest and most vulnerable members. Insuch a crisis all dangers to life are intensified, choices are coarsened, and thetreatment of children becomes an ultimate index of a regime’s human prioritiesand social vision.

By the outbreak.of the Pacific war the model for Japan’s junior citizens hadbeen clearly determined, and their education was proceeding with high pitchedorganization. Patriotic self-sacrifice, military readiness, and loyalty to theEmperor were ideals which permeated study, sport and trivial pastimes.1 Withmaturity most boys would experience military service, while girls would beattentive auxiliaries in the imperial state. Death in battle had an honoured placein official ideology, but survival into adulthood remained an essential assumptionof government policy.

Yet in the late summer of 1943 many of Japan’s political and militaryassumptions were withering as policies were reappraised over a wide sweep ofadministration. Guadalcanal had been lost, garrisons in the Aleutians had beenannihilated, and Japan’s European allies were suffering major defeats. Italy wasambling towards surrender and the Anglo-American bomber offensive hadalready inflicted uprecedented urban destruction. In late July Hamburg sufferedattacks of appalling intensity. Thirty thousand civilians were killed in a singlenight; raids were repeated, and Berlin was soon to follow. The Germangovernment anticipated this danger and within three weeks over a millionBerliners were evacuated into reception centres in rural areas.2

Perhaps the deep impact of these events upon Japanese civil defenceis surprising for they came so late in her experience of total conflict. That theirinfluence was so great indicates much of Japan’s vision of the conduct of war.As early as ‘16 October 1939 the Ministry of War was given authority todetermine the number and location of new factories, and could refuse to permitfurther construction in potential target areas’; but plans for the evacuation ofcivilians of all ages were largely non-existent.3 For years many of Japan’s

leaders had believed that their cities could never suffer sustained aerialpunishment, but ideology tinged with carelessness had also restrained notions ofcivilian evacuation.4

The examples of Berlin and Hamburg were powerful influences on Japanesemilitary and civilian thinking but observation of events in London also played apart in challenging established ideas. In September 1942 Lieutenant GeneralTatsumi Eiichi returned from Britain where he had served as military attaché atthe Japanese Embassy.5 Due to his detailed knowledge of British tactics againstGerman bombing he was soon appointed to be Chief of Staff of Japan’s EasternRegion, which included the capital. In explaining this selection premier T� j�stated ‘it is possible that Tokyo may be bombed in the future’ and indicated thatexperience gained in London might help in the defence of Tokyo. Tatsumi wassomewhat surprised at the Prime Minister’s lightly casual attitude to air raids andthe similarly casual state of Tokyo defence preparations. The capital had fiftythree fighters, less than a hundred anti-aircraft guns and no plans for civilianevacuation. Tatsumi found support for his criticisms of this negligence amongmembers of the Imperial General Staff, but a mood of inactivity continued forseveral months. Finally in October 1943 he came to understand what lay behindthis persistent inaction. In a discussion of evacuation premier T� j� explained histotal opposition to the evacuation of school children from Japan’s major cities.‘To defeat our materially wealthy enemies, Britain and America’ he declared ‘theJapanese spirit is essential, the basis of the Japanese spirit is the family system’and concluded; ‘evacuation will destroy the Japanese family spirit’. After afurther scolding Tatsumi returned to his work. Now he began an active series ofconsultations with sympathetic friends who pressed for some change ingovernment policy. The Governor of Tokyo Prefecture Matsumura, influentialmembers of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, and the future Governorof Tokyo Metropolis, � date, all combined to persuade T� j� to adopt a morerealistic policy.6

Finally, in late December 1943, the Cabinet reached agreement on the ‘GeneralSummary of Metropolitain Evacuation’ (Toshi Sokai Jisshi Y� k� ). Although thisdocument clarified broad directions of policy, it also retained traces of previousattitudes. Four evacuation areas were clearly specified:

Tokyo-Yokohama area: All the wards of Tokyo, Yokohama City, andKawasaki City.

Osaka-Kobe area: Osaka City, Kobe City, Amagasaki City.Nagoya area: Nagoya CityNorthern Kyushu area: Moji City, Kokura City, Tobata City,

Wakamatsu City, Yahata City.

But it also stated that ‘guidance will be given so as not to do violence tothe spirit of the family principle’.7 Households were to move to the countrysideas units and were to live with relatives. In the Advisory Order passed to the


governors of the affected cities a limited and soft approach was clearly apparent.Officials were not to ‘stir up fear of air raids’ and encouragement of evacuationwas to be ‘by means of strong enlightened propaganda’.8 While the destructionof houses to create fire breaks was a matter of virtual compulsion general socialevacuation was to be achieved by persuasion rather than government diktat. Yetthe reasons for evacuation continued to be masked in considerable ambiguity.Movement of population was, allegedly, ‘to make a positive contribution to thenational distribution of war personnel for the sake of strengthening unity’.9 Thisbracing language may have helped to soften anxiety, but it scarcely stimulatedrapid action. Above all this official prose reflected a hovering uncertainty overthe aims of the new policy. In addition to the notion of protecting civilians wentthe equally significant idea of mobilizing urban people to carry out useful workin the countryside. Other strictures might well be added to this criticism ofgovernment policy; many large city areas were excluded from the newprovisions, much of the programme was to be left in local hands, and officialpersuasion would demand much energy, time, and mental exertion.

Some of these criticisms were soon voiced by powerful officials who workedbelow the clouded heights of Prime Minister and Cabinet. While national policyremained an awkward hybrid Tokyo’s administrators became decisive. By May1944 the capital had overtaken the national government in the field of evacuationpolicy and a small scale programme of group evacuation had been initiated. As afirst step some children were moved to seaside and summer school buildings inNumazu and Nasu.10

In June 1944 the relatively slow progress which had been achieved inevacuating children to relatives brought a new urgency to Cabinet action. Whatwas more B29s based in China had begun to strike at the Japanese mainland.These factors finally produced policies which resembled those which had alreadybeen carried out in London and Berlin. On 30 June the Cabinet issued the‘Summary of increasing the Evacuation of Schoolchildren’ (Gakud� SokaiSokushin Y� k� ). This again replayed the theme of kinship and stated ‘pupilevacuation depends on the evacuation of their guardians and the entirehousehold’, but for Tokyo children with no rural relatives group evacuation wasto be arranged to country areas. Pupils would be supervised by teachers, theireducation would continue separate from that of host communities, and specialplans would be made for food and transport. Parents were to pay a mere ¥10 permonth while the metropolitan and national government would bear the remainderof the cost.11 In July this pattern was extended to cover a further thirteen cities,but the limitations of this scheme remained considerable. It was only applied tothe 3rd to 6th years of National Junior Schools (Kokumin Gakk� ) and it was stillto be voluntary in application. Perhaps Japan’s tight family system madecompulsion almost impossible but persuasion was to require a major programme.Teachers paid repeated visits to parents. Information was passed down throughneighbourhood associations. There were radio talks and the publication ofpropaganda literature. One significant example of official persuasion came in a

THE EVACUATION OF SCHOOLCHILDREN IN WARTIME JAPAN 113

special edition of the ‘Weekly Bulletin of Tokyo Metropolis’ (T� sei Sh� h� )dated 29 July 1944. This answered as best it could a series of hypotheticalquestions from an imaginary parent.12 By this time the campaign had achieved afair measure of success but this document could scarcely evade some of the starkcontradictions which still flawed evacuation policy. Only three school years wereembraced by the new scheme, while the youngest, and arguably the mostvulnerable, pupils remained outside the programme. Problems of face washingand personal hygiene were cited as reasons for excluding these children but noreasons were given for the exclusion of middle school classes who could easilyhave coped with personal chores. An air of formal optimism permeated thispublication, its tones were sympathetic and warm, yet these virtues couldscarcely hide the gaping dangers inherent in such a narrow and restrictedprogramme.

No doubt humane officials wished to save lives and had no desire to presideover a disaster. Yet humanistic policy remained no more than a part of theadministrative equation. There persisted a notion of semi military mobilizationwithin the war economy which militated against a clear understanding of theissue and lives which remained at stake.

When the Governor of Tokyo, � date, addressed heads of National Juniorschools on the theme of evacuation on 16 July he still described the operation insemi-military rhetoric. It would ‘nurture the future defence power of the Empire’and ‘bring about the combat distribution of the Imperial Capital’s children’.13

This was yet a further indication of the residual ambiguity which survived inofficial intentions. From the beginning the energy which evacuees wouldcontribute to agriculture had been emphasised. Now some writers went evenfurther to headline the uniqueness of Japan’s evacuation policy, and the elementswhich distinguished it from those of friendly and hostile countries in the West. Inthe Asahi Shinbun one commentator dwelt upon the 2,600 year history of theYamato race and interpreted evacuation as an example of the special family likemood which permeated the whole of Japanese society.14

In Tokyo and most other designated conurbations the response to this mixtureof sympathy and bluster was ultimately positive. By September over 411,000children had been evacuated by special trains and were accommodated in a wideassortment of public and private buildings. 186,000 were in country temples, 153,000 in inns, often in hot spring areas, and the remainder occupied churches,schoolrooms, public halls and private homes.15

In general the mechanics of the migration were well organized. Teachers wereassisted by nurses, cooks and helpers. There was close liaison with theauthorities in host communities. Medical services were provided in evacuationzones, and all schools had similar time-tables. Broad organization provided nomajor problems, but on occasion even the loan of saucepans could provokeprotracted wrangles and bureaucratic confusion.16 Of more importance wasinadequate food which was to create difficulties of increasing proportions.Children took their ration cards to their country retreats and in theory the


Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce were to ensure concentrations of foodsupplies, but this proved extremely difficult to accomplish. In the case ofTokyo’s children adequate quantities were provided for the initial ten days intheir new environment, but from this time on supplies were inadequate, andpersistent goading failed to produce all that was required.17 Clearly blockade,bombing, and the neglect of agriculture for munitions all contributed to thisnutritional crisis but military stockpiling also made inroads into civilianresources.18 Despite these growing food problems the evacuation of much of thespecified age band of children was achieved by September 1944. Yet against abackground of obsolete defences and overwhelming American air power thelimitations of these measures encouraged totally unnecessary casualties. Innorthern Kyushu group evacuation was never carried out, and though an officialhistory attributes this to the success of family measures it seems unlikely that thiswas the sole explanation.19 Furthermore in cities such as Kobe a considerableminority of eligible children remained at home after the initial evacuation hadbeen completed.20

Even outside the defined series of evacuation cities the quickening rhythm ofAmerican raids drove an increasing number of adults and children intomountains and countryside. But the number of children who remained at hazardwas still considerable. In Nagasaki no official measures were taken, and as lateas January 1945 almost 30,000 children continued their lives in the city as theyhad done from the beginning of the war. In a formal sense Nagasaki’s exclusionfrom government plans accounted for inaction but its officials also complainedthat lack of funds and buildings and the ineffectiveness of persuasion hadprevented effective action.21

Yet for the 400,000 children who were virtually safe from urban bombing howsuccessful was this practical application of the Yamato spirit? At the timeanxieties were soon aroused, and within four months of the initial migrationsome 50,000 pupils had drifted back home or had begun to share accommodationwith relatives.22 Homesickness was certainly a problem and with the approachingwinter there was concern about ‘epidemics and severe colds’.23 Japanesehistorians have also been quick to emphasise the social conflicts which wereprecipitated by the arrival of city children in the provincial countryside.24

Certainly there is evidence of social friction but it is fragmentary rather thanoverwhelming. Government officials were well aware that trouble arose because‘city people being wealthy spoiled the local market by buying things up attremendously high prices’ but they were less struck by incidents involvingchildren.25 It is difficult to obtain a nationwide impression of the lives ofevacuees throughout their settlements but documents and diaries often dwellupon material hardship rather than social tensions as the source of deepestunhappiness.26

Overall group life was well regulated, and as far as possible educationcontinued as before. The aim of involving children in the spirit of war wasnaturally unchanged and with lessons often interrupted by air raid warnings


emotional involvement in the struggle would have been difficult to avoid.Teachers frequently read war news to their pupils and versions of major events,however garbled, circulated among children. In one school the death of the Germanleader ‘Hitler Jugend’—in battle, and the strangling of Mussolini—byAmericans, were well known soon after less fantastic versions of these eventswere officially reported.27

Certainly a military mood pervaded much of school life. In a typical schoolchildren rose at 6 a.m., assembled in squads in front of their dormitory andbowed in the direction of the Imperial Palace. They then repeated in unison ‘Weare the children of the divine country Japan. We are the children of fightingJapan. We are the children of Japan which is building Greater East Asia’.28 Therewere exercises, training to withstand cold and a whole series of military styleactivities. In one school the theory and method of hara kiri were taught inanticipation of an American invasion.29 In another there was bayonet training.30

Army terminology was employed, military songs were sung, marching waspracticed and even innocent card games were tinged with nationalistic references.31

In spirit and in deed evacuated children were bound into the many publiccampaigns which the Japanese government organized in its final months ofdesperate warfare. Besides harvesting and construction they also joined in thewidespread excavation of pine roots for the manufacture of ersatz petroleum. Yetoverwhelmingly their activities were devoted to remedying the deepening foodshortage which affected civilians of all ages.

In late 1945 members of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey wrote ofa group of children at Manrenji temple, Kitayanagi, Saitama Prefecture ‘all werehealthy and appeared to be enjoying their education in the country. At thenoonday meal they were served a large bowl of rice, beets and sweet potatoes.32

Similar observers wrote similar things of children living at Miki in Kobe’s ruralhinterland.33 But it is more than likely that these witnesses saw something of aperformance as parents often did when they made their monthly visits to theirchildren. Perpetual references in contemporary writings to extraordinarygastronomic remedies suggest that food was often short and happiness notalways readily available. Snakes, stream crabs, edible herbs, insects, patentmedicines, tooth cleaning powder, paint and crayons all featured in theimprovised diets of evacuated schoolchildren.34 That this desperate inventivenesswas necessary indicates the severe numbing hunger which affected thousands ofchildren.

In these conditions food became an obsession, and almost displaced the war asa subject of interest. What was worse, it fomented sordid and sometimes violentstruggles. Teachers stole from children. Children stole from each other. Cropswere torn from fields. Group leaders became petty tyrants and food was at theroot of much minor cruelty and physical violence.35

Second to food came problems of hygiene and disease. With limited nutritionand heavy physical exertion children’s strength declined and they were plaguedby fleas and lice. Diahorrea was commonplace and in at least one case bathing in


hot spring baths spread venereal disease.36 By the summer of 1945 children wereso weakened that they found it increasingly difficult to carry out the agriculturalwork alloted to them. To some extent knowledge of these conditions wascontrolled by the censorship of letters but parental unease was widespread andeven the official news service D� mei occasionally reflected parental anger andunhappiness.37

By the spring of 1945 the war and evacuation reached a new stage and a newcrisis. With more frequent and fiercer bombing there were questions in the Dietand a more ambitious programme of evacuation.38 Now first and second yearpupils were to be moved to safety, if necessary, in groups. At last the lethalreality of air raids was accepted at face value. It was no longer an imprecisedanger to be balanced against political considerations and spirituality.

Accompanying the dangers of bombing went continued administrativemistakes which produced unnecessary casualties. Tokyo children who hadcompleted their junior school education were instructed to return to Tokyo by 10March 1945. This coincided with the worst air raid of the Pacific war and somechildren died as a result of fulfilling official policy.39

Immediately following this raid the skelter of evacuation policy achieved anew urgency. But its timing was so flambuoyantly incompetent that even thecontrolled press carried letters of criticism.40 Now there were new dangers, thepossibility of American invasion and the exhaustion of local food supplies. Thusat a time of acute social confusion many evacuees were moved from dormitoriesin coastal provinces into the interior. Others were switched to rice producingprefectures in Northern Honsh� .41 Amidraids, defeats and economic collapse, theevacuation of children finally merged into a desperate cavalcade of ten millioncity dwellers desperately seeking refuge in inland villages.

In a basic sense evacuation was a qualified success. Only two mainlandchildren are known to have died in refuge zones but large numbers died in Kobe,Tokyo, and Nagasaki as a result of confused and torpid administration.42 In otherrespects this social experiment illustrates much of the fundamental values ofwartime Japan. In situations of unparalleled scarcity and danger Japan’s civil andmilitary authorities refused to give significant priority to the safety and nutritionof their most helpless citizens. In the history of evacuation ideals of family wereinvoked to justify both inaction and sacrifice, but social realities bared thehollowness of official rhetoric. Evacuation brought human separation andinhuman neglect and symbolised the innermost values of the ‘family state’.

NOTES

The author would like to thank Professor Matsuzawa Hiroaki and Mrs.Matsuzawa Nozomi of � asa, Hokkaido, and Mr. John E.Taylor of the NationalArchives, Washington D.C. for their kind help in providing materials for thepreparation of this article.


1. For a brief sketch of pre-war and wartime educational policies see Fujiwara Akira:Taiheiy� Sens� (Kokumin no Rekishi 23), Tokyo, 1970, pp. 196–98.

2. Kat� Hidetoshi: ‘Ky� sei sareta ij� seikatsu’ in Kat� Hidetoshi, Imai Seiichi, et al:Sh� wa-shi no Shunkan vol. 1 (Tokyo 1974), p. 92.

3. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch: R. & A. No. 2450.Population and Migration in Japan, 5 September 1945, pp 13–14

4. For some basic assumptions of Japanese civil defence see United States StrategicBombing Survey: Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects inJapan, Washington, 1947, p. 2. and Nobutaka Ike (editor) Japan’s Decision for War(Stanford. 1967) p. 281.

5. For Tatsumi’s career see Nihon Kindai-shiry� Kenky� kai: Nihon Rikukaigun noSeido, Soshiki, Jinji, Tokyo 1971, p. 46.

6. Nobinobi, August 1975, p. 427. United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Field Report Covering Air Raid

Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, Japan (Washington, 1947) p. 220.8. Ibid., p. 219.9. Ibid., p. 219

10. Nobinobi (August 1975) pp. 43–45. Tokyo K� sh� o Kiroku suru kai ‘TokyoDaik� sh� -Semaishi, v. 5 Tokyo 1974, p. 701–10.

11. United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Field Report Covering Air RaidProtection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, Japan (Washington, 1947) p. 221.

12. T� sei Sh� h� -Gakud� Sokai Tokush� g� No. 48, 29 July 1944. ‘Gakud� SokaiMond� ’ reprinted in T� ky� K� sh� o Kiroku suru kai: T� ky� Dai-k� sh� Sensaishiv. 5. pp-723–26.

13. T� ky� K� sh� o Kiroku suru Kai: T� ky� Daik� sh� Sensaishi v. 5, p. 712–1314. Quoted in Yuri Hajime: Sokai no Shis� , Tokyo 1972, p. 25.15. Nobinobi August, p. 1 and p. 45. For statistics of the accommodation and

distribution of evacuees see Appendices I and II of this article.16. ‘Mainichi Shinbun, Tokyo, 23 August 1944: “Notebook” “A group of school

children were evacuated from Tokyo to a temple in Saitama prefecture. It isdifficult to get pots and pans in Tokyo, but in this temple there are lots ofcauldrons, pans, and cooking utensils.

“When the teacher, who was their leader, immediately went to the owner andtried to borrow these by stating their difficulties, the priest replied, ‘I have,promised to let you use my temple, but not my pans.’ The teacher asked theprefectural government to intercede. The prefectural government refused and said,‘That’s under the jurisdiction of the city government (Tokyo)’. Therefore, theteacher went to the city government which said, ‘That’s a matter for the prefecturalgovernment to take care of’, so the teacher was In a hopeless fix.

“Since he was helpless, the teacher took the matter up with a certain officer inthe Ministry of Education. In which office, where, and by whom will this matter besettled? No one will be interested in the solution of the above matter, but I imaginethat the public will look askance at the public office and the officers.”

From Office of War information, Area III, Overseas Branch, Foreign MoraleAnalysis Division: Japanese Home Morale Under Bombing (30 July 1945) pp. 20–29.

17. T� ky� Daik� sh� Sensashi v. 5. p. 728.


18. ‘Children’s living became more difficult by reason of the army requisitioning somuch foodstuffs’ (sic). Interview with M.Yasueda, 31 December 1945, p. 2.Records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, R.G.243. P.T.O. Section14f(36)

19. Mombush� : Gakusei Hyakunenshi (Tokyo 1972) p. 567.20. United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Field Report Covering Air Raid

Protection and Allied Subjects in Kobe, Japan.21. ‘The educational authorities in Nagasaki City stated that as long as they had not

received direct instructions to prepare a plan of evacuation of the primary schoolchildren, they would not initiate it. Another reason was the lack of funds, the costof which the city would have to bear, unless the evacuation was ordered by thegovernment’.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Field Report Covering Air RaidProtection and Allied Subjects in Nagasaki, Japan. Washington i947, p. 85.

22. Nobinobi, August 1975, p. 46.23. ‘It may be wiser’ reports Domei (in romaji to GEA, Oc.28) to reevacuate the

children to other areas. Moreover from the standpoint of food and sanitation, itwould no doubt be better to lessen the number of children in any concentratedgroup’. (R.G.262, NND 76019. Federal Communications Commission, ForeignBroadcast Intelligence Service. Radio Report on the Far East. 58 10 November1944, BC3).

24. e.g. Kat� Hidetoshi, Imai Seiichi et al Sh� wa shi no Shunkan, vol. 1, pp. 97–98. 25. e.g. R.G.243 Records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey P.T.O.

Interrogation 158. (Morale) 25 Oct.45. S.Koizumi, Director of Bureau of police,Home Affairs, p. 4, and Interrogation 137 (Morale) 24 October 1945, Mr. AkabaneYutaka, Vice-Chief Cabinet Information Bureau, p. 5, ‘not much trouble withchildren because the country people were rather in sympathy with them’.

26. e.g. Akemura Hiroshi: Ot� san ga Kodomo de Sens� no koro, Gakud� Sokai Nikki,Tokyo 1972.

27. Ibid. p. 74.28. Yuri Hajime: Sokai no Shis� , Tokyo 1972, pp. 57–58.29. Nobinobi August 1975, p. 1630. See illustration, ibid. p. 91.31. Akemura: Ot� san ga Kodomo de Sens� no koro, p. 36, a patriotic version of the

New Year card game Hyakunin Isshu.32. United States Strategic Bombing Survey Field Report Covering Air Raid

Protection and Allied Subjects in Tokyo, Japan. Washington 1947, p. 157.33. Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Kobe, Japan, p.

83.34. Kat� , Imai et al. Sh� wa-shi no Shunkan, p. 96.35. e.g. Nobinobi, August 1975, p. 14.36. Fujiwara Akira Sens� to Kokumin (Nihon Minsh� no Rekishi 9) Tokyo 1975 p. 221

and Nobihobi, August 1975, p. 3637. Concerning the extension of evacuation by one year. ‘The parents of the child

evacuees must have experienced no little sadness upon hearing of the extension. Thisis all due to the cursed enemy. Someone has said “Just wait, in the next year thechildren of New York will have to be evacuated to the Rockies”. These words shouldnot be ridiculed. They describe the true indignation of one parent.’ ‘Transcript of


short wave broadcast, 18 January 1945. 8.00 E.W.T. Tokyo to G.E.A. RomanizedJapanese’. R.G. 243 Records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey,P.T.O. 1.p.

‘Our son wrote home saying “I am fine and happy”, actually he was veryunhappy and miserable. Letters censored by teachers.’ Interview with M.Yasueda,31 December 1945. p. 1. R.G.243 P.T.O. Section 14.f36.

38. Nobinobi, August 1975, p. 48.39. T� ky� K� sh� o Kiroku Suru Kai: T� ky� Daik� sh� Sensai Shi, Vol. V, p. 740.40. Akimoto Ritsuo: Sens� to Minsh� , Tokyo 1974, p. 228.41. Nobinobi August 1975, p. 48.42. However, large numbers of children were drowned when the Tsushima-maru was

sunk by U.S. torpedoes when evacuating children to the Mainland from Okinawa.For evacuation statistics for island areas see Appendices III and IV.

APPENDIX I ANALYSIS OF GROUP EVACUATION OF JAPANESE SCHOOLCHILDREN BY TYPES OF ACCOMMODATION(Ministry of Eduacation Stastistics September—1944)

Inns Temples OtherAccommodation

Total

City orPrefecture ofOrigin

Evacuation Zone

No. No. ofChildren

No. No. ofChildren

No. No. ofChildren

No. ofBuildings

No. ofChildren

Tokyo Miyagi 34 6,955 75 - - - 164 18,781

Yamagata

42 5,323 - - - - 245 14,406

Fukusliima

140 14,068 8 897 - - 581 29,958

Ibaragi 64 7,838 17 1,234 - - 128 6,544

Tochigi 53 7,816 10 941 - - 218 19,647

Gumina 152 23,321 91 7,390 2 334 309 28,068

Saitama 13 628 115 8,268 8 605 186 8,408

Chiba 15 866 129 7,216 6 444 178 8,782

WithinTokyo

- - 46 5,080 25 3,110 201 7,347

Niigata 108 6,211 118 7,121 35 1,768 295 14,147

Toyama 5 252 86 5,019 - - 102 6,257

Yamanashi

82 7,702 40 1,489 4 630 210 9,191

Nagano 215 29,767 45 6,489 6 1,083 433 36,975

Shizuoka

86 10,170 184 14,557 23 3,373 320 27,095

TOTAL 1,009 120,862

964 65,773 109 11,347 3,570 234,305



Total


Evacuation Zone

No. No. ofChildren

No. No. ofChildren

No. No. ofChildren

No. ofBuildings

No. ofChildren

N.B. Other Accommodation includes private houses, etc.Statistics for categories of accomodation 5 September 1944Totals—for 20 September 1944


Total


EvacuationZone

No. No. ofChildren

No. No. ofChildren

No. No. ofChildren

No. ofBuildings

No. ofChildren

KanagawaPrefecture

Kanagawa

151 13,424

354 16,780

285 8,234 790 38,438

AichiPrefecture

Gifu 6 352 102 5,728 12 667 120 6,747

Aichi 33 1,196 347 19,134

6 690 386 21,020

Mie 38 2,319 61 3,840 9 230 108 6,389

TOTAL

77 3,867 510 28,702

27 1,587 614 34,156

Osaka Ishikawa

- - 62 2,958 5 200 67 3,158

Fukui 15 918 44 1,191 2 150 61 2,259

Shiga 6 403 183 9,610 44 2,684 233 12,697

Kyoto 7 249 52 788 7 225 66 1,262

Osaka 18 2,006 440 22,001

51 1,464 509 25,471

Nara 60 3,385 110 6,961 3 135 173 10,931

Wakayama

6 350 79 3,220 13 200 98 3,770

Shimane

21 652 85 2,915 2 50 108 3,617



Total


EvacuationZone

No. No. ofChildren

No. No. ofChildren

No. No. ofChildren

No. ofBuildings

No. ofChildren

Hiroshima

1 40 83 2,975 16 865 100 3,880

Tokushima

4 330 85 3,172 7 374 96 3,876

Kagava

35 1,532 149 5,683 6 665 190 7,880

Ehime 8 300 50 2,420 15 825 73 3,545

TOTAL

181 10,615

1,422 63,894

171 7,837 1,774 82,346


Total


EvacuationZone

No. No. ofChildren

No. No. ofChildren

No. No. ofChildren

No. ofBuildings

No. ofChildren

Hy� g�Prefecture

Hy� g� 81 2,351 202 8,248 96 4,258 379 14,857

Tottori 45 1,542 11 496 13 578 69 2,616

Okayama

17 866 51 2,787 12 489 80 4,142

TOTAL

143 4,759 264 11,531 121 5,325 528 21,615

NATIONALGRAND TOTAL

1,561 153,491

3,5i4 186,680

713 34,330 7,276 411,360

(Statistics repainted in Nobinobi August 1975, p. 45)

APPENDIX IIGROUP EVACUATION OF JAPANESE SCHOOL CHILDREN FROM URBAN AREAS(.September 1944)

Home Area Number of Children Distribution among Evacuation Areas

Tokyo 234,806 Nagano 36,975

Fukushima 28,958

Gumraa 28,068

Shizuoka 27,095


Home Area Number of Children Distribution among Evacuation Areas

Tochigi 19,647

Miyagi 18,781

Yamagata 14,605

Niigata 14,147

Yamanashi 9,191

Chiba 8,782

Saitama 8,408

Greater Tokyo 7,347

Ibaragi 6,544

T� yama 6,258

Yokohama 25,237)

Yokosuka 8,158) Kanagawa 38,438

Kawasaki 5,043)

Nagoya 34,156 Aichi 21,020

Gifu 6,747

Mie 6,389

Osaka 82,346 Greater Osaka 25,471

Shiga 12,697

Nara 10,931

Kagawa 7,880

Hiroshima 3,880

Tokushima 3,876

Wakayama 3,770

Shimane 3,617

Ehime 3,545

Ishikawa 3,158

Fukui 2,259

Kyoto 1,262

Kobe-Amagasaki 21,615 Hy� g� 14,857

Okayama 4,142

Tottori 2,616

(Statistics from Mombush� : ‘Gakud� Sh� dan Sokai Jisshi J� ky� reprinted in NobinobiAugust 1975, p. 1)

APPENDIX IIISTATISTICS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN EVACUATED FROM ISLAND AREAS(No date available)

Home Area Number of Children Evacuation Areas (Prefectures)

Okinawa (Prefecture) 7,000 Kumamoto


Home Area Number of Children Evacuation Areas (Prefectures)

Miyazaki� ita

Tanegashima 5,500 Kagoshima

Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands 300 Nagano

(Mombush� : Gakusei Hyakunen-shi, Tokyo 1972, p. 567)

APPENDIX IVGROUP EVACUATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN FROM OKINAWA

Reception Areas(Prefectures)

Number of SchoolChildren

AccompanyingPersonnel

Total

Miyazaki 2,643 477 3,120

Kumamoto 2,602 454 3,056

� ita 341 46 389

Grand Totals 5,586 979 6,565

N.B. These statistics do not include children evacuated to Taiwan or those who evacuatedindividually to the Japanese mainland.

From Okinawa-ken: Okinawa-kenshi 1. Ts� shi (Tokyo 1977) p. 869


First published in B.A.J.S. Proceedings (1978). Part One: History

and International Relations, pp. 137–150

16Taira: A Provincial City in the Pacific War

DURING the reflective, reformist years of the 1970s the historiography ofJapan’s localities has undergone a vivid and expressive transformation. Inmegacities, Okinawa and substantial urban communities radical governors andpopulist academics have impelled a wave of local research and publication whichhas abandoned the mannered antiquarianism of earlier years. As in politics thiscampaign has combined the vigour of citizen activists with the intellectualapproaches of scholars, and has swung attention from safe historical distances tothe uncomfortable proximities of the Pacific War.1 It has combined foreign anddomestic documentation with the evidence of oral history, and has pioneeredimportant fields of enquiry which have been largely untracked by academichistorians. The impact of this historiographical version of municipal socialismhas been surprisingly far reaching, and has done much to reshape surveyhistories and the interpretation of the wartime years.2 No longer is the recenthistory of the Japanese people seen as a simple story of elites, cliques or abstractmasses, but has come to embrace millions of individual men, women andchildren whose names, vitality and suffering would otherwise have been lost toemerging generations of scholars and citizens.

It would be churlish and tedious to criticise the organisation, toil andvoluminous achievements of these new historians but the limitations of this newtide are significant and worthy of note. Like the phenomenon of radicalgovernors this intense collaboration of scholars and citizens has been largelyconfined to major cities, and the contribution of Japan’s provinces to recent historyremains much less studied than the role of Satsuma, Ch� sh� or Tosa in theclosing years of the Tokugawa Bakufu. Certainly the forty seven volumes ofYamakawa Shuppan’s kenshi (prefectural history) series pay little attention tocontemporary history, and their accounts of the Pacific War, where they exist,are usually brief, dated and clumsily inaccurate.3

In view of this crushing over emphasis upon major cities it is perhaps useful toreangle historical attention to an example of provincial life against which tojudge the typicality of city problems, and the homogeneity of Japanese wartimeexperience.

Like many of Japan’s local towns of firm-ribbed character Taira, in South EastFukushima prefecture, has a solid pedigree as a one time castle town. Until the

collapse of the Northern lords at the time of the Meiji Restoration it supported aminor daimy� ; and even after the inauguration of the modern system of localgovernment it had a brief reign of administrative esteem as the focus of Taira-ken, a small unit of no great significance, soon to be erased from theadministrative charts of Tokyo officials.4 Taira’s development, like that ofmodern Japan, was ultimately linked with nationwide industrial progress, and by1937 it had achieved city status and served as a commercial, administrative andmanufacturing focus for the nearby J� ban coalfield, and for agricultural areaswhich fringed much of the city’s outer limits.5 Taira’s appearance aptly reflectedits historic and industrial parentage. The railway line from Ueno ran almostdirectly East-West through the town and separated its official and commercialquarters. North of the line was an area which was almost completely bounded bythe Natsui river which flowed eastward into the Pacific Ocean. Here were twomajor hills one of which was covered by the ruins of the And� family castle. Tothe West was a cluster of buildings which indicated Taira’s claim to someadministrative importance; a jailhouse, with a staff of ten, a forestry office, acourt house, a silk examination office, and an isolation hospital. These hill areasfalling to the river’s edge contained fields, schools, six temples and associatedgraveyards.

In contrast to this spacious and scenic Northern sector was the main centre ofresidential and commercial activity which was tightly pressed into an area of flatland, cut by canals, immediately South of the railway. This had few paved streetsbut contained virtually all the town’s population, the railway station, the cityhall, the main thoroughfare—the Higashimachi doori, the police station and theKatakura spinning mill. Like Taira’s Northern fringes her Southern marginscontained paddyfields; but here several important institutions stood aloof, largelysurrounded by agricultural land. The industrial school, the commercial schooland the prostitution quarter were all well distanced from the main centres ofshops, houses and population.6

By the outbreak of the Pacific War Taira had a population of approximately30,000 of which some two-thirds were employed in government, commerce,manufacturing and miscellaneous trades.7 Like the rest of Japan the cityexperienced wartime conscription, rationing and official propaganda, but despitethese broad similarities it is surprising that the authors of the definitive localhistory chose to devote no more than four inaccurate lines to the history of theseeventful years.8 In contrast, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey soughtto balance its knowledge of major cities with information on smaller settlements,and devoted several days to an intensive study of this minor provincialcommunity. The resulting collection of statistics, interrogations and personalreports provides an invaluable profile of this Fukushima city which loitered onthe sidelines of war but was finally shaken by national defeat.9

In comparison with much of Japan’s economy Taira’s industrial structure waslittle affected by the events of war. Until 1945 the Katakura spinning plantcontinued to be the main local employer, and it was only in the final desperate


stage of conflict that it was briefly converted to the manufacture of aircraftcomponents. In August 1945 the factory was abandoned and its recordsdestroyed, but the testimony of Mr. Kusano, the manager of a smaller enterprise,the Tanabe K� j� , provides an incisive description of factory life in Taira whichcontasts vividly with customary notions of a disciplined wartime Japan.10

The Tanabe factory produced mining machinery until 1945, when some of itsenergies were transferred to the manufacture of parts for charcoal poweredautomobiles. Despite the war its equipment and buildings remained largelyunchanged, and this theme of continuity amid conflict is also evident in itsmanager’s observations on his locally recruited workforce. Of his employees hecommented

People at Taira didn’t exert full effort in work. Compared to Tokyo andOsaka, productive ability was about one-half. They didn’t feel the effectslike Tokyo and Osaka; there wasn’t the same stimulus… People thoughtthat the amount of work they were doing was O.K. There was no need toexert full efforts and put full energies into work. It was thought to be O.K.to lounge on the job and be lazy, not really doing work. Of course thisaffected production. We talked about this constantly, but when managersweren’t around, the workers just went back to doing it.11

Common methods of stimulating war production, such as round the clockworking had no place in this Japanese factory. There was one shift from 8 a.m. to5 p.m., arranged to match local train services. But despite the inefficiency of thissystem it was socially necessary for longer hours would have rendered foodhunting impossible.12 In addition to these significant handicaps the Tanabefactory also suffered from increasing absenteeism which at times reached almostone third of its payroll. Perhaps one third of this was the outcome of genuinesickness but ‘religious festivals, family deaths, trips etc’ featured among thescattered excuses which were given and did not always satisfy an exasperatedmanager.13 Wartime Japan is often depicted as a police state but although themanagers of this factory often discussed calling constables to censure dubiousabsentees they never did so. In most cases home visits and threats of dismissalproved temporarily effective.14

If industry was slightly aside from the political pressures of the centralgovernment this could hardly be said of the activities of Japan’s wartime policeestablishment. This was not only encumbered with such extra duties as ‘pricecontrol, diversion of material to war plants, and transport control’,15 but it washampered by greatly diminished numbers. During the war years Taira’s policeforce was reduced by ‘about thirty percent’ so that by 1945 116 men had topolice a population of over 200,000. No special or temporary constables wereever appointed, administrators were compelled to go on the beat, constables oftentook on three extra patrol zones, and the force was clearly acutely stretched.Perhaps as a result police power in Taira seems to have been wielded with

TAIRA: A PROVINCIAL CITY IN THE PACIFIC WAR 127

toleration rather than hard fisted oppression. By the latter months of the warblack marketeering was apparently condoned by police officers, and it was onlyin the case of particularly impudent violations that arrests were made. Even inthese instances convictions were only secured in 106 out of 186 cases. Blackmarket dealings clearly rose as shortages became harsher but arrests fell ratherthan climbed in the same period.16 In fact by the end of the war it seems likelythat the police were monopoly merchants in the new industry of black marketoperations.17 If police operations had a harsh edge it was probably against localKorean coal miners who were apparently arrested and suspected with more thanaverage frequency.18 Yet overall Taira’s police force seems to have maintained asturdy independence in the face of central government instruments and policies.The abolition of geisha was never implemented in Taira and their patrons werealmost as numerous in the final weeks of the war as they had been before. Someefforts were made to persuade prostitutes to enter productive war industries buteven this policy seems to have been implemented with somewhat qualifieddetermination.19 It is true that political dissent, rumour mongering and thoughtcrimes were outside the sphere of the weary local police force, for twelve specialpolice members dealt with these offences,20 but the bulk of day to day laws andcontrols appear to have been administered with a combination of inefficiency,common sense and corruption which is hardly consistent with effectivetotalitarian control.

Clearly the Japanese government sought more than passive obedience to itsmanifold laws and policies, and overlapping circles of local, professional andindustrial organizations were created to produce a degree of total participationwhich was impossible in the era of parliamentary politics.21 Yet here againevents in Taira belie rather than confirm government success in an area less than140 miles from the national capital. In form Taira was as well and firmlyorganised as the remainder of the nation. Tonarigumi (neighbourhoodassociations) had existed in the city well before the Home Ministry made themofficial in 193922 and with the implementation of Home Office orders thepopulation was enrolled in some 530 of these administrative clusters. Theseusually met on the 30th of each month while the leaders of these cellsparticipated in ward association (Kunaikai) meetings at similar intervals.23 Thesebodies were, in the fullest sense, all inclusive. Koreans and women were fullmembers, though not leaders, of neighbourhood associations24 and with mostmen in the armed forces, or engaged in full time labour, women and aged menbore much work and responsibility. Just as police duties widened with war, soneighbourhood associations bore a growing yoke of civil and stateresponsibilities; shelter construction, mutual aid in time of bereavement,vegetable growing and occasionally, road construction.25 At times there werecomplaints to upper ranks of administration that burdens were too great; butoverall there seems to have been little protest or dissension in these smallestcentres of government organisation. Yet despite all these positive attributesTaira’s head of Community Association Affairs was well aware of their


deficiencies.26 The enthusiasm which could be generated amid declining foodsupplies was inadequate. Not only were students, women and grandparents lesswell muscled than adult males but their lack of skills and tools further augmenteddifficulties. What was worse, increasing responsibilities were crammed into thetimetables of neighbourhood associations so that overall effectiveness slitheredto even lower levels.

Parallel to these all inclusive neighbourhood associations were two women’sorganisations which spanned all ages and classes in the community. In Taira some6,000 women over twenty five years of age were voluntary members of theFujinkai (women’s association) while younger women formed an auxiliaryorganisation.27 Like neighbourhood associations the Fujinkai consisted of localbranches which in theory held monthly meetings. Leaders of the thirty six localgroups were usually chosen by election, but leadership of the city organisationusually went to the wife of the mayor or former mayor, irrespective of her wishesor personality.28 In comparison with the neighbourhood associations the Fujinkaiappears to have been a far less vigorous and effective agency of patriotic or localendeavour. Membership was sought by nearly everyone but purposeful activitywas another matter. Despite the theory of monthly meetings these gatheringswere often postponed or cancelled, even these less than frequent meetings werescarcely well attended.29 Usually no more than half a group’s enrolment couldparticipate actively, and activities at meetings were no more than a pallid shadowof what was probably intended. Much energy was devoted to collecting moneyfor patriotic purposes, or discussing how it might be collected, or howinstructions from above might be implemented.30 However ephemeral theseactivities were they clearly had a distinct if minor place in the vast panoply oftotal war. In contrast, a good many hours appear to have been devoted to far lesssignificant objectives. Mrs. Inose, who led the Taira Fujinkai for three and a halfyears spoke of discussing ‘how to make clothes, the patterns, whether hems wideor narrow etc.’, and it is clear that a casual provincial quality characterised manyof the Fujinkai’s somewhat unpredictable gatherings.31

In food distribution as in local organisation Taira was confined within thebroad limits of government policy.32 Yet in this sphere too, local variations wereas important as national patterns. The rice ration had begun as 2 go 7 shaku,33

but from the beginning of rationing the ‘rice allocation’ consisted of rice, othercereals and substitute vegetables. Even in 1940 less than half people’s ricerations were distributed in the form of rice but in the first two years of warfarecitizens could often obtain additional black market rice from nearby farmers andrelatives.34 The monthly distribution of rice clearly fell from 356,000 kilogramsin 1942 to 230,000 in 1944, but surprisingly, wheat bread and flour supplies rosein the same period to make up much of the deficit. It was only in the final year ofwar that wheat supplies fell swiftly, yet in these same months rice deliveriesunderwent some improvement.35 In contrast to this general theme of decliningsupplies and inevitable substitution were increasing quantities of some importantcommodities. Bean paste (miso) and soy sauce (osh� yu) were available on an


ever increasing scale throughout the war, and were twice as plentiful in 1945 asin the first year of wartime conditions.36 No doubt food was scarce, as the activeencouragement of vegetable gardening indicated, but the relative abundance offood in Taira is perhaps evident from the railway sorties of Tokyo people, whofrom 1943, swept into the town to haggle for various foodstuffs.37 With lack oflabour and fertilisers, rice production inevitably fell. In contrast, demand rose in1945 when over 1,800 evacuees joined the resident population.38 However, itwas in the aftermath of war, rather than during wartime that soy saucedisappeared from the market place, and diet took on an unprecedented drabnessand severity.39 Yet even in December 1945 Taira’s nutritional crisis scarcelycompared with the great hungers of European or Asian history. At this timevirtually all bomb sites had been nimbly converted into vegetable gardens, andmuch rough ground had been transformed into allotments and daikon (radish)patches.40 Taira may have been a lucky exception but at the end of 1945 itsfarmers were still somehow ‘making comparatively comfortable ends meet’while in general its food ‘containing considerable fish’ was appreciably superiorto that in many northern regions.41

Much writing on wartime Japan describes a polarity between the nutritionalcrisis and aerial slaughter suffered by city dwellers, and the affluence and safetyof the peasantry.42 Clearly such deep contrasts were significant, but theexperience of Taira and its rural hinterland suggest that this imbalance of cityand village was partly redressed by other tendencies. To the extent that food is themainspring of health clearly farmers were healthier than clerks or schoolmasters, but the quality of medical treatment followed a different pattern. In theTaira area some doctors were drawn into army service and medicines becamescarce in the final years of war but within the town doctors and hospitals claimedto maintain reasonable standards of diagnosis and treatment. Somepharmaceutical supplies and medical personnel were required by the armedforces but there were other commodities which were even more important toJapan’s military operations. Motor vehicles, tyres and petroleum were too valuableto be left to civilian doctors, so that treatment in country villages became rareand sometimes impossible.43 This was particularly damaging as outbreaks oftyphoid and dysentery were particularly marked in rural communities. Suchmedical inadequacies were especially harmful at a time when increasing work,less cleanliness and falling nutrition all undermined physical health. Thusincreasing numbers lost weight and energy, and fell victim to tuberculosis,typhoid and epidemics.44 As a result the death rate rose sharply, from 548 in1942 to 437 in the first 7½ months of 1945.45

Yet even in matters of health and welfare there were relatively favourabletendencies. With many young men away at the front the incidence of venerealdisease declined; and despite growing talk of melancholia there was no majorrise in suicides or mental illness. Alcoholism did not increase, there was nodramatic vogue for new religions, little anti-social behaviour and no interest insupernatural activities.46 Women feared infertility and suffered menstrual


irregularities but substantial worsening of physical health was largely delayeduntil the spring of 1945.47

Perhaps surprisingly this time of medical shortages saw a major reorganisationin national provision for health care. In the 1938 Diet session the governmentpassed a National Health Insurance Bill which was designed to promote a spiritof neighbourly mutual assistance.48 This new legislation provided for thecreation of voluntary national health insurance authorities based upon places ofwork and residence. These would provide sickness. accident, maternity and deathbenefits and in theory would begin as spontaneous undertakings. At a later stagethe voluntary bodies would ask prefectural governors for permission to establishformal organizations. But in fact it was often assumed that everyone would joinsuch a helpful association and governors took the initiative in ordering thecreation of such bodies. Taira was apparently the object of such an order, and thegovernor gave his formal approval to the association on 28 January 1944. As aresult all citizens except those already covered by the Mothers’ Aid Law andRelief Law were named as association members. By December some 24,806people were covered by the provisions of the Taira organisation, and some 3,794ordinary and 181 maternity cases had received its assistance. In addition totreatment, preventive medicine was also an objective of the new body, and therewere plans to employ a nutritionist who would disseminate information onhealthy gastronomy.49

The association’s local directorate was to contain doctors, dentists, local menof influence and representatives of community organizations. This was asbroadly based an organisation as could be expected in such a specialised field asmedical insurance. The motives of government leaders in creating this newsystem may be questioned; clearly morale and military efficiency were importantobjectives. Nevertheless it says much for the stability of provincial life andbureaucracy that such a novel scheme could be implemented in a time of militarymisfortune and economic decline.

Overall the Pacific war brought no deep disturbance to Taira until 1945. Then,with the arrival of evacuees and the beginning of air raid precautions thecommunity and its activities were sharply shaken for the first time.50 During thewinter of 1944–45 a. serious programe of shelter construction was undertakenwith tunnels being scooped out of nearby inclines.51 By February the whole ofFukushima prefecture was embraced in the Air Defence Region of the SecondArmy, and air raid signal stations were positioned in Taira. At the same time theform and pattern of the town suffered initial measures of preventive surgery.Almost two hundred houses were demolished to create fire breaks around therailway station and main post office, and for the first time, citizens were drivento share accommodation with nearby relatives.52 Such official demolition wasobviously unwelcome but all house owners appear to have receivedcompensation and there was no vocal resistance to these drastic measures.53

The justification for these policies and their effectiveness were soon apparent,for on the night of 10 March, amid a whirling gale, American Superfortresses


strewed incendiaries across six sections of the city. 585 houses were destroyed,as was the taxation office, the blind school, a branch of the Osaka ShipbuildingCompany, two iron works, a temple and a shrine belonging to Tenriky� .54

However the railway station and post office survived.55 After this scarring of thecity centre its people showed their first interest in securing military assistance.They requested anti-aircraft guns to provide protection but by now the Americanbomber offensive was under way. There were no guns to spare and the mayorwas curtly informed that there were more important cities to be defended.56 On18 July American aircraft strafed the city with 1500 rounds of ammunition. Twopeople were killed and five severely injured.57 Eight days later a single bomberdropped a one ton missile on Taira’s first primary school, and a rim of blastdamaged 1500 houses.58 From this point on the threat and reality of aerial attackbecame a continuous element in daily life. In July there were 45 alerts in 31days. In the final two weeks of war there were 21 alerts and three serious alarms.Alerts now averaged almost four hours in length, alarms 80 minutes, and hastyshuffling into insanitary shelters stole more and more time from work and leisure.59

On 28 July the community suffered its third bombing raid when six zones of thecity were attacked with incendiaries. 188 houses, a school, two banks, twofactories and numerous clinics were destroyed.60 Only three people died but thevaluable business centre of the city was transformed into a scab of blackened ash.Now over 3,000 people were homeless and crowded into the houses ofrelatives.61

Taira’s physical preparation for air raids had been far from adequate. Bombinghad not been expected until late in the war and shelter construction had beendelayed until 1944. Even in August 1945 only factories had sufficient shelterspace for all likely occupants.62 Nevertheless responses to bombing werecomplex and illustrate social discipline rather than disintegration. Throughout1945 Taira had no military protection but her citizens reacted to air attacks withincreasingly effective cooperation. At the time of the first raid all civil defencetraining was forgotten as people fled and left much of their city to burn.63 But, bythe time of the second raid, behaviour corresponded tightly to the maxims ofofficial hand books. When the alarm was heard the headmaster of the firstprimary school organised the evacuation of his pupils to nearby shelters. He andhis assistants remained to supervise the building. All pupils survived but theheadmaster and two teachers were killed in the subsequent explosion.64 This wasno solitary act of bravery for during the third raid communal defence wasorganised with cool nerves and firm commitment. In the words of the chief ofpolice ‘on that occasion the citizens united in a body and performed marvellouslyin the work of extinguishing the fires and keeping damage to a minimum’.65 Inthe face of military indifference Taira’s population had doubtless concluded thatself-help was the only remaining means of survival.

In the aftermath of Taira’s air raids local administration remained surprisinglystrong and resilient. For three days after each raid army and company cookingfacilities were used to provide emergency meals for victims, and special food


supplies were brought from surrounding villages. Certainly the quantity andquality of staple items was criticised but dried and salted foods were supplied inadequate amounts. Air raid victims criticised the level of emergency provisionsbut all found accommodation, and relief foods were supplied over and abovenormal rations.67

This organisation and solidarity were not accompanied by unbrokenconfidence in victory. After the war one local doctor stated that ‘the masses’ hadthought ‘that they would win’, but Taira’s mayor declared that by July 1945‘people didn’t think they could possibly win’.68 The police bureau claimed that‘with the defeat of our forces, first at Guam, Tinian and the Mariana bases thepeople began to entertain doubts…the air attack on Tokyo…proved a greathindrance to the task of elevating the fighting spirit of the populace’.69 The cityoffice linked a ‘general sentiment of defeat’ with knowledge and experience ofserious bombing; but such sentiments, however widespread, had no organisedexpression and only became evident in the final year of war.70

Taira’s experience suggests the limited impact which the Pacific war broughtto one Japanese community. Life retained its provincial torpor, modest sensualityand healthy narrow mindedness. The police often condoned crime and officialsviewed central government with detachment. It was only in 1945 that fire, deathand overcrowding affected this provincial city and even then its social fabricremained intact. Taira’s unity survived the Pacific war and sustained recoveryand reconstruction.

NOTES

1. For outstanding examples of this genre of local history see Tokyo K� sh� o kirokusuru kai: Tokyo Daik� sh� Sensaishi vols. I–V (Tokyo, 1973–74) and Yokohama noK� sh� o Kiroku suru kai and Yokohama shi: Yokohama no K� sh� to Sensai vols. I–VI (Yokohama, 1975–77).

2. e,g. the accurate account of the bombing of Tokyo included in Fujiwara Akira:Nihon Kindai-shi III (Tokyo, 1977) p. 159 is clearly based upon the research of theTokyo K� sh� o kiroku suru kai.

3. e.g. Kobayashi Seiji and Yamada Akira’s Fukushima-ken no Rekishi (Kenshi seriesvolume 7) (Tokyo, 1970) only mentions wartime bombing in a chronologicalappendix which mistakenly states that Taira was attacked in 1944.

4. Yasuda Hatsuo: Fukushima-ken shinshi (Tokyo, 1950) p. 22.5. For a brief sketch of Taira’s geography and welfare institutions see United States

War Department: Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan: Fukushima-ken (1945) pp. 23and 128.

6. This description is based upon a 1:7,500 map of Taira included in R.G. 243(Records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, National Archives,Washington, D.C.) P.T.O. 14 f(35) (c) and R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14 f(b). Ken Iseri:Report on Taira, 7 February 1946.

7. For statistics of employment in Taira see Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan:Fukushimaken p. 25.


8. Gaisetsu Taira-shi (1959) p. 637 describes the war as follows—‘At the close of thePacific War Taira twice suffered air raids, on 10 March and 26 July 1945; and theSouth and West sections of the city suffered war damage. At this time beginningwith the tax office, industrial school, commercial school and branches of OsakaShipbuilding (Company) and the Kangy� Bank, over two thousand buildings weredestroyed by fire. In particular the industrial and commercial schools receivedattacks from incendiary bombs. The First primary school was destroyed by anexplosive bomb. Our Taira city experienced the misery of war at first hand’.

9. Team 11 of the Survey led by F.Hulse visited Taira. Its records are to be found in R.G.243 P.T.O. 14 f(35) (a–e).

10. R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14 f(35) (a). Background interview with Mr. Kusano Shiro,manager of the Tanabe Kojo, Machine Parts Plant, at Taira, Dec. 8th (1945) at 9.00a.m., ended 10.50 a.m.

11. Ibid. p. 4.12. Ibid. p. 2.13. Ibid. p. 3.14. Ibid. p. 3.15. R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14 f(35) (a) Background interview with Chief of Police

Shimozu (sic), of Taira, at his Office in Taira, on Tuesday, December 11, 1945, at2.15 PM. Ended 3.40. p. 2.

16. R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14 f(35) (b) Background Report on Taira City, Fukushima-ken, pp.11–12.

17. Ibid. p. 11. ‘The figures…show a general trend downwards…but it is suspectedthat this indicates only the degree to which police officials succeeded in takingover the black market, and eliminated the independent operators who had beencompeting with them’.

18. Ibid. p. 12.19. Ibid. pp. 13–14.20. R.G. 243 P.T.C. 14 f(35) (a) Background Interview with Chief of Police Shimozu

(sic), of Taira…December 11, 1945. p. 2.21. For brief accounts of these aspects of government policy see Fujiwara Akira, Imai

Seiichi and � e Shinobu: Kindai Nihon-shi no Kiso Chishiki (Tokyo, 1972) pp. 442–43 and 422–23.

22. R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14 f(35) (a) Background Interview with Mr. Hasegawa Masaichiwho is in charge of Community Association Affairs, at our hotel in Taira onTuesday, December 11th, from 9.05 AM to 11.20 AM p. 1.

23. Ibid. p. 1.24. Ibid. p. 2.25. Ibid. p. 3.26. Ibid. p. 4.27. R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14 f(35) (a) Background and Special Interview with Mrs. Inose,

Kimi, City Leader, the Fujinkai at Taira. In our office at Taira, Sunday, December9th, at 1400 hours, ended 1500 hours. p. 1.

28. Ibid. p. 2.29. R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14f (35) (a) Background and Special Interview with Mrs. Inose

Kimi, City Leader, the Fujinkai at Taira. In our office at Taira, Sunday, December9th, at 1400 hours, ended 1500 hours, pp. 1–2.

30. Ibid. p. 1.


31. Ibid. pp. 12 and R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14f (35) (b) Background Report on Taira City,Fukushima-ken, p. 16. ‘most of them spent their time talking of frivolous things’.

32. For a useful account of national policy see B.F.Johnston, Japanese FoodManagement in World War II (Stanford, California, 1953) pp. 186–212.

33. 1 go=0.18 litres, 1 shaku=0.018 litres.34. The ration period was 10 days. R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14f (35) (a) Background Interview

with Mr. Yamagishi, Chief of Industrial Section of the City of Taira, at Taira, onWednesday, December 12, at 2.00 p.m., ended 3.40 pp. 1–2, 4.

35. R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14f 35(b) Background Report on Taira City, Fukushima-ken, p. 22.36. Ibid., p. 22.37. Ibid., p. 22 and R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14f 35(b) Report on Taira by Ken Iseri 7 February

1946, p. 2.38. R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14f 35(b) Background Report on Taira City, Fukushima-ken, pp.

14–15.39. Ibid., p. 22.40. Ibid., p. 22.41. R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14f 35(b) Taira…Contact impressions, p. 2.42. e.g. Rekishigaku Kenky� kai: Taiheiy� Sens� -shi vol. 5 Taiheiy� Sens� II 1942–45

(Tokyo, 1973) pp. 109–110.43. ‘Out of 130 doctors, 23 joined the armed forces, and those who remained had to

take over their work; of course this hit the rural areas a good deal worse than it didthe city itself R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14f 35 (b) Background Report on Taira City, Fushima-ken, p. 20 and ‘Q. Has there been a shortage of medicine in Taira? A. Yes, supplieshave been short for two or three years. But hospitals and their facilities have beenadequate here in the city. I feel that the lack has been felt in villages because ofshortage of vehicles to get to see patients. We can make a living, but we just can’tget around to see all our patients without tvres and gasoline etc.’ R.G. 243 P.T.O.14 f 35(a) Special and background interview with Dr. Hoiosmasa (sic), Shimidzu,President of the Medical Association of Taira, at Taira, on Saturday, Dec. 8th, 2.00p.m., ended 3.30 p.m., p. 2.

44. Ibid., pp. 1–245. R.G. 243 14 f 35 (b) Background Report on Taira City, Fakushima-ken, p. 2046. Ibid., pp. 12–13, and R.G. 243 14f 35(a) Special and background interview with Dr.

Hoiosmasa Shimidzu, President of the Medical Association of Taira, at Taira, onSaturday, December 8th, 2.00 p.m. ended 3.30 p.m. pp. 2–3.

47. Ibid., pp. 1–348. R.G. 243 P.T.O. 14 f 35(a) General Outline of the Taira National Health Insurance

Association by Katsuyo Takeshita, p. 1.49. Ibid. pp. 3–4.50. During this period factory work was carried out in schools, textbooks were in short

supply and educational standards fell. R.G. 343. P.T.O. 14f. 35(a) Background andSpecial Interview with Mr. Watanabe, Ito Principal of the Iwaki Boy’s MiddleSchool at Taira, Sunday, December 9th from 9.25 a.m. to 10.30 a.m., pp. 1–2.

51. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f. 35(b) Background Report on Taira City, Fukushima-ken, p. 8.52. Ibid. p. 7 and U.S. War Department: Civil Affairs Handbook Japan—Fukushima-

ken, p. 116.53. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(b) Background, Report on Taira City, Fukushima-ken, p. 8.


54. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(c) Investigations of the Strategic Bombing of theAmerican Air Troops by Taira City Office, p. 4, and R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(i) File580 of the Taira Police Bureau… December 8, 1945, p. 4.

55. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35 Background Report, Form JE (Completed by PoliceSergeant Susumu Yokoyama), p. 8.

56. Q. Were there ever any anti-aircraft guns to defend the city? A. There were not.People of course disturbed and complained to Ken government, asking that Armyput up guns for their protection. The Army said, however, that other places weremore important than Taira. So people became more and more disturbed—andmorale did not go up. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(a) Background interview with Mr.Ito Hidekichi, Mayor of Taira, at our office at Taira, on Monday, 10 December at 2.55 p.m.: ended, 4.50 p.m. p. 3.

57. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35 Background Report, Form JE, p. 3.58. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(c) Investigations of the Strategic Bombing of the

American Air Troops by Taira City Office, p. 4.59. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(b) Background Report on Taira City, Fukushima-ken, pp.

3–8.60. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(c) Investigations of the Strategic Bombing of the

American Air Troops by Taira City Office, p. 4.61. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(b) Background Report on Taira City, Fukushima-ken, p. 4.62. Ibid. pp. 8–9.63. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(c) File 580 of the Taira Police Bureau, p. 5.64. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(a) Background and Special interview with Mr. Watanabe,

Ito, Principal of the Iwaki Boys’ Middle School at Taira, Sunday, 9 December,1945, from 9.25 a.m. to 10.30 a.m., p. 1.

65. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(c) File 580 of the Taira Police Bureau, p. 6.67. Ibid. p. 10.68. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(a) Special and Background interview with Dr. Hoiosmasa,

Shimizu, President of the Medical Association of Taira, 8 December, 1945, p. 3and R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f (a) Background interview with Mr. Ito Hidekichi, Mayorof Taira, 10 December, 1945, p. 3.

69. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(c) File 580 of the Taira Police Bureau, 8 December, 1945,pp. 2–3.

70. R.G. 243. P.T.O. 14f 35(c) Investigations of the Strategic Bombing of theAmerican Air Troops by Taira City Office, p. 1.


First Published in Daniels (ed.), A Guide to the Reports of the

United States Strategic Bombing Survey, London, Offices of the

Royal Historical Society, 1981

17Introduction to A Guide to the Reports of the

United States Strategic Bombing Survey

FROM THE YEARS of their technical infancy airships and aircraft suggestedthe extension of modern warfare from battlefields to civilian society. By the FirstWorld War the range, height and speed of these new weapons inspired theoriesand tactics which already went far beyond reconnaissance and frontlinebombardment. In 1915 German Zeppelins made ragged attacks on the Englishmidlands. Two years later fleets of bombers raided London, and soon fighters,balloons, observers and anti-aircraft batteries were deployed in defence ofBritain’s capital. Aircraft were few and bomb loads light, but public concern wasrising and the pattern of future conflict was clearly established. Yet far moreimportant than these immediate realities of combat were the strategies andorganizations which stemmed from this first wartime experience. In 1917 theCommander-in-Chief of the Royal Flying Corps, Major General Trenchard,asserted that aircraft should strike offensively behind the German lines. Soonafter General Smuts advocated a large strategic bomber force within anindependent air service.1 The Royal Air Force was created and the wideningdimensions of bombing were increasingly accepted in British military thinking.

In war Trenchard always emphasised attacks on German military targets buthe also proclaimed the importance of subtler psychological objectives. He statedthat ‘the moral effect of bombing stands undoubtedly to the material effect in aproportion of 20 to 1’, while in 1918 the Chief of the Air Staff, Major-GeneralSykes also wrote ‘the wholesale bombing of densely populated industrial centreswould go far to destroy the morale of the operatives’.2 Thus by the close of waraircraft had become much more than simple aids to land combat, and appearedkeys to the economic and social destruction of future enemies.

This sweeping and imaginative use of air power came to be termed strategicbombing, but within this concept there emerged two distinct notions whichpreoccupied strategists throughout the inter-war years. In Britain, Trenchard’svision of widespread damage and demoralisation continued to influence thedevelopment of bombing theory, but across the Atlantic the role of strategicbombers was gradually redefined. In 1917, like British leaders, the Chief of theStrategic Aviation Branch of the American Army Air Service, Edgar S.Gorrell,had advocated attacks on German factories and transport. But unlike Trenchard,Sykes, and Smuts, he ignored morale and favoured concentrated blows on vital

targets.3 In later years, notions of strategic bombing survived and its nextAmerican proponent, General William Mitchell, sought an independent air forceas well as a new pattern of aerial attack. In 1926 Mitchell told the House ofRepresentatives Committee on Military Affairs that acceptable targets included‘centers of population…anything that tended to keep up the war’.4 Some yearslater he wrote that ‘warfare by air will…bring about quick decisions. Superior airpower will cause such havoc or the threat of such havoc…that a long drawn outcampaign will be impossible’.5 Mitchell clearly combined the notion of terrorand deterrence within his developing theory, but in peacetime America suchviews were hardly likely to attract widespread support. Indeed the second anddominant concept of American strategic bombing implicitly rejected civilianslaughter for a narrower concept of aerial attack. By the 1930s humanitarianfeeling, tradition and technical progress had combined to produce a new theory ofbombing which was to shape American strategy until 1944. In 1935 Boeing builtthe first Flying Fortress, a fast, well armed aircraft, which seemed capable of selfdefence during daylight operations. The development of new bomb sights madeaccurate daytime bombing apparently more promising, and the native tradition ofsharpshooting gave further vigour to the idea of precision bombing.6

In these years, humanity and technology merged in the notion of selectivetargets but the new strategy was also the product of America’s own increasinglycomplex society. To the strategist living in an advanced economy its intricatecomplexities suggested a special vulnerability which could be exploited byscientific attack. If an economy’s workings could be understood, and its vitalsectors destroyed then its operation could be dislocated or paralysed by selectiveblows. Clearly such systematic destruction required analysis and intelligence butit promised an economical means to rapid victory. Thus by 1935 the notion ofdaylight precision bombing dominated American air strategy and before theinvention of radar aeronautical technology supported this optimistic notion offuture war.7

With the outbreak of war in Europe bombing soon passed from theory topractice and British leaders re-evaluated the Luftwaffe and Bomber Command.With Trenchard’s inheritance British fear of bombing was as potent as awarenessof its importance and Neville Chamberlain was reluctant to provoke Germanretaliation. In the first months of war Bomber Command attacked military targetsand dropped bales of leaflets, but losses and fear prevented a more ambitiousrole. On 14 May 1940 German bombers attacked Rotterdam and with Germanground advances, the air war reached its first important climax. Now withChurchill as premier, and a rapidly worsening military situation, R.A.F. bomberswere launched in night attacks against railways and refineries in the Ruhr.8 Bynight, narrow precision bombing was impossible, by day losses wereinsupportable. As a result, Bomber Command made night raids on industrialcentres where even inaccurate bombing might achieve some effect. Using thesemethods aircraft losses were only 2.3 percent but accuracy left much to bedesired.

138 INTRODUCTION TO A GUIDE TO THE REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES STRATEGICBOMBING SURVEY

In August 1941 the British government analysed the impact of 100 recentraids and discovered that ‘of those aircraft recorded as attacking their target onlyone in three got within five miles…over Germany as a whole the proportion wasone in four, over the Ruhr it was only one in ten’.9

If inaccuracy suggested illspent energies rising losses also overshadowedBomber Command. By November the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff stressed ‘thenecessity for conserving our resources’ and long range raids were abandoned.10

Yet by 14 February 1942 four-engined bombers were appearing and a newnavigational aid also gave hope of more efficient operations. What was more,objectives were now clearly defined as area raids in which ‘the primary objectof…operations should…be focused on the morale of the enemy civil population,and in particular of the industrial workers’.11

This new directive on area bombing was singularly appropriate to BomberCommand’s new Commander-in-Chief Air Marshal Harris. Like earlier prophetsof strategic bombing Harris believed that the heavy bomber was the decisiveweapon of modern war. If massive resources were invested in bomberproduction, and relentless attacks made on German cities, the economy of theReich would be broken and its population so demoralised that invading armieswould gain easy success. Sustained by iron belief and massive determinationHarris soon launched new methods and achieved mounting destructive success.At first the results of new navigational aids were disappointing but on 28 March1942 incendiaries devastated 200 acres of medieval Lubeck. Two months later athousand bombers flew in a planned stream to overwhelm German fighters anddestroyed six hundred acres of urban Cologne. Building upon theseachievements, Bomber Command created Pathfinder forces to mark importanttargets and began its major offensive in March 1943. Now using a new blindbombing aid, 600 acres of industrial Essen were badly damaged. In the summerthe Ruhr received spectacular devastation and Harris believed that victory was insight.12 In July 1943 radar jamming foil was used against Hamburg and fourmajor raids created fires and explosions which razed much of the city and killed50,000 of its citizens. Such victories inflated hopes and generated optimism butby autumn the tactical equilibrium had undergone a significant change. Germannight-fighter forces increased, and improved, and repeated strikes at Berlin onlyachieved inaccurate bombing and unacceptable casualties.13

Parallel to these night campaigns of area bombing the proponents of precisionbombing, the United States Army Air Force, were already practising daylightbombing from bases in the British isles.

In view of British abandonment of this older strategy American persistencemay appear surprising, but years of training, theory and technical preparationmade change inconceivable before the hard lessons of a practical campaign.14

Furthermore, American operations were slow to achieve momentum,and distractions delayed the ultimate test of their fundamental strategy. InAugust 1942 the first American B-17 raid took place from British airfields but itsscale was small. Two months later the Combined Chief of Staff ordered attacks


on submarine bases while the most efficient American units were transferred toNorth Africa to assist allied landings. In 1943 after the Combined Chiefs of Staffmet at Casablanca, American bombers were directed to attack submarine pens inthe long preparation for final landings in France. Thus it was not until later thatlarge raids on Germany began and the true cost of daylight operations becameobvious. In May the Combined Chiefs formulated their Combined Bomberoffensive plan which selected as targets submarine bases and yards, the Germanaircraft industry, ball bearing manufacture, oil production, synthetic rubber andmilitary transport plants. However, concern at German fighter strength was sogreat that it was singled out as a priority objective for ‘if the German fighterstrength was not arrested quickly it might become literally impossible to carry outthe destruction planned and thus to create the conditions necessary for ultimatedecisive action’.15 Throughout the summer the American Eighth Airforce beganits first major precision attacks.

Now Flying Fortresses and Liberators were flying deep into Germany and theravages of German fighters produced chilling results. In the first half of the year31% of B-17s over Germany were damaged.16 In the autumn losses rose furtherand by October losses of aircraft had become intolerable. On 14 October 228bombers raided ballbearing factories at Schweinfurt and the impossibility ofexisting tactics became unmistakable. 62 aircraft were lost, 138 damaged, and539 crewmen were killed in the assault.17 From this date on daylight missionsdeep into Germany were abandoned. Later the balance of forces was restored bythe appearance of long range fighters which could escort bombers and destroyGerman attackers under their own skies. But casualties in combat were not the fullmeasure of American failure.

Resistance, weather and human fallibility all obstructed the accuracy whichhad always been an axiom of the American Air Command. With the failure ofvisual bombing, United States planes increasingly resorted to radar to improvetheir destructive performance. With such techniques only large areas could formthe focus of a successful attack and such bombardment came to resemble areabombing in all but name.18

Both Britain and the United States had committed immense resources tostrategic bombing, and had modified this vast experiment in response to therealities of war, but in 1944 its final outcome remained far from certain. Thisnovel strategy inevitably posed unanswered questions and it was understandablethat planners should seek to evaluate the effectiveness of this major weapon.

In its early stages the appraisal of bombing was restricted to aerialphotography and overhead observation, but American notions of selective,scientific destruction placed a particular premium upon knowledge, analysis andintensive evaluation. These needs had already played a role in the establishmentof the Committee of Operations Analysts in Washington in December 1942. Thisnot only included military specialists but civilian economists and bankers whocontributed important knowledge on target information. This committeerecommended that ‘there should be continuing evaluation of the effectiveness of


air attack on enemy industrial and economic objectives in all theaters’.19 Thisnotion of the need for exhaustive, rigorous study was widespread within theUnited States Army Air Force but received its first concrete expression in theOffice of the Assistant Chief Air Staff Intelligence in late March 1944. In amemorandum to Assistant Chief Brigadier Thomas D.White, Major RalphA.Colbert, Chief of the European Branch of the Target Information Section,suggested the creation of ‘a Commission of experts, headed by USAAFIntelligence, prepared upon Germany’s defeat to conduct an investigation insideGermany which will disclose the true facts concerning the Strategic AerialBombardment of Europe, and on the basis of such facts, to prepare a reportanalysing the accomplishments and potentialities of air power as an independentinstrument of military strategy’. Such an organization would ‘provide the answerto questions of vital importance not only to the future of the USAAF but toNational Security and World Peace as well, such as to what extent was the originalmission of the Combined Bomber Offensive…accomplished?’ and ‘What wouldhave been required to achieve complete victory through strategic bombing?’

Colbert suggested that ‘the objective factual story of the first major test of theeffectiveness of strategic bombardment should be written by the organizationprimarily concerned, the USAAF’20 and his proposal was adopted by hissuperior and forwarded to the Commander of the Army Air Force, GeneralArnold.

Parallel with this current of opinion a second centre of forward thinking hadproduced a similar notion of a grand inquest on the bomber’s role. General MuirS.Fairchild, a member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and a creator ofthe Committee of Operations Analysts, also acted as a member of GeneralArnold’s Advisory Council and within this circle mentioned the need for a post-war study of the bomber offensive. As in the C.O.A. Fairchild was eager toutilise civilian specialists, but his proposal had no formal existence until two of hisCouncil colleagues, Lieutenant Colonel Ames and Brigadier General Cabell,were posted to the USAAF in London. Ames was now special assistant to MajorGeneral Frederick L.Anderson, Deputy Commander for Operations in the U.S.Strategic Air Forces, and like Colbert addressed his superior on the need for asurvey of strategic attacks. Like Colbert he believed that such a survey shouldprovide data for ‘application in the war against Japan and may well prove thefoundation of future doctrine in the employment of air power’.21 However,Ames’ letter also contributed the new notion of an independent civilian chairmanfor such a survey, an idea which was to deeply affect future events. Andersonwas impressed by this proposal and commended it to his Commander in Chief,General Carl Spaatz. On 5 April 1944, Spaatz wrote to General Arnold inWashington to press the idea and suggested that the survey be carried out by asmall committee which ‘would include senior Air Force Officers and be assistedby a group of military and civilian experts in the various fields of Germanmilitary economic and political life’. Like Ames, Spaatz favoured anindependent chairman to ensure that its report would be received as unbiased and


completely impartial and proposed ‘that some well known publisher, jurist oruniversity president…be chosen for this post’.22 But even before a reply wasreceived to this important proposal Ames was appointed to begin preparatorydiscussion of such a survey with appropriate American and British agencies inLondon. In late April Spaatz wrote to General Arnold advocating action. Hefeared that further delay might lead to American independence in the surveybeing impaired. In a letter to General Arnold, Spaatz urged speed and action. Infact, Arnold had already approved Spaatz’ proposal and on 21 April hadrequested his views on ‘the skeleton organization in order that we may give youadditional help’.23 By May consultations in Washington had established that thesurvey was to be a large scale undertaking and a project of this importance couldnot proceed without approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 6 June the JointChiefs agreed and by now further major decisions had been communicated toLondon. Despite Anglo-American discussions Arnold, like Spaatz, favoured anindependent American survey while in presenting the project, the need for speed—to assist in the war against Japan—was to be a major theme.

In London, tentative planning continued throughout June but it was not until 7July that specialist officers arrived to continue preparations with renewed vigour.Not surprisingly, Major Colbert was entrusted with this mission while ColonelKoenig, who had experience of bombing as well as pre-war service in Berlin,was appointed his associate. In subsequent weeks there were conflicts,consultation, and abortive experimental surveys but by 5 September the newbody’s outlines were clear. On that day Koenig had completed a detailedprogress report on two months activity which proposed that the survey bedivided into Physical Damage, Strategic Operations, Political and Morale,Economic and Military Effects Divisions. These would operate from a Londonheadquarters and regional headquarters in France and Germany, and wouldcomprise some 1579 officers, civilians and men. Koenig emphasised the need forspeed if conditions were to be surveyed ‘while the damage factors are stillunreconstructed’.24 Clearly the scale of the projected enterprise had grownrapidly from the 20–30 men envisaged in April, but no director, specialisedpersonnel or definition of objectives had been specified, and allied forces werealready advancing into occupied territory. This well shaped report added impetusto activity in Washington where preparations were already well under way.

In August, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, James Lovett, was approachedby Arnold to help in the selection of a director and, with his interest aroused, beganvigorous prosecution of the new cause. At first he suggested that selection ofsome ‘outstanding impartial institution such as Harvard, M.I.T., University ofCalifornia (to)…accept the responsibility for monitoring the enterprise…’.25 Thisnotion was abortive but in drafting a letter to be signed by Roosevelt, Lovettgave vital energy to the half launched scheme.

Roosevelt’s letter to Secretary of War, Stimson, stated that ‘in connection withair attacks on Japan and postwar planning it would be valuable to obtain animpartial and expert study of the effects of aerial attack on Germany’.26 As in


Koenig’s outline this letter proposed not only the study of effects on industry butof social issues such as evacuation and food supplies, and the social impact ofaerial destruction. In its broad scope and authority this single document signalledthat a sweeping investigation was approved and removed much delay andobstruction from its administrative path.

Koenig returned to London on 24 September and continued activepreparations for the survey’s future activities. Field teams of the PhysicalDamage and Economic Divisions carried out experimental surveys but without adirector there were limits to the scope of serious constructive activity. Dr.Sproul, President of the University of California, responded favourably toLovett’s invitation but the University obstructed his appointment and it was notuntil October that General Arnold successfully approached Franklin D’Olier, thehead of the Prudential Insurance Company, to accept the leadership of the half-formed organization.27 Now the survey’s director was faced by the task ofselecting skilled assistants to help in his new enterprise.

In approaching the selection of personnel the new Director envisaged hisorganization as a ‘sort of holding company of which he was Chairman of theboard, advised by a board of directors each of which was the director (president)of an operating company of an autonomous nature’.28 As his vice-chairman heselected Robert Lovett’s friend, Henry Alexander, a Director and Vice-presidentof J.P.Morgan and Co., while government and private industry were scoured forcivilians with specialist knowledge and administrative experience. Within a weekGeorge Ball, a Bombing Research Analyst with the A.A.F. Evaluation Board,was selected to head the Transport and Machine Tool Division. Paul Nitze fromthe Foreign Economic Administration was to supervise the Ball Bearing andMachine Tool Section. Professor Bowman, head of the department of CivilEngineering at Drexel Institute, Philadelphia. would head the Physical DamageDivision, while the Vice President of Newmont Mining Company wouldadminister the Steel and Munitions Division. This initial team of directors wascompleted by Dr. Rensis Likert of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s ProgramSurveys Division, who was to be in charge of morale analysis. Recruitment hadnot been completed but on 4 November this small vanguard left for London tobegin the real work of organization. Empowered by directives from the heads ofthe armed services, work could now begin in earnest and a revised organizationalstructure was soon presented. The scope of the five existing directors’ divisionswas more clearly defined and Aircraft, Oil, and Overall Economic EffectsDivisions were projected. Now, with headquarters established at 20 GrosvenorSquare, recruitment and the procurement of supplies and transport, proceededrapidly. By 25 November the Adjutant General authorised a complement of 300officers and 500 enlisted men. Soon after, 300 civilians were recruited to assist inresearch analysis. By December, Theodore Wright, the Director of U.S. CivilAeronautics, had been appointed head of the Aircraft Division. Robert Russell,of Standard Oil was to be director of the Oil Section and Frank McNamee,Deputy Head of U.S. Civil Defence, was selected to direct a newly added Civil


Defence Division. By April 1945, John Kenneth Galbraith of the Office of PriceAdministration had been appointed to head the Overall Economic EffectsDivision, and with this the directorate was finally complete for its Europeanwork. D’Olier’s philosophy of organization was drawn from the world ofbusiness and manufacturing and virtually all his fellow directors were importantfigures in the world of private corporations. One critic has described them as‘novices in the field of enquiry’.29 In a narrow sense this may have been true butsuch figures as Wright, Russell and Nitze, were men of energy and organizationalcapacity, and their knowledge of the technical fields to be surveyed clearlyoutranked that of any military personnel. What is more they brought to thesurvey’s work techniques from business and industry which might well havebeen neglected by purely military investigators.

Yet the completion of D’Olier’s directorate was only a symbolic end to a longphase of intellectual and organizational preparation which ante dated his own andeven Colonel Koenig’s appointment. Before sites could be investigated threeprocesses were essential. These required a concentrated programme of variedactivity. All potentially relevant information had to be garnered from both Britishand American Intelligence organs, such as the Office of Strategic Services andthe Economic Warfare Divison of the United States Embassy. Secondly,factories, Ministries, and high officials had to be selected for survey, the seizureof documents and intensive interrogation. Finally, and most difficult, principlesfor analysis and speedy on the spot investigation had to be evolved. The natureof the survey placed a premium upon speedy entry into liberated territory whilethe novelty and scale of the enterprise created daunting problems of logistics andmethod. Furthermore, close consultation and co-operation with operationalcommanders was also a matter of pressing importance.30

In a sense these complex preparations continued and changed in response tomodified circumstances but three organizational developments were of centralimportance to the survey’s working history. In the early preparatory phase themost important section, and the most clearly formed, was the Physical DamageDivision whose purpose was obvious and whose work was clearly identified. Inthe early months of 1945 as the broader social, economic and military purposesof the survey came to assume greater importance this division was drasticallyreduced to provide personnel for other sectors.31 Besides the redistribution ofmanpower, awareness of the practical implications of the survey’s tasks createdtwo new important agencies to serve the researchers at and below the directoriallevel. If reports were to be produced rapidly a Secretariat was a necessity. Thissoon grew to a considerable size. In addition, the decision to feed all Americanand British units’ attack data into an I.B.M. punch card system to produceotherwise unobtainable statistics created the need for a tabulating section. This wasthen used for much wider purposes. Here D’Olier’s connection with thePrudential Insurance Company enabled the survey to make use of its facilities inits broadening analytical activity.32


By April 1945 teams from the twelve divisions of the survey were active inFrance, Belgium and Germany and had established regional headquarters at St.Germain-en-Laye, Brussels, Strasbourg, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Cologne, andEssen; with the most important forward headquarters at the West German spa ofBad Nauheim. The intellectual and logistic problems of the survey wereintrinsically complex but the investigators faced other obstacles, both allied andenemy, which further exacerbated their considerable difficulties. For some timeeven the survey’s written authorisations were questioned by local commanders.Other intelligence agencies often competed in securing documents while alliedtroops themselves at times scattered materials in the excitement of victory.Furthermore, refugees and displaced persons destroyed important documents inthe anarchy of 1945. Naturally the German authorities hid and destroyed as muchimportant documentation as possible and the success of survey teams in locatingmaterial in caves, coffins and other irregular libraries testified to theeffectiveness of their operations.

Perhaps the most spectacular success of the survey were accomplished by itsG-2 or intelligence service which found Albert Speer at Flensburg on 10 Mayand carried out some ten days of interrogations. At a later stage Goering, Doenitzand other leaders were interrogated at Bad Neuheim.

From its earliest beginning the survey had been concerned at the attitudewhich the Soviet Union might take to its activities, and difficulty of access totarget sites which were in Soviet hands always prevented a totallycomprehensive survey. Certainly the Soviet Union never gave carte blanche toAmerican survey activity but in the months before the close of the European warsurvey personnel sometimes received assistance from Soviet forces. However,the most important activities in Soviet occupation zones were far more irregularand took place with no suggestion of formal approval. On 16 July representativesof the Equipment, Munitions and Overall Economic Effects Division arrived inBerlin in search of the one time chief economist of the Speer Ministry, RolfWagenfuehr. Wagenfuehr was already working for the Russian forces but hehanded over a copy of his recently completed history of the German economy inthe interwar and wartime years. Following this limited success the investigatorslater obtained a key to the safe in the Air Ministry containing its record of theeffects of allied bombing. They then entered the Russian zone and succeeded inobtaining the required documents. This was followed by other similar successesand the final seizure of Wagenfuehr and his removal to the American zone.33

Perhaps of more technical interest than these irregular forays were theattempts made by the survey to go beyond interrogation and the retrieval oftraditional documents into new areas of investigation. Morale, which was fromthe first an element of serious concern, could not be studied from any existingsources. Thus the Morale Survey attempted to use the latest techniques ofsampling and social survey to construct an image of popular attitudes during theyears of aerial assault. This involved the distribution, collection, and translation


of several thousand questionnaires and the final analysis of five million punchcards by I.B.M. tabulating machines.34

Despite the historical significance of the survey’s social investigation the mosturgent of its tasks was the production of conclusions which could be of value inthe bombardment of Japan. On 9 June the chairman, the vice chairman and fourdirectors were questioned by the Joint Target Group in Washington. Two dayslater a further series of meetings began with large all service groupings, and theseries reached its climax in a meeting with General Marshall and the Secretariesof War and the Navy.35

At this stage the survey’s conclusions were far from definite but theirrecommendations were clearly based on hard experience. While existing plansfavoured the destruction of Japanese urban centres the survey proposed that blowsagainst Japanese rail and coastal transport would be the most effective way ofdestroying the enemy’s capacity for serious resistance. In later weeks paperswere submitted which re-echoed this argument, and the case for attacks on oil,chemicals and electric power. These priorities and the dubious benefits of anattack on Japanese civilian morale were ultimately included in the instructionswhich General Spaatz took to the Pacific Theater.36

On 6 July in the midst of completing the final report on the European theater,D’Olier was asked to carry out a similar inquest in Japan. By now it seemedpossible that Japan might be defeated by bombing alone and it would clearly beof great advantage to Army Air Force leaders to have this clearly stated by anindependent body. On 15 August 1945, President Truman formally wrote toD’Olier asking him to carry out a survey in the Pacific; but in this case the termswere far broader than in the European theater. Now bombing was redefined toinclude all Naval as well as Army Air Force attacks, while atomic weapons wereinevitably a focus of the new study.37

For the new task there were immediate problems of manpower and leadershipas well as the need to begin operations as soon as possible after the Japanesedecision to surrender.

Henry Alexander, Vice Chairman in Europe, was unable to continue in anactive capacity. George Ball and Robert Russell returned to civilian life, whileFred Searls was unable to be more than a nominal director. As a result Paul Nitzereplaced Alexander as the executive leader of the organization. Dr. MontagueSpaght of Shell took over the Oil and Chemicals investigation, while Dr. LouisThomson of the United States Public Health Administration administered a newindependent Medical Section. As naval activities now fell within the orbit of thesurvey, Rear Admiral Ralph A.Ofstie joined the Board of Military Advisors.There were other significant changes of analytical emphasis. The Area StudiesDivision was replaced by an Urban Studies Division which placed greateremphasis on economic dislocation, while Capital Equipment and Construction,Basic Materials, Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies were other newdivisions created for the investigation in the Pacific.38


The transfer of personnel from Europe to the Far East took place withremarkable speed. By 4 September, two days after the signing of the JapaneseSurrender an advance party arrived in Tokyo and by the end of the month severalhundred survey members were at work in Japan.39 Headquarters were establishedin Tokyo while provincial offices were established in Hiroshima, Nagasaki,Osaka and Nagoya. In many respects conditions for an effective survey were farmore favourable than in Europe. Japan had surrendered with her administrationintact, and by the time survey personnel arrived many of her forces weredisarmed and domestic peace was restored. In comparison with the Third Reich,documents were few as fire raids had been particularly destructive; but Japaneseattitudes were surprisingly helpful to the survey authorities. Having suffereddefeat, Japanese industrialists and officials seemed eager to adapt to immediatepolitical realities and were markedly willing to provide introductions, documentsand co-operation. Many Japanese civil servants filled in questionnaires withpainstaking care, others created helpful contacts with politicians and courtierswhile some acted as willing interpreters for American personnel.40 The absenceof documents made interrogation a far more vital source of information than inGermany and hundreds of leading figures were interrogated at length in anexceptionally efficient programme.41 The subjects of such interrogations wereextremely wide ranging, but in contrast to Europe, capitulation in the aftermath ofatomic bombing raised the issue of the impact of bombing on the decision tosurrender. This inspired detailed investigation into Japan’s political system andits working during the Pacific War.

As in Europe the elusive concept of public morale was a subject ofcomprehensive enquiry and a large scale sample survey was carried out inselected communities throughout Japan’s main island. This combined with thequestioning of influential citizens produced the first major social survey in thehistory of modern Japan. Many interviews with ordinary citizens were recordedon primitive tape recorders to simplify problems of linguistic difficulty.42

Much activity in Japan clearly paralleled that which had taken place in Europebut in this theater the scope of the survey extended far beyond the mainland of thedefeated enemy. The order to analyse all forms of aerial attack not only impliedan analysis of carrierborne raids on Japan’s home islands, but an immense studyof the role of aviation throughout the islands of the Pacific Ocean. To fulfill thismission the Chairman left Japan on 19 November for Shanghai, Manila, Leyte,Morotai, Biak, Hollandia, Rabaul, Bougainville and Guadalcanal.43 This journeyis but one indication of the enormous distances that were covered by leadingfigures in the survey and by large numbers of rank and file personnel.

If this geographical scope created immense problems of distance, the militaryscope of the survey generated a species of conflict which had been totally absentin the European theater. With the war won and both Naval and Air Forcesections being present in the survey, a dispute erupted as to the relative role ofthe two services in achieving victory.44 By 1945 this issue was not merely amatter of inter service rivalry and rival claims to historical recognition but one


which might determine the future structure of the American armed services. Onthe one hand was the traditional claim, dating from the days of William Mitchell,for an independent air arm, while on the other were calls for the unification of allmilitary services. Thus the writing of history could be of vital importance indetermining the future independence or disappearance of mighty organizations.Furthermore, in view of the development of nuclear weapons and the newelement which they brought to military strategy it was essential to use recentexperience to prevent reckless demobilisation in the post war world. In thiscontext it was inevitable that the Navy’s chief representative on the survey wouldact as the uninhibited spokesman of service interest. In Rear Admiral Ofstie’swords there was need for a ‘thorough study of all prior operations which broughtus within striking range of the Japanese homeland and without which therewould have been no successful conclusion of the war’.45 This clearly went farbeyond the scope of the survey’s original directive involving all types of airattack. Naturally this provoked opposition from the Army Air Force’s GeneralAnderson. Opposition, however, could prevent neither conflict nor Navalsurveys which swept heedlessly beyond the widest notions of air attack. Alreadywhile the Military and Naval Analysis Divisions were carrying out research inTokyo, friction had developed over a draft Naval publication The Carrier AirEffort Against Japan.46 This made no effort to confine itself to carrier strikes onmetropolitan Japan but was a history of the carrier role throughout the PacificWar. Following in the same vein the Air Force’s champions within the surveyplanned an equally partisan volume. This was deeply repugnant to Paul Nitze,the effective chairman of the survey in Japan. In the immediate post war monthsthe internecine rivalry continued and reached its climax in the publication of TheCampaigns of the Pacific War (1946) devoted purely to Naval operations and itscounterblast Air Campaigns of the Pacific War which appeared in 1947. Yetthese represented only the most conspicuous symbols of interservice jousting, forthe Naval division had devoted considerable attention and a whole series ofpublications to naval bombardments of the Japanese shoreline. Despite theirinherent interest these activities strayed beyond the untidy limits of PresidentTruman’s original letter.

Yet despite this side-stage thunder the activities of the survey in the Pacificwere an impressive model of businesslike military organisation and what it canachieve. Within three months of the pioneer party arriving in Tokyo the survey’swork was effectively completed and most of its personnel returned to the UnitedStates by the end of the year.

The end of field work marked the conclusion of the survey’s period of fullyfledged operations but much work remained to be completed. The Directorscould now return to their normal occupations, breaking from time to time todiscuss the final phase of editorial and interpretive policy. For important militarypersonnel there were also new assignments so that a neat rapid end to surveyactivity was scarcely possible. The completion of this vast venture was to takesome time but by September 1945 the Summary Report on the European War had


been made public and a steady stream of important European reports were madeavailable for sale. On 1 July 1946 the Chairman’s Report on the Pacific Warappeared along with a study of the Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima andNagasaki, and the political analysis of Japan’s Struggle to End the War. Thesekey reports on the conflict in Europe and the Pacific were documents of majorpermanent significance. Both treated the role of strategic bombing with squareobjectivity, free from service malice. This made them pioneering statements onthe history of major military aspects of the Second World War. In analysing theEuropean programme of aerial destruction the Summary Report (European War)emphasised the failures as well as the successes of strategic air attack, and theimportance of total air superiority in making bombardment successful.47 In theparallel verdict on Japanese defeat emphasis was placed on the inability of Japanto continue resistance beyond the end of 1945, even without the use of atomicweapons.48 Reports on the two theaters continued to appear until October 1947.By then over 33,000 pages of research findings had been issued though somewere to remain classified for a further quarter of a century.49 In addition to theirstatements on the human and physical detail of the great age of strategic bombingthe central reports provided recommendations which formed part of a brisk shiftof American military policy.

The survey’s ultimate message was the importance of military vigilance, theneed for a centralized intelligence service and the need for a separate air force.50

It would be rash to claim that this alone inspired America’s worldwide militaryrole, her establishment of an independent air force and the creation of the CentralIntelligence Agency, but without this inspiration the process may well have beenless swift, sure and resolute.51

EDITORIAL METHOD

Although the reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey are theproduct of a single organisation their format is far from consistent. Many of thereports which describe the European Theater were published in great haste andwere not fully indexed or paginated. In contrast, the reports which analyse thePacific War were written in postwar tranquility. Nevertheless the variousDivisions of the Pacific Survey often adopted different styles of printing andpresentation, and in both theaters such terms as appendix, exhibit and chapterwere used without common definition or consistency. In view of these variationsand irregularities it has been extremely difficult to determine the best means ofindicating the contents of each report in this Guide.

In principle three guidelines have been followed in an attempt to impose someconsistency on this vast and varied material. Firstly the survey’s most wide-ranging reports, those issued by the Chairman’s Office, have been described inthe greatest detail. Secondly, in all other cases, chapter headings form the basisof descriptive summaries. As no common definition of a chapter existed this hassometimes involved arbitrary decisions but it is hoped that the summaries which


are provided are sufficiently detailed to enable any scholar to grasp the maincharacter of a report and its likely historical value. Finally limitations of spacehave made it impossible to list all exhibits and appendices and where theseconsist of statistics, lists, photographs and drawings only the general characterand scale of such materials has been indicated. However, great care has beentaken to list all documentary exhibits and appendices. These include manytranslations of military and civilian documents and interrogations, all of whichappear of great intrinsic value to historians. In some cases such documents maybe of greater historical value than the texts of the reports themselves, asresearchers may use them to draw their own conclusions. These may differ fromthose of the original authors. In short, this Guide aims to indicate the length,contents and documentary appendices of the reports and where no paginationexists an approximate page count has been included to enable the scholar toassess a report’s length and detail. In cases where reports appeared inmimeographed typescript or some form which differs from the printed page thishas also been indicated, as has the date of the survey’s field research. Clearly theprecise details of many of the reports can only be understood by a direct resort tothe original texts but it is hoped that the information in this Guide will leadhistorians to new sources of information and interpretation.

NOTES

1. Webster and Frankland, I, 34–37.2. Despatch of Trenchard 1 January 1919 and C.A.S. Memo 27 June 1918 quoted in

Webster and Frankland, I, 46.3. G.Shandroff, ‘The Evolution of Area Bombing in American Doctrine and Practice’

(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1972), 19.4. United States House of Representatives 68th Congress 1st Session, House

Committee on Military Affairs, Department of Defense and Unification of AirServices (Washington, 1926), 397, quoted in Shandroff, 21.

5. W.Mitchell, Skyways (Philadelphia, 1930), 256, quoted in Shandroff, 24.6. Ibid., 25–27.7. Ibid., 33.8. Ibid., 57.9. Report by Mr. Butt to Bomber Command on his Examination of Night

Photographs, 18 August 1941, reprinted in Webster and Frankland, IV, 205.10. 13 November 1941, Air Vice-Marshall N.H. Bottomley (Deputy Chief of the Air

Staff) to Air Marshall Sir Richard Peirse, reprinted in Webster and Franklaiid, IV,142.

11. 14 February 1942, Air Vice-Marshall N.H. Bottomley (Deputy Chief of the AirStaff) to Air Marshall J.E.A.Baldwin (Acting Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief,Bomber Command), reprinted Webster and Frankland, IV, 144.

12. M.Middlebrook, The Nuremberg Raid, 30–31 March 1944 (London, 1974), 21.13. Ibid., 78–80.14. Shandroff, 67.


15. The Combined Bomber offensive from the United Kingdom (Pointblank) asapproved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 14 May 1943, reprinted in Webster andFrankland IV, 275, for the background to the document see MacIsaac, 15.

16. Shandroff, 81.17. Ibid., 82.18. Ibid., 94.19. Memorandum for Lt. General Arnold entitled ‘Report of Committee of Operations

Analysts with respect to the C.B.O. Plan for Operation POINTBLANK’ quoted inMacIsaac, 25.

20. Dated 27 March 1944, quoted in MacIsaac, 27–28. A large collection of importantdocuments relevant to the history of the U.S.S.B.S. is appended to Beveridge.

21. Letter—James B.Ames to Major General F.L.Anderson, Deputy Commander,Operations, 28 March 1944: SUBJECT: Proposed Committee to Survey Results ofCombined Bomber Offensive (4th Document in the Appendix of supportingdocuments attached to Volume I of Beveridge).

22. Quoted in MacIsaac, 31–32.23. Quoted in Ibid., 35.24. Executive Director Strategic Bombing Effects Survey: Strategic Bombing Effects

Survey, Report of Progress, 5 July 1944–1 September 1944, p. 1B, quoted inMacIsaac, 47.

25. James Lovett to Carl Spaatz, 3 September 1944, quoted in MacIsaac, 45–46.26. Franklin D.Roosevelt to the Secretary of War, 9 September 1944 reproduced as the

53rd document in the appendix of Beveridge. 27. For details of D’Olier’s early career and that of the Directors of the Survey see

Appendix, ‘The Chairman and Directors of the United States Strategic BombingSurvey’ below.

28. MacIsaac, 54.29. S.Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords, 1904–46 (London, 1978), 389.30. For an excellent study of this stage of the Survey’s preparations see MacIsaac, 51–

74.31. Ibid., 70–71.32. For details of the Secretariat and the Tabulating Service Section see Beveridge,

221– 234.33. For an incisive study of the Survey’s activities in Europe see MacIsaac, 77–102.34. The Morale Division’s activities are described in Beveridge, 360–377.35. MacIsaac, 99.36. Ibid., 101.37. Ibid., 107.38. The official chart of the Survey’s organization in the Pacific is reproduced in

MacIsaac, 112.39. Ibid., 116–119.40. See Beveridge, 11, 36–40.41. For a list of Japanese leaders who were interrogated see M.B.Guptil and J.

Mendelsohn, Records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Inventory ofRecord Group 243 (Washington, D.C., 1975), 43–60.

42. For details of the Morale Division’s activities in Japan see Beveridge, II, 189–202.43. MacIsaac, 117.44. Ibid., 119–135.


45. 16 September 1945; see Ibid., 125.46. Ibid., 127.47. United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, European War

(Washington D.C., 1945), 16–18.48. United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, Pacific War

(Washington D.C., 1946), 26.49. In addition to the Survey’s reports virtually all its Archives have been declassified

and are available in the Modern Military Section of the National Archives,Washington D.C. For a useful introduction to this collection see M.B.Guptil andJ.Mendelsohn, Records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Inventoryof Record Group 243 (Washington, D.C., 1975). A comprehensive listing is UnitedStates Strategic Bombing Survey; Index to Records of the United States StrategicBombing Survey (Washington, D.C., 1947). This index is available on microfilmfrom the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

50. United States Strategic Bombing Survey; Summary Report, Pacific War, 30–32.51. MacIsaac, 164. For examples of the widespread consultation in which D’Olier and

his colleagues participated after returning to the United States see Beveridge, II,221–222.


First published in History Today, Vol. 32, January 1982

18Before Hiroshima: The Bombing of Japan,

1944–45

ON 5TH JULY, 1928 the citizens of Osaka, Japan’s second largest city,experienced blacked-out streets and air raid sirens for the first time. Long beforePearl Harbor Japanese leaders recognised bombing as a danger, and began airraid drills in major cities. At first these were amateurish rehearsals; but as warapproached new laws and organisations laid the foundations of nationwide civildefence. In April 1937 the Air Defence Law was passed, and two years later theGreater Japan Air Defence Association began a programme of training andpropaganda.

Despite these early beginnings Japan’s military leaders paid surprisingly littleattention to American air power. On the eve of war Prime Minister Tojo believedthat overseas conquests would protect Japan from heavy bombing, and declared‘Preparations for homeland air defence must not interfere with the operations ofour armed forces overseas’. Japan’s conquests in South East Asia confirmed thismisplaced confidence, and her air defences lagged far behind those of Britain andGermany. But in these years of Japanese complacency America was preparingthe B-29, a fast, well-armed bomber able to raid Japan from distant bases. InSeptember 1942 its test flights began at Seattle, and in June 1944 a force ofB-29s arrived in China to launch attacks on the Japanese mainland.

News of the B-29 and the devastation of German cities gradually destroyed theassumptions of Japanese strategists. On April 18th, 1942 sixteen carrier-borneB-25s had made a symbolic raid on Tokyo, Nagoya and Kobe, but by 1943 itwas clear that Japan would soon face more destructive attacks. Now civil andmilitary defence became matters of unprecedented importance.

In many respects Japan had important advantages in civil defence preparations.Her population was homogenous, united and disciplined, and in 1940 thegovernment had converted voluntary neighbourhood associations intocompulsory organisations under Home Ministry control. These groups provideda ready basis for co-operation in wartime emergencies. The Japanese family wasyet another element of strength in civil defence planning. Most city dwellersretained close links with relatives in the country so that evacuation posed lessdifficulties than in many European countries.

In December 1943 the Japanese government presented its first proposals forevacuation. Ministers recommended that children and those without war work

should leave greater Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka and North Kyushu. Evacueeswere expected to live with relatives in the country but the government gave littlehelp in implementing its programme. In fact evacuation gained little momentumuntil June 1944 when B-29s made their first raid on Northern Kyushu. At thistime Ministers again called for the evacuation of children to the homes ofrelatives, and special provision was made for those with no grandparents in thecountry. Under this new plan third to sixth year junior school pupils were to beevacuated in groups. Teachers would supervise them, and they would livetogether in temples, inns and public halls. Few parents were happy at the prospectof divided families but official persuasion and propaganda overcame much oftheir resistance. By September 1944 over 411,000 children had been evacuatedwith their teachers, but outside the four great conurbations little organiseddispersal had taken place.

As fear of bombing intensified, the Japanese government made plans toprotect their cramped wooden cities from fiery destruction. The repetition ofsimple ‘bucket relay’ fire drills formed one element of official policy; but urbansurgery was the most dramatic sphere of government action. In November 1943municipalities began destroying buildings to create fire breaks. Belts up to 120feet wide were cleared of all houses, while around public buildings everythingwas razed to the ground. Citizens whose homes were destroyed werecompensated, but no alternative accommodation was provided. Like evacueesthey were expected to share the homes of friends and relatives. By the end of thewar 1,800,000 people had lost their homes as a result of these air raidprecautions.

Evacuation and destruction made few demands on national resources, butshelter construction required supplies of important materials. In 1943 thegovernment urged the building of public and family shelters; but cement andsteel were in short supply. A few concrete bunkers were built for importantpersons but plank-covered trenches had to suffice for most civilians. Theseunsafe, insanitary shelters remained the only refuge for most Japanese.

If Japan’s civilian defence was inadequate her military protection was almosttotally ineffective. From the beginning of the war Japan possessed a warningsystem of picket boats, radar and observation platforms, but these were never morethan a faulty shield. Japan’s radar could not cope with very high or low flyingaircraft; it could not detect the altitude of enemy bombers, and was too crude foroperators to judge the types of aircraft which crossed their screens. There wasoften poor communication between observers, radar and fighter stations and thiscreated unnecessary delays in mounting counter-attacks.

Even more serious difficulties stemmed from the aircraft whichconstituted Japan’s fighter forces. During the war attempts were made toimprove their quality and organisation, but overall they were outclassed by thetechnical quality of the B-29. The new American bomber could cruise withoutdifficulty at 30,000 feet whereas few Japanese fighters could attack effectively atthis altitude. Japan had no properly equipped night fighters and attempts to


produce a jet fighter were still incomplete at the end of the war. Japanese forceswere also handicapped by a shortage of good pilots for many had been lost inoverseas campaigns. Aircraft fuel was yet a further difficulty. In 1944 Americansubmarines destroyed many tankers and imports were insufficient for a fullprogramme of training flights. Like all Japan’s military forces her fighter unitswere hopelessly overcommitted. In early 1945 some squadrons were transferredto the Philippines, others were needed in Okinawa while many aircraft were heldin reserve for an expected invasion.

Like her radar and aircraft Japan’s anti-aircraft guns were also obsolete andinadequate. After four years of war there were still insufficient guns to protect alltowns and cities, and the fire of many batteries could not reach the altitude ofB-29 formations. Japan’s gun-laying system was also ineffective and she lackedsufficient low calibre weapons to ward off low level attacks. In comparison withthe formidable barrages which defended German cities, Japanese fire was bothweak and inaccurate.

In June 1944 the United States Army Air Force planned to defeat Japan byscientific precision bombing. Its commanders believed that the B-29 coulddestroy key targets and paralyse Japan’s economy and war-making power. Tocarry out this policy B-29s based in China began by attacking the Yawata steelworks which produced 24 per cent of Japan’s rolled steel. In many respects thisfirst raid indicated the difficulties of accurate bombing with a new, complexaircraft. Of seventy-five bombers scheduled to attack Yawata seven were unableto take off, one soon crashed, and a further four returned to base with mechanicaldifficulties. When the B-29s reached their target they found it fully blacked outand thirty-two planes were forced to bomb by radar. Fifteen bombed visually andsix were forced to jettison their bombs due to technical difficulties. Japanesefighters and anti-aircraft batteries mounted no serious opposition, but the Yawatasteel works suffered no real damage. This was to be the pattern of most raidsfrom Chinese bases. The complex instruments of the new bomber, insufficientaircraft and hastily trained crews all contributed to ineffective bombing.

At the time of these unsuccessful raids American forces were battling forbases closer to the Japanese mainland. In June 1944 they invaded Saipan, and byAugust had occupied all the Mariana islands. Immediately construction unitsbegan building large bomber bases, and in October the first B-29s arrived. Tokyoand all Japan’s major cities were within range of the new airfields and onNovember 24th 110 bombers attacked the Nakajima aircraft factory on theoutskirts of Tokyo. This was a high altitude daylight raid, but it was no moresuccessful than the night attacks which had been launched from China. Asbefore, Japanese opposition was ineffective but thick cloud and strong windsmade accurate bombing almost impossible. Later raids on aircraft factories wereequally disappointing. In fact the indirect effects of bombing were moresignificant than physical destruction. Fearing air raids, aircraft manufacturersbegan to disperse their plants to remote villages. The resulting disruptionseriously reduced the output of fighter aircraft.

BEFORE HIROSHIMA: THE BOMBING OF JAPAN, 1944–45 155

Inconclusive attacks continued, and on January 20th, 1945 General HaywoodHansell, commander of the Mariana force, was replaced by General Curtis LeMay. The new commander was a decisive and resourceful airman with wideexperience of bombing in Germany and Manchuria. At first Le May continuedprecision raids but he also experimented with incendiary attacks on Japanesecities. Such raids had a dual purpose; to destroy small workshops which providedcomponents for large factories, and to demonstrate America’s enormous powerto the Japanese people. On February 4th sixty-nine bombers attacked Kobe withincendiaries and 2.5 million square feet of the city were destroyed. Three weekslater 172 aircraft bombed Tokyo and 27,000 buildings were burnt out. Afterthese successes Le May adopted a dramatic new tactic. By early March over 300B-29s had been assembled in the Marianas and he decided to launch these in aconcentrated night attack on Tokyo. All aircraft were stripped of armament sothat large incendiary loads could be carried, and they bombed in smallformations, at 7,000 feet, to confuse Japanese radar. Many thought this ahazardous enterprise but the vast scale and novelty of the raid utterly confusedTokyo’s defenders. On March 9th, 279 B-29s rained 1,665 tons of incendiarieson the densely populated North East section of the city. Tightly-packed woodenbuildings blazed instantly, and a high wind whipped the flames into an immenseinferno. Some canals boiled and others were choked with corpses as thousandssought refuge from the swirling fire. In the midst of this disaster fire brigades and


neighbourhood associations were helpless. Medical posts and hospitals wereovercome by flames, and by dawn 83,700 people were dead, 40,000 injured andover a million homeless. Fifteen square miles of Tokyo were a charredwilderness.

This immense disaster transformed both public attitudes and official policies.The evacuation of schoolchildren was extended to include first and second-yearpupils, much civil defence training was abandoned, and thousands of terrifiedcivilians streamed into the countryside. In the past exhortations to leave citieshad been ineffective, now fear drove people to seek safety wherever they could.

For General Le May the attack had been an overwhelming success and hequickly applied his new tactics to other cities. On March 11th 285 bombersdropped 1,700 tons of incendiaries on Nagoya. Two days later 270 B-29sattacked Osaka. On March 16th 66,000 buildings in Kobe were burnt to theground. A second raid on Nagoya started 192 fires. Within ten days Americanbombers had destroyed thirty-two square miles of urban Japan. The destruction ofJapan had begun in earnest, but stocks of incendiaries were exhausted.

Before new supplies of incendiaries arrived the B-29s turned to assist theinvasion of Okinawa. While American landing craft massed to attack, bombersfrom the Marianas raided airfields in Kyushu, Okinawa’s forward defence. Atthe height of the battle these sorties continued, and for almost a month thesetargets replaced Japanese cities as the main objective of the bomber fleet.

Top: The theatre of the Pacific War.Below: The B-29 target cities in Japan.

BEFORE HIROSHIMA: THE BOMBING OF JAPAN, 1944–45 157

By April 13th more incendiary bombs had been received and the destructionof Tokyo and major cities was resumed. In May the first 500 bomber raid waslaunched, and in two nights eighteen square miles of the capital were destroyed.By this time American bombers had a further advantage. In March United Statesforces had taken Iwojima; from there Mustang fighters could escort B-29s to theJapanese mainland. On May 25th Mustangs accompanied bombers on a majorraid on Yokohama. They destroyed twenty-six Japanese interceptors, andincreasingly Japanese defences disintegrated before the combined force ofAmerican bomber and fighter power. By mid-June the task of destroying Japan’slargest cities was almost complete, and day by day millions of refugees retreatedinto remote villages. Now carrier-borne planes bombed and strafed, special unitsattacked oil refineries, and bombers dropped mines in coastal waters. Nextprovincial centres became prime targets for the American offensive. Fifty-twocities were largely destroyed and a further six suffered substantial damage. Inthis final stage of bombardment B-29s often dropped warning leaflets beforeraids, saving thousands of lives.

By August 5th, 1945 Japan’s air defences were broken. Precision bombing hadfailed but fire raids had been cruelly effective. Cities were charred and ruined.200,000 civilians lay dead, half a million were injured and 8,000,000 refugeeswere crowded in rural villages. Japan’s war was lost, but Hiroshima was still tocome.

NOTES ON FURTHER READING

Perhaps the best introduction to the history of the bombing of Japan is Carl Berger, B-29,The Superfortress (New York, 1970). Social conditions are vividly described inThomas Havens, Valley of Darkness, The Japanese People and World War Two(New York, 1978). Japanese accounts of aerial defence can be found in D.S.Detwilerand C.B.Burdick (Editors), War in Asia and the Pacific, 1937–1949, Vol 12, Defenceof the Homeland and End of the War (New York and London, 1980). The officialhistory of B-29 operations is W.F.Craven and J.L.Cate (Editors), The Army AirForces in World War II, Vol V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki (Chicago,1956). Detailed post-war analyses of many aspects of air attacks on Japan can befound in David MacIsaac (Editor), The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, VolsVII–X (New York and London, 1976).


First published in Bowring & Kornicki (Eds.), The Cambridge

Encyclopedia of Japan, Cambridge University Press, 1993

19‘Japan at War, 1937–1945’

FOR THE US, Britain and Australia conflict with Japan in the Second WorldWar began in 1941 after the raid on Pearl Harbor. It is this conflict that the term‘Pacific War’ refers to. But this is to distort the picture, for Japan had by thenalready been effectively at war for four years, not with any Western power butwith China. This conflict began in 1937, two years before the outbreak of war inEurope, and is still known in Japan as the ‘China Incident’.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN CHINA

During the night of 7 July 1937 small groups of Japanese and Chinese troopsexchanged fire near the Marco Polo Bridge south of Beijing. The origins of thisskirmish remain unclear but it developed into a vast undeclared conflict. Localcommanders arranged a truce, but powerful interests on both sides favouredwarfare. The Japanese government sent three additional divisions and embarkedupon full-scale hostilities. At the same time millions of patriotic Chineseattacked their government’s earlier ‘appeasement’ policy and called for a unitedfront against the foreign invader. In the face of these antagonisms it becameimpossible to negotiate a compromise.

On 9 August a Japanese naval officer was killed by Chinese troops at Shanghai,and Chinese aircraft attacked Japanese warships anchored offshore. Theseincidents precipitated further battles and new areas of Japanese militaryoccupation. As the war spread many Japanese believed that only the conquest ofthe Chinese Nationalist capital, Nanjing, would compel Chiang Kai-shek, theleader of the Nationalists, to surrender. Yet the eventual capture of that city andthe massacre of many of its citizens brought surrender no nearer. The citizens ofT� ky� celebrated the victory with lantern processions but Chinese forces simplywithdrew into the interior and continued their stubborn resistance.

THE HOME FRONT

The campaign in China not only brought increasing casualties but also led to tightercontrols on Japanese society. By late August the government had initiated aspiritual mobilization campaign and for the first time in its history Japan

embarked upon total war. This required new laws controlling imports andexports and the creation of new agencies to co-ordinate decision-making andofficial propaganda. In October the Cabinet Planning Office was established todevelop plans for a war economy while two months later the Cabinet InformationBureau began shaping propaganda policies.

Even during the first months of the war the impact of the ‘China Incident’upon everyday life was clearly evident. Local ex-servicemen’s associations andwomen’s groups organized celebratory farewells for departing troops. Patrioticwomen made ‘thousand-stitch belts’ which were supposed to ward off bullets,and the ashes of the war dead were formally received back in Japan. Emotivesongs such as ‘A mother of our military country’ were sung over the radio whilenewsreels, broadcasts and newspapers combined to bring news of the war to aconcerned and loyal public.

Despite the public celebration of war and sacrifice, the government alsosought to use more oblique and peaceful strategies in dealing with China. InNovember German diplomats made overtures to China on behalf of the Japanesegovernment, but before Chiang Kai-shek could even agree to negotiations theJapanese army had stiffened its terms and a ceasefire became impossible. Moresuccessful were Japanese attempts to undermine Chinese resistance byestablishing ‘autonomous’ regimes in conquered regions of northern China. On27 October an autonomous government of Mongolia was established, and sixweeks later the ‘Provisional Government of the Republic of China’ was createdin Beijing.

Although 1937 had been a year of victories, the government still fearedpolitical dissidents. In mid-December Yamakawa Hitoshi and other wellknownnon-communist leftists were arrested and charged with planning to set up a‘popular front’. The arrests made it clear that political liberty was in decline andthat official intolerance was on the rise.

PREPARATION FOR TOTAL WAR

By early 1938 the optimism of Japan’s first victories had passed and prime ministerKonoe’s cabinet developed new policies for the successful conduct of the war.On 16 January he declared that he would no longer deal with Chiang’sNationalist government and prepared further legislation to centralize economiccontrol. These new measures ranged from macroeconomic regulations to the firstrationing of consumer goods. The National Mobilization Law empowered the stateto control all forms of labour and material, and the unlimited powers it grantedprovoked remarkably outspoken criticism. One such outburst from the socialdemocrat Nishio Suehiro led to his expulsion from the Diet. However, schemesfor centralized economic planning also angered major industrialists. These farfrom radical figures feared that a tight network of state controls might wellundermine the foundations of the private enterprise system. But plans for newgovernment controls extended far beyond industry and trade. The Home Ministry


now acted to extend and control a nationwide network of neighbourhoodassociations to intensify the nation’s commitment to war. Virtually the entirepopulation was enveloped by this so-called ‘popular movement’, making politicaland social dissent even more unlikely than before.

The left wing had not yet been cowed into submission and plays inspired by‘socialist realism’ were still occasionally performed in T� ky� , but ideologicaland artistic conformity was enforced with increasing severity. In February 1938more left-wing intellectuals were arrested and eight months later works by thedistinguished economist Kawai Eijir� were banned, including his critique ofcontemporary fascism. On the other hand, Hino Ashihei’s trilogy of novels onthe war in China were widely read and film documentaries on China were designedto draw attention at home to the China Front.

By the autumn Japanese armies had advanced more deeply into China. InOctober Guangzhou (Canton) was taken and soon afterwards Wuhan wascaptured too. But Japanese military action on the Asian continent was notconfined to action against Chinese troops nor was it uniformly successful. In lateJuly Japanese troops attacked Soviet forces at Zhanggufeng on the borderbetween Manchuria and the USSR near Vladivostok and both sides sufferedheavy casualties. If nothing else this brief battle demonstrated that any Japaneseattack on Soviet territory would meet stubborn resistance.

Events in Europe at this time did nothing to discourage the government fromholding the view that military strength was the key to diplomatic success.Germany had annexed Austria without provoking any serious response fromBritain or France, while in September the Munich Agreement had allowedGermany to occupy the Sudetenland. Similarly, Japanese actions in China hadprovoked nothing more serious than criticism at the League of Nations.

Japanese victories and advances in China were now answered by waves ofguerrilla resistance. In response Konoe sought a new formula which wouldcombine Japanese hegemony with the suspension of hostilities. In a radioaddress he proposed a ‘New Order in East Asia’ based upon an ‘equalpartnership’ between China and Japan. Some weeks later the foreign minister,Arita, adopted a more strident tone and called for a Japan-China-Manchuria blocto preserve Eastern civilization from the communist menace and to defend itagainst the discriminatory tariffs of the West.

Events in 1939 added further prestige to German and Italian styles ofgovernment. Hitler took Prague and Mussolini occupied Albania. Notsurprisingly, Japanese leaders attempted to develop similar techniques ofeconomic and political control. In January the cabinet formulated a ProductionExpansion Plan. In March plans were shaped to conscript all males into militaryor labour service. A marked emulation of Nazi methods was the new Film Law,which intensified censorship, limited the showing of foreign films and placedcontrols on the production and distribution of features, news and ‘cultural’ films.

Austerity was the keynote of new and often minute controls imposed on thelives of Japanese civilians. Students were forbidden to wear long hair, permanent

‘JAPAN AT WAR, 1937–1945’ 161

waves were banned for women, and the first day of each month was declared‘Public Service for Asia Day’. On these days the sale of alcohol ceased, neonlights were extinguished and millions of citizens performed ‘labour service’. Ablend of austerity and the military ethos was also apparent in junior schoolswhere j� d� and other martial arts became part of the national curriculum.

TOWARDS WORLD WAR

Events abroad brought dilemmas as well as inspiration for Japan’s leaders.Hitler’s non-aggression pact with the USSR created consternation amongJapanese who regarded the USSR as Japan’s ideological and obviousgeopolitical enemy. The difficulties of Japan’s relations with the USSR werefurther high-lighted by a second military clash with Soviet forces in May whenfighting broke out at Nomonhan on the frontier between Manchuria and theSoviet satellite state of Outer Mongolia. Large-scale land and air battlescontinued until September when the superiority of the Soviet forces brought thefighting to an end. By this time the complexities of relations. with the USSR haddriven the cabinet to hand in its resignation.

Despite two years of extensive campaigning Japan had still not eliminatedChinese military resistance. Even the deployment of heavy bombers against thenew Nationalist capital Chongqing failed to bring surrender. Faced with thisstalemate few Japanese were prepared to acknowledge that Chinese resistancestemmed from patriotic resolve and instead they attributed it to foreign weaponsand encouragement. Predictably, therefore, Japanese troops and diplomats nowtook new steps to harrass China’s supporters and ‘collaborators’. In JuneJapanese forces blockaded the Anglo-French Concession at Tianjin and somemonths later France was pressed to prevent aid reaching Chongqing through hercolonies in Indo-China. In September 1939 war broke out in western Europeleaving both Britain and France unable to respond firmly to Japanese pressures.Meanwhile, the US became increasingly alarmed at Japan’s economic andmilitary power and its apparent sympathy for Germany and Italy. US demands forJapanese withdrawals brought no significant reponse and Washington retaliatedby refusing to sign a new Commercial Navigation Treaty with Japan.

At the onset of war in Europe Japan was uncertain of the outcome and wasapprehensive of involvement in a new conflict. But German successes in thesummer of 1940 brought attractive opportunities. France’s surrender left Indo-China without significant defences, Hitler’s occupation of the Netherlands leftthe Dutch East Indies without protection and Britain’s struggle for survival left itunable to reinforce Hong Kong and its south-east Asian colonies.

Events in Europe gave further encouragement to Japanese military andpolitical leaders who wished to transform the political system into a one-partystate. In July the rise of these demands led to the resignation of the cabinet andits replacement by a new administration headed once again by Konoe. During thelate summer the new cabinet led formal discussions on the creation of a new


political order. These talks involved political, military. bureaucratic and businessleaders and generated much argument and mutual antagonism. Whileparticipants agreed on the need for political reconstruction, few could agree uponits details and ultimate purpose. Businessmen feared a loss of economic power tothe army. The Home Ministry feared losing influence to a new politicalmovement and the army favoured the creation of a ‘national defence state’ whichit would dominate. Furthermore, there were serious obstacles in the way offorming a German-style dictatorship on account of the prestige of the imperialinstitution and the lack of a tradition of charismatic political leadership whichmight have produced a suitable ‘Führer’ for a new regime. Nevertheless, a loosenational organization, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, was establishedand in September 1940 Japan allied itself with Germany and Italy in theTripartite Pact.

RISING TENSIONS IN 1941

In the spring of 1941 the foreign minister, Matsuoka Y� suke, travelled to Berlinand Moscow in the hope of improving relations with the USSR to enable Japanto concentrate its attention on Asia. In Berlin he found growing hostility towardsthe USSR, but he was not informed of the imminent launch of OperationBarbarossa against the USSR and so in Moscow he happily concluded theNeutrality Pact, by which each party undertook not to get involved if the otherbecame involved in conflict. On 25 June the invasion of Russia began andMatsuoka argued for solidarity with Germany and an immediate attack on theUSSR in spite of the Neutrality Pact. This proposal was, however, overruled forit would have meant abandoning the proposed push southwards to gain control ofthe oil wells in the Dutch East Indies. Negotiations to acquire access to these oilfields without recourse to arms were not going well and in the army opinion wasgrowing that there would have to be a military solution to the problem.

Meanwhile the Japanese ambassador to the US was trying to resolve thedifferences between Japan and the US. The US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull,was pressing Japan to observe the principles of territorial integrity and torenounce interference in the internal affairs of other nations. The principalsticking points were the demands that Japan withdraw from China and abrogatethe Tripartite Pact; the Japanese government refused to consider these demandsand insisted that normal commercial relations with the US be restored. Matsuokafavoured breaking off the negotiations, but Konoe and the new foreign ministerhe appointed to replace Matsuoka were determined to continue seeking asettlement.

At the end of July Japan moved troops into southern Indo-China. In responseto this the US, Britain and the Netherlands froze all Japanese assets and placedan embargo on exports to Japan; the most important consequence of this was thatJapan was cut off from its sources of Oil, 80% of which had come from the USin 1940. Konoe, faced with growing pressure for war from the army and now the

‘JAPAN AT WAR, 1937–1945’ 163

navy too, still hoped for a resolution of matters with the US and he proposed toRoosevelt that they hold a summit conference. Roosevelt, however, insisted thatthere would have to be some Japanese concessions on China before he wouldagree to a summit, and as a result Konoe resigned to be replaced by his ministerof war, General T� j� Hideki. T� j� undertook to continue negotiations with theUS while at the same time preparing for war and on 5 November AdmiralYamamoto Isoroku was ordered to plan a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor inHawaii. The negotiations made no progress on the question of China and On 26November a naval task force set sail in conditions of utmost secrecy for Hawaii.

THE START OF THE PACIFIC WAR

On 7 December 1941 Japanese carrier-borne aircraft inflicted great damage onthe US Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl flarbor. Almost simultaneouslyamphibious operations were launched against the Philippines, Hong Kong, Guamand Malaya, and on 10 December British naval power in the Far East wasdestroyed when the battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse weresunk by Japanese aircraft. This new conflict was named the ‘Great East AsiaWar’, and Japanese propaganda emphasized the theme of colonial liberation andthe creation of a new Asian order, led by Japan and freed from Westerneconomic and cultural domination.

Initially Japanese forces swept all before them. Within three months Manila,Singapore, Hong Kong and Rangoon were taken and Dutch power waseliminated. Overall these victories reflected the effective training and highmorale of the troops, but in Burma and Malaya local nationalists providedJapanese units with information and support. In Indonesia the Japanese forceswere greeted by much of the population as emancipators and in many colonialterritories they freed political prisoners. However, in the aftermath of conquestthe liberators often behaved cruelly towards their new subjects, and the Chinesein South-East Asia who sympathized with Chiang Kai-shek’s patriotic struggleagainst the invasion of China were often the victims of persecution: in Singaporesome 5,000 Chinese were executed during the first three months of Japaneseadministration.

At home the government sought to use the euphoria of victory to tighten andconsolidate its machinery of control. In the spring of 1942 it began preparationsfor a general election which was designed to produce a more compliant Diet anda public committed to war. To secure electoral success the governmentrecommended and supported amenable candidates and encouraged voting as apatriotic act. As a result the April election produced a Diet of 381‘recommended’ members, but the electorate’s less than complete enthusiasm forthe T� j� cabinet was clear from the success of 85 ‘unrecommended’ candidates.

The intensification of government control over its citizens was achieved by thecreation of a series of officially controlled organizations. The Great JapanImperial Rule Assistance Young Men’s Corps was established to give new


impetus to economic and political programmes, while the founding of theImperial Rule Political Association and the Great Japan Women’s Associationfurther extended the scope of government power. In addition, existing patriotic,industrial, agricultural, commercial, women’s and youth organizations werebrought under the overall control of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.Soon all community councils and neighbourhood associations were integratedinto this nationwide body. Nowhere was government control more apparent thanin publishing, where measures to control the supply of newsprint and to ensurepolitical conformity culminated in the amalgamation of different sections of thepress and the restriction of each prefecture to a single newspaper.

Despite the absence of significant domestic resistance or opposition, thegovernment soon faced serious challenges to its military prowess. On 18 April1942, 16 US carrier-borne B-25 bombers launched token raids on T� ky� ,Nagoya and � saka. These inflicted little damage but their penetration ofJapanese defences impelled the leadership to seek further conquests to giveadded protection to the homeland. As part of this strategy Japanese forcesconquered the western Aleutian Islands, occupied new territory in China and inJune launched a naval attack on the US island of Midway in the Pacific.

MIDWAY AND THE TROUBLES OF 1943

The Battle of Midway on 6 June 1942 was a crucial turning point in the war forit was Japan’s first and most significant military catastrophe. Like the attack onPearl Harbor, Midway was planned as a surprise operation but US success inbreaking Japanese naval codes enabled its naval commanders to anticipate muchof Japan’s strategy. Despite this US advantage Midway was a costly campaignfor both sides, but Japan was defeated and its loss of four aircraft carrierstransformed the balance of naval power in the Pacific. In the summer and autumnof 1942 Japan suffered further reverses. An overland attack on Port Moresby inNew Guinea was repulsed and after months of costly land and sea battles it wasdecided to abandon Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.

The first months of 1943 were to see dramatic military reverses. At Buna inNew Guinea and Attu in the Aleutians Japanese garrisons were annihilated andJapan’s most distinguished admiral, Yamamoto Isoroku, was shot down over theSolomons. By mid-1943 US submarines were inflicting heavy losses on Japanesemerchant shipping. As a result shipyards were unable to maintain the overallstrength of the merchant fleet. Losses of cargo ships interrupted the flow of foodand raw materials from South-East Asia and drove General T� j� ’s government toreappraise the effectiveness of Japan’s war industries. Official analyses revealedthat production was poorly co-ordinated, and priorities were still those of theChina conflict. Weapons for a land war, not for the amphibious campaigns of thesouth seas, still dominated production. To resolve these difficulties thegovernment created a Munitions Ministry to plan output, and gave a newemphasis to the construction of aircraft, tankers and cargo ships. This new sense

‘JAPAN AT WAR, 1937–1945’ 165

of crisis also inspired social measures which were unprecedented: on 30 July1943 female students were mobilized for labour service and two months later allunmarried women under 25 were mobilized for agricultural or industrial work. Itwas forbidden to recruit men to 17 occupations declared to be ‘non-essential’,and students from the élite universities were conscripted into the army and navy.

As government fears and insecurity grew, attacks on cultural andpolitical dissidents became more and more frequent. In January jazz was bannedalong with approximately 1,000 British and US melodies, and in March 1943 theserialization of Tanizaki Jun’ichir� ’s major novel The Makioka sisters wassuspended by government order. Later, members of the editorial staff of thedistinguished monthly Ch� � k� ron were arrested on charges of left-wingactivity. Even Nakano Seigo, a leader of the radical right wing, was seized andinterrogated after criticizing T� j� ’s authoritarian rule.

Japan’s military response to growing external danger was to define a new‘Vital Defence Zone’ embracing Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indo-China,Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Caroline and Mariana Islands. However, theprotection of this vast empire required the political, military and economic co-operation of south-east Asians, as well as the efforts of Japan’s own forces. Toinspire co-operation Japan now embarked upon a series of imaginative if hollowpolitical gestures. On 1 August 1943 Burma was granted nominal independenceand on 14 October the Philippines were recognized as an independent republic.Both régimes signed military alliances with T� ky� , and nine days later Japanrecognized the anti-British provisional government of India. As part of this newpolicy Japan sought to counter allied propaganda statements, such as the AtlanticCharter, with a statement of pan-Asian ideals. On 5 November a representativeof Thailand and the puppet rulers of China, Burma, Manchuria, the Philippinesand ‘Free India’ met government leaders in Tokyo for the Great East AsiaConference. The next day they signed the Great East Asia Declaration, whichattacked Western colonialism and proclaimed a new Asian order of racialequality and economic co-operation. However, it also reflected a new balance ofpower among Japan’s leaders. Its final clause advocated world-wide trade and co-operation: this was the vision of pragmatic diplomats, such as ShigemitsuMamoru, who had gained influence at the expense of advocates of an exclusiveEast Asian bloc.

Throughout 1943 defeats, retreats and news of the bombing of Germanyforced the government to recognize the possibility of air attacks against Japanesecities and the Cabinet began to make preparations. Plans were drawn up for theevacuation of school children to the countryside, for the dispersal of governmentoffices and the destruction of thousands of houses to create fire-breaks, while theadministrators of Ueno Zoo in T� ky� destroyed all the dangerous animals,fearing that bombs might free them from their cages.


THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE BEGINNING OF THEEND

During 1944 Japan suffered a series of calamitous defeats at the northern andsouthern extremities of its conquests. In March the army launched a majoroffensive against Imphal on the Indo-Burmese border, but after months ofcombat allied forces were victorious. This single campaign cost Japan 30,000dead and 45,000 wounded. On 15 June US forces landed on Saipan in theMarianas. The battle for this small archipelago was crucial, for possession of itsairfields would enable US bombers to strike at T� ky� . The battle for Saipanlasted three weeks, cost 40,000 Japanese lives and demonstrated that the fiercestJapanese resistance was no match for US firepower.

Although this defeat meant the beginning of the physical destruction of Japan,its forces were still capable of gaining victories against the weaker allies of theUS. In April the ‘No. 1’ operation was launched in China to capture territory anddestroy US bomber bases. During six months eight Chinese provinces wereconquered and the US base at Guilin was captured. These victories were agrievous blow to China’s international prestige but they could not prevent airattacks on mainland Japan. On 25 October 100 B-29s attacked Ky� sh� from theremaining US bases in China and a week later bombers from the Marianas raidedT� ky� .

The desperate military situation now had a major effect on domestic politics.Criticism of T� j� spread among the leadership, while members of the NavalGeneral Staff and the Cabinet Planning Staff became convinced that there couldno longer be any hope of victory. Eventually, T� j� was driven from office and on22 July replaced by General Koiso. Koiso, however, betrayed expectations byfailing to challenge the continuation of the war.

Despite acute shortages of food and raw materials, industry achievedsurprising successes during 1944. Output of new ships reached an all-time recordof 1.69 million tons and aircraft production reached 28,180, whereas the total in1941 had been 5,088. Nevertheless, these levels of output could not bemaintained. Workers were ill-fed and overworked, stockpiles were exhausted,and the re-cycling of scarce components had reached its limit.

Economic shortages were also apparent throughout the ‘Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’. Food was requisitioned by Japanese armies, civilians wereundernourished and large numbers of forced labourers were compelled to buildroads, railways and fortifications. Indonesians were conscripted to work on theAsian mainland and Koreans and Chinese were transported to Japan. There theysupplemented the inadequate numbers of dockers, coal and ore miners. Theseworsening conditions and cases of Japanese cruelty brought deep disillusionmenteven in territories which had originally welcomed the liberators. In 1944 and1945 anti-Japanese resistance, often led by communists such as Ho Chi Minh,spread across Malaya, the Philippines and Indo-China.

‘JAPAN AT WAR, 1937–1945’ 167

The government now faced the immediate threat of bombing and the prospectof a future Allied invasion. Responses to the crisis were rapid but ofteninadequate. In July 1944 the Ministry of Education ordered the evacuation ofjunior school pupils from major cities and over 400,000 accompanied theirteachers to live in rural inns, temples and schools. Evacuation succeeded inprotecting vulnerable children from the hazards of air raids, but shelters, fire-fighting equipment and anti-aircraft batteries were inadequate to combat thelarge-scale attacks on the cities. Preparations to repel invasion, thougnambitious, were often desperate and unreal. Tens of thousands of youths and oldmen were trained with inadequate weapons, and bamboo spears were distributedamong women and girls. Professional commanders of distant battlefronts alsoresorted to increasingly wasteful and inhuman tactics. In Burma suicidal chargeswere commonplace and in the Philippines kamikaze raids were launched bypilots trained to crash their aircraft onto US warships.

In February 1945 some members of Japan’s élite were also calling for newpolicies. Among proponents of peace was Konoe, who warned the emperor ofthe inevitability of defeat and the danger of ill-fed and disillusioned peoplelaunching a communist revolution. However, most military leaders still saw noalternative to further resistance.

In the same month US bombers launched their first incendiary raid onresidential areas and its success persuaded General Le May to launch anunprecedented fire raid on the densely populated areas of northern T� ky� . On 10March US incendiaries killed approximately 85,000 people, and this dramaticresult led to similar raids on � saka, Nagoya and K� be. In the aftermath of theseurban disasters over 8,000,000 people fled to the countryside seeking food andshelter. In this crisis the government resorted to desperate measures to protectchildren and augment the size of its labour and defence forces. On 18 March allschool teaching, apart from the most elementary, was abandoned, for at least anentire year.

In April US forces landed on Okinawa to begin what was to be a long bloodycampaign, and this led to the formation of a new cabinet. Kido, the Lord Privyseal, believed that the new prime minister, Admiral Suzuki, would oppose themilitary and bring the war to an end. Initially the government hoped to gain thehelp of the USSR, which was still observing the Neutrality Pact signed in 1941,in negotiations with Britain and the US, but, with Germany now defeated, Stalinwas already preparing to enter the war in Asia. Not knowing this, Japan proposedthat Konoe should begin talks in Moscow but Stalin rejected this suggestion outof hand.

On 26 July Britain, US and China issued the Potsdam Declaration whichwarned that Japan faced ‘prompt and utter destruction’ unless it agreed to anunconditional surrender. Although Prime Minister Suzuki favoured surrender,the Army Minister and the two Chiefs of Staff argued for continued resistanceand better terms. As a result Suzuki could only make an ambiguous reply toAllied demands.


In early August three devastating blows completed the defeat of Japan. On the6th a single B-29 destroyed Hiroshima with an atomic bomb. Two days later theUSSR declared war and invaded Manchuria and the Kurile Islands; and on the9th Nagasaki was devastated in a second nuclear attack. Now Suzuki sawacceptance of the Allied terms as the only escape from total destruction and on14 August, at an Imperial Conference, the emperor made a decisive interventionopting for surrender. Thus the emperor’s first significant contribution to policy-making during his reign brought the war to an end. The next day EmperorHirohito made his first-ever broadcast announcing the end of the war andexhorting the whole population to avoid any act which might threaten the socialorder.

In spite of defeat, most members of the government still sought to preserve asmuch as possible of the existing political order. The Home Ministry stillinstructed its police to observe potential dissidents and arrest them wherenecessary. But of more importance were the new policies which followed the endof hostilities. Broadcasts urged people to prepare for peace, the ideal ofreconstruction was promoted and over a million servicemen were demobilizedand disarmed. Above all, Japanese were exhorted to avoid any acts of resistanceto the Allied forces. In late August a Japanese delegation met US commanders atManila to make arrangements for the arrival of US forces. Prince Higashikuninow became prime minister. No one was more likely to ensure the obedience ofservicemen and civilians and a smooth transition to Allied occupation than amember of the imperial family. When the Supreme Commander for the AlliedPowers, General Douglas McArthur, landed at Atsugi on 28 August, Japan was atpeace. The formal surrender ceremony took place on 2 September on board USSMissouri in T� ky� Bay.

The USSR attacks: August 1945

‘JAPAN AT WAR, 1937–1945’ 169

First published in I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot (Eds.), The Oxford

Companion to the Second World War, Oxford University Press,

1995

20Japan—Domestic life, economy and WarEffort; Defence forces and Civil Defence;

Culture

DOMESTIC LIFE, ECONOMY, AND WAR EFFORT

FOLLOWING Japan’s conquest of Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese governmentsuccessfully encouraged planned industrial development and modernization, aprocess which was helped by the existence of the large conglomerates, theZaibatsu, which combined mining, shipping, manufacturing, and bankingactivities. Textiles experienced relative decline but heavy industry grew rapidly,accounting for 73% of industrial production at the end of 1941 compared with58% at the start of the China Incident in July 1937. Increasing numbers ofworkers left the land to word in urban factories so that the percentage employedin agriculture dropped from 48% in 1930 to 42% a decade later. Of even greatersignificance was the creation and expansion of distinctly modern sectors ofmilitary production. The motor vehicle, aircraft, and shipbuilding industriesexpanded rapidly and were sustained by army and navy expenditure which, by1938, absorbed 75% of Japan’s national budget. To support this increase inpublic spending bank credit was expanded and large deficits became a lastingfeature of national accounting. Very high inflation was the result and the retailprice index rose from 100 in 1936 to 175 in 1940. During the same period theUK’s rose to 125 and that of the USA to just 101.

Even more crucial was Japan’s increasing dependence on imported rawmaterials to sustain this expansion. Oil, bauxite, tin, rubber, and nickel—allessential to its military industries—could not be provided by Manchukuo, norwas Japan self-sufficient in them itself (see Table 2). In 1936 two-thirds of Japan’soil was imported from the USA, while rubber and tin had to be purchased fromEuropean colonies in South-East Asia. Soon new Japanese oil refineries werebuilt, the production of synthetic petroleum was attempted, and nationalstockpiling began. However, none of these measures could prevent Japan’sgrowing dependence upon international shipping, and the oilfields, mines, andplantations of South-East Asia.

Similarly, the domestic sources of Japan’s food supplies depended on small-scale, non-mechanized farms. By 1941 the cultivation of arable land had justabout reached its maximum possible expansion—even golf courses were

ploughed up—but in that year Japan needed to import 22% of its rice, 72% of itssoyabeans, and 82% of its sugar. The line between adequate supplies andstarvation was a very thin one, but domestic rice crops and imports kept thepopulation adequately fed until the shipping blockade and strategic air offensiveduring the last year of the war. These disrupted supplies and brought quite severeshortages and some malnutrition.

Japan, 2, Table 2: Dependence on imports of industrial raw materials

Commodity Percent Self-Sufficient in 1936

Iron Ore 16.7

Pig Iron 93.8

Steel 62.2

Scrap Iron –

Copper 63.2

Lead 8.2

Tin 28.8

Zinc 38.9

Bauxite –

Finished Aluminium 40.6

Nickel –

Sulphuric Acid 14.1

Crude Oil 20.2

Coal 90.9

Crude Rubber –

Salt 31.3

Phosphate rock 12.0

Raw cotton –

Sources: Japan’s Dependence on Imports, Special Study No. 281 Mitsubishi KeizaiKenkyu Kyoku (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1938) p. 11. From Cohen.

When undeclared war broke out between Japan and China in July 1937— theChina Incident—Japanese civilians showed little spontaneous enthusiasm. Notonly was it a distant conflict, but Japanese aims were largely undefined. SoonJapan’s leaders sought to remedy this popular indifference by promoting a majorprogramme of spiritual or psychological mobilization. In October a NationalSpiritual Mobilization Central League was established which organized lectures,distributed pamphlets, and encouraged visits to important patriotic shrines. TheLeague’s local sub-committees reinforced these activities by providingpsychological support for the families of servicemen going to the front. Soldierswere sent off amid flags, banners, and martial music, and later more subduedceremonies were held to receive the ashes of the fallen. Groups of housewives


also showed their patriotism by making ‘thousand stitch belts’ which werereputed to protect their wearers from bullets and the Chinese winter cold.

Alongside the encouragement of patriotic enthusiasm the government tookincreasingly severe measures against any signs of political or social dissent. InDecember the renowned Christian scholar Yanaihara Tadao was driven from hisposition at Tokyo Imperial University and more than 400 left-wing activists werearrested, accused of conspiring to establish a popular front.

Parallel with morale building and political discipline the government shapedeconomic policies designed to increase military production and nationalefficiency. As early as 1936 Japan had instituted a ‘quasi-wartime economy’ andin August 1937 the ministry of commerce and industry took new powers toencourage the creation of cartels and enforce obedience to industry-wideagreements. Further powers were provided by the Foreign Trade AdjustmentLaw. This enabled the government to ban the import of foreign luxuries and‘unnecessary’ products, and prevent the export of goods and materials whichwere essential for military production. A new planning body was also establishedto integrate production and prepare new legislation for the control of theeconomy. In late October the existing Cabinet Planning Office and ResourcesBureau were merged to form the Cabinet Planning Board, which soon began thedrafting of a National General Mobilization Law. When this wide-ranging lawwas presented to the Diet (the Japanese parliament) in February 1938 a handful ofconservative members criticized it as unconstitutional, but it was soon approvedand provided the legal foundation for a network of wartime rules and regulationswhich would control almost every aspect of economic life.

Government intervention was further extended by the creation of theIndustrial Patriotic League, which aimed to replace conventional union activitywith ‘Industrial Patriotic Associations’ promoting labour-management co-operation. The League’s slogans were ‘Family Harmony’ and ‘The Plant as OneFamily’, and by 1939 almost three million workers and managers had beendrawn into these company organizations.

In addition to economic and political policies designed to promote industrialefficiency the cabinet shaped social policies to improve the nation’s physical andpsychological health. In January 1938 a Welfare Ministry was founded toimprove the physical fitness of potential recruits to industry., agriculture, and thearmed forces. In contrast, philanthropic organizations which could be construedas ‘hotbeds of left-wing thought’, such as Tokyo Imperial University’s‘Settlement’, were promptly closed.

Although Japan’s diplomatic links with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy stillremained issues of serious controversy, government policies increasingly aimedto promote pro-German and pro-Italian feeling among Japanese civilians. In thesummer of 1938, 30 members of the Hitler Youth were entertained in Japan. AJapanese youth delegation visited Germany and Japan’s most popular femaleentertainers, the Takarazaka Girls’ Opera Group, sailed for a goodwill tour ofGermany and Italy.

172 JAPAN—DOMESTIC LIFE, ECONOMY AND WAR EFFORT; DEFENCE FORCES ANDCIVIL DEFENCE; CULTURE

By the end of 1938 broad government strategies increasingly impinged uponthe details of Japanese daily life. Fuel shortages brought charcoal-powered buseson to Tokyo’s streets, and restricted the opening hours of public bathhouses.Cotton goods were increasingly replaced by textiles made of a blended ‘staplefibre’, and wood and bamboo often replaced metal in the manufacture of kitchenutensils.

In 1939 not only did the China Incident absorb increasing numbers ofJapanese troops but a protracted campaign against Soviet forces on theManchurian border reinforced demands for the creation of a yet more disciplinedsociety. In March a new national committee gave a fresh impetus to spiritualmobilization; in April attendance at ideological evening schools was madecompulsory for boys outside conventional education; and in May martial artswere added to the junior school curriculum. Even more dramatic wereprohibitions on women having permanent waves, and restrictions on the openinghours of restaurants, bars, and dancehalls. Discipline and ‘spirituality’ were furtherintensified on 1 September 1939 when the first day of every month was declared‘Public Service for Asia Day’. This somewhat euphemistic term described dayswhen citizens carried out ‘labour service’, neon signs were extinguished, andsake (rice wine) was removed from public sale.

Throughout 1939 economic controls affected an increasing range of dailynecessities. Rice distribution was brought under government regulation. Theprice of sugar was fixed by civil servants, and in October the price of manygoods was frozen at their 18 September level. By December even the distributionof charcoal was subjected to government ordinance. Despite this fine mesh ofofficial regulations, Japan’s consumer economy still proved difficult to control.The October price freeze was impossible to enforce and black marketeeringbecame an established feature of city life. Perhaps the strangest product of thenew, supposedly moralistic economy, was the appearance of scrap metal dealerson annual lists of Tokyo’s wealthiest citizens.

By 1940 government slogans, rules, and prohibitions may have appeared all-pervasive but the possibility of war with the western powers stimulated a newwave of petty controls. Attempts to create a more patriotic and disciplinedculture soon reshaped what remained of popular pleasure and entertainment.Singers with western stage names were compelled to adopt more Japaneseequivalents, traditional storytellers were ordered to purge salacious or criminalcontent from their stories; and cigarettes with English names such as Cherry orGolden Bat were converted into more ‘patriotic’ brands.

But for most Japanese, food and clothing remained their most pressingconcerns. These were subjected to further restrictions and rationing procedures.In June, rice, salt, sugar, and soy sauce were distributed against coupons in sixmajor cities, and five months later the system was extended to the entire country.In these months the manufacture of silk clothing and neckties was forbidden andin November an austere national people’s uniform was launched for civilians ofboth sexes.


The imposition of orthodox conduct was most marked in the policies of thehome ministry which was the most powerful agency of domestic administration.The newly founded Imperial Rule Assistance Association was designed toprovide a Japanese equivalent of the Nazi Party, but it proved an ineffectivestructure. In contrast the home ministry successfully brought all voluntary andquasi-voluntary neighbourhood and hamlet associations under local governmentcontrol. In later years all would hold meetings at centrally determined times,listen to identical radio broadcasts, and support savings and salvage campaignsaccording to government order.

At the beginning of 1941 the army minister, General T� j� , placed a newemphasis on the training of children and young people for a role in the newNational Defence State Structure. On 16 January the government created theGreater Japan Youth Corps which was to integrate its training programme withthose of conventional schools, and in April junior schools were drasticallychanged. Renamed People’s Schools (kokumin gakko—a literal translation of theNazi Volkschule, these eschewed such democratic concepts as liberalism andindividualism, and replaced so-called ‘intellectualism’ with ‘the union of mindand body’. A new five-subject curriculum sought to ‘refine an imperial nation’,and placed increasing emphasis on collective acts, such as regular bowingtowards the imperial palace. Even more dramatic was the introduction of semi-military ‘national defence sports’ into outdoor school activities. Institutions ofsecondary and higher education were also subjected to powerful militaryinfluences. In late August military training experts were attached to alluniversities and, soon after, the academic year for universities, higher schools,and technical colleges was shortened in the interests of military service and thewar economy.

The dominance of military priorities in national life was also apparent fromthe steady deterioration of many civilian services. Virtually all group travel wasforbidden. Third class sleeping-cars disappeared from the national railways anddining-cars became very scarce delights. The communications ministry evenforbade the sending of greetings or condolence telegrams.

As relations with the western nations deteriorated, anti-Western propagandabecame more bitter. Its most common theme was Japan’s encirclement by theABCD League (America, Britain, China, and the Dutch). This was a strangeemotional fabrication, but the public’s increasing xenophobia received seriousjustification when, on 15 October 1941 one of Japan’s most distinguishedjournalists, Ozaki Hotsumi, was arrested on a charge of transmitting secrets tothe USSR; and three days later a raffish German journalist, Richard Sorge, wasseized for participating in the same spy ring. These dramatic events gave addedstrength to government appeals for vigilance, and popular fears of aliens anddissidents.

During the first months of the Pacific war a rapid series of victories arousedpublic enthusiasm and assisted the government in consolidating its so-cailed‘new order’. In January 1942 the Great Japan Imperial Rule Assistance Youth


Corps was established to create an ideologically aggressive youth movement andfour months later the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association was foundedto include virtually all members of both houses of the Diet. This policy ofamalgamating similar groups into new inclusive organizations was furtherextended with the creation of the Great Japan Women’s Association—which, ithas been claimed, had more than 19 million members—the Great Japan MartialArts Association, and the Japan Publications Culture Association. This processreached its climax with the integration of all neighbourhood associations into theImperial Rule Assistance Association,

Yet victories and organizational changes could not prevent the appearance ofnew shortages and greater austerity. In January 1942 gas and cooking salt weresubjected to systems of rationing and 37 Ginza restaurants were closed afterparticipating in black market activities. By the end of the year a network of localfoodstuff corporations had been organized to distribute staple foods toneighbourhood associations; these grassroots organizations were to play a vitallyimportant role in the distribution of rice and basic foods to individual families.

Shortages of consumer goods reflected the dominance of military priorities inthe national economy, but in late 1942 problems in military production began totrouble Japan’s leaders. Initially, Japan had expected a short war and itseconomic plans had been based upon this erroneous premiss. Indeed the firstyear of war was a time of surprising complacency. Not only was little attentionpaid to the production of essential ships such as tankers and ocean freighters, butlittle attempt was made to stimulate the overall growth of the economy. Evenmore marked was the inefficiency of government planning agencies. The cabinetplanning board could draft detailed plans, but it had no authority to impose themupon particular industries or private companies. This power was left in the handsof individual ministers. In late 1941 pre-war cartels had been replaced by a seriesof industrial control associations which were to organize production anddistribution in particular sectors. The Transfer of Adminisrative Authority Lawsoon gave these associations additional powers, but industrialists rather thanministers or civil servants controlled these organizations. As a result thegovernment’s wishes could still be thwarted by industrial leaders,

By March 1943 Japanese forces had suffered important defeats at Midway andGuadalcanal and T� j� (prime minister from October 1941) took increasedpowers to direct the economy. Now maximum emphasis was placed upon fiveindustrial sectors: coal, steel, light metals, ships, and military aircraft (seeTable 3). At the same time army/navy rivalries were increasingly seen as seriousimpediments to effective planning. Simultaneously a high-level study of aircraftproduction revealed that 45% of Japan’s aluminium supplies was being sold onthe black market, or being used for the manufacture of pots, pans, or otherinessentials. In the face of these discoveries and a worsening military situationT� j� brought about an administrative revolution. The ministry of commerce andcabinet planning board were abolished and a new ministry of munitions creationof integrated land and maritime transport policies. However, the attainment of


these vital objectives was partially undermined by continued militaryinterference.

Such drastic changes inevitably made further inroads into what remained ofnormality or semi-normality in Japanese civilian life. Middle-school

Japan, 2, Table 3: Production of matériel

Type 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

Mediumtanks (14–17tons)

495 531 554 294 89a

Light tanks 529 634 232 48 5a

Self-propelledguns

26 14 59 48a

Armouredcars

88 442 615 725 105a

Fightersb 1,080 2,935 7,147 13,811 5,474

Bombers 1,461 2,433 4,189 5,100 1,934

Reconnaissance aircraft

639 967 2,070 2,147 855

Battleships 1 1

Aircraftcarriers

5 6 3 4

Cruisers 1 2 2 1

Destroyers 9 9 15 31 6

Submarines 11 22 40 37 22

a April–July 1945b total annual aircraft production, including fighters, bombers, reconnaissance aircraft,

trainers, flying boats, gliders, etc., was 5,088 (1941), 9,861 (1942), 16,693(1943), 28,180 (1944), and 11,066 (1945)

education was reduced from five to four years, limits on the working hours ofwomen and minors were waived, and cloth shortages led to restrictions on thesleeve length of traditional dress and a prohibition on the manufacture of double-breasted suits. But perhaps the most striking changes were those which revealeda serious reappraisal or abandonment of values which had, hitherto, been centralto Japanese life. T� j� had viewed the traditional domestic role of women as a majorstrength of the nation, but in September 1943 unmarried women under the age of25 were conscripted into a labour volunteer corps. A powerful symbol of Japan’scrisis was a large scale ceremony at the Meiji Shrine Stadium on 21 October1943 to bid farewell to thousands of university students who were to join theimperial army and navy. Even Japan’s precious intellectual élite was no longerimmune from the hazards of modern war.


Despite the organizational difficulties of Japanese economic planning, 1943and 1944 saw remarkable achievements in some spheres of war production.These successes did not result from the utilization of raw materials fromconquered territories, for Allied submarines controlled the southern seas.Instead, rapid increases in production were based on plundering raw materialstockpiles, reducing civilian production, and the desperate employment of anemergency workforce. Perhaps Japan’s greatest success was in aircraftproduction. In 1943 it produced 16,693 aircraft and in 1944 28,180, representinga remarkable advance on the 5,088 planes which had been manufactured in thefirst year of war. However this was a once-and-for-all achievement, for whenstockpiled raw materials had been exhausted many factories were left with sparecapacity and an under-used labour force. Soon, fear of American bombingushered in measures which caused further interruptions to production. In anattempt to preserve large numbers of strategic factories machinery was dispersedto mountain and rural regions-often by means of primitive ox-carts and otherimprovised transport. In many cases, machinery was relocated in damp caves andunderground chambers where corrosion soon ruined sophisticated equipment.

For Japanese civilians temporary industrial achievements brought littlereward; shortages multiplied and the fabric of city life was eroded by newscarcities and further restrictions. On 20 April 1944 all Tokyo kindergartenswere closed. In August sugar rations were suspended and in the autumnpassenger trains were drastically reduced to permit the transport of largerquantities of military equipment. Even worse, food shortages led to wild dogsroaming the streets of Tokyo. Some were even killed and marketed for humanconsumption.

While the Japanese government now prepared to resist an Allied invasion,American bombing of Japan’s cities began in earnest. At first B29 raids sought todestroy defined industrial targets, but on 9 March 1945, 334 B29 Superfortresseslaunched a low-level incendiary attack on northern Tokyo. Within hours 40sq.km. (15.4 sq.mi.) of the city were destroyed and tens of thousands of civilianswere killed. This raid demonstrated the total inadequacy of Japan’s defences andstimulated a vast process of urban flight. During the last months before surrendermore than 10 million city dwellers—two-thirds of them women and children—fled to the countryside. Increasingly pessimistic rumours circulated amongcivilians and Korean immigrants were accused of guiding American bombers totheir targets.

Now a complex of economic forces began the final dislocation of Japan’seconomy and society. Food shortages drove workers to the countryside to buyrice and vegetables, and industrial absenteeism rose to unprecedented heights.Simultaneously, blockade made the importation of food and raw materials fromKorea virtually impossible; even ferry links between Japan’s two principalislands, Hokkaido and Honshu, were interrupted by bombing; and soon theprocess of aerial destruction was extended to virtually every significantprovincial town and city in Japan.


Government spokesmen continued to talk of discipline, duty, and resistance,and fortune tellers were officially instructed to produce optimistic forecasts, butthe Soviet declaration of war on 8 August, and nuclear attacks on Hiroshima andNagaski brought a swift acceptance of Allied terms. At first little changed.Special police continued to trail potential dissidents, and political prisonersremained in gaol, but soon fear of the ‘devilish’ enemy brought new policies andpatterns of behaviour. Thousands of wives and daughters were sent into thecountryside for fear of American molestation, while the government instructedlocal authorities to establish brothels to satisfy the anticipated desires of theoccupiers. Much of the army which had been prepared to resist an Alliedinvasion was rapidly demobilized and ministers now urged citizens to turn theirattention to national reconstruction and peace. Indeed, soldiers were instructed toavoid any actions which might produce friction with American units. By the timeUS forces arrived, and the war was formally ended on 2 September, Japanesesociety was mentally and physically disarmed.

DEFENCE FORCES AND CIVIL DEFENCE

Although Japan held its first air raid drill in July 1928, little serious attention wasdevoted to civil defence until the eve of the China Incident. On 5 April 1937 thegovernment promulgated the Air Defence Law, which proclaimed broadprinciples of policy and made prefectural governors responsible for local civildefence. Two years later the home ministry established auxiliary police and fireunits which were largely based upon traditional volunteer associations. Civildefence was further encouraged by the founding of the Great Japan Air DefenceAssociation and the Great Japan Fire Defence Association, nationwide bodieswhich sponsored publicity and training, and provided financial aid to localcitizens’ groups.

Even after Pearl Harbor most civil defence preparations remained theresponsibility of local officials and bitter inter-ministerial rivalries obstructed theformation of integrated policies. Even more damaging were the militaryassumptions which formed the basis of civil defence planning. Army and navycommanders claimed that Japan would never face large-scale air attacks, andthat limited preparations would suffice to protect her major cities. In April 1942the Doolittle raid penetrated Japan’s air defences, but it was ineffective and seemedto confirm rather than challenge the premisses of government policy.

These complacent attitudes remained largely unchanged until November 1943,when news of Allied victories and the bombing of German cities gave a newurgency to civil defence policy. Symbolic of this new mood was the creation ofthe Air Defence Headquarters under the minister of home affairs. This neworganization attempted to co-ordinate policies between rival ministries andinitiate new lines of action. By this time large numbers of trench shelters hadbeen constructed; now these were roofed, and local authorities were urged toexcavate public tunnel shelters in cliffs and hillsides. Tunnel shelter construction


was further encouraged by government offers of large subsidies to prefecturaland city governments.

In late 1943 the central government also began drafting formal plans for theevacuation of non-essential personnel from the Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and northKy� sh� conurbations. Initially, Prime Minister Tojo opposed such schemes as hefeared that they would fragment families and undermine national morale. Howeverhis reservations were gradually overcome by his desire to preserve the nextgeneration for future wars. Old people, mothers, and children were encouraged tomove to the homes of friends and relatives in the countryside. In cases where thiswas impossible junior school pupils from the third to the sixth grade were to beevacuated, as classes, with their teachers. In the summer of 1944 thousands ofcity teachers visited parents to persuade them of the virtues of school evacuationand by August more than 333,000 children had travelled to rural villages. Herethey lived in inns, temples, and public halls, and despite homesickness andmeagre rations, continued their education with tolerable success. A further 459,000 children travelled with their parents to the homes of country relatives.

A further wave of evacuees was precipitated by radical fire preventionpolicies. In 1943 the government began the destruction of thousands of dwellinghouses to create firebreaks; this destruction soon drove more than 343,000 citydwellers to rural areas, or to temporary accommodation near their workplaces.

Besides these ambitious evacuation policies the government also encouragedlocal training for expected incendiary raids. In every town and city ‘blockassociations’ and neighbourhood groups donned padded clothing and practised‘bucket relays’ and other primitive methods of fire-fighting. Equally importantwas the ‘air defence oath’ which urged citizens to stand their ground in the faceof incendiary or high explosive bombs. Such training was understandable butsuicidal, for by 1945 Japan’s anti-aircraft batteries and fighter squadrons wereobsolete and could offer no challenge to modern, high-flying bombers. Whenlarge-scale incendiary raids began on 9 March radio warnings effectivelymobilized fire brigades and civil defence workers but neither could control thefirestorms which swept across northern Tokyo. In the aftermath of thiscatatrophe the evacuation of third to sixth grade pupils was made compulsory,and first and second grade pupils were urged to leave all major cities. Within amonth 87% of children in these groups had reached sanctuaries in the country.

As American bombers devastated city after city thousands of medicalpersonnel and civil defence workers ignored orders and fled. For millions ofurban Japanese escape to the country now constituted the only effective form of‘civil defence’. Government rules, plans, and preparations were soon rapidlyoverwhelmed by a mass unplanned exodus to the safety of provincial villages.The country’s defence forces never had to be employed operationally and wouldhave proved equally ineffective if they had been.

In January 1945 Imperial General Headquarters formulated a HomelandOperations Plan in preparation for an expected Allied invasion. Army and navyleaders planned large-scale military resistance and Prime Minister Koiso sought


to reinforce these efforts by drawing millions of citizens into auxiliary activities.On 23 March the cabinet formally decided to establish People’s Volunteer Units(Kokumin Giy� tai). These were to consist of both men’s and women’s sections,and were to be organized on the basis of school, workplace, or locality.Volunteers were to assist the army, navy, and police in such diverse tasks asmilitary construction, evacuation, transport, food production, air defence, therepair of roads and buildings, and the maintenance of public order. In May andJune the government gave further encouragement to the growth of the volunteermovement by dissolving the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and otherpatriotic societies and encouraging their members to join the new volunteers.

As the danger of invasion grew the government moved to transform many ofthe new groups into fighting units. On 23 June a new volunteer military servicelaw created the People’s Volunteer Combat Corps (Kokumin giy� Sent� tai) to beraised from men aged from 15 to 60 and women aged from 17 to 40. Thesecitizen forces were planned as city or prefectural federations, appropriate forflexible local defence. They were under the control of local governors and theprime minister acted as the corps’ C-in-C. By this time modern weapons werealmost unobtainable and tens of thousands of volunteers were trained withsimple staves and bamboo spears. Government propagandists now advocated‘The Glorious Death of One Hundred Million’ to ‘Defend the National Polity’but the atomic bomb attacks brought surrender before an invasion, and on 2September 1945 all People’s Volunteer organizations were dissolved and theiractivities ended.

CULTURE

For most Japanese artists and intellectuals war began on 7 Juiy 1937 whenJapanese and Chinese forces exchanged fire at the Marco Polo Bridge nearPeking. Fighting soon spread across north and central China and Japanesepublishers and government organizations mobilized literary celebrities to raisenational morale. In August and September prominent writers were dispatched tothe front and produced vivid, if highly censored, accounts of Japanesecampaigning. Among these literary chroniclers perhaps the most successful wasHino Ashihei whose trilogy Wheat and Soldiers, Earth and Soldiers, andFlowers and Soldiers became best-sellers.

Four years later Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor aroused near-mystical delightamong Japanese writers. Intense patriotism and anti-colonialism united authorsfrom right to left, and in May 1942 virtually all professional writers joined theJapan Literature Patriotic Association (Nihon Bungaku H� kokukai). Thisgovernment-sponsored organization included eight sections embracing novels,drama, general poetry, tanka (31-syllable verse), haiku (17-syllable verse), thehistory of Japanese literature, the history of western literature, and literarycriticism; it was headed by the veteran writer Tokutomi Soh� . In April 1943 itsfirst conference discussed ‘The Creation of a Literature of the Annihilation of


America and England’ and a month later the association produced a new variantof the popular anthology Poems by One Hundred Poets entitled Patriotic Poemsby One Hundred Poets.

Writers were also mobilized for pan-Asian propaganda in the Greater EastAsian Writers Congress (Dait� a Bungakusha Taikai). The congress includedauthors from Japan, Korea, Formosa, China, Manchukuo, and Mongolia, andheld wartime conferences in Tokyo and Nanking. These Japanese-dominatedgatherings repeatedly emphasized such themes as anti-westernism and Asiansolidarity, and promoted the Japanese language as the new life-force of EastAsian culture.

As in the China Incident, writers were frequently sent abroad to producereportage and spread knowledge of Japanese civilization. Visits to South-EastAsia brought contact with unfamiliar cultures, and writers responded withreflective fiction and propaganda. Ozaki Shir� ’s Cumulus Clouds describedAmerican defeats from a Filipino viewpoint while Ibuse Masuji’s City ofFlowers recounted the adventures of Japanese propagandists in occupiedSingapore; arguably the most effective short work of this genre was TakamiJun’s Nowkana, an account of Japanese difficulties with Indian cooks andservants, which unconsciously echoed European colonial writing.

One of the most remarkable literary products of the war years was a vastoutpouring of nationalistic poetry, particularly in the traditional tanka form. Butsuch works as Noguchi Yonejir� ’s ‘Slaughter them, the English and Americansare our enemies’ were too direct and emotive to attract discriminating readers.

Wartime dramatists also sought to utilize traditional forms to present pan-Asian and anti-Western themes to domestic audiences. A medieval-style n� playwas produced to commemorate the capture of Rangoon, and traditional farces(ky� gen) were written to excoriate Western imperialism. A typical one wasTreasure Island in which greedy English and American devils were attacked byswarms of bees and driven into the sea.

As Japan’s fortunes declined official censorship tightened, and one of Japan’smost distinguished writers became a victim of it. In January 1943 the élitemagazine Ch� � K� ron began the serialization of Tanizaki Junichir� ’s novel TheMakioka Sisters, but after two instalments, publication was banned. This majorwork contained no criticism of official policy, but its subject, pre-war middle-class life, was considered too frivolous for a nation at war.

Throughout eight years of hostilities Japanese writers showed little overtresistance to Government policy. Many sincerely believed in Japan’s cause, andnon-co-operation would have closed all doors to work and publication.Nevertheless, one writer of independent means, Nagai Kaf� , abstained from allpublic pronouncements and confined himself to acid criticisms of the governmentin his private diary.

Newspapers and magazines were equally powerful cultural influences onpublic opinion. In earlier times the Japanese press had a vigorous tradition ofexposing public corruption but the China war brought a tightening net of


government controls. Although all editors spontaneously supported the wareffort, daily censorship was imposed by the press sections of the army and navy,and of the foreign, home, and Greater East Asia ministries. In addition theCabinet Information Bureau, the quasi-official news agency D� mei, and thepress department of Imperial Headquarters carried out effective programmes ofnews management. These organizations blacklisted some authors, approvedothers, and imposed news bulletins and commentaries on national and provincialnewspapers.

In the early months of war when Japanese armies won sweeping victoriesthere was little need for deception or distortion in the projection of daily news,but in 1942 the catastrophe of Midway was reported as a victory, and in thefollowing year Japanese forces were said to have carried out a ‘sidewaysadvance’. In contrast the European conflict was described with relativeobjectivity, and Japanese readers were clearly aware of the declining fortunes oftheir allies in Rome and Berlin. Similarly, Japan’s domestic difficulties wereoften analysed with surprising frankness. No journalist ever criticized thegovernment’s ultimate objectives but inefficiency and mismanagement werefrequently attacked; food distribution, local administration, air raid defence, andindustrial management were all targets of editorial criticism. Even moreremarkable were admissions of glorious defeats and occasional criticisms of theconduct of war. In May 1943 the annihilation of Japanese forces on Attu in theAleutian Islands campaigns was openly reported, while in February 1944 theMainichi Shinbun’s naval correspondent attacked the army’s preparations for anAllied invasion in an article entitled ‘Bamboo Spears are Not Enough’. Theauthor was soon conscripted into the army but even Prime Minister T� j� did notdare to close a national newspaper with several million readers.

Although Japan’s illustrious ‘general magazines’ had far fewer subscribersthan daily newspapers, their influence and intellectual character made themdeeply suspect in the eyes of official censors. In September 1942 a contributor toKaiz� was arrested for praising Soviet policies towards minority peoples and,soon after, the editor and his senior staff were compelled to resign. Furtherarrests and four deaths under torture followed, and in 1944 both Kaiz� and Ch� �K� ron were closed.

In contrast with the UK, where painting as a means of communicating thehorrors of war produced a number of great works of art, Japanese painters playeda relatively minor role in their country’s wartime culture. In April 1942 many ofJapan’s most important artists were commissioned to travel to South-East Asia topaint battle scenes and other war subjects, but there is little evidence that theseworks exerted a major influence on public opinion. Instead, bringing the visualimpact of the war to the Japanese public was largely left to the cinema.

By 1937 Japan had a highly developed film industry which was dominated bytwo powerful companies, T� h� and Sh� chiku, and a number of importantdocumentary producers.


Like publishers, film companies saw the war in China as a subject of profoundpublic interest and newsreel cameramen were posted to the front to cover thefighting. Soon T� h� , Sh� chiku, and their satellites began producing feature filmsset against the background of the China campaign. Many roughly-madeproductions were unsuccessful but such films as Tasaka Tomotaka’s Five Scoutsrecreated the ordeal of combat with sombre accuracy. The most highly acclaimedfilm of this genre was Tasaka’s rendering of the novel Earth and Soldiers whichdescribed a unit’s physical and emotional endurance in the Hangchow campaign.Another common cinematic theme was Japan’s mission in China and thebuilding of Sino-Japanese co-operation. Watanabe Kunio’s Vow of the Desertshowed cooperation in highway building and a Sino-Japanese romance, whileFushimizu Osamu’s China Nights featured a tender relationship between aJapanese naval officer and a Shanghai orphan. Efforts were also made toreinforce Japanese links with Nazi Germany by encouraging a major co-production. Arnold Fanck’s The New Land attempted to explain the culturalmainsprings of Japanese conduct; but despite fine photography it failed to attractJapanese audiences.

By 1939 Japan was increasingly attracted to Nazi methods of film propagandaand a Film Law was passed modelled upon German legislation. This establishedpre-production censorship, government control of film distribution, restrictionson the import of foreign films, and the compulsory showing of newsreels. In1940 government controls were further extended with the forced amalgamationof all private newsreel companies into the Nippon News Film Company (NipponNy� su Eigasha).

Japan’s attack on British, Dutch, and American territories at the start of thePacific war brought new cinematic opportunities. Cameramen recorded not onlyimpressive victories but also the exotic scenery of Malaya, Burma, and thePhilippines which added to the novelty of documentary productions. In the earlymonths of war newsreels were far more popular than ever before and theJapanese armed forces shot lengthy documentaries chronicling recent conquests;the army’s Malaya War Record, Burma War Record, and Victory Song of theOrient were widely shown in schools and community centres, as well as inconventional cinemas.

As victories became fewer, the government attempted to maintain public moraleby reconstructing earlier successes in major feature films. In 1942 the navyencouraged the production of the first such work, The War at Sea from Hawaii toMalaya, and later examples depicted the capture of Hong Kong and Singapore.Like most countries at war Japan also deployed history or quasi-history in thecause of propaganda. Stories of samurai self-sacrifice such as Ch� shingura, anddepictions of Western imperialism, notably The Opium War, attracted largeaudiences in both Japan and South-East Asia. As Japan’s situation becamecritical film-makers were pressed to create civil defence documentaries, andfeature films relevant to increased production. In 1944 and 1945 air raidprecautions were the subect of several instructional films while the young


Kurosawa’s The Most Beautiful depicted women workers in an optical lensfactory. By the final months of war film stock had become extremely scarce andnew productions were shorter and fewer than in earlier years. In additionAmerican bombing destroyed hundreds of cinemas.

Although film may have been the most sophisticated wartime medium, radiowas perhaps the most flexible. The Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) hadbeen founded in 1926 and by 1937 over a quarter of Japanese were licenceholders. In peace and war the Japanese government saw radio as an importantvehicle of education and propaganda; entertainment occupied only a minor placein broadcasting schedules.

During the China Incident news bulletins were extended and ministers andcivil servants regularly explained government objectives over the radio. Moreoriginal were special programmes which linked troops at the front with their hometowns and prefectures. In these years radio ownership spread rapidly, and thearmed forces became an increasingly powerful voice in determining broadcastingpolicies.

By the time of Pearl Harbor wartime schedules had been carefully preparedand news was supplemented by ministerial speeches, and readings from patrioticand anti-western works such as � kawa Sh� mei’s A History of American andBritish Aggression in Asia. Particularly impressive were attempts to deepennational resolve by transmitting cultural programmes of high quality. This trendbegan in 1939 with the broadcasting of Yoshikawa Eiji’s historical novelMiyamoto Musashi, continuing with talks on such subjects as Zen Buddhism andtraditional flower arrangement. By 1944, when it was clear that monotonousexhortation was achieving little, a new radio strategy was adopted whichattempted to raise morale by increasing and improving entertainmentprogrammes.

‘Sensuous’ western melodies had already been banned, but European classicalmusic now occupied a significant place in NHK schedules. Such operas as TheMarriage of Figaro and Tannhäuser. were broadcast and attracted largeaudiences. An even more impressive example of quality entertainment was a star-studded radio production of the famous kabuki (music and dance) play Kanjinch�on New Year’s Day 1945. This provided a significant fillip to national moralewhen economic and social conditions were declining rapidly; but in the finalmonths of war the production of radio sets fell, and their repair was renderedincreasingly difficult by shortages of valves and components.

Although music could not convey complex and detailed propaganda messagesit was viewed as an important element in Japanese ideological policy. As early as1937 the authorities aimed to create a Japanese equivalent of the Nazi ‘HorstWessel’ song and organized a national competition for suitable words forSetoguchi Tokichi’s ‘Patriotic March’. This composition was jaunty rather thanmilitary and became popular throughout Japan and South-East Asia. Furthermarches followed and songs from successful films such as Earth and Soldiersand China Nights achieved widespread popularity. Throughout the war special


songs were composed to commemorate victories and inspire national support forvital campaigns. Yet despite official attempts to emphasize national and patrioticelements in Japanese musical life European classical music remained widelypopular and orchestral concerts continued until June 1945.

Despite its superficial orientalism Japanese cultural propaganda employedthemes which were also used in Allied films, books, and broadcasts. Historicvictories, national solidarity and diligence were emphasized by both democratsand proponents of authoritarian ideals. Ironically, Japan’s centralized massmedia were used by American occupiers to spread democracy in the post-waryears.

Domestic life, economy, and war effort

Cohen, J.B., Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis, 1949, repr.Westport, Conn., 1973).

Havens, T.R.H., Valley of Darkness. The Japanese People and World War Two (NewYork, 1978).

Johnston, B.F., Japanese Food Management in World War II (Stanford, Calif., 1953).

Government/Culture

Berger, G.M., Parties out of Power in Japan, 1931–1941 (Princeton, 1977).—‘Politics and mobilization in Japan, 1931–1945’, in P.Duus(ed.), The Cambridge

History of Japan, Vol. 6: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 1988).Maxon, Y.C., Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalrly

1930– 1945 (Berkeley, 1957; repr. Westport, Conn., 1975).Shillony, B.A., Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (new edn., Oxford, 1991).

Defence forces and civil defence

United States Strategic Bombing Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and AlliedSubjects in Kyoto (Washington, DC, 1947).


— Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan (Washington,DC, 1947).


Part III

The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–52:Reform, International Rivalries and British

Policies

First published in Hokkaido Law Review Vol. 27. No. 2. Nov.

1976. pp. 335–358

21Nationalist China in the Allied Council:

Policies Towards Japan, 1946–52

IN THE YEARS which followed Japan’s surrender East Asia was transformedby political and diplomatic revolutions which erased the sympathies andsuspicions of half a century. In China civil war produced a regime whichabandoned friendship with the United States. In Japan, defeat and occupationwelded an alliance with America which has survived continuous opposition.

The domestic significance of these complex changes is universallyrecognized. Their importance in Soviet-American rivalry is rarely neglected, butthe history of Sino-Japanese relations is a largely forgotten aspect of theoccupation years.1 Much documentation necessary for the study of this questionis not yet accessible, yet sufficient material is available to illuminate some majorthemes of Kuomintang policy towards defeated Japan. In particular the Minutesof the Allied Council for Japan, the most public international forum for thediscussion of occupation policy reveal many of the chief priorities of Chinesediplomacy.2

Before discussing policies within the Allied Council it is necessary to outlinethe evolution of occupation administration, as this provided the essentialframework for Allied rivalries during six and a half years of military control.

It is common knowledge that American power overwhelmed Japan in thesummer of 1945, but the political consequences of her enormous power were asimportant as her military victories. American military success was the product ofenormous wealth which supported lavish intellectual preparation for the comingpeace.3 Furthermore the distance of the United States from the turmoil of battlepermitted reflective planning which was impossible in more war torn states. Inshort, America was prepared for the occupation of Japan while her allies were not.On arrival in Tokyo Supreme Commander MacArthur possessed detailed planswhich enabled his stiff to begin major acts of punishment, surgery, and reform.4

Consequently American troops not only occupied Japan in the first months ofpeace but they established a control structure which issued instructions to theJapanese Government with formidable speed. By the close of 1945 the press hadbeen freed, political prisoners released, trade unions encouraged, and a purge ofwartime leaders begun. Indeed, within the first four months of American rule the

broad lines of policy had been determined, and two groups of Japanese leaderspressed into a study of constitutional reform.5

Against this background of an American monopoly of power, preparation, andinformation, the allies of the United States began to demand some role indetermining the future course of Occupation policy.

Initially the Soviet Union suggested that the Allied Control Commissionswhich supervised administration in Eastern Europe should be paralleled in theFar East.6 If America could have representatives in Romania and Bulgaria,Russia could fairly claim similar privileges in Japan. Alternatively, when aChinese representative could participate in the London Conference, and attenddiscussions on the Balkans Russia could justifiably seek a role in Tokyo.7 Twoof Russia’s clearest demands were rejected in exchanges with the United Statesin the closing months of 1945. Her suggestion that she should have a voice inselecting the Supreme Commander for Japan, and her claim for a Soviet as wellas an American Supreme Commander, were firmly rebuffed by Washington.Notions of a Soviet zone of occupation, or of a Russian occupation force,independent of American control were, similarly, unacceptable to PresidentTruman.8

Despite America’s determination to maintain a monopoly of effective power itwas impossible to discard the notion of some forum in which the Soviet Unionand other allies would have an indirect, symbolic role in Occupationadministration. Not only would such a body pose no threat to Americanomnipotence but some vehicle of consultation was desired by Britain, China, andAustralia, as well as other friendly states.

At an early stage the United States suggested the establishment of an elevenpower Far Eastern Advisory Commission to meet in Washington to furnishadvice to the occupation authorities.9 In contrast Stalin desired a body clearlyparallel to the Control Commissions in Europe. This would meet in Tokyo wherea sharp eye could be kept on the shoal of decrees which sped from the Dai IchiSeimei Building.10 Russia saw this as a Council of the four major powers of theFar East, not a wider committee embracing smaller states. At the ForeignMinisters’ Conference held in Moscow in December 1945 the United States andthe Soviet Union finally agreed on a compromise formula for the control ofJapan.11 The Advisory Commission was re-named the Far Eastern Commission.This was to consist of the eleven states which had defeated Japan, and wouldmeet in the old Japanese Embassy Building in Washington.12 Its role was to‘formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which thefulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may beaccomplished’.13 Clearly the distance which separated the Commission from itsarea of concern, and a procedure with a virtual great power veto, limited itseffectiveness to a minimum. Its subsequent activities were largely confined toapproving policies long after their execution. The second body which emergedfrom the Moscow Conference was the Allied Council for Japan.14 This fourpower agency consisted of the United States, China, the British

NATIONALIST CHINA IN THE ALLIED COUNCIL: POLICIES TOWARDS JAPAN, 1946–52189

Commonwealth15 and the Soviet Union, and existed ‘for the purpose ofconsulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to theimplementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan,and of directives supplementary thereto’.16 MacArthur was to ‘consult and advisewith the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance,the exigencies of the situation permitting’. If a member of the Council disagreedwith the Supreme Commander on a fundamental matter the Agreement specifiedthat the Supreme Commander would ‘withhold the issuance of orders…pendingagreement in the Far Eastern Commission’. Certainly the Council’s brief wassomewhat unclear, but the representatives despatched from Moscow, Canberra,and Nanking were surely not unreasonable in believing that the Council wasintended to perform a useful function, if not a dominant one.17

The First Meeting of the Council on 5th April 1946 certainly had the trappingsof importance. The Supreme Commander himself attended the morninggathering at the Meiji Seimei Building. The press was well represented, and theoccasion occupied the headlines in the following day’s newspapers.18 In contrastMacArthur regarded the Council with deep suspicion and his opening addressmay well have surprised Lieutenant General Chu Shih-Ming, W.MacMahon Ball,and Lieutenant General Derevyanko. After an eloquent appeal for internationalco-operation the Supreme Commander emphasised the ‘advisory andconsultative’ character of the Council, and stressed that it would not divide his‘executive authority’.19 He underlined the importance of press publicity to avoidthe ‘suspicion…distrust and…hatred so often engendered by the veil of secrecy’,20

and declared ‘there is nothing…to conceal…from the eyes and ears of our fallenadversary’.

Such publicity would hardly contribute to fruitful exchanges, and on thispoint, and other matters of procedure, the basic conflict in the Council soonbecame apparent. Soviet hostility to the United States would have beenpredictable. American sympathy for China and the British Commonwealth mighthave been expected, but the division of opinion was far simpler. Americanbehaviour indicated a calculated policy of treating all three allied representativesas pupils or novices in the messianic world of the Supreme Commander. Inresponse there was almost total unity among the non-American delegates. Therewas of course some inherent confusion in a body where the Chairman, the UnitedStates representative, and the representative of the Supreme Commander wereone and the same person; but in other respects too there were no concessions tothe internationalism which MacArthur had preached in his opening address.General Chu, unlike his Russian colleague, always spoke in English, but when heasked if this was ‘considered the official language’ he was told there was noreason to have one.21 Similarly when the Chinese delegate asked why the whollyAmerican secretariat was termed ‘international’ he was told it was because itserved all four representatives. Like his colleagues Chu understood that highlypublicized sessions could produce no effective discussions, and criticized ‘allthese lights blazing’. He agreed with MacMahon Ball that plenary sessions


should alternate with informal private consultations, and finally this wasaccepted by all Council members.22

Unity among the non-American representatives was already apparent and theirconfrontation with the American Chairman was to continue for many months.Essentially, the Supreme Commander wished to make the Council a wellpublicized, ineffective body while Chu, MacMahon Ball, and, apparently,Derevyanko sought to use it to some creative end.

This unity of attitude towards American overbearance was strongly reinforcedat the Second Meeting of the Council. This occupied 17th and 19th April 1946and was in many respects the most significant in the history of the body. On thisoccasion Brigadier General Courtney Whitney revealed the crude reality ofAmerican intentions. In the main section of the meeting he took the rostrum toanswer a written question from the Soviet Representative.23 This suggested that,despite the purge, not all undesirables had been removed from positions ofauthority, and requested that the Council be informed as fully as possible.24

Far from attempting to divide or woo the allied delegates Whitney sought todemonstrate the immensity of American power and the triviality of the Council.He was very angry that the question had been asked and declared that he wouldgive a detailed answer ‘if it took all summer’.25 He then read a speech lastingthree hours which occupied most of the morning and afternoon sessions of themeeting. This calculated filibuster listed over a hundred and ten ultranationalistsocieties, over a hundred control associations, and scores of categories ofpurgees. In addition to its numbing monotony the speech was scattered withsarcastic asides such as ‘the authority or influence of 185,386 persons…hasalready been prevented. And I regret I don’t have with me the names to giveyou’. When the meeting was resumed two days later Whitney was as belligerentas ever. He denied that the Council had the right to interrogate him as a witness,and declared ‘the Council is not set up for the purpose of prying into SCAPaffairs, attempting to find some weak point in SCAP armor, probing somethingby which to create national sensationalism’.27

After suffering this display of uncontrolled arrogance the Council memberswere driven to a renewed discussion of procedure. Without information it wasimpossible to render meaningful advice to the Supreme Commander, but arequest for information had been the source of Whitney’s tedious epic. Arepetition of that was to be avoided at all costs. The Chinese, Soviet, andCommonwealth delegates united in claiming the right to place a time limit onCouncil speeches, but in reply the Chairman castigated them harshly, saying thiswould be ‘definitely undemocratic’. He added that the American Government‘would never agree to such a proposal’.28 Once again a feeling of impotence andtriviality returned to the Council.

At the Third Meeting on 30th April Lieutenant General Chu made a seriousattempt to transform the Council into an effective body. With the support of theSoviet and Commonwealth delegates he suggested the creation of four specialistsub-committees covering politics, economic affairs, education and culture, and


military problems.29 These groups would examine SCAP proposals, and poolspecialist advice so that informed suggestions could be passed to the SupremeCommander. In particular, the Chinese representative hoped that these expertcommittees would be able to make field investigations of regions or problems,and be free to carry on discussions away from the publicity of formal meetings.If the Council was to have any independence some such bodies were essential,and the Commonwealth and Soviet delegates supported the proposal.30 GeneralChu was no bitter critic of MacArthur’s policies, he merely sought anindependent source of information. In reply Chairman Atcheson31 merelystressed the letter of the Moscow Agreement, which made no mention of sub-committees.32 Chu protested that the Agreement did not forbid the creation ofsuch bodies, but no compromise could be reached. After attempting to dilute theproposal into insignificance Atcheson finally declared ‘I don’t see that there wouldbe any work of this sort in which I or my staff might participate’.32 From this itwas clear that any attempt to co-ordinate independent research would provokedetermined opposition from Occupation Headquarters.

At the same meeting the United States Representative cum Chairman revealedhis power to obstruct discussion in a new and simple way. The United States wasalready supplying foodstuffs to Japan to relieve a desperate shortage. Forpolitical and humanitarian reasons she sought to minimise malnutrition and avoidstarvation. In the aftermath of war when many countries were suffering fromacute scarcities it was natural that MacMahon Ball sought to discuss ‘food forJapan’ as ‘part of a world problem’. He wondered whether the needs of Japanwere ‘greater than the needs of…occupied or liberated countries, in other partsof the world’.33 But in response Atcheson made no attempt to justify or analyseAmerican policy. He ruled that the issue was ‘entirely outside’ the scope of theCouncil’s activities.34

At the Fourth Meeting of the Council the three again confronted the Chairmanon the question of information. General Derevyanko asked that all decrees besent to the Council well before they were issued, so that they could be studied indetail. Yet once more the representatives found themselves caught in a viciouscircle of American evasiveness. General Chu acknowledged that against abackground of full information and study forty-eight hours would suffice toexamine decrees.35 But the first months of the Council’s activities had shownthat receiving the desired information at the appropriate time could hardly betaken for granted.

During the summer of 1946 the Council held general discussions on fishing,trade, labour, government property and zaibatsu dissolution. But it was on theissue of Land Reform that the Council made its most important contribution toOccupation policy.36 This was an issue on which all four delegates shared thesame objective, and the major divide lay between the Council and the Japaneseauthorities. In December 1945 the Japanese Government passed Land Reformlegislation but MacArthur’s aides considered it unsatisfactory. During the firstmonths of 1946 the Occupation authorities and the Ministry of Agriculture


discussed more radical proposals and in May the problem was placed before theCouncil. On 29th May and 12th June MacMahon Ball placed detailedrecommendations before his colleagues. Five days later all four powers gavethem general, support.37 The Chinese representative Yorkson C.T.Shen agreedwith the Soviet delegate that the plan should be implemented within two years,and the Council’s recommendations were accepted by the Supreme Commander.This document provided the basis for new legislation passed by the Diet inOctober 1946.

By early June the atmosphere within the Council had calmed, and there wasless bitterness than in earlier months. Despite this improvement the Chairmanwas still prone to ruffle and tease the delegates by presenting intensely complexissues and requesting immediate advice. In June he asked for plans to rehabilitateex-officers but provided no statistical information.38 A month later he urged thedelegates to suggest schemes for maritime quarantine, but none of them hadscientific advisers who could provide essential data.39

Such action merely unified the dissident three, and this unity continued untilthe Eighth Meeting of the Council on 26th June 1946. On this occasion Atchesonraised in a new form the integration of repatriates into civilian society. This issuewas to split the Council along a new divide and bring it once more to theattention of public opinion. The basic statistics of repatriation delivered by theChairman told their own story. Of the Japanese who had been scattered over a vastarc from Manchuria to Indonesia, 93% of those in American hands had beenrepatriated; 94% of those in China, and 68% of those in British hands had alsolanded at ports in Japan. Less than 1% of prisoners in Soviet hands had beensimilarly released.40

In these discussions the Chairman thanked the Chinese for their sterling co-operation. General Chu emphasised that there had not been ‘a single majorunpleasant incident’ during repatriation, and believed that most ex-prisonerswere ‘fully saturated with a deep sense of repentence as regards their behaviourin China’.41 In contrast the Soviet delegate who had usually sought to widendiscussion, against American resistance, now began a reverse course. He claimedthat the issue of integration did not encompass repatriation, and sought to stiflethe debate.42 For the firrst time there was a clear division between the Russianand Chinese delegates, and the closeness of feeling between Chu and Atchesonwas more marked than in the past. During July 1946 there were few majordevelopments but the Chinese representatives continually demonstrated theirmajor strength in discussion. While the Soviet and Commonwealth delegateswere skilled in debate, and in their different ways impressively logical, GeneralChu and Yorkson Shen showed a detailed knowledge of the Japanese scenewhich frequently demonstrated American ignorance. During initial discussion ofthe purge Chu asked directly if Hatoyama Ichir� had been barred from publiclife. The question went unanswered.43 Japanese names and terms were invariablyincomprehensible to American officials; while the Chinese always showed aknowledge of nationalistic monuments which must have surprised their


colleagues.44 This expertise stemmed from a common script, education in Japaneseuniversities, and a prolonged war in which knowledge of Japan was vital forChina’s survival.45

At the Twelfth Meeting of the Council on 13th August Chairman Atchesonemployed a tactic which might almost have been designed to restore a measureof unity among the dissident three. At a procedural meeting, quite withoutnotice, he suggested that the Council would benefit from a drastic transfusion ofnew diplomatic talent. He recommended that the Tokyo representatives of theFar Eastern Commission powers not represented on the Council, should participatein its meetings.46 This was tantamount to rewriting the original MoscowAgreement and like General Whitney’s celebrated performance it filled thedelegates with irritated confusion. Perhaps this was the desired effect orAtcheson may have hoped that a larger body would be unlikely to arrive at acommon viewpoint. Certainly this scheme was as drastic as the abandonednotion of committees, and for the first time the Chinese representative requestedspecial advice from his government. The Commonwealth, Soviet, and later theChinese delegate successfully resisted this novel plan, but its initiation showedthat the American desire to castrate the Council was as strong as at the initialmeeting.

In subsequent meetings on 4th and 18th September the Council turned itsattention to the critical state of the Japanese coal industry, an issue relatively freefrom emotional overtones. In response to the Supreme Commander’s question of‘whether the coal industry should be nationalized or whether…the present systemof subsidy financing should be continued’47 the Chinese delegation made theirmost important policy recommendations. These showed a deep concern for therevival of the Japanese economy which conflicted strongly with much of Chinesepublic opinion. After hearing the Chief of the Industry Section48 explain that theloss of Korean labour and food shortages had reduced productivity in Japanesemines to half its wartime level, General Chu, for the first time discussed theinterdependence of the Chinese and Japanese economies.49 He emphasised Japan’straditional need for coking coal for her steel industry, and the productiondifficulties of Chinese mines producing fuel coal. In view of this situation hesuggested an emergency barter trade whereby China would supply Japan withcoking coal in return for Miike coal for China. He also recommended thenationalization of some Japanese mines, an improvement in working conditions,and labour participation in management.50

On 18th September the Chinese delegate reported that his barter plan had beenenthusiastically received in Japanese business circles. He also read out a telegramfrom L.T.Zee, Chairman of the Fuel Control Commission in the ChineseMinistry of Economic Affairs. This stated ‘as soon as transportation improves inour Northern provinces we shall be able to supply twenty thousand tons or moreof first and second grade coking coal per month’. To underline this messageGeneral Chu reasserted the economic interdependence of China and Japan saying‘no effort should be spared to provide for eventual free trade between China and


Japan by legitimate businessmen of all nations. My country is prepared tosupport to the fullest extent the Supreme Commander in his efforts to expedite theeconomic rehabilitation of Japan. It is necessary for no other reason than theclose relationship between the economies of the two nations…the economicsituation cannot be stabilised in one country without the same being effected inthe other’.51 In developing the theme of improving output in the Japanese coalindustry he suggested a well-developed range of policies in a plan worked out byhis advisers. This suggested that mines producing less than half their 1944 outputshould be nationalized, as experience of the Yunnan Tin ConsolidatedCorporation had shown that efficient results could be achieved by stateenterprises. Where mines were too large, and therefore too expensive, to bebought by the state it suggested partial state investment and management. Inother cases there could be private ownership and government management, whilea sliding scale of subsidies and incentives could be used to stimulate efficiency.He outlined three principles as the basis of the Chinese recommendations. Firstlythe state owned and administered mines should be operated on purelycommercial basis as ‘industry should be independent of politics just as thechurch should be separated from the state’.53 Next mines should be equippedwith new machinery; and finally, management should be democratized as far aspossible, so raising miners’ morale and efficiency. The aim of these changes wassimilarly three fold. Production would be raised, inflation stemmed, and thepower of the zaibatsu and other monoplistic organizations weakened. TheOccupation authorities and the Japanese Government never accepted these wellconsidered proposals but they vividly illustrate a chief priority of Chinese policy.54

In October 1946 China, Russia, and the Commonwealth turned their attentionto the forthcoming local elections. All hoped that they would be as successful asthe April General Election and presented proposals to eliminate nationalisticinfluences. Yorkson Shen proposed that existing district governors should resignone month before local voting, and that the names of all purged officials shouldbe made public at the same time.55 The Chairman made no positive reply to thesesuggestions but now antagonism had largely left the procedings.

Towards the end of 1946, and increasingly during early 1947 Chinese policyturned more and more towards attitudes which anticipated future Americanpolicies. In January 1947 MacArthur banned a threatened strike of publicemployees, and economic recovery became the major focus of Americanattention. Similarly Yorkson Shen reiterated the need for economicreconstruction and on 2nd April asked whether SCAP would ‘take anyfavourable view of making an early attempt to modify the existing controlmeasures that have set a barrier between Japan and other countries’. In replyAtcheson commented that the ‘Chinese Member (had) echoed some of the recentremarks of General MacArthur on the economic blockade of Japan’.56

In the spring of 1947 the concern of the Chinese representative for recoveryand stability was further apparent in a new discussion of repatriated Japanese. Onthis occasion General Chu openly referred to the poor reputation which the


Council enjoyed among journalists.57 To remedy this he suggested that hiscolleagues concentrate upon moderate, constructive discussions. Regarding theplight of repatriates he called for ‘an all round welfare programme, long term aswell as short term’ to be ‘systematically worked out’, and for the public worksprogramme to be rapidly expanded.58 In reply SCAP official Max Bishopoutlined the comprehensive range of existing provisions. These included rations,grants, and temporary housing. From current trends it appeared that by the closeof the year only 15% of five million repatriates would remain in temporaryaccommodation. The remainder would have returned to their families or foundpermanent dwellings.

In contrast to these optimistic estimates this meeting brought the firstindications of the failing power of Kuomintang administration. Some 95,000Japanese still remained in the provinces of Manchuria, and it was explained thatthese areas were not yet under Government control. Hence repatriation had beenimpossible.59

Throughout the spring and summer of 1947 economic revival continued to bethe main theme of Chinese comments and recommendations. In April YorksonShen suggested an end to the fragmentary pattern of government agenciesattempting to control inflation, and proposed its replacement by a central controlmechanism. On the same occasion he advocated the expansion of food producingand distributing co-operatives, greater emphasis on coal output, and a thoroughgoing suppression of the black market.60 All these suggestions closely reflectedcontemporary tendencies in SCAP thinking.61

Although Nationalist Chinese policy moved closer and closer to SCAPdirectives it was far removed from much public opinion on the mainland.

In early 1947 the Occupation authorities invited a party of ten well-knownChinese journalists to make a comprehensive tour of Japan to study recenttendencies. They visited Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, Hiroshima, and other majorcentres, and held discussions with American, Chinese, and Japanese leaders.Some of their articles which appeared in the Shanghai newspaper Ta Kung Paoexhibited a good deal of scepticism towards Occupation achievements. Onearticle by Editor Wang Yun-sheng entitled ‘Japan’s Dangerous Road’62

contrasted American claims of democratization with the potential danger of anationalist revival. Understandably the writer found many Americans unable tograsp the subtleties of Japanese behaviour and drew attention to dangerouselements of tradition remaining in Japanese life. Like the Chinese delegate on theCouncil he was acutely aware of nationalistic monuments, and in a second article‘Japanese Thought; 1947’ condemned the survival of Saig� ’s statue in UenoPark. More understandably he was disturbed by the continuing popularity of theYasukuni Shrine. Both these articles were heavy with suspicion. Theyemphasised the extent to which the growing civil war in China was revivingJapanese feelings of superiority towards her neighbour, and highlighted thedanger of the United States regarding Communism as her only enemy. The‘dangerous road’, which formed the title of Wang’s first article was that of


Japanese using anti-Communism to ingratiate themselves with the United Statesso as to bring about a nationalist revival.

While Japan continued to attract the attention of Chinese public opinion, theAllied Council became less and less significant as a forum for serious discussion.In August 1947 Chairman Atcheson refused, for the first time, to accept a Sovietsuggestion for the Agenda. At the same meeting he informed the representativesthat SCAP would no longer provide them with data on request as in the past ithad been ‘unproductive of usefulness’.63 From this point on the consciousmanipulation of the Council’s Agenda made its meetings even more barren thanbefore.

Parallel with these changes in the Council the focus of American policymoved from Japan’s domestic condition to her diplomatic future. Persuaded thata prolonged occupation would become increasingly unpopular the United Statesattempted to convene a preliminary conference to discuss a formal peace treaty.America wished to invite the eleven victor states to an initial meeting, whileRussia favoured a meeting of the Big Four. In contrast China suggested acompromise plan for an eleven power meeting with near veto powers for herself,Britain, America, and the Soviet Union.64

The Chinese Foreign Ministry clearly sought to mediate between the Sovietand American proposals but much of Chinese public opinion was deeplysuspicious of the United States and its new warmth towards Japan. On 15September 1947 a Joint Memorandum of the Members of the Control Yuandemanded the cession of the Ryukyus to China, a limit on Japanese industry tothe level of 1930, and the implementation of a severe reparations programme.Eight days later the Resident Committee of the People’s Political Council issuedan even sterner statement suggesting Chinese Trusteeship of the Ryukyus,military supervision of Japan for thirty years, and a restriction of production tothat of 1928. Like earlier articles in the Shanghai press these documentsemphasised the danger of America incorporating Japan into an anti-Communistfront, thereby reviving her economic and military power.65

Within the Allied Council meetings became shorter and their contents lesssignificant. In mid-August MacMahon Ball resigned as CommonwealthMember.66 Within the same week George Atcheson died in an air accident.67

With the disappearance of these two powerful figures the vitality of the Councilwas even further impaired.

In China civil war was threatening the basis of Nationalist power and herspokesman became less and less likely to dissent from the policies of her keyally, the United States.68

On 1st October the new Chinese Representative General Shang once morereturned to the theme of economic recovery and regretted that ‘since the Sino-Japanese hostilities mines, industrial equipment, transportation etc. throughoutChina have been severely damaged’ and therefore China could not supply Japanwith sufficient raw material to meet her requirements. Perhaps of even greaterinterest was his suggestion that Japan, despite her many crises, might ‘find her


way to render assistance to China in the industrial field’ so that she might exportmore raw materials to Japan.69

Throughout 1948 the Council fell into a state of prolonged torpor. On 28thApril ‘the three’ protested that the Maritime Safety Board had been createdwithout any prior notice.70 There was a flash of temporary unity but neither thenew Commonwealth member, Patrick Shaw, nor his Chinese colleague objectedto the contents of the new measure.

Between May and August the Council’s Agenda was empty and therepresentatives attended pro forma meetings lasting one or two minutes.71 On28th August the Council discussed SCAP inspired action to remove the right tostrike of public employees. The Soviet delegate made predictable criticisms.Shaw gave reluctant support. While the Chinese delegate, abandoned earlierideas of democratic management, and approved the Japanese Government’saction.72 By now his government was a struggling satellite.

On the Chinese mainland there was now a rising tide of opinion against thepro-Japanese course of American policy. On 7th April Wang Yun-sheng wrote tothe American journal Pacific Affairs complaining that America was preparingJapan as an ally in case of war with the Soviet Union. In a lurid diatribe heattacked soft policies towards one time militarists, and new high targets for theJapanese economy.73 In June many students in Chinese cities demonstratedagainst American policy in Japan, and professors, businessmen, and Members ofthe Legislative Yuan demanded that the Government oppose the United States.The ineffectiveness of Government policy towards the course of Occupationpolicy was a major source of widespread dissatisfaction. Once more thecomplaint was being raised that Chinese raw materials were fuelling Japaneseindustry and Japanese goods were said to be re-entering the Chinese market.74

In addition to the broad thread of American policy small but emotionallyinflammable incidents further ignited opinion. In the summer of 1946 Tokyopolice had fired on Formosans. Chinese stores and homes had been searched, andold prejudices were alleged to be rife.75 All such news provoked further hostilityin Chinese cities. Students continued anti-American demonstrations and in June1948 the American Ambassador in Nanking, J.Leighton Stuart, issued astatement pointing out the dangerous state of Sino-American relations. What wasmore he described the new objectives of American policy with a frankness whichwas often eschewed in the Allied Council. As if echoing the Kuomintangrepresentative in Tokyo he implied that Japan’s economic recovery would assistChina, and stated ‘as a hungry and restless people (Japan) will be a threat topeace. Such a situation is made to order for Communism. If we are sincere in ourprofession that Communism in the general interest must be stopped then wemust remove the causes which encourage Communism’.76 Stuart was toosophisticated an Ambassador to express all his sentiments directly. He hinted at areduction in American aid if the ‘Anti-American-Aid-to-Japan’ movementcontinued, but this was a message to be inferred, rather than clearly understoodfrom his remarks.


In January 1949 the Allied Council once more held a meeting which centredupon serious debate.77 In a discussion of the increasing size of Japanese policeforces, the Chinese delegate made a firm statement in favour of a force sufficientfor law and order to be fully preserved.78 He condemned any notion of Japaneserearmament but in no way reflected the hostility to American policy which wasprevalent on the mainland.

From January to December 1949 the Council delegates assembled twenty fourtimes and found nothing to discuss.79 The Council was almost dead, but in anever harsher atmosphere of Cold War it had a brief but spiritless role to play.Throughout Japan there was widespread anxiety at the fate of over 300,000prisoners still in Soviet hands. Many citizens addressed letters and petitions tothe Occupation authorities and Council members.

Finally in December Chairman Sebald placed the problem on the Agenda.80

Propaganda and humanitarianism were sourly mixed in this enterprise. Fourlarge bundles of letters were brought into the Council Chamber while a furtherone hundred and two were placed in an ante-room. General Derevyanko claimedthat repatriation was beyond the Council’s terms of reference, and after twentyfive minutes walked out of the meeting. General Chu complimented his owngovernment on returning all prisoners, and the Commonwealth spokesman,W.R.Hodgson, suggested that the Swiss Government or the Red Cross mightmake investigations.81 Throughout January and February 1950 there was furtherdiscussion of repatriation, and further walk outs. Finally, in May the Sovietdelegate began to boycott Council Meetings.82 Somewhat sickeningly the presstook a lively interest in these theatrical gestures. American housewives called atthe Meiji Seimei Building for entertainment. Bright lights were turned on, andthere was talk of television cameras.83

Throughout the summer propaganda alternated with empty agendas. Finally on8th November Major General Kislenko, the Soviet delegate returned. Now theChinese delegate represented no more than Taiwan and was deeply dependent onthe United States. Chinese statements reflected this enfeebled position anddescended to heavy irony and rough cut propaganda. Chen Yen Chun suggestedthat Kislenko ‘had spent the past months…digging into the…number,whereabouts and conditions of the 370,000 Japanese prisoners…still underdetention by the Soviet Government’ and stated that ‘the Council and theJapanese people would be most anxious to hear the answer’.84 In later commentshe referred to the ‘pernicious germs of Soviet propaganda’ and the Chairmancautioned him for such provocative statements.

During 1950 and 1951 the Council descended to the exchange of crudepropaganda and predictable accusations. Now against the background of theKorean War, a new group of three aligned itself against the Soviet Union.Kislenko claimed that the Chinese delegate did not represent the Chinesemainland. His adversaries repeated their charges about missing prisoners. Russiaattacked the Japanese Government’s ‘Red Purge’. The Chinese delegate said that‘it did not quite go far enough’.85 By the autumn of 1951 the possibility of


creative discussion had totally disappeared and even the representatives tired ofcontinual insults.

Between 24th October 1951 and 23rd April 1952 the Council held only twobrief discussions.86 Its final meeting was held five days before the restoration ofJapanese independence. Kislenko used the occasion to denounce the ‘illegality’of the San Francisco Treaty, and measures against left wing publications. TheChinese delegate had no instructions, and therefore no views on the Council’sdemise.

No one would claim that the Allied Council for Japan was a major agency ofinternational co-operation. General MacArthur and the Kleig lights saw to that.Nevertheless its history is a significant litmus of changing antagonisms in EastAsia. In particular the alienation of the Chinese delegate from his people, is apowerful allegory of Nationalist decline.

NOTES

1. For an invaluable introduction to post-war East Asia see, Akira Iriye: The ColdWar in Asia, A Historical Introduction. New York. 1974. For a brief summary ofChinese attitudes towards Japan in the post-war years see, Kawara Hiroshi andFujii Sh� z� : Nich� Kankei no Kiso Chishiki. Tokyo. 1974. pp. 374–75, 379–80.

2. Allied Council for Japan: Verbatim Minutes. Hereafter cited as VM.3. For a bibliographical survey of American planning for the Occupation of Japan see

Robert E.Ward and Frank Joseph Shulman: The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–52, An Annotated Bibliography of Western Language Materials Chicago. 1974. pp.33–39. For a useful outline of planning activities see Hugh Borton: AmericanPresurrender Planning for Postwar Japan. New York. 1967.

4. For a collection of important documents see, U.S. Department of State: Occupationof Japan: Policy and Progress. Washington. D.C. 1946.

5. For the early phase of Occupation reforms, see Rekishigaku Kenky� kai: Taiheiy�Sens� shi. Vol. 6. San Furanshisuko K� wa, 1945–52. Tokyo. 1973. pp. 77–114.

6 For a brief appraisal of the Commissions in Europe see, George F.Kennan:Memoirs, 1925–50. Boston. 1967. p. 235.

7. For an outline of Soviet-American rivalry see, Herbert Feis: Contest Over Japan.New York. 1967.

8. Harry S.Truman: Memoirs. Volume 1. Year of Decisions. Garden City. N.Y. 1955.pp. 431, 440–44, 455, 516–18.

9. The members of the Commission were to be Australia, Canada, China, France,India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippine Commonwealth, UnitedKingdon, United States, and the U.S.S.R.

10. The Supreme Commander’s Headquarters in Tokyo.11. For an American assessment of the Moscow meeting see, Dean Acheson: Present at

the Creation, My Years at the State Department. New York. 1969. pp. 426–28.12. George H.Blakeslee: The Far Eastern Commission, A Study in International Co-

operation, 1945–52. Washington. D.C. 1953.13. Agreement of Foreign Ministers on Establishing the Far Eastern Commission and

the Allied Council for Japan, Moscow, December 27, 1945. The text may be found


in U.S. Department of State: Occupation of Japan Policy and Progress.Washington. D.C. 1946. p. 69.

14. It is significant that the word ‘Control’ does not appear in the name of the Council,or the Commission.

15. ‘a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, andIndia’. Agreement of Foreign Ministers on Establishing the Far EasternCommission and the Allied Council for Japan, Moscow, December 27, 1945.

16. Ibid.17. The Japanese press clearly regarded the Moscow Agreement as an important

development. It was the lead story in the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, andthe Yomiuri H� chi on 29 December 1945. The Council was to meet ‘not less oftenthan every two weeks’, sufficiently often for useful work to be done.

18. MacArthur’s initial address to the Council, appealing for world peace, was the leadstory in the Asahi Shimbun, the Mainichi Shimbun, and the Yomiuri H� chi on 6thApril 1946.

19. V.M. First Meeting. 5th April 1946. p. 1.20. ibid. p. 2.21. ibid. p. 24. General Chu had been educated at M.I.T. and an American Staff

College.22. ibid. p. 20.23. Whitney was Chief of the Government Section of the Occupation adrninistration.24. V.M. Second Meeting. 17 April 1946. morning session. P. 21.25. ibid. p. 22. 26. V.M. Second Meeting. 17 April 1946. afternoon session. p. 20.27. V.M. Second Meeting (continued) 19 April 1946. p. 10.28. ibid, p. 15.29. V.M. Third Meeting. 30 April 1946. morning session. pp. 1–2.30. ibid. p. 2. and p. 5.31. George Atcheson, Jr. Chief of the Diplomatic Section of SCAP (1946–47).32. V.M. Third Meeting. 30 April 1946. morning session. p. 12.33. ibid. p. 14.34. ibid. p. 24.35. V.M. Fourth Meeting. 15 May 1946. morning session. p. 25.36. For a detailed study of this field of Occupation policy see R.P.Dore Land Reform in

Japan. London. 1959.37. V.M. Seventh Meeting. 17 June 1946. pp. 4–5.38. V.M. Eighth Meeting. 26 June 1946. pp. 25–28.39. V.M. Ninth Meeting 10 July 1946. p. 10.40. V.M. Eighth Meeting. 26 June 1946. p. 19.41. ibid. p. 23.42. ibid. p. 20.43. V.M. Second Meeting. 17 April 1946. afternoon session. p. 22.44. V.M. Tenth Meeting. 24 July 1946. p. 13.45. Yorkson C.T. Shen received his M.S. from Tokyo Imperial University. Wang Kung

Kee, Deputy Chief of the Chinese Mission in 1957 was educated at WasedaUniversity, Tokyo.

46. V.M. Twelfth Meeting. 13 August 1946. pp. 3–4. for a contemporary Americancriticism of Atcheson’s tactics in the Council see, Foreign Relations of the United


States, 1946. Volume 8. The Far East. Washington. D.C. 1971. pp. 332–334.Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (Borton) tothe Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) SECRET. 7 October1947.

47. V.M. Fourteenth Meeting. 4 September 1946. p. 9.48. Joseph Z.Reday. Chief of the Industry Section of SCAP September 1946-March

1947.49. V.M. Fourteenth Meeting. 4 September 1946. p. 14.50. Ibid. p. 15.51. V.M. Fifteenth Meeting. 18 September 1946. morning session. p. 18.52. Ibid. p. 20.53. Ibid. p. 22.54. In their non-ideological spirit the Chinese measures resembled the Temporary Coal

Industry Control Act of December 1947, but the content of this legislation was lessradical than the Chinese proposals.

55. V.M. Seventeenth Meeting. 16 October 1946. pp. 17–18.56. V.M. Twenty-Ninth Meeting. 2 April 1947. pp. 12–13.57. V.M. Twenty-Seventh Meeting. 5 March 1947. P. 3.58. Ibid. p. 3.59. Ibid. p. 20.60. V.M. Thirtieth Meeting. 16 April 1947. p. 16.61. For studies of these aspects of SCAP policies see, Supreme Commander for the

Allied Powers. General Headquarters. Statistics and Reports Section. History of theNon-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan. Tokyo. 1952. Monograph 30.Agricultural Co-operatives, 1945-December 1950. and Monograph 42. Fisheries,1945–50. (available on microfilm from the National Archives, Washington. D.C.)

62. Wang, Yun-sheng: ‘Japan’s Dangerous Road’ in the China Magazine. Volume 17.September 1947. pp. 10–15. and ‘Japanese Thought: 1947’ in the China MagazineVolume 17. October 1947. pp. 27–31.

63. Immanuel C.Y.Hsu: ‘The Allied Council for Japan’ Far Eastern Quarterly Volume10. February 1951. pp. 175–176.

64. ‘Summary of Responses by Other Governments to United States Japanese TreatyProposals’ Department of State Bulletin. Volume 17. (November 1947) pp. 435–436.

65. ‘Chinese Views on Japanese Peace Treaty: Joint Memorandum of Control YuanMembers’ China Magazine Volume 17. November 1947. pp. 22–29.

66. For the background to MacMahon Ball’s Resignation see Foreign Relations of theUnited States. 1947. Volume 6. The Far East. Washington. D.C. 1972. pp. 268–269.The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State. TOP SECRET.1 August 1947.

67. See William J.Sebald and Russell Brines: With MacArthur in Japan, A PersonalHistory of the Occupation. New York. 1965. pp. 58–59.

68. V.Kudryavtsev: ‘The Japanese Problem is Sino-American Relations’ Soviet PressTranslations Volume 2. (15 November 1947) pp. 226–229.

69. V.M. Forty-Second Meeting. 1 October 1947. pp. 9–10.70. V.M. Fifty-Eighth Meeting. 28 April, 1948. p. 1.71. From the Fifty-Ninth Meeting (12 May 1948) to the Sixty-Sixth Meeting. (18

August 1948) there were no items on the Council’s Agenda.


72. V.M. Sixty-Seventh Meeting. 28 August 1948. p. 21.73. Wang, Yun-sheng ‘Japan; Storm Center of Asia’ Pacific Affairs. Volume 21. (June

1948) pp. 195–99.74. James F.C.Liu, ‘Resurgent Japan, A Chinese View’ Far Eastern Survey Volume

XVII. Number 23. 8 December 1948. p. 270.75. ‘Protest of Representatives of Chinese Public Opinion Against American Policies

in Japan’ Soviet Press Translations Volume 3. Number 14. 15 July 1948. p. 420.76. J.Leighton Stuart ‘Campaign By Chinese Students Against American Policy in

Japan’ Department of State Bulletin. Volume 18. 20 June 1948. pp. 813–814.77. V.M. Seventy Seventh-Meeting. 5 January 1949.78. Ibid. p. 15.79. From the Seventy Eighth Meeting (19 January 1949) to the One Hundred and First

Meeting. (7 December 1949) the Council had no items on its Agenda.80. For the background to this meeting see William J.Sebald and Russell Brines: With

MacArthur in Japan, A Personal History of the Occupation. pp. 141–42.81. V.M. One Hundred and Second Meeting. 21 December 1949. p. 25.82. The Boycott contined from 10 May to 25 October 1950.83. ‘Four Power Farce in Japan’ Economist Volume 158. 11 February 1950. pp. 323–

24.84. V.M. One Hundred and Twenty Sixth Meeting. 8 November 1950. pp. 1–4.85. V.M. One Hundred and Twenty Ninth Meeting. 20 December 1950. p. 41.86. On 16–17 January 1952. Japan’s Budget and the Security Treaty with the United

States were discussed.87. V.M. One Hundred and Sixty Fourth Meeting. 23 April 1952. p. 7.


First published in the Japan Society Proceedings, No. 95,

November 1981

22The British Parliament and Occupied Japan,

1945–52

IN THE IMMEDIATE postwar years British governments were besieged bydifficulties. Fear of the Soviet Union dictated a search for new alliances. Economiccrises threatened European stability. Problems of industrial weakness wereunrelenting, while nationalization and the creation of the welfare state absorbedmuch parliamentary time and energy. These varied problems often pushed Japanto the margins of British politics; but at times both houses of parliament paidserious attention to the former enemy and their debates reveal important changesand continuities in British domestic and international policy.1

At all times parliament is merely the public face of politics and its discussionsrarely reveal every aspect of government and official policy. In the autumn of1945 the public mood also prevented ministers revealing many of the painfulrealities of Britain’s position. At this time the sense of Commonwealth andImperial unity was so great that many Englishmen believed that Britain wasmore powerful than she was, while an understandable pride in victory made itdifficult for leaders to admit Britain’s inability to influence United States actionsin Japan. Furthermore, America was so crucial to British security in Europe thatministers generally felt compelled to defend American occupation policy.Government spokesmen also claimed that Britain was being consulted in theseimportant matters; for to have suggested otherwise might have damaged relationsbetween London and Washington. Despite these qualifications there was genuineBritish approval for much that General MacArthur was attempting in occupiedJapan.

Despite this general support for American policies there was a distinctiveBritish view of Japan’s economic future which was strongly and publiclyexpressed. Keynes’ criticisms of the Versailles treaty, the importance of Japanesegoods to British colonies and Britain’s inability to provide financial support toJapan combined to produce a policy of supporting the revival of Japan’s non-military industries. This was not only an enlightened policy but a brave one for itconflicted with significant opinion in both major political parties. Members fromLancashire and Cheshire textile towns and the Staffordshire potteries were allfearful of Japanese competition but on 28 October 1946 the President of theBoard of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, categorically declared

The government do not…consider it practicable to reduce or eliminateJapanese competition in export markets by yet another surgical operationon those of her export industries which have no direct war potential. Japanmust be left after the peace settlement, in such a position that she canbecome and remain internationally solvent; otherwise, she will requirepermanent foreign support in the form of direct or indirect subsidies… Tobalance her payments Japan must export, and after the severe curtailmentwhich will be imposed for security reasons, on her heavy industries shewill have to concentrate her efforts on the lighter industries, includingtextiles. The conclusion is inescapable if Japan is to be self-supporting.While, as I have said, we hope that Japan’s economic recovery will beaccompanied by the achievement of better. labour standards and theelimination of artificial subsidization of exports, we cannot afford to stifleJapanese competition in export markets by means which would merelyimpose upon us a corresponding, if not greater, burden. For the solution ofour export problems we must look rather to the efficiency of our ownproduction and to a greater total volume and increased flow ininternational trade, in which we can all effectively share.

Within seconds of this statement several Members of Parliament leapt to theirfeet to call for internationai agreements and better labour standards before Japanwas allowed to re-enter world trade but they were crisply and coolly rebuffed.Both Labour and Conservative members were to raise these issues again, butthere were also distinctive left and right wing criticisms of government andAmerican policy which vividly illustrate broader British political attitudes.

Perhaps the first left-wing critique of occupation policy appeared in JamesCallaghan’s maiden speech on 20 August 1945. In this he claimed that ‘a semi-divine monarch’ could not ‘be reconciled with the introduction of a democraticState’ and called for the ending of the Imperial institution. In December he spokemore fully on occupation policy and attacked MacArthur’s regime as too militaryand too conservative. He commented

American policies in Japan at this moment are to some extent satisfactory;in other aspects they are unsatisfactory… I have drawn the attention of theHouse before to the fact that Prince Konoye is still permitted to remain thevoice of the throne in Japan. Anybody who examines Prince Konoye’srecord must know that he cannot be the friend either of the West or ofdemocracy… We are told that if we insist on a Control Commission,General MacArthur will resign his job, but with great respect to that veryfine soldier, it is not a soldier’s job any longer… What are we going to doto re-educate the Japanese?… I was really aghast two or three days ago toread that Prince Konoye said that the Japanese Constitution wasreally democratic and he thought it needed only minor alterations… Article


3 says that the Japanese Emperor is ‘sacred and inviolable’. Does thatsound like a democratic institution?

Despite James Callaghan’s speeches the left possessed no acknowledged expertson Japan, yet there was certainly lively interest. In particular Labour M.P.s in theUnion of Democratic Control were active inside and outside parliament inwriting and speaking about Japan.2 For these enthusiastic radicals the postwarworld was a people’s world, and occupied Japan provided a perfect laboratoryfor social and socialistic experiments. Liberation, emancipation, socialism, andtrade unionism were all concepts which they thought relevant to Japan and whichformed central elements in their parliamentary questions. For some time DavidRees Williams was the most active U.D.C. member on the back benches. InOctober 1946 he asked the Foreign Secretary ‘whether he would take steps tointroduce State ownership of land and nationalised industries’ in Japan. Eightmonths later he enquired what was being done to help implement MizutaniCh� zaburo’s wish that ‘the policies of the British Labour Party’ should ‘form thebasis of his own party’s philosophy’. Co-operatives, trade unions, and betterlabour standards were all topics raised by critics of America on the back benchesbut in view of Britain’s minimal influence answers were usually limited to sharpfactual statements. In the spring of 1947 the Foreign Office decided to deal withColonel Rees Williams by other means. On 14 April Christopher Mayhew sent alucid brief describing the situation in Japan to the International Secretary of theLabour Party, Denis Healey.3 This aimed to enlighten Labour Members ofParliament and avoid the preparation of unnecessary parliamentary answers.

Perhaps some left-wing questions were more visionary than realistic, but fearthat criticism of America could damage Anglo-American friendship appears tohave been genuine. This apprehension explains the careful arrangements whichwere made for Members of Parliament to visit Japan. As early as August 1946Sir Alvary Gascoigne approached General MacArthur to suggest that he invitefive M.P.s to visit Tokyo. A public invitation was issued on 5 September, and itwas agreed that the Reverend Gordon Lang, Lieutenant-Colonel Evelyn King,Meredith F.Titterington (Labour), and Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean andCommander T.D.Galbraith (Conservative) would spend two weeks in Japanstudying ‘Constitutional reform, Trades Unions and Labour Organizations, (the)Co-operative Movement, Education., Japanese development towards democraticgovernment (and the) welfare of Occupation Forces’.4 In addition to this busyprogramme the Reverend Lang was to have a private meeting with the SupremeCommander, while in Gascoigne’s words the M.P.s ‘would like if possible toenjoy a brief rest at Nikko, or in some other resort’.5 American hospitality wasapparently effective for at the end of their visit the M.P.s wrote to GeneralMacArthur that Thanks to the excellent arrangements made for us we have beenable to obtain information which has given us a clear insight into the great task towhich you have set your hand, and the many difficult problems which confrontyou. We leave with feelings of admiration for all that has already been

206 THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT AND OCCUPIED JAPAN, 1945–62

accomplished and will follow with deep and sympathetic interest the progress ofthis great experiment’.6

In the following year a further delegation consisting of the Reverend Lang,John Paton and Hervey Rhodes (Labour), and William Teeling and W.R.S.Prescott (Conservative) visited Japan. On this occasion three weeks were spenttravelling through Honshu, Kyushu and Hokkaido, and again everyone was wellpleased. In the words of Sir Alvary Gascoigne the visit was ‘highly successful…not only because of the opportunity which it has afforded to a body ofresponsible United Kingdom Nationals (and through them to the House ofCommons and the people of the United Kingdom) to learn something of theproblems and difficulties which confront you in your difficult task…but alsobecause of the beneficial effect which it has had upon Anglo-Americanfriendship and co-operation in the Far East’.7 The United States embassy inLondon also heard of the M.P.’s happy reactions from Esler Dening. Acceding toE.F.Drumright

Mr. Dening said… The delegation had been particularly appreciative of thefreedom granted its members to make observations, and of the facilitiesafforded by the occupation authorities. Members of the delegation hadvisited jails, mines, factories, farms, et cetera, and had talked to Japanese inall walks of life. General MacArthur had impressed them with his visionand statesmanship. Mr. Dening made the point that the delegation had beenin Japan for three weeks only, and the members had scarcely been able toobtain more than superficial impressions. Nevertheless, he felt that the triphad been of value in that the members would be able to some extent toshare their observations and impressions with less well-informedparliamentary colleagues. Mr. Dening said he was confident from hisconversations with mission members, that they would, in speaking onJapan in the Commons, generally take a favourable attitude toward theoccupation administration and the progress made in Japan toward reform.8

Left wing critics of early occupation policy may have been the greatest nuisanceto the Labour cabinet; after all they were members of the same party. But therewas also a conservative critique of American, and implicitly official Labourpolicy towards Japan. In broad terms this looked back to European attitudes inearlier wars and more laissez-faire attitudes to a defeated enemy. Perhaps themost striking advocate of this view was Mr. Kenneth Pickthorn, the Conservativerepresentative of Cambridge University. On 21 February 1946 he asked

Upon what basis of international law can it be right for an occupying Power,for us, or our Allies partly relying on the force which they draw from theiralliance with us, to do what we are doing, for example, in Japan to abolishShintoism and to abolish feudalism so-called?… I ask upon what basis oflaw as understood in Europe these last two thousand years, can an


occupying Power without negotiations or treaty…set about to alter thereligious establishment or the landholding arrangements of any country… Ihave asked questions about it in this House…and I have not been told thatthere was some principle or practice which I had forgotten.

Sir Hartley Shawcross simply replied ‘Ask again’ but this articulate Conservativenever received a straight answer. A variant on Pickthorn’s non-interventionismcame from Major Wingfield Digby (Conservative) who criticised the purging ofHatoyama Ichir� who had been selected as Prime Minister following the 1946general election. Noting the dangers involved in compelling Japanese to becomedemocrats Major Digby stated ‘Those of us who have been to Japan know thatalways there were forces who believed in democracy. We should do everythingthat we can to make matters easier for them and not more difficult’. The elementof personal contact which coloured these remarks was often an important elementin Conservative criticism of radical policies. For example, William Teeling, themost frequent Conservative speaker on Japan, stated

I knew the Emperor’s brother fairly well, because he was educated at mycollege at Oxford and I formed the opinion that he and the small grouparound him were the only people in that country with anything likedemocratic ideas. They were Liberal statesmen and I think that only theseand their like could help us at the present moment… These older menmight be of great use to us today.

However these conservative criticisms found their strongest expression in theHouse of Lords.

In the upper house a concern for law, and prewar relations with Japaneseofficials were dominant influences on some prominent personalities. On 10 May1949 the lords debated the Tokyo war crimes trials in terms which challenged thefundamentals of allied policy more drastically than critics in the Commons. Thedebate was opened by Lord Hankey who took up the case of ‘An old true friendof this country Mamoru Shigemitsu who was Japanese Ambassador here beforethe war’. He continued ‘If I had time I would expand on his love of peace, hispatriotism, his vision to see that Japan’s higher interests lay in peace andfriendship with this country and America’. In particular Lord Hankey quotedJustice Roling of the Netherlands ‘The accused Shigemitsu should be acquittedon all charges brought against him.’ Soon he advanced from this individual caseto condemn the whole nature of the Tokyo trials; and attacked them ‘for trying toestablish that there was a conspiracy in Japan to do all these wicked things’. Heremarked ‘As I read the majority judgment I felt that the arguments on this pointwere rather thin and the dissenting judgments strongly confirmed that view’.Hankey also questioned how far such terms as ‘Conspiracy’ and ‘aggression’could be adequately defined in a court of law and wondered how far men inauthority were responsible for the misdeeds of those serving under them. The


Earl of Perth also believed that extenuating circumstances had not beenadequately considered in Shigemitsu’s case, but much feeling in the House ofLords was voiced by Lord Winster who remarked ‘On the general question ofwar trials, I would say that I do not think the British find such trials verycongenial. As a race we are not good haters, and we have an ingrained partialityfor “calling it a day” when the contest is over.’ The Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowittreplied in emotional rather than legal terms. He cited cases of cruelty to prisonersof war, rather than points of jurisprudence and declared ‘Aggressive war doesnot cease to be aggressive war because you cannot define it. You cannot define apretty girl but, thank God, pretty girls exist’. Unfortunately there were very fewlords present in the House on this occasion, and its influence in the case ofShigemitsu was insignificant. It was the power of the Soviet Union which hadbeen decisive in his condemnation by the International Military Tribunal for theFar East.

By the time the verdicts of the Tokyo trial were announced in November 1948American policy had moved emphatically from reform to economicreconstruction. As part of this new occupation strategy MacArthur reversed hispolicies towards labour and the destruction of the zaibatsu. It was this moreconservative policy which the Attlee government was now compelled to defendand which formed the main focus of Commons discussion. In these debates thefirst issue which divided members was the extent to which American reformshad been successful; for the ‘reverse course’ was officially justified, by the claimthat Japanese democracy was safe and economic policy could be given greateremphasis. Here two men who had visited Japan, John Paton and Hervey Rhodesdrew totally different conclusions from their experiences. John Paton was deeplysympathetic to the efforts and ideals of the Japanese people and believed thatthey had made sincere efforts to democratise their political system. In contrastRhodes remained sceptical, particularly regarding the extent to which labourrelations had been transformed in zaibatsu companies. At a coal mine in Kyushuhe claimed to have been introduced to Baron Mitsui who had been described as acolliery welfare officer. Hervey Rhodes was unconvinced of the truth of thisstatement and questioned the degree to which trade unions had becomeinfluential in Japan. In considering labour problems economic and politicalissues were often conveniently intertwined. Labour members believed that tradeunions were both agencies of democratisation and bodies which could raisewages and weaken Japan’s competitive power. Here was an instance whereeconomic and constituency interests and political ideals fitted neatly and usefullytogether.

In 1949 as America’s policies became Increasingly conservative the Labourgovernment remained unwilling to make open attacks on MacArthur’s regime.The Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, criticised measures against public serviceunions in private, for public criticism might have helped the Soviet Union in itsrivalry with the United States. However in Parliament the dangers of Japanesecompetition soon became the dominant theme of protracted debates. On 2 March


responses to this question ranged from the bizarre to the coolly rational. JamesErrol (Conservative) scarcely seemed to understand the results of the PacificWar and the continuing civil conflict in China. He remarked that ‘The Japanesecould well go back to their old territories instead of invading marketstraditionally belonging to the West. If they grew more food in Korea andManchuria and traded a bit more with these territories the immense pressurewhich they are going to build up to export manufactured goods into our marketswould be reduced’. In contrast Austen Albu (Labour) though that British industrywas crying before it was hurt and reminded the House that Britain and the UnitedStates, as well as Japan, sometimes resorted to forms of subsidy to supportparticular industries. Despite parliamentary anxiety the government spokesman,John Edwards, still hewed to an anti-protectionist line. He declared that ‘BothGermany and Japan must, as soon as is practicable, earn sufficient in theiroverseas trade to pay their own way and to cease to be pensioners on our owntaxpayers or on those of the United States’. He went on to mention that Japanwas developing new industries, such as engineering, which might reduce hercompetition in textiles. In these matters party allegiance was far less significantthan constituency pressures, and political doctrine was relatively unimportant. Itwas a Conservative, Walter Prescott of Darwen, who closed the debate in adecidedly sour mood. He stated

I visited Japan recently and I know a certain amount of what is happeningthere… I know we are concerned in this matter, and speaking personallyand for most of the people of Lancashire I am very disappointed.

By 14 December 1949 parliamentary alarm had replaced disappointment and anadjournment debate was held on competition from the Japanese textile industry.Labour critics clearly reflected the opinions of textile trade unions and AnthonyGreenwood declared ‘The irony of the situation is that we are pouring millionsof pounds of British money into schemes of colonial development and theinhabitants of the colonies are spending the money on Japanese goods’. InUganda and Tanganyika there were many cases of Japanese textiles sweeping thefield. Greenwood admitted that Japanese labour costs had risen but they stillremained sufficiently low to play havoc with British trade. Yet solutions werevery hard to prescribe. Like virtually all British M.P.s he admitted Japan’s needto survive stating ‘we cannot nor should we wish to smash Japanese industry.That would be bad economics and worse ethics. The Japanese have to live butthe people in Lancashire have to live too. From the long term point of view thesolution lies in international socialist planning’. The government spokesmantried to lower the emotion by speaking of palliatives such as an Anglo-Americanstudy mission, but it was clear that Anglo-American military co-operationremained Britain’s dominant interest. As a result little action could be taken ontextiles. However Arthur Bottomley (Labour) stoutly defended MacArthur for


diversifying Japanese industry and making sure that certain labour standardswere achieved.

In April 1950 the trade issue was wrangled over again though by now HerveyRhodes was Parliamentary Secretary at the Board of Trade. In his new capacityhe emphasised all the improvements which had taken place in Japanese livingstandards and commented favourably on ‘a tremendous improvement indormitory conditions’ and the absence of the old pre-paid contract system.Furthermore the new spokesman used his inexperience to justify postponinganswers to several difficult questions.

Yet it would be wrong to believe that shirts, cloth and handkerchiefs were theonly Japanese matters which interested Members of Parliament in the final yearsof the occupation. The Cold War saw to that. American hostility to CommunistChina brought a new ideological element to discussions of the Far East andU.D.C. and Tribune group members viewed this new conflict with seriousconcern. Such Labour critics were both romantic and prophetic. Romanticismwas evident in Harold Davies’ view that some vast plan for Asia could magicaway problems of development and commercial competition. But in sensing thatthe racial factor would become increasingly important in Asian politics he wasperceptive, as he was in believing that the Cold War would soon encompassmuch of East Asia. At this time ideas of economic interest also coincided withpolitical idealism, for if Japan could avoid involvement in the Cold War shemight find markets in China, and competition with British companies would beallayed. Left wing opinions may often have been unrealistic but a shortage ofinformation about Japan, which Davies criticised hardly contributed to cool ormature discussion.

In the summer of 1951 discussion of Japan’s political future became muchmore specific when the future peace treaty was presented to the House. On 26thJuly the new Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison introduced the draft agreementto the Commons, and spoke of the harm which would stem from a less liberalpeace. Morrison stated ‘A liberal treaty would give us the best chance of seeingJapan develop along liberal parliamentary lines and play her part in the freeworld’. British attempts to secure some restraints on Japanese industrial powerhad failed and perhaps from necessity Morrison reverted to the Crippseansentiment ‘that in the long run the future of Lancashire prosperity, like the rest ofBritain, will depend on the sustained pursuit of the right economic policies athome, and on international co-operation in economic affairs’. R.A.Butler, theConservative spokesman was perhaps less influenced by Lancashire and potteryinterests and spoke favourably of the agreement. He praised the diplomatic workof Sir Esler Dening and emphasised the need for a committed British presence inJapan. He also talked nostalgically of the golden days of the Anglo-Japanesealliance but questioned why Britain had no place in the ANZUS pact. Mr. Butlerwondered if Japan would sign an agreement on the copyright of designs, butoverall made no major criticism of the treaty. It was left to Anthony Greenwood


to return to the textile bogey but even he agreed that the expansion of world tradewould be the best solution to the problem.

However Greenwood also noted that world trade was not expanding andwondered what would happen if Japan was compelled to recognise theNationalist regime on Formosa. For

That would mean that outlets available to Japan would be further restrictedand once again she would be driven to expanding her markets andpenetrating into markets which we would like to keep for goods producedin this country.

He continued

I hope that before Japan is allowed to expand as completely as she will beable when sovereignty is conceded to her we shall renew discussion withthe United States and make sure that America will use her influence toprevent the expansion of the Japanese textile industry. I say this becausethere is a suspicion, particularly in Lancashire, that America is anxious tobuild up the Japanese textile industry because this would help to give Japana viable economy without competing with America and at the same timeprovide an outlet for American raw cotton which may at some stagebe extremely useful to the United States.

Trade Unions and the International Labour Organization were seen as possiblehalf-solutions to Lancashire’s problems and Greenwood vainly called forpressure to obtain more protection in the forthcoming treaty. Clement Davies(Liberal) claimed that liberal internationalism was embodied in the draft andproclaimed the virtues of free trade and the I.L.O.Harold Davies saw the treatyas a humiliation for Japan, while the opening of the China market was againmentioned as a means of ameliorating competition.

On 28 November 1951 the Second Reading of the Japan Treaty of Peace Billwas debated in the House of Commons. By this time Churchill had replacedAttlee as Prime Minister and both front benches supported the treaty. Membersfrom Lancashire and the potteries vainly called for economic safeguards. Left-wing critics disliked an agreement which Communist China and India hadrefused to sign but the President of,the Board of Trade, Peter Thorneyeroftexpressed the dominant feeling of the House in his final remark ‘Japan was onceour great ally. I believe she can again be our friend’. The Bill was accepted by382 votes to 33. Michael Foot and other Tribunite members voted against thetreaty.

Following initial fears of Japanese militarism British parliamentary opinionwas surprisingly enlightened. M.P.s of all parties were committed to Japan’sdemocratisation and her return to the international community. There werecriticisms of the United States from left to right but overall Ministers and


parliamentary visits to Japan were successful in restraining anti-Americanopinion. Perhaps the most striking theme in six and a half years of debate waspessimism regarding Britain’s industrial future. At first this was confined to ahandful of members but in time its influence spread significantly in both majorparties. Many problems of the occupation years are now forgotten, but Britain’sindustrial crisis remains as intractable today as in the austere years of Attlee’sbeleagured administration.

NOTES

1. The primary souce for this paper is Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates. Othersources are indicated in the footnotes below.

2. The Union of Democratic Contrors attitudes can be studied in its pamphlets Japan(1947), Crisis in Japan (1950), Japanese Ally? The Facade and the Facts (1951)and Far Eastern Time Fuse, The Japanese Peace Treaty: What is says and what itreally means (1952). The U.D.C.’s origins are described in A.J.P.Taylor, TheTroublemakers, Dissent Over Foreign Policy, 1792–1939 (London, 1957), pp. 132–166.

3. ‘Mr. Rees-Williams has been asking a number of questions about Japan… But itdoes appear…that he is getting the wrong facts from somewhere…the Departmentis thinking of compiling a brief memorandum showing how the machine works inJapan, which Major Mayhew might care to pass to Mr. Healey for the Labour Partyin general’. Esler Dening’s minute, 23 January 1947, PO 371/63765 (F 1237/1182/23) (Public Record Office, Kew, London) and ‘Memorandum on Conditions inJapan for Mr. Healey’ by the Japan and Pacific Department of the Foreign Office,25 February 1947 and Christopher Mayhew to Denis Healey, 14 April 1947(International Secretary’s Japan File, Labour Party Archives, Labour PartyHeadquarters, London).

4. See Sir Alvary Gascoigne to General Douglas MacArthur, 30 August 1946 (RG-5,SCAP, British Mission Correspondence, No. 1, August 1945–December 1947,MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, U.S.A.).

5. Sir Alvary Gascoigne to General Douglas MacArthur, 4 September 1946 (RG-5,SCAP, British Mission Correspondence No. 1, August 1945–December 1947,MacArthur Memorial Archives).

6. Meredith Farrar Titterington et al to General Douglas MacArthur, 29 September1946 (RG-5, SCAP, MacArthur Memorial Archives).

7. Sir Alvary Gascoigne to General Douglas MacArthur, 10 November 1947 (RG-5,SCAP, MacArthur Memorial Archives).

8. E.F.Drumright to the Secretary of State (Confidential), 17 December 1947 (RG-5,Political Adviser to SCAP Correspondence, July 1947–March 1951, MacArthurMemorial Archives, Norfolk, Virginia).


First published in Ian Nish (Ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919–

1952 (Cambridge University Press, 1982)

23Britain’s View of Postwar Japan, 1945–49

Government policy

AT MIDNIGHT on 14 August 1945 the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee,broadcast a simple message commemorating the ending of the Pacific war. In itsemphasis this brief statement indicated the first salient feature of Britain’s viewof post-war Asia, and, implicitly, of Japan’s significance within it. EssentiallyAttlee paid tribute to the ‘men from this country, from the Dominions, fromIndia and the Colonies…that fought so well in the arduous campaign againstJapan’. He recognized the decisive role of the United States but devoted specialthought to ‘our friends in the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand, in India,in Burma and in those colonial territories upon which the brunt of the Japaneseattack fell’.1 This imperial vision of the Pacific War, as a struggle fought by aunited Commonwealth and Empire was to dominate much post-warconsideration of Japan. This, rather than bilateral Anglo-Japanese considerations,characterized British policy in the first post-war years.

If British policy had a second, if related, keynote, this also stemmed from avision which transcended a narrow definition of Anglo-Japanese relations. ThePacific War had been unprecedented in its geographical scope and racialintensity, but to many British statesmen and commentators the message of theFirst World War was of overwhelming significance. According to J.M.Keynes,the Versailles treaties had spawned social and economic chaos which bredmilitary conflict. Thus the notion that social and economic reconstruction wasessential for lasting peace was a powerful vision which shaped broad Britishviews of Germany and Japan. In the, words of the economist Barbara Ward,broadcast on 15 August,

Japan and Germany do present formidable economic problems. They haveboth built up their large populations…on the basis of intensiveindustrialisation. Without industry, they probably could not keep alltheir people alive; and even if they could, their living standards would fallcatastrophically and they would become economic cripples, centres ofmisery and unrest. It would be very hard to build up a world-wide peace

with two vast economic slums in the world—one in Europe and one in theFar East.2

Speaking in the House of Commons on 20 August the Foreign Secretary, ErnestBevin, repeated this broad theme with the words ‘We must strive to fightsuccessfully against social injustice and against hardship and want, so that thesecurity we have won militarily may lead to still greater security, and that greatersecurity to still greater economic expansion.’3 In Bevin’s view Japan could neverbe a stable element in the world community without eventual economic security.

Yet, despite this benign imperial vision of post-war Asia, British policy was farfrom well-prepared to create detailed plans for the domestic reform of Japan’seconomy and society. Japan’s defeat had come too swiftly for detailed blueprintsto be prepared. The United States had the power, will and energy to occupyJapan before any of her allies, and she had deliberately concealed her post-surrender planning from the British embassy in Washington. All thesecircumstances combined to limit the political information which was available toBritish planners. Furthermore General Douglas MacArthur’s position asSupreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) enabled him to control entryto Japan, to censor letters and newspapers and restrict any British role to aminimum. Needless to say, Britain’s imperial responsibilities, her occupationrole in Germany and her financial exhaustion prevented any effective challengeto American dominance in Tokyo.

Yet even if Britain could make no substantial challenge to American politicaland military power, pride in her past and present encouraged her view that, evenwithout significant military authority, she could still play a useful role in theevolution of post-war Japan. Britain’s sacrifices as a member of the militaryalliance in the Pacific certainly suggested a reasonable claim to influence thereformation of the ex-enemy. Indeed the distinctive nature of British political andeconomic democracy—combined with the pride taken by members of the Labourgovernment in their experiments in public ownership and welfare—suggestedthat Britain had a distinctive message to convey to Japan’s leaders which mightprove socially creative.

Thus British policy sought a secure Commonwealth, economic reconstruction,and an influence on Japan’s social and economic development; but of almostequal significance were negative factors in the British setting which gave a broadflexibility to official policy,. Throughout the Second World War the Japanesehad remained, in the words of the Churchill government’s Minister ofInformation, Brendan Bracken, ‘thousands of miles away’ and ‘interest in theFar East’ had been ‘sparsely distributed in this country’.4 To a large extent thissituation persisted after Japan’s surrender so that a lively, and vivid publicopinion concerning Japan was rarely an important restraint on governmentpolicy. In the Foreign Office, opinion on the value of sweeping social changes inJapan was as sceptical as at the time of the Meiji restoration. Such attitudes gavelittle positive direction to ideas of domestic reform in defeated Japan.


Against this broad background Britain approached the first months ofoccupation determined to assert, as far as possible, a role in Japan which wouldparallel her importance in Germany. On 20 August she proposed the creation of afive-power Control Council for Japan which would issue orders to the SupremeCommander. Furthermore, the British also suggested that Allied representativesshould be attached to executive departments of the occupation which would carryout the Control Council’s policies. As a counter-suggestion America proposedthe establishment of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission to be located inWashington. In response the British Foreign Secretary demanded a ‘voice…commensurate with what we have suffered from Japanese treachery, with ourcontribution to Japan’s defeat and our responsibility towards our own peoples forpreventing any renewal of Japanese aggression’.5 Yet, in the discussions whichfollowed, Britain was inhibited by non-Asian considerations which continuouslyovershadowed any discussion of policy towards Japan. Any hostility towardsWashington might jeopardize United States military or economic help in Europe,while there was the additional danger that Britain might find herself holding anunwelcome identity of view with the Soviet Union. Finally, at the foreignministers’ meeting which was held in Moscow in December 1945, agreementwas reached on a British and Allied role in the control of Japan; but the eleven-power Far Eastern Commision and the Allied Council had such limited powersthat they confirmed, rather than compromised, the total dominance of Americanpower. This cosmetic settlement also illustrated the importance of the emphaticCommonwealth element in British actions towards Japan. A singleCommonwealth representative was to represent the United Kingdom, Australia,New Zealand and India on the Allied Council; and Britain reluctantly agreed thatthe Australian, W.Macmahon Ball, should serve as the agent of theseschizophrenic interests.6 Similarly the British Commonwealth Occupation Forcewhich arrived in Japan early in 1946 was under Australian command—but(unlike American garrison units) had no military government teams or politicalinfluence.

Following this rebuttal of Britain’s claim to a resonant voice in Japan’sadministration, two major issues came to dominate British policies towardsJapan’s future. The first of these, as in late 1945, was to retain Americangoodwill and prevent any public criticism or implied antipathy towards UnitedStates activities. At home this was not difficult to achieve. The mass media tookrelatively little interest in Japan and Members of Parliament appear to have beenso starved of information that Parliamentary questions were easily rebuffed byministers with sharp factual descriptions of American reforms—or references to‘continuing consultations’. Perhaps more important, and more controversial,were the economic objectives which increasingly formed the centre-ground ofBritish activity. Certainly British traders were eager to return to Japan toparticipate in any possible commerce, but over-all expectations of trade withJapan were hardly ambitious. Visible trade with Japan in pre-war days hadoccupied a minor place in the British economy; and, though invisibles had been

216 BRITAIN’S VIEW OF POSTWAR JAPAN, 1945–49

more significant and profitable, future prospects were hardly encouraging. Incontrast, the industrialization of China, should peace and order be restored,appeared to promise a long-term export of capital goods which might be muchmore advantageons. As in defence and politics, so in commerce. Japan’s trueimportance lay in the Commonwealth connection. Britain’s south-east Asiancolonies were short not only of food, but also of textiles which Britain could notproduce, and both of these were essential to the welfare of their people. In theautumn of 1946 agreement was reached to establish an Allied Trade Board toarrange the limited opening of trade to Allied countries and British policytowards Japan’s economic future was defined with increasing clarity.Understandably Britain still feared the possible revival of Japanese militarypower and favoured ‘a rigorous pruning, and where necessary the totalelimination of those industries which can contribute directly or indirectly to warmaking potential… Japanese steel, heavy engineering, chemicals, shipping,aircraft and metal industries will on security grounds, undergo at least severereduction.’7 But, as in the past, emphasis was laid on Japan’s immense difficultiesand the need for their amelioration. In his statement of 28 October 1946 SirStafford Cripps, the President of the Board of Trade, diagnosed low wages and‘government manipulation of exchange subsidies and other methods which canbe regarded as inconsistent with proper commercial standards’ as the main basisof pre-war competition, and expressed the hope that international agreements and‘the forcible breaking up of the oligarchic corporate system of industry withrising standards of wages and living would go far to dissolve this difficulty.’ ButCripps reiterated the need for Japan to be ‘left after the peace settlement in sucha position that she can become and remain internationally solvent’. Theimmediate alternative was ‘permanent foreign support in the form of direct orindirect subsidies’. Clearly Britain was in no position to accept any such burdenand the only alternative was for Japan to export. Given that heavy industry wouldbe curtailed Japan would have to concentrate on her lighter industries includingtextiles. Recognizing the competition which such a revival might imply forLancashire and Yorkshire textile products, Cripps concluded: ‘For the solutionof our export problems we must look rather to the efficiency of our ownproduction and to a greater total volume and increased flow of international trade.’8

This basic position on the rehabilitation of Japanese commerce and industry wasunderstandably unpopular but it was a logical extension of thee notion of peacebased upon international economic security.

The next major concern of British policy was to encourage Japan’s recoveryby negotiating a peace settlement and bringing to an end her occupation status. Asearly as the spring of 1946 the United States had proposed a demilitarizationtreaty for Japan which Britain had supported, but as on other matters nothing couldbe achieved until there had been further consultation with Commonwealthgovernments.

These initial Anglo-American exchanges had been confidential but on 27February 1947 Christopher Mayhew (Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign


Affairs) stated in the Commons that ‘Dr Evatt and General MacArthur are infavour of an early treaty, and we ourselves would not dissent from that viewprovided of course the powers concerned and especially the dominions can workout the basis of such a treaty.’9 On 19 March D.F.MacDermot, head of the Japanand Pacific Department of the Foreign Office, reinforced this statement in aconfidential conversation with the First Secretary of the United States embassy,but stated that a general treaty should be preceded by a disarmament treaty on thelines of that which had been discussed in the previous year. From this time on,British and Commonwealth interest in a treaty gathered momentum. On 16 MayBevin advocated a treaty in the Commons. In August Commonwealth leaders metin Canberra and reached general agreement on an early treaty which would bediscussed with all members of the Far Eastern Commission. Commonwealthleaders favoured a demilitarized Japan, American trusteeship of the Ry� ky�islands and the prohibition of arms manufacture. But they opposed thecontinuing occupation of their former enemy by Allied forces, and believed thatforces outside Japan could provide an adequate safeguard against future militaryexpansion. By October Britain was so eager for a peace treaty that she favoured‘pressing ahead with plans…with or without Russian participation because in theinterests of the whole of Asia we wish to avoid the same state of continueduncertainty as exists in Europe, and the blame which will attach to the Westernpowers if they are responsible for delay’.10 Britain sought, if possible, to achieveRussian participation in any discussions. Unfortunately China opposedAmerica’s suggested voting procedure. Russia insisted on a great-power decision,while the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff was worried about Japan’spolitical stability. All these factors ended British hopes of a clean sharp end toJapan’s occupation status. Against this unfavourable background Britain was,understandably, unwilling to take the lead in pressing for treaty negotiations. Butat all levels her urgent desire for a treaty as the basis for Japanese recovery wasrepeatedly expressed. At the Labour Party conference in May 1948, Ernest Bevinreferred to the Vexed problem of Japan’, the problems for industry of continueduncertainty, and the undesirability of leaving ‘ninety millions of people…in acesspool of poverty’ and, again linking Commonwealth with commerce,declared: ‘The government cannot be a party to excluding Australia, NewZealand, Burma, India and Pakistan from the Peace Conference.’11 Perhaps therationale for British attitudes was most vividly stated by Esler Dening in aconversation with the counsellor of the United States embassy in London,E.R.Dickover, on 1 April 1948. In advocating as early a peace as possible, hereasoned:

The Japanese cannot return to normal conditions and rebuild theireconomic and political structures until occupation is terminated and theyare left to their own devices. Until that time they will adopt a passiveattitude relying upon General MacArthur and American aid. Mostcompetent Japanese will not come forward under present conditions to fill


Government or industrial posts, because they feel that in futurecollaboration…will redound to their discredit. As for the second reason…Britain desires to resume normal economic and political relations withJapan… Furthermore, the Japanese cannot proceed with the rehabilitationof their industries until they know what level is to be left after removal ofreparations.12

Throughout 1948 Britain’s desire for a peace treaty persisted, but changingcircumstances led her to reappraise Japan’s situation and to place confidentialexchanges with America above considerations of Commonwealth co-operation.In late March the Foreign Office felt that the State Department was re-analysingJapanese policy without taking Britain into her confidence, while the UnitedStates believed that Esler Dening’s visit to Commonwealth capitals was an act ofpique in response to American coldness. In May mutual suspicions were largelyallayed when MacDermot stated that ‘if the UK and the US could talk thingsover alone we could undoubtedly easily arrive at satisfactory conclusions, but theUK [has] to consider the wishes of her obstreperous children Australia and NewZealand’.13 He also disclaimed any British desire to construct a BritishCommonwealth bloc in treaty preparations. Now George Kennan, director of thePolicy Planning Staff of the State Department, and other American thinkers wereincreasingly dubious as to the advantage of a treaty. Japan appeared incapable ofself-defence and they feared that, if the Bevin formula of a treaty without Russiawas adopted, the psychological advantage of the peace would be lost. British andAmerican policy did agree on one central point of analysis. If Japan remained asit was, ‘Japanese muscles might well become flabby.’14 Thus, even if a treaty—with all its attendant hazards—was not signed, it was essential for Japan to havemore autonomy and for the inner realities of occupation to be changed. Indiscussions in Washington, Dening agreed that Japan represented no ‘militarythreat for the foreseeable future’ and that ‘controls against future Japaneseaggression should be of the simplest nature’. In this same exchange Deningstated that Australian and New Zealand views of the situation differed from hisand declare that they were viewing ‘with unreasoned alarm the prospect ofJapanese emigration southward in the Pacific’. He also described ‘their“pathological worry” over the level of Japanese industry’ in ‘marked contrast tothe attitude of Burma and Malaya’.15 Britain remained unhappy about thepossible future of Japanese shipbuilding but suggested that British and Americanviews on Japan’s industrial future might well converge with the passage of time.Convergence was again marked in Dening’s agreement with Kennan on the needto narrow the provisions of the purge policy and wind up the war-crimes trials soas to aid greater Japanese recovery. In top-secret conversations in May and earlyJune, Dening made numerous suggestions which proved to be extremelyprophetic. But in the immediate future they were unacceptable. On 2 June hesuggested that it might be ‘advisable for the US to secure its strategic interests inthe Western Pacific without postponing a treaty through the conclusion of a US-


Japanese bilateral pact. Presumably such a pact would give the US rights tomaintain bases and troops in Japan to the extent necessary for guaranteeingJapan’s territorial integrity.’16 He also declared that Japan’s deep economicdependence on the United States would prohibit her from changing sides in thecold war, and that ‘world opinion would not be morally adverse’ to such a US-Japan defence pact. By late 1948, with the Berlin blockade and Soviet control ofCzechoslovakia, Britain relegated Japan to a secondary position in her worldoutlook; but her belief that a peace treaty was desirable remained unchanged.Beset by weakness and difficulties, she could scarcely take the initiative inconvening a preparatory conference. With the possibility of a treaty becomingever more distant the British Foreign Office dissolved its treaty-drafting unit butcontinued to believe that the non-Communist powers should proceed towards anagreement with Japan irrespective of Russian non-co-operation. By September1949 Britain’s earnest wish for a treaty and her intimate links with the UnitedStates had effectively relegated the Commonwealth countries to the status of atroublesome obstacle which had to be overcome to obtain a treaty.

In other words, if Commonwealth agreement to a peace could be obtained, itwould no longer be necessary for the United States to have veto power in anypeace conference, as no non-Communist opposition would be conceivable.Indeed Commonwealth considerations were now so secondary to Anglo-American co-operation that Bevin suggested that substantial American food aidto India might secure Premier Nehru’s co-operation in the preparation of a peaceconference. Later Bevin suggested that the United States should prepare a drafttreaty and that he could solicit support for it at the forthcoming Commonwealthconference. The United States, concerned at the danger of Bevin’s too closeidentification with the American point of view, baulked at this suggestion. Thusby the close of 1949 Britain’s view of Japan, and the Commonwealth hadundergone a steady gradual transformation. The emotional imperatives ofCommonwealth unity which had followed victory had given way to calculationsof face and diplomatic appearances; but in her desire for a treaty and areasonably prosperous Japan Britain had kept the essentials of her policy.

Trade union diplomacy

British views of Japan were never confined to grand diplomatic strategy, andattempts to influence her future were not limited to simple capital-to-capitaldiplomatic negotiations. The establishment of the British Liaison Mission in1946 was the most obvious, but by no means the only, attempt to shape thefuture of Japan. In social and cultural matters Britain sought to influence Japanby various levels of propaganda, and thus to augment her own prestige. SomeBritish officials understandably believed that some narrowing of the socialdistances which separated the two societies could well have beneficial economiceffects. Furthermore, leaders of Britain’s Labour government and trade unionleaders in numerous western countries believed that the introduction of their


pattern of trade union organization would be of great value to Japan inemancipating her workforce and improving its sense of political activity. On 19December 1946 Hector MacNeil, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office,stated in Parliament that ‘His Majesty’s Government attach importance to thehealthy growth of trade unionism and Co-operative movements in Japan and as afirst step I am at present discussing with the State Department a proposal toattach a British expert on trade union affairs to General MacArthur’sheadquarters.’17 In May 1947, after praising the fair wage clause and otherwelfare provisions in the Japanese textile industry, Ernest Bevin mentioned thathe had sent a labour attaché to Tokyo—a subtly different scheme fromMacNeil’s. Despite such gestures. SCAP’s control over non-Americaninvolvement in Japan was so rigorous that no individual could achieve muchchange in Japanese industrial relations. Yet, in the idealistic months after theAllied victory, trade unions themselves not only created a new internationalorganization, the World Federation of Trade Unions, but sought to play an activerole in the ‘denazification’ of Germany and Japan. The initial meetings of thenew body were held in London, and when a Federation mission visited Japan in1947 the International. Secretary of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), ErnestBell, played a leading role in its investigative and educational activities. On hisreturn Bell submitted a report to the TUC which, with its appended documents,throws a good deal of light upon ‘labour diplomacy’ in the first phase of theAllied occupation. The General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, SirWaiter Citrine, who approached Bevin for his help in obtaining the mission’saccess to Japan, believed that Japan like Germany was administered by an inter-Allied Control Council. He was disabused of this belief by the Foreign Secretaryand it was clear that no permanent links between the World Federation and theoccupation authorities could be achieved. Nevertheless the British government,in the shape of the Board of Trade, provided Bell with a confidential document,Further Statement on Japanese Position in Postwar Export Trade, which sharplyillustrates some government motives for the development of Japanese tradeunions. Like other official statements this referred to ‘a severe surgical operationon Japanese heavy industry—steel, other war potential materials, armamentsindustries, shipbuilding, aircraft and engineering’. The consequences it observedwould be to ‘force the concentration of Japanese energies even more on to thelighter consumer goods industries’. This document, like many others, referred tothe need for Japan to become economically solvent, but of democraticdevelopments it concluded that

it is inevitable that closer concentration on the individual’s standard ofliving, on his right to improve his condition by trade union organization,should have an effect on Japan’s cost structure, which will bring it moreinto line with that of the Western world. This leads to the special problemof Japan as a low cost or ‘unfair’ competitor. If it is impracticable…todiminish Japan’s competitive power by directly clipping its wings, the


question arises of action which might be possible to ensures that shecompetes on the terms which are comparable with the conditions of othertrading nations.18

Needless to say, Bell’s report makes no reference to this incisive document, butit seems unlikely that he ignored it in contemplating Japan’s industrial scene.Like most other visiting delegations, the WFTU representatives were wellreceived by MacArthur, and Bell was much impressed by the vast growth inmembership in Japan’s new-born unions. Understandably many of Japan’s tradeunion leaders seemed lacking in organizational experience, and many rank-and-file members had a ‘lack of appreciation…of the basic principles of trade unionorganization’.19 Japanese unionists did seem eager to learn from moreexperienced foreign trade union organizations, and the delegation continuallyemphasized the need for trade union education. By British standards manyunions seemed based upon small groupings, but others were not. Workingconditions were often unsatisfactory but Bell had little sympathy with attemptsby union leaders to seek political, rather than strictly economic, objectives.

Labour Party diplomacy

In other words, the British government attempted to influence British tradeunions which would attempt to influence Japan. Similarly the Foreign Officeappears to have co-operated with the International Division of the Labour Partyin improving British influence in whatever way seemed possible. In April 1947Christopher Mayhew in the Foreign Office provided a tightly-written briefing onthe Japanese situation for the International Secretary, Denis Healey, whichdescribed the occupation in favourable terms and analysed British interests solelyin terms of limited potential trade.20 Not surprisingly, opportunities to use theprestige of Britain’s governing party to advantage in politico-cultural relationswere at their height in the brief period of socialist rule under Prime MinisterKatayama Tetsu. In these months the Japanese Premier appears to have requestedconsiderable quantities of Labour Party publications, which were forwardedthrough the Foreign Office to Tokyo. Similarly, when Seki Yoshihiko and hisShakai Shis� Kenky� kai (Social Thought Study Group) issued an appeal to theFabian Society in June 1947 with ‘a desire to reconstruct Japan on the model ofBritish Socialism’, a large number of publications was forwarded through theBritish Liaison Mission in Tokyo.21 Small as these links were, one should notunderestimate the important difficulties which obstructed such Anglo-Japanesepolitical relations in these years. A member of the British Liaison Mission., F.E.Mostyn, did lecture to the Shakai Shis� Kenky� kai on British socialism but thiswas, strictly speaking, ‘not permitted by SCAP’. The European editor of theAsahi Shinbun, Dr Ryu, appears to have had meetings with a Labour member ofParliament but only as a substitute for an investigative tour of British industrial


areas, which proved impossible as local people were ‘so very averse to receivinga Japanese and expressed their feelings in no uncertain terms’.22

Parliamentary opinion

Directly or indirectly such semi-official initiatives sought to advance limitedsectors of British policy; but even against a background of low public interestthere were widespread expressions of opinion which criticized the direction ofgovernment thinking. Within Parliament perhaps the most sweeping andfundamental criticism of Allied attitudes came in a House of Lords debate on 19May 1949 which discussed the war-crimes trials and in particular the verdictwhich had been passed on former Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru. In thisprolonged debate Lord Hankey (Independent) not only went to great lengths todefend Shigemitsu’s reputation as a man of peace, but also threw doubt onHirota’s conviction. He went further and attacked the whole establishment andconduct of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. In this critic’swords, the Tokyo tribunal seemed ‘to have imitated the Nuremberg trial rathertoo closely—namely in trying to establish that there was a conspiracy in Japan todo all these wicked things’. Hankey also attacked the rise of the indefinableconcept of ‘aggression’ in the trials. In many respects Lord Hankey anticipatedmuch later revisionism in his attack on the court’s crude notions of politicalresponsibility and the role of the Russians in pressing for the verdict againstShigemitsu. Like much later criticism, this condemnation made skilful use of theattack on the trial made by ‘the learned Netherlands Justice… Mr Roling’. Inparticular Lord Hankey pointed out the meaninglessness of any attempt atresistance in a totalitarian state, and demanded first ‘speedy action to secure therelease of Shigemitsu; second, a review of all the Tokyo sentences; third, an endto the Japanese war crimes trials, and fourth as soon as practicable, anamnesty’.23 Lord Winster (Labour) commented that ‘I do not think the Britishfind such trials very congenial. As a race we are not good haters and we have aningrained partiality for “calling it a day” when the contest is over!…anyexpression of opinion however moderate or however light by our Government,from our Government spokesman in favour of clemency in this matter wouldhave very great weight indeed’.24 This may well have been a misjudgement, butthe Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowitt, seized upon a series of quotations fromShigemitsu’s writings to defend the court’s verdict, and by raising issues relatedto the treatment of prisoners rebutted Hankey’s argument with powerfulemotion, if not logic or legal precision. Though this debate hardly typifiedBritish political discussion, it did reveal a line of conservative criticism of Alliedpolicy which was occasionally found in questions in the House of Commons.Such questioners could find no legal justification for measures such as theabolition of Shint� or land reform, and their questions were never effectivelyanswered. These members revealed an ability to view Japan in detached termswhich was far from common.


Needless to say, most Parliamentary criticisms of British and, indirectly,Allied policy concerned matters which were far less universal than internationallaw and far more closely linked to the material interests of individualconstituents. Throughout much of the immediate post-war period Japan was notdebated in detail, but it was the subject of large numbers of private questionsregarding the possible revival of the Japanese textile and pottery industries.These naturally came from the representatives of Lancashire, Cheshire orStaffordshire constituencies. With the exception of the Conservative foreignaffairs spokesman, R.A.Butler, and William Teeling (Conservative) of Brighton,such members took the greatest interest in Japanese developments. As early as 22October 1946 the ever voluble Walter Fletcher (Conservative) member for Bury,linked American dominance of Japan and Japanese industrial potential to conjureup a nightmare economic collaboration between Washington and Tokyo. Whileacknowledging the justice of American administration this member warned

They are the dominant Power, but, if the American economy inside theUnited States continues to turn out as it seems to be doing at the presentmoment, and we have a sort of spiral of higher wages, higher prices, higherwages, the American Government may say to itself ‘Here we have inJapan the greatest arsenal for the production of cheap goods the world hasever seen’… If we raise the standard of living as I am sure everyonedesires to do, we shall, with American machinery and trade development,have an ancillary machine which, if [the] American economy goes on in itspresent direction, will present us with very serious troubles from the exportpoint of view… I believe that this is a question which should…be studiedin real seriousness and on a practical basis of finding out how we are toprevent the competition of goods from that country.25

On 15 November, Arthur Vere Harvey (Conservative), the member for the silk-manufacturing constituency of Macclesfield, complained of American control ofJapan, the failure of Japan to supply raw silk for Macclesfield, the danger of lowprices and the need for some international marketing board to ‘ensure that they willgive a fair return and enable the standard of living to be increasedsubstantially’.20

As the Japanese economic recovery progressed, concern at competitionheightened and on 4 November 1948 a full-scale debate was held on the future offar eastern trade. This was opened by Hervey Rhodes (Labour), the member forAshton-under-Lyne in Lancashire, who had recently returned from a visit toJapan as a member of a Parliamentary delegation. Rhodes had rightly noted thechange of emphasis in occupation policy but perhaps misinterpreted theimplications of the ‘reverse course’. He believed that the more severe policytowards trade unions would automatically return power to the pre-war zaibatsuwith consequent bad effects for north-country industry. Rhodes claimed to havebeen introduced to Baron Mitsui who had been described as ‘the welfare officer’


of a coal mine in Kyushu, and concluded ‘The Zaibatsu are nearly back wherethey were.’27 Yet Rhodes understood some of the profound virtues of theJapanese people which would have made them formidable competitors, namely,their diligence and industriousness. He also realized that the commercialimplications of these virtues would become increasingly dramatic as Americanrestraints on Japanese industry were removed. Teeling hoped that trade conflictswith Japan could be settled by international agreement and that the Americanswould come to regard Japan from something other than can entirely financialpoint of view’. Frank Fairhurst (Labour), the member from Oldham, praised theequipment of Japanese industry and believed that America’s gains fromexporting raw cotton to Japan gave her good grounds for encouraging thedevelopment of the Japanese textile industry. Yet all these criticisms could havelittle effect in the face of American power and British official policy which sawtextiles as the only immediate source of Japanese prosperity. On 2 March 1949these same issues were debated in a new form when trade competition fromGermany and Japan was the subject of prolonged discussion. In this exchangeFrederick Errol (Conservative), representing the Cheshire constituency ofAltrincham and Sale, recognized government policy for what it was—‘to permitthe ex-enemy countries…to achieve a self-supporting economy’—but wonderedif the cabinet understood the damage which would be done to Britain’s hard-currency earnings.28 In a sense Errol had a broader vision of Japanese industry thanmany of his colleagues. He recognized that Japan could be an efficient producerin such new fields as clock-making and shipbuilding. In fact he suggested aperspective on Japanese trade which was the direct opposite of that which hadmotivated British government policy; whereas Cripps and Bevin had suggestedthat textiles rather than heavier products should be the basis of Japanese survival,Erroll suggested that Japan should export a wide variety of products to ease theintensity of textile competition. In another respect, too, Erroll seemed to havepossessed a curious perspective on Japan’s future. He suggested that she shoulduse Korea and Manchuria once more as agricultural centres and produce morefood at home so that a large export trade would be less necessary. Contrary tothese imaginative rambles into an agrarian idyll, Austen Albu (Labour) admittedthat Britain herself subsidized her iron and steel industry and that the UnitedStates gave special help to its shipbuilding companies. This more sympatheticview of competition was echoed by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board ofTrade, John Edwards, who emphasized the need for Japan’s solvency, and therelatively low level. of production of the Japanese textile industry. StanleyPrescott (Conservative), the member for Darwen, perhaps echoed the opinions ofmany Lancashire MPs when be ended the debate with the following words:

I visited Japan recently, and I know a certain amount of what is happeningthere. I listened to what the Parliarnentary Secretary, had to say with greatinterest because I know we are concerned in this matter, and speaking


personally and for most of the people of Lancashire, I am verydisappointed at what he had to say tonight.29

This statement typified the frustrations of a whole series of critics of governmentpolicy who never received substantial satisfaction.

Within Parliament, criticism of the political condition of Japan or of Americanattitudes was always limited by scarcity of information and the absence ofexpertise, but Parliamentary opinion was often an interesting reflection ofchanging international conditions. In the immediate aftermath of war, before thepattern of American-Soviet rivalry was clearly established, fear of Japaneseexpansionism remained and could produce varied, and sometimes strange,expressions of alarm. In December 1945 the antipathy of James Callaghan(Labour) to the Emperor and Prince Konoe led him to call for rapid politicalchanges. Teeling suggested a more active role for the Soviet Union in feeding theJapanese people and spoke of the danger of a Japanese attack on BritishColumbia. As time passed, however, sympathy was increasingly expressed for theJapanese people, and criticism was voiced of the vagaries of American policy. InJune 1946 K.S.D.W.Digby (Conservative) criticized the American removal ofHatoyama Ichir� from politics on the grounds that this was inhibiting democraticdevelopment. On 23 January 1948 Teeling attacked the inconsistencies ofAmerican policy towards the zaibatsu and attacked the purge with the words

Do we realise that people who are found to be connected with the wareffort—heads of firms, some of whom, like the Mitsuis, are not even beingtried—are being purged even to the third degree of their relationship?…Does that not savour of something just a little like what was done to theJews not very long ago? Is it not wrong? What is our attitude?… What isour policy?30

If Teeling showed one form of sympathy, John Paton (Labour)—who had alsovisited Japan—showed another. This speaker praised the success of Japan’sdemocratization, stating that ‘it is my considered view that…this new system[has] been brought in with the will and support of the Japanese themselves andof the popularly elected government which is there now… many of those whoare cynical about this great development are most unjust to the aspirations andthe good will that have formed It’.31 In a sense this speaker made the strongestcriticism, albeit late, of Allied economic policy towards Japan—but from astandpoint of close identification with the Japanese people. He denounced thecentral doctrine of the Potsdam Declaration, stating that ‘These policies of forcedlimitations are not capable of achievement in the long run, as the VersaillesTreaty amply demonstrated to the world but are the very negation of statesmanshipand they are on the level of the imbecile applying a torch to set alight thehaystack of the farmer.’


If such comments indicated growing svmpathy for Japan and recognition ofher importance, this gradual change was also evident in the only debate devotedtotally to Japan on 29 October 1948. In this, Harold Davies (Labour) made animpressive plea for greater understanding of Japan, for fuller materials on Japanin the library of the House of Commons and for a fact-finding commission ofenquiry to visit Tokyo and carry out a survey. Perhaps a lack of information wasresponsible for the immense imaginative range of Mr Davies’s wide-sweepingcontribution. He called for a policy which would integrate Japan into a pattern ofdevelopment for the whole Pacific basin and for a consideration of possibilities ofJapanese emigration. Like many Parliamentary speakers Davies condemnedBritain’s lack of policy in the far east but he went much further in expressing hisdissatisfaction with British attitudes and indifference towards east Asia, anddeclared, ‘I believe that unless the white man gets a sane policy in relation to thecoloured races of the world, we may arouse a world racial issue that will sweepaside this petty issue of Communism and capitalism.’32 A prosaic statement fromChristopher Mayhew pointed out various inconsistencies in Davies’s visionaryschemes and indicated that limits on Japanese industry were being graduallyrelaxed; but for all its erratic inconsistencies Davies’s speech had highlighted thegulf which separated the immense implications of Japan’s recovery and Britain’sinability to exert a major influence upon her development.

Commercial opinion

Criticism of Japan and of government policy towards Japan was not of courseconfined to Parliament in the immediate post-war years. It was issues ofcommerce which drew Japan most Parliamentary attention, and it wascommercial organizations which were most apprehensive about her economicfuture. Understandably, Manchester’s Chamber of Commerce, the centre ofBritish cotton textile interests, was alarmed at Japan’s industrial future. Even asearly as September 1946 its Monthly Record warned its readers:

To those who had close acquaintance with the products of Japan, in theyears immediately prior to Pearl Harbour, it will be unnecessary to issuethe warning that they can no longer be classed with the general run ofIndian, Brazilian or Mexican textiles… They are no longer content toproduce cloths for their merchants just sufficient in quality to meet therequirements of their individual export markets. The danger of theircompetition approaches Lancashire’s own field of converted fabrics.33

Not surprisingly Sir Stafford Cripps’s statement of 28 October 1946 that ‘at thepresent stage we cannot use preventions on Japan for the purpose of protectingBritish trade’ was reprinted in full in the November issue of the Monthly Record.By the summer of 1947 anxiety was growing concerning ‘the situation whichwill face sections of British industry when ex-enemy countries are freed of


control by the allied powers’. To their credit, the editors of the Monthly Recordrecognized ‘the inevitable need for the steps that are being taken to allow our ex-enemies to get on their feet’ but urged that ‘the development of industry in suchcountries should be so balanced as to ensure that when they recoverindependence, their economy from the point of view of exports will not impairthe fulfilment of employment policies in other parts of the world’.34

If these fears of Japanese competition were one indication of British industrialweakness, the events of the fuel shortage of 1947 highlighted the narrow marginsof British textile operations. Shortage of fuel so damaged domestic productionthat Japanese grey cloth had to be imported for finishing to supply Britishcolonies. By the end of 1948 Manchester was becoming even more fearful ofJapanese competition and the Monthly Record politely stated ‘The ball istherefore in the court of… Governments, and rightly so— because the long-termplanning of Japan’s industrial future lies outside the hands of the trader. He hasdone his part in warning the Governments of the dangers ahead. It is up to theGovernments to decide upon and apply the remedy.’35 At the close of 1949Lancashire’s anxieties remained unallayed. The government appeared to betaking no action, though some comfort was drawn from the notion of an Anglo-American textile mission to Japan. The only hope for help or protection nowappeared to lie with the American government, for a member of the ManchesterChamber of Commerce wrote: ‘The American cotton industry now hassubstantial interest in export markets —much larger than was the case in theinterwar years. It must therefore be assumed that the industry and also theAmerican Government will wish to see no upheaval such as faced Lancashire inthe 1930s.’36 In short, all this criticism brought no result.

Nor did the activities of the Association of British Chambers of Commercewhich was similarly perturbed at developments in Japan. In 1947 at the annualmeeting of the Association, Wentworth Schofield of the Oldham Chamberdeclared that ‘If British industry was to be protected against the re-emergence ofthis Eastern menace…it could only be done through the determined efforts of theBritish Government, and of our Representative on the Far EasternCommission.’37 C.J.Hirst of the Glasgow Chamber spoke approvingly of pre-warGerman and Italian commercial behaviour but declared that ‘The commercialmorality of Japan had been of a very low order. There were several instances ofthe Japanese re-naming their villages with the names of important trading townsthroughout the world so as to allow the Japanese manufacturers to claim thattheir goods were made in those towns.’38 F.Johnstone of Exeter spoke of theimpact of cheap labour on the silk piece-goods trade, and representatives ofLeeds and Bradford also attacked Japan. In these condemnations money andmorality were combined in an uneasy equation and Sir Alan Anderson broughtinternationalism to Britain’s defence with the words ‘It was a question of eviltrading throughout the world. If Japanese trading methods were immoral worldopinion should pronounce against them.’ He also suggested that contact shouldbe made with the United States Chamber of Commerce as well as the


International Chamber of Commerce.39 It was also planned to contact theFederated Chambers of the British Empire. There were further discussions, aresolution and communications with the Board of Trade, but all were of no avail.British and American policies were fixed and vocal opposition could achievelittle effect.

The Union of Democratic Control

If commercial circles produced a surprising volume of anti-Japanese criticism,and hostility to Anglo-American policy, political organizations producedsurprisingly little. The Trades Union Congress, the Labour Party, theConservative Party, the Liberal Party and the Fabian Society appear to haveignored Japan in their conferences, publications and activities. In fact it was leftto an organization which was almost forgotten, the Union of Democratic Control(UDC), to make a sustained criticism of events in Japan. In 1947 the Unionproduced a short pamphlet entitled Japan, which not only analysed occupationmeasures but presciently highlighted the impact of China’s civil war onAmerican policies. The author of the pamphlet—he may well have been HaroldDavies—saw Japan as a country which would replace China as the main focus ofAmerican financial interest in the far east. What the UDC feared was thedevelopment of a cold war in Asia which would parallel that in Europe. Yetanother preoccupation of the Union was the preservation of democracy. Scentingthe beginning of America’s reverse course it feared that the zaibatsu and othertraditional centres of power would be revived and that Japan’s liberal advanceswould be reversed.

Despite commercial hostility to Japan, and popular antipathy to Japan’streatment of Allied prisoners, British attitudes towards post-war Japan remained—in government and Parliament—surprisingly sympathetic to the fundamentaleconomic requirements of the Japanese people. One may correctly observe thatBritish policy represented a species of self-interest; that even Labour or tradeunion interest in Japan had an ulterior motive. One may claim that Britisheconomic strategy stemmed from financial poverty or the interests of imperialism.In a sense such claims are irrefutable. But the Soviet Union was economicallypoor, and she too had imperial far eastern interests, but her policies towardsJapan in these years were profoundly different. British views of Japan illustratethe gradual replacement of the Commonwealth by Anglo-American relations.They indicate that hope of a significant cultural influence gradually weakened,but the expansive concepts of John Maynard Keynes, Barbara Ward and ErnestBevin survived. They remain relevant to the achievement of Anglo-Japaneseunderstanding.


NOTES

Unfortunately the author was unable to consult the archives of the Federation ofBritish Industries (University of Warwick) and of the Japan Association(London) as they are not fully catalogued. The fullest survey of British policytowards occupied Japan is Roger W. Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy, Britainand Japan 1945–52 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1979).

1. Clement Attlee, ‘Japan surrenders’, The Listener, vol. 34 (16 August 1945), p. 171.2. Barbara Ward, ‘Days charged with destiny’, The Listener, vol. 34 (16 August

1945), p. 187.3. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (House of Commons), vol. 413, col.

287.4. Memorandum by Minister of Information, 11 June 1943, CAB 66/37 (Public

Record Office, London), quoted by Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home FrontMorale and the Ministry of Information in World war II (London, 1979), p. 274.

5. Ernest Bevin to J.R.Byrnes, 12 September 1945, US Department of State, ForeignRelations of the United States 1945 (hereafter FRUS), vol. VI Washington, D.C.,1969), p. 714.

6. For the text of the Moscow Agreement, see United States Department of State,Occupation of Japan, Policy and Progress (Washington, D.C., 1946), pp. 69–73.

7. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (House of Comons), vol. 428, col.269.

8. Ibid., col. 271.9. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (House of Commons), vol. 433, col.

2396.10. British embassy to Department of State, presented to Borton by Graves on 9

October 1947, US Department of State, FRUS 1947, vol. VI (Washington, D.C.,1972), p. 53,

11. Labour Party, Report of the 47th Conference 17–21 May 1948 (London, 1948), pp.197– 8.

12. Counsellor of US embassy in the United Kingdom (Dickover) to Director of theOffice of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), 2 April 1948, US Department of State,FRUS 1948, vol. VI (Washington, D.C., 1974), pp. 720–1.

13. Counsellor of US embassy in the United Kingdom (Dickover) to Director of theOffice of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), 11 May 1948, ibid, p. 753.

14. Memorandum of conversation by Marshall Green of Division of North-east AsianAffairs, 28 May 1948, ibid., p. 170,

15. Ibid., pp. 791–2.16. Memorandum of Conversation by, Marshall Green of Division of North-east Asian

Affairs, 2 June 1948, p. 797.17. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (House of Commons), vol. 431, col.

1931.18. Board of Trade, National Production Advisory Council on Industry, Further

Statement on Japanese Position in Post-War Export Trade, NPACI (46) 29, 6August 1946, in WFTU Mission to the Far East 1947 File (Trades Union CongressArchives, Congress House, London).


19. World Federation of Trade Unions Delegation to Japan, Summarised Report byErnest A.Bell I.C. 4/3, 29 May 1947, p. 4, in WFTU Mission to the Far East 1947File (Trades Union Congress Archives).

20. Memorandum on Conditions in Japan for Mr Healey (8 pp.) by the Japan andPacific Department of the Foreign Office, 25 February 1947, and ChristopherMayhew to Denis Healey, 14 April 1947 (International Secretary’s Japan File,Labour Party Archives, Labour Party Headquarters, London).

21. Appeal to the Fabian Society from ‘Shakaishis� Kenky� kai’, 10 June 1947, andDenis Healey to John Pilcher, 22 July 1947 (International Secretary’s Japan File,Labour Party Archives).

22. T.R.G.Lyell to Denis Healey, 21 July 1947, and Denis Healey to D. Rees-Williams, 22 July 1947 (International Secretary’s Japan File, Labour PartyArchives).

23. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), vol. 162, col. 874.24. Ibid., cols. 890–2.25. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (House of Commons), vol. 427, cols.

1557– 8.24. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (House of Commons), vol. 430, col.

457.27. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (House of Commons), vol. 457, col.

1095.28. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (House of Commons), vol. 462, col.

482.29. Ibid., col. 504.30. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (House of Commons), vol. 446, col.

572.31. Ibid., col. 578.32. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (House of Commons), vol. 457, col.

482.33. ‘Japan’s cotton textile industry, present capacities and future potential’ in

Manchester Chamber of Commerce Monthly Record, vol. LVII (30 September1946), p. 217.

34. ‘Editorial comment’, Manchester Chamber Record, vol, LVIII (30 June 1947), p.153.

35. ‘Editorial comment’, Manchester Chamber Record, vol. LIX (31 December 1948),p. 378.

36. ‘Editorial Comment’, Manchester Chamber Record, LX (31 December 1949), p.434.

37. Association of British Chambers of Commerce, Annual Meeting, Report ofProceedings at the 87th Annual Meeting (12–13 June 1947), p. 52.

38. Ibid., p, 53.39. Ibid., p. 57.


Frist published in W.W.Burkman (Ed.) The Occupation of Japan:

Eduacational and Social Reform, Norfolk, Virginia: The MacArthur

Memorial, 1982, pp. 457–469

24Social Reform in Postwar Japan: British

Perspectives on Education and Land Reform

IN AUGUST 1945 Britain still ruled an empire, but her transition to a lowlierrole had already begun. Her economy was exhausted by six years of war, herinternational commitments were crippling, while plans for postwarreconstruction challenged the social assumptions of the imperial age.1 ClementAttlee’s new Labor government promised a welfare state and colonialemancipation but imperial conceptions continued to dominate much influentialopinion. From these conflicting visions of domestic and international societysprang views of postwar Japan which often differed from those of Britain’smajor allies.2

Despite various conflicting opinions, British politicians, officials, andcommentators shared several important conceptions regarding the shaping of thenew Japan. J.M.Keynes’ criticisms of the punitive Versailles Treaty had beenjustified by the rise of Nazism and the Second World War.3 Hence there was awidespread belief that peace could only be constructed on the basis of worldprosperity; this conception linked realists and idealists in the consideration ofpostwar Asia. Many believed that the revival of Japan’s economy and trade wasessential to her political stability, and that without these foundations socialreform would have little prospect of success. A typical exponent of this view wasSir George Sansom who advised the Foreign Office that ‘It would be useless fora military government…to embark on ambitious projects for the political re-education of a starving and miserable people.’ He held that ‘the prospects ofJapanese political liberalization might be improved if Japan could engage insome foreign trade as soon as possible.’4

In addition most Englishmen saw American friendship as essential to nationalsecurity and accepted the prospect that the United States would play the dominantrole in the control of Japan. In the autumn on 1945 Commonwealth interests andnational prestige produced demands for a significant voice in the shaping, if notthe execution, of occupation policy; but by January 1946 it was clear that anyBritish role in Japan would be a minor one.5 Yet Britain’s worldwide politicalexperience led her to propound confident opinions on a wide range ofOccupation policies.

Perhaps the dominant elements in British official thinking were theunconscious reflexes of colonial history.6 From the seventeenth century British

officials had been accustomed to ruling peoples of diverse race and culture, andthis experience had produced an attitude towards social change which wasdistinctly conservative. Unlike French colonists who had sought to assimilate theircolonial subjects, British administrators had recognized the power of nativetradition, and had sought to rule with the minimum of social intervention. As aresult there was deep skepticism toward experiments in strange societies. Thisworldly wise posture concerning social planning was manifest in Foreign Officeattitudes toward postwar Japan. It was reinforced by the experience of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and social preferences which consciously or unconsciouslydetermined feelings toward the defeated enemy. Japan had been Britain’s ally inthe pre-militarist period and this made English diplomats aware of the liberalelements which had existed in earlier years. These might provide foundations fora more acceptable Japan. Britain’s measured approach to postwar reform wasalso strengthened by the institution of monarchy which was common to bothcountries and the existence of an aristocratic or hierarchical society in bothBritain and Japan. All these factors suggested that radical or egalitarian reformswere generally undesirable.

These doubting attitudes toward social change were further underlined by aconcern for the formal processes of law which sometimes inhibited notions ofradical policy making. Perhaps this view was expressed in its most extreme formby Frank Pickthorn, the member of parliament for Cambridge University. On 19December 1945 with Japan in mind he asked,

On what basis of law as understood in Europe any time these last twothousand years, can an occupying power without negotiation or treaty,merely by right of strategic success, set about to alter the religiousestablishment or the land-holding arrangements of any country? There is aneed and a duty to get people back to a law-abiding habit of mind.7

Such lukewarm attitudes toward reform provided not only a general approach tooccupation policies but a particularly skeptical stance toward measures such aseducational laws, which implied that governments could change public attitudesswiftly and effectively.

By contrast, liberals and social democrats were not only more optimistic aboutsocial innovation but they viewed education as the only tool for achievingfundamental change. On 13 December 1945 in the House of Commons the youngLabor member of parliament James Callaghan emphasized the importance of ‘theattempt of the United Nations to re-educate the Japanese people to bring theminto the comity of nations.’8 But it was John Morris, the BBC’s senior radiocommentator on Japan, who most strongly advocated educational change. Morrishad lectured at Kei� University before the war and ‘had seen the effect which thesubtle poison of a warped educational system was having on the youngergeneration.’9 To remedy this and ‘to make quite certain that Japan will neveragain have the will…to make aggressive war’ he believed that ‘the occupation

SOCIAL REFORM IN POSTWAR JAPAN: BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATION ANDLAND REFORM 233

must last long enough to control the education of at least two generations onreally democratic lines.’10 ‘As I see it,’ Morris wrote, ‘the whole occupationproblem resolves itself into a long-term educational project… We should I feelconcentrate not on any short-term “re-education” but on the fundamentalreorganization of the whole Japanese educational system. This is obviously animmense but not an impossible task.’11 Morris made few specificrecommendations for change but he sought to ‘encourage and develop…theuniversal side of the Japanese character’ if possible by romanizing the languageand introducing a large number of foreign teachers ‘who believe so passionatelyin democracy that they are prepared to devote some portion of their lives toteaching its benefits.’12

In contrast Foreign Office attitudes to educational change were cool andhaughty. In January 1946 when the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Tokyoinformed London of plans for the United States Education Mission to Japan,L.H.Foulds wrote dismissively, ‘I hope that we shall not waste our energies on thissort of “missionary” enterprise.’13 The economist G.C.Allen, a temporaryofficial who had taught at the Nagoya College of Commerce, adopted a morepositive stance. He suggested that at least one British representative should beattached to the mission, but his view commanded little support.14 Inevitably theultimate inquiry was passed to Sir George Sansom who justified inaction on acomplex mixture of grounds. There would be problems of integrating personnel.Britain’s inadequate resources should be used in territories where they could bedominant and, anyway, American policy was ‘on sound lines, though perhapswith excessive zeal and optimism.’15 British inaction could always be convertedinto virtue by looking to the future and Sansom guessed that ‘in due course somereaction against too much Americanization will arise on the Japanese side andwe shall be asked for advice and help.’16 Perhaps the authentic official viewcame from Foulds who wrote of the Americans, ‘they will be unable to refrainfrom ramming their pet ideas down the throats of the Japanese and we shall losenothing in the long run by holding off.’17 Ultimately British participation in themission was abandoned, partly because this would have delayed its activities, butArthur de la Mare in the Foreign Office saw this as nothing but a happyoutcome. He believed that international cultural missions merely accentuatedinternational differences and wrote

If the Americans and ourselves had not so assiduously attempted to foistChristianity and Western culture on the Japanese there might not have beenthat reaction to Shintoism and ideological chauvinism which so largelycontributed to the outbreak of the late war, the slower we go on this thebetter.18

The negative attitudes were revealed again in the following vear when theForeign Office was asked to comment on Far Eastern Commission draft SC 047/2 on education policy. In reply to this request D.F.MacDermott wrote


Our general feeling is that the allies should always be ready to respond toany initiative from the Japanese by offering to help them improve andhumanize their education, but that very little good is likely to result fromattempts by the Far Eastern Commission or any other foreign authority toimpose an alien system.19

Such skeptical attitudes, and shortages of expert staff, were doubtless responsiblefor the lack of any detailed British plan for educational change. As a resultForeign Office comments on FEC documents were confined to general principlesor minor details which were regarded as objectionable. In a minute DudleyCheke wrote ‘the most that we can hope for is a paper free from glaringblemishes.’20 British diplomats recarded the banning of j� d� or kend� asridiculous and D.F.MacDermott questioned whether it was wise ‘to require theelimination of veneration of the Emperor’ from education.21 As a monarchist hewished to permit secular veneration of the sovereign to continue. However themost significant theme of Foreign Office comments was the importance ofinternational—as opposed to purely Japanese or American—elements in postwarJapanese education. Dudley Cheke commented,

Foreign educational institutions are I think a genuine part of the idealJapanese educational system at present, and the more influence they canexert the better (always assuming that the Russians do not start a largescale missionary enterprise).22

Ultimately a paragraph recognizing the importance of the international elementin Japanese education was included in the British recommendations to the FarEastern Commission.

If British attitudes toward purely social issues were surprisingly negative thiswas less true of socio-economic matters where the future of British interestsappeared more directly involved. In Britain, as in the United States Japan’s ruralpoverty was seen as an important cause of Japanese military expansion; and forthis reason it was a significant element in discussions and plans for occupationreform. Here there was a large measure of agreement across a broad band ofpolitical and official thinking though differences of emphasis between liberal andconservative positions occasionally appeared.

As early as 26 September 1945 the liberal Manchester Guardian first raisedthe issue of agrarian reform in a leading article entitled ‘Japan in Defeat’. Thisdescribed ‘the peasants (both tenants and smallholders)’ as ‘the most depressedclass in Japan’ and concluded

Agrarian reform is perhaps the first essential for the establishment of thesocial and economic health of Japan for improved living conditions for thefarmers will reduce the inexhaustible supply of cheap labor for Japaneseindustry as well as of docile recruits for Japan’s Army. An increase in the


peasant’s purchasing power would also expand Japan’s home market andtherefore reduce the pressure to export—and to conquer. JudiciousAmerican pressure at this point might bring about the revolution whichalone can make Japan ‘safe for democracy.’23

On 17 December The Times wrote approvingly of SCAP’s injunction tothe Japanese government to undertake land reform stating that this ‘will initiate anew way of life for the cultivating classes who constitute nearly half thepopulation of Japan. and lay the foundations of a system of peasants’ rights andprivileges such as the country has never known before.’24 In the following year,David Rees Williams, a Labor member of parliament, asked the ForeignSecretary ‘what decisions [had] been arrived at with reference to land tenure…inJapan’ and whether he would ‘take steps to introduce State ownership of land.’25

In a written answer Bevin replied with a simple account of recent developments,but in the Foreign Office a distinctive British policy was being prepared.

In the summer of 1945 the Economic and Industrial Planning Staff (EIPS)which had been formed to analyze postwar Europe turned its attention to Japan.By March 1946 it had drafted a memorandum, ‘Japanese Agriculture and theSystem of Land Tenure’ (ORC (46) 22) which received Cabinet approval.26 Thisdocument stated that ‘the reactionary and militarist forces that have moldedJapanese national life in the last two decades take their strength largely from thesupport given by the rural population’ but like all British statements its tone wascautious, declaring

Whatever is done it cannot be expected that the approach of the Japaneseagricultural community to Arcadia will be other than very slow. Measurescalculated to remove grievances are not always likely to be greeted withenthusiasm by so conservative a community.27

Nevertheless this memorandum produced an analysis and proposals whichdiffered markedly from those of other Allied powers.

Perhaps the strength of British notions of private property may haveinfluenced the EIPS analysis which placed little emphasis on the redistribution ofagricultural land. It criticized the SCAP directive as being ‘appropriate to acountry of large landed estates’ whereas ‘in Japan there are very few largeproprietors of agricultural land.’28 Consequently, and perhaps justifiably, thisdocument focused upon other aspects of Japanese rural society. The heavyburden of rural taxation had been a marked feature of Japanese economic historysince the Meiji Restoration and the first EIPS proposal was to ‘require theJapanese Government to revise its system of taxation in such a way as to reducethe burden on the agricultural classes.’29 Its second suggestion called for someredistribution of land ‘so as to avoid the waste which attends the holding of landin scattered strips’, while its final measures were technical rather than evangelicalin their objectives. These proposed written leases which…confer on the tenant


much greater security’ and ‘a more satisfactory agricultural credit policy.’30 Thememorandum emphasized the valuable role of cooperatives in the past and in thefuture and saw the accumulation of farming debt as the overwhelming problem.It cautiously concluded

It is desirable to prevent so far as it is possible, the re-creation of a burdenof farming debts from which agricultural community suffered in the past.It is doubtful if the United Nations should go beyond this. It is still moredoubtful whether, if these reforms were not effected, the transformation oftenants into peasant proprietors would do very much to alleviatethe farmers’ distressed conditions.31

Although this scheme was forwarded to the British Liaison Mission in Tokyo itsrecipients were unsure whether they should show it to the AustralianW.MacMahon Ball, who was the British Commonwealth representative on theAllied Council. This diplomatic uncertainty was to have embarrassingconsequences. By May 1946 General MacArthur placed the issue of land reformbefore the Allied Council and, without consulting Britain, the Commonwealthrepresentative presented his own radical scheme. It was difficult for the ForeignOffice to protest against this as Ball was in theory their own representative.Nevertheless neither EIPS nor professional diplomats favored the Australian planwhich was discussed in the Council. This new scheme placed its emphasis onland redistribution and EIPS condemned it, stating

If the Commonwealth proposals were a statement of general principles,they call for little criticism. If, however, they are put forward as definiteplans upon which the Japanese Government is to be instructed to act, theyare much too inelastic. They do not take into account the complicated setupof Japanese agriculture or the social repercussions that would arise fromsudden and drastic action…. Our opinion is that while it is right topropound general principles, and to encourage the Japanese Government totake steps to implement them it is imprudent to lay down hard and fastrules, based largely on western experience, for a country whose long-established customs are so vastly different. The methods of reform must beworked out as to details by the Japanese for Japanese.32

As on education de la Mare exhibited the Foreign Office view in extremis. Of theSpecial Meeting of the Allied Council on land reform he wrote,

These discussions seem to me to be getting more and more ridiculous andunrealistic. At one stage…it was seriously suggested that the tenancysystem should be completely abolished, this would mean that no owneroccupier could for any reason let his land even for a short term…. Mr. Ballboasts…of his ability to deliver one hour lectures on political theory but it


seems to me that what they need on the Council is a practical farmer to tellthem when they are talking nonsense. If the other members of the Councilare going to support such proposals for the restriction of the liberty of theindividual they ought really to avoid giving their Soviet colleagues lectureson the meaning of democracy.33

In late August de la Mare again wrote of ‘fundamental objections both to the SovietPlan…and the proposals of Mr. Ball’, and EIPS condemned both schemes forconcentrating on the ‘conversion of all tenant farmers into peasant proprietors’.This expert committee believed that the two drafts would ‘result in greatconfusion’ and damage Japan’s all-important food production.34 Britishpessimism continued though it had little impact on American policy in Tokyo.When the Foreign Office finally received a copy of the new land reform law,which was based on MacMahon Ball’s proposals, J.F.Ford gloomily wrote, ‘Itwill be a miracle if any true reforms come out of it.’35

When land reform eventually became an issue in the Far Eastern Commissionin 1948 there was fear that the Soviet representative might cause obstruction andBritish officials sprinted into action. But at this time their interest was largelyconfined to a tactical ploy. It was suggested that the British introduce proposals,on EIPS lines, to counter Russian action, but the idea met with little enthusiasm.H.G.Graves wrote dispassionately, ‘We recognize that a good many members ofour former service consider that the less we have to do with this greatexperiment the better.’36 Despite the successful implementation of land reformthere was some substance to the British analysis. In August 1948 the Britishjournalist Honor Tracy visited rural areas in Nagano prefecture and wrote of theshock ex-tenants had experienced when they heard ‘that in future they would beresponsible for paying the rates and taxes.’37 Two months later Sir AlvaryGascoigne wrote to the Foreign Secretary in terms which partially justified theEIPS position. GHQ’s chief agricultural economist has stated that land reformwould only last if the government was prepared to reform the tax system. ‘At themoment,’ Gascoigne wrote,

Japanese farmers are bearing a disproportionately large burden of bothindividual and indirect tax…. Clearly if the comparatively small holdingsallowed to owner farmers under the Land Reform Regulations are to becapable of supporting their owners in a reasonable state of prosperity thegovernment must give peasant proprietors some tax relief at the expense ofindustry…. It is hoped that the Japanese Government will take measures todeal with these problems before the land reform is declared complete.38

In the aftermath of the Shoup tax mission and difficulties in obtaining ricedeliveries, the burden of farm taxation was reduced, and by 1953 it had beenhalved.39 To this extent Britain’s analysis of rural Japan had been partiallyjustified; but in neglecting the Japanese peasantry’s sharp appetite for land


ownership officials exhibited a detachment from Japanese social reality whichoften flawed British estimates of postwar Japan.

British perspectives on the Allied Occupation contained numerous contrasts—between liberals who sympathized with SCAP’s energetic policies and diplomatswho were frigid towards social experiment. British approaches often differedfrom those of the United States and Australia and emphasized skepticism andgeneral principles rather than detailed blueprints. Yet throughout Britishobservers, of all persuasions, believed that economic prosperity and securitywere the foundations of social and political improvement. Englishmen may haveunderestimated the potential for reform and change in Japanese society, but inregarding prosperity as the main anchor of democracy they perceived a centraltruth in the emancipation of postwar Japan.

NOTES

1. For valuable studies of the changing climate of wartime opinion see Angus CalderThe People’s War, Britain 1939–45 (London, 1969) and Paul Addison, The Road to1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London, 1975).

2. For a detailed study of British views of the Pacific War see Christopher Thorne,Allies of a Kind: The United States. Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945(London, 1978).

3. J.M.Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London, 1919).4. Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 5

(London, 1976), p. 522. Soon after, the economist Barbara Ward wrote that ‘itwould be very hard to build up a world-wide peace with two vast economic slumsin the world—one in Europe and one in the Far East.’ ‘Days Charged withDestiny’, in The Listener, 16 August 1945, p. 187 (originally broadcast on the BBCHome Service).

5. e.g. ‘We are quite willing to let the United States take the lead in controlling Japanand we are prepared to recognize that the execution of policy in Japan itself shouldbe the sole responsibility of SCAP…. We are anxious that the problem of thecontrol of Japan should not become a major issue between ourselves and theAmericans.’ The Control of Japan, Top Secret, Far Eastern Department, TheForeign Office, 10 September 1945 (FO 371/46449, F 6699/364/23) Public RecordOffice, London.

6. e.g. ‘But the right comparison is with the early days of British rule in India; notonly were bribery and corruption commonplace, but we made just as many andstupid mistakes (one need only instance the fantastically unsuitable educationalsystem introduced by Macaulay) in trying to ‘reform’ that country as theAmericans are now making in Japan. It was in India that we learned by ourmistakes the snags and pitfalls of Imperialism; it is in Japan that the Americans arelearning by theirs.’ John Morris, ‘De-mok-ra-sie in Action’ (a review of HonorTracy, Kakemono: A Sketch Book of Post-war Japan), in The Listener, 22 June1950, p. 1073.

7. Hansard (House of Commons), 19 December 1945, Column 1319.8. Hansard (House of Commons), 13 December 1945, Column 753.


9. John Morris, The Phoenix Cup: Some Notes on Japan in 1946 (London, 1947), 4.10. John Morris, ‘Japan After a Year’s Occupation’, in The Listener, 12 September

1946, p. 334 (previously broadeast on the BBC Home Service).11. John Morris, The Phoenix Cup, p. 207.12. Ibid., pp. 4, 221, 215.13. L.H.Foulds’ Minute, 14 January 1946 (FO 371/54287/F 1244/688/23).14. G.C.Allen to Sterndale Bennet, 17 January 1946 (FO 371/54287/F 1244/688/23).15. Sir George Sansom to the Foreign Office (telegram) 30 January 1946 (FO 371/

54287/F 1713/688/23).16. Ibid.17. J.H.Foulds’ Minute, 8 February 1946 (FO 371/54287/F 1713/688/23).18. A.H.de la Mare’s Minute on telegram from Washington, 19 February 1946 (FO

371/54286/F 2691/688/23).19. D.F.MacDermott to H.A.Graves, 17 January 1947 (FO 371/63722/F 299/110/23).20. D.J.Cheke’s Minute concerning SC 047, 14 January 1947 (FO 371/63722/F 299/

110/23).21. D.F.MacDermott to H.A.Graves, 17 January 1947 (FO 371/63722/F 299/110/23).22. D.J.Cheke’s Minute concerning SC 047, 14 January 1947 (FO 371/63722/F 299/

110/23).23. ‘Japan in Defeat’, in The Manchester Guardian, 26 September 1945.24. ‘Land Reform in Japan’, in The Times, 17 December 1945.25. Hansard (House of Commons), 21 October 1946 (Written Answers), Column 298.26. 2 March 1946 (FO 371/54318/F 3422/3010/23).,27. Ibid., p. 3.28. Ibid., p. 2.29. Ibid., p. 3.30. Ibid., p. 3.31. Ibid., p. 3.32. EIPS Comments on Tokyo telegram 688 of June 20, Commonwealth

Member’s proposal on Reform of ownership and tenure of Japanese AgriculturalLand, 3 July 1946 (FO 371/54319/F 9665/3010/23).

33. A.J.de la Mare’s Minute on the Verbatim Minutes of the 7th (Special) Meeting ofthe Allied Council—Rural Land Reform, 2 June 1946 (FO 371/54318/F 9725/3010/23).

34. A.J.de la Mare’s Minute of 29 August 1946 (FO 371/54319/F 11496/3010/23) andEIPS/565 Memorandum on Proposals for Agricultural Reform in Japan, 22 July1946 (FO 371/54319/F 11496/3010/23).

35. Minute by J.F.Ford on the English text of the Land Reform Law, 10 April 1947 (FO371/63765/F 3627/1182/23).

36. H.A.Graves to D.F.MacDermott, 19 April 1948 (FO 371/69874/F 6187/416/23).37. Honor Tracy, Kakemono: A Sketchbook of Post-war Japan (London, 1950, p. 198.38. A.Gascoigne to the Foreign Secretary, 7 October 1948 (FO 371/69874/F 15051/

416/23).39. R.P.Dore, Land Reform in Japan (London, 1959), p. 235.


First published in Japan Educational Journal, No. 15, 1982, pp. 10–

12

25The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–52: A

Reassessment

SHORTLY BEFORE 2 p.m. on 30 August 1945 General Douglas MacArthur,Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, landed at Atsugi airfield to beginthe allied occupation of Japan. Three days later a formal surrender was signed,and on 15 September allied headquarters were established in central Tokyo.

Soon, a stream of American directives began the liberalisation of all aspects ofJapanese society. This brisk, energetic action was hardly surprising for Americanpreparations had been long and extremely detailed. As early as the summer of1942 training for the military government of Japan had been inaugurated and inthe following year America’s most distinguished universities had undertaken thetraining of hundreds of servicemen in many aspects of Japanese language andculture.

Furthermore, America’s leaders had consulted a wide range of businessmen,scholars, missionaries and diplomats who had experience of Japan in preparingplans for the reform of the East Asian enemy. Long before the end of hostilitiesthe United States had decided to retain Japan’s Emperor, and crude notions ofpunishment had given way to schemes for Japan’s democratisation and her returnto international society.

Japan's active involvement

Yet despite America’s victory and her elaborate preparations Japan was an activeand not a passive element in the history of occupation rule. Indeed by earlySeptember 1945 Japanese attitudes and decisions had already done much totransform American ideas of military control. Originally, American commandershad planned to invade Kyushu and the Kanto plain, and expected that a militaryvictory would be followed by tight army administration. However, Japan’speaceful acceptance of allied terms, on 14 August, removed the need forinvasion, and the Imperial Government sought to avoid all friction withAmerican troops.

In the final weeks of August Japanese newspapers and broadcasts urged fellowcitizens to accept occupation forces and the Emperor publicly supported this newpolicy. At the same time the Japanese Government began the rapid

demobilisation of its home garrison so that American units met virtually nohostility when they arrived.

In this new atmosphere detailed military control was clearly unnecessary andMacArthur was able to achieve reform through the existing Japanesegovernment and civil service. Consequently, American ‘military governmentteams’ in the provinces had the task of supervising reform rather than imposingdetailed changes. Thus, even after the arrival of American forces, Japaneseindividuals, groups and agencies were free to play a surprisingly active role ininfluencing the development of occupation policy.

General MacArthur’s first aim was to oversee the complete demobilisation ofJapan’s armed forces which had been begun by the Japanese authorities. In thesame weeks he directed the Japanese government to remove all existing barriersto political freedom and urged the cabinet to revise the Meiji Constitution. On 13October, Prime Minister Shidehara responded by organising a committee tostudy amending the nineteenth century constitution. After four months theCommittee produced various limited proposals, but these were far tooconservative to meet American wishes.

Model constitution

Now MacArthur seized the initiative and ordered his own staff to draft a modelconstitution. Their’s was certainly a radical document. It removed all theEmperor’s political powers, renounced the maintenance of armed forces, andplaced sovereignty in the hands of the people.

In late February 1946 the Japanese cabinet was threatened and pressed toaccept these dramatic proposals, but Japanese representations secured significantchanges in the document. The MacArthur draft provided for a single chamberparliament, yet the Japanese successfully argued for the creation of an electedsecond chamber. An American suggestion that a two-thirds majority in the Dietshould be able to overthrow Supreme Court decisions was also abandoned aftervocal Japanese resistance. No one could claim that General MacArthur madeconcessions on essential principles but it would be equally wrong to dismiss theinfluence of the Shidehara cabinet on the final form of the post-war Constitution.

Despite the importance of relations between Japanese cabinets and GeneralMacArthur ministers were not the only Japanese who sought to sway thedirection of American reforms. In the aftermath of defeat many Japaneseministries still retained their unity and efficiency and the Home Ministry took amajor initiative in attempting to shape the new political system.

Enfranchisement of women

In the autumn of 1945 it was clear that the Americans would require theenfranchisement of women as part of a more liberal electoral system.Consequently, officials in the Home Ministry began drafting amendments to the

242 THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN, 1945–52: A REASSESSMENT

1925 election law which would not only satisfy MacArthur but would help in theirlongstanding struggle against local political bosses.

By early November they had completed their proposals which includedwomen’s suffrage, reducing the voting age from twenty-five to twenty, loweringthe minimum age for candidates from thirty to twenty-five, and introducing largeconstituencies and plural balloting. As these ideas emanated from the old guardof the Home Ministry several of the Supreme Commander’s aides opposed them,but ultimately they were accepted and came to form the legal framework for thefirst post-war general election.1

In the following months the Home Ministry lost much of its power and it wassoon to be dissolved in a sweeping programme of reorganisation. Now PrimeMinister Yoshida became the dominant influence on the electoral system. Hisconservative cabinet proposed a return to the medium-sized constituencies of pre-war days, Socialist parties objected, and some Americans were suspicious ofproposals presented by the Japanese. General MacArthur refused to intervene inwhat he saw as a domestic matter. Once more, Japanese acts and wishes hadexerted an important influence on the new political system.

In social as well as political reform Japanese influence was at times clear andsignificant. From the beginning of the occupation MacArthur’s staff intended tore-shape Japanese education so as to democratise and emancipate futuregenerations of children. Initially the Civil Information and Education Section(CIE) of occupation headquarters was determined to purge nationalistic teachersand remove all xenophobic propaganda from history and ethics text books. CIEofficials also believed that Shinto in schools constituted a barrier to democraticdevelopments.

Reform of education

These idealists had broad theories and general objectives but they requiredspecialist advice to help shape detailed policies. To answer this need GeneralMacArthur invited the United States Education Mission to tour Japan andpresent its recommendations. The Mission arrived on 6 March 1946 and afterconsulting Americans and Japanese produced a comprehensive report.

Among its recommendations were many ideas which became central elementsin MacArthur’s education policy. The Mission favoured the decentralisation ofeducational administration by transferring powers to elected local committees. Italso advocated a new regime of nine years compulsory education to be followedby optional three year courses in upper secondary schools.

Higher education was to be expanded and transformed with a massive increasein the number of universities and colleges. Most of the Mission’s suggestionsmerely sought to advance the Supreme Commander’s ideals in all fields ofeducation but in one respect its proposals went much further. According to itsReport the Mission sought to ‘overcome the linguistic supports of the spirit ofnational isolation and exclusiveness’. In practical terms this implied a drastic


reform of the Japanese written language with the wholesale abandonment ofChinese characters, hiragana and katakana. All were to be replaced by theRoman script.

It is true that the occupation authorities did not regard this reform as animmediate objective, but its total rejection was principally due to the powerfulopinions of Japanese who recognised its irrelevance to democratisation and theirown plans for language reform.

Redistribution of land

Perhaps the most sweeping social reform enacted during the occupation was theredistribution of land which aimed to eliminate tenancy from Japaneseagriculture. Throughout the 1920s disputes between landlords and tenants hadbeen a growing problem in Japanese society and several unsuccessful schemesfor land reform had been drafted by the Ministry of Agriculture.

In the war years tenants had been given greater security to encourageproduction so it was natural that Ministry officials saw land reform as necessaryto solve the post-war food shortage. In autumn 1945 the Ministry of Agriculturedrafted a limited scheme for land redistribution and sent it to the Cabinet. TheCabinet and the Diet diluted these proposals before passing them and it was onlyin December that Occupation views were clarified. The Japanese Governmentwas now ordered to prepare land reform proposals by 15 March 1946.

It was soon evident that General MacArthur regarded the existing law astotally inadequate and after consultations with representatives of the BritishCommonwealth, China and the Soviet Union he pressed a new draft upon theJapanese Government. This aimed to redistribute all the land of absentee ownerswhile other landlords would only be permitted to retain 2.5 acres of theirholdings. The state would purchase the land which would then be bought bytenants at fixed prices. A Law based on this draft was passed in autumn 1946.

It is clear that American pressures dictated the scope and acceptance of thisSecond Land Reform Bill but Japanese officials had prepared the way. Withouttheir support such a complex reform would have remained an ineffectiveblueprint. The experience and sympathy of Ministry officials, and the generalsupport of Japanese opinion played a crucial role in implementing theseimportant changes in every village and hamlet in rural Japan.

Women's influence

Below the level of Premiers, Ministers and highly placed bureaucrats individualJapanese at times exerted a surprising influence on American Occupation policy.From the early days of allied control the feminist leader Kato Shizue developedcontacts with American officials who had a broad interest in the improvement ofwomen’s status in Japanese society. Mrs Kato was an energetic, skilful anddetermined propagandist and did much to encourage the creation of the Women


and Minors’ Bureau within the Ministry of Labour. It is true that this feministleader soon became a member of the Diet but her unofficial influence onoccupation policy was far more effective than her parliamentary attempts toinitiate action to benefit women.

In addition, the cause of women’s rights was often advanced by numerousJapanese women who worked alongside Americans in Occupationadminis tration. These relatively unknown officials advised and promptedAmerican personnel who had a broad sympathy for changes which wouldimprove the role of women in society. In this area of social reform, which washardly central to American policy, the initiative and energy of Japanese feministswas essential in converting ideals into practical and effective measures.

Balance of influence?

In assessing the balance of influence between Americans and Japanese in theimmediate post-war years it is also important to recognise the limited nature ofAmerica’s physical presence in many areas of provincial Japan. By the end of1945 the size of the American garrison was being gradually reduced and in 1946there were insufficient qualified military government teams to staff eachprefecture.

Increasingly, civilians were recruited to technical posts as there was a shortageof qualified military personnel. Often there were insufficient civilianreplacements to provide a full complement of economic and technical experts.These were involuntary limits on American activities but there were alsodeliberate changes in American control which accompanied America’s changingview of Japan’s importance.

By 1948 the United States saw Japan less as an ex-enemy and more as apotential ally and sought to revive her political confidence and economicstrength. As part of this policy the Occupation authorities continued to exert apowerful influence on the financial policies of the Japanese central government.Yet in 1949 most military government personnel were withdrawn from theprovinces to permit the Japanese greater freedom in determining their ownaffairs.

In 1950 American intervention in Japanese central government was also muchreduced so that the interpretation and modification of earlier reforms lay largelyin Japanese hands. In the two final Occupation years American influence wasgradually withdrawn and intervention was confined to the essentials of defenceand security.

Throughout six-and-a-half years of occupation American power and idealismcombined to exert a profound influence on Japanese society. Some Japaneseaccepted American proposals, others merely endured them; but JapaneseMinisters, civil servants and private citizens often refined and shaped occupationpolicies in deeply impressive ways.


NOTES

1. The author is grateful to Mr Michael Hayes for this information.


Unpublished paper read at the Conference of the European

Association for Japanese Studies, The Hague, 1982

26Asakai K� ichir� and Occupied Japan

IN THE CONFUSED weeks which followed Japan’s acceptance of unconditionalsurrender her Foreign Ministry received two unprecedented American demands.First, during the Manila negotiations, which arranged the procedure for DouglasMacArthur’s arrival in Honsh� , American representatives demanded that theJapanese Government establish an organisation which would provide diplomaticlinks between the existing Japanese administration and the allied occupationforces. By 26th August 1945, four days before MacArthur landed at Atsugi air-field, the Sh� sen Renraku Jimukyoku—loosely translated as the Central LiaisonOffice—was established according to ordinance 496, in what Yoshida Shigerudescribed as ‘a corner of the Foreign Office’. Legally speaking this newadministrative entity was to deal with ‘the ending of hostilities and relations withthe allied powers’, but these bland phrases hardly suggest the complexity of itsoperations, and the changes which it was to undergo in the following weeks andmonths. Its work was much expanded and embroidered with the coming to officeof Yoshida as Foreign Minister in the Shidehara cabinet in September 1945.Yoshida determined to enlarge the Office’s functions and on 1st October thestatus of its chief was raised to Sosai (President) by ordinance 500. Yoshida tookover this position in the following spring.

As the United States had demanded, nine branch offices and six branchcommittees were established in the provinces and by early 1946 the Sh� ren had astaff of almost 300 officials. Its main task was to receive directives, orders andrequests from various staff sections of GHQ and to transmit them to appropriateadministrative sections of the Japanese Government. As a result it became acomplex body with a structure which paralleled those of both the Japanesegovernment and MacArthur’s control machinery. In practical terms it arrangedpersonal meetings between American officials and Japanese leaders, conveyedreports of each day’s proceedings in the Diet to SCAP and was the vehicle fornumerous Japanese representations regarding aspects of American policy. Inshort much of the Foreign Ministry now confined its activities to events withinJapan ranging across such fields as industry, reparations, law and order,education, communications, military matters and politics. All were within theambit of relations with the allies— but many were outside normal diplomaticfields.

The Foreign Ministry was also seriously affected by a second American orderin October which excluded it from virtually all its normal diplomatic activities.Thus, excluded from its normal fields of action, and driven into unfamiliar and attimes provincial outposts, the Foreign Ministry began a curious interim existence.

Nevertheless, under the new flag of the C.L.O. diplomats had importantadvantages in facing their tasks. They were men of ability, with training inreporting, recording and negotiation. A good many of them also had personallinks with foreigners from pre-war days. What is more Sh� ren’s wide margin ofoperations may have given a greater element of coordination to its activities thanthe Foreign Ministry had had in earlier days of inter-ministerial conflict. Nodetailed history of the Office exists but important aspects of its activities are nowreadily available in the reports of Asakai Koichiro which were published shortlyafter they were declassified by the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Shoki TainichiSenry� Seisaku, Mainichi Shimbunsha, Tokyo). Furthermore, these personalreports cast much light upon Japanese-American relations, and Japanese viewsof the world in the early occupation years. Asakai’s reports may even modifysome broad interpretations of the period.

Asakai K� ichir� was born in 1906, entered the Gaimush� in 1929 and wassoon despatched to Edinburgh University for three years study and training.After a brief phase working in the London Embassy he was posted to Nanking forthree years. He later returned to Tokyo to work in such diverse fields as culture,treaties, information, East Asia, commerce and the war economy. With thisdiverse if not untypical training he became a political and business sub-sectionhead within C.L.O. in October 1945. He became a section head in March 1946.

In the following years his activities were almost as diverse as those of Sh� renitself. However as diplomacy and economic matters were his most importantconcerns he was never close to major acts of political reform. Certainly Asakai’sfirst postwar activities were remote from the sophisticated life and dignity ofcustomary diplomacy. He accompanied Americans travelling to Hokkaid� andthe J� ban coalfield to observe and cope with widespread disorder among foreignand Japanese coal miners. Chinese and Korean miners were stealing goods,monopolising geisha in certain onsen, pushing into taxi queues, behavingroughly towards Japanese and seeking repatriation. Asakai could do little morethan observe and liaise during these provincial wanderings; but in one respectthey provided him with invaluable experience. However apprehensive he was ofAmerican power, and aware of Japan’s prostrate economy, it was soon clear thatvia his knowledge of English he could have civilised, useful and almost equalexchanges with American personnel. Furthermore although Americans mightultimately declare that it was Japan’s responsibility to cope with her manydifficulties it was apparent that the occupation forces would help, cooperate andlisten, in crises where ships. transport and moral support were essential to therestoration of law and order. Even in local situations Americans viewedproblems in complex terms and recognised that solutions required a goodmeasure of mutual cooperation.


Building upon these impressions Asakai sought to use all possible sources ofinformation to clarify American policy and push it, where possible, in directionsfavourable to Japan. If one receives two impressions from Asakai’s writings thefirst is his industriousness in digesting newspapers, foreign broadcasts andmagazine articles—so that at times he was better informed than his Americanacquaintances. Secondly, the issues which preoccupied many Japanese in 1945and 1946 were very distant from the rousing rhetoric of Douglas MacArthur andhis political aides. In short, impoverished Japan, in which social order wasfraying seemed most threatened by possible reparations payments. If anythingseemed likely to ruin Japan it was not a tide of unwelcome reforms but theexaction of heavy reparations. What was more there were threateningdevelopments. The Soviet Union was removing every nut, bolt and girder fromManchuria and President Truman’s special reparations advisor, AmbassadorEdwin Pauley, appeared to take a harsh view of Japan’s future. It was thedesperate nature of this Japanese fear which produced Asakai’s remarkableencounter with this millionaire of ambassadorial rank on 29 November 1945.Asakai managed to board Pauley’s special train bound for Nikk� , asked whichAmerican passenger Pauley was, approached him, and found him willing toanswer a wide range of questions on reparations. Pauley said little to reassure hisJapanese acquaintance, but a surprising amount of goodwill radiated from theconversation. In talking of Soviet claims to reparations Pauley suggested that theSoviet Union’s role in the war scarcely justified them. He talked of the need toimpress the Japanese with the immorality of the attack on Pearl Harbor, but madeclear that any references to Japan sharing the same standards as nearby Asiancountries referred only to supplies of food in the immediate situation,—not tomatters of long term distribution of industry. Asakai was surprised by Pauley’saccessibility and the anti-Soviet implications of his remarks.

This American openness and the state of relations between Washington andMoscow were to form central themes in Asakai’s writings in later months. As isnow well known Asakai, (on behalf of the C.L.O.), attended virtually all meetingsof the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo in the first three years of its activities.This was an extremely valuable experience, for despite the availability of theminutes of these meetings his visits enabled him to judge the atmosphere ofexchanges and the facial expressions of participants. Asakai wrote briefsummaries of virtually all meetings, but in addition also wrote down hisreflections on the state of great power relations as reflected in the Council.Americans such as Justin Williams and William Sebald dismiss the barrenness ofthese meetings as the result of Soviet obstructions but Asakai perceived differentthings in these proceedings. Conflict between the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates came as something of a surprise—particularly in such a public forum; butmuch more dramatic was the fact that on virtually every issue—the purge, theconduct of elections and the expansion of Japanese fishing, the Americanrepresentative of the Supreme Commander George Atcheson, was time after timepro-Japanese. He was not only sympathetic to Japan but often praised Japan in

ASAKAI K�ICHIR� AND OCCUPIED JAPAN 249

the strongest terms and turned an acid tongue on the other so-called allies. If thisprovided any impression it was that America was clearly committed to theJapanese cause, as early as the spring of 1946, when most Japanese were still farfrom certain of many aspects of American policy.

The character of American public behaviour also surprised Asakai. Atcheson,often went out of his way to denounce Communism and to see signs ofCommunist propaganda, where others might not find them obvious; for examplein the text of the 1946 May Day Protest. Asakai reflected that even whensubjects of discussion were minor the American representative was prone to stirthem into a major affray—simply because they had been raised by the Sovietdelegate. Asakai also noted that the Soviet representative, Kuzma Derevyanko,sometimes sought to needle his American counterpart into antagonism. Yet hegenerally noted that Atcheson was on the attack while the Russian abstained fromdiscussion and awaited instructions from Moscow. Like some Americans Asakaialso noted the disparity between conflict on the Council (the U.S.A. versusChina, the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth) and the clear cold warconfrontation in Europe where Britain—led by Ernest Bevin—was heavily pro-American in disputes with the Soviet Union. Perhaps wisely, Asakai interpretedthis as the result of the changing nature of Britain’s power and the changingcharacter of the British Commonwealth. After all, he mused, Ball theCommonwealth representative did not really represent Britain because the PrimeMinister’s personal representative in Tokyo was General Gairdner. According toAsakai Ball’s position reflected the rise of Australia, Britain’s lack of authorityand Canberra’s indifference to European conflicts. Unlike the writers of someAmerican memoirs Asakai saw Nationalist China not as America’s friend but asa species of neutral, hovering between the Australian and American positions.

Yet the main conclusion which Asakai derived from this experience wasAmerica’s commitment to Japan—against all others, whoever they might be.This deep impression was further reinforced by the special relationship whichdeveloped in private conversations between Asakai and the American diplomatGeorge Atcheson. The key to this sequence of surprisingly frank encounters mayhave lain partly in Asakai’s personality and language skill, but there were alsothreads from the past which held them in a close relationship. Both had knowneach other in Nanking before the Second World War, and their relationship hadlittle in common with the unhappy tensions which often characterise relationsbetween victors and vanquished. Time after time in discussing reparationsAtcheson made clear that America desired an agreement which would notdamage Japan’s economy and referred to the bothersome failure of America’sallies to reach an agreement.

If Atcheson provided solace regarding reparations he also providedencouragement in repeated discussions of a possible peace treaty. Already, in1946, this was a staple item in their exchanges. Frequently Asakai argued that apeace treaty and a reparations settlement were vital if Japan was to enjoy anymeasure of economic recovery, and be able to maintain her stability. On all these


occasions Atcheson not only showed sympathy but in 1947 talked frankly ofAmerica’s use of de facto credits to aid the Japanese economy. Both hoped thatthe unitary nature of America’s control in Japan, and the existence of a fullyfledged Japanese national government would enable a peace treaty to be signedmore easily than in Europe. Italy, rather than Germany, was usually seen as anappropriate model.

In numerous respects Atcheson’s position seems to have ante-dated officialUnited States policy by perhaps two years. For example, when Asakaicomplained about the ambiguities in assorted American statements on tradeunions Atcheson emphasised MacArthur’s commitment to law and order, and hisdesire that the Japanese government should act decisively, and depend less onthe advice and support of the Supreme Commander. The Atcheson conversationsnot only reflect many shared ideas and frank exchanges but no subject seems tohave been excluded from their discussions. Even in July 1946 the controversialArticle 9 of Japan’s constitution was discussed, with little restraint on Asakai’spart. When he asked what Japan would do in case of foreign aggressionAtcheson talked of the United Nations. When Asakai mentioned the possibilityof this organization proving unreliable Atcheson stated that this was an academicpoint. Pressed still further Atcheson admitted that both Australia and the UnitedStates could not remain indifferent to Japan’s future fate, and virtually agreedthat they could not remain indifferent to Japan’s defence. Asakai sharply pointedout that the strengthening of Communist forces in North Korea would necessitatea large American force in South Korea, which would scarcely be irrelevant toJapan’s defence. Behind all these discussions lay a sense that Japan’s economicrecovery and security were matters of continuing serious interest to Washington.

Such reassurance was by no means the limit of what Asakai sought from hisAmerican colleague. Following the appointment of George Marshall as Secretaryof State in 1947 Atcheson planned a visit to Washington to form contacts withthe new head of the State Department. On the eve of this visit Asakai asked if thenew Secretary of State was likely to change occupation policy. Atcheson repliedthat this was unlikely, though Japan might gain from Marshall’s China experience—which implied a sharp interest in the Far East. However Asakai’s most crucialquestion concerned an errand which Atcheson might carry out on Japan’s behalf,namely to contact the American media and emphasise the importance of a kindlyreparations settlement, and a swift peace treaty—so that Japan could recoverrapidly. Atcheson agreed to do this stating that American businessmen wished toavoid any financial burden on the United States. Thus the Atcheson-Asakairelationship exhibited growing trust and proximity of views. In fact at times,Atcheson was, acting as an advocate of Japan’s cause.

Although Asakai’s relationship with Atcheson was particularly close it wasnot his only diplomatic friendship in this period. Asakai had known YorksonShen (who represented Nationalist China on the Far Eastern Commission and attimes the A.C.J.) during his Nanking days, and in February 1946 had a long andserious discussion with him. In this exchange Shen was somewhat more reserved


than Atcheson later became, and made clear the past sufferings of the Chinesepeople at Japanese hands. He also indicated the kindly attitude of Chiang Kai-shek towards the Japanese. But in speaking of reparations and Japaneseeconomic recovery he emphasised that China merely sought to end Japan’s warmaking potential. She opposed any punitive peace which would damage thefuture of Japan as a stable and eventually friendly nation. Like Atcheson, Shenindicated a wish to return to profitable mutual relations without unnecessaryacrimony.

From the Japanese point of view the strangest and least understood figure inallied circles in Tokyo was W.MacMahon Ball, the Australian political scientistand Commonwealth member of the Allied Council. Despite his public hostility tosome Japanese aspirations Ball was also willing to meet Asakai and talked to himdirectly about his own position and Japan’s possible future. For Asakai perhapsBall’s most revealing comments concerned his apparent support for the Sovietposition in the A.C.J., and rumours about his allegedly punitive stand onreparations. Ball indicated that his apparent unity of view with Derevyanko wascoincidental and that he had virtually no close contact with him. Furthermore heexplicitly denied holding a punitive view of reparations, and declared that farfrom being a Soviet sympathiser the Australian Communist Party had protestedagainst his own appointment to Tokyo. Ball admitted that he had no diplomaticexperience, ambition or particular suitability for his post, but agreed with Asakairegarding the changing face of the British Commonwealth. Ball pointed out thenow familiar truth that Britain was grossly over-committed throughout theworld, —and that Australia might have a greater role in the Pacific. LikeYorkson Shen, Ball admitted the depth of anti-Japanese feeling among his fellowcountrymen, but he agreed that future trade with Japan would be valuable forAustralia. If nothing else Japan might usefully help to bid up the price of wool inworld markets.

What might one conclude from this very brief examination of Asakai’sactivities in the C.L.O.—supposedly masked from the world of internationaldiplomacy? Clearly the Allied Council’s public proceedings and Asakai’s privatecontacts provided a vision of the world which helped to orientate Japan in theshifting postwar situation. More important, the broad spectrum of Asakai’scontacts indicated an unexpected degree of American sympathy for Japan and—in some circles—a series of commitments to Japan which would slowly solidifyinto public policy. Japan’s economic recovery, mild reparations, more power tothe Japanese government and a commitment to Japan’s ultimate protection wereall mentioned favourably at this time. Such remarks must have done much toraise Asakai’s confidence—from the miserable mood of 1945 when hedesperately asked Ambassador Pauley ‘Will the Japanese Embassy inWashington be confiscated as reparations?’ Both Ball and Yorkson Shenindicated that the world was not as hostile as some rumours and Sovietbehaviour might have indicated. Despite the blows suffered by the ForeignMinistry Asakai was a surprisingly effective advocate of Japan’s cause. He was


an ingenious and energetic searcher for information, and may have exertedmarginal influence on American policy. Finally his conversations andobservations suggest that the basic axioms of SCAP’s ‘reverse course’ weresketched if not determined long before the fall of Prague, Peking or the outbreakof the Korean war.


First published in I.Nish (Ed.), The British Commonwealth and the

Occupation of Japan, ICERD (International Studies), London

School of Economics, 1983

27New Zealand and the Occupation of Japan

DURING the second world war His Majesty’s Dominions, Australia, NewZealand, Canada and South Africa shared a common seniority in the Britishimperial structure. All were virtually independent and co-operated in the struggleagainst the axis. But among these white-ruled states differences were as apparentas similarities. In particular factors of geography and racial composition gaveNew Zealand a distinct political economy which shaped its special perspectiveon the Pacific War. Not only were New Zealanders largely British in racial originbut their economy was effectively colonial.1 New Zealand farmers producedagricultural goods for the mother country and in return absorbed British capitaland manufactures. Before 1941 New Zealand looked to the Royal Navy for herdefence and in exchange supplied troops to fight alongside British units in bothworld wars.2 What was more, New Zealand’s prime minister from 1940 to 1949was Peter Fraser who had been born and reared in Scotland. His deputy, WalterNash, had also left Britain after reaching adulthood.3 Thus political links betweenBritons and New Zealanders were reinforced by true threads of Kith and Kinwhich made identification with the mother country especially potent. Theseeconomic and political ties were confirmed by the restricted nature of NewZealand’s diplomatic apparatus which formed the basis of her view of the EastAsian world. New Zealand had been a signatory of the Versailles Treaty and theLeague of Nations Covenant but at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack her soleoverseas diplomatic office was the High Commission building in London.4 As aresult virtually all diplomatic information was provided by London and Britishofficials represented New Zealand throughout Europe, Asia and the Americas.

Yet there was a basis, however indefinite, for the slow emergence of anindependent New Zealand foreign policy. From 1926 the Imperial Section of thePrime Minister’s Office had been a miniature foreign ministry, and its leadingfigure, Carl Berendsen, was to be a major figure in New Zealand’s wartime andpostwar foreign relations.5 By 1943 a Department of External Affairs had beencreated and diplomatic missions had been opened in Washington and Canberra.6

Furthermore, between the wars, New Zealand had developed distinct reflexes tointernational, affairs which were the direct product of her scale and geography.In the League of Nations she often aligned herself with small powers againstBritain, and favoured the imposition of effective sanctions upon Germany, Italy

and Japan.7 Such internationalist attitudes were probably strengthened by the riseof the Labour Party in New Zealand’s domestic politics. The rise of Japanesemilitary power also created fears of a threat from the north and the need forgreater protection against a Japanese strike.8

This uneven weave of imperial and national attitudes became even moreapparent during the Pacific war. The new legation in Washington symbolised thesearch for a new shield and by 1942 slit trenches and air raid drills were featuresof life in Auckland and Wellington.9 But New Zealand never experiencedJapanese air attacks, as did northern Australia, and unlike Australia she was nevermenaced by the threat of direct invasion.10 Thus though New Zealand turnedincreasingly to tne Pacific her concerns remained imperial and European. Herforces played no major role in direct combat with Japan. Australia not only feltmore threatened by the Japanese empire but she took the initiative in leadingNew Zealand into a somewhat more vigorous foreign policy. In 1944 the restlessand abrasive Australian foreign minister, Herbert Evatt, invited Prime MinisterFraser to Canberra for consultations on military and political co-operation. Thiswas a well-prepared Australian initiative, the two men warmed to each other, andultimately signed the Canberra pact.11 This bilateral agreement not only sought todevelop close military liaison between the two dominions, but staked a claim tobe consulted in future peace making with Japan.

If events in Canberra marked antipodean self-assertion the closing months ofthe Pacific War were to see New Zealand return to her somewhat ambiguousattitudes to East Asia. Since 1939 New Zealand had strained all her efforts to aidthe mother country, and her sacrifices in the European war were great, but thesuggestion, in 1945, that she should participate in the invasion of Japan receiveda cool reception. Some argued that New Zealand’s best contribution to the allieslay in food production, and the National Party, which represented farminginterests, was generally hostile to the diversion of valuable labour to a newcampaign. Fortunately the Pacific War ended before New Zealanders could seeservice on Japanese beachheads.12

By the time of the Japanese surrender both Evatt and Fraser had discoveredthat the Canberra pact carried little weight among the great powers. Theconferences at Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam, which sketched the outlines of aPacific peace ignored the voices of Australia and New Zealand, and Britain soonindicated that it was beyond her power to affect these realities.13 New Zealandwas disappointed by these failures, but Fraser unlike Evatt sought to avoidunseemly disputes with the mother country. Furthermore New Zealand’s primeminister felt a closeness of sympathy with Attlee’s Labour Government whichwent beyond Evatt’s comprehen sion.14 Indeed the ceremonials of surrender andthe prestige which these symbolised preoccupied the theatrical Evatt in a mannerwhich was scarcely appreciated by Peter Fraser. The contrasting roles andambitions of these two dominions were vividly reflected in the process whichculminated in both Australia and New Zealand signing the surrender document.Britain had failed to obtain American concurrence to such an arrangement. Evatt

NEW ZEALAND AND THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 255

gained it by a direct approach to MacArthur.15 New Zealand automaticallygained the same privilege when the Supreme Commander agreed that all thedominions would sign as independent parties, not as ceremonial adjuncts to theUnited Kingdom delegation.

Yet New Zealand’s more modest attitudes and demeanour did not indicate anyindifference to the substance of postwar Japanese developments. New Zealandhad no missionaries or traders with expertise in Japanese language or culture butshe perceived Japan as a major threat to her future security.16 What is more she haddefinite ideas regarding the measures which were needed to transform Japan intoa less threatening Pacific power. These views reflected New Zealand’s physicalinsecurity. They also reflected the social democratic philosophy of her Labourpoliticians. Her ideas certainly differed drastically from the somewhatconservative attitudes of United Kingdom diplomats.17 In the words of Fraser’sletter to London of 11 August 1945:

It will be necessary to effect radical changes in Japanese political, socialand economic institutions if we are to prevent the rebirth of Japaneseaggression and to promote conditions which will ensure that a co-operativeJapan may later come into being. [Fraser continued] Because of the closeinterrelation of the ruling groups in Japan and their direction under theEmperor it may be dangerous to preserve established institutions for thepurpose of ensuring stability in Japan…it would be unwise to gamble onthe emergence of effective moderate elements amongst the existing rulinggroups, and we would prefer a policy that would ensure radical changes inJapanese institutions as a necessary preliminary to the emergence of ademocratic and law-abiding Japan. Though such a plan must involve heavycommitments, the alternative to bold action now may well be heaviercommitments at some time ahead.

A long-term policy should provide for agrarian reform and a moreextended ownership of the means of production, financial organisation,etc., including the breakdown of monopolies of the great corporationswhose directors have been willing partners in Japan’s aggressive plans.18

In other words though New Zealanders forswore a Carthaginian peace, theysought radical changes to remove the aggressive element from Japanese society.But for New Zealand resources and scale were always pressing problems. Not onlydid she lack specialists and diplomats but the very democratic fabric of hersociety limited the role she could play. Clearly one obvious means of cultivatingprestige, and staking a claim to influence in Japan was to participate in her militaryoccupation but as over Pacific campaigns public opinion and political libertycreated major complications. While Evatt could threaten the British with thecreation of an independent occupation force Fraser was faced by calls to ‘bringthe boys home’, and to use only volunteers in an occupation force.19 WhenGeneral Freyberg visited northern Italy and enquired how many New Zealanders


sought a period of service in Japan he received few positive answers.20

Ultimately troops were compulsorily transferred to Honsh� but only afterconsiderable heart-searching. It was clear that they would soon have to bereplaced by volunteers.21

Like all British Comonwealth occupation troops in Japan New Zealand forcesplayed an insignificant political role; but as over ideas of reform this ventureoften manifested a distinctive social democratic element.22 It is commonknowledge that Commonwealth troops were not allowed the relatively free‘fraternisation’ which was permitted to American forces.23 But in the case ofNew Zealanders this policy stimulated serious thought about the limits andpolitical consequences of ‘non-fraternisation’. In the words of Foss Shanahan,the Acting Permanent Head of the Prime Miriister’s Department, commenting ona non-fraternisation order. ‘It is felt that it is, perhaps, somewhat offensive in itsreference to the conditions of the agricultural workers of Japan.’ Shanahancontinued,.

Maintaining always a high standard of conduct: mix freely, and do notneglect the working people for they are the base on which any sounddemocratic regime must be built; learn all the Japanese can teach you andbe tireless in propagating among them whatever you know aboutdemocracy; do your utmost to enlighten the under-privileged andencourage the liberals, but give some thought to Tarawa before youcultivate the ‘Tojos’.24

Problems of venereal disease clearly worried Brigadier Potter, the Commanderof the New Zealand force, but even he declared ‘It is our object and desire topresent to the Japanese in its best light our democratic way of living. To do thisthere must be some form of contact and interchange of ideas,25 furthermore inproviding guidance to subordinate officers Potter felt compelled to include adetailed class analysis of Japanese society and an encouragement to his men toattend Japanese cultural events and to give lectures on religious, cultural orartistic subjects.26 New Zealand forces occupied Yamaguchi and later Shimaneprefecture and successfully supervised the return of large numbers of Koreans totheir homeland, but in one sense the occupation experience was a majordisappointment.27 New Zealand’s leaders had seen the British CommonwealthOccupation Force (BCOF) as a means of promoting Commonwealth unity, forFraser hoped that the Commonwealth would remain a major political force.28

Unfortunately the withdrawal of British and Indian units soon showed thatproblems of nationalism and scarce resources would eventually erode theCommonwealth’s international significance.29 In 1948 New Zealand units werealso withdrawn from Japan.

If the role of New Zealand’s occupation contingent was limited by Americanpower and pressure for a volunteer force, Wellington’s diplomatic role was alsolimited by resources. Although New Zealand believed that allied supervision of


the occupation would best be achieved by the creation of a single internationalbody the Moscow agreement created a two-tier structure.30 This comprised theFar Eastern Commission (FEC) and the Allied Council for Japan.31 In .the latterthe British Commonwealth was represented by a single spokesman who acted onbehalf of Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India. Due to staff shortages NewZealand was unable to provide anyone to serve on the staff of the Australian, WMacmahon Ball, who acted as the first Commonwealth representative.32 Despitethis, New Zealand, in contrast to the United Kingdom, saw the Allied Council asa significant agency for the reform of Japan.33 Consequently she expected that itwould be consulted by MacArthur and would work in harness with the FarEastern Commission. Although neither Wellington nor London sympathised withBall’s view that he should mediate between America and the Soviet Union, NewZealand supported his claim to influence occupation policy.34 As Fraser wrote on3 May 1946,

We cannot agree with SCAP in his unduly restrictive interpretation of theAllied Council terms of reference. We agree…that the Council should notbe precluded from reviewing earlier actions of SCAP…. In addition we areclear that if subcommittees can assist the Council in its efficientfunctioning it is absurd to argue that their establishment is ultra vires. Sucha view if logically pursued and based on a strict comparison of the terms ofreference of Allied Council and FEC would by rights deprive the Councileven of its secretariat.35

By 1948 when the Council had become virtually paralysed New Zealand wasdeeply disturbed. A D McIntosh, Secretary of External Affairs, commented,‘Although from the first it was evident that the Council would be able to playonly a very minor role in Japanese affairs, it fulfils, even under presentconditions, an important function which cannot be performed by any othercontrol agency.’ Of the Commonwealth representatives he continued:

the course which Mr Macmahon Ball and Mr Shaw have endeavoured tofollow in the Council has been to our mind highly commendable. Theyhave both been generously appreciative of SCAP’s achievements whileexpressing honest differences of opinion on particular issues. It hasnevertheless often seemed to us that the Americans would be satisfied withno less than the complete subservience of the Council, that anything shortof complete acquiescence in SCAP’s policy would be interpreted as anunfriendly act…we…hope that the Council will continue to exercise infact as well as in force, the functions for which it was established.36

Two months later Foss Shanahan wrote ‘We…continue to be perturbed at thestifling by the Chairman of the Council of any appearance of criticism’.37 Butthere was little that could be done. Until 1947 there was no New Zealand office


in Tokyo, and then only a small trade agency was established.38 The ghost ofNew Zealand representation on the Council was never transformed intosignificant political substance.

Yet New Zealand was represented in Tokyo in one sphere which was ofconsiderable significance in occupation policies, the International MilitaryTribunal for the Far East. A New Zealand judge, Erima Northcroft, and associateprosecutor, R H Quilliam, participated in the trials; and in two senses reflectedimportant characteristics of contemporary Wellington behaviour.39 First, theyshowed a clear preference for British or Imperial legal standards in preparationsfor the trials. Northcroft and Quilliam were appalled at the American ChiefCounsel Keenan’s erratic, alcoholic and unprofessional conduct, and tactfullybut unsuccessfully sought his dismissal.40 They were also unhappy at Americanwillingness to change judges in mid-trial. Secondly, New Zealanders showed arelative willingness to make outspoken criticisms of Americans while the BritishCounsel, Comyns Carr,41 preferred not to embarrass the senior ally. A tendencyto disregard the real element of power behind international relationships oftenappeared to characterise New Zealand’s diplomatic behaviour in the earlyoccupation years.

If military occupation, the Allied Council and the International MilitaryTribunal were all oblique forms of influence on occupied Japan, the Far EasternCommission, in theory, constituted a forum in which New Zealand had a realshare in occupation policy-making. This body met in Washington, where NewZealand’s most important diplomatic office was located, headed by CarlBerendsen.42 From the beginning Berendsen had clear notions of his objectivesand the role of the Commission and he sought to implement these with muchregiour and eloquence. Perhaps Berendsen was too accustomed to the family-likeatmosphere of Commonwealth relationships; certainly his first forays into theCommission’s activities were embarrassingly unsuccessful. On more than oneoccasion he advanced views which obtained support from no-one,—whichsuggests some lack of prior consultation.43 In Berendsen’s defence it must benoted that he was never criticised by his government in Wellington. Aboveeverything he believed that the Far Eastern Commission was a most importantpolicy-making body and that its prestige was worth fighting for. Despite manyconflicts, Berendsen was no enemy of SCAP. He was a fervent anti-Communistand, during the Comission’s visit to Japan in January 1946, wrote:

I am convinced that much of the success of the occupation has dependedand will continue to depend upon the reputation amongst the Japanesepeople of the Supreme Commander. There is not the slightest doubt—indeed it is agreed on all sides,…that at present at any rate he holds theconfidence of the Japanese people to quite a remarkable degree.44

Unlike Sir George Sansom Berendsen was favourably impressed by the generalcalibre of MacArthur’s associates, writing


Indeed so high is the competence and the enthusiasm of the Americanofficers responsible for the reconstruction of Japanese life and economythat I would be inclined to anticipate not so much a failure as too muchsuccess…and it may well be worth American drive and ‘know-how’ addedto the industry and economy of the Japanese people, that Japan after adecade or two, may be stronger and healthier than it would have been butfor war.45

At the time of the FEC’s visit to Tokyo MacArthur gave it to understand that hewould co-operate with its future activities.46 But Berendsen rightly anticipatedthat, if the Commission was to be successful it would require effective means ofliaison with the focus of power in Tokyo. He wrote:

it seems to me to be of the first moment that in order to achieve any degreeof efficiency and to avoid trouble and misunderstanding, there should bethe closest possible liaison between SCAP on the one hand in Japan andthe Far Eastern Commission in Washington…as I see it, it would bedesirable for the Commission to have a permanent official representativeliving in Japan… As a corollary, it seems to me to be no less desirable tohave a permanent representative of SCAP with the Far EasternCommission in Washington in order to keep SCAP advised of theConmission’s activities.47

However this was never to be.For Berendsen the Commission had clear powers which were superior to those

of the Supreme Commander and from the outset he sought to transform this idealinto a reality. In the pursuit of this goal he was also helped by his appointment asChairman of the Commission’s Steering Committee.48

The first issue to which Berendsen and members of the Commission devotedthemselves was the 1946 Japanese general election. For diplomats still concernedwith the dangers of Japanese militarism it appeared that an election in the Springof 1946 would not give liberal elements sufficient time to contest for publicsupport on reasonably equal terms.49 But attempts to persuade SCAP to postponethe election had no success. A much more serious question for Berendsen and theCommission was the new Japanese constitution. If the FEC’s theoretical policy-making power was to be transformed into reality it was obvious that MacArthurcould not be permitted total authority to create a new constitution. Thus NewZealand and the Commission sought to establish some procedure for a reviewprocess —by the Japanese people on Diet. But again they achieved no significantconcessions.50

New Zealand’s deep concern with conditions in occupied Japan was notconfined to these essentially political matters. Like Ball, the Commonwealthrepresentative on the Allied Council, Berendsen saw Japan not as an isolatedproblem but as part of a crisis-ridden continent.51 Hence it seemed wrong that


Japan was receiving special American food aid when the victims of Japan’swartime aggression, China and India, were suffering a more severe food crisis.Great efforts were made to impress the significance of the broad Asian foodcrisis on the United States and the occupation authorities. These pressures mayhave achieved a minor, marginal change in American policy.52

If New Zealand views of Japan seem harsh it should be noted that otherCommission members, such as Australia and the Philippines, often took harsherviews. New Zealand always opposed the notion of a severe peace which mightdamage the prospects of a democratic Japan.53 Although reparations were a majorconcern of the Far Eastern Commission New Zealand’s claims were minor andshe often sympathised with the moderate policies in this field adopted by theUnited Kingdom.54 Even on matters of economic and security interest to NewZealand Berendsen often expressed distinctly reasonable views. A typical case washis opposition to Japanese whaling missions, which were supported by SCAP. ToNew Zealand these missions not only involved Japanese ships sailing close toNew Zealand’s Antarctic dependencies, but, more important, Japanesetechniques of processing whales were far less efficient than those of Norway orother European states. New Zealand also made eloquent protests on ecologicalgrounds—as Japanese whalers had often paid little heed to the need to allowstocks of whales to be replenished.55 Needless to say the Supreme Commandercould not be compelled to change his attitude on this as on other issues.

Like all other members of the Commission, Berendsen experienced a wholeseries of American tactics in 1946 and 1947, which prevented the FEC achievingany significant authority. Not only did the Commission’s American staff oftenappear unprofessional and lacking in ability but messages to Tokyo were oftentrapped in a web of civil and military bureaucracy. Furthermore liaison officerswere never exchanged and divisions between the State Department, WarDepartment and SCAP made it particularly difficult to deal with Americanobstructions.56 As early as 17 May 1946 Berendsen wrote:

I fully share with my colleagues on the Far Eastern Commission a sense offrustration and exasperation due entirely, whether for good or inadequatereasons, to the attitude of the United States representatives on theCommission and perhaps the Secretariat also. There is what we all believeto be a marked reluctance on the part of the American authorities to facilitatethe functioning of the Commission, and a still more marked unwillingnessto provide the Commission with the necessary reports…57

In contrast, until 1948, the behaviour of the Soviet delegate appeared to begenerally correct, and was often handicapped by considerable languagedifficulties.58

In this situation New Zealand at times appeared to inhabit an idealistic world,a little detached from harsh diplomatic realities. A D McIntosh, Secretary ofExternal Affairs, wrote ‘we are fortunate that our distinctive national interests are


not so powerful as to endanger the wider interests we have in internationaljustice and security; and when we come to political issues our views may carrymore weight if we have established a reputation for impartiality.’59 That suchidealism was unwarranted was clear on more than one occasion, when Berendsenwas subjected to unjustified tirades by the American Chairman, Major-GeneralMcCoy. Later McCoy apologised, but always in private.60

As early as June 1946 New Zealand’s frustration was obvious. As a small stateshe could exert little influence and Berendsen doubted whether the Commissionjustified the energy and time which he and his colleagues were devoting to it.61

The New Zealand mission in Washington, however, continued its frustratingexhausting struggle.

By 1948 it was clear that a series of American missions to Japan indicatedmajor changes of policy. But the impotence of the Far Eastern Commission wasmanifest in its failure to be consulted regarding these new measures. WhenAmerican proposals for Japan’s economic reconstruction went beyond the pointwhich New Zealand regarded as safe Fraser voiced concern. But as before thisaccomplished nothing.62 Nevertheless the United Kingdom had some success inexplaining to Wellington the dangers which Japan might pose if it fell underCommunist influence, and the advantages of New Zealand being protected bysome form of Pacific pact.63

For New Zealand her six years of activity in the Far Eastern Commission werea marathon of disappointment and frustration. But this harsh experience mayhave had its rewards. Perhaps it provided a severe and valuable education in therealities of international relations outside the Commonwealth framework.Furthermore the eloquence of Berendsen and his colleagues may havecontributed to America’s ultimate defence commitment to the Pacific dominionsand the 1951 ANZUS pact. Overall, New Zealand’s experience with occupiedJapan was a continuous illustration of her own weakness, and the decliningsignificance of the British Commonwealth. It was a painful prelude to NewZealand’s contemporary role, overshadowed by the might of America and thewealth of a reformed Japan.

NOTES

The author is grateful to the librarian of New Zealand House and Mrs P Taylorfor their help in providing materials for the preparation of this paper.

1. Even as late as 1961 51% of New Zealand’s total exports went to Britain, and theDeputy Leader of the New Zealand Labour Party, C F Skinner stated ‘Ourindustries have been built up with the idea of supplying the British market. Wehave felt that it was almost unpatriotic to search for new markets elsewhere.’ RKennaway, New Zealand Foreign Policy, 1951–1971 (London and Wellington,1972) pp. 81–82.

2. For an introduction to New Zealand foreign policy before 1941 see Ibid pp. 17–23.


3. Fraser was born at Fearn, Ross-shire in 1884. He arrived in New Zealand in 1911, JThorn, Peter Fraser, New Zealand’s Wartime Prime Minister (London, 1952) p. 13.Nash was born at Kidderminster in 1882, and emigrated to New Zealand in 1909,Robin Kay (ed) Documents on New Zealand External Relations. Vol. 2 TheSurrender and Occupation of Japan (Wellington, 1982) (afterwards cited asDNZER.2) p. 289 f.n.1. For Nash’s wartime views see his New Zealand, A WorkingDemocracy (London, 1944).

4. ‘It was not until 1941 that for the first time we established diplomatic relations witha foreign country—the United States’. T C Larkin (ed) New Zealand’s ExternalRelations (New Zealand Institute of Public Administration) (Wellington andLondon, 1962) p. 32. See also New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, NewZealand in World Affairs Vol. 1 (Wellington, 1977) pp. 13–20.

5. Carl Berendsen (1890–1973) was Permanent Head of the Prime Minister’sDepartment 1932–43, High Commissioner for New Zealand in Australia, 1943–44,New Zealand Minister in the United States, 1944–48, and Ambassador for NewZealand to the United States, 1948–52. DNZER.2 p. 75 f.n.1.

6. An External Affairs Department had existed as far back as 1919 ‘but its duties hadquickly become confined to the Mandate of Western Samoa and hence relationswith the League of Nations’, New Zealand in World Affairs. Vol. 1 pp. 12–19. TheDepartment established in 1943 was designed to fulfil a much broader role.

7. F P Walters, A History of the League of Nations (R.I.I.A.) (London, 1952) p. 686,and New Zealand in World Affairs. Vol. 1 p. 17. ‘New Zealand called for Leagueaction in support of China, New Zealand urged the League to take up the cause ofRepublican Spain. New Zealand banned the shipment of scrap iron to Japan as farback as 1936. The policy of appeasement as it was pursued during these years bothin Europe and the Far East was vigorously opposed.’ Walter Nash, New Zealand, AWorking Democracy p. 36.

8. For a recent survey of pre-war New Zealand-Japanese relations see M PLissington, New Zealand and Japan 1900–41 (Wellington, 1972).

9. ‘For the first time in this century, New Zealanders had felt their own country to bethreatened. They were grim, those early months in 1942, slit trenches were dug inparks and schoolgrounds; air raid drills became frequent; school children weregiven identity discs’, Bruce Brown, New Zealand Foreign Policy in Retrospect(N.Z.I.I.A.) (Wellington, 1970) p. 4.

10. Although Australia itself was not invaded, its neighbouring mandated territory inEast New Guinea was the scene of bitter fighting with the Japanese.

11. From 1943 Fraser also held the External Affairs portfolio. For a detailed study ofthe Canberra pact, see Robin Key (ed) Documents on New Zealand ExternalRelations. Vol. 1. The Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 1944 (Wellington,1972).

12. F L W Wood, The New Zealand People at War, Political and External Affairs(Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939–45),(Wellington, 1956) pp. 297– 302.

13. DNZER.2 pp. LXXXII–LXXXIII and The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs(Addison) to the Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) 16 August 1945. Ibid. p. 77.

14. Statement by the Prime Minister (Fraser) in the House of Representatives, 22 August1945. Ibid. pp. 90–91. Statement by the Prime Minister in the House ofRepresentatives, 24 August 1945, Ibid. pp. 100–101. ‘I was concerned as I am now


to avoid any public indication of serious differences between a Labour Governmentin New Zealand and a Labour Government in the United Kingdom. I feel that openstatements of any such differences are a mistake and that, however serious, theyshould first be frankly discussed in private.’ The Minister of External Affairs(Fraser) to the Minister of External Affairs in Australia (Evatt) 25 August 1945.Ibid. p. 114.

15. Ibid. p. LXXXV, Press Statement by the Australian Minister for External Affairs(Evatt) 24 August 1945. Ibid. pp. 108–110, and the Secretary of State for DominionAffairs (Addison) to the Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) 24 August 1945,Ibid. p. 104.

16. e.g. ‘To Japan, the chief threat to New Zealand’s physical security, it has beennecessary to devote particularly close attention’, Department of External Affairs,Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 March Appendix to the Journals of the Houseof Representatives, 1947. Vol. 1. p. 23.

and ‘On a vast variety of issues affecting Japan, New Zealand’s representativemade known their support for measures designed to deprive Japan of the physicalmeans of aggression or the will towards it’ T C Larkin, New Zealand and Japan inthe Postwar World (N.Z.I.I.A.) (Wellington, 1969) p. 5.

17. e.g. Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War. Vol.5(London, 1976) pp. 513–23.

18. Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs(Addison) 11 August 1945 DNZER.2 p. 44.

19. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (Addison) to Minister of External Affairs(Fraser) 1 September 1945 Ibid. pp. 1272–73, and Prime Minister (Fraser) toGeneral Officer Commanding 2nd NZEF (Freyberg) 31 August 1945. Ibid. p.1271.

20. General Officer Commanding 2nd NZEF (Freyberg) to Prime Minister (Fraser), 5September 1945. Ibid. pp. 1275–77.

21. Statement by Prime Minister (Fraser) 1 October 1945. Ibid. pp. 1289–90.22. According to the MacArthur-Northcott agreement the role of Commonwealth troops

was limited to ‘Military control of area and demilitarisation and destruction ofequipment, arms and other defences’ Minister for External Affairs in Australia(Evatt) to Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) 15 Decem7oer 1945. Ibid. p. 1320.New Zealand’s contribution to the Commonwealth force was ‘an army brigadegroup and a Royal New Zealand Air Force fighter squadron’ Ibid. p. LXXXIX.

23. For the problems of American fraternisation, see H E Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo,The Occupation and its Aftermath (London, 1954) pp. 326–36.

24. Acting Permanent Head of the Prime Minister’s Department (Shanahan) to Chiefof the General Staff (Weir) 7 September 1946. Ibid. p. 1375. Seventeen NewZealand coastwatchers who were captured in the Gilbert Islands were executed atTarawa or 15 October 1942.

25. Commander 2nd NZEF (Japan) (Potter) to Chief of the General Staff (Weir) 3October 1946. Ibid. p. 1377 and Memorandum Issued by the Commander 2nd NZEF(Japan) (Potter) to Officers Commanding Units of Jayforce, July 1946. Ibid. p.1379.

26. Ibid. pp. 1379–81.27. For the official history of New Zealand Occupation activities see O A Gillespie,

Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939–45, The Pacific


(Wellington, 1952) pp. 307–17. For the extension of New Zealand responsibilitiesto Shimane. DNZER.2. p. 1459 f.n.3.

28. e.g. ‘I feel sure that the New Zealand people will agree that this opportunity ofproving our unity and solidarity with the mother country, and of sharing in theresponsibilities of the British Commonwealth in the Pacific, should be accepted bythe provision of a brigade group.’ Statement by Prime Minister Fraser, 30September 1945, DNZER. 2. p. 1287. For Fraser’s view of the Commonwealth seeN.Z.I.I.A. New Zealand in World Affairs Vol. 1 pp. 39–42.

29. See Roger Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy, Britain, The United States and Japan1945– 1952 (Cambridge, 1982) pp. 98–100 and R Singh, Official History of theIndian Armed Forces in the Second World War, Post-war Occupation ForcesJapan and S.E.Asia (Kanpur, 1956) pp. 156–65.

30. e.g. ‘We regret that the changing of the function of the Commission from advisoryto control should be accompanied by the establishment of a four-power body inJapan’. The Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) to the New Zealand Minister,Washington (Berendsen) 6 November 1945. DNZER.2. p. 246.

31. For details of the Moscow Agreement see Ibid. pp. 280–84.32. ‘Owing to personnel difficulties it has not been found possible to attach a New

Zealand adviser to Mr Macmahon Ball, who has represented BritishCommonwealth interests with conspicuous ability.’ Department of ExternalAffairs, Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 March 1947, Appendix to theJournals of the House of Representatives, 1947. Vol. 1 p. 23.

33. ‘For Britain the political advantages of the ACJ were minimal, while theopportunities for confusion and disagreement with the United States and Australiawere to prove enormous’ R Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy, p. 80.

34. New Zealand Minister Washington (Berendsen) to Minister of External Affairs(Fraser) 17 May 1946. DNZER.2 p. 392. Ministry of External Affairs to Minister forExternal Affairs in Australia (Evatt) 18 April 1946. Ibid. p. 1165.

35. Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) to Minister for External Affairs in Australia(Evatt) 3 May 1946. Ibid. pp. 1169–70.

36. Secretary of External Affairs (McIntosh) to Official Secretary (Jean McKenzie)Office of the High Commissioner for New Zealand, Canberra 5 February 1948.Ibid. pp. 1244– 45.

37. Secretary of External Affairs (Shanahan) to Official Secretary, Office of the HighCommissioner for New Zealand, Canberra, 22 April 1948. Ibid. p. 1250.

38. The head of this office, R L G Challis, arrived in Japan in May 1947. DNZER.2. p.477. In January 1952 Challis was appointed first head of the newly created NewZealand Liaison Mission to SCAP. New Zealand Government News 4 January1952.

39. See statement by Acting Prime Minister (Nash) on Nominations for theInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East. 18 January 1946. DNZER.2. pp.1507–8.

40. New Zealand Associate Prosecutor, IMTFE (Quilliam) to Secretary of ExternalAffairs (McIntosh) 25 June 1946. Ibid. pp. 1601–4.

41. British Commonwealth Sub-Area, Tokyo to Headquarters, 8 July 1946. Ibid. p.1615.

42. The Commission met in the Japanese Embassy building, Washington.


43. e.g. New Zealand Minister, Washington (Berendsen) to Minister of ExternalAffairs (Fraser) 6 March 1946. DNZER.2. p. 333.

44. ‘Berendsen in the (U.N.) Assembly of the late 1940s was an influential figure, anantipodean “hammer of the Coms”’, Bruce Brown, New Zealand Foreign Policy inRetrospect (N.Z.I.I.A.) p. 23 and New Zealand Minister, Washington (Berendsen)to Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) 31 January 1946. DNZER.2. p. 297.

45. e.g. Katharine Sansom, Sir George Sansom and Japan, a Memoir (Tallahassee,Florida, 1972) p. 149, and New Zealand Minister, Washington (Berendsen) toMinister of External Affairs (Fraser) 31 January 1946. DNZER.2. p. 296.

46. ‘Whatever he (MacArthur) may have been reported by the press to have felt on thesubject of the Commission…he made it plain that he had the fullest intention of co-operating with the Commission.’ Ibid. p. 297.

47. Ibid. pp. 309–10.48. New Zealand Minister, Washington (Berendsen) to Minister of External Affairs

(Fraser) 6 March 1946, DNZER.2. p. 332.49. ‘Obviously the longer, within reason, the election is postponed, the better the

chance of obtaining a liberal administration’ New Zealand Minister, Washington(Berendsen) to Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) 31 January 1946. Ibid. p. 305.First Secretary, New Zealand Legation, Washington (Powles) to Minister ofExternal Affairs (Fraser) 20 March 1946. Ibid. p. 348. New Zealand Minister,Washington (Berendsen) to Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) 30 March 1946,Ibid. p. 356.

50. e.g. Far Eastern Commission Policy Decision on a Draft Japanese constitutionFEC-031/1. 20 March 1946. Ibid. pp. 353–4. ‘This Committee has been revived toconsider only one question, the review of the Japanese Constitution…the USSR issilent; the United Kingdom and France know that nothing practical can be donesince the United States wants nothing done’ New Zealand Ambassador,Washington (Berendsen) to Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) 11 February1949. Ibid. p. 1028.

51. British Commonwealth Member, Allied Council for Japan (Ball) to Minister ofExternal Affairs (Fraser) 30 April 1946. Ibid. p. 1168.

52. e.g. Counsellor, New Zealand Legation, Washington (Powles) to Secretary ofExternal Affairs (McIntosh) 23 January 1948. Ibid. pp. 822–25.

53. e.g. ‘The New Zealand Government earnestly desire that the Japanese economyshould be placed on a self-supporting basis’ New Zealand Government to UnitedStates Embassy, 16 June 1949. Ibid. p. 1065.

54. New Zealand Minister, Washington (Berendsen) to Minister of External Affairs(Fraser) 3 April 1946. Ibid. p. 363.

55. Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) to New Zealand Minister, Washington(Berendsen) 24 June 1947. Ibid. p. 718. New Zealand Legation, Washington toState Department, 25 June 1947. Ibid. p. 721–22.

56. e.g. New Zealand Minister (Washington) to Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) 23May 1946. Ibid. p. 396.

57. New Zealand Minister, Washington (Berendsen) to Minister of External Affairs(Fraser) 17 May 1946. Ibid. p. 392.

58. e.g. New Zealand Minister, Washington (Berendsen) to Minister of ExternalAffairs (Fraser) 11 March 1946. Ibid. p. 340.


59. Secretary of External Affairs (McIntosh) to First Secretary New Zealand Legation,Washington (Powles) 29 May 1946. p. 402.

60. e.g. New Zealand Minister, Washington (Berendsen) to Minister of ExternalAffairs (Fraser) 28 January 1947. Ibid. pp. 616–21.

61. New Zealand Minister, Washington (Berendsen) to Minister of ExternalAffairs (Fraser) 7 June 1946. Ibid. p. 417.

62. Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) to Secretary of State for CommonwealthRelations (Noel-Baker) 29 July 1948. Ibid. pp. 957–58.

63. High Commissioner for United Kingdom (Duff) to Prime Minister (Fraser) 21 July1948. Ibid. pp. 954–56.


First published in A.H.Ion and R.Prete (eds), Armies of

Occupation, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,

1984

28The American Occupation of Japan, 1945–52

A serious problem facing the United States in Asia is that of amilitary occupation of Japan. The nature of such an occupation willbe extremely important in terms of our future relations not only withJapan but with Asia as a whole.1

SO WROTE the social anthropologist John F.Embree in the summer of 1944.This perceptive scholar was aware that American forces already had ‘plenty ofexperience in military occupation’; they had ruled the defeated South, occupiedNew Mexico and carried out various forms of military administration in thePhilippines, the Caribbean and Central America. Following the First World WarAmerican units had briefly controlled part of the Rhineland, but apart from asingle report on this German experience there was little recorded history whichseemed relevant to the challenge which Embree perceived.2 Yet Americanpreparations for ruling enemy lands during the Second World War wereimpressive in speed, range and imagination. Already, in the spring of 1942, thefirst school of military government was established on the campus of theUniversity of Virginia at Charlottesville.3 This drew both civilians andservicemen into its programme, and recruited many college graduates withpublic affairs experience. These first courses emphasised the management ofeveryday crises in any occupied territory but their sweeping generalitiesillustrated the complex puzzles involved in preparing for military government.Japan, Germany and Italy were all potential zones of occupation, but so wereBulgaria and Hungary, and Japanese islands in the Pacific; even Vichy Francemight require occupation and military administration. No single programmecould possibly cope with this vast range of possibilities. As a result, morespecialised centres were soon created to supplement the school at Charlottesville.These new Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS for short) were jokinglyabused as academies ‘for American gauleiters’ but they represented much thatwas best in American academic and civilian life.4 Some schools concentrated onthe training of administrators for Europe. Others embarked upon the moreexacting task of training specialists to occupy Japan.5 These courses wereestablished at Harvard, Yale, Michigan, North-western, Stanford and Chicago

universities. They usually lasted six months and embraced intensive languagetraining, area studies (Japanese culture, politics and society) and education inmilitary administration. Lecturers included academics, diplomats, missionariesand businessmen with direct experience of Japan, and many Americans ofJapanese descent. These programmes were remarkably successful and by thesummer of 1945 over two thousand new Japan hands had graduated from CivilAffairs Training Schools. These graduates waited to accompany invasion forcesto the Japanese mainland.6

Parallel with this programme of administrative training a different form ofoccupation planning was taking place in the higher reaches of Americangovernment. As early as February 1942 the Advisory Committee on PostwarForeign Policy was created under the chairmanship of the secretary of State.7

This consisted of a wide range of government and non-government personneland in March spawned the Territorial Subcommittee which began to discussfrontier questions and the restoration of stable regimes after the war. In July 1942this Subcommittee began consultations with the State Department’s Division ofSpecial Research which was also preparing papers on postwar issues.8 However,little serious attention was paid to Japan until August 1942 when GeorgeBlakeslee, a Far Eastern specialist, was appointed to Special Research to beginwork on East Asian questions.9 Soon after, the Division of Special Researchcreated an East Asian Planning Group to consider a wide range of Japaneseproblems. This new group included Japan specialists such as Robert A.Feareyand Hugh Borton and immediately turned its energies to future occupationpolicy.10 How long should an occupation last? What forces should constitute anarmy of occupation? How should Japanese civilians be treated?—were all topicsof discussion. Furthermore, the political objectives of military government andthe treatment of the Emperor were already on the Group’s agenda.11 In January1943 Special Research was replaced by the Divisions of Political and EconomicStudies and a year later the newly formed Postwar Programs Committee enteredthe field of policy discussion. By this time relevant bodies in the Navy and WarDepartments were raising a succession of questions regarding occupied areas andthe Far East Area Committee of the Department of State was also submittingproposals to the Postwar Programs Committee.12 At this time argument began tofocus upon two basic issues. Firstly, would an occupation be implementeddirectly or indirectly? In short, would the Japanese government be retained orswept away? Secondly, what attitude should be taken to the Emperor afterJapan’s surrender?13 A paper submitted by Hugh Borton made a powerful casefor indirect occupation, and this was ultimately to become American policy.Borton rightly argued that the United States and her allies had insufficient trainedmen to administer Japan down to the smallest hamlet. He also claimed that thesudden abolition of the Imperial Institution, against the wishes of the Japanesepeople, would ignite resentment and prove ineffective.14 When this documentwas passed to the Postwar Programs Committee it was bitterly criticised butultimately it survived and proved very influential.


The next organisation to enter the swirling flow of policy discussion was theState-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) which met for the first timeon 19 December 1944.15 This body had far greater powers than earlier groupingsand based much of its Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan on Bortonprinciples. In particular, indirect rule and the maintenance of the Emperorbecame central elements in American planning.16 At a different level, furtherpreparations for occupation rule were being made by the Office of StrategicServices and the Office of War Information, their guides and reports on Japanbecame increasingly sophisticated and comprehensive.17

Superficially it may appear that high level and practical planning were nowreasonably in harness. Unfortunately military events soon threw preparations intoa tangle of confusion. Almost everyone assumed that the war would continueinto 1946 but nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Sovietintervention, swiftly ended Japanese resistance.18 On 15 August 1945 theEmperor publicly announced Japan’s acceptance of allied terms. However, atthis time many publications which were designed for occupationaires were stillat the printers. Furthermore there was no adequate staging area in the Philippinesto arrange for CAT graduates to move smoothly to Japan. As a result the mainstaging area was established in the United States, at Monterey in California.19

Despite these difficulties, on 5 August, a formidable organization, the MilitaryGovernment Section (MGS) of General Headquarters United States Army ForcesPacific had been created in the Philippines. Originally MGS was intended toadvise Douglas MacArthur on the conduct of policy in occupied areas. Howeverthe Chief of Staff opposed this, and when military government personnel wereeventually attached to MacArthur’s occupation force they fell outside the controlof Military Government Section.20 In the meantime MGS in Manila City Hallbegan to plan legal, welfare and cultural policies for Japan; and on 28 AugustMacArthur despatched orders, which emanated from Military GovernmentSection, to army and corps commanders. These were based on the premise ofretaining the Emperor and declared

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will issue all necessaryinstructions to the Japanese Emperor or to the Imperial Government andevery opportunity will be given for the Government and the Japanesepeople to carry out such instructions without further compulsion. Ifnecessary however the Supreme Commander will issue appropriate ordersto the army and corps commanders indicating the action to be taken bythem to secure the obedience by the agencies of the Imperial Governmentor Japanese people.21

Verbal explanations of written instructions indicated that unit commanders wereto avoid any direct intervention in civilian affairs. Of course this policy dependedto a large extent upon Japanese reactions. It was correctly assumed that therewould be little or no overt resistance; and on 31 August and 1 September a small

270 THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN, 1945–52

group of twenty-three military government personnel arrived at Yokohama andestablished themselves in the Customs Building.22 On 2 September a formalsurrender was signed on the United States battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.Shortly after these ceremonies American-Japanese conversations resulted in acrucial policy decision. Japanese representations led MacArthur to abandonplans to issue direct proclamations regarding military currency and theestablishment of courts to punish offences against the occupation.23 The Japanesegovernment affirmed that it would cooperate with the allies and it was evidentthat direct proclamations would be detrimental to the concept of working throughexisting institutions. Meanwhile Military Government Section in Manila wasbriskly drafting instructions for the Japanese Government on a.wide range ofpolitical and economic subjects. In contrast its officers in Japan occupied acuriously ill-defined position. Japan had not been invaded and the JapaneseGovernment was to be preserved. These new circumstances produced a novelseries of institutions.24 On 15 September a decree establishing the Economic andScientific Section of the Supreme Commander’s headquarters marked thebeginning of the end for conventional military government. This act strippedMilitary Government groups of all their economic specialists. A week later theCivil Information and Education Section was created from other MilitaryGovernment personnel. On 22 September 1945 the Chief of Staff BrigadierSutherland formally announced the passing away of Military GovernmentSection in Japan.25 Despite their earlier training for work in Japan most of itsmembers were eventually despatched to Korea. The residue were attached tospecialist sections of SCAP. It was only after this drastic process of dissectionand regrafting that, under General Order Number One of 2 October, theheadquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) wasformally established in the Daiichi-Seimei Building, across the moat from theImperial Palace in Tokyo.26 From this time on SCAP was divided into fivefunctional sections: Economic and Scientific, Civil Information and Education,Natural Resources, Public Health and Welfare, and Government.27 There werealso departments dealing with Statistics and Reports, Legal Affairs, CivilCommunications and Civil Intelligence. Later, other specialist divisions, such asthe International Prosecution Section (which dealt with war crimes) were alsoestablished.28 These organisations constituted the main apparatus of the army ofoccupation. But below were subordinate agents and agencies which enabled thecentral machine to influence the behaviour of the whole Japanese nation. Inaddition to these specialist organisations was MacArthur’s own general staffwhich carried out its usual military functions, and transmitted specialmemoranda to the Supreme Commander. To link General MacArthur with theJapanese central government a Central Liaison Office was established which waslargely composed of former Japanese diplomats.29 In the first years of occupationSCAP’s specialist section chiefs could only confer with Japanese officialsthrough this Liaison Office. Below these lofty heights were tactical garrisontroops and so-called ‘military government teams’ which were posted in every


prefecture.30 Despite their formal title these teams did not govern, and theiractivities were confined to observation, investigation and reporting oncompliance with SCAP instructions.31 Usually these units contained civilian aswell as military personnel and included members with special responsibilities forsuch fields as education, welfare and economic affairs. However until May 1946these outposts of the Supreme Command were often surprisingly ill-informedand only learned of significant policy changes from the pages of the Englishlanguage newspaper, Nippon Times.32 Yet, as in much administration theory didnot always correspond with reality. When a local team discovered a case of non-compliant behaviour its report was submitted to corps and then armyheadquarters before, perhaps, arriving at the Daiichi-Seimei building. Thus itwas often easier to achieve Japanese obedience by illegally exerting pressureupon local officials.33 In addition to these ‘military government teams’ counter-intelligence units were also active in the Japanese provinces, their task was toprevent hostile political conspiracies or possible armed resistance.34

Despite the administrative complexities of the first months of occupation thiswas a time when General MacArthur possessed important advantages. Followingthe shock of defeat Japanese society was surprisingly malleable, and Americanforces were in total control of the Japanese mainland. In fact other allied powershad made virtually no preparations for the occupation of Japan and Americanreforms could be implemented without foreign influence or diplomatic threats.35

Indeed, it was not until 31 December 1945 that MacArthur’s relations with theother allies were clearly defined.36 At the Foreign Ministers’ conference inMoscow, British and Soviet calls for a voice on occupation policy were finallyheeded. According to this agreement an eleven-power Far Eastern Commissionwas to shape occupation policy. This collection of Asian, European andAmerican allies was to meet in Washington and be a forum for all the powers whichhad fought against Japan. MacArthur initially feared the Commission but anexamination of its charter indicates that the Supreme Commander was to retainthe initiative in all matters.37 Furthermore it was agreed that the United StatesGovernment ‘would issue interim directives to the Supreme Commanderwhenever urgent matters are not covered by policies already formulated by theCommission’.31 A second, four-power agency The Allied Council for Japan wasto meet in Tokyo, but this was to be merely a consultative apparatus. It couldeasily be humiliated and ridiculed by MacArthur’s private staff. The SupremeCommander’s monopoly of information in many fields was a crucial weapon inthis important process.39

In the early months of occupation, MacArthur had the broad principles ofAmerican policy before him: the destruction of the Japanese armed forces, theemancipation of the press and radio and the promotion of democracy in politics,agriculture and industry.40 All these processes were to ensure that Japan wouldnot again ‘become a menace…to the peace and security of the world’.41 The firstaspects of this programme, the dissolution of Japanese armed forces, and thedismantling of the old control regime were relatively simple.42 But the


determination of priorities and the creation of constructive programmes weremore difficult. In many respects MacArthur was an aloof and distantcommander. He had few confidants and scarcely approached policy in asystematic way.43 Yet in the first years of occupation men such as Marquat andWhitney, who had been with him during much of the war. formed an importantinner wall of defence and prevented him being overwhelmed by politicalsuitors.44 If any division of SCAP appeared to have MacArthur’s ear andsympathy at this time it was Government Section. This was headed by thebrusque but loyal Courtney Whitney and was staffed by a mixture of Japaneseexperts, loyal soldiers and passionate democrats.45 This powerhouse of reformissued a bewildering series of pronouncements on such matters as election laws,the reorganisation of central and local government, the police, the judiciary andthe civil service.46 Perhaps equally important was its rhetoric, sweep of languageand righteous purpose. In particular, Charles Kades, Harvard law graduate andchampion of democracy, radiated a mercurial blend of vitality and high-pacedidealism which impressed both Americans and Japanese. 47

Given MacArthur’s considerable freedom and his wide range of specialistagencies, how did reform germinate, grow and prosper? From time to timeinstructions were issued from Washington but often there was no clear blueprintfor action. Indeed MacArthur was often moved by chance enthusiasms andpolitical calculations rather than orders from the United States. Perhaps thesingle most important political reform—the shaping of a new Constitution—besthighlights the quixotic elements of chance and power which could propel rapidchange through allied and Japanese organisations.48 In October and November1945 members of SCAP’s Government Section approached elder statesmanPrince Konoe and Prime Minister Shidehara and suggested that serious revisionsof the 1889 Constitution was essential for the creation of an acceptable Japan.49

Konoe’s enquiries did not achieve much for he was soon listed as a suspected warcriminal and on 15 December committed suicide.50 The Prime Minister, BaronShidehara moved more purposefully and created a seventeen man committee toconsider revision of the constitution.51 By prewar standards this groupingcontained some of Japan’s most liberal and erudite lawyers but the ambiguitiesof SCAP intentions and the outdated attitudes of the committee created profoundmisunderstandings.52 In early February 1946 the constitutional revisioncommittee, headed by Matsumoto J� ji, finally presented its suggestions forminor amendments to the Meiji Constitution. Essentially Matsumoto and hiscolleagues saw little that required change in Japan’s nineteenth centuryConstitution. In the past it had been misused by extremists but it had alsoaccommodated the rise of political parties and the gradual extension of malesuffrage.53 MacArthur’s reaction—as voiced by his spokesman Whitney—wasnot only to declare minor modifications unsatisfactory, but to transform the pace,style and objectives of constitutional discussion. But why? And why at thisjuncture? Clearly petty modifications did not square with MacArthur’s sweepingvision of emancipation, but political factors also exerted a significant influence.


The Far Eastern Commission was slowly beginning its activity and MacArthur wasdeeply apprehensive of its power. The prospect of the Japanese constitutionbecoming the subject of international discussion, in which the Soviet Unionmight play a surly part, was unacceptable.54 Almost immediately MacArthur andWhitney gathered together a committee of reformers from Government Sectionand set them to write a completely new constitution as quickly as possible.55 Thecommittee was not composed of constitutional lawyers. There were franticexpeditions to find reference works in Japanese libraries, but MacArthur hadmade his requirements clear. The Emperor was to remain but his sovereigntywould be stripped away. The Diet would become the dominant organ ofgovernment and power was to be in the hands of the people.56 Most dramatic ofall Japan’s right to maintain arms and to wage war was to be renounced. Thecommittee in which Colonel Kades played an energetic and crucial role soondelivered its constitution.57 The new draft began

The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity of thepeople, deriving his position from the sovereign will of the people.58

The language, rhythms and aspirations of the new document were so alien to theaging Japanese Cabinet that they requested time to consider this threat to thehierarchical Japan which they sought to preserve.59 In reply they were informedthat failure to accept MacArthur’s draft would have very serious consequences.The Supreme Commander might appeal, over their heads, to the Japanesepeople; a very distasteful proposition. Even worse, in such an eventuality thesafety of the Emperor could not be guaranteed; for Australia and the SovietUnion were deeply critical of his position and person.60 Inevitably thebeleaguered Cabinet accepted Whitney’s ultimatum and MacArthur publiclyannounced

It is with a sense of deep satisfaction that I am today able to announce adecision of the Emperor and Government of Japan to submit to theJapanese people a new and enlightened Constitution which has my fullapproval.61

Of course no Japanese could seriously imagine that Shidehara and his anxiousCabinet of veterans had shaped such a Constitution. But MacArthur’s statementindicated that he sought no public humiliation of the Japanese Government.Despite the power and singlemindedness of the Supreme Commander and hisaides these events and their aftermath illustrate a further crucial element in thisarmy’s major reforms. In all fields they built upon an important measure ofJapanese cooperation; a process of inter-argument, however unequal, was alwayspresent in Japanese-American relations.62 MacArthur’s draft had provided for asingle chamber parliament but after Japanese protests an elected Upper Housewas included in the new constitution.63 To become law the Constitution also had


to proceed formally through both houses of the existing Diet. Here it was open toJapanese comment and criticism, and though American ‘advisers’ supervised itspassage into law the Japanese retained the capacity to amend minor points ofdetail.64 Reforming American colonels and conservative Japanese statesmenoften conversed in different political languages but there also existed a thirdlanguage which could, with effort, be drawn from the depths of Japaneseconsciousness. Many influential Japanese possessed a half forgotten knowledgeof Western culture which helped them to comprehend and implement Americanmeasures.65

In preparing complex technical reforms, such as the destruction of industrialcombines, Japanese and Americans often stood in a far more equal relationship.In others third and fourth parties joined in the interflow of power and ideas. On12 November 1945 press reports of SCAP plans stated that ‘Japanese farmersand their families are about to be liberated from a condition approachingslavery’. But the Japanese government had already begun preparing land reformlegislation.66 This draft was limited in scope and diluted by parliamentarydebate. But that it was produced at all was a tribute to the experience and skill ofJapanese civil servants. Later Macarthur demanded a more drastic reform and in1946 asked the British Commonwealth, American, Chinese and Sovietrepresentatives on the Allied Council to produce new proposals.67 UltimatelyAustralians and Americans wove together a radical reform which was pressedthrough the Diet. The Supreme Commander’s staff played a major role inshaping and enacting this legislation but its implementation in thousands ofJapanese villages would have been impossible without the knowledge andstatistical expertise which only Japanese officials could bring to this immenselycomplex problem. The details of these high level Japanese-Arnericanrelationships were often complex and subtle but of equal significance were theroutine visits of military government officers to remote villages. These irregularforays symbolised the strength of American determination, and indicated thatresistance to reforms would not go unchallenged.68

At times reforms were planned without sufficient knowledge or experience ofJapanese realities but between 1945 and 1948, when activity was at its widest,the occupation army, gathered and marshalled information with highprofessionalism. If political and military power were the heaviest weapons,knowledge and intelligence were the supplest. For three years after Japan’ssurrender ranks of translators in the Allied Interpreter and Translation Section(ATIS) spent each day combing through Japanese national and local newspapersand magazines, translating and classifying articles so that American personnelwere always abreast of political, social and cultural developments. Interpreterspainstakingly attended political meetings, noting speeches, dress and chanceremarks.69 Economists surveyed farms, factories, mines and forests seeking adetailed and comprehensive understanding of Japan’s commercial future.70

Cultural monuments, libraries and the nature of woinen’s organisations were allcarefully studied—as sources of reform, improvement and understanding.71


New knowledge of Japan was not only collected by conventional means. In anarmy where scholars and social scientists occupied important positions publicopinion polls and social surveys were repeatedly carried out. In 1945 a crosssection of Japan’s population was surveyed on its attitude to the war, the Emperorand Japan’s future.72 This investigation clearly indicated the Emperor’spopularity and confirmed America’s early decision to retain the Imperialinstitution. Japanese were also encouraged to adopt this novel technique; and byJanuary 1946 newspapers had begun to carry out crude polls and had establishedtheir own inhouse polling units.73 In this new liberal atmosphere even radioreporters questioned and interviewed ordinary citizens on issues of the day.74

Behind the rapid sequence of reforms there was yet another mobilisation ofinformation which aimed to reshape the attitudes of Japanesecitizens. Throughout Japan’s prefectures knowledge of America’s politicalsystem, history, literature and society was spread through scores of reading roomsand information centres. There were films and broadcasts and even strollingmanipulators of coloured picture cards—all promoting democracy, peace andrural reconstruction.75

The intensity of this programme of reform and information gathering reflectedthe unassailable position of MacArthur and his occupying force. Until 1948 therewere few military or political restraints to check or weaken idealistic policies. Atfirst many believed that Japanese ultra-nationalists might arouse patriotichostility to the occupation. Others noted that a small number of communistswielded surprising intellectual influence. But neither constituted meaningfulobstacles to American policy. Numerous commissions of American experts weredespatched to Japan to provide MacArthur with detailed advice but Washingtontook relatively little interest in many aspects of occupation policy.76 Events inEurope occupied much Presidential attention and for a time Japan seemed freefrom major difficulties.

Yet by early 1948 new events inside and outside Japan were impinging onMacArthur’s thought and objectives. Firstly, while the new politics had thrivedJapan’s economy was only limping towards recovery.77 From the first winter ofoccupation Washington and MacArthur had provided food so that Japan’spopulation did not starve. SCAP also gave greater and greater freedom toJapanese traders and fishermen, but political considerations hobbled Ministersand industrialists. Insecurity over possible reparations, concern at inflation,inaction due to excessive government intervention; all impaired confidentplanning for the future.78 The economic insecurity and poverty of a vastpopulation was in itself a matter of deep concern. But its political consequencemight be even more threatening. Not only would it jeopardise all previous reformsbut it might damage the long term interests of American traders. Furthermore,there was growing opposition in the United States to the financial burdens ofsustaining the Japanese economy.79 Even more important, the broad freedomwith which MacArthur had carried out his policies was now being challenged. InWashington the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff sought to determine


the pattern of Japanese-American relations which would follow the signing of apeace treaty.80 Up to this time representatives of the Department of State hadbeen present in Tokyo but their influence had been relatively slight.Consequently in late February 1948 George F.Kennan, Director of the PolicyPlanning Staff, flew to Tokyo to assert the interest of the State Department inJapan’s political future. Kennan’s Memoirs clearly describe his difficulties ingaining adequate access to MacArthur, and when the two men finally met therewas less than total agreement.81 Both recognised Japan’s great strategic value butthey differed in defining the enemies which she faced. MacArthur held that itwould be possible to maintain American forces in Japan after a peace settlement.Kennan disagreed and declared that it would be best to postpone a formal peacetreaty.82 But the most drastic of Kennan’s reactions concerned the results ofreform and the whole future of occupation policy. Ironically this civilian injecteda measure of harsh military realism into the analysis of Japan’s future. Kennan’smessage was clear. Reform had brought some improvements but it had alsocreated social instability. MacArthur regarded the Japanese Communist Party aspathetically weak. Kennan saw Communist and Soviet influence as the greatestdangers.83 He believed that the first priority was for the occupation army towithdraw from its reforming enterprises. In Kennan’s words

Instructions should be given to SCAP that in the coming period its varioussections should take particular care not to interfere or participate directly inthe work of the Japanese government or to perform functions which wouldnormally be the responsibilities of agencies or officials of the Japanesegovernment. Its functions should be reduced as rapidly as possible to thoseof general supervision, and it should deal with the Japanese government asa rule ‘only at a high level and on matters of broad policy. This wouldapply particularly to the Economic and Scientific Section…as for reformmeasures already taken or in process of preparation by the Japaneseauthorities SCAP should be authorised steadily but unobtrusively to relaxpressures on the Japanese government in connection with these reformsand to permit the Japanese authorities to proceed in their own way with theprocess of implementation’.84

In October the National Security Council affirmed and strengthened the new linein its document NSC 13/2. This stated

Every effort, consistent with the proper performance of the occupationalmission as envisaged in this policy paper and with military security andmorale, should be made to reduce to a minimum the psychological impactof the presence of occupational forces on the Japanese population….(Regarding) SCAP…the scope of its operations should be reduced asrapidly as possible,…to a point where its mission will consist largely ofsupervisory observation of the activities of the Japanese government and of


contact with the latter at high levels on questions of broad governmentalpolicy.85

Kennan was an extremely influential visitor to MacArthur’s Japan but a series ofeconomic missions further developed Washington’s influence on the reshapingof policy.86 Economic revival was clearly the overwhelming objective; and inDecember 1948 the United States Government declared it a matter

of urgency that the Supreme Commander require the Japanese governmentto put into effect a programme of domestic economic stabilisation,including measures leading to fiscal, monetary, price and wage stability,and maximum production for export.87

Measures aimed at dissolving industrial combines were weakened. Attitudestowards labour became increasingly severe and informal advice replaced publicdirectives.88

Throughout 1949 SCAP responded actively to this new current of advice andmilitary government teams were reduced in numbers.89 Their earlier mission, thesupervision of reform, was now a thing of the past. But the occupying army’spolitical role was not at an end. The encouragement of economic recovery wasone major objective, the defeat of international communism another. By nowmany of SCAP’s reformers had returned to the United States and increasinglycounter-intelligence became an important element in occupation activities.90

Yoshida, who had been regarded as too conservative for the new Japan was againPrime Minister, and was seen as a firm anti-Communist friend.91 In this world ofharsh economic policies unemployment rose, popular distrust of America’smotives was widespread and Japanese were increasingly divided in theirestimates of SCAP’s manifold activities.92 Now Americans were accused ofundercover activities—such as framing communists, and limiting the veryacademic freedom which they had created.93

On 6 June 1950, MacArthur ordered the purging of members of the JapaneseCommunist Party’s Central Committee from positions in the public media, and inJune the outbreak of the Korean war provided a clear justification for the creationof embryonic Japanese armed forces—The National Police Reserve.94

Not only had the role of the occupying army changed but after the outbreak ofthe Korean war much of the American garrison was transferred to combat duties.95

Few troops remained to guard American bases and the 75,000 National PoliceReserve began its training at American camps. Some were immediatelydespatched to Hokkaid� , arguably the area most vulnerable to Soviet subversion.

Even in these less idealistic years of occupation, a little of the earlier spirit ofsocial innovation persisted. If reform was over, some reflected, now was the timeto study its effects scientifically. Following the report of a psychiatrist, Dr.Florence Powdermaker, in July 1949, the Analysis and Research Division of theCivil Information and Education Section was transformed into the Public


Opinion and Sociological Research Division headed by John William Bennet.96

This new body cooperated closely with Japanese polling agencies and studiedresponses to land reform, attitudes to the position of women, and shiftingJapanese views of America and the Soviet Union following the outbreak of theKorean war. Other researchers sought to answer similar questions using differentmethodologies. Herbert Passin and Arthur Raper, in cooperation with Japanesesociologists made a study of The Japanese Village in Transition which attemptedto trace the impact of land reform on ten rural communities.97

By 1951, Japan was largely occupied by a new army, consisting of Americanand other United Nations forces, preparing for and recuperating from combat inthe Korean peninsula. MacArthur’s dismissal in April 1951, ironically forproposing a sterner anti-Communist policy, marked the symbolic end of thegreat social experiment.98 In September 1951, Peace and Security treaties weresigned at San Francisco. Seven months later Japan regained her legal sovereigntyand independence.99

Clearly, the greatest legacy of this army of occupation is the interweave ofmilitary, economic and political ties which continues to link the societies ofJapan and the United States. Overall, this surprising success was built uponAmerica’s deep knowledge of Japan, and a remarkable degree of Japanesecooperation. The occupation also gained much from MacArthur’s considerableautonomy from civilian and diplomatic intervention. Furthermore in 1945 Japanwas already the most Westernised society in Asia. These fortunate circumstanceswere unique, but this uniqueness was rarely acknowledged.100 To many itseemed that American power and applied social science could force and coaxextensive social changes in any alien society. The history of land reform inTaiwan might justify such optimistic assumptions. But the disaster of Vietnameffectively negates them. For Vietnam was not only a species of military failure.It demonstrated that area studies, technical prowess and varieties of indirectoccupation cannot always triumph over hostile circumstances. In a subtle andunforseen sense John Embree was right. The occupation of Japan came to exert aprofound influence on America’s relations with the entire Asiatic world.

NOTES

1. John F.Embree, ‘Military Occupation of Japan’ in Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 8, No.19 (20 Sept. 1944), p. 173. Embree had published Suye Mura, a Japanese Village(Chicago, 1939) and served with the War Relocation Authority (which dealt withthe ‘relocation’ of Japanese living on the American West coast) as head of thecommunity analysis section. He was later Visiting Associate Professor at the CivilAffairs Training School, University of Chicago. In 1945 he wrote The JapaneseNation, A Social Survey (New York, 1945).

2. Ibid., p. 173, John B.Mason, ‘Lessons of Wartime Military Government Training’in The Annals of the American Acadeny of Political and Social Science, Vol. 267(Jan. 1950), p. 183 and Hajo Holborn, American Military Government; Its


Organization and Policies (Washington, D.C., 1947), pp. 2 and 6. The ‘HuntReport’ on the Rhineland Occupation was officially entitled, American MilitaryGovernment of Occupied Germany, 1918–20 (Report of the Officer in Charge ofCivil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany) (mimeographed), 4vols. (Coblenz, 1920). Its first volume was reprinted in Washington in 1943.

3. ‘Some 70 to 80 per cent were college graduates and a good many had professionalor advanced degrees’. John B.Mason, ‘Lessons of Wartime Military GovernmentTraining’ in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,Vol. 267 (Jan. 1950), pp. 185–186 and Hajo Holborn, American MilitaryGovernment, Its Organization and Policies, pp. 3–4.

4. Hajo Holborn, American Military Governmnt, Its Organization and Policies, p. 4and J.B.Mason, ‘Lessons of Wartime Military Government Training’, pp. 184–186.For a detailed study of one aspect of these programes see Joseph K.Yamagiwa, TheJapanese Language Programs at the University of Michigan during World War II(Unpublished typescript, Ann Arbor, February 1946) (Available on microfilm fromthe Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) Japanese instruction in the CATschool Far Eastern programme is described on pages 51–67.

5. See C.J.Friedrich and D.G.Haring, ‘Military Government for Japan’ in Far EasternSurvey, Vol. 14 (14 February 1945), pp. 37–40.

6. C.J.Friedrich et al, American Experiences in Military Government in World War II(New York, 1948), p. 320 and Philip H.Taylor, ‘The Administration of OccupiedJapan’ in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,Vol. 267 (Jan. 1950), p. 140.

7. For a brief survey of American government planning see Hugh Borton, AmericanPresurrender Planning for Postwar Japan (Occasional Paper of the East AsianInstitute, Columbia University) (New York, 1967). An excellent case study of onefield of planning is Marlene J.Mayo, ‘Psychological Disarmament: AmericanWartime Planning for the Education and Re-education of Defeated Japan, 1943–1945’ in T.W.Burkman (ed.), The Occupation of Japan: Educational and SocialReform (Norfolk, Virginia, 1982), pp. 21–127. A valuable Japanese survey isTakemae Eiji, ‘Tai-Nichi Senry� Seisaku no Keisei to Tenb� ’ in Iwanarni K� zaNihon Rekishi. 22. Gendai 1 (Tokyo, 1977), pp. 22–80.

8. H.Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, pp. 5–6 and 35.9. Ibid., p. 8. George Blakeslee (1871–1954) was Professor of History and International

Relations at Clark University, Worcester, Mass., 1903–43 and became SpecialAssistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in 1945. See � kurash�Zaiseishishitsu, Sh� wa Zaiseishi Sh� sen kara K� wa made, Amerika no Tai-NichiSenry� Seisaku (Tokyo, 1976) (fuzoku shiry� ), p. 54.

10. Robert A.Fearey had served as private secretary to Joseph Grew, the United StatesAmbassador to Japan (1941–42). Hugh Borton had studied at Tokyo ImperialUniversity (1935–36) and been a Research Associate at the Institute of PacificRelations. He had taught at Columbia University, New York and at the WarDepartment’s School of Military Government. Ibid. 1 pp. 57 and 54.

11. H.Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, pp. 15–16.12. Ibid., p. 14.13. Ibid., p. 15.14. Ibid., p. 16.15. Ibid., p. 18.


16. Ibid., pp. 21–22. For the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, seeDepartment of State, Occupation of Japan, Policy and Progress, (WashingtonD.C., 1946) pp. 73–81.

17. For a list of civil affairs guides prepared by the O.S.S. see � kurash� Zaiseishishitsu(ed.) Sh� wa Zaiseishi, Sh� sen kara K� wa made, Amerika no Tai-Nichi Senry�Seisaku (Tokyo, 1976), (fuzoku shiry� ), pp. 40–42.

18. For the background to Japan’s surrender see R.J.C.Butow, Japan’s Decision toSurrender (Stanford, California, 1954).

19. Carl J.Friedrich, et al, American Experience of Military Government in World WarII (New York, 1948), p. 321, and Hajo Holborn, American Military Government,Its Organization and Policies (Washington D.C., 1947), p. 91.

20. C.J.Friedrich, American Experience of Military Government in World War II, p.325.

21. Ibid., p. 328.22. Ibid., p. 333.23. For the text of the surrender document see Occupation of Japan, Policy and

Progress, pp. 62–63. For a Japanese account of subsequent conversations seeMamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny (London, 1958), pp. 375–77. For aless dramatic American description see C.J.Friedrich, American Experience ofMilitary Government in World War II, pp. 330–31.

24. American Experience of Military Government in World War II, p. 335.25. Ibid., p. 336.26. Ibid., pp. 336–37.27. For a description of the Non-Military Sections of SCAP see Reports of General

MacArthur, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation Military Phase, Volume 1,Supplement (Prepared by His General Staff) (Washington D.C., 1966), pp. 75–82.

28. American Experience of Military Government in World War II, pp. 337–38.29. For an outline of the Liaison Office see Senzenki Kanry� sei Kenky� kai (ed.),

Senzenki Nihon Kanry� sei no Seido. Soshiki. Jinji (Tokyo, 1981), pp. 684–85.30. For an outline of Military Government activity see Reports of General MacArthur,

MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation Military Phase, Volume 1, Supplement, pp.194–203.

31. American Experience of Military Government in World War II, pp. 343–44.32. Ibid., p. 344.33. Ralph J.D.Braibanti, ‘Occupation Controls in Japan’ in Far Eastern Survey, Vol.

12, No. 17, 22 September 1948, p. 218.34. Ralph J.D.Braibanti, ‘Administration of Military Government in Japan at the

Prefectural Level’ in American Political Science Review, Vol. 43 (April, 1949), p.251 and Reports of General MacArthur, MacArthur in Japan: The OccupationMilitary Phase, Volume 1, Supplement, pp. 254–58.

35. e.g. British official thinking only achieved some impetus on 10 August 1945, seeRoger W.Buckley, ‘British Diplomacy and the Allied Control of Japan, 1945–1946, in Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies, Vol. 2, Part1, p. 171. For a more general account of British attitudes in 1945 see LlewellynWoodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. 5 (London,1976), pp. 513–33.

36. For the text of the Moscow agreement see Occupation of Japan, Policy andProgress, pp. 69–72.


37. For MacArthur’s hostile attitude to the Commission, see Douglas MacArthur,Reminiscences (New York, 1964), pp. 334–35.

38. Occupation of Japan, Policy and Progress, p. 70.39. For MacArthur’s tactics towards the Allied Council see Gordon Daniels

‘Nationalist China in the Allied Council; Policies towards Japan, 1946–52’ inHokkaido Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, November 1976, pp. 165–88.

40. For Demobilization of Japanese forces see Reports of General MacArthur,MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation Military Phase, Vol. 1, Supplement(afterwards cited as Reports of General MacArthur), pp. 117–49. The officialhistory of political reform is Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,Government Section. Political Reorientation of Japan (2 volumes) (WashingtonD.C., 1949). The unpublished official history of the Occupation-SupremeCommander for the Allied Powers, General Headquarters, Statistics and ReportsSection, History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan (Tokyo,1952) includes Monograph 15, Freedom of the Press, 1945–51, Monograph 27,The Rural Land Reform, 1945–51 and Monograph 24, Elimination of ZaibatsuControl, 1945–50 (National Archives, Washington D.C.).

41. United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan 29 August 1945, Occupationof Japan, Policy and Progress, p. 74.

42. Rekishigaku Kenky� kai; Taiheiy� -Sens� shi, Volume 6, San Furanshisuko K� wa1945– 1952 (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 51–87 (afterwards cited as Taiheiy� -Sens� shi, 6).

43. MacArthur’s aloofness was symbolised by his failure to visit anywhere in Japanoutside Tokyo—see Harry E.Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, The Occupation and itsAftermath (London, 1954), p. 10.

44. For a recent study of Whitney see Justin Williams, Japan’s Political Revolutionunder MacArthur, A Participant’s Account (Athens, Georgia, 1979) (hereafter citedas Williams, Political Revolution), pp. 74–97. For Marquat’s career see Sh� waZaiseishi, Sh� sen kara K� wa made, Amerika no Tai-Nichi Senry� Seisaku (fuzokushiry� ), p. 61.

45. For details of leading figures in Government Section see Williams, PoliticalRevolution, pp. 52–73. For MacArthur’s admiration of the Section see PoliticalReorientation of Japan, Volume 1 (afterwards cited as Political Reorientatiori),pp. iii–vi.

46. For a broad if subjective account of the Section’s work see Political Reorientation,Volume 1.

47. For Kades’ career see Williams, Political Revolution, pp. 33–51.48. An official account is Political Reorientation, Volume 1, pp. 82–118. A recent

description is Williams, Political Revolution, pp. 98–144. A Japanese account isTaiheiy� Sens� shi, 6, pp. 103–5.

49. Taiheiy� Sem� shi, 6, p. 99.50. Ibid., p. 101 and United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the

United States 1946, Volume VIII The Far East (Washington D.C., 1971), p. 385.Memo Left by Prince Konoye to His Second Son.

51. Political Reorientation, Volume 1, p. 91. For a list of the Committee’s memberssee Ibid. 1 Volume 2, pp. 603–4.

52. Among its members was Professor Minobe—the object of bitter right wing hostilitybefore the war.


53. For the text of the Meiji Constitution see Political Reorientation, Volume 2, pp.586– 602.

54. Williams, Political Revolution, pp. 104–105.55. Ibid., pp. 107–113.56. Ibid., p. 107.57. Ibid., p. 113.58. Political Reorientation, Volume 2, p. 625. First Government Draft of Constitution.59. Williams, Political Revolution, pp. 114–5.60. Taiheiy� Sens� shi, 6, p. 104.61. Political Reorientation, Volume 2, p. 657. General MacArthur’s Announcement

Concerning the Proposed New Constitution for Japan, 6 March 1946.62. Such a process was particularly evident in the field of women’s rights—Helen

Hopper ‘Kat� Shidzue, Socialist Party M.P., and Occupation Reforms AffectingWomen, 1945– 1948: A Case Study of the Formal vs. Informal Political Influenceof Japanese Women’ in T.W.Burkman (ed.), The Occupation of Japan: Educationand Social Reform (Norfolk, Virginia, 1982), pp. 375–95 and Susan J.Pharr,‘Bureaucratic Politics and Social Reform: The Women’s and Minors’ Bureau inOccupied Japan’ in Ibid, pp. 401–18.

63. Williams, Political Revolution, p. 121.64. Ibid, p. 121 and Political Reorientation, Volume 1, pp. 110–11.65. A striking feature of the immediate post-war years was the rise of ex-diplomats

such as Yoshida into high political positions. These men were relatively wellacquainted with Western ideas and institutions.

66. R.P.Dore, Land Reform in Japan (London, 1959), pp. 130–2.67. Ibid., pp. 136–7.68. For the importance of the Occupation’s power see Ibid, pp. 172–3.69. For a summary of ATIS’ work see Reports of General MacArthur, fn. 75, p. 260.

For an example of one American’s work in following social and political events—John K. Emmerson, The Japanese Thread, A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service (NewYork, 1978), pp. 249–280.

70. For a list of reports prepared by the National Resources Section see Robert E.Wardand Frank J.Shulman, The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–52, An AnnotatedBibliography of Western Language Materials (Chicago, 1974) (afterwards cited asWard & Shulman), pp. 588–90.

71. Ibid, pp. 118–9.72. See United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on

Japanese Morale (Washington D.C., 1947), p.153.73. Y.Tatsuki, General Trend of Japanese Opinion Following the End of the War,

Based Especially on Public Opinion Surveys (Japan Institute of Pacific Studies)(Tokyo, 1948), p. 2.

74. History Compilation Room Radio and TV Culture Research Institute, Nippon H� s�Ky� kai, 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting (Tokyo, 1977), p. 143.

75. See Reports of General MacArthur, pp. 206–8, and Political Reorientation,Volume 1, pp. 365–70 and 382–401.

76. For example the United States Education Mission of 1946. For Washington’sdetatchment from SCAP see George F.Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950 (London,1968) (afterwards cited as Kennan), pp. 369–76.


77. In January 1948 Japan’s industrial production was only 42.7% of that achieved in1932–1936—Robert A.Fearey, The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948–50(New York, 1950), pp. 123–4.

78. e.g. Ibid, pp. 142–4.79. Ibid., p. 137.80. Kennan, p. 385.81. Ibid., pp. 383–385 and United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1948, Volume VI, The Far East and Australasia (Washington D.C.,1974) (afterwards cited as FRUS.1948.VI), p. 712, Top Secret, Explanatory Notesby Mr. George F.Kennan, 25 March 1948.

82. Kennan, p. 391. 83. Ibid., pp. 384 and 390 and FRUS. 1948. VI, p. 697. Memoranda of Conversations with

General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, Top Secret, General MacArthur’sRemarks at Lunch, 1 March 1948 and pp. 712–713, Top Secret, Explanatory Notesby Mr. George F.Kennan, 25 March 1948.

84. Ibid., pp. 693–694. Top Secret, PPS 28. Recommendations with Respect to U.S.Policy Toward Japan (by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Kennan).

85. Ibid., pp. 858–859. Top Secret, NSC 13/2, Report by the National Security Councilor Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan(Washington, 7 October 1948).

86. e.g. The Overseas Consultants Inc. mission on Japanese reparations and the Shoupmission on Japanese Taxation.

87. FRUS. 1948. VI, p. 1060. Confidential Statement of the United States Government,Economic Stabilization in Japan (Washington), 10 December 1948.

88. For these fields of policy see Eleanor M.Hadley, Antitrust in Japan (Princton, 1970)and Takemae, E. Sengo R� d� Kaikaku, GHQ R� d� Seisakushi (Tokyo, 1982).

89. Ralph J.D.Braibanti, ‘The Role of Administration in the Occupation of Japan’ inAnnals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 267(January 1950), p. 154.

90. For the anti-Communist role of counter intelligence—see Reports of GeneralMacArthur. pp. 264–7.

91. Williams, Political Revolution, pp. 50–1.92. e.g. J.Livingston, J.More and F.Oldfather (eds.), The Japan Reader, Volume 2,

Postwar Japan, (Harmondsworth, 1976), pp. 176–80.93. e.g. Chalmers Johnson, Conspiracy at Matsukawa (Berkeley, California, 1972), pp.

19–20.94. Taiheiy� Sens� shi, 6, pp. 262–3.95. Ibid., p. 264.96. The author of Paternalism in the Japanese Economy, Anthropological Studies of

Oyabun-Kobun Patterns (Minneapolis, 1963). For a summary of the Section’swork see Ward & Shulman, pp. 723–724, also Ralph J.D.Braibanti, ‘The Role ofAdministration in the Occupation of Japan’ in The Annals of The AmericanAcademy of Political and Social Science, Volume 267 (January, 1950), pp. 154–5.

97. Arthur F.Raper et al, The Japanese Village in Transition (SCAP Natural ResourcesSection Report 136, Tokyo, 1950).

98. For MacArthur’s own account of his dismissal see his Reminiscences, pp. 443–52.For the Secretary of State’s memoirs see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, MyYears at the State Department (New York, 1969), pp. 521–528. Professor Roger


Dingman is at present preparing a detailed study of the Truman-MacArthurconflict.

99. See United States Department of State, Record of Proceedings of the Conferencefor the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty with Japan (Washington D.C.,1951) and U.S. Department of State, The Security Treaty between the United Statesand Japan (Washington D.C., 1952).

100.For

a contrasting pattern of American military Occupation see Bruce Cumings, TheOrigins of the Korean War, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes,1945–47 (Princton, New Jersey, 1981).


First published in N.Pronay & K.Wilson (eds.), in The Political Re-

Educational of Germany & Her Allies, London, Croom Helm, 1985,

pp. 203–217

29The Re-Education of Imperial Japan

IN 1868 Japan already possessed the most effective system of education in Asia.Each domain provided official schools for warriors to study Confucianism andthe literary arts, and temple schools taught ‘reading, writing and the abacus’ toincreasing numbers of peasants, traders and artisans. Literacy rates were higherthan in large areas of Europe and Western observers praised the high educationalstandards of the common people.1

Against this background it was natural for the founders of the modernJapanese state to give education a central place in their programme ofWesternisation.2 A nationwide system of schools would replace provincialismwith national unity, and bring knowledge of the modern world to the humblestcitizen. In 1871 the Ministry of Education was established and in the followingyear a system of compulsory primary schooling was inaugurated. Like Europeanstates the Japanese government used schools to instruct children in patriotismand loyalty and the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) urged students to‘offer themselves courageously to the State’ to ‘maintain the prosperity of…[the]… Imperial throne co-eval with Heaven and Earth’.3 However, economic andpolitical modernisation also required more sophisticated institutions of higherlearning. To produce significant numbers of officials, technicians andbusinessmen the regime created a series of educational ladders including middleand higher schools, educational and technical colleges and imperial universities.Entrance to higher education was on the basis of merit and the hard path fromfarming household to college and university brought a significant stream oftalent into Japanese public life.4

In the twentieth century economic growth and imperial expansion created neweducational needs. Compulsory education was extended, further universitieswere created, and some private colleges received university status. Japaneseeducation was highly centralised but within it were vivid differences ofatmosphere and regulation. Primary schools emphasised obedience, rote learningand conformity; but in elite high schools and universities there was relativelyfree discussion and student residences were often self-governing.5 Undergraduatesocieties discussed such varied ideas as Christianity, socialism and democracyand the 1920s witnessed the growth of student internationalism and criticism ofauthority. Such novel ideas attracted official disfavour, and contributed to the

introduction, in 1925, of military training into schools and universities.6 Sixyears later the world recession and a sense of national isolation producedwidespread chauvinism among all classes of Japanese. These changes had a rapidimpact on most aspects of education. In 1937 the Ministry of Education issuedthe ‘Basic Principles of the National Polity, (Kokutai no Hongi) which stated anew patriotic philosophy. Like earlier proclamations this emphasised obedienceand loyalty but it went beyond the nationalism of the nineteenth century. Theauthors of the new document openly attacked the rationalism and individualismof liberal Western societies and in contrast praised filial piety, the divineemperor and the creation of ‘a new Japanese culture…sublimating Westernculture with our national polity’.7 The outbreak of war with China in July 1937and increasing campaigns for ‘spiritual mobilisation’ extended this ethos into alllevels of education. In schools relatively liberal textbooks were replaced bypatriotic readers, and such subjects as history, geography and ‘ethics’ weredominated by concepts of ultra-nationalism and military glory. Military trainingand ‘war sports’ even entered elementary school education and the declaration ofwar on Britain, the United States and the Netherlands in 1941 accentuated theconcept of the garrison state.8

Although the war years saw the expansion and development of Japanesetechnical education, important subjects were surprisingly neglected. In particularthe study of English, the language of Japan’s main enemies, was largelyabandoned. Wartime education also suffered from the effects of air raids, theshortening of courses, and the mobilisation of students to work in factories.Hundreds of schools were destroyed by incendiaries and in the spring of 1945middle and higher schools were closed to permit pupils to carry out importantwar work.9

Noting the militarism, xenophobia and intolerance of Japan’s wartimeeducation, it is hardly surprising that American officials saw it as a major factorin Tokyo’s aggressive policies. Indeed as early as 1942 the United StatesGovernment began to plan the re-education of the Japanese population and thetransformation of the enemy into a peaceful democratic state. However, much ofthis discussion centred on negative rather than positive aspects of policy. Therewas widespread agreement on the need to remove government controls from themass media and to end military training in schools; but, initially, Americans wereunsure of their ability to intervene successfully in the details of Japaneseeducation. Consequently it was thought best to retain the existing Ministry ofEducation and use it as an agency for liberal improvements. Some Americandiplomats were aware of the efficiency and meritocratic virtues of Japaneseschools and universities but by the summer of 1945 increasingly critical ideashad come to dominate American thinking. In July, Gordon Bowles, of theDepartment of State, drafted a radical series of proposals which were toinfluence much later policy.10 Bowles urged the purging of ultranationalists fromthe teaching profession and positive measures to emancipate new generations ofJapanese. These included greater educational opportunities for women, the


expansion of higher education, improvements in vocational courses, and an‘internationalist’ curriculum. At the centre of these ideas was the encouragementof freedom and individualism which were to be aided by measures todecentralise the control of education. But even these novel principles constitutedno more than a framework of policy. Public pronouncements continued to spellout little more than generalities. On 26 July 1945 the allies issued the Potsdamdeclaration which demanded Japan’s unconditional surrender and declared ‘TheJapanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengtheningof democratic tendencies…freedom of speech, religion and thought…shall beestablished’.11 Although Japan did not concede surrender until 15 August thisdocument indicated the likely direction of allied policy, and unconsciouslysuggested ways in which occupation plans might be anticipated.

When Japan accepted the Potsdam declaration her situation was very differentfrom that anticipated by American pre-surrender planners. Her early surrenderhad prevented armed invasion and her administrative system remained intact.Furthermore, America was the only allied power to have made detailed plans foroccupying the Japanese mainland; she also possessed sufficient local power toexclude Britain, China or the Soviet Union from any share in administration. Asa result, Supreme Commander MacArthur enjoyed total control but would rulethrough the Japanese cabinet and civil service.

However, even before MacArthur landed in Japan, the imperial governmentsought to head off American intervention with its own tentative steps towardseducational reform. On 17 August a new cabinet including pre-war ‘liberals’ wasformed and a week later the Ministry of Education abolished all wartimeregulations, and began the removal of military personnel from schools andcolleges.12 The Minister of Education in the new cabinet was Maeda Tamon, a manof some international experience who had worked in the International LabourOffice in Geneva and the Japanese Cultural Centre in New York.13 He soonappointed other liberal figures to advise him in planning reform of theeducational system. On 15 September Maeda issued Education Policy for theConstruction of a New Japan, the first lengthy statement on the future directionof Japanese schools and universities. This emphasised the maintenance of theEmperor system, but also called for the elimination of military thought andpractice and the encouragement of peace and science.14 A further contribution tonew thinking was a personal memorandum submitted by Tanaka Kotaro, aRoman Catholic who was head of the Law Faculty of Tokyo ImperialUniversity. This also emphasised internationalism and peace and the need toencourage individualism. Tanaka also extended the discussion from ideas toorganisation and advocated the abolition of chauvinistic education colleges andthe subordination of administrators to teachers and academics.15

It was against this background that the American occupation forces begantheir own intervention in Japanese education. General MacArthur established hisheadquarters in Tokyo on 17 September but it was not until five days later that anagency was established to supervise the shaping and execution of educational

288 THE RE-EDUCATION OF IMPERIAL JAPAN

reform. This was the Civil Information and Education Section (CIE) of GeneralHeadquarters which was to be responsible for policies in such wide-ranging fieldsas religion, film, broadcasting, language, schools and universities.16 CIE’s firsthead Brigadier Kenneth Dyke who had worked in the National BroadcastingCompany (NBC) was well suited to the task of liberalising Japan’s mass media.However, the censors of Counter-Intelligence also played a significant role.

As early as 10 September MacArthur had issued the first ‘civil libertiesdirective’ which ordered the Japanese Government to impose standards of‘truthfulness’ upon the press and radio. Unfortunately this produced unexpectedresults. Some Japanese journalists continued to proclaim the Emperor’s virtueswhile others attacked the American use of atomic weapons. This produced farfrom subtle reactions. On several occasions in September MacArthur brieflysuspended newspapers to punish such transgressions, and on 21 September a tenpoint ‘Press Code’ was issued by Colonel Hoover of Counter-Intelligence.17 Thisforbade any criticism of the allies, emphasised public tranquillity and condemnedany ‘propaganda line’ in news reporting. All these events demonstrated thatpress freedom was to be conditional and limited. Censorship was to remain animportant weapon of American policy and the occupation authorities often‘suggested’ appropriate themes for press attention.18

Similarly, in the field of broadcasting, initial talk of freedom was replaced bythe ‘Radio Code’ of 22 September. In many respects this resembled theinstructions already issued to newspaper companies, and the Japan BroadcastingCorporation (NHK) was also forbidden to broadcast to overseas audiences. UnderCIE pressure radio became a major agency in advocating ‘democracy’ anddenouncing the evils of the old regime.19

CIE’s policy towards the cinema consisted of a similar mixture ofliberalisation and control. On 27 September and 10 October all existing controlsand agencies of censorship were abolished, but MacArthur soon showed aheavier hand. In mid-November CIE issued a list of 236 films which were to bebanned from cinemas and handed in for SCAP scrutiny and destruction. Not onlywas this list an arbitrary jumble of historical epics and chauvinistic propagandabut intervention soon went further. CIE began to suggest ‘appropriate themes’for new films such as women’s rights, trade unions and democracy. Newsreelsalso became acquiescent aids to ‘democratic propaganda’.20

Despite these manifold forms of re-education the transformation of theJapanese education system remained the most ambitious and important field ofCIE activity. CIE’s educational policies, like Maeda’s proposals, began withbroad demilitarisation. The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy, whichwas issued from Washington on 6 September, had stated that ‘militarism andultranationalism in doctrine and practice, including paramilitary training shall beeliminated from the educational system’21 and on 22 October this theme wasconverted into a broad directive to the Japanese Government. This memorandumentitled Administration of the Educational System of Japan called for thescreening of teachers and administrators and the dismissal of military personnel


and proponents of ‘militarism and ultranationalism’. Textbooks and courses wereto be scrutinised for unsavoury content and unsatisfactory sections eliminatedand replaced. But this document also suggested that far more drastic changeswere afoot. The Japanese Ministry was directed to establish practices ‘inharmony with international peace, representative government, the dignity of theindividual and fundamental human rights’ while, for the first time, students andteachers were to be permitted ‘free and unrestricted discussion of issuesinvolving political civil and religious liberties’. Even more dramatic was anorder to the all-powerful Ministry of Education to furnish regular reports on itscompliance with American instructions.22

Initially CIE was handicapped by acute shortages of staff but as this wasgradually remedied American action became more overt. Further instructionsfrom Washington aided this process, and on 15 December the statesupportedEmperor cult (Shinto) was condemned and government assistance forbidden.This directive had an immediate impact in Japanese schools for all references toShinto were removed from textbooks, visits to shrines were forbidden andcirculation of ‘Basic Principles of the National Polity’ was prohibited.23 By theend of the year an even more sweeping directive temporarily banned the teachingof existing courses in Japanese history, geography and ethics, all of which wereheavily coloured by extreme nationalism.

Despite this vigorous attack on the most chauvinistic aspects of Japaneseeducation MacArthur lacked a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction ofschools and universities. Furthermore the relatively conservative Ministry ofEducation still appeared a barrier to extensive reform. These two factorscombined to produce the next major steps in American policy. After muchdiscussion within CIE, on 6 January 1946, MacArthur requested the United Statesgovernment to select and organise a mission of educational specialists to tourJapan and furnish advice on democratic reform.24 Three days later the JapaneseGovernment was instructed to create a parallel committee of experts to cooperatewith the visiting mission. In response to this request a group of twenty-ninedistinguished Japanese educators and laymen was chosen and approved by CIE.This committee—the Japanese Education Committee (JEC)—included some ofthe most liberal figures in Japanese intellectual life. Its head was ProfessorNambara Shigeru, a Protestant who had opposed the military during the war andhad recently been appointed Principal of Tokyo Imperial University.25 Amongother influential members was Tanaka Kotaro who had already furnished adviceon future policy. In the ensuing weeks the JEC produced a detailed programmeof suggestions which was to prove remarkably influential. The committee’swritten ‘Opinion’ began with the hope that the Emperor’s prestige could be usedto assist new educational ideas, but most of its proposals marked a completebreak with tradition. It proposed the reduction of the Ministry’s powers and thetransfer of much administrative power to prefectural and metropolitancommittees. These would be elected by ordinary citizens and teachers and wouldcontain no more than one or two administrators. This theme of decentralisation


was affirmed in a plan to end the ministerial control of textbooks andteaching instructions. Perhaps the committee’s most important blueprintconcerned the basic structure of the school system.26 The committee found thesystem of stratified educational ladders extremely inflexible and in its placeproposed a single comprehensive system which would extend compulsoryeducation from eight to nine years. According to this a full course fromelementary education to university degree would embrace six years at juniorschool, six years at middle and high schools and four years at university. TheJEC also favoured a less standardised curriculum, less emphasis upon textbooksand more freedom for pupils to express their natural creativity. It also proposedthat teachers should have the legal right to form unions and professionalassociations.

In parallel with these Japanese discussions, the American Government hadslowly gathered together members of the United States Education Mission. Thisprocess was not only hampered by the busy schedules of numerous academics butby active political pressures to include prestigious Roman Catholic educators inthe party. The eventual Mission consisted of twenty-seven scholars,administrators and laymen under the leadership of Dr George Stoddard,Commissioner of Education for the State of New York. Accompanying the partywas Gordon Bowles, of the Department of State, who had already exerted anearly influence on occupation education policy. The Mission arrived in Japan on6 March and was to explore the themes of ‘Education for Democracy’,‘Psychology in Re-education’, ‘Administrative Re-organisation’ and ‘HigherEducation’. All these concepts were interpreted in extremely broad terms so as toembrace language reform, libraries, museums, and the social sciences as well asthe familiar theme of decentralisation.27 At the Mission’s first meeting withJapanese leaders, the new Minister of Education, Abe Yoshishige, made acourageous attempt to assert Japanese interests. He declared: ‘It must be a verydifficult thing to be a good victor…we believe that you…are not going to beneedlessly proud and arrogant as a victorious nation… I hope I am not too boldin expressing the wish that America will not avail herself of this position to imposeon us simply what is characteristic of America…this is a mistake which avictorious people is always apt to make’. In reply Stoddart stated: ‘We shall lookfor what is good in the Japanese education system…our hope is that we maystudy these tasks together formulating the joint outcomes of our work’.28 In asense these Japanese and American comments symbolised the complexrelationship which underlay the Mission’s activities. Of course, victors andvanquished could never be equals but in the Mission’s four week investigation itabsorbed ideas and schemes from CIE, the Japan Education Committee, theMinistry of Education and a wide variety of individuals.

The Mission’s Final Report ignored the centralised educational systems ofvarious allied countries and claimed that decentralisation was essential todemocracy and the elimination of militarism. This was linked to a broadphilosophical analysis which emphasised the importance of the locality, the


individual and choice, in the development of a free system. Any morality taughtin schools should not be imperial ethics but ‘equality’, ‘the give and take ofdemocratic government’ and ‘pride in individual workmanship’. If this were tobe achieved, new textbooks would be needed as well as programmes to re-educate the teaching profession. The healthy growth and development of pupilswould require improved courses in hygiene, more relevant vocational coursesand increasing attention to modern technology. Many of these ideals appealed toJapanese liberals but in one respect the Mission pursued a notion which wasanathema to virtually all Japanese.29 Under the influence of ill-informedenthusiasts in CIE, Stoddard proposed the total transformation of the Japanesewriting system. Arguing that the mixture of Chinese characters and twosyllabaries was a barrier to literacy and international communication headvocated the adoption of total romanisation. The Mission may have beenmotivated by high ideals but a minority in CIE had more sinister objectives. Suchofficers as Robert K.Hall believed that such a move would isolate all futuregenerations of Japanese from traditional culture and thereby prevent the revivalof militaristic sentiments.30 Perhaps of more value was the suggestion that manynuances of spoken Japanese should be replaced by a simpler ‘democratic’ style;and this may have contributed to the later streamlining of much everydaylanguage.

Of all the Mission’s proposals the most important and influential was its planfor the reshaping of the school system. Despite Japan’s enormous financialproblems it followed the JEC’s proposal for the extension of compulsoryschooling to nine years. It also adopted the related Japanese idea of a singlecomprehensive educational ladder for all children. Under this so-called ‘6.3.3.system’ all would attend co-educational primary schools for six years and middleschools for three years. For those who wished to continue their education, three-year high school courses would be available—as the necessary preliminary tohigher education.31 Parallel with this single ladder school system the Missionproposed the simplification and expansion of higher education. Favouring theopening of educational opportunities and the destruction of privilege, the Reportadvocated the replacement of varieties of higher schools, colleges anduniversities with a standardised system of four-year universities.

In supporting a policy of decentralisation the Mission reflected American andliberal Japanese ideas. It proposed the control of education by electedcommittees and sought to link the general public with educational agencies. Thisideal was further expressed in imaginative plans for the promotion of adulteducation and the development of libraries and community halls.32

General MacArthur received this humane and idealistic report favourably butimplementation was to be a complex and selective process. Not only was itimpossible to impose complicated reforms on an intricate alien society but thesurvival of any changes would depend upon generating substantial publicsupport. As a result, MacArthur sought to continue the element of cooperation ineducational reform which had already produced significant results. In practical


terms this meant the eventual replacement of the Japan Education Committee bythe Japan Education Reform Council which was created at CIE’s behest.33 Likeits predecessor this was a generally liberal body which might aid the occupyingarmy in its dealings with the conservative Ministry of Education. Although the USEducation Mission Report was now to form the basis of most educationalchanges its ideas were only transformed into detailed legislation after discussionby the new body. At first the officials of the Ministry tried to cling to a largemeasure of autonomy but by 3 September 1946 American pressure had given theJERC an autonomous and powerful position in the refinement of reform.Coordination between the Council, the Ministry and the CIE was provided by apermanent steering committee which enabled MacArthur to sway policy withoutovertly intruding in the Council’s activities.34 In theory the Council was to beresponsible for general policy while the Ministry was confined to matters ofadministrative detail.

In one important respect the new Council differed from the opinions of itsliberal predecessor. Members of the JEC had believed that the basis of the newdemocratic education should be enshrined in a new Imperial Rescript. Thiswould replace the statement of conservative principles which had been issued in1890.35 However, American disapproval, and democratic philosophy propaganda,had destroyed this idea and in its place there had developed the notion of aFundamental Education Law which would be enacted by Japan’s newdemocratically elected parliament. Finally, in March 1947, the Fundamental Lawof Education was enacted. This echoed both Japanese and American ideals of theconstruction of a peaceful state and society and emphasised equality ofopportunity, coeducation, ‘political education for intelligent citizenship’ and thesecular character of the public education system.36

To any sceptical observer the gulf between Japan’s physical poverty andexpensive reform proposals must have appeared unbridgeable. But Americanpressure prevented conservatives utilising economic conditions to justifyresistance to reform.37 The skilful formula which prevented obstruction was anagreement ‘that reforms would be accepted in principle’. Thus theirimplementation was taken out of the realm of immediate difficulties. In thissetting the JERC not only adopted the 6.3.3. system but assisted in the draftingof the 1947 School Education Law. This second legal foundation of postwareducation covered all levels of teaching from kindergarten to university andprovided a much needed strengthening to provisions for blind and handicappedpeople.38

The enactment of legislation to implement the philosophy of decentralisationwas to prove a far more difficult problem. Not only did this concept threaten thefundamental basis of ministerial authority but history provided an unfortunateprecedent. In 1879 Japan had briefly experimented with local autonomy andconfusion had resulted. Furthermore, there were legitimate fears that popularlyelected committees might lack the professional expertise which characterisedJapanese education administration.39 In fact even liberals who might agree on the


general principle of decentralisation could differ drastically about ways andmeans. Tanaka Kotaro believed that Japan’s small area made American-styledevolution inappropriate. He favoured regional rather than local decentralisation,and fearing the chauvinism which the Japanese population had shown in therecent past, believed that membership of elected committees should be confinedto professional educators. Morito Tatsuo, Minister of Education in 1948,similarly believed that implementation of the principle should be slow and thatJapanese laymen would not give their services to committees without financialreward. All these arguments certainly created delay but ultimately they were ofno avail. On this issue the unofficial entente between occupationaires and liberalJapanese was replaced by a far harsher relationship. The Japanese were virtuallycompelled to enact the 1948 School Board Law with its system of popularlyelected local committees.40

Perhaps the most fundamental challenge to Japanese ways and customs lay inthe carrying out of decentralisation. Few Japanese were happy at the radicalismof the School Board law, and by 1949, the year of the first elections, even someAmericans were apprehensive lest Communists or traditional political bosseswould come to dominate local committees.41 Lack of local financial resourcesand suitable personnel remained a significant obstacle to local control; and it ishardly surprising that this major education reform was reversed following therestoration of Japanese independence.

Although reports and legislation constituted the main landmarks of re-education policy they were never more than a small element in the activities of CIEand Japanese officials and pedagogues. From the outset of the occupation bothJapanese and Americans faced physical as well as policy difficulties inrehabilitating Japanese education, and both sought to return education tonormality as soon as possible. To this end textbooks were rewritten, publishedand distributed with remarkable speed.

This activity was not confined to such politically sensitive fields as history andgeography but covered virtually every subject in the curriculum. The creation ofsuch an extensive range of materials was obviously beyond the abilities of CIEstaff so a complex system of review was adopted whereby each draft wastranslated into English while American suggestions and corrections were,conversely, translated into Japanese. Clearly occupation officials retained a vetoin this process but some textbook authors claim that the volume of Americanintervention was small, and instructions often concentrated upon clarity of styleand presentation.42 However, CIE also had an important political role in resistingthe demands of left-wing teachers for the insertion of a large quantity of Marxistmaterial in new teaching materials. At its peak this textbook programmeinvolved the simultaneous preparation of more than eighty works and thoughmany books merely sought to provide up-to-date information, new works onhistory were dramatically original. These presented scholarship rather than mythand for the first time devoted a significant space to the history of the commonpeople.


In one major field, language reform, occupation activity was half-hearted andambiguous. For MacArthur this issue was always too intimately linked withJapanese culture to warrant crude intervention. The Japanese government wasencouraged to introduce the teaching of the roman alphabet into all schools butthis was always in addition to, rather than instead of, the existing scripts. Yet inraising the language issue the occupation force may have given encouragementto Japanese who sought a simplified script, and who reduced the number ofcharacters in everyday use.43 Even so, this sector of policy was not without itsideological absurdities. Some members of CIE saw calligraphy as inextricablylinked to the evils of the old regime and clumsily sought to reduce its place in theschool curriculum.44

Another field in which America ultimately left much responsibility tothe Japanese was the much vaunted screening of teachers and educationaladministrators. The scale of the task was too great for American manpower andit was carried out by committees of Japanese. As all teachers had effectivelysupported the war effort a drastic purge was educationally impossible. What wasultimately a very selective process removed a mere 3151 staff from Japaneseschools.45

Parallel to the varied attacks on old ideas went equally determined programmesto strengthen new thinking. To this end CIE carried a large-scale programme ofteacher education and novel courses for educational administrators. These effortsbegan in the autumn of 1945 with radio broadcasts on democratic education; andexpanded into large-scale film programmes in public halls and schools. In itsmost typical form the re-education of teachers took the form of conferences andworkshops throughout Japan, and as the war was slowly forgotten selectedJapanese teachers were allowed to visit the United States for study tours andmore detailed training.46

One of the most lasting elements in occupation reform was the revisedcurriculum. This not only removed archaic and chauvinistic materials, butintroduced new subjects and a new coherence to school courses. Social studieseffectively replaced history and geography, and increasing efforts were made tolink the subject matter of various subjects to create what was termed a ‘corecurriculum’.47 The new scheme gave increasing importance to science, foreignlanguages, and international studies—all characteristics which have remainedunchanged throughout the postwar period.

Although the transformation of Japan’s school system was always CIE’smajor concern, higher education gradually assumed an increasing importance inoccupation policy. MacArthur’s advisers believed that the expansion of highereducation would have three important virtues. It would aid the liberation oftalent, be economically valuable and end the notorious ‘examination hell’ ofuniversity entrance which had marred the elite prewar system.48 Despite thecriticisms of Japanese who lamented the alleged loss of academic standards,American plans were successfully carried out. The notion that Japaneseprefectures, like American states, should each have a public university was often


ridiculed; and the resulting institutions were condemned as ‘station lunch-boxuniversities’ but educational opportunities were drastically expanded. Hundredsof colleges and higher schools were transformed into new style universities tocreate a system which has come to resemble the open, varied American patternof higher education, rather than the more traditional systems of Western Europe.Despite these radical changes of structure attitudes changed much more slowly.Most Japanese continued to regard the erstwhile imperial universities as the mostdesirable and economical of academic destinations so that competition to enterthem increased rather than slackened. Thus their elite character survived, andexamination hell remained an essential preliminary to entering Japan’s mostfamous universities.

Inherent in most educational reform were political objectives; not onlydemocratisation but the maintenance of American influence over Japan. This notonly implied the exclusion of non-American models from educational changebut the limiting of Communist influence in the educational system.49 Fear ofCommunism was unimportant in 1945 when militarism seemed the greatestenemy; but by 1949 a divided Korea and the advance of Chinese Communismhad created new alarms. Furthermore the left-wing attitudes of the JapanTeachers Union added to American fears.50 Occupation officials exhortedJapanese teachers to exclude Communists from their ranks and Walter Eels ofCIE toured universities to condemn the presence of Communists in a liberaleducation system. Yet for many Japanese political freedom had become animportant virtue and academics were alarmed by talk which recalled theintolerance of pre-war days. Many scholars still saw militarism and centralcontrol of education as their worst enemies, while Communists retained someprestige from their wartime resistance to authority. In Japan it was difficult toreproduce the simplicities of American anti-Communist analysis.

Yet despite political and educational frictions American educational reformswere the product of a surprising measure of cooperation between occupiers andoccupied. Plagued by language difficulties, lack of expert personnel andimmense material problems Americans were often dependent upon Japanesecooperation. In particular, liberal, internationalist Japanese who shared importantAmerican ideals played a significant role in transforming broad concepts intolegislative realities. Without a residue of Japanese liberalism reform would havehad far less prospect of popularity or success.

Following the 1951 peace treaty the Japanese Ministry of Education defeateddecentralisation and regained much of its former control over textbooks and thecurriculum,51 but Japanese education had been fundamentally changed. Todaythe Japanese system has little in common with the narrow meritocracy of pre-wardays and the occupation’s creation of mass higher education has provedirreversible. Large scale universities and colleges combined with American-stylevocational studies have contributed much to Japanese prosperity, and made areturn to crude authoritarianism impossible. Now, as in 1868, Japan possesses


the most efficient education system in Asia. Her society has become one of themost open in the contemporary world.

NOTES

1. For the best account of Japanese education in the era before modernization seeR.P.Dore, Education in Tokugawa Japan (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,1965). E.g. ‘Mr. Mactariane, quoting from M.Meylan, a more recent authority,states that children of both sexes and of all ranks are invariably sent to rudimentaryschools, where they learn to read and write, and are initiated into some knowledgeof the history of their own country. To this extent, at least, it is considered that themeanest peasant should be educated…it will appear that a more widely diffusedsystem of national education exists in Japan than in our own country, and that inthat respect at all events, if no other, they are decidedly in advance of us.’ LaurenceOliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin’s Mission to China and Japan(Blackwood, Edinburgh and London, 1859), Vol. 2, p. 117.

2. ‘With the opening of Japan to Western thought, the literature of Confucianismwas temporarily put aside to enable the people to master a great body ofinformation in a brief time. Education which had been a by-product of moraltraining became one of the major purposes of life. It was no longer a private road toaccomplishment for a few, but an essential preparation for youth to take their partin building a modern state. There was little time for aesthetics. There was strongpressure to acquire knowledge, so that Japan could grow strong and face otherpowers on equal terms.’ R.S.Anderson, Japan: Three Epochs of Modern Education(U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C., 1959), p. 3.

3. For the full text of the Rescript see General Headquarters, Supreme Commanderfor the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section, EducationDivision, Education in Japan (Tokyo, 15 Feb. 1946), p. 111—reprinted inM.Kodama (ed.) Educational Documents of Occupied Japan, Vol. 1, CIE (15 Feb.1946) Education in Japan (Meisei University Press, Tokyo, 1983)—afterwardscited as Education in Japan.

4. ‘Replacing family background, performance in impartial entrance examinationsdetermined matriculation beyond the universal and compulsory primary school.The promise of social mobility through the national educational system is oftencited as an effective measure by which the Meiji leadership liquidated arbitraryclass privileges… To simplify drastically: rational standards of performanceregulated admissions to each ascending level of the school system, provided thatthe applicant was male and came from a family that could cover the nominal costsof tuition and board.’ Donald Roden, Schooldays in Imperial Japan. A Study in theCulture of a Student Elite. (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980), pp. 4–5.

5. For a vivid picture of elite student life in the early twentieth century, see Henry D.Smith, Japan’s First Student Radicals. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,Mass., 1972).

6. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, CivilInformation and Education Section, Education Division. Education in the NewJapan, Vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1948), p. 31.


7. R.Tsunoda, W.T.de Bary, and D.Keene (eds.), Sources of Japanese Tradition(Columbia University Press, New York, 1958), p. 795.

8. E.g. Thomas R.H.Havens, Valley of Darkness, The Japanese People and WorldWar Two (W.W.Norton, New York, 1978), pp. 25–31, 138–142.

9. Mombusho (Ministry of Education) Gakusei Hyakunen-shi (Hundred Year Historyof the Education System) (Tokyo, 1972), vol. 2, p. 138.

10. See Marlene Mayo, ‘Psychological Disarmament: American Wartime Planning forthe Education and Re-education of Defeated Japan, 1943–1945’ in ThomasW.Burkman (ed.), The Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform(MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia, 1982), pp. 61–67.

11. For the text of the Potsdam declaration see Supreme Commander for the AlliedPowers, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 toSeptember 1948, Vol. 2 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,1948), p. 413.

12. ‘The Ministry of Education… Issued Order No. 20 on 25 Aug. 1945 abrogating allthose orders designed to promote militarism and ultra-nationalism in the schoolswhich came under the Ministry of Education.’ Education in Japan, p. 63. See alsoJoseph P. Trainer, Educational Reform in Occupied Japan, Trainor’s Memoir(Meisei University Press, Tokyo, 1983), p. 20. (afterwards cited as Trainor)

13. Oe Shinobu, Sengo Kaikaku (Postwar Reform), Nihon no Rekishi (History ofJapan), Vol. 31 (Shogakkan, Tokyo, 1976), p. 174. Maeda (1884–1962) served asMinister from 18 Aug. 1945 to 13 Jan. 1946. Mombusho (Ministry of Education)(ed.) Gakusei Hyakunen-shi (Hundred Year History of the Education System)(Tokyo, 1972), Vol. 2, p. 365.

14. Oe Shinobu, Sengo Kaikaku, p. 174. For the full text of this document see GakuseiHyakunen-shi, Vol. 2, pp. 52–53.

15. Sengo Kaikaku, pp. 174–175. ‘Tanaka was a distinguished professor of TokyoImperial University’s Law School, a Catholic, and an advocate of universal valuesin Japan’s educational system’—Harry J.Wray, ‘Decentralization of Education inthe Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952’ in T.W.Burkman (ed.), TheOccupation of Japan Educational and Social Reform, p. 150. (afterwards cited asWray)

16. The best brief account of CIE’s organisation and activities is Takemae Eiji, GHQ(Iwanami Shinsho, Tokyo, 1983), pp. 115–128 and pp. 183–197.

17. Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, Education and Politics in OccupiedJapan, 1945–1952 (Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1982), pp. 86–91, afterwards citedas Nishi.

18. Ibid. pp. 88–89.19. Ibid. pp. 89–90. For the most detailed study of radio reform see D.G.Smitham ‘The

Reform of Japanese Broadcasting 1945–1952’ in Historical Journal of Film, Radioand Television (forthcoming).

20. For the history of cinema policy see Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Theatre andMotion Pictures (Tokyo, 1950) (available on microfilm from the NationalArchives, Washington, D.C.).

21. See Political Re-orientation of Japan, Vol. 2, p. 424.22. For the text of this document see Education in the New Japan, Vol. 2, pp. 26–28.


23. William P.Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan and Japanese Religions(E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1972), pp. 295–299.

24. Education in the New Japan Vol. 2, pp. 36–39.25. For the background to the Education Mission see Edward Beauchamp, ‘Education

and Social Reform in Japan: The First United States Education Mission to Japan,1946’ in T.W.Burkman (ed.) The Occupation of Japan: Educational and SocialReform pp. 175–192 (afterwards cited as Beauchamp). The instruction to theJapanese Government is reproduced in Education in the New Japan Vol. 2, pp. 40–42. See also Sengo Kaikaku, pp. 177–80.

26. Ibid. pp. 179–18027. See Beauchamp and Nishi pp. 188–190. For a valuable review of Nishi’s work see

Harry Wray’s review in Monumenta Nipponica Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (1983) pp.102–104. For the full text of the Mission’s report Report of the United StatesEducation Mission to Japan see M.Kodama (ed.) Educational Documents ofOccupied Japan (Vol. 1) Education in Japan (Meisei University Press, Tokyo,1983).

28. Trainor pp. 77–79.29. See 27.30. The Report’s treatment of language reform occupies pp. 20–23 of the document.

See also Nishi pp. 199–206.31. For the Mission’s ideas and its links with Japanese suggestions see Sengo Kaikaku

pp. 179–181.32. Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan pp. 44–47.33. For a useful discussion of the JERC see Trainor pp. 101–119 and Sengo Kaikaku

pp. 181–182.34. Trainor p. 107.35. Ibid. pp. 108–109.36. For the text of the law see Education in the New Japan Vol. 2, pp. 109–111.37. Trainor p. 111.38. For the text of the School Education Law see Education in the New Japan Vol. 2,

pp. 112–130.39. For a sympathetic view of Japanese resistance to this policy see Wray pp. 144–192.40. Nishi pp. 210–211.41. Ibid. p. 212.42. Takemae Eiji, GHQ pp. 184–185. For discussions of textbook revision see Trainor

pp. 120–138, and Nishi pp. 176–180.43. GHQ pp. 185–186.44. Nishi pp. 206–208.45. Nishi p. 175. Though over 110,000 teachers who were likely to be purged retired

voluntarily. 46. Trainor pp. 203–220. Education in the New Japan Vol. 1, 281–299.47. Takemae Eiji and Kinbara Samon, Showashi (Showa History) (Yuhikaku, Tokyo,

1982) pp. 258–259.48. For higher education see Trainor pp. 221–241 and Education in the New Japan

Vol. 1, pp. 253–281. For the problem of entrance examinations—Peter Frost‘Examination Hell, the Reform of Entrance Examinations in Occupied Japan’ inT.W.Burkman (ed.) The Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform, pp.211–218.


49. Trainor pp. 327–361.50. Benjamin Duke, Japan’s Militant Teachers (University of Hawaii Press, Hawaii,

1972).51. The content of history textbooks continues to be a significant political issue. In

1982 the governments of both Korean regimes and the People’s Republic of Chinamade public complaints regarding the toning down of accounts of wartime atrocitiesin Japanese textbooks.


First published in Zinbun, Kyoto University, 1985

30From Benevolence to Enmity: Britain and

Japanese Communism, 1945–50

RECENT SCHOLARSHIP has vividly revealed Britain’s subordinate role in thehistory of occupied Japan.1 The British Commonwealth Occupation Forcegarrisoned areas of Western Honshu and Shikoku.2 London voiced support forAmerican defenders of the Imperial Institution.3 British judges co-operatedeffectively in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East but weaknessand unreadiness were major obstacles to any significant British influence onAmerica’s programme of reform.4 Yet America’s power and authority scarcelyjustify the present scholarly neglect of many important aspects of British policytowards defeated Japan. British diplomats wrote incisive reports on the state ofJapanese society. Their notes and despatches illuminate American and Japanese,as well as British, attitudes, while London’s diplomacy formed part of a broadstrategy towards the Asian continent which was of major internationalsignificance.

The aim of this paper is to analyse a so-far neglected aspect of Britain’s policytowards post-war Japan, namely her changing perception of the JapaneseCommunist movement. Such perceptions are not only important as an illustrationof Britain’s overall view of Japanese politics, but they also illustrate her strategicvision of Japan’s role in the deteriorating cold war situation.

During the final months of the Pacific War officials in the British ForeignOffice were understandably ignorant of Japanese opposition forces. Indeed theironly discussion of Japanese Communism was apparently stimulated by thepublication of a single article in the left-wing magazine Tribune. This articleentitled ‘The Other Japan’ had originally appeared in the American magazineNation and included Japanese Communists in Yenan in its list of potentialdemocratic forces.5 Foreign Office analysts were hardly warm towards JapaneseCommunists and their leader Okano Susumu (Nozaka Sanz� ) but they correctlyprophesied the influence which outside powers were likely to have on the futureof Japanese Communism. The Oxford historian, G.F.Hudson, then employed inthe Foreign Office, commented, ‘Political leadership in Japan after the warcannot be a merely internal problem, there are bound to be pro-American andpro-Soviet factions with the ex-militarists supporting whichever line seems topromise dividends.’ Five days later Arthur de la Mare observed, ‘If Japan isoccupied for say fifteen years after defeat, and if the occupying forces are mainly

or wholly American, it seems unlikely that Okano will have a chance to get backto Japan at all.6 Both of these verdicts contained elements of error andapproximation but they rightly saw America as an obstacle to Communistsuccess in Japan, and Soviet policy as a significant element in the developmentof the Japan Communist Party.

Following the wartime drought of information regarding the Japanese left,Japan’s surrender brought new opportunities for investigation and research. Inthe early autumn of 1945, British diplomats and military personnel entered Japanand soon began to study elements which might contribute to post-war politicalreconstruction. Among such groups were recently liberated Communists,7 andinterviews with leaders such as Shiga Yoshio contributed to a surprisinglyfavourable impression of the Japan Communist Party. On 10 November twomembers of the Intelligence Staff of the British Naval Liaison Officerinterviewed Shiga at Communist Party Headquarters.8 Both interviewers wereimpressed by the ill-treatment which Shiga had undergone in eighteen years ofimprisonment and concluded,

‘At the present stage the Communist Party certainly has a more genuineappearance than either the Social Democratic Party or the Liberal Partywhich are composed mainly of elderly Diet Members whose chiefdistinction is that they have managed to keep out of trouble. TheCommunists, on the other hand, have suffered for their convictions andcannot be accused of changing with the times… The moderation of Mr.Shiga’s programme shows that anything in the nature of a Communistrevolution is unlikely.’9

Furthermore the Communist Party’s initial opposition to the Emperor systemwas also viewed in a favourable light. In a weekly report submitted

from Japan in December, D.MacDermot of the Foreign Office declared,

‘Of the two score or more parties already in the lists for the next electionsthe Communists alone strike a note of sincerity. They are Communists inname only, with a programme of very mild and gradual socialism, but theyalone of the parties have come out firmly against the Imperial Institutionwhich, right or wrong, is a sign of genuine emancipation.’10

Such sympathetic views of Japanese Communism were not confined to Britishobservers who had direct experience of Japan and its recently liberated politicalprisoners. On 11 January 1946 the young Labour Member of Parliament JamesCallaghan wrote to The Times to attack the conservative opinions of ex-ambassador Craigie. Callaghan concluded ‘…if a Communist movement inJapan followed the example of the other Far Eastern Communist movement inYenan, and concerned itself with agrarian reform, fair taxation and instituted therule of law, there could hardly be a more desirable turning for Japanese politics

302 FROM BENEVOLENCE TO ENMITY: BRITAIN AND JAPANESE COMMUNISM, 1945–50

to take.’11 The Foreign Office may not have been influenced by Callaghan’s letter.Its officials simply filed a copy without comment. But they could hardly ignoresomewhat similar views expressed by General Gairdner the Prime Minister’spersonal representative in Tokyo. In a telegram in early 1946 Gairdner stated ‘Iconsider that present so-called Communist Party in Japan is communist in namealone and is not under Russian control though it probably receives some Russiansupport.’12

Despite their benevolent views of Japanese Communism British officials werecoldly realistic in their estimates of the Communist Party’s electoral prospects.Most British diplomats saw conservatism and monarchism as far more potentforces in Japanese life, while they also noted the importance of money in thewinning of Japanese elections. As MacDermot wrote of the Communists ‘theyhave no funds—Japanese political parties are run by the rich industrialists towhom the Communist programme does not appeal. They are therefore unlikelyto gain much success in the elections.’13 This view was amply justified by theCommunist Party’s poor showing in the April 1946 general election. Of 142Communist candidates only five were elected.14

So far British opinions had been largely influenced by aspects of the SecondWorld War, namely the excesses of Japanese militarism and the role of Communistgroups in resistance activity. However, postwar tensions soon stimulated aserious reappraisal of Japanese Communist activity. In particular the BritishEmbassy in Moscow was alarmed rather than reassured by Gairdner’s benignopinions. On 28 April 1946 Frank Roberts, a senior analyst in the embassytelegraphed a secret coded message to the British Liaison Mission in Tokyo. Thiswarned

‘Object of Communist parties everywhere is to gain power; and where thisis not possible by force parliamentary methods and programmes areadopted for tactical reasons. But end remains the same. Nor should it besupposed that any Communist party is not amenable to Soviet influence, orwould fail to follow a tactical line useful to the Soviet Union at any givenmoment (e.g. criticism of Britain). Support given to Japanese CommunistParty in Soviet press is clear indication of connexion. I would thereforecommend careful watching of both Japanese Communist Party and Sovietrepresentation in Japan. However opportunist their tactics, the results willnot in the long run work out to our advantage and we shall not gain bystrengthening their position.’15

In other words the Moscow embassy saw the Japanese Communist Party as a linkin worldwide Soviet strategy. Its importance rested on its supposed links with theSoviet Union. The problem was did such links really exist?

Roberts’ views on the matter were already clearcut and he reiterated his standin a long survey of Soviet activity in the Far East which he compiled on 30 August


1946. This extensive document emphasised the vast scope of Soviet ambitionsand declared

‘In view of past history and of the Japanese military record, Japan itselfmust still be the main Soviet preoccupation in the Far East… They havetried to gain a footing in Japanese politics by support of theCommunist Party, which disposes of considerable funds (certainly not allcontributed by Japanese) and is attempting, under the guidance of skilledleaders trained by Moscow, to extend its control through the usualDemocratic Fronts, Labour Unions, and other Soviet pattern pressuregroups…the formation of a moderate Government may lead to the settingup of a Left opposition coalition, in which the Communists would, aselsewhere, exercise an influence out of all proportion to their numbers.’16

These alarming stories were passed to Tokyo and led the head of the BritishLiaison Mission, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, to investigate possible clandestine linksbetween Moscow and Japanese Communists. Unfortunately Gascoigne had onlya handful of intelligence officers among his staff so he had little choice but todepend on American sources. Despite this Gascoigne had a particularly closerelationship with General MacArthur and was able to ask what Americanintelligence officers had discovered about this delicate matter. The results ofthese private enquiries were emphatically negative. On 14 October Gascoignesent a secret despatch to the Foreign Secretary which declared

‘Mr. Roberts refers to Moscow’s support of the Japanese Communist Party.While I personally have no doubt that the Russians are acting in this way Ipossess no evidence to show that this is so. The Supreme Commander forthe Allied Powers, with whom I have discussed this question on more thanone occasion, has repeatedly informed me that despite the efforts whichhave been and are being made by the American Intelligence Corps, nothingconcrete has yet emerged. Nor is there anything to show that the JapaneseCommunist Party is controlled or advised by the Russians either directlyfrom Moscow or through the large Russian Mission which is stationed inTokyo.’17

Despite this dearth of solid information Roberts’ despatch had contributed to asignificant change of attitude. From this time on Soviet strategy towards Japanbecame a major British concern—in both Tokyo and London. More specificallythere were serious fears as to what might happen when the allied occupation cameto an end. From comments recorded in London it is clear that Esler Dening andothers were uncertain of the intentions of the American government—which wasa central factor in the situation. As in all Japanese matters the opinion of SirGeorge Sansom was highly valued. His view was far from optimistic, believingthat ‘the Japanese have no firm tradition which is in essence hostile to


Communism.’ Esler Dening agreed. But both these Far Eastern specialists sawAmerica’s role as the main issue. Sansom and Dening held that ‘if the Japanesefeel confident that they can count on continued American protection againstRussia and upon a fairly liberal treatment in economic matters, then they arelikely to pursue something like a democratic course.’18 But if this were not sothere could be an internal struggle in which ex-officers of the Imperial Armymight sympathise with the pro-Soviet faction.

In December 1946 Gascoigne replied to Dening’s enquiries about Americanintentions and Russian activity. He described Russian ambitions but afterconsultations with MacArthur he was convinced that ‘The Americans areworking towards acquiring a permanent hegemony over this country. They aredetermined that it shall not fall under Russian domination.’19 General Gairdner,who had a long standing relationship with the Supreme Commander was evenfranker observing

‘General MacArthur’s views on the Occupation policy in Japan should beconsidered in the light of his opinion on world affairs. He himself has nodoubt about the Russian menace to Anglo-American democracies…. In theFar East therefore MacArthur argues that Japan should be made (for wantof a better term) into a ‘puppet’ state favourable to America. To do this itwill be necessary to teach the Japanese people Western democracy.’

MacArthur was prepared to ‘withdraw the occupation troops in the course of thenext year or so’ if ‘definite guarantees’ could be arranged through a peace treatyor the U.N. Without these he believed that ‘American occupation would merelybe substituted by Russian occupation.’ It was in this light that MacArthur hadsaid that the American occupation would last ‘until hell freezes.’20 Following theSupreme Commander’s reassuring statements British fears were temporarilyeased; but events soon revived concern regarding Communist activity. In January1947 a major crisis developed in labour relations in the Japanese public sector. Atthis time a combination of inflation, union campaigns and government rigidityproduced the threat of a general strike. On 31 January MacArthur successfullybanned the projected strike, but the crisis stimulated Gascoigne to re-examine therole of Communist activity. Now the head of the British Liaison Mission showedno benevolence towards Japanese Communism and saw it as an essentiallyhostile force. Gascoigne summarised the issues as follows:

‘While the origins of the proposed strike were…economic, it developed astrong political complexion. During the negotiations…a considerablenumber of unions, which represented labour not employed by theGovernment, announced their intention of coming out on strike insympathy with the Government workers…there can be no doubt that it wasthe Communist Party who were the principal agitators…. I learn…thatTokuda at the Communist Party Executive meeting on 27th January, told


his audience that they were to support the general strike to the full. Theconfusion that would ensue would give the Communist Party itsopportunity to achieve the first step in its programme for political power inJapan.’

Thus Gascoigne heartily approved of MacArthur’s successful action believingthat such a strike ‘would undoubtedly have caused extreme hardship to thepopulation, and if prolonged would have had disastrous consequences on theprecarious national economy…and if it had lasted long might have imperilled lawand order.’21 At this point there was considerable identity of view betweenMacArthur and Gascoigne. Both saw danger emanating from Communist activityin trade unions—though direct links with the Soviet Union remained uproven.The general election of April 1947 certainly indicated no growth in the JCP’soverall popularity. Its candidates received a mere 3.6 per cent of the popular voteand only four Communist members were elected to the Lower House.22

Although 1947 saw no further threats to overall stability Gascoigne continuedto press MacArthur for information regarding Communist activity and its linkswith the Soviet Mission in Tokyo. In January 1948 he reported the ‘meagreresults’ of his prolonged enquiries.23 These contained a mixture of positive andnegative elements. MacArthur’s resolute action against the general strike hadbeen a ‘definite set-back to Communism.’ There was a major split in the partybetween Tokuda and the more flexible Nozaka, and the ill-treatment which vastnumbers of Japanese prisoners of war had suffered in the Soviet Union hadhardly helped the Communist cause. Furthermore SCAP officials considered that‘the Soviets have had practically no success in their indoctrination of ex-regularofficers, and men.’ Even prisoners who had received ‘especially favourabletreatment’ were no more sympathetic to the Soviet viewpoint. Nevertheless theCommunist Party remained ‘well disciplined’ and was ‘working actively, ifquietly, to prepare for the day when it may be more propitious for it to raise itshead and come once more into the open.’ Despite the Party’s shortage of fundsmoney was apparently reaching it ‘from North Korea through KoreanCommunist channels’ while definite links now appeared to exist between theSoviet Mission and the JCP. ‘Funds were being passed by the Russians to theJapanese Communists’ and although Soviet officials in Tokyo had ‘exercisedgreat skill in concealing their contacts with the Japanese leftists’ it was ‘acertainty’ that they were ‘furnishing them with guidance, if they are not actually“controlling” them.’ Understandably Gascoigne was worried that recentCommunist successes in North Korea and China might influence the situation inJapan. More specifically he was alarmed by the views of some Americanofficials who believed that Conununism could be excluded from Japan simply byretaining control of Okinawa. Gascoigne remained deeply worried thatCommunism might benefit if American forces were withdrawn from theJapanese mainland.24


In February 1948 Gascoigne updated his assessment of the Communistmovement. Now there seemed many grounds for optimism. Wherever onelooked Communism appeared to be making very little progress. Communistinfluence in the trade union movement had not recovered following the abortivegeneral strike. The Japanese Federation of Labour Unions had recently begun ananti-Communist campaign, while the Minister of Labour in the Katayamagovernment, Yonekubo Mitsusuke was said to be doing all he could ‘to draw upplans to offset communist influence in national administration.’ Outside the tradeunion movement Communism appeared to be equally unsuccessful. Theinfluence of the Communist Party on political opinion was ‘negligible’ and itsinfluence on the broad alignment of political parties appeared insignificant.Furthermore, there was no evidence that the Japanese Communist Party wasfollowing a ‘Cominform’ line in accord with Soviet wishes. The Party’s mainobjective remained distinctively local—to match its tactics to Japan’s ownspecial situation. A particular cause for satisfaction was General MacArthur’simplicit acceptance of the central British belief that the best defence againstCommunism was a reasonable standard of living. In Gascoigne’s words:

‘MacArthur is convinced that the only way to keep this country out of thecommunist maw is to make the people contented, and for the moment theonly method of doing this is to arrange for substantial imports of foodstuffsand raw materials, as the Japanese economy is very far from havingregained its feet.’25

Gascoigne’s optimism was echoed by opinion in London. On 16 March 1948F.S.Tomlinson commented ‘Communism in Japan remains a fairly negligibleforce. Japanese Communists and their Russian mentors must be aware thatCommunism has no natural attraction for the Japanese as a whole, and thatbarring an actual Soviet invasion their brightest hope lies in economic chaos.’MacDermot was even more sanguine believing that in any situation ‘Moscowwould find it very difficult to subordinate the extremely nationalistic Japanese toher purposes.’26

Despite these shared views in Tokyo and London divergent opinions weresoon to develop among British officials and between British and Americanrepresentatives in Japan. This discord was the product of America’s newpriorities; Japanese economic recovery and severe policies towards organisedlabour. By March strikes were occurring in many branches of governmentservice and the British Embassy in Moscow interpreted these outbreaks as theresult of Communist activity ‘possibly with Soviet backing.’27 In contrastGascoigne and his staff believed that the reasons for strikes were ‘fundamentallyeconomic.’ He continued ‘Successive Governments for the past year have notimplemented their promises to their workers. Extra allowances which wereapproved have not been paid in full and in some cases the basic wages are amonth in arrears.’28 In London, E.Bolland was also sceptical regarding


interpretations based on stories in the Soviet press. He believed that Russianarticles were not a reflection of real conditions ‘but of what the Soviet would likethem to be.’29 As late as 20 April 1948 General MacArthur still viewed theactivities of the Russian Mission in Tokyo as less serious than in earlier months,but his policies towards labour soon hardened.30 On 22 July the SupremeCommander wrote to Prime Minister Ashida demanding restrictions on the rightsof public sector unions. In particular he called for a ban on strikes by workers ingovernment service. This produced a major confrontation between Gascoigneand MacArthur as the Foreign Secretary, Bevin urged British resistance to suchmeasures. Furthermore an anti-Communist obsession now appeared to colourmuch SCAP policy—though this obsession seemed to have little factual basis.British scepticism towards this new American policy was forcibly expressed byIvor Pink in a long despatch from Tokyo on 26 August. This attacked thevolatility of much American behaviour and the reliability of much of SCAP’sintelligence:

‘I believe that experts on American opinion are agreed that one of its mostremarkable characteristics is a tendency to swing rapidly from one extremeto another, to pass from the deepest gloom to the most unrestrainedoptimism and back again in the space of a few days, and to pursue the latestfashionable idea with an enthusiasm which at times becomes almosthysterical. If this is so, and if the present anti-Communist witch hunt inthe United States is a fair sample of this tendency, then it has beentruthfully reflected by American opinion in Japan…. Before attempting toassess the reality and scale of this danger, it may be worth considering howit has come to occupy such a position of prominence in the minds of G.H.Q.In the first place, American staff officers here naturally reflect the viewsfashionable amongst their colleagues in Washington; as a result, the C.I.C.detachments scattered over Japan have been told to concentrate uponinformation about Communism in preference to anything else. Due partlyto that somewhat teutonic rigidity from which some American officerssuffer, and partly to their youth and inexperience, they look left becausethey have been told to do so, and fail to look right because no-one has toldthem to. Now the majority of American officers engaged on intelligencework speak no Japanese and are dependent for their information on theirJapanese staff and their contacts. In general the Japanese are anti-Russianin sentiment…naturally desirous of setting one conqueror against theother, and anxious to please their employers. Having learnt thatinformation about Communism is the most popular commodity these days,they collect every scrap of information they can find (or invent) on thissubject which is then duly passed on to G.H.Q…. As a result much of theinformation which is contained in the daily intelligence summariesproduced by G-2 of G.H.Q. is wildly exaggerated…. Their superiors in


G.H.Q. cannot escape a share of the responsibility, for they seldom stirfrom their desks in Tokyo.’31

To reinforce these general criticisms Pink cited the impressions of LieutenantColonel Figges, Assistant Military Adviser to the British Mission who hadtravelled widely in Hokkaido.32 Japan’s northernmost island was widely regardedas ‘a hotbed of communist activity,’ but ‘though Colonel Figges travelledentirely by rail he saw no signs of the railway service being disrupted: indeed theonly case of delay which came to his notice was that of a local train which waskept waiting 20 minutes for him by a kindly disposed station master.’ Ivor Pinkwas prepared to admit that Communism represented ‘an actual or…a potentialmenace’ but he called for a cool sense of proportion. He continued-

‘Estimates of the strength of the Japanese Communist Party vary widely.The latest figure given by G.H.Q. for actual members of the party is 15,200; for fellow travellers they give an estimate of 70,000. This figure for acountry with a population of nearly 80 million, is remarkably small. InGermany, for example, which is perhaps today the most fundamentallyanti-Communist country outside the Iron Curtain, the Communists in theWestern zones can still, I believe, count on a vote of around 5 per cent inan election. A similar proportion in Japan would give the Communists 2million votes, far more than even the most fervent witch-hunters in Tokyohave suggested.’32

At the heart of British criticism was the belief that many Americans regardedvirtually all labour activity as Communist inspired. This American viewappeared to be encouraged by Japanese conservatives. Pink even feared that suchattitudes could well drive moderate unions ‘into the hands of the Communists.’This would ultimately defeat America’s original objective.

Officials in the Foreign Office in London largely agreed with Pink’s analysis.E.Bolland described the 26 August despatch as ‘a sober and realistic estimate ofthe strength of Communism in Japan, the fear of which was one of the mainreasons for the action taken by the Americans.’33 Some weeks later the ForeignOffice produced a survey of all Communist parties outside the Eastern bloc. Theauthors of this document also took a detached view of Japanese Communists andtheir prospects. Of Communist activity in trade unions it concluded:

‘the Communists are unable to influence politics after the manner of thosein France, since they notably lack popular support, even among theworkers, and they might easily forfeit their positions were they to provokefurther opposition of the type of the “Democratisation League”. For themoment they concentrate on organising economic discontent into strikewaves within the limits imposed by the occupation. The artificial elementin these tides is apparent in that, unlike the North Sea of Canute, they


check and recede obedient to MacArthur’s command each time he judgesthat they have risen too far…. Except in Hokkaido, where the population issparse and Russian territory is but twenty kilometres from the Japanesecoast, Japanese Communism appears still too weak, too alien and tooimpecunious to form an effective fifth column. The Koreans in Japanwould better serve this purpose though they are less well organised, lessliked, and only number some 600,000.’34

In 1948 British detachment had contrasted with American anti-Communist zeal,but in the following year different attitudes emerged. In the general election heldon 23 January 1949 the Communist Party obtained 9.6 per cent of the popularvote and thirty-five Communist members were elected to the new Diet.35 Thismarked, if limited, Communist success soon created alarm among Britishdiplomats, and this alarm was probably deepened by Communist progresselsewhere. The Communist rebellion in Malaya now posed a major threat toBritish administration while the tide of Communist victories in China seemed tomenace British commerce.36 As a result British officials were disturbed byMacArthur’s equanimity and his confidence in the face of JapaneseCommunism.

In the immediate aftermath of the January election, and in early MayMacArthur dismissed Communist electoral successes as ‘a freak vote’ whichgave an exaggerated impression of Communist support. The SupremeCommander explained his optimism by referring to the declining influence ofCommunists in the labour movement, and the inherent conservatism of most ofthe Japanese populaion.37 In contrast Pink in Tokyo, and Tomlinson in Londonboth noted that over 200,000 people had attended the 1949 May Day Rally inTokyo—far more than the 30,000 who had participated in a celebration of thenew constitution.38 More significantly a report from the Tokyo Liaison Officesuggested that Communist strength ‘may be considerably above the 9.6 per centof the popular vote received in the January election.’ This analysis ofCommunist growth continued..

‘The collapse of the Socialist Party in elections must have brought them anumber of new recruits and the widespread belief that theYoshida Government is anti-Labour as well as anti-Corninunist will help toswell their ranks, as will the immediate effects of the economic austerityprogramme imposed by Mr. Dodge. Finally most Japanese prisoners ofwar who have been repatriated from the U.S.S.R. this year have beenheavily indoctrinated and must be regarded as Communists, at any rate forthe present.’39

Although British observers now took Japanese Communism more seriously thanbefore they remained antipathetic to the anti-Communist excesses of members ofMacArthur’s staff. Such policies seemed to be the mistaken result of ‘the latters’


anxiety to build up the Communist danger to emphasise their success inmaintaining law and order’ in Japan.40 Furthermore officials in Tokyo werecareful to point out that press reports of ‘industrial unrest caused by Communistactivity’ were wildly exaggerated. Strikes remained far less common in Japanthan in Britain and the the United States.41

Despite such signs of objectivity British officials were now less fastidious intheir discussion of anti-Communist policies. Perhaps this was most apparent intheir reactions to the Shimoyama incident. Following large scale redundanciesamong railway employees Shimoyama Sadanori, the President of Japan NationalRailways was found dead beside a railway line north of Tokyo. WhetherShimoyama had been murdered or had committed suicide was unclear but theJapanese government blamed Communists for this and other violent incidents. Inassessing this complex issue Sir Alvary Gascoigne showed little interest in thedetailed merits of the case. He was more concerned with its political outcome.On 31 August he wrote:

‘Whether in the end the police conclude that the Shimoyama case isinsoluble, whether they decide that he committed suicide, or whether theydiscover the murderer now seems to be of little importance. It is however ofgreat importance that Shimoyama’s death helped the government to carryout a ticklish retrenchment programme with little difficulty, and enabledthem to deal a damaging blow to the political power and popularity of theJapan Communist Party.’42

Up to the beginning of 1950 any links between Japanese Communism and worldCommunism had been secret, vestigial or imaginary, but in the first week of thenew year a dramatic change occurred. The Cominform journal published anarticle, signed ‘Observer’ which not only criticised MacArthur’s occupationregime but launched a fierce attack upon Nozaka Sanz� , Japan’s most popularCommunist leader. According to the British Legation in Bucharest Nozaka wasaccused of:

‘(a) …white-washing the occupation by suggesting that the regime is of aprogressive and democratic character, that the occupation does not amountto American colonisation and that, under it, it is quite possible to establish a“people’s democratic government.”

(b) of deceiving the Japanese people and inducing them to acquiesce in the lossof their independence.

(c) of deviating from Marxism by advocating a “peaceful transition tosocialism…the naturalisation of Marxism-Leninism on Japanese soil”.’43

British diplomats in Bucharest concluded that this denunciation stemmed ‘from apolicy decision that, as a result of the Communist victory in China, the time hascome for Communists in Japan to abandon the compromising tactics which they


have hitherto pursued, and to come out in their true colours as orthodoxrevolutionary disciples of the Kremlin.’44 These observations were passed ontoGascoigne in Tokyo who in turn consulted MacArthur about these bizarredevelopments. His consultations again revealed a significant difference betweenBritish and American interpretations of Communist prospects. When Gascoignemet the Supreme Commander on 13 January 1950 MacArthur

‘expressed delight…at the action taken by the Kremlin… He said that thisincident absolutely vindicated his previous opinion regarding thepotentialities of Communism in Japan. It showed that JapaneseCommunists had completely failed either to damage the prestige of theoccupation or to make headway with the people of the country. TheKremlin’s recent action was a gesture of rage and despair. It might well betaken as showing that Moscow had “thrown in the sponge” as far as Japanwas concerned… MacArthur described the effect of the Kremlin’s actionas being disastrous to the Communists…and said that the Japanese peoplewould henceforth regard the Japanese Communist party as “lepers”.’

In more concrete terms MacArthur added that ‘the Japanese Communist Partyhad never been in lower water financially than they were now, and that hethought that their funds had been cut off by Russia owing to their lack ofproducing any grist to the mill.’45 In other conversations MacArthur reassuredGascoigne that ‘Owing to occupationary regulations overt methods ofindoctrination, so skilfully applied by the Soviets in certain European countries,have not been used here…“the Soviet Mission has its hands tied; this willcontinue as long as I am here”.’46

Despite MacArthur’s reassurances and his confidential disclosures Gascoigneremained marginally more fearful of the Communist danger. He was delightedthat the Comintern incident had demonstrated that ‘a Communist Japan would beexpected to be a satellite of Russia’ but believed that ‘it would be anexaggeration to define it as a death blow.’47 Nevertheless the Cominform attackand the Japanese Communist Party’s resulting embarrassment had vividlydemonstrated links between Moscow and Tokyo, which British diplomats inMoscow, London and Tokyo had long suspected. Furthermore it had reducedprevious differences between American and British evaluations of theCommunist threat. Such closeness of view was to produce overall Britishsupport for the intensification of American moves against the JapaneseCommunist Party. The ‘red purges’ of 1950 were to mark a new era in SCAP’spolicy towards the Japanese left.

Between 1945 and 1950 British views of Japanese Communism traversed anuneven circle. In 1945 Arthur de la Mare saw American power as the obviousbarrier to the Communization of Japan. For a brief period Gairdner andMacDermot viewed the Japan Communist Party as moderates who wereCommunist in nothing but name. But from the spring of 1946 British diplomats


stood squarely behind MacArthur’s anti-Communist policies. At times Britishofficials condemned SCAP’s anti-Communist hysteria, but following the 1949election they were more fearful than MacArthur of a creeping Communistadvance. Perhaps Britain’s struggle with Malayan Communism helped to createthis exaggerated unease.48 In 1950 the Cominform’s attack on Nozaka seriouslydamaged the JCP and British fears were largely eliminated. By this time theUnited States not only planned to guarantee Japan against Communist influence,but to reconstruct her as a permanent member of the ‘Western’ camp. As de laMare, Sansom, Dening and Gascogine had repeatedly asserted, America held thekey to Japan’s future. Soviet activity, however ingenious, could scarcelychallenge this inescapable reality.

NOTES

1. e.g. Roger Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy, Britain, the United States and Japan1944– 1952 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982).

2. Ibid., pp. 86–105.3. Roger Buckley, ‘Britain and the Emperor. the Foreign Office and constitutional

reform in Japan, 1945–1946’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 12, Part 4, October1978, pp. 533–570.

4. For the inadequacies of British planning see Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy, pp.7–26.

5. Tribune, 2 February, 1945.6. Minutes by G.F.Hudson (12 February, 1945) and A.de la Mare (17 February, 1945)

on F 780/4/23 in F.O. 371/46428 (Public Record Office, Kew, London). AllForeign Office documents cited below are kept in the Public Record Office, Kew,London.

7. The American Occupation authorities released imprisoned Communists on 10October, 1945. Nozaka was allowed to return to Japan in January, 1946.

8. B.N. No. 146.00 (16 November, 1945) F.O. 371/54126.9. Ibid.

10. Mr. MacDermot to Mr. Bevin, Secret, 14 December, 1945, p. 5. F 559/95/23, F.O.371/46428.

11. A copy of Callaghan’s letter headed ‘Japan and the Emperor’ is filed in F 743/95/23 in F.O. 371/54126.

12. See A.de la Mare’s Minute, 2 May, 1945, F 6437/95/23 in F.O. 371/54138.13. See note 10.14. For a brief outline of the 1946 election, see Supreme Commander for the Allied

Powers (Government Section), Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 toSeptember 1948 (U.S.G.P.O., Washington, D.C., 1948), Vol. 1, pp. 315–322.

15. (CYPHER) From Moscow to United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan,Departmental, No. 1, 28 April, 1946, F.O. 371/54138.

16. Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin, Confidential, 30 August, 1946, p. 4. F 12910/12653/23,F.O. 371/54335.

17. Mr. Gascoigne to Mr. Bevin, Secret, 14 October, 1945, F 15903/12653/23 in F.O.371/54335.


18. M.E.Dening to A.D.F.Gascoigne. Top Secret. Personal, 7 November, 1946. F.O.371/54335.

19. A.D.F.Gascoigne to M.E.Dening, 3 December, 1946 (?), F.O. 371/54335.20. General Gairdner to Head of Mission (Gascoigne), 2 December, 1946, F.O. 371/

54335. 21. Mr. Gascoigne to Mr. Bevin. Confidential. (Labour Situation in Japan), 3 March,

1947, pp. 1–2, F 2866/15/23, F.O. 371/63697.22. Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I, p. 334.23. A.D.F.Gascoigne to Mr. Bevin. Top Secret. 29 January, 1948, F 2626/44/23/G in

F.O. 371/69819.24. Ibid., p. 3.25. A.D.F.Gascoigne to C.F.A.Warner. Top Secret. 14 February, 1948, F 3838/44/23/G,

F.O. 371/69819.26. F.S.Tomlinson’s Minute of 16 March, 1948, and D. McDermot’s Minute of 17

March, 1948, on F 3838/44/23/G, F.O. 371/69819.27. ‘Soviet Comments on the Japanese Political Situation’, 12 April, 1948, F 5345/44/

23, F.O. 371/69820.28. From Tokyo to Foreign Office. Cypher/OTP, 2 April, 1948. F.O. 371/69820.29. E.Bolland’s Minute of 13 April, 1948, on F 5345/44/23, F.O. 371/69820.30. A.D.F.Gascoigne to Mr. Bevin. Top Secret. 20 April, 1948, F 6289 in F.O. 371/

69820.31. Mr. Pink to Mr. Bevin. Secret. Guard. 26 August, 1948, F 12413/44/23 in F.O.

371/ 69823.32. Ibid., p. 3.33. E.Bolland’s Minute of 11 September, 1948, on F 12413/44/23 in F.O. 371/69823.34. SECRET. JAP/1/48. F.O. 371/69823, pp. 1–2.35. ‘Communist Influence in Japan’. Telegram. Y. No. 96. Saving. Secret. (undated)

9898/1015/23. F.O. 371/76182.36. For a general view of British Government reactions to Communism in Asia see the

author’s ‘The British Cabinet and East Asia, 1945–50’, in Chihiro Hosoya (ed.),Japan and Postwar Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific Region (International Universityof Japan, Tokyo, 1984).

37. Ivor Pink to the Foreign Secretary (Bevin). Confidential. 11 May, 1949. F 7509.F.O. 371/76182.

38. Ivor Pink to P.W.Scarlett. Confidential. 4 May, 1949. F 7266/1015/23, F.O. 371/76182. F.S.Tomlinson’s minute (24 March 1949).

39. See Note 35.40. Ibid.41. Ibid.42. Sir A.Gascoigne to Foreign Office. 31 August 1949. F.O. 371/76183.43. Chancery, British Legation, Bucharest to Far Eastern Dept., Foreign Office, 9

January, 1950, 2191/2/50, F.O. 371/83806.44. Ibid.45. Sir A.Gascoigne to Foreign Office. Telegram. En Clair, By Confidential Bag. 13

January, 1950. F.J. 1017/8, F.O. 371/83806.46. Sir A.Gascoigne to Foreign Secretary (Bevin). Confidential. 17 January, 1950. J

1017/10 F.O. 371/83806.47. Ibid.


48. Copies of virtually all documents regarding Communism in Japan were sent toSingapore and Hong Kong as well as Washington.


First published in Japanese Studies, JS/1990/214, STICERD,

London School of Economics and Political Science

31The Social History of Occupied Japan: Some

Sources and Problems

FOR THE PAST DECADE and a half the history of Occupied Japan has been amajor theme of international research and controversy. The opening andmicrofilming of vast quantities of documents in Japan, the United States andBritain have stimulated much new writing, while the holding of majorinternational conferences at the MacArthur Memorial, Amherst, Stanford, theSmithsonian and the Suntory-Toyota Centre has produced a species of newhistorical consensus. These developments may suggest that occupied Japan isalready a conquered academic frontier.1 But this appears doubtful as soon as oneventures beyond diplomacy and politics, to explore the social history of theseturbulent years.

In the last 15 years what has been learnt and understood about OccupiedJapan? Certainly we possess much more factual information about Americandecision-making and politics. Such works as Michael Schaller’s The AmericanOccupation of Japan and William Borden’s The Pacific Alliance2 havesynthesised much diplomatic and economic material, and our knowledge ofmany aspects of policy has been enriched by the publication of a magnificentcollection of English-language documents by the Japanese Finance Ministry.3

We also know far more about the subtle half-secret interplay between Americanand Japanese men and women of influence— whether in the sphere of women’srights, currency policy, budget-making or the drafting of the Constitution.4 Nodoubt these gains represent major historical advances—but equally one mightquestion whether this process is not, in fact, an escape from as well as anencounter with historical reality. In both Japan and the United States there hasbeen a subconscious desire to write the pre-history of the American-JapaneseAlliance rather than to understand the occupation in terms of its own times andvalues.5 Furthermore Japan’s recent power, prosperity and affluence may havedistracted historians’ attention from many humiliating and painful aspects of theimmediate postwar years. Such observations are amply justified if one comparesthe writings of early commentators on postwar Japan with writings in the 1980s—whether by radicals or supporters of a liberal capitalist consensus.

Early works such as Mark Gayn’s Japan Diary were preoccupied with thehuman realities which form the foundation of any political society—whether itbe authoritarian or democratic. On his first page Gayn wrote:

‘Before us, as far as we could see lay miles of rubble. The people lookedragged and distraught. They dug into the debris to clear space for newshacks. They pushed and dragged carts piled high with brick and lumber.But, so vast was the destruction that all this effort seemed unproductive.There were no new buildings in sight. The skeletons of railway cars andlocomotives remained untouched on the tracks.16

Gayn’s concern with physical austerity, and the raw edges of pain, cold andhunger was distinctive but it was not his only preoccupation. He also describedan atmosphere of corruption, and semi-criminality which were the natural resultsof moral and social confusion, and economic distress. This aura of corruption,shortage and immorality also characterised one of the first muck-raking memoirsto be written by an occupationaire, Harry Emerson Wildes’ Typhoon in Tokyo,which appeared in 1954.7 This book’s morose and bitter tone was in part areflection of personal disappointments but this work was not without itsimportant truths. In particular Wildes chronicled the sexual excesses ofoccupation forces and the shabby, fly, and flyblown aura of much low levelAmerican activity.

What has been lost in much recent writing is not simply the suffering, hungerand drabness of the occupation years but almost any sense of what washappening in large areas of Japanese society. Historians may have gainedcomfort and esteem by taking a hygienic elevator to the written and oral archivesof men in high places but they have forfeited much else in the process. Thus,apart from Japan Diary and Typhoon in Tokyo we have little concrete descriptionor analysis of what was taking place across Japan’s four main islands. When didfood supplies become tolerable? When did they become agreeable? Where wasfood most and least difficult to obtain? Did or did not people starve? How didJapan’s repatriated people return to a settled life of equilibrium? When did air-raid evacuees return to Tokyo, Osaka or Nagoya? How quickly, and on whatfinancial basis did temporary or permanent housing appear in bombed-out cities,country towns and villages? How did patterns of marriage, childbirth, diseaseand death fluctuate and stabilise between 1945 and 1952? What was thechronology, geography and organisation of the black market, crime,demonstrations and strikes during this period of American reform, whichculminated in the establishment of conservative political hegemony. In mostacademic writing far more attention is paid to Joseph Dodge’s economic policiesthan to their social consequences —and the regional variations and periodizationof their human impact. These many profound and often quantitative questions arenot merely important because they constitute major historical omissions. Theyare also inextricably linked with major political, diplomatic and economicthemes which historians customarily examine with great care and attention.Clearly election results partially reflect some of these social forces. A moreimportant issue is when and how did education, health, employment and familylife achieve sufficient stability to enable the Japanese people to think beyond

THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF OCCUPIED JAPAN: SOME SOURCES AND PROBLEMS 317

immediate needs and begin the national collaborative process which culminatedin economic advance.

In part the answers to such sweeping questions can only be constructed by anew generation of scholars often with specialisms—such as medicine and publichealth—which differ from those of most present-day historians of Japan.Sophisticated solutions to these questions also call for the synthesis of muchsecondary material in Japanese—histories of towns and prefectures, companiesand government agencies and of particular areas of official action. However,some initial steps can be taken by simply examining and re-examining largevolumes of American material which are readily available in major Britishlibraries. One major source for the years 1945 to 1948 is the monthly seriesSummations of Non-military Activities.8 These elaborate compendia of data onsocial, economic and political trends contain much largely neglected informationwhich is of value to the social historian. For example, the second issue of theSummation series contains over 130 pages of socio-economic informationembracing such themes as labour, religion and public welfare. In this instance thesingle heading ‘Public Health and Welfare’ covers material on disease incidence,repatriation, relief, hospital administration, and contemporary prison statistics.9

In particular the Summations furnish more than simple narratives of Americanpolicy. They are valuable repositories of statistics, charts, maps and diagramswhich can aid the process of historical synthesis. Such material can also form avaluable basis for undergraduate and graduate seminars and class discussion.

A second major source which is less objective but nevertheless invaluable isthe unpublished official History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupationof Japan which is available on National Archives microfilm.10 Despite theirprofoundly American outlook and triumphalist tone these 55 thematic volumeshave several major advantages. Their thematic layout enables one to locatematerial on neglected social issues with relative ease; and, in contrast to theSummations, these historical monographs often survey events up to 1950 or 1951.Thus they come close to covering the reconstruction as well as the reform periodof occupation administration. Furthermore, these studies often contain largequantities of statistics, copies of important regulations and decrees, as well asbackground data on the wartime and pre-war periods. Should anyone doubt thehistorical value and interest of these official histories one might note that untilthe mid-1970s eleven were completely classified as their contents werepolitically sensitive. For example, the once classified volume on populationpolicy clarifies the influence of the Roman Catholic Church upon SCAP’s oftenambiguous attitudes.11 The existence of over 400 pages of material on health andwelfare, and a similar amount of data on the pricing and distribution of food andnon-food products may suggest the value of this series for the study of socialhistory.

Undoubtedly these histories pay undue attention to SCAP’s self-image. andAmerica’s role in confronting social and economic difficulties, but discerning


academics can mine these sources for statistical information, and read betweenwhat are, historiographically, very well-spaced lines.

It will be many years before scholars construct a social atlas of occupied Japanbut the summations and official histories will assist in beginning its compilation.Even a cursory or superficial reading of such material suggests the basis of somere-interpretation of the occupation period. Despite Washington’s bitter criticismsof SCAP policy in 1947 and 1948 it would appear that significant social gainshad already been made.12 This was notably true of food relief and thesuppression of infectious diseases. These major achievements were crucial to thewelfare of the Japanese people but of less interest to businessmen and cold-warstrategists.

There is no smooth short road to an understanding of the intricate socialrealities of occupied Japan. Such works as Bruce Johnston’s monograph onwartime food policy and Jerome Cohen’s early study of Japan’s Economy inWar and Reconstruction, provide little coverage of the postwar years.13

However, the imperfect American documents which I have described can stillhelp scholars to return to the ashes and early rebuilding which were the truebeginnings of postwar Japan.

NOTES

1. Since 1975, The MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia 23510, has published sixconference volumes with the following titles. The Ocupation of Japan and itsLegacy to the Postwar World, The Occupation of Japan: Impact of Legal Reform,The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform, The Occupation of Japan:Educational and Social Reform, The Occupation of Japan: The InternationalContext, The Occupation of Japan: Arts and Culture. The Smithsonian Conferencepapers are reproduced In Robert Wolfe (ed.) The Americans as Proconsuls: UnitedStates Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952 (Southern IllinoisUniversity Press, Carbondale, 1984). The Suntory-Toyota International Centre(L.S.E.) has published two pamphlets in its International Studies series. Ian Nish(ed.) The British Commonwealth and the Occupation of Japan (1983) and Ian Nish(ed.) Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan (1986).

2. Michael Schaller: The American Occupation of Japan. The Origins of the ColdWar in Asia (Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York, 1985). WilliamS.Borden: The Pacific Alliance. United States Economic Policy and Japan’s TradeRecovery. 1947–1955 (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1984).

3. � kurash� Zaiseishishitsu: Sh� wa Zaisei-shi, Sh� sen Kara K� wa Made. Vol. 20(Eibun Shiry� ) (Financial History Section, Ministry of Finance: The FinancialHistory of Japan, The Allied Occupation Period, 1945–52. Vol. 20 EnglishDocuments). (T� y� Keizai Shinp� sha, Tokyo, 1982), 851 pp. This volume individed into the following sections: 1. Pre-occupation—General, 2. Pre-Occupation—Economics, 3. General Policy, 4. National Security and External Relations, 5.Political and Social Reform, 6. Economic Reform, 7. Economic Disarmament and


Reparations, 8. Economic Control and Planning, 9. Aid and Trade, 10. Finance, 11.The ‘Dodge Line’, 12. Money and Banking, 13. U.S. Occupation of Germany.

4. E.g. Helen Hopper, ‘Kato Shidzue, Socialist Party MP, and Occupation ReformsAffecting Women, 1945–1948: A Case Study of the Formal vs. Informal PoliticalInfluence of Japanese Women’ in T.W.Burkman (ed.) The Occupation of Japan,Educational and Social Reform. (MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia, 1982),pp. 373– 399.

5. One might note that Robert E.Ward and Frank J.Shulman’s excellent bibliography,The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952. An Annotated Bibliography ofWestern Language Materials (American Library Association, Chicago, 1974), 867pp. had its origins in a meeting of a subcommittee of the Department of State’sCommittee on Educational and Cultural Relations with Japan and a counterpartgroup from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, ibid. p. xv.

6. Mark Gayn: Japan Diary (William Sloane Associates, New York, 1948). p. 1. Areprint is now available from Charles Tuttle, Tokyo.

7. Harry Emerson Wildes: Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and its Aftermath(MacMillan, New York and London, 1954). A reprint was issued by Octagon Books,New York in 1979).

8. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers: Summation of Non-Military Activitiesin Japan and Korea. September/October 1945-February 1946. Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan. March 1946–August 1948 (Total—35 issues).(Available on microfilm from the National Archives, Washington, D.C.).

9. Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea. Number 2. November1945, pp. 147–176.

10. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Statistics and Reports Section: Historyof the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, SCAP, Tokyo, 1952.(Available on microfilm from the National Archives, Washington, D.C.). Thevolume titles are as follows:

1. Introduction. 1945–1951.2. Administration of the Occupation. 1945—July 1951.3. Logistic Support. 1945–1951.4. Population.5. Trials of Class ‘B’ and ‘C’ War Criminals.6. Local Government Reforms. 1945—December 1950.7. The Purge, 1945—December 1951.8. Constitutional Revision, 1945—December 1951.9. National Administrative Reorganization, 1945–1949.

10. Election Reform 1945—November 1951.11. Development of Political Parties, 1947—November 1951.12. Development of Legislative Responsibilities, 1945—October 1950.13. Reorganization of Civil Service, 1945–1951.14. Legal and Judidal Reform, 1945—December 1950.15. Freedom of the Press, 1945—January 1951.16. Theatre and Motion Pictures, 1945—December 1951.17. Treatment of Foreign Nationals.


18. Public Welfare, 1945—December 1949.19. Public Healthy September 1945—December 1950.20. Social Security, 1945—March 1950.21. Foreign Property Administration.22. Reparations.23. Japanese Property Administration.24. Elimination of Zaibatsu Control, 1945—June 1950.25. Deconcentration of Economic Power, 1945—December 1950.26. Promotion of Fair Trade Practices, 1945—October 1951.27. The Rural Land Reform, 1945—June 1951.28. Development of the Trade Union Movement, 1945—June 1951.29. Working Conditions, 1945—September 1950.30. Agricultural Cooperatives, 1945—December 1950.31. Education, 1945—December 1949.32. Religion.33. Radio Broadcasting, 1945–1951. 34. Price and Distribution Stabilization: Non-Food Program.35. Price and Distribution Stabilization: Food Program.36. Agriculture, September 1945—December 1950.37. National Government Finance, 1945—March 1951.38. Local Government Finance, 1945—March 1951.39. Money and Banking, 1945—June 1951.40. Financial Reorganization of Corporate Enterprises.41. The Petroleum Industry, 1945—June 1951.42. Fisheries, 1945–1950.43. Forestry, September 1945—January 1951.44. Rehabilitation of the Non-Fuel Mining Industries.45. Coal.46. Expansion and Reorganization of the Electric Power and Gas

Industries, 1945— March 1950.47. The Heavy Industries, 1945–1950.48. Textile Industries, September 1945—December 1950.49. The Light Industries, 1945—March 1951.50. Foreign Trade.51. Land and Air Transport.52. Water Transportation, 1945–1951.53. Communications, 1945—December 1950.54. Reorganization of Science and Technology in Japan, 1945—

September 1950.55. Police and Public Safety, 1945—October 1951.

11. Ibid., volume 4.


12. e.g. J.L.Kauffman: ‘Report on Conditions in Japan as of September 6, 1947’,reprinted in � kurash� Zaiseishishitsu: Sh� wa Zaisei-shi. Vol. 20 (Eibun Shiry� ), pp.368– 378 and Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan No. 33. June 1948, p.289.

13. Bruce F.Johnston: Japanese Food Management in World War II (StanfordUniversity Press, Stanford, 1953), pp. 213–237, ‘Japan’s Postwar Food Shortage’.Jorome B.Cohen: Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction. (University ofMinnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1949). Reprinted by Greenwood Press, Westport,Conn. 1973), pp. 417–504, ‘The Economy Under Occupation’.


First published in The Japan Society Proceedings, No. 127,

Summer 1996

32When did the American Occupation of Japan

Really End? Japanese-American Relations1952–1960

FORMALLY, Japan regained her sovereignty on 28 April 1952; but, in spirit,the Occupation may have ended a year earlier, on 16 April 1951, when GeneralMacArthur left Tokyo. It could also be claimed that the Occupation, as originallyconceived; had ended earlier still in March 1949 when the American economic‘adviser’ Joseph Dodge addressed Japanese and foreign journalists on his nineprinciples of new economic policy. Clearly, no single date can satisfactorilymark the ending of Japan’s lengthy Occupation, for such an ending involvedattitudes as well as policies, neither of which followed the tidy dictates of the SanFrancisco Treaty.

When Japan became formally sovereign in 1952 she remained dependent onAmerican forces for the defence of what Prime Minister Yoshida perceived as‘national security’. Furthermore Japan had still to enter international economicorganisations which were essential to her commercial recovery. In many suchfields American patronage continued to be vital to Japan’s reintegration intointernational society. Moreover, Tokyo remained in need of American technicaland financial aid, and desperately required access to North American markets.Japan’s dependence on the United States in so many spheres of her national andinternational life indicate that whatever sovereignty Japan regained in 1952 itwas of a very qualified variety. Not only was Japan far weaker than the UnitedStates but a residual folk culture of dominance continued to characterise muchAmerican behaviour. Such attitudes were reinforced by the special positionwhich Japan had come to occupy in American strategic thinking. This wasclearly apparent in President Truman’s Memorandum of 21 February 1952 whichstated:

The security of Japan is of such vital strategic importance to the UnitedStates position in the Far East that the United States cannot permit hostileforces to gain control of any part of the territory of Japan…the overridingrequirement for United States policy affecting all post-Treatyarrangements with Japan is the necessity for preserving and strengtheningthe voluntary and strong commitment of the Japanese Government andpeople to a close association and to joint action with the United States andthe free world.1

By 1952 the United States had already sought to add to her dominant militaryposition in the Far East by encouraging the development of malleable Japaneseforces but so far these efforts had brought little reward. However situationsremaining from the Occupation era could be exploited to encourage Japaneserearmament. This exploitation revealed the very diluted nature of Japanesenational sovereignty.

In late 1952 Soviet military aircraft began to overfly Hokkaido at a time whenJapan not only lacked an airforce capable of taking meaningful counter measuresbut also lacked surveillance equipment able to track Soviet aircraft. In such asituation Japan was totally dependent on information emanating from theAmerican military authorities. Hence she had little choice but to agree to anAmerican suggestion that US forces take counter action. Significantly the USauthorities only informed Tokyo of the Soviet overflights when American planeswere ready to act and when American officials believed that raising the issuemight help them pressure the Japanese into increasing military expenditure.

However, the political residue of the Occupation could hinder as well as helpAmerican military objectives. The greatest monument to MacArthur’sOccupation, the Japanese Constitution, contained Article 9 which was not onlyan obstacle to Japanese rearmament but, indirectly, to the free movement anddisposition of American forces. For the United States a revision of the JapaneseConstitution would bring clear benefits. More significantly Constitutionalrevision was not considered an issue which lay beyond the proper scope ofAmerican intervention. The American Embassy’s support for changes in theconstitution is apparent in Ambassador Allison’s Telegram to Washington, dated25 September 1953. This stated:

Revision of Constitution dependent upon education campaign bringing hometo Japanese people facts of life in present world and necessity for adequatedefence system. Kimura* agreed with our contention that Japanese Governmenthad so far been deficient in carrying out such educational program but claimednecessity was realised… He expressed opinion…that it would probably takeabout three years to get Japanese public in proper frame of mind.2

American interest in reshaping Japanese domestic politics was not restricted toConstitutional change. For if Washington’s military needs were to be met theconditions for constitution change had to be created. These included a two thirdsmajority in favour of change in the National Diet. To achieve this it was notsufficient to have conservative cabinets. A unified conservative party wasessential. This was a cause in which American officials invested considerableenergy. A policy statement of 27 October 1954 declared, ‘Conservative groupsare politically dominant but continue to be split by personal rivalries…if thesegroups could cooperate effectively…[they] would be able to carry out policies

*Kimura Tokutaro, Director of the National Public Safety Agency, May 1953-July 1954.


for…stronger defence… The U.S. should do what it can to encourage effectiveconservative action in Japan’.3 On 18 March 1956 some months after the unitedLiberal Democratic Party had been created Secretary of State Dulles stated toMinister of Agriculture, Kono Ichiro ‘that the United States regarded theconservative merger as a very important achievement for Japan; if it had not beenachieved…there might have been a real danger that Japan would simply fallapart’.4

Despite this apparent success the United States remained dissatisfied. One ofthe first leaders of the united conservatives was Hatoyama Ichiro who was farfrom being an American favourite. Hatoyama sought a greater measure ofindependence for Japan, a significant divergence from the quasi-Occupationmould.

American quasi-Occupation attitudes extended well beyond purely politicalissues. The Japanese economy continued to be a major American preoccupation.In the early and mid 1950s Japan remained a relatively poor country andJapanese economic management was often an object of fierce American criticism.Of the Yoshida Government Ambassador Allison wrote in September 1953: ‘Thepresent government brings to these problems the attitude of a prodigal, wastefulof its substance and confident that the United States will bail it out throughspecial procurement, Korean rehabilitation or new loans’. The Ambassador’sexasperated conclusion was that: ‘Until remedial measures are adopted weshould make no further dollar loans except for cotton and the pending thermalpower application… When sound policies are adopted we should be prepared toconsider further dollar loans or economic assistance’.5

The existence of a quasi-Occupation mentality was perhaps most evident inAmerican attitudes to the generality of the Japanese population. A strikingexample of such attitudes was apparent in 1954 when the crew of a Japanesefishing boat The Lucky Dragon were poisoned by fall-out from an Americannuclear test. If anything American policy at this time recalled attitudes towardsthe citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Initially America’s only interestin the crew of The Lucky Dragon was as possible providers of medical data.When it was discovered that any such data would be of little value, policy simplybecame a public relations exercise. American insensitivity towards Japan’snuclear apprehensions is apparent in Ambassador Allison’s letter of 20 May1954 which analysed public responses to the incident:

When new pressures of Japan’s exposure to ‘ashes of Death’ were added,government and people cracked. Period of uncontrolled press seemed torevel in fancied martyrdom… Breakdown was triggered by a small groupof Japanese scientists and doctors, many of whom were fuzzy-mindedleftist, pacifists, neutralists.6

American attempts to influence or manipulate Japanese general elections alsorecalled the atmosphere of the MacArthur era. The timing of economic

WHEN DID THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN REALLY END? JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1952–1960 325

assistance, the return of the Amami Oshima islands to Japan andPrime Ministerial visits were in large part orchestrated to lend support to theLiberal Democratic Party or its conservative predecessors.

Yet in these activities, as in the Occupation proper a complex nexus existedbetween Japanese leaders and their American supporters. In late Occupation daysPrime Minister Yoshida must have been aware that America had much to lose ifhe fell from office. Similariy Americans could be perplexed when their supposedconservative allies tried consciously to exploit the Washington-Tokyo nexus. Inthe aftermath of France’s defeat in Vietnam, in 1954, Ikeda Hayato spoke of itbeing an inappropriate time for Japan to choose sides in the Cold War. Americanofficials suspected Ikeda’s motives but also sought to retain his sympathy to thefree world’s cause.

Needless to say the particularly strong links which bound Americans andJapanese conservatives were in part the obverse of the United States’ almostconsistent view that Japan’s opposition parties would be unacceptable rulers.This was not only a view which Japanese conservatives encouraged. Japaneseleft wing politicians usually opposed the broad direction of American policy andtreated Beijing as a desirable destination for well publicised political journeys.Such activities left little scope for American detachment.

Nevertheless, even in the first post-Occupation years Japanese leaders hadtheir objectives which, to a degree, they successfully achieved. When Occupiersand Occupied negotiated the Administrative Agreement (in early 1952)establishing the working detail of the Security Treaty, Americans complainedbitterly at the effectiveness of Japanese negotiating skills. Even worse they wereoffended by the Japanese propensity to leak confidential information to theTokyo press.

Equally impressive was Prime Minister Yoshida’s stolid resistance toAmerican pressure for rapid rearmament, and the Japanese Finance Ministry’sopposition to the speedy expansion of the arms industry. Japanese leaders alsowon a difficult battle to persuade American officials that Mutual Security Aidshould be used for non-military rather than military purposes.

Despite these Japanese achievements the Tokyo-Washington relationshipremained redolent of the Occupation, at least until 1957. Throughout these yearsUnited States military forces were extremely reluctant to abandon theirextraterritorial privileges, and exhibited profound distrust of the Japanesepopulation.

However, by 1957 American attitudes were changing. In part this was thedirect result of Japanese economic success. The advance of Japanese textiles inthe American market provoked hostility in Alabama and South Carolina, butoverall, Washington was favourably impressed by Japanese economic growth.American sympathy was probably deepened by Japanese attempts to controlexports by self-control or ‘orderly marketing’. On 20 June 1957 Prime MinisterKishi stated that:


Japan was endeavouring to take into consideration the repercussions in theUnited States industries of imports from Japan. Japan was trying to arriveat methods for orderly marketing of its products in the United States andhoped it could expect greater consideration from the UnitedStates particularly with respect to movements…towards restriction of tradewith Japan.7

Clearly Japan’s economic situation was ‘on the whole healthy’ as an increase inexports of 12.9 per cent and a growth in production of 7.6 per cent wereconfidently forecast. Yet for American diplomats the appearance of Kishi asPrime Minister was as important as the vitality of the Japanese economy. In factKishi appeared the first post-war leader possessed of the dynamism andcommitment to serve as a totallv satisfactory ally. Millions of Japanese mightdistrust Kishi on account of his role in Tojo’s wartime Cabinet, but for UnitedStates leaders such matters were unimportant. Enthusiasm for Kishi is apparentin a telegram despatched from the Tokyo Embassy to Washington on 18 October1957. This declared:

In broad terms Kishi has tried to create an atmosphere of forwardmovement in terms of Japan’s domestic and foreign problems designed toappeal to reviving national mood of self-confidence and purpose. He canstand on record of considerable accomplishments during seven shortmonths in office… Kishi has tried to enhance atmosphere of action bymodern public relations techniques used for first time on extensive scale inpresenting conservative policies to public.8

Unfortunately American enthusiasts had to admit that ‘while he has personality,which appeals to Westerners it has not as yet got across with Japanese public’.Despite this important qualification electoral endorsement of the new PrimeMinister was almost unqualified. The Tokyo Embassy continued:

I strongly recommend that as matter of urgency we begin at once an activestudy (possibly by high level group) to see where we might be helpful instrengthening Kishi. It is most important that wherever it possible to behelpful in pre-election period, we act so as to influence election outcomerather than delaying our action until after election… I will enumerate someproblems where it seems to me that there are possibilities of being helpfulto Kishi.9

Among such measures were further reduction in sentences of war criminals and amore accommodating attitude to Japanese fishing boats encroaching in centralPacific waters. Concerning the latter issue Ambassador MacArthur wrote:


I have no complaints about Navy’s action. However in handling such casesin future we should bear in mind very important pre-electoral period inwhich we now find ourselves and handle them in way calculated to doleast damage.10

By March 1958 not only was Prime Minister Kishi much admired but a new erain American-Japanese relations was clearly envisaged. This would becharacterised, above all, by sympathetic consultations with Tokyo. A new reviewof United States policy made the following recommendations:

1. Consult fully with the Japanese on the disposition of United States forces inJapan and give consideration to waiving the Japanese yen contribution to thesupport of our forces in Japan;

2. Evince a clear and positive attitude toward trade with Japan and move toeliminate State statutes discriminating against the sale of Japanese textiles;

3. Consult closely with the Japanese Government on our policies toward Chinabut avoid the appearance of pressure to make Japan conform to thesepolicies;

4. Re-examine our Bonins policy to determine what steps might be taken withregard to limited repatriation and compensation for use of land;

5. Ensure that further withdrawals of United States forces from Japan arehandled in a manner that will result in maximum political advantage to theUnited States;

6. Take certain steps to assist Japan to expand its trade with South-east Asia;7. Re-examine our policies in the Trust Territory to permit limited Japanese

access to the Territory;8. To the extent feasible, give Japanese requests priority in allocating PL 480

commodities;9. Examine the feasibility of increasing United States procurement of military

commodities and services in Japan;10. Complete on an urgent basis current negotiations for an atomic power

bilateral with Japan; and11. Consult as appropriate with high officials of the Japanese Government on

current and long-range foreign policy problems, particularly in Asia.11

America’s strong identification with prime Minister Kishi and the ‘new era’concept combined to give powerful impetus to preparations for a revised SecurityTreaty.

Furthermore, during these preparations many of the presuppositions of theearly 1950s appear to have been abandoned. Constitutional revision was nolonger a significant aim, as a degree of Japanese rearmament was proceedingwithout it. The notion of storing nuclear weapons in mainland Japan was alsoshelved and Secretary of State Dulles who had once urged rapid Japaneserearmament now appeared reconciled to a limited Japanese defence effort. In


discussing Japan’s role American officials increasingly compared Japan with theUnited Kingdom or West Germany, a clear indication that Occupation, or post-Occupation attitudes were weakening.

During negotiations on a new Security Treaty some difficult issues persisted.These included the projected treaty’s geographical scope and its procedures forjoint consultation. Despite such difficulties State Department attitudes were farmore conciliatory than ever before. American optimism was also encouraged byKishi who suggested that Right wing Socialists such as Nishio Suehiro werelikely to support a new Security Treaty.

Neverthless, American optimism was in part the product of wishful thinkingmuch of which stemmed from analyses made by Kishi’s supporters. As late as July1959 the American Embassy in Tokyo was happy to accept Sato Eisaku’sestimate of Japanese public opinion. Regarding opposition to the proposedTreaty he declared that, ‘There was no chance that it would develop into agenuine “people’s movement”.’12 There were however some reasons fordisappointment. In 1959 and 1960 it was often obvious that the LiberalDemocratic Party’s unity was a formality rather than a reality. Someconservatives even appeared willing to oppose American policy to gain personalor factional benefits. In particular, Kono Ichiro was seen as a devious figure whowas prone to make political mischief. Conversely there was an increasingwillingness to admit that America’s actions could themselves generate politicaldifficulties. This was most obvious when an American U-2 spy plane was shotdown over the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, optimism remained the dominant element in American attitudes.As late as 20 May 1960 when there were unseemly brawls in the Diet it wasreported that it was ‘still too soon to predict whether press and public outcry willreach such heights as to cause serious problems for Kishi government’.13 On thefollowing day the depth of local hostility to Kishi was reported for the first time.According to a Japanese informant while the Prime Minister was Very capable,experienced and courageous’ he was ‘not popular and some still attack him forhaving been member of Tojo cabinet. Public has now developed general image inthinking of Kishi…and it is to his great disadvantage that Japanese youth,intellectuals, and the press are particularly critical of his past association withTojo and war’.14

As the situation in Tokyo worsened memories of occupation or post-occupation connections could still return to influence American tactics. When itwas reported that Ikeda Hayato no longer clearly supported Kishi it wassuggested that Yoshida, who was visiting the United States, be urged to press himto return to the political fold. Ambassador MacArthur recommended ‘you shouldsay that if anything happens to treaty it will be greatest victory Communistscould gain in Asia and terrible blow not only to US-Japan relations but particularlyto Japan itself. Ikeda seems to be key to situation and in the circumstances youhope Yoshida will communicate directly and urgently with Ikeda to urge him tosupport Kishi government and its action in passing treaty’.15


As is well known Kishi fell, the Security Treaty survived and Ikeda becamePrime Minister. This final equation was to prove far less politically damagingthan some Americans had feared. Perhaps the subsequent recovery of US-Japanese relations testifies to the real changes which had occurred in US-Japanrelations in 1957,—not in 1955 or 1952. To ask when the Occupation ended maybe a rhetorical question—but to calibrate shifts in American influence on Japanis a significant historical activity. Yet if one seeks a rhetorical answer to arhetorical question one might suggest that the occupation was only fully overwhen a one time occupant of Sugamo prison could become America’s mostesteemed postwar Japanese leader.

NOTES

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the first meeting of the JapanHistory

Group held in Cambridge in December 1995.

1. Memorandum by the President, Subject: Interim Policy with Respect to Japan. 21February 1952. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol XIV. Chinaand Japan Part II (Washington. D.C. 1985) p. 1161.

2. The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State. 25 September 1953— 11 a.m. (Telegram) Ibid p. 1512.

3. Progress Report on NSC 125/2 and 125/6 ‘United States Objectives and Courses ofAction With Respect to Japan’. 27 October 1954. Ibid p. 164.

4. Memorandum of a Conversation. Tokyo. 18 March 1956. PST/MC/9/2. ForeignRelations of the United States 1955–1957. Vol. XXIII Part I Japan (WashingtonD,C, 1991).

5. The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State, 7 September, 1953— 3 p.m. (Telegram) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954. Vol. XIV.China and Japan. Part II pp. 1499–1500.

6. The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State, 20 May 1954—2p.m. (Telegram) Ibid p. 1644.

7. Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and PrimeMinister Kishi, Department of State, Washington, 20 June 1957, 4 p.m. Foreign.Relations of the United States 1955–1957 Vol. XXIII Part I Japan p. 398.

8. Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, 18 October 1957,8 p.m. Ibid p. 518.

9. Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, 18 October 1957,8 p.m. pp. 520–521.

10. Ibid pp. 522–523.11. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

(Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, 28 March 1958 ForeignRelations of the United States 1958–1960 Vol. XVIII, Japan, Korea (WashingtonD.C. 1994) p. 15.

12. Memorandum of Conversation Tokyo, 17 July 1959 Ibid p. 210.


13. Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo, 20 May1960, 9 p.m. Ibid p. 296.

14. Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo. 21 May1960, 4 p.m. Ibid p. 298.

15. Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo, 23 May1960 6 p.m. Ibid p. 300.


Part IV

Japanese History, Historiography andHistorians

Unpublished paper delivered to the British Association of Japanese

Studies’ Conference, held at Emmanual College, Cambridge, April,

1975

33Major American Publications on Japanese

History, 1970–75, and their Post-War Setting

IN 1975 readers of American studies of Japanese history receive a totalimpression which suggests a strangely misedited film. Some periods aredescribed by works of detail, accuracy and intellectual sophistication. Others aretreated with a stereotyped simplicity which recalls a sequence of animated film.Despite the persistence of these two levels of historical writing their relativesignificance has changed rapidly in recent years. This brief essay seeks to outlinesome of these important movements against the political and academicbackground of recent decades.1

By 1970 two substantial waves of post-war research added much to academicknowledge of modern Japan. In contrast, earlier periods remained largelyunexplored by the writers of serious monographs. J.Edward Kidder’s JapanBefore Buddhism (1959) was the only important synthesis of the prehistoric age2

and studies of the centuries spanning the Yamato and Edo periods were rare.Undoubtably the most impressive and ambitious work covering this thousandyears was John W.Hall’s Government and Local Power in Japan, 500—1700, aStudy based on Bizen Province (1966). As its title indicates this was a study of asingle region, and it had no parallel describing other provinces. MinoruShinoda’s Introduction to a translation of the ‘Azuma Kagami’: The Founding ofthe Kamakura Shogunate, 1180–85 was the only detailed work on the Minamotoregime. While the Ashikaga period received its only substantial treatment inH.Paul Varley’s background essay to a partial translation of the ‘Chronicle of� nin’—The � nin War (1967). On the religious aspects of the Middle AgesAlfred Bloom’s Shinran’s Gospel of Pure Grace was published in 1965, butbetween 1945 and 1970 the early and medieval phases of Japan’s developmentreceived little attention outside the covers of survey histories.3

On the modern period most post-war works written before 1960 were inspiredby the experiences and documents of the Pacific War. Much writing explored theprocess by which Japan degenerated from the internationalism of the Taish� erato the ultra-nationalism of the early Sh� wa period, Robert J.C.Butow’s Japan’sDecision to Surrender (1954) and T� j� and the Coming of the War (1961)represent lasting achievements from this period. Robert A. Scalapino’sDemocracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan (1953) pioneered the post-

war study of Japanese civilian politics; but its sub-title ‘the failure of the firstattempt’ indicates an implicit concern with vice and virtue which typified theaftermath of the war.

With few exceptions the outstanding works of the 1960s were the result of asecond major phase of historical research. This stemmed from important changesin the international position of America and Japan, and the partial replacement ofcold-war by peaceful coexistence. President Kennedy’s ‘Alliance for Progress’was but one of many expressions of American concern for economicimprovement in the underdeveloped world; and by 1960 Japan had easilysurpassed her pre-war standard of living. The one time enemy now appeared as apossible model for the improvement of impoverished Asian and African societiesand development became a central concern of many historians and socialscientists.

Some may argue that important new studies of nineteenth century Japanesehistory were barely linked with these worldwide tendencies; but it seems likelythat sympathetic, scholarly interest in the beginnings of Japan’s moderntransformation was affected by a new belief in the international importance ofher example. Albert M.Craig’s Ch� sh� in the Meiji Restoration (1961) andMarius B.Jansen’s refined study of Sakamoto Ry� ma & the Meiji Restoration(1961) set new standards among Western studies of nineteenth century Japan,and both authors played an important role in the Association for Asian Studies’Conference on Japan, which was founded in 1959 and financed by the FordFoundation. The titles of the first volumes produced by the Conference indicateits concern with themes of development and change; Changing JapaneseAttitudes Toward Modernization (1965) (edited by Marius B.Jansen), The Stateand Economic Enterprise in Japan (1965) (edited by W.W.Lockwood), Aspectsof Social Change in Modern Japan (1967) (edited by R.P.Dore) and PoliticalDevelopment in Modern Japan, (1968) (edited by Robert E.Ward).4 In this fourthvolume the post-war Allied Occupation received its first contemplative treatmentby a major Western scholar.5 In this the United States was no longer seen as asecular redeemer but as the executor of planned political change helped by apopulation which was ‘at the outset…a remarkably literate, well-educated, andpolitically experienced national group’.6

No one interested in comparative studies can dispute the value of the‘Modernization Series’. These works explored their theme with imagination andflexibility and introduced three novel elements into western studies of Japanesehistory. Major Japanese scholars such as Maruyama Masao and Ishida Takeshicontributed papers. Indian and Chinese parallels were used to stimulatediscussion;7 and a wide range of social scientists and historians collaborated asnever before.

Parallel with these publications Robert E.Ward and DankwartA.Rustow edited Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Studies inPolitical Development, Volume 3) (1964) which compared varied aspects ofpolitical and social change in those two societies. Like the ‘Modernization’


volumes, this work originated in the proceedings of a conference, in this instanceorganized by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the American SocialScience Research Council, and funded by the Ford Foundation.8

In additon to their inherent interest some major essays from these five worksdeveloped into major monographs, some with no obvious parallels in Japanese.9

As studies of modernization deepened they became increasingly detached fromthoughts of contemporary politics. Attention moved from the process of changeto its antecedents in the Tokugawa period. T.C.Smith’s The Agrarian Origins ofModern Japan, (1959) had introduced scholars to the economic significance ofthese centuries for later change. Now Harvard, Columbia and PrincetonUniversities supported major publications on Tokugawa politics. ConradTotman’s Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1600–1853 (1967) originated in adesire to study the decline of the Bakufu but developed into an analysis of itstraditional pattern of operation. Herschel Webb’s The Japanese ImperialInstitution in the Tokugawa Period (1968) appeared in the same year as did JohnW.Hall and Marius B.Jansen’s Studies in the Institutional History of EarlyModern Japan, (1968). The latter volume combined. twenty major essays toexplore the themes of feudalism, the establishment of daimy� rule, daimy� rulein castle-town and village, and late Tokugawa history.10

While the study of development led, indirectly, to new research on earlymodern Japan, the war in Indo-China promoted a new interest in the historicalbackground of the Pacific War. It would be naive to oversimplify the motives ofresearch in the late 1960s but the immense tragedy of Vietnam suggestedsignificant parallels with the ‘China Incident’ of pre-waryears.11 At times youngAmericans exaggerated the similarity between these two guerilla challenges toestablished powers, yet some points of resemblance could scarcely be denied. Asense of shared catastrophe certainly helped produce a new more sympatheticapproach to the policies and problems of early Sh� wa Japan. Perhaps thistendency first appeared in James B.Crowley’s Japan’s Quest for Autonomy,1930–38 (1966). In this pre-war leaders were no longer seen solely as objects ofopprobium but were described as ‘honourable men, loyal servants of theThrone…’ who ‘sought what their predecessors had sought, security andprosperity.’12 This attempt to see the years 1931–41 in a more objective light wasechoed in the final volume on the theme of modernization—Dilemmas of Growthin Pre-War Japan (1971) (edited by James W.Morley).13 This departed from theemphasis of earlier volumes on the Tokugawa and Meiji periods andconcentrated attention on the inter-war decades. China, India and Turkey were nolonger the basis of comparison and Germany replaced them as the internationalpoint of reference. Now previous analyses were inverted. Growth rather thanfeudalism or conspiracy was seen as as a possible cause of military expansion.114

After a careful discussion of Western and Japanese writings on the origins of thePacific war James Morley asked ‘to what extent were these (modernizing)trends responsible for the heightening of violence which swept Japan in the1920s and 1930s, and for which the Government formed no more satisfactory

MAJOR AMERICAN PUBLICATIONS ON JAPANESE HISTORY, 1970–75, AND THEIR POST-WAR SETTING 335

answers than repression and war?’ He answered that they were ‘largelyresponsible,…in the sense that they set up many of the most serious dilemmasJapan has had to face.’15 This re-examination of pre-war Japan was alsoexpressed in essays edited by George M.Wilson Crisis Politics in Pre-WarJapan, Institutional & Ideological Problems of the 1930s (1970) which dealtwith the bureaucracy, the Military Reserve Association and the Incident of 26thFebruary, 1936.

This renewed interest in Sh� wa Japan was one of the emerging features ofpublications after 1970. Ben-Ami Shillony expanded his chapter in CrisisPolitics into a full length monograph; Revolt in Japan, The Young Officers andThe February 26 Incident (1973). Dorothy Borg and S.Okamoto’s Pearl Harboras History, Japanese-American Relations, 1931–41 (1973) contained manyimpressive essays on pre-war politics, and revisionism reached its polemicalclimax in Richard H.Minear’s Victor’s Justice, the Tokyo War Crimes Trial(1971). This discussed the International Miltary Tribunal’s view of the pre-waryears and concluded ‘The indictment and judgement assumed that Japanesehistory could be explained in terms of a conspiracy and that conspiracy was benton aggression. An unbiased look at the evidence would have forced drasticrevision of these misconceptions.’16

Since 1970 this new research on the 1930s has been paralleled by a reappraisalof the preceding decades of ‘Taish� democracy’. This re-investigation originatedwith Tetsuo Najita’s Hara Kei and the Politics of Compromise 1905–13 (1967)and Peter Duus’ Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taish� Japan (1968), andwas continued with a pioneering sequence of monographs and general works.Henry Dewitt Smith’s Study of the Shinjinkai—Japan’s First Student Radicals(1972) highlighted the links between student behaviour in the 1920s with that ofthe post-war years; and Stephen S.Large’s The Rise of Labour in Japan, 1912–19, The Yuaikai (1972) provided a useful introduction to the beginnings ofTaish� trade unionism. Perhaps the trend of future research can best be judgedfrom the scope of Bernard S.Silberman and Harry D.Harootunian’s ConferenceSymposium Japan in Crisis, Essays on Taish� Democracy (1974). This volumewas partly funded by the A.A.S. Conference on Modern Japan and includedAmerican & Japanese scholars among its contributors. Its contents includedpapers on political thought, proletarian literature, and economic history whichmay well develop in a further series of detailed monographs.

The Allied Occupation is a further aspect of the twentieth century which hasrecently attracted scholarly interest. Despite reprints of official publications,17

semi-official histories, and contemporary commentaries this field has only drawnserious attention during the last four years.18 Eleanor M. Hadley’s Antitrust inJapan (1970), William P.Woodard’s The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–52,and Japanese Religions (1972) & Chalmers A. Johnson’s Conspiracy atMatsukawa (1972) are all near definitive studies of their respective themes, yetmany major problems remain to be explored. The progress of all future researchon these years will be speeded and encouraged by Robert E.Ward & Frank


J.Shulman’s magnificent bibliography, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–52An Annotated Bibliography of Western Language Materials (867 pp.) (1974)which complements a parallel listing of Japanese materials.19

In addition to these new explorations in twentieth-century history the 1970’shave seen the rapid development of research on medieval Japan. Peter Duus’short essay Japanese Feudalism (1969) synthesised much existing knowledge;and H.Paul Varley’s Imperial Restoration in Medieval Japan (1971) providedthe first serious study of the Kemmu Restoration of 1333– 36. Even moresignificant has been the impressive programme of research organized byProfessor John W.Hall at Yale University. In 1972 the Ford Foundationsupported a Yale Research Seminar on Medieval Japan and its proceedings werepublished two years later as J.W.Hall and Jeffrey P.Mass’ Medieval Japan;Essays in Institutional History (1974). These studies analyse Court and RuralDevelopments in the Heian Period, the Kamakura Bakufu, the Economic Impactof the Mongol Invasions, and the Muromachi regime. As in earlier symposia somepapers appeared likely to generate future monographs, and already JeffreyP.Mass’ essay has been expanded into Warrior Government in Medieval Japan,A Study of the Kamakura Bakufu, Shugo and Jit� (1974) published by YaleUniversity Press.

In addition to turning their attention to new periods, historians in the 1970shave moved to new themes of scholarly investigation. Cultural history hasreceived surprisingly little attention since Sir George Sansom’s pre-war work20

but the penultimate volume of the ‘Modernization Series’, Donald M. Shively’sTradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture (1971) went some waytowards restoring cultural issues to the central stream of contemporary writing.This surveyed, musical, literary and artistic aspects of modern Japanese history,and their links with such political landmarks as the Sino-Japanese war. Thisrenewed interest in cultural questions was further marked by H.Paul Varley’soutline study, Japanese Culture, A Short History (1973), the first such survey tobe published in the postwar years.

Biography was yet another aspect of historical writing which received moreactive attention after 1970. Following decades with hardly a single satisfactorystudy of a Japanese political leader Roger F.Hackett’s Yamagata Aritomo and theRise of Modern Japan 1838–1922 (1971), Ivan P.Hall’s Mori Arinori (1973) andJoyce Lebra’s Okuma Shigenobu, Statesmen of Meiji Japan (1973) appeared inrapid succession. Intellectual figures of Tokugawa and Meiji times were also thesubject of serious study in such works as Thomas R.H.Havens. Nishi Amane andModern Japanese Thought (1970) and Shigeru Matsumoto’s Motoori Norinaga1730–1801 (1970). Equally important was Albert M.Craig & DonaldH.Shively’s Personality in Japanese History (1970) which contained short, wellresearched sketches of statesmen, literary figures and practical men several ofwhom had never been described in any Western works. At the level of day to daypracticality new handbooks, and texts for students have recently providedvaluable assistance for scholars and teachers. Among these publications, Frank


J.Shulman’s Japan and Korea; An Annotated Bibliography of DoctoralDissertations in Western Languages, 1877– 1969 (1970) John W.Hall’s Japanfrom Prehistory to Modern Times (1970), H. Paul Varley’s A Syllabus ofJapanese Civilization (2nd Edition 1972) and James B.Crowley’s Modern EastAsia: Essays in Interpretation (1970) have been of particular importance. Thelatter contains tightly written essays which embody much recent research on thehistory of China, Japan and East Asia. The increasing need for syntheses ofresearch and academic debates has also been recognised by the founding of theJournal of Japanese Studies (in October 1974) and published at the University ofWashington, Seattle.21

In conclusion, the 1970s have seen American studies of Japan break free frommany of their previous limitations. Medieval, Tokugawa, Taish� and Sh� waJapan have been illuminated as never before but many areas still requiresophisticated treatment. Cultural history is still much neglected. Prehistory isstill largely ignored. The history of minorities, emigration, cities, science andtechnology all await academic pioneers. These vast and crucial aspects of theJapanese past continue to appear in the sketchy perspective of historicalanimation.

NOTES

1. For a detailed treatment of writings produced before 1966 see John W.Hall:Japanese History, New Dimensions of Approach and Understanding. SecondEdition 1966. Service Center for Teachers of History. Publication Number 34,American Historical Association, Washington D.C. (obtainable from the HistoricalAssociation, 59A Kennington Park Road, London S.E.11)

2. For a less used, pioneering work see J.G.Groot: The Prehistory of Japan (1951). In1965 J.E.Kidder also produced The Birth of Japanese Art, a study of early potteryfigures.

3. For a useful historiographical study see John Young’s The Location of Yamatai, ACase Study in Japanese Historiography. 720—1945. (1958)

4. Important revisionist works on the political history of the Meiji period includeGeorge Akita Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan; 1868–1900 (1967) and Joseph Pittau: Political Thought in early Meiji Japan; 1868–89(1967)

5. Robert E.Ward, ‘Reflections on the Allied Occupation and Planned PoliticalChange in Japan’. pp. 477–535.

6. Ibid p. 517.7. e.g. Helmut Wilhelm ‘Chinese Confucianism on the Eve of the Great Encounter’

and Stephen N.Hay ‘Western and Indigenous Elements in Modern Indian Thought,The Case of Rammohun Roy’ in Changing Japanese Attitudes TowardModernization.

8. The Conference on Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, 10–14September, 1962 Gould House, Dobbs Ferry, New York.


Bernard S.Silberman and Harry D.Harootunian’s Modern Japanese Leadership(1966) was a further example of a valuable symposium produced from Conferencepapers. The original meetimg entitled ‘Nineteenth Century Japanese Elites’ washeld at The University of Arizona in December 1963.

9. e.g. Roger F.Hackett’s Yamagata Aritomo and the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838–1922 (1971).

10. A later significant addition to work on the Tokugawa Period was HarryD.Harootunian’s Toward Restoration, The Growth of Political Consciousness inTokugawa Japan (1970).

11. Hilary Conroy’s ‘Japan’s War in China: Historical Parallel to Vietnam?’ PacificAffairs Vol XLIII, No. 1, Spring 1970. pp. 61–72.

12. Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 1930–38, p. XVII13. The outcome of a Conference held in Puerto Rico in January 1968.14. Perhaps the new recognition of the unfortunate side effects of economic growth

in Japan also contributed to this new approach.15. J.W.Morley: (ed.) Dilemmas of Growth in Pre-War Japan p. 28.16. Victor’s Justice p. 15 817. Notably the Greenwood Press reprints of U.S. Department of State: Occupation of

Japan, Policy & Progress. S.C.A.P. Government Section: Political Re-orientationof Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, (2 volumes). Edwin M.Martin: TheAllied Occupation of Japan. Robert A.Fearey: The Occupation of Japan, SecondPhase, 1948–50. Robert B. Textor: Failure in Japan with Keystones for a PositivePolicy. (obtainable from Westport Publications Limited, 3 Henrietta Street, LondonWC2E 8LT).

18. Two short but useful works are Grant K. Goodman (Compiler), The AmericanOccupation of Japan: A Retrospective View (1968) (International Studies, EastAsian Series Research Publication No. 2) Centre for East Asian Studies, TheUniversity of Kansas, distributed by Paragon Book Gallery Ltd. 14 East 38th St.New York 10016; & Herbert Passin: The Legacy of The Occupation in Japan(1968) (Occasional Paper of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University.)

19. Sakamoto Yoshikazu et al. Nihon senry� bunken mokuroku Nihon GakujutsuShink� kai, Tokyo, 1972.

20. Japan, A Short Cultural History (1931)21. Editorial and Business Offices, Thomson Hall, DR—05. University of

Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195.

Postscript September 1975.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Thomas R.H.Havens: Farm & Nation in Modern Japan Agrarian Nationalism, 1870–1940, (1974)

Joyce C.Lebra (editor) Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II(1975)

Tetsuo Najita: Japan (1974)Irwin Scheiner (editor): Modern Japan, An Interpretive Anthology (1974)


Richard J.Smethurst: A Social Basis for Pre-War Japanese Militarism, the Army & theRural Community (1974)

David A.Titus: Palace & Politics in Pre-War Japan (1974)


First published in Japanese (Gaikokujin-muke no Kyoto no Rekishi)

in Jinbun, No. 31, 1985, Kyoto University research Institute for

Humanistic Studies

34The History of Kyoto for Foreigners

BEFORE THIS VISIT to Japan I scoured British bookshops for a detailed guidebook to Kyoto, but could not find one. So immediately after arriving I visited theCity Tourist Office in front of the station, and discovered the Tourist Office’spublications Gaidobukku Kyoto and the English language guide Kyoto. Thinkingthat Kyoto was an English translation of Gaidobukku Kyoto, and that they mightbe useful for translation practice, I bought the ‘set’ of two. But on returning toKyoto University’s International House, and comparing them, I found that,sadly, the two were quite different. However some of these differences were,perhaps, understandable. Certainly it would be an unusual foreign tourist whowould be interested in a list of Kyoto pickle shops!!

However if one examines the two books carefully interesting differences areapparent. These could be considered differences of historical viewpoints. Forexample in the book for Japanese readers the history of the Shimabara pleasurequarter, and a photograph of the Great Gate of Shimabara are included, but theyare missing from the English language guide. It is difficult to know the exactreason for this, but perhaps the author of the English language volume sought toconvey an image of a ‘clean Kyoto’—rather than explain the role whichShimabara had played in the history of the city.

Even more interesting is the difference between the two books’ treatment ofthe nineteenth century. If we consider nineteenth century world history Japan’sMeiji Restoration (1868) has an importance which ranks with the unification ofGermany, and Italy. Furthermore in the final pre-Restoration years Kyoto wasthe absolute centre of political turmoil. So if one examines the Japanese languageguide book—there are descriptions of the sites of the ‘martyrs deaths’ ofRestoration heroes Sakamoto Ry� ma and Nakaoka Shintar� —even though noold buildings remain. Even the Reizan graveyard of loyalist samurai is described.Naturally the Japanese book’s description of Nij� castle mentions the MeijiRestoration—but in the English volume, there is no mention whatever of theturmoil and political murders of the nineteenth century. In fact only the fine artsand tranquillity of the shogunate period are referred to.

Behind these differences may be a preconception that foreigners have nointerest in the Meiji Restoration—but it is difficult to imagine that a guide bookto Boston, would fail to mention the American War of Independence or that a

guide to Dublin would be silent regarding the anti-British Easter Rising, or that aguide to Paris would not mention the French Revolution. It is probably not anoverstatement to say that Kyoto seems to treat the history of Kyoto as simply arthistory or the history of culture and crafts. Compared with the Japanese languageguide it’s clear that it seeks to make the history of Kyoto a Shangri-la style myth.If we base our view on the fact that the history of Kyoto is closely linked withworld history one can say that guide books like Kyoto ‘guide’ us into worldhistory in a very bizarre way!

342 THE HISTORY OF KYOTO FOR FOREIGNERS

First published in John Cannon (ed.), The Blackwell Dictionary of

Historians, Oxford, Blackwell Reference, 1988, pp. 213–215

35Japanese Historiography

JAPANESE historical writing began with the introduction of the Chinese script,and Chinese dynastic chronicles. From the seventh century Japanese emperorssponsored the compilation of official histories, and the oldest surviving example,the Kojiki, appeared in 712. This complex blend of myth, legend and realitydescribes the origins and achievements of the Imperial Household. The nextmajor history, the Nihon Shoki (720), followed the language and form of theChinese chronicles even more closely, and continued the glorification of theimperial line.

In the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries, palace officials compiled five officialhistories, but with the weakening of the imperial court unofficial scholarshipbecame a major feature of Japanese historiography. Now both courtiers andBuddhist monks used new forms and methods to reinterpret the Japanese past.Particularly important was the monk K� en’s Fus� Ryakki which used templerecords and other Buddhist sources to broaden the scope of historical writing. Asecond innovation was the narrative history which copied the style of the‘literary tale’. The first example of this genre was the Eiga Monogatari (c. 1030)which celebrated the lives and exploits of the rich and powerful Fujiwara family.The greatest work in this style was the � kagami which surveys the years 850 to1025. The novelty of this history lay in its use of an imagined dialogue betweenimpossibly old men to describe the decline of imperial power and the glories ofthe Fujiwara.

As the power of the aristocracy waned and warriors rose to authority, themesof decline and fate increasingly dominated historical writing. Against thisbackground, the distinguished monk Jien wrote the Gukansh� (c. 1220), the firstphilosophical treatment of Japanese history. In contrast to many earlier works,the Gukansh� was written in simple Japanese and explored the rules and cycles ofhistorical development. Jien divided history into seven periods and saw cyclicalpatterns in the growth of Japan. In contrast to the sophistication of the Gukansh� ,the popular Heike Monogatari was filled with vivid drama. But even this popularepic embodied ideas of transience and decline which were obvious products ofBuddhist philosophy.

Although the court never regained its former authority, powerful rulerscontinued to commission official histories. In the late thirteenth century, officials

of the Kamakura shogunate compiled the Azuma Kagami. This major history wascomposed in a special blend of Japanese and Chinese and described thesuccessful establishment of the Kamakura regime.

In the civil wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, military chroniclesbecame a dominant genre, but with the achievement of national unity the writingof national histories became an important activity. In the seventeenth century theTokugawa shogun’s advisers turned to Chinese historiography for their models,and Hayashi Razan and his son completed the Honch� Tsugan (1670). Thisnational history embodied the ethics and accuracy of the best Confucianscholarship. In the Tokugawa period some individual lords also commissionedhistories, and in 1657 the ruler of Mito ordered the compilation of a history ofJapan, the Dai Nihon Shi. This was eventually completed in 1906 and remains amajor monument of Japanese scholarship.

Perhaps the most original historian of the seventeenth and eighteenth centurieswas Arai Hakuseki (1657–1725), an adviser of the sixth Tokugawa shogun.Although Hakuseki was a Confucian scholar he took a new detached attitude toJapanese and Chinese historical records. In such works as Dokushi Yoron hedivided earlier centuries into ‘early’ and ‘medieval’ periods and attempted thepsychological analysis of important historical figures. In exploring such newfields as transport, money and international relations, this remarkable scholardramatically widened the scope of Japanese historical studies.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many non-samurai scholarsavoided Confucian moralism and developed the pursuit of so-called ‘NationalLearning’. Such writers as Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) re-evaluated Japan’searly literature and chronicles and his ‘Commentary on the Kojiki’ (1798)combined both linguistic and historical analysis. Such writers often criticized theaccretion of Buddhist and Confucian thought in Japanese culture and claimed thatthis had damaged traditional virtues.

Even before the opening of Japan in 1854, scholars of the ‘Textual CriticismSchool’ embarked upon the rigorous evaluation of documents and the collectionof source materials. However, contact with the west and the creation of the modernstate (1868) brought a major transformation of historical studies. In fact Germanhistorical method fused with existing textual criticism to produce a newacademic tradition.

In 1879 Tokyo University founded its historical section and eight years latervon Ranke’s student, Ludwig Riess, was invited to become professor of history.Soon after, the Historical Study Society (Shigakkai) began the publication of itsprestigious journal, Shigaku Zasshi, which remains of major importance.

Although modernization was a stimulus to historical scholarship, the politicalorthodoxy of the new state soon began to limit intellectual freedom. In 1892, thedistinguished scholar Kume Kunitake was expelled from Tokyo University fordismissing emperor-based Shinto as an ‘ancient practice’.

344 JAPANESE HISTORIOGRAPHY

This was only the first of a series of conflicts between historians andgovernment which were to continue until 1945. In particular, research whichprobed the mythology of the imperial household was largely suppressed.

Perhaps the most striking feature of research between the wars was thedevelopment of social and economic history, including major works of Marxistanalysis. Indeed the most important historical debates of the 1930s were inspiredby attempts to fit modern Japanese history into a Marxist framework.

During the war years, nationalist writing was superficially dominant but withJapan’s surrender and occupation, Japanese historians experienced unparalleledfreedom. Again, Marxism became a major influence on historical writing and itwas only in the 1970s that American historiographical methods came tochallenge Marxist dominance in many fields.

Although serious western studies of Japanese history were pioneered byBritish diplomats in the 1860s, large scale research did not develop until thesecond world war. Some wartime western works, such as E.H.Norman’s Japan’sEmergence as a Modern State, were influenced by Japanese Marxist writing butin the postwar years specialist ‘empirical’ studies have dominated westernpublications on Japan.

Reading

Ackroyd, Joyce: Told Round a Brushwood Fire: the Autobiography of Arai Hakuseki,translated with an Introduction and Notes (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press,1979).

Aston, W.G. transl.: Nihongi: Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to AD 697(Repr. of 1896 edn) (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1972).

Brown, Delmer M. and Ishida, Ichir� : The Future and the Past, A translation and study ofthe Gukansho, an interpretive history of Japan written in 1219 (Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1979).

Brownlee, John S. ed.: History in the Service of the Japanese Nation (Toronto: Universityof Toronto and York University joint Center on Modern East Asia, 1983).

Dower, John W. ed.: Origins of the Modern Japanese State—Selected Writings ofE.H.Norman (New York: Pantheon, 1975).

Kitagawa, Hiroshi and Tsuchida, Bruce T. (transl.): The Tale of the Heike (University ofTokyo Press, 1975).

Koschmann, J.Victor: The Mito Ideology, Discourse, Reform and Insurrection in LateTokugawa Japan, 1798–1864 (University of California Press, 1987).

Matsumoto, Shigeru: Motoori Norinaga, 1730–1801 (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1970).

McCullough, Helen Craig: Okagami, The Great Mirror, Fujiwara Michinaga (996–1027)and his Times: a study and translation (University of Tokyo Press, 1980).

Philippi, Donald L.: Kojiki, a translation with an Introduaion and Notes (University ofTokyo Press, 1969).


Shinoda, Minoru: The Founding of the Kamakura Shogunate, 1180–85, with SelectedTranslations from the Azuma Kagami (New York: Columbia University Press,1960).

346 JAPANESE HISTORIOGRAPHY

First published in History Today, Volume 40, January 1990

36Rethinking Japan, 1937–1945

AT THE HEIGHT of the Second World War a young official in the UnitedStates Department of State analysed Japanese expansion with surprisingdetatchment. In a paper designed to sketch the outlines of a more peaceful worldRobert Fearey attributed Japan’s attacks upon China, America, Britain andHolland to structural economic causes. Among these causes Fearey listedWestern protectionism, which had obstructed Japan’s commercial development,and Japan’s lack of secure supplies of food and raw materials. Even moreperceptive was Fearey’s suggestion that Japan would soon face Asiancompetition and needed to develop more varied and sophisticated exportproducts.

Not surprisingly such objectivity and logic had little place in Westernhistorical writing in the aftermath of four years of total war. Memories ofcasualties, atrocities and devastation soon produced a historiography which waspreoccupied with issues of conspiracy, guilt and political delinquency. Thesemoralistic concepts also dominated the allied trials of Japan’s wartime leaders,which in turn shaped the sources and assumptions of many historians. Thewritings of postwar scholars were also coloured by the strident messages ofJapanese wartime propaganda. These had proclaimed the uniqueness of Japan’simperial state, the antiquity of her martial tradition and the divine origins of herruler and people. Thus the first generation of post-war historians often saw Japan’sguilt as the product of a feudal military tradition which had overcome moremodern forces of internationalism, democracy and cultural pluralism. Earlystudies of the emperor system, nationalism and ultranationalism all reflectedthese basic assumptions is did Robert Scalapino’s pioneering study of pre-warpolitical parties which was aptly subtitled ‘the failure of the first attempt’.

By the early 1960s a received view of pre-war and wartime Japanese history wasclearly established in Anglo-American academic circles.

This perpetuated the conspiracy theories of the Tokyo trials and depictedultranationalists, particularly young army officers, as the decisive actors inrecent history. According to this interpretation junior officers from impoverishedrural areas had used threats, plots and assassinations to gain influence over theirsuperiors. From this position of strength these fanatical patriots had forced

commanders, ministers and industrialists into an expnsionist war which hadended in national disaster.

By the mid-1960s Japan’s economic recovery, America’s intervention inVietnam and advances in historical scholarship had combined to produce a waveof revisionist writing which viewed pre-war Japan in more sympathetic andcomplex terms. A group of largely American scholars began to study Japan’s‘modernisation’ for clues to successful development, and concluded thatnineteenth-century Japan had been a remarkably advanced society. In fact thefinal volume of the ‘Modernisation series’ suggested that Japan’s rapiddevelopment, rather than her backwardness, had precipitated the pre-war crisis.Development had brought an unprecedented dependence on internationalmarkets, and the Wall Street crash and its aftermath had undermined economicand political stabilitv.

In 1966 James Crowley’s Japan’s Questfor Autonomy National Security andForeign Policy, 1930–1938 confirmed this shifting trend in Westernhistoriography. This American scholar argued that the economic and militarycrises which Japan had faced rendered lier attempt to create a self-sufficient EastAsian block an understandable stratagem, rather than an irrational raid on theimpossible. This work made no overt reference to America’s war in Vietnam butits suggestion that Japanese expansion had been motivated by traditional raisonsd’état was perhaps an unconscious by-product of America’s own global conceptof national security.

Crowley not only reassessed the motives of Japanese leaders but alsoquestioned previous analyses of politics. Whereas earlier scholars had seen theattempted military coup of February 22nd, 1936, as evidence of ultranationalistinfluence, Crowley dwelt upon its ultimate failure and the continued capacity ofthe high command to determine policy. This writer challenged the view thatvirtuous civilians had been overwhelmed by an unprincipled military anddemonstrated that important civilian leaders had been committed to the cause ofoverseas expansionism. Crowley also condemned early analysis of armyfactionalism as naive and unhistorical and asserted that support for overseasadventures had been widespread among Japan’s army and navy leaders. Thisiconoclastic work was a major historiographical landmark. It was the firstWestern monograph to distance itself from the spirit and documents of the Tokyotrials and the first to make extensive use of a new multi-volume Japanese work(Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi—‘The Road to the Pacific War’) which wasgrounded in the detatched analysis of contemporary sources.

The interpretive link between America’s war in Vietnam and Japan’s pre-warand wartime expansion was only implicit in Crowley’s monograph. It was clearand explicit in Richard Minear’s Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Trial whichappeared in 1971. This radical polemic supported the Indian judge Pal’s criticismsof the legal and ethical basis of the trial and concluded that most allied judgeshad been biased and inconsistent in their conduct and verdicts. Some prosecutionshad been launched to avert friction with the Soviet Union, while the notion of


Japanese aggression appeared far less clear-cut in the light of America’sundeclared war in South East Asia.

Both Crowley and Minear had focused attention on the motives andmechanisms of Japanese foreign policy but the next major revisionist workGordon Berger’s Parties Out of Power in Japan, 1931–41 concentrated on thepattern of her domestic politics. Unlike many writers who had begun theiranalyses with the events of the Manchurian crisis Berger delved into the earlierevents of the 1920s. By investigating the ideas of a variety of civilian andmilitary leaders Berger extended Crowley’s notion of realpolitik to the shaping ofdomestic politics. According to this interpretation the notion of a nationaldefence state with a planned economy and centralized political structure was notthe product of pre-modern fanaticism but an intellectual response to Europeanconcepts of total war. Berger also traced the impact of such ideas on the shapingof Japan’s wartime polity, and concluded that disunity rather than dictatorshipwas the hallmark of Japan’s ‘new order’. In a fascinating discussion of the ideasand personalities which contributed to the creation of a single political organ, theImperial Rule Assistance Association, Berger demonstrated that unbridgeablegulfs separated many of Japan’s ruling élites. The themes of inter- and intra-service rivalry had already been a familiar element in the testimony and memoirsof army and navy leaders but Berger’s work clarified a less familiar series ofcivil-military and inter-civilian disputes. Groups as diverse as the owners ofJapan’s electric power companies and the powerful home ministry hadsuccessfully defeated attempts to subdue and control them. Consequently therewas little that was new or orderly in Japan’s wartime regime.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s broader comparative analyses and new linesof research produced more detailed reappraisals of Japan’s wartime politics. Ben-Ami Shillony’s Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan confirmed the narrowlimits of the Emperor’s political power and demonstrated that Prime MinisterTojo had possessed far less authority than Hitler, Stalin or Mao-tse Tung.Particularly striking was Shillony’s account of the smoothness and formality ofTojo’s ejection from office in 1944.

Although Shillony’s political analysis suggested a more fragmented and lessauthoritarian state than the Third Reich his discussion of the Japaneseintelligentsia emphasised conformity and political loyalty. In earlier yearsJapanese scholars had often claimed that intellectuals had refused to collaboratewith the wartime regime, or had only done so following physical orpsychological torture. In contrast Shillony revealed that many writers andacademics had enthusiastically supported the war effort. The very success ofJapan’s cultural modernisation had made her intellectuals more independent ofthe West—thus war with Britain and the United States ignited an almost mysticenthusiasm among some distinguished men of letters; just as the Great War hadaroused near ecstasy among English poets and pundits.

Shillony also demonstrated remarkable elements of continuity and normalityin his discussion of such themes as Japan’s judicial process, elections and

RETHINKING JAPAN, 1937–1945 349

political prisoners. Most law courts appear to have been little affected bywartime conditions, elections were remarkable for their general propriety, andTojo, unlike Stalin or Hitler, imprisoned few political offenders.

The late 1970s also saw the appearance of a work which sought to extend theanalysis of wartime Japan to embrace the whole of civilian society. ThomasHavens’ Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War II examinedthe half-forgotten realities of wartime life: food and clothing shortages andrationing, air raid precautions, mass evacuation and months of relentlessbombing. Many of these themes evoked comparisons with European experience,and further eroded images of a bizarre feudalistic society. Havens also placedsuch emotional phenomena as ‘spiritual mobilisation’ and high-pitchedpropaganda in the context of modern, all-out total war. This work also describedprogressive social tendencies which closely paralleled British experience. Thedemands of wartime industry had removed personal servants from wealthy andmiddle-class households, and women had entered many occupations which werepreviously a male preserve.

In later writings Ben-Ami Shillony also re-evaluated aspects of Japan’swartime education system. Many Japanese and American works had rightlyemphasised the central position of military indoctrination and ultra-nationalismin the wartime school curriculum but Shillony explored less familiar areas oftechnical, scientific and higher education. In these important fields Japaneseresponses were modern rather than traditional, and differed little from those inother belligerent states. Between 1935 and 1945 the Japanese governmentfounded new research institutes, colleges and universities and gave a majorimpetus to scientific and technical education. In this decade overall studentnumbers doubled, while the number of engineering students was increasedfourfold. All these policies helped to compensate for Japan’s isolation fromAmerican science and made an important contribution to war production.

Links between war and production were also the theme of Richard Rice’srecent studies of wartime industrial administration. In discussions of governmentattempts to manage and organise military production this scholar, like Berger,highlighted the squabbles, inadequacies and rivalries which plagued majorattempts at coordinating armaments production. Japan’s ministry of munitionswas not established until 1943, and even then failed to integrate production aseffectively as its British equivalent. Time after time industrialists resistedgovernment and army intervention, and a shortage of technically qualifiedofficials left ministers dependent on the goodwill or otherwise of privatebusinessmen.

A more effective field of state control, the mass media, has also been re-assessed in contributions to Kenneth Short’s Film and Radio Propaganda inWorld War II. Essays and memoirs in this collection demonstrate that powerfulmodern elements dominated the organisation and execution of Japanese domesticpropaganda. As in Germany and Britain state censorship, self-censorship andofficial objectives shaped radio, the press and film-making. Nevertheless


Japanese broadcasters, journalists and film directors often responded to achanging war situation with remarkable flexibility and imagination. Whenlisteners were war-weary, drama and entertainment broadcasts were increased.When air raids threatened documentary films expounded air raid precautions, andJapanese studios provided surprising opportunities for Ozu and Kurosawa tomake feature films with little or no political content. Similarly Japan’s drasticallyreduced range of newspaper and magazines published important literary works,and occasionally reflected anti-government criticism.

These specialised and general re-evaluations of Japanese political culture andsociety suggest complex and contradictory interpretations. Much writing hassuggested that wartime Japan was a more modern and less tradition-boundsociety than that depicted in her own late and desperate propaganda. However,recent writings may have been excessively influenced by Japan’s postwarprosperity and political liberalism. Indeed scholars have often chosen to ignoreor minimise less favourable aspects of Japan’s wartime experience. The physicalprivation and sufferings of Japanese civilians, which were in part theconsequence of government arrogance and incompetence are rarely discussed indetail. More often such themes have become the preserve of scholars of otheracademic disciplines, Powerful accounts of the sufferings of the citizens ofHiroshima and Nagasaki exist, but these are frequently literary works or productsof research in the social sciences. The nationwide impact of incendiary bombing,the deterioration of health, housing and nutrition, the plight of Chinese andKorean forced labourers are all significant social themes that suffer oversight inthe pursuit of excessive ‘re-interpretation’. Indeed the selective ‘rehabilitation’of wartime Japan has at times been too clinical to be completely faithful to amental and physical past which has become increasingly difficult to recreate.

Much recent academic discussion has focused upon the extent to whichwartime Japan was or was not a fascist state. As Berger and Shillony havedemonstrated Japan’s regime lacked the personal dictatorship, unity and effectiveone party apparatus which characterised Nazi Germany. However, many ofJapan’s leaders manifestly sought to emulate aspects of Nazi politics, economicmanagement and propaganda control. Similarly, the diplomatic and militarysuccesses which Germany and Italy achieved between 1933 and 1940 exerted asignificant but unquantifiable influence upon Japanese civil and military opinion.Japan’s ‘New Order’ may have been incomplete and ineffective but it wasclearly an attempt to blend, authoritarianism, autarky and nationalism in wayswhich diverged from the more open politics of the 1920s.

In contrast, much press and media discussion has recently focused on thenarrow issue of the emperor’s political role, and his responsibility for war and itsatrocities. Professional historians have rightly stated that the proponents ofimperial guilt are almost invariably journalists with little or no knowledge ofprimary sources. Distinguished scholars have clarified the Emperor’s role as aconstitutional monarch and his known preference for peaceful rather thanaggressive policies. But in the context of wartime Japan the Emperor’s greatest


importance was as a symbol of modernity—who visited universities, researchinstitutes or scenes of bomb damage—or of tradition who particicated in Shintoceremonies. The emotional and social power of this symbol is impossible toestimate but it was a crucial element in Japan’s conduct of total war.

With the passing of Europe’s colonial era and the emergence of new historiansacademic debate has often broadened to embrace Japan’s role beyond hermetropolitan territories. Such discussion has also been inspired by the claims ofJapanese historians that despite defeat Japan had liberated the colonial territoriesof South East Asia. In the immediate aftermath of war it was common for Britishscholars to dismiss Japanese occupation policies as no more than clumsy effortsto exploit Asian territories for labour, resources and strategic bases. Clearly suchmotives dominated Japanese plans, but behind this broad intent lay a widevariety of political and cultural policies. In Hong Kong, Singapore and theChinese settlements of Malaya and Indonesia, Japanese policies were tyrannicaland cruel, as all Chinese were viewed as potential supporters of China’s anti-Japanese war. But in other colonial territories the destruction of European andAmerican power and the employment of pan-Asian propaganda could evokefavourable responses.

Japanese behaviour in occupied territories was often shaped by the fortunes ofwar and the sensitivity or clumsiness of local commanders. The responses of theoccupied were also influenced by the sins and virtues of their former colonialmasters. Following the inflexible rule of Dutch administrators the population ofJava and Sumatra showed considerable sympathy for the Japanese presence. Incontrast, the inhabitants of the Philippines, who had already been promisedindependence, were far more hostile to Japanese rule. Nevertheless, manycolonial subjects were at first enthused by Japan’s destruction of colonialcontrol, However this verdict does not amount to an acceptance of Japaneseclaims to have been virtuous liberators. Japan’s concession of nominalindependence to Burma and the Philippines, and her belated encouragement ofIndonesian independence were largely the product of her declining strength, andthe need to rally Asian support against allied offensives. Even Japan’s militarydecline did not always bring quasi-liberal responses. In Vietnam it brought thereverse—a consolidation of Japanese military authority and the final destructionof French influence.

Perhaps the most stimulating reappraisal of Japan’s political role in East andSouth East Asia is provided by Akira Iriye’s Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–45. This work goes beyond local analyses and examinesthe structural concepts of Japan’s Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.According to Iriye, Japan’s Asian policy was premised upon two fundamentalconcepts, Japanese power and a vision of a shared culture linking peoples asdiverse as Mongols, Chinese, Malays and the inhabitants of the Indiansubcontinent. In fact, harsh experience and Japan’s prolonged war againstNationalist China demonstrated that notions of cultural compatibility had littlesubstance. Indeed Iriye suggests that the barrenness of Pan-Asianism was already


recognised by enlightened Japanese in 1943, when the East Asian Conferenceconvened in Tokyo. In its policy declaration this pro-Japanese gatheringadvocated relations with a wider world—not simply with an inner brotherhoodof Asian peoples.

Despite its inconsistencies the rhetoric of Japanese Asianism was not withoutlasting significance. It made a psychological contribution to the erosion ofcolonial authority and presaged much of the anti-colonial language of the postwaryears. Furthermore, as John Dower has shown in War Without Mercy, the Japanesewere themselves the victims of virulent racial antipathy in Europe and the UnitedStates. In short, the alliance of Western powers which Japan sought to destroywas not simply a coalition which represented democracy, pluralism andinternational law. It was an alliance which was permeated by a variety of racialprejudices which were slowly undermined by the pressures of war.

Following four years of total war both Washington and Tokyo ultimatelyabandoned the excesses of economic nationalism. The liberal order whichfollowed removed the economic roots of Japanese expansion which enlightenedAmericans had first perceived in the midst of the Pacific War.

FOR FURTHER READING:

Gordon M.Berger, Parties Out of Power in Japan, 1931–1941 (Princeton UniversityPress, 1977); James B.Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, National Security andForeign Policy, 1930–1938 (Princeton University Press, 1966); John Dower, WarWithout Mercy (Pantheon, 1986); Theodore Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy. JapanAgainst the West in Java and Luzon, 1942–1945 (Princeton University Press, 1988);Thomas R.H.Havens, Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two(W.W.Norton, 1978); Akira Iriye, Power and Culture, The Japanese American War,1941–1945 (Harvard University Press, 1981); Richard H.Minear, Victors’ Justice,The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton University Press, 1971); Robert A.Scalapino,Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan, The Failure of the FirstAttempt (University of California Press, 1962); Ben-Ami Shillony, Politics andCulture in Wartime Japan (OUP, 1980); Kenneth R.M.Short, (ed) Film and RadioPropaganda in World War II (Croom Helm, 1983).


First published in Sir Hugh Cortazzi and Gordon Daniels (eds),

Britain and Japan 1859–1991 Themes and Personalities, London,

Routledge, 1991, pp. 277–288, 313–314

37Sir George Sansom (1883–1965): Historian

and Diplomat

AMONG British historians whose minds and senses have engaged Japan’s richcivilization Sir George Sansom remains pre-eminent. Sixty years after thepublication of his Japan A Short Cultural History and a quarter of a century afterthe completion of his History of Japan, these works remain classics of grace andrigour which set exacting standards for each generation of western scholars.1 YetSir George Sansom was far more than a historian of formidable and subtlepowers. He was a long-serving diplomat, linguist and aesthete who overcameillness and disappointment with epic patience and resolve.

George Bailey Sansom was born in Limehouse on the eastern fringe ofLondon on 23 November 1883. His father was a naval architect who lost most ofhis savings by investing, unwisely, in his employer’s company. As a resultSansom was never to study at a British university and regretted this intellectualloss to the end of his life. Yet within these relatively straitened circumstancesSansom received an education which heightened his cultural sensitivity andrefined his linguistic skills.2 After graduating from Palmer’s School, Grays, hemoved to the Lycée Malherbe in Caen, and then spent over a year at theUniversities of Giessen and Marburg in Germany.

After returning to England Sansom spent some months in purposefulcramming and soon passed the examinations for the Far Eastern ConsularService. In 1904 he sailed for Japan and on arrival immersed himself in a varietyof Japanese cultural activities which are rarely embraced by British diplomats.At Nagasaki he joined a N� chorus, began the study of painting and calligraphy;and, more conventionally, began to collect ceramics, screens and other works ofart. In these years of diplomatic apprenticeship Sansom also devoted himself to awide variety of physical pursuits, one of which brought unexpected dangers. Fly-fishing, riding, golf and tennis were conventional diversions from official dutiesbut Sansom also undertook adventurous cross-country hikes. On one of these hewas gashed by a poisonous shrub and only a new drug from Vienna saved hislife.3 Between 1910 and 1914 Sansom served in Yokohama, Tokyo, Chemulpo inKorea and Hakodate, but with the outbreak of war he returned to London andwas recruited into the recondite world of naval intelligence. As part of theseduties he was despatched to Archangel, and discovered that Russian forces did

not lack supplies, but simply the will and organization to remove them from thequayside.

In 1919 Sansom returned to Japan and served as acting Japanese counsellorbefore assuming a variety of posts in Tokyo and the provinces. The years whichfollowed were to see his reputation rise high within the Tokyo Embassy and in1925 the ambassador, Sir Charles Eliot, evaluated him as follows.

For intellectual brilliance Mr Sansom is generally admitted to stand first inthe Japanese Service. He is an extremely good Japanese scholar—he hasalso published several valuable linguistic papers and translations. He is avery good draftsman in English, is well informed on all political and socialquestions and has specially studied commerce and financial matters. Atpresent he is greatly handicapped by ill health.4

At this evaluation it suggests Sansom’s relationship with Sir Charles Eliot wasclose and friendly. What is more, it extended well beyond the narrow confines ofprofessional diplomacy. Both men were committed scholars who were deeplyinterested in Japanese Buddhism and its rich and subtle intellectual heritage.From these shared interests stemmed a close rapport which continued afterEliot’s retirement to Nara.

By 1926, Sansom had begun work on his first important historical work, acultural history of Japan. In this he was aided by a diplomatic life which retainedsome of the relaxed ambience of Victorian days. During the summer longperiods were spent in the hills near Lake Chuzenji, and weekends and eveningswere rarely disturbed by diplomatic work. This regime was especially conduciveto Sansom’s method of historical research, which differed markedly from muchlibrary-based historical enquiry. Sansom visited temples and shrines in Kyoto,Nara and Ise, and even travelled to Korea to examine sites and museums whichilluminated the origins of Japanese art and architecture. Even more importantwas his creation of a sophisticated network of Japanese informants whose helphe always acknowledged in later years. This group included Professor AnesakiMasaru, the great authority on religious history; Professor Fukui Rikichiro, arenowned scholar of Japanese art; and Professor Yashiro Yukio, who possessed adeep knowledge of both Japanese and European art. Later Sansom recalled thepreparation of his cultural history with great warmth and enthusiasm:

I was in a state of continuous excitement. I had spent a decade or more inthe society of Japanese artists scholars, collectors, archaeologists, monks,museums, directors, actors, farmers and fishermen. There is very littlementioned in the book with which I was not familiar—paintings,sculptures, buildings, landscapes, mountains and rivers.5

Even before he completed this labour of love Sansom had published hisfirst major book, which was In part a by-product of his historical enquiries.


Though his Historical Grammar of Japanese was chiefly ‘a work of reference’for advanced students of Japanese, it was also ‘designed to provide material forstudy of the affiliations of the Japanese language—for inquiry into the origins ofthe Japanese race’.6 This pioneering work continued to be reprinted for fortyyears after its publication in 1928.

Japan: A Short Cultural History was finally published in 1931.7 DespiteSansom’s later achievements this event may have marked the highpoint of hisJapanese experience. The book’s preface mentions Japan’s ‘brave and lovablepeople’, a description which would have been unlikely in the years following theManchurian Incident of September 1931. However, the Manchurian crisisfocused western attention upon Japan to an unprecedented degree, and may havecontributed much to the Cultural History’s success in Europe and the UnitedStates. Despite its scholarly strengths, the Cultural History’s reception was notuniformly enthusiastic. The Times Literary Supplement acknowledged theauthor’s ‘erudition and painstaking research’ but continued:

candour compels the observation that the general reader is likely to find itmore instructive than stimulating. His procession moves in stately fashionthrough the eventful centuries, compelling our respect: but it compels ourregrets also, in that it moves without banners or beating of drums, givingbut little hint of those dramatic elements, of that romantic quality,persistent throughout the darkest periods of Japanese history.8

This was scarcely the view of discerning Japanologists.Arguably, the writing of the Cultural History may have posed less difficulties

for Sansom than his next scholarly undertaking, the preparation for publicationof Sir Charles Eliot’s unfinished manuscript ‘Japanese Buddhism’. Not only wasEliot’s manuscript a draft, but it lacked a section on the major Japanese Buddhistleader Nichiren. In 1935 Sansom completed a final chapter on Nichiren’s life andthought, and the book was published; but as he later confessed, ‘adding a chapterto a book written by a genius is a terrible job…your heart sinks as you take thepen’.9

Although Japan: A short Cultural History may now appear the most lastingproduct of Sansom’s pre-war years, his diplomatic writing and reporting was ofgreat contemporary significance. From 1926 to 1939 his principal role was that ofcommercial counsellor, at a time when trade was a central issue in Anglo-Japanese relations.

Sansom later claimed that he had accepted this position as it permitted himremarkable freedom and independence, but this rationale never detracted fromhis commitment to the post or the professionalism which characterized hiseconomic reporting. Indeed, Sansom’s observations on Japanese economicdevelopment was often prescient and prophetic. He perceived Japan’s transitionfrom a pre-modern to a modern economy before many others, and in 1932concluded ‘Japan is rapidly passing out of the imitative phase and is developing

356 SIR GEORGE SANSOM (1883–1965): HISTORIAN AND DIPLOMAT

into a powerful industrial and commercial state.’10 Long before the British textileindustry had recognized the true dimensions of Japan’s competitive power, hewas attempting to persuade Lancashire industrialists to ‘look upon Japan as amodern industrial country. In fact an able competitor’.11 Sansom’s perceptiveanalyses of international trade also led him to note the negative influence whichwestern protectionism could exert on Japanese foreign policy. Despite hisantipathy towards Japan’s Manchurian adventure in November 1932, he couldstill write

the Japanese, if they find themselves, as they well may, driven out of oneforeign market after another by tariff measures directed against them, arelikely to be confirmed in their present mood of hostility. They can arguethat the very Powers which reproach them for their conduct in Manchuriaare forcing them to desperate measures by closing other markets againstthem. This argument is not without foundation, for the past few yearsJapan has had to contend with tariff increases—some of which were aimedspecifically at her—in India, Australia, South Africa and the UnitedKingdom; while she is now confronted with the possibility of furtherincreases in the United States, the Philippines, Java and India, at a timewhen she is suffering severely from the boycott and depressed condition inChina.12

These cogent opinions failed to dissuade Britain and her Commonwealthpartners from taking ‘legitimate defensive measures’ against Japan but the notionthat trade lay at the centre of most international relationships— including thosebetween Tokyo and the West—was to form an important motif in Sansom’sdiplomatic thinking.

Despite Sansom’s understanding of Japan’s economic difficulties he had nosympathy for her continental expansionism or the populist chauvinism whichshaped her politics in the 1930s. His detestation of ultra-nationalist fanaticismwas a natural product of his humane values but it was further deepened by hisloss of close Japanese friends in the political assassinations of the time.13

In these years of increasingly exacting work Sansom still retained his broadcultural and intellectual vitality. In 1929 the Indian ‘poet-sage’ Tagore visitedTokyo, and Sansom and his wife Katharine met him to discuss ‘literature andlanguage’. Four years later George Bemard Shaw spent some days in Japan andSansom escorted him to the N� , to meet Prime Minister Saito and, moreimprobably, to confront the ultra-nationalist Araki Sadao in a bizarre battle ofwits. Sansom’s meetings with Tagore and Shaw probably helped him to keepabreast of recent literary trends, as did his encounters with Peter Fleming,W.H.Auden and Christopher Isherwood, all of whom visited Tokyo on literarypilgrimages to the Far East. Sansom’s intellectual vitality was also apparent inhis next ambitious plan for historical research. In 1934 he began active work on amajor study of the impact of western thought on Japan. However, the final


manuscript The Western World and Japan would not be published for a furthersixteen years.14

By 1934 Sansom’s reputation as a historian was so well established that hewas invited to give a series of lectures on Japanese culture at ColumbiaUniversity in New York. He happily accepted this invitation and arrived in NewYork in September 1935. To his surprise he was greeted like a Japanese scholarreturning from distant lands. Dr Evarts Green, the head of the Japanesedepartment at Columbia and Tsunoda Ryusaku. professor and librarian, waited atthe quayside, accompanied by two students, who were to act as porters. In NewYork and Boston the Sansoms were honoured and feted in ways which wouldhave been unimaginable in Tokyo. Perhaps the highlight of Sansom’s stay wasan invitation to speak at the prestigious Pilgrims dinner. He chose this occasionto advocate the expansion of oriental studies in American universities andconcluded,

All over the Far East important movements are shaping, which willpresently affect our own lives in one way or another. The least we can dois to study them and I am convinced that all such study must be based upona foundation of pure learning. Great progress has been made of late inOriental Studies in this country—less in my own I am ashamed to say—but I wish to plead for still greater effort.15

Soon after Sansom rejected the offer of a permanent post at Columbia, but hisexhilarating stay in New York had persuaded him that a stay in an Americanuniversity would form an agreeable postscript to retirement.

In 1936 Sansom returned to Japan to find its politics more violent and volatilethan before. These developments not only depressed him, they brought manypractical difficulties to his work. As xenophobia suffused Japanese ministries,officials increasingly restricted foreign diplomats’ access to information. Thisinevitably slowed the compilation of Sansom’s annual economic reports.16

In 1937 overwork and the outbreak of the undeclared Sino-Japanese War furtherdeepened Sansom’s depression and an ulcerated stomach now added to hisanxieties. Even worse, the new British ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, knewlittle of East Asia or Japan and took scant notice of Sansom’s expert knowledgeand advice.17 Craigie’s indifference did allow Sansom more time to relax at hissummer house in Kita Kamakura, but this was little consolation when Japan’sgovernment seemed set upon a course of authoritarian rule and militaryexpansionism.

By 1939 these many depressing circumstances had persuaded Sansom to leavethe Foreign Office and accept a new invitation to spend a term teaching atColumbia. In May he left Japan for London and on arrival quickly handed in hisresignation.18 Unfortunately, events moved too quickly for Sansom to escapeeasily to academic pastures. The outbreak of the war with Germany increased theForeign Office’s world-wide burdens and Sansom was recalled to official service.


After some months working in London he was again despatched to Tokyo towork alongside his less-than-favourite ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie.

In Tokyo Sansom reflected on the complacency which had characterizedBritish policy in the previous year. Recalling his own historical research helamented the ‘steady if almost imperceptible deterioration which overcomes asociety or a class which will not accept or adjust itself to change’.19 Hecontinued, ‘That has been our trouble. The defence of the status quo isn’tnecessarily immoral or mistaken but it always tends to be a losing battle unless itis conducted along with a more positive aim.’ The condition of Japan in 1940gave further cause for lamentation as many of its day-to-day felicities weregiving way to coarseness and petty crime. On 27 July 1940 he wrote, ‘It isinfuriating to see the rude, tough kind of Japanese in the ascendant and to knowthat all the time in this country there are immense reserves of decency andkindliness and the essential things of civilization.’20

Having completed his temporary mission to Tokyo Sansom was free to spendthe winter semester at Columbia. As before, his lectures on Japanese historywere warmly received, and American friends, Louis and Jean Ledoux, providedgenerous hospitality at Cornwall-on-Hudson. Unfortunately, the harsh realities ofBritain’s position soon interrupted Sansom’s academic idyll. On a visit toWashington he offered his services to the British ambassador Lord Halifax, whosuggested creating a post which would permit Sansom to do ‘Far Eastern things’.Unfortunately, before such a post materialized the Far Eastern crisis worsened,and Sansom was needed in Singapore.

In the spring of 1941 Sansom sailed from Los Angeles to take up his newposition as advisor to the Far Eastern Mission of the Ministry of EconomicWarfare. Despite its title this post involved political rather than economic duties;more specifically the collection of information concerning ‘events andpsychological movements in Malaya, South China, Thailand, Burma and…Singapore Island’.21 Sansom was also appointed to be the civilian representativeon the Singapore War Council and appears to have shocked his superiors byclearly stating that a Japanese attack was inevitable. Indeed, Sansom’s forecast,that the war would begin ‘about the end of November’ was extremely accurate,for the attack on Pearl Harbor came a mere week later. Sansom also transmitted amessage to Washington warning that Japanese forces in Indo-China werepreparing to advance into Thailand and Malaya.22

By January 1942 it was clear that the fall of Singapore was inevitable andSansom was ordered to Java to join General Wavell at his new headquarters. AtBandung he acted as political and diplomatic advisor to General Headquartersand provided news and information to British and foreign journalists. On 15February Singapore finally fell to Japanese forces and the Sansoms escaped fromBatavia to Melbourne on a Dutch liner. After these months of stress andexhaustion in the tropics Sansom was again weak and ill and was compelled tospend some weeks convalescing in Australia.


In the late spring of 1942 the Sansoms recrossed the Pacific, and in Mayarrived in New York. During the summer they recuperated in the cool air of theCatskills, and in September the scholar-diplomat accepted a specially createdpost in the British Embassy in Washington. Sansom now became minister to dealwith Far Eastern questions, a position which left him free to visit many collegesand universities to lecture on British policy and Far Eastern problems.

Seven months later Sansom was appointed to a new position in the BritishEmbassy—liaison officer between the Foreign Office and the Combined Chiefsof Staff. In this capacity he was to liaise with American leaders regarding theshaping of policy towards defeated Japan. The Foreign Office hoped that Sansomwould monitor and perhaps influence American thinking, but Sansom’s viewswere often at variance with those of American planners.23 These differences arehardly surprising for they stemmed from profound cultural and philosophicaldifferences. Sansom always found American academic fife and hospitality highlycongenial, but his political views were very different from those whichdominated Roosevelt’s America. In short Sansom was a self-confessed ‘old Tory’while New Deal conceptions of active government and social engineeringincreasingly dominated plans for the occupation of Japan. These differenceswere clearly apparent in a triangular conversation between Sansom, Hugh Bortonand George Blakeslee on 28 July 1943. On this occasion Sanson lent his supportto notions of economic recovery and an early peace, but showed himself hostileto ideas of radical reform. Hugh Borton summarized these elements in Sansom’sthinking as follows:

In general Sir George was opposed to the enforcement by the UnitedNations of changes in the Japanese Constitution and Government as suchenforcement would be practically impossible if the Japanese themselveswere not convinced of the need for these changes. Specifically, he felt itextremely inadvisable to depose the emperor. The supervision from theoutside of the Japanese educational system would be quite impossible. Theenforced adoption by Japan of a bill of rights would have little meaning asthe ordinary Japanese is little aware of the real significance of personalliberties.

Sir George believed that the military occupation of Japan, unless it cameabout as a result of hostilities, was both unnecessary and unwise. Hebelieved that the future air strength of the United Nations would besufficient to protect any disarmament commissions that might be sent toJapan to supervise the enforcement of the terms of surrender.24

No-one can doubt the sincerity of Sansom’s views for they were consistentlyheld throughout the war, but they were a significant obstacle to close Anglo-American co-operation. Furthermore, Sansom’s conservatism may havecontributed to the British government’s tardiness in beginning discussion ofJapan’s future. In fact, Whitehall did not turn serious attention to these issues


until May 1945 by which time most American policies had been formulated. On28 May an official in the Department of State showed Sansom a draft of its plansfor occupied Japan which envisaged a first phase of severe American militaryadministration. Not only was this concept contrary to Sansom’s non-interventionist views but ‘the United States Government did not intend as yet toinform other Governments of their views or invite participation’.25

Soon after Sansom returned to London and drafted a critique of Americanpolicy which emphasized Japan’s economic weakness and rejected the need for‘a costly machinery of internal controls’. Despite their realism and practicality,Sansom’s views were not accepted by the foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, whofeared any friction with Washington. Yet in one important respect Sansom’sviews anticipated the realities of the Occupation which was to come: he alwaysfavoured working through the Japanese government rather than attempting thecomplexities of direct military administration.

Despite Sansom’s presence in London in these crucial weeks, his role wassurprisingly restricted. He was not selected to accompany the British delegationto Potsdam and he attacked the Potsdam Declaration as ‘really a poor document’.In a letter dated 30 July he sadly lamented his situation:

I have been seeing various old friends who all think i should have gone toPotsdam, and I thought so myself. But…it would have been churlish toobject. Also they all feel I should have been Ambassador to Japan beforethe war and think even now that I should be. But I have no ambition of thatkind.26

Despite these morose reflections Sansom was selected to represent Britain on theFar Eastern Commission, the Allied body established to ‘oversee’ the Occupationof Japan from Washington. Before the Commission established itself in theAmerican capital, it paid an exploratory visit to Japan in January and February1946. Sansom took this opportunity to renew links up with many of his long-standing Japanese friends.

As before Sansom was critical of many aspects of American policy, inparticular the notion of destroying the major industrial and financial groups, thezaibatsu. He also exhibited a disdain for aspects of American society which hadbeen elevated to the status of blueprints for the new Japan. After a meeting withmembers of MacArthur’s Civil Information and Education Section, he wroteacidly, ‘education in the United States today is not of such a quality as toencourage one in feeling that it provides a model for any other country’.27

Yet for all his dislike of the radicalism and inexperience of many of MacArthur’saides, he recognized the Supreme Commander’s own charisma and theoverwhelming nature of American power. Before meeting any of his oldJapanese friends, he felt it necessary to ask the Supreme Commander’spermission. Even more striking was his tactful rejection of an invitation to meet


the emperor after consulting General McCoy the American chairman of the FarEastern Commission.28

Following his return to London Sansom’s knowledge and judgement appear tohave been more highly regarded by the new foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, thanby his predecessor Anthony Eden. He was frequently consulted on importantissues of Far Eastern policy, and received the KBE ‘in recognition of thevaluable services’ he had ‘rendered to the state’.29

From May 1946 to October 1947 Sansom spent much of his time inWashington serving as both minister in the Embassy and United Kingdomrepresentative on the Far Eastern Commission. In view of his long experience ascommercial counsellor it was perhaps natural that he was now appointedchairman of the Commission’s Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs. Inthis capacity Sansom saw uncertainty as a major threat to Japan’s economicrecovery, and repeatedly emphasized the importance of setting levels of industrialproduction which Japan would be permitted to achieve. Unfortunately Americanpower and obstructionism left little scope for British diplomats to assert theirinfluence, and Sansom could achieve little during his time in Washington.30

In the autumn of 1947 Sansom finally left the Foreign Office and satisfied hislong-held desire to return to academic life. Twelve years after his first lectures atColumbia he became the first director of its Far Eastern Institute. Sansom wasnow 63 and had little appetite for university administration; however, mostroutine tasks could be safely left to his assistant, Hugh Borton. Freed from day-to-day duties Sansom had ample time for reflection and research.

Despite his fragile health Sansom still continued his transatlantic journeys andspent his summers at his home, Chandos Lodge at Eye in Suffolk. During thesestays he strengthened his friendships with British writers on Asia such as VictorPurcell and Guy Wint, and consulted G.C.Allen on aspects of Japan’s social andeconomic history. In particular, Sansom was troubled by an American tendencyto apply the epithet ‘feudal’ to Tokugawa and modern Japanese society. In aletter to G.C.Allen he wrote:

I think you would agree that many of Japan’s troubles which are nowattributed to feudal ideology, are in reality quite ordinary phenomena in amodern capitalist state, and may well in many cases represent a departurefrom feudal standards, thus being more Western than Eastern.31

Yet despite Sansom’s advanced interpretation of Japan’s economic development,he remained sceptical of American policies of democratization. He sawdemocracy as an essentially western phenomenon and in 1949 wrote of theJapanese: ‘Why…should it be expected that a people whose social and politicalhistory has not prepared them for such a process, can be induced—spontaneouslyand indigenously?—to depart from the own tradition by precept or even byexample, offered by their conquerors?’32


Despite his obvious dislike of aspects of American thought and action Sansomfound Columbia a sympathetic and creative environment. In 1950 he completedThe Western World and Japan, his first major book since 1931. This not onlyanalysed the history of Europe’s impact on Japan from the sixteenth to thenineteenth century, but anticipated much later scholarship. Sansom’s new workclearly focused on the theme of ‘westernization’ or ‘modernization’, which wasto preoccupy both American and Japanese scholars in the 1960s and 1970s.33

Furthermore, Sansom’s assertion that ‘some at least of the causes that producedthe industrial revolution had been operating…in parts of Asia, particularly Japan,long before the ships of the foreigners came to Japanese shores’ unconsciouslyanticipated T.C.Smith’s later analysis of the ‘agrarian origins’ of Japan’s moderndevelopments

In October 1950 Sansom set off on his Far Eastern travels again. His firstdestination was Lucknow where he attended the Institute of Pacific Relationsconference and met Prime Minister Nehru. Of greater interest was hissubsequent visit to Japan where he met the emperor and lectured at theUniversity of Tokyo. These lectures, later published as Japan in World History,demonstrated a generosity of spirit which was rare among contemporary visitorsto Japan. In contrast to many Occupation personnel Sansom showed a deepadmiration for Japanese culture and scholarship which must have impressed hisJapanese hosts. In his first lecture he declared, ‘I have no right to pose…as anauthority upon Japanese history and no foreigner can hope to achieve the depth ofknowledge and understanding which we expect from Japanese scholars…. Wemust regard ourselves as pupils not as teachers.’35 Yet more impressive wasSansom’s emphasis on Japan’s broad significance in ‘the history of the aggregateof human societies’—particularly at a time when many westerners saw Japaneseas a uniquely delinquent people; of little relevance to the history of western orAsian humanity.

Despite the beginnings of Japan’s economic recovery, life in Tokyo in 1950was still harsh and austere. Weakened by cold and discomfort Sansomsuccumbed to double pneumonia and was unable to leave Japan for severalweeks. He finally returned to Suffolk after convalescing in the dry, warm climateof the American west.

Sansom remained at Columbia until his retirement in 1954. During these yearshe lectured twice each week to undergraduates and, with the support of theRockefeller Foundation, embarked upon another major project, a three-volumeHistory of Japan. For a man who was physically frail and already 71 this was a vastheroic enterprise.

At this time the cold and humidity of New York and Suffolk wintersincreasingly threatened Sansom’s health and he sought a drier and milder refugefor his retirement. Fortunately two friends from Singapore days now enabled himto settle in California. Two Australians, John Galvin and Stanley Smith, hadworked with Sansom in 1942 and offered to build him a house on the campus ofStanford University. In this calm and exquisite setting Sansom was able to


consult the Oriental Collection of the Hoover Institution, and meet distinguishedJapanese scholars who were invited to Stanford. Among these was his old friendfrom the 1920s, Yashiro Yukio.

At Stanford Sansom confessed to being ‘less given to enthusiasm, less capableof sustained effort and more cynical’ than in earlier times, but within four yearshe completed the first volume of his new History.36 Although Sansom made littleuse of post-war Marxist writing, he drew upon many original documents todescribe the history and eclipse of the Heian Court. Even more striking was hisfastidious account of Heian aesthetics and sensibilities, which was based upon aprofound knowledge of literary sources.37

In preparing the second volume of his History, which analysed the years from1334 to 1615, Sansom again drew upon many original sources as well as theknowledge of distinguished Japanese historians. For several months he worked‘at the same desk side by side’ with Professor Toyoda Takeshi, and alsocorresponded with Fukui Rikichiro.38 By 1961 the new volume was complete,and within four years Sansom published the third and final section of hisHistory. Although John Whitney Hall regretted the ‘modest proportions’ of thisconcluding volume he acclaimed it as the work of a ‘master craftsman’, whichsucceeded in ‘capturing the interplay between the [Tokugawa] system and itsenemies’.39

In these final productive years Sansom received a series of well-meritedacademic honours and distinctions. In 1954 Columbia awarded him the honorarydegree of Doctor of Laws. Soon after he became Honorary Consulting Professorat Stanford. In the 1960s Mills College and Leeds University added furtherhonorary degrees.

Sir George Sansom died on 8 March 1965 in Tucson, Arizona. His ashes werelaid in a mountain canyon.

Sansom’s greatest achievements were those of a historian who combinedcourage, humanity and scholarly refinement. As a diplomat he pioneered theserious study of the Japanese economy—when few westerners understood itsmodernity or its crucial significance. Ironically the achievements of thisremarkable Englishman owe most to friends and institutions beyond the seas.Without John Galvin and Stanley Smith, Stanford and Columbia, his health andcreativity would have been much impaired.

NOTES

1. G.B.Sansom, Japan: A Short Cultural History was first published by the CressetPress, London in 1931, and remains in print. G.B.Sansom, A History of Japan to1334, A History of Japan 1334–1615 and A History of Japan, 1615–1867 were alsopublished by the Cresset Press, in 1959, 1961 and 1964 respectively. They remainin print.

2. For Sansom’s early life see Katharine Sansom, Sir George Sansom and Japan: AMemoir, Tallahassee, Florida, 1972, pp. 1–3. The Reminiscences of Sir George


Sansom, New York: Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1957, pp.1–4; E.T.Williams and C.S.Nicholls (eds), Dictionary of National Biography, 1961–1970, Oxford 1981, pp. 922–3, and his Obituary in The Times, 10 March 1965.

3. K.Sansom, Sir George Sansom, pp. 6–7.4. Sir Charles Eliot’s official assessments of Sansom’s qualities are reprinted in K.

Sansom, Sir George Sansom. pp. 12–13.5. Letter from Sir George Sansom to Professor Marius Jansen, 1 September 1959.

(Kindly supplied to the author by Professor Jansen.)6. G.B.Sansom, An Historical Grammar of Japanese, Oxford, 1928, p. vii.7. G.B.Sansom, Japan: A Short Cultural History, 1st edn, p. vii.8. Times Literary Supplement, 7 April 1932.9. G.B.Sansom, Reminiscences, p. 17.

10. Memorandum by Sansom, enclosed in Lindley to Simon, No. 574, 28 October 1932(F 8307/39/23), FO 371/16242 cited in W.R.Louis, British Strategy in the Far East1919– 1939, Oxford, 1971, p. 218.

11. K.Sansom, Sir George Sansom, p. 32.12. Memorandum by Sansom, 11 November 1932, enclosed in Lindley to Simon, No.

603, 11 November 1932 (A 8174/53/45), cited in Louis, British Strategy in the FarEast, p. 219.

13. K.Sansom, Sir George Sansom, p. 95; G.B. Sansom, Reminiscences, p. 36.14. K.Sansom, Sir George Sansom, pp. 36, 56–68 and 77. G.B. Sansom’s, The Western.

World and Japan: A Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures wasfinally published by the Cresset Press, London in 1950.

15. K.Sansom, Sir George Sansom, p. 89.16. ibid., p. 92.17. ibid., pp. 94–7.18. Sansom later recounted his resignation as follows: ‘I had said to the permanent

Under Secretary, I really don’t see why I should stay. I’m not going back to Japan.I hate your ambassador there. He’s a fool’, Reminiscences, p. 57.

19. K.Sansom, Sir George Sansom, p. 110.20. ibid., p. 114.21. ibid., p. 120.22. ibid., p. 123–4.23. Sansom’s work in wartime Washington is well summarized in Roger Buckley,

Occupation Diplomacy, Britain, the United States & Japan, 1945–1952,Cambridge, 1982, pp. 10–13.

24. ‘Sir George Sansom’s views of postwar Japan’, Memorandum of Conversation, 28July 1943. Participants, G.Sansom, G.H.Blakeslee, H.Borton, Drafted by H.Borton,reprinted in � kurash� Zaiseishishitsu (ed.), Sh� wa Zaiseishi, Sh� sen Kara K� wamade. Vol. 20 Eibun Shiry� , Tokyo, 1982, pp. 6–7.

25. Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. 5,London, 1976, pp. 519–21. Sansom’s role at this time is also summarized inChihiro Hosoya, ‘George Sansom, Diplomat & Historian’, in I.H.Nish and C.Dunn(eds), European Studies on Japan, Tenterden, Kent, 1979, pp. 116–18.

26. K.Sansom, Sir George Sansom, p. 141.27. ibid., p. 154.28. ibid., p. 146.29. ibid., p. 161.


30. For the official history of the Commission, see G.H.Blakeslee, The Far EasternCommission: A Study in International Co-operation 1945 to 1952, Washington,DC, 1953). For Sansom’s role see Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy, pp. 76–9.

31. Letter from Sir George Sansom to G.C.Allen (undated). MS Add. 247/2/0 (G.C.Allen Papers, University College, London).

32. G.B.Sansom, ‘Can Japan be reformed?’, Far Eastern Survey, 2 November 1949, p.258.

33. This preoccupation was most evident in the five volumes of the ‘modernization’series published by Princeton University Press.

34. G.B.Sansom, The Western World and Japan, p. 223; see also T.C.Smith, TheAgrarian Origins of Modern Japan, Stanford University Press, 1959.

35. G.B.Sansom, Japan in World History, London, 1952, p. 1.36. Letter from Sir George Sansom to Professor Marius Jansen, 1 September 1959.37. Marius Jansen, ‘Review of G.B.Sansom, A History of Japan to 1334’ Journal of

Asian Studies, 18 (1958–9), pp. 501–3.38. G.B.Sansom, A History of Japan, 1334–1615, p. vii.39. John Whitney Hall, ‘Review of G.B.Sansom, A History of Japan, 1615–1867’,

Journal of Asian Studies, 23 (1963–4), pp. 615–17.


First published in The Japan Society Proceedings, No. 126, winter

1995, pp. 76–82

38The Historiography of Postwar Japan: A

Survey of Surveys

FROM THE COMPILATION of imperial chronicles by the early Japanese courtto Japan’s defeat in 1945 written history provided moral and intellectual supportfor a variety of Japanese elites and rulers. Shoguns and Buddhist clerics of themedieval and early modern periods, and nativist writers of the late Edo centuriesall regarded the moral lessons of history as valuable appurtenances to theirinfluence and authority. However it was the creation of the Meiji state whichlinked such objectives to the power of modern government and attempted toimpose an imperial historical orthodoxy. As early as 1892 two distinguishedprofessors were dismissed from Tokyo Imperial University for applyingscholarly analysis to traditional religion and in 1940 Tsuda Sokichi was drivenfrom his university post for challenging the authenticity of early imperialchronicles. Yet even in these years of restrictive policies historical pluralismsurvived. In 1932 a broadly Marxist coalition of scholars founded theRekishigaku Kenkyukai and Marxist discourse remained a significant element inhistorical enquiry throughout much of the 1930s. Nevertheless these fluctuatingtraditions of orthodoxy and pluralism were not fully emancipated until theAmerican occupation of the postwar years.

1945–1952

Although American censors controlled and influenced much Japanesepublishing during the Occupation (1945–1952) the liberalisation of historicalenquiry was a major feature of the immediate postwar scene. Ultranationalistdoctrines and their proponents were purged from curricula and the universities,and encouragement was given to the writing of cultural and popular history.

1952–1960

Significant historical syntheses of the postwar period did not appear until thelate 1950s when the distinguished Christian liberal Yanaihara Tadao edited a twovolume work—Sengo Nihon Shoshi (A Short History of Postwar Japan). Thissurvey was originally commissioned by the Japanese section of the Institute ofPacific Relations (I.P.R.) and issued by the University of Tokyo Press. Althoughlargely written on the basis of Japanese secondary works it constittutes a major

historical milestone. Above all, these volumes are permeated by a half-innocenthistorical idealism. For example, Yanaihara’s introduction claims the work to beone of science, without a political agenda, but goes on to state that its objective isan understanding of the forces which would assist the development of Japanesedemocracy. Yet for all its liberalism Yanaihara’s introduction expresses a post-imperial sense of discomfort at Japan’s subordination to the United States. Thisemotion is most vivid in the metaphor which is used for Tokyo’s relationshipwith Washington. For Yanaihara this resembled Manchuria’s prewar subjectionto Japan. Indeed Yanaihara characterized American objectives in postwar Japanwith peculiar severity. Prewar Japan, he wrote, had been a capitalist country likethe United States and therefore Washington had simply desired to create acapitalist Japan subordinated to a capitalist United States. But as a liberal ratherthan an orthodox Marxist, Yanaihara was not totally negative in his estimate ofthe occupation years. He acknowledged that America’s destruction of theImperial Army and Navy had been a major contribution to democraticdevelopment. Like later scholars Yanaihara believed that occupation reforms hadfertilized Japan’s own democratic tradition, and not imposed a blueprint ofliberty on a freshly bleached surface. In attempting to periodize the postwaryears Yanaihara had considerable difficulty, for developments in Americanmilitary, political and social policy were scarcely synchronised, but forYanaihara the outbreak of the Korean War was especially significant andthreatening. Not only had this brought the beginning of Japanese rearmament buta clearer definition of America’s military interests in postwar Japan.

A year after the appearance of Yanaihara’s work a more popular account ofcontemporary history appeared with similar moral intent. The Iwanamipaperback Showashi by three left-wing historians, Toyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichiand Fujiwara Akira was published at a time when the dangers of the cold war,and fear of a reversion to authoritarianism were major preoccupations. For theliberal publishers, Iwanami, liberalism clearly implied a left-wing defence ofpostwar democracy and peace. It is clear that this vastly popular book was basedon a rich array of primary and secondary sources but an equally importantelement in its creation was the harsh life which its authors had experienced inwartime Japan. Much of this work is devoted to Japanese domestic events and itspostwar section emphasises the sufferings of the Japanese people at the hands ofcapitalists and black marketeers. Like some American radical writers the authorsof Showashi saw the occupation years as a time of lost opportunity when thefailure of left-wing forces to unite effectively had prevented the completion ofJapan’s pacification and democratization. These writers found periodisation acomplex issue but they gave particular emphasis to the year 1950 when theoutbreak of the Korean War had given a vital stimulus to Japanese industry, andan American guarantee of raw material supplies. Although these authors saw thepost-Occupation period as one of continuing subordination to Washington theyacknowledged that Japan’s economic condition was improving—though an

368 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF POSTWAR JAPAN: A SURVEY OF SURVEYS

unfortunate consequence was the re-emergence of business influence in politicallife.

Both these widely read books appeared before the most dramatic events inpostwar Japanese politics, the mass demonstrations against both theunparliamentary tactics of Prime Minister Kishi and the new Security Treatywith the United States. The 1960 disturbance fell far short of removing theLiberal Democratic Party from power but for many years numerous anti-establishment writers looked back on the 1960 struggle with a sense orexcitement and missed pseudo-opportunity. In contrast most foreign observerssaw 1960 and after as a time of rapid Japanese economic growth when Japaneseproducts penetrated new markets in Asia, Europe and North America.

1960–1980

In this new atmosphere two works appeared which crystalized drasticallydifferent approaches to Japan’s postwar development. One was the final volumeof a popular history of Japan Nihon no Rekishi which like Showashi waspublished as an Iwanami paperback. The author of this fluently written surveywas Inouye Kiyoshi a Kyoto University Professor who combined a rich blend ofMarxism and nationalism with a penchant for ‘people’s history’. The tone ofInouye’s account of the postwar years is set by its iconographic frontispiecewhich showed massed demonstrators in 1960 bearing flags and banners, halfenveloped by operatic clouds of gas and smoke; clearly a moment worthy ofcommemoration. For Inouye who provides no bibliography or footnotes the term‘monopoly’ is almost a leitmotif of postwar history. The allied occupation was anAmerican ‘monopoly’ and both Japanese and American ‘monopoly capitalists’are the most energetic actors in a world of ‘monopoly capitalism’. Inouye’sattempt to periodize the postwar years is both confused and confusing, butperhaps his nationalism rather than his Marxism is the work’s most outstandingfeature. Again, resentment at American dominance is a potent emotion, andJapan’s only possible escape from Washington’s capitalist-imperialist claws isseen to be an international popular front in which Japan would align herself withrising waves of Communism and Nationalism which were believed to be erodingimperialist bastions in Asia. When this book appeared in 1966 such a view wasalready somewhat fanciful as the Sino-Soviet split had demonstrated the frailtyof international ideological alliances.

Little more than a year after the appearance of Inouye’s Nihon no Rekishi anew work was published which symbolized Japan’s new prosperity and the morecentrist conservatism of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato and his successors. Thevery appearance of Chuo Koronsha’s History of Japan in 27 volumes itselfsuggests a publisher’s response to Japan’s new affluence; but especiallyinteresting is the more complex, eclectic approach apparent in its final volume:Royama Masamichi’s 400 page work on the postwar period. Royama’speriodization was straightforward: the occupation, the years between the San


Francisco Treaty and the 1960 crisis, and the rest, but his analysis is refreshinglynovel. The liberal Royama blurred previous analytical simplicities and explorednew areas of Japan’s development. This writer also saw a place for individualsand human factors in history which Marxist writers had implicitly denied.

In discussing land reform and the dissolution of the Zaibatsu Royama did notmerely analyse American methods and objectives but saw these forms of economicredistribution as processes which imbued their beneficiaries with unprecedentedenergy. This in turn had produced striking economic benefits. Royama alsobroke new ground in discussing the economic gains derived from occupationpolicies towards Japanese women, and the reverberations of technical change inJapan’s economy and society. Royama’s distinctive approach was particularlymarked in his assessment of the 1960 disturbances. For this writer these were notglorious moments of an almost-revolution, but an indication that the Japanesepeople were ill-informed in matters of foreign affairs, and that opposition partiespossessed no meaningful alternative to alignment with the United States. Likemost writers on the postwar period Royama provided a peroration in which helooked to the future, but in this he presented no unlikely project for world-wideclass alliances—merely an injunction to construct a new Japan on the basis offreedom, equality and welfare.

By the mid-1970s Japan was not only far more prosperous than before but itsscholars had travelled more widely and made increasing use of documents in theUnited States. As a result perceptions of the postwar period had becomeincreasingly complex, even among Marxist historians. In 1975 Fujiwara Akira,one of the authors of the 1958 Showashi produced a survey of the years 1931 tothe 1960s Nihon Kindaishi III (Iwanami Zensho) which illustrated the speed withwhich research and analysis were advancing. This synthesis drew on muchprimary and secondary material and uses a deceptively simple style, but changewas clearly perceptible. As in Inouye’s writing, terms such as ‘imperialist’ and‘monopoly capitalist’ are scattered across the text but these words are often usedin a somewhat routine manner. Of far greater interest is the attention whichFujiwara paid to Japanese actions in the broad context of postwar relations withthe United States. In this work the Japanese actors are not passive subordinates,but Yoshida Shigeru and others are seen as leaders employing tactics to muflflethe effects of American reform. Indeed, this writer goes much further than hispredecessors in pointing out the continuities between pre-war and postwar Japan—in both politics and trade unionism. Fujiwara’s analysis of MacArthur’sHeadquarters also encompasses discussion of rivalry between different sectionsand personalities. In other words America is no longer seen as a mechanicaljuggernaut following a pre-ordained path, instead it appears divided like anyother sophisticated society. In dealing with the international setting of postwarJapan Fujiwara is a good deal less interesting and reliable, there is always asubtle suggestion that the Soviet Union was more ethical and innocent than theUnited States, but this work’s particular form of leftism has redeeming features.Its description of the scale and energy of Japanese peace movements in the 1970s


is a valuable and important reminder of the distinctive nature of Japan’s postwaratmosphere which is not readily fitted into a simple Marxist analysis. Fujiwaraalso reminds us that subordination to the United States remained a significantissue in the minds of some Japanese as late as the 1970s. For this historian, as forYanaihara in the 1950s, one metaphor remains significant. The securityarrangements linking Tokyo to Washington are not regarded as a partnershipbetween democracies but as profoundly unequal, recalling prewar ties betweenManchuria and Imperial Japan.

A similar emotion was also apparent in the volumes covering the postwarperiod in Shogakkan’s 32 volume survey of Japanese history which appeared in1976. For Oe Shinobu the left-wing author of the volume entitled ‘PostwarChange’ the sufferings of the Okinawan people and their subordination to theUnited States constituted a microcosm of postwar Japan. Nevertheless, thisauthor also gave left-wing historiography a more human dimension by recordingthe sufferings of Japanese repatriates from continental Asia, and of Chinese andKorean minorities within Japan. Despite Oe’s awareness of the importance ofAmerican policies—he, like Royama, liberates the Japanese from a simplerobotic role under American domination. Accordingly, he describes the earlyoccupation as not simply a period of political change, but a time when Japaneseexpressed and experienced a profound sense of liberation. This new vitality wasapparent in the appearance of many new magazines—some of which escaped theeyes of American censors. Oe completes his work with a chapter which linksnationalist and social concerns and describes the ultimate success of a popular,mass movement—that for the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration—a thinly disguised metaphor for a Japanese escape from American dominance.

1980–1995

By the mid 1980s Japan’s problems in foreign relations stemmed from theeconomics of success rather than the diplomacy of subordination. Thistransformation was evident in the increasing role of economists as sythesisers ofpostwar history. In Shogokkan’s 10 volume History of Showa the two finalvolumes were written by economists and placed increasing emphasis oneconomic growth. Shibagaki’s work From Peace to High Growth did mentionJapan’s subordination to Washington but partially redressed this by attaching dueweight to more positive developments. These included marked improvements infood and clothing and the disappearance of coarse, illicitly brewed alcoholicbeverages. As one might expect this account of the 1950s and 1960s doesdescribe the Security Treaty crisis but with relative detachment. Shibagakiconcludes that as a result of the crisis the conservative government required‘rehabilitation’ and that Prime Minister Ikeda was able to engineer this process.The final volume in the Shogakkan series An Economic Great Power, byMiyamoto Kenichi is preoccupied by more contemporary concerns than theworks of most postwar historians. Pollution rather than the United States is


depicted as Japan’s major antagonist and a map is provided which shows Japan’smost polluted sites. A chapter entitled ‘A Country of Advanced Pollution’epitomises Miyamoto’s work. In dealing with international affairs Miyamotodevotes more attention to Japan’s relations with China and South Korea thanthose with the United States. Furthermore he, depicts the United States as aconciliatory rather than an over-assertive member of the internationalcommunity.

In 1985 there appeared the first detailed treatment of the postwar period by asingle author—Sengo Shi (Post War History) by Masamura Kimihiro, aneconomist at Senshu University in Tokyo. This two volume survey is richlysourced from official and scholarly publications and follows a broadlychronological sequence. Despite its broad range of concerns this work placesparticularly heavy emphasis on both domestic and international economicconflicts. Even more impressive is the interest which this work shows inindividual politicians. Masamura chronicles Tanaka Kakuei’s riches, foibles andnetworks of influence with a degree of detail which earlier writers would haveavoided. This writer’s work is also notable for its detachment in treating issueswhich many historians would have described with emotion. For example, theviolent student movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s are analysed withprecision and cool clarity leaving an impression of divisions and confusionrather than overarching idealism.

For Masamura the problems of the 1980s were ones which all citizens inadvanced countries would recognise as familiar, rather than issues peculiar toJapan. These included the rationalization of national administration, privatizationof public bodies and budgetary balancing. Especially striking is this autlior’smoralistic peroration. Masamura regrets the persistence of torture, oppression,civil war and the forcible imprisonment of dissidents in some unfortunatecountries; most of which were in Asia or the Communist bloc—all societieswhich Inouye and earlier writers had seen as models for Japanese emulation.

As Masamura’s work suggests there have been major shifts in the assumptionson which the writing of postwar history had been based. Nevertheless someorganizational continuities remained. In 1991 the Rekishigaku Kenkyukai—nowa broad left rather than a Marxist organisation —produced a five volume historyof the postwar years (Dojidaishi) which is based on a meticulous gathering ofsources. This work periodizes the past 50 years in an effective and possiblydefinitive way. These authors see a crucial break in events mid-way through theoccupation, another with the 1951 peace treaty and a third with the founding ofthe Liberal Democratic Party in 1955. 1960 is understandably seen as a furtherwatershed as is the beginning of high growth policies in 1964. The Nixon shocks(concerning relations with Beijing and floating the dollar) of 1971 are treated asa further turning point— when economic issues became increasingly important.Much of this periodization may seem obvious but this work is distinctive inadding cultural and social dimensions to political and economic history. Popularsongs, new religious sects, the spread of sport and broadcasting are all discussed


in analyses of the 1940s while in its treatment of more recent years it describessocial life in apartment blocks, the emotional effects of the oil shocks of the1970s and the almost legendary toilet paper panic. The final message of thiswork is much more complex and interesting than its organizational derivationmight suggest. Analogies are drawn between postwar and nineteenth centuryJapan—when economic progress was not matched by the creation of asatisfactory political system. These authors also see the ‘worship of money’ as anevil attribute of life at several stages in Japan’s nineteenth and twentieth centuryhistory.

Finally, in surveying recent writing one might note a recent prize winning two-volume history of the Showa period (Showashi) by the distinguished economistNakamura Takafusa. Not surprisingly this work gives due weight to economicand social change but it also integrates literary and cultural phenomena into itsnarrative in a particularly imaginative way. This work reminds us that even amidthe austerities of the occupation people queued for days to obtain reprints ofProfessor Nishida’s ‘Studies on Zen’—an impressive fragment of experiencewhich earlier Marxist writers would surely have ignored.

In some respects one might note convergences in the writing of Western andJapanese history of the postwar period. In both, Marxist influences havemoderated and the historical agenda has been widened and enriched. ButJapanese historiography has been and will remain pluralistic and distinctive.Furthermore, earlier historiography should not be subjected to casual ridicule, forit shaped both political and historical perceptions, which are themselves vitalmaterial for future analysis.


Part V

Postwar Japanese Foreign Relations andEuro-Japanese Relations

First published in Japan: Miracle’70, prepared by the Financial

Times, London, Longman, 1970, pp. 143–148

39Foreign Relations

IN THE YEARS since the accession to office of Prime Minister Sato in 1964 theAsian scene and Japan’s position have been transformed. This transformation haspresented Japan with the need for new diplomatic emphases and adjustmentswhich may be of significance to powers on all sides of the Pacific Ocean.

In the past five years President Sukarno has fallen from power, China hasexperienced the Cultural Revolution. fighting has occurred between Russia andChina, and the British Government has planned its withdrawal from East of Suez.But overshadowing all these significant changes has been the Vietnam War andits impact on President Nixon’s Asian diplomacy. In this context of instability,change, and painful rethinking Japan can well be seen as a haven of economicprogress, growing strength, and political continuity. Her economy has continuedto boom, her exports have reached 13,000 m dollars (£5.416 m), and with theproduction of Uranium 235 she has the capability, if not the aim, of constructingnuclear weapons.

Besides these physical achievements Japan has also shown increasing signs ofdiplomatic self-assertion; in response to popular feeling the Liberal DemocraticGovernment regained control of the Bonin Islands, and began pressing theUnited States to restore Japanese administration to Okinawa and the rest of theRyukyu group. Many Japanese would prefer the restoration of Okinawa with nostrings attached, but a compromise including the continuation of American basesmay well be the outcome of projected talks.

Arduous negotiations over Okinawa and American unhappiness at her £416 m(990.5 m dollars) trade deficit with Japan should not be seen as evidence of afundamental change in relations between Washington and Tokyo. The JapaneseGovernment continues to base its defence upon the Security Treaty with theUnited States. and with over a quarter of her exports going to the Americanmarket Japan is highly dependent on American prosperity and liberal tradingpolicies. Indeed protectionist policies in the the United States and other advancedcountries could be politically and economically damaging to Japan’sdevelopment. For if Japan’s living standards do not continue to rise the resultingfrustration could endanger political stability.

While Japan’s increasing strength has produced some frictlon in the US, otherchanges, some in American policy, have brought Japan significant advantages.The growing Sino-Soviet rift has strengthened Russia’s fear of China andsoftened Moscow’s attitude towards Japan, while America’s desire for a détentewith the Soviet Union has eased the way for Japan to respond to Russia’s moves.Besides abating her active hostility Russia now feels that she can gain from co-operating with Japan in the economic development of her exposed Easternterritories. In August 1968 Japan agreed to join in the development of lumberingin West Siberia, the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee is surveying theresources of South Siberia and Sakhalin, and the Moscow-Tokyo air service is tobe improved and extended. There is still, however, no peace treaty betweenJapan and the Soviet Union, and Japan’s claims to the islands of Habomai,Shikotan, Etorofu and Kunashari are still unanswered. But even friction on theserather emotive issues can hardly halt the momentum of trade and economic co-operation.

While Japan’s relations with Russia have improved in recent years relationswith mainland China have been almost paralysed by the Cultural Revolution. Inthe early summer of 1966 prominent spokesmen in Japan’s ruling party wereurging the Cabinet to make new moves towards diplomatic recognition of Peking.This pressure, combined with the hopes of Japanese businessmen, seemed topoint towards increasing links with the Chinese Government. But the newChinese militancy which accompanied the Cultural Revolution suddenly frozeSino-Japanese relations in their existing limited form. In 1968 the existingprivate trade agreement was only extended for one further year and this actuallyenvisaged a contraction of 33 m dollars (£14 m) in this relatively limited trade. AsChina has returned to less turbulent conditions Japanese statements haveacquired a more flexible and positive nature. Despite China’s attempt to extractpolitical concessions for the continuation of trade, Japanese speeches havecontained an interesting mixture of old and novel elements. The traditional themeof ‘the separation of politics from economics’ (which permits diplomatic relationswith Taiwan and trade with the mainland) has been combined with patient talk of‘restoring China’s confidence in Japan step by step’ and the Japanese ForeignMinister has mentioned the possibility of a Tokyo-Peking air Iink. ‘The flight ofa Chinese ballet company’ was the first step suggested in this connection but thebroader implication was clear. Japan has also shown growing willingness to easethe financing of trade with the Communist regime.

In 1964 the Yoshida Letter assured the Taiwan Government that JapaneseImport-Export Bank credits would not be made available to finance trade withthe Peking Government but although this is still the general principleunderpinning Japanese policy it is now stated that such credits may be granted on‘a case-by-case basis’. This gesture should not be understood as a serious coolingof attitude towards Taiwan, which Japan sees as a vital area, but it marks anattempt to move forward from the sterile rigid pattern of recent years. Thoughtrade with Peking cannot hope to replace that with the advanced and affluent


states of the West, improved relations with a nuclear China are desirable for anyJapanese Government. At a time when American attitudes towards Peking areapparently more flexible it seems more likely than ever that there will be someslow improvement in relations across the China Sea.

While turmoil in China has stunted the development of Sino-Japaneserelations, the fall of President Sukarno has aided the development of contactswith Indonesia. The decline of Communist influence and the return to financialorthodoxy have both led to stronger diplomatic and economic links betweenTokyo and Djakarta. Besides her obvious interest in a stable regime in Indonesia,Japan has much to gain in the future from the exploitation of Indonesia’s rawmaterials. Already these factors have produced increased Japanese investment inIndonesian oil and timber, a 100 m dollar (£42 m) loan to the SuhartoGovernment, and Japanese technical assistance in rice farming and fisheries.

Undoubtedly the most politically, taxing problem for Japan in recent years hasbeen the Vietnam war. On the one hand, as a close economic and military partnerof the US the Japanese Government has felt compelled to give moral support tothe American military effort. On the other, Japanese public opinion, fearing theescalation of the war into a Sino-American nuclear conflict, has been stronglyopposed to the whole tenor of American policy. It is true that Japan has madeeconomic gains by supplying material for the American forces, but a series ofdisturbing incidents, including a local rise in radioactivity after the visit of anAmerican nuclear submarine, further intensified the fears of many Japanese. Thiswidespread popular alarm must have been among the reasons for Amerlca’sdecision to transfer a number of her installations to Japanese control.

Meanwhile the Japanese Government, apprehensive at the apparent instabilityof South-east Asia, and concerned to support American policy, has played anincreasingly active role in the region. Prime Minister Sato has embarked onsweeping tours of South-east Asia and Australasia, the Thai Prime Minister hasbeen welcomed to Japan, and Japan has played an active role in ASPAC and theAsian Development Bank. Japan has had defence talks with Australia, givenincreased aid and investment to South Korea and played a far more active part innon-military regional organisations than at any other time since 1945.

This increased activity is not surprising, for it is perhaps among the small andunderdeveloped states of South-east Asia that Japan’s power has most room formanoeuvre. Certainly the United States would approve of a more active Japaneserole in this area, but the problems involved should not be minimised. PresidentNixon, determined to avoid another Vietnam war and hoping to reduce theAmerican commitment, has spoken of ‘peace in Asia coming primarily from theinitiative of those who live in Asia’, and some observers believe that Americawould like to see Japan play a more active military role in South-east Asia, butso far Japan has rejected the idea of entering regional alliances. Japan’s positionis delicate and understandable, for many doubts surround an over hastyacceptance of the American torch.

FOREIGN RELATIONS 377

Japan is still a relatively poor country when compared to America or the richerEuropean states, and a big diversion of resources to military or overseas spendingmight well be damaging to the improvement of social services at home.Furthermore, Japan is a country where anti-military feeling and pacifism are a veryreal element in public opinion. While many Japanese accept the existence ofJapanese armed forces many might be severely shaken by any clear acceptanceof military commitments overseas. Such a departure might further deepen thegulf which separates Government and Opposition and this could hardly bebeneficial to parliamentary government. Finally, too heavy a foreign presence,whether commercial or military, could in time provoke a nationalistic reaction inSouth-east Asia, and this could ultimately do great harm to the development ofthe region.

Japan has valuable know-how and capital which can assist the development ofher southern neighbours but it would be wrong to overestimate the resources ather command or to disregard the frictions and domestic repercussions whichmight stem from too rapid a change of course.


First published in R.Shiratori (ed.), Japan in the 1980s, Tokyo,

Kodansha, 1982, pp. 84–99

40Japanese Foreign Policy and its Problems

IN THE TWENTY YEARS between the San Francisco Peace Treaty and HenryKissinger’s visit to Peking in 1971, Japanese diplomacy was the object ofcontinuous domestic criticism. Many Japanese simply claimed that their countryhad no independent foreign policy; others were more uncertain and demandedproof that Japanese diplomacy was in more than a state of suspended animation.1

For such critics Japan appeared like a junior climber, roped to a more muscularAmerican partner, simply following in the footholds marked out by dominantsecretaries of state. Such criticisms were understandable, for postwar Japanesepolicy was deeply coloured by American influence. In the occupation years(1945–52), Japan’s conservative leaders had chosen capitalist democracy as thebasic pattern of their society. They had rightly seen the United States as thedominant economy of the contemporary world. By February 1950, Japan faced ahostile Sino-Soviet military alliance; furthermore, Russian treatment of Japaneseprisoners of war scarcely attracted Japan towards friendship with the SovietUnion.2 Yet, even if the clear choices made by Prime Minister Yoshida and hissuccessors did not constitute a fully independent policy, it would be a gross over-simplification to dismiss all the labours of Japanese foreign ministers asresponses to the dictates of the United States. Japan’s resistance to Americanpressures for rapid rearmament, her special relationship with President Sukarnoof Indonesia, her conduct of reparations negotiations with Southeast Asianstates, and her refusal to join a SEATO-style military alliance—or to participatein the Vietnam war—indicate that the nation was following a distinctive policy.3

This diplomacy was wisely constructed to hold in equilibrium friendship withAmerica, pacifist opinion at home, and the pursuit of economic improvement.Yet criticism of this policy as being negligible or disappointing wasunderstandable. In the Meiji, Taisho, and early Showa eras, Japan had pursued avigorous policy which was the most striking of any Asian nation. In comparisonwith this memory, the diplomacy of the 1950s and 1960s seemed lethargic. Whatwas worse was that other countries had replaced Japan as the political championsof Asia. By the 1960s Japan’s economy thrived and her people prospered. Butfor many years India —then clearly non-aligned—spoke for Asian neutralism,while the ideological diplomacy of Peking suggested that Chinese policy was moreidealistic than Japan’s quiet pragmatism. However, Japan had not only been

displaced as a diplomatic leader, but by virtue of American pressure she was alsoisolated politically from her nearest neighbour, Communist China. For millionsof Japanese this was an undignified position. To radicals it meant isolation froma model society; to many businessmen, it meant exclusion from an immensemarket.4

By 1971 the world was clearly changing: Canada and Italy recognised thePeople’s Republic of China, while the barbarities and failures of the war inVietnam lowered the United States in popular esteem and reduced confidence inits military power. Henry Kissinger’s first overture to China produced adiplomatic revolution, and the Sino-Soviet split indicated that the militaryalliance between Peking and Moscow was virtually at an end. After thesedramatic changes the Japanese soon saw that the rapprochement between Pekingand Washington would increase their diplomatic freedom. In contrast, thecrumbling of American military supremacy, and the emergence of economicrivalries between Washington and Tokyo, threatened the long-standingfriendship between Japan and the United States. In particular, the developmentof a large Japanese trade surplus with America and the activities of well-organised pressure groups in both countries produced acrimonious textilenegotiations. In 1971 Japan had a $2,517 million surplus in trade with the UnitedStates. This provoked an American import surcharge of 10 percent and measuresaimed at forcing up the value of the yen.5 This temporary harshness in mutualexchanges suggested that in economic and diplomatic policy America was nowless sympathetic to Japan. But, in fact, the continuing commitment of bothWashington and Tokyo to mutual friendship soon repaired the ragged edges oftheir relations. Confidence in America had been weakened, however, and couldnever be restored to the simple certainties of the 1960s.

If the events of 1971 produced doubts and suspicions they also producedcreative opportunities for Japanese foreign policy. In September 1972 PrimeMinister Tanaka was able to establish diplomatic relations with the People’sRepublic of China,6 while American weakness in Southeast Asia provided scopefor increased Japanese activity in the region. At the same time Japan’s continuingeconomic growth provided sufficient wealth to allow a more active part inproviding aid to neighbouring countries. Between 1970 and 1975 Japan’s officialaid to developing countries rose from $458 million to $1,147.7 million.7 ThusJapan was settling into a more active role in East and Southeast Asia, and therewas hope that if relations with the Soviet Union could be improved, a new andsafer equilibrium could be established. Soon, however, Japan was affected bydistant events that showed the impossibility of conceiving Japanese policy assomething concerned solely with North America, and East and Southeast Asia. In1973, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war, Japan, like other advancedcountries, faced the threat of Arab oil sanctions and was compelled to condemnIsrael’s failure to withdraw from the territories which she had occupied in 1967.This rapid diplomatic action staved off oil sanctions, but in three respects theseevents hastily reordered the framework of Japanese foreign policy.


Firstly, America’s own weakness in the face of Arab threats showed that itwas totally unable to protect Japan in her hour of need. Secondly, the MiddleEast, which had never formed a large element in Japanese foreign policy, nowbecame of dramatic importance and demanded far more attention. Finally, the so-called oil shock showed with savage clarity that Japan was dependent upondistant and uncontrollable supplies of essential raw materials. It was nowessential for her to disperse her sources of supply and secure them by activepolicies of aid, investment, and diplomacy.8

Against this background of major shifts in East and West Asia, Japan’s foreignrelations remain predicated upon a close relationship with the United States.Mutual relations between 1975 and 1980 have been plagued by commercialfrictions but, against a background of Soviet hostility, the two powers haveshown an impressive capacity to negotiate their way through complex difficultiesand to maintain their political partnership. In the field of trade the abiding issuebetween Washington and Tokyo is Japan’s high productivity and agility inmarketing. In 1971 the textile issue was settled by voluntary Japaneserestrictions. The devaluation of the dollar temporarily strengthened Americanexports, but by 1978 Japanese exporting successes in such fields as electronicgoods and motor vehicles had helped to generate a surplus of $11.5 billion. Thissurplus was not merely the result of Japanese success but also a reflection ofAmerican failures.9 Between 1965 and 1977 America’s share of Japan’s importsfell from 29 percent to 18 percent, and in machinery and equipment theAmerican share fell from 66 percent to 49 percent.10 In the face of the frictionswhich these trends produced, Japan liberalised imports of American agriculturalgoods but, by 1980, unemployment in the American motor vehicle industry hadled to deep unease in the United States. There was criticism of imports ofJapanese cars and agitation for restrictions. Yet the solutions which have beenproffered to solve this question, and the broad problem of trade imbalance, reflectthe two powers’ long experience of close relations. Gone are the days of RichardNixon’s mixture of electoral razzmatazz and tough diplomacy. Now voluntaryimport restrictions and increased Japanese investment in America (Honda hasplanned a $200 million factory in Marysville, Ohio) are the means suggested togradually ameliorate these difficulties. Despite an active advertising campaign bythe Ford Motor Corporation in favour of import controls, it is clear thatAmerican leaders fear the consequences of a trade war and any threat to thepolitical and strategic partnership of the two largest economics in the free world.

It is sometimes said that America’s military weakness makes her an unreliableally, but in some respects America’s commitment to Japan has a sounder basisthan in the past. Between 1972 and 1977 surveys in the United States revealedthat support for military action if Japan were attacked had risen from 43 percentto 50 ercent.11 Furthermore, population movements in the United States meanthat the Pacific Coast, which has the greatest economic and political interest inJapan, has more political influence than in the past. This may well work to

JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS PROBLEMS 381

Japan’s advantage. In addition, the growing importance of Pacific trade—overAtlantic commerce—may reinforce America’s commitment to Tokyo.12

The end of the Vietnam war and a reduction in the number of Americanmilitary bases in Japan reduced irritants to Japanese-American harmony at thepopular level. This provided a more favourable background for closer relationsthan in the 1950s and 1960s. In recent years Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodiaand the exodus of refugees from Indochina have destroyed popular Japaneseillusions regarding the virtues of communist societies. Certainly, in 1979 and1980 Japan demonstrated political support for American policy in many overtways—some of which may have been to her short- or mediurn-termdisadvantage.

To support America’s policy toward Afghanistan, Japan boycotted theMoscow Olympics and placed a ban on the export of high-technology goods tothe Soviet Union. Japan gave the United States diplomatic support against Iranand was embarrassed by the abortive attempt to rescue American hostages.Elements of continuity in Japan’s relations with America have been clearest incommercial and military policies. Japan continues to see the preservation of anopen American market as a major interest, while resistance to Americandemands for rapid rearmament remains a significant element in diplomacy.

If cooperation despite friction dominates relations with the United States,tension and antipathy have dominated Japan’s relations with the Soviet Unionbetween 1952 and 1980. Whereas the United States returned the Ryukyu, Bonin,and other Japanese islands which were occupied in the aftermath of war, theSoviet Union refuses to return the four small islands off Hokkaido to whichJapan still lays claim. For Japan these islands constitute the only territorial issueremaining from the Second World War. They command an important seapassage between the Japan Sea and the Pacific Ocean and are so close toHokkaido that they pose a potential military threat. Between 1978 and 1990 notonly has the Soviet Union moved away from the ambiguous statement of 1973regarding talks to settle matters ‘outstanding since World War Il’, but hasincreased the garrison on the disputed islands, carried out manoeuvres in nearbywaters, and dismissed Japanese claims as baseless. This is not the only problemwhich plagues Japanese-Soviet relations at the present time. Russian aircraftoften approach Japanese airspace; sometimes, they infringe it and Russian navalactivity has become more and more intense.13 In 1980 a damaged Soviet nuclearsubmarine infringed Japanese territorial waters and served to remind Japan ofRussia’s insensitive disregard for national boundaries. Such activities, andRussia’s often brusque language, have done little to assist economic cooperationbetween the two powers. Throughout the 1970s, and particularly in the aftermathof the 1973 oil shock, Japan has looked to Soviet Siberia as a valuable potentialsource of oil, coal, timber, natural gas, and other raw materials.14 Soviet-Japanese business cooperation conferences have been held from 1966, andJapan, in partial cooperation with the United States, has made major investmentsin timber, coal, and gas developments in Soviet Asia.15 However, Japanese


cooperation in the development of the Tyumen oil field has been abandoned inview of Russia’s desire to link this with the construction of a Baikal-AmurMainline (BAM) railway which would be of great value to Soviet forces in apossible war with China. In the autumn of 1980 Japan relaxed some Post-Afghanistan sanctions, but Russia’s use of Vietnamese naval bases andintransigent stance on the territorial issue make it difficult to see how PrimeMinister Suzuki’s desire for improved relations can be easily satisfied.

It is in relations with Russia’s main Asian rival, the People’s Republic ofChina, that Japan’s relations have been most drastically transformed in the finalyears of the 1970s. After the drama of Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to Peking in1972 relations advanced slowly. Mutual suspicion was slow to disappear, andChina demanded that Japan Air Lines not fly to Taiwan. That problem waseventually solved by painting aircraft with new markings, but the issuesymbolised the prickly atmosphere of early contacts. However, by 1975, thedesire for Chinese oil and coal and fear of possible Western trade restrictionsmade Japan increasingly eager to develop relations with Peking. SimilarlyChina’s fear of the Soviet Union intensified and added a political element tomutual China-Japan interests. This movement toward agreement was delayeduntil 1978 by China’s demand that any treaty should implicitly— by condemning‘hegemony’—strike a blow against the Soviet Union. This was a move whichJapan sought to avoid, but by September 1978 a combination of Sovietintransigence and skilful negotiation produced an apparent compromise betweenTokyo and Peking. On the surface their agreement was a fair and innocentbargain. Article II of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which declared that‘Each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries toestablish hegemony,’ was counterbalanced by Article IV, which declared that‘The present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting partyregarding its relations with third countries.’16 This text, however, must beinterpreted against the background of current events. Japan was in long-standingconflict with the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories, and the rejection ofa Soviet Draft Treaty of Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation indicated that thePeking agreement symbolised a clear preference for China.17 This new aspect ofJapan’s policy has been abundantly clear in the years that have followed. Japanhas signed long-term agreements for the purchase of Chinese oil and coal and forthe export of machinery, plant, and technical skills. Furthermore, the Japanesegovernment has provided backing for bank loans to sustain these large-scaleprograms. In 1978 Japan commanded 26 percent of China’s total trade whiletheir commercial agreement envisaged a $20 billion trade from 1978 to 1985.18

China’s new policy of four modernizations—agriculture, industry, science, anddefence—has provided great scope for Japan’s exports. Despite some trimmingof China’s most ambitious plans, it is clear that while the nation retains thepresent empirical leadership its modernization will provide a crucial element inJapan’s trade.


With the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, it was clear that America’scapacity to protect mainland Southeast Asia was strictly limited. As a result,Japan’s southern neighbours looked to Tokyo for increasing economic andpolitical support. In August 1977 Prime Minister Fukuda visited six SoutheastAsian countries and enunciated the ‘Fukuda doctrine’ of close peaceful relationsbetween Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Atthis time Fukuda hoped that economic and diplomatic links could be establishedwith the unified communist government of Vietnam.19 This would have avoideda major political division in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Japan’s promises ofaid, programme of cultural exchanges, and frequent consultations with ASEANleaders indicated a commitment to support non-communist states in the region.The Vietnamese conquest of Cambodia in 1979 ended the fragile hope ofcoexistence in Indochina and made it difficult for Japan to avoid diplomaticsupport for ASEAN countries that felt threatened by Vietnam. Japan has not onlysuspended promised aid to Vietnam but, like all America’s allies, has symbolisedits political stance by supporting so-called Democratic Kampuchea. This rump ofthe Pol Pot regime is recognised by Japan, and its representatives have beenwelcomed in Tokyo and supported at the United Nations. Like the members ofASEAN, Japan has been cool toward India for its recognition of the new pro-Vietnamese Cambodian regime. Japan’s commitment to the stability of theASEAN powers has also been shown by gifts of rice and funds for Indochineserefugees, whose arrival in Thailand has created enormous difficulties in borderprovinces.

From the time of the oil crisis and Japan’s heightened consciousness regardingraw materials, Tokyo’s interest in Southeast Asia has increased while Vietnam’sexpansion has produced an increasingly clear political commitment to Indonesia,Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. Against this background,anti-Japanese feeling in Southeast Asia, which was a major issue in 1974, hasnow largely disappeared.

As a result of the Arab-Israeli war, Japan’s concern for energy becamedramatically clear in the mid-1970s when Japan entered the difficult field ofMiddle Eastern diplomacy. In 1974 a series of high-ranking emissaries promisedhelp with a whole series of economic development projects in Iran, North Africa,Arabia, and the Levant. In some cases, plans were not fulfilled, but by 1978Japanese exports to Saudi Arabia had reached $3,254 million and sales to Irantotaled $2,691 million20—in an area where Japan had little previous commercialexperience. Not only did Japan become involved in major economic cooperationprojects in the Middle East, but a whole range of cultural and political eventswere promoted to deepen understanding and to try to tighten links with the Arabworld. There were ‘Arab weeks’ in Japanese cities, exchanges of statesmen andscholars, and sympathetic statements regarding the Palestine LiberationOrganization. Yet the history of Japan’s largest physical gesture in the region—alarge petrochemical project in Iran—indicated the difficulties of blendingeconomic and diplomatic policy in a region with turbulent political conditions.


Work on the plant was interrupted by the Iranian revolution in 1979 and wasbelatedly resumed in 1980. Japan, like other customers, has attempted to transferoil purchases from Iran to Arabia, Mexico, and other suppliers. In the MiddleEast, Japan, like other industrial powers, faces a region which is vital butprofoundly unstable. However generous or enlightened political policies may be,there can be little expectation of long-term stability.

Europe is also a region whose importance for Japan has increased swiftly inthe late 1970s. In comparison with economic and political links with the UnitedStates, ties with Europe developed late; but, by the 1970s, Japan’s continuing andgrowing trade surplus with EEC countries created calls for protection notdissimilar to those voiced in the United States.21 Although Japanese exports incertain fields (ships, cars, and cameras are obvious examples) have had a sharpimpact on European industries, Japanese goods represent a very small percentageof Europe’s imports. Furthermore, the low level of European exports to Japanhas often reflected European predilections for selling in ex-colonial markets,rather than formal or informal Japanese measures against imports. In 1978 and1979 there developed what appeared to be acute crises in trade relations betweenEurope and Japan. These conflicts were accompanied by heavy-handed talk aboutprotection and alleged obstacles to European traders. Yet on both occasionsTokyo and Brussels recoiled from actions that could have precipitated a tradewar. Japan has simplified and reduced many restrictions on European goods, andEuropeans have abandoned target dates for reductions in the Japanese surplus.European negotiators have also turned from threats of excluding imports tolonger-term schemes for parallel reductions in both European and Japaneserestrictions. Furthermore, plans for increased Japanese investments in Europeand collaborative arrangements between European and Japanese companies (forexample, British Leyland-Honda and Nissan-Alfa Romeo) indicate that bothsides acknowledge shared interests in an open economic order which can only bepreserved by an uneven process of give-and-take. Indeed a sense of sharedinterests between Japan and Europe has recently extended further than meretrade negotiations. Both Japan and Western Europe (with the exception ofBritain) are vulnerable to the erratic supply and rising price of oil. Perhaps bothshare a less ideological view of world politics than does the United States. Thusin viewing the Middle East and Iran, Japanese and Europeans have often shownpro-Arab sympathies and distrust of heavy-handed economic sanctions.

In addition to the growing importance of Europe and the Middle East to Japan,Latin America and Australia have assumed a new significance for Tokyo’spolicy-makers. Prime Ministers Tanaka and Ohira visited Latin America inpursuit of oil and other raw materials, and Japan has entered into economiccooperation agreements with Brazil. Australia has immense reserves of iron,uranium, and coal, and is another important source of raw materials, while thedepletion of Japan’s fishing grounds has made fishing grounds as distant as NewZealand of economic significance. In all these areas there have been objections toJapanese economic influence but, as in relations with Europe, proponents of open


commerce and economic freedom have seen great value in developing trade withJapan.

Against this background of shifting political relations, what are Japan’s mainneeds and interests at the beginning of a new decade? In economic terms there isan acute and unprecedented awareness of Japan’s massive dependence uponimported oil, ore, coal, and natural gas. The Nomura Research Institute’s TheSearch for Japan’s Comprehensive Policy Guideline in a Changing World(Tokyo, 1978) focused upon the need to diversify supplies and types of energy,and the government has made plans to increase the role of imported coal inenergy supplies from 11.6 to 13.6 percent by 1985.22 Recent agreements withCanada to supply coal from British Columbia illustrate this trend, and supplies ofcoal from China and Australia will continue to increase. The stockpiling oflarger reserves is yet a further means of minimizing the impact of economic orpolitical instability in oil- or coal-producing countries. Yet as the July 1980Report on Comprehensive National Security indicates, there is ultimately noalternative in this field to good relations with Australia, Canada, the UnitedStates, and Saudi Arabia.23 However efficient conservation may be, diplomacyhas a crucial role in this aspect of Japan’s future.

Fortunately, Japan’s great dependence on imported foods (wheat, soybeans,and corn) principally involves relations with Canada, Australia, and the UnitedStates—countries with which Japan has good relations. The chance of seriousconflicts with these powers is minimal, but should there be major interruptions tomaritime trade, Japan’s stockpiles (three months in the case of wheat and onemonth in the case of soybeans) would scarcely provide substantial protection. Ina war, Japan’s more than 50 percent dependence on food imports (in caloryterms) could produce social catastrophe.24

Political security for any state (in Japan’s case the preservation of an openpolitical system) is as important as economic survival. In this respect Japan’sposition is arguably, and perhaps ternporarily, more secure than in the worstyears of the cold war. Japan is now part of an informal alignment with China, theUnited States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Western Europe— all ofwhich have a significant role in Japan’s economy as well as her politicalstrategy. Yet Chinese political behaviour is deeply unpredictable. A Chineserapprochement with the Soviet Union may be highly unlikely, but a change ofpolicy in China toward a more autarkic economy or a more chauvinistic policy ispossible and, in view of Japan’s increasing economic stake in China, such amove could have disastrous effects. If attitudes in China changed there arenumerous issues, such as control of the Senkaku islands, which could form thebasis for political conflict. However unlikely such changes may be, there remainsthe long-term problem of how China will choose to use its augmented powershould the Japanese-aided policy of modernization prove successful. Theselonger-term points of doubt show the need for careful diplomacy with China andalso for particularly considerate treatment of Chinese students and visitors. Thefurther development of Chinese studies programmes in Japanese universities is


also necessary if Japan is to achieve the deep, sensitive understanding of Chinawhich has always been the aspiration of enlightened Japanese.

Relations with the United States, Europe, and Australia are of greatimportance and will suffer repeated frictions. But a wide range of sharedinterests should prevent serious conflict. In view of wartime antipathies betweenJapan and America and Australia, and their disparate cultural traditions, thediplomatic understanding which has been achieved is a remarkable achievement.But even in this area further improvements are still possible, and the late PrimeMinister Ohira’s Pacific Basin Study Group has suggested imaginative cultural,technical, and economic projects, such as a joint Pacific Ocean ScientificSurvey, which could further improve trans-Pacific relations.25 In the past theForeign Ministry has placed political goals first, while the Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry has often emphasized pressure groups andeconomic interests. Better coordination of policy—perhaps the creation of therecently suggested Comprehensive National Security Council—might help tominimize these frictions which can do disproportionate damage in relationsbetween countries with free mass media and open public opinion.26

In relations with Southeast Asia Japan’s achievements have also beensubstantial in recent years. In the early 1970s Japanese economic penetrationcreated hostile public opinion, but since 1975 increased Japanese economic aidand attempts to produce sympathetic behaviour toward Southeast Asians hashelped to minimize local conflicts. Here the future depends not only upon theinternal politics of ASEAN countries (heavy-handed behaviour could alwaysrevive anti-Japanese opinion) but also on the future of Vietnamese politics. Thelong-term costs of Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia and the maintenance ofher forces on the Chinese border may lead to some tempering of Hanoi’smilitancy and might enable Japan to use economic assistance to increase itsinfluence throughout Indochina.

Needless to say, it is in relations with the Soviet Union that Japan has itsdeepest political antagonisms. Within these frictions are three elements— none ofwhich are easy to resolve. Behind all relations between Tokyo and Moscow is apolitical and ideological divide. This, coupled with the long, unhappy history ofRusso-Japanese relations, produces a background of deep mistrust. A moreimmediate element is the impact of Russia’s advance in Afghanistan, whichJapanese government leaders have interpreted as an aggressive act. Yet perhapsRussia’s less dramatic military links with Vietnam and use of bases in Indochinaare even more threatening to Japan.27 Even more importantly, there remains theperennial issue of the Northern islands; and on this question it is difficult to seeany hope that the Soviet Union will make concessions. Apart from the islands’strategic and economic importance, which are substantial, a concession couldwell act as an incentive to irredentist claims on many frontiers of the SovietUnion. If this territorial conflict existed between Japan and a non-communistcountry, one could imagine a territorial concession by Japan being matched bysome economic concession. But against the background of bitterness which


exists in Soviet-Japanese relations such a hypothetical arrangement would hardlybe valid or dependable. Perhaps Japan might succeed by pursuing its aims in aless public manner, but it is doubtful if this would ultimately achieve substantialgains. Following the recent improvement in relations between Japan and China,antagonisms between Japan and the Soviet Union have become far morecomplex. China has supported Japan’s territorial claims, and closer ties withPeking have not improved relations with Moscow. As the ComprehensiveNational Security Study Group pessimistically concluded in July 1980,‘Establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union will be no easy task.’28 OnAugust 15, 1980, Mr. Brezhnev’s comments on Japan again balanced talk ofcommercial negotiations with attacks on Japanese ‘militarism’.

Linked to the issues of Soviet intransigence and military power is the questionof countermeasures and the strength of Japan’s own forces. In recent years, notonly have Japanese self-defence forces come to be more widely accepted bypublic opinion, but particular emphasis has been placed upon antisubmarineaircraft and ships and the capacity to patrol Japanese waters. These are clearresponses to increased Soviet naval and air power in East Asia. In 1980 theDefense Agency’s demand for a 9.7 percent increase in military spending againhighlighted Japanese fears of the Soviet Union.

On August 18, 1980, Prime Minister Suzuki underlined the importance ofJapan’s armed forces by stating that ‘Japan should not depend only on the UnitedStates’s nuclear force. Japan should be capable of defending its own territory aswell as its existence as a nation.’ There has been talk of sending Japanese units—so far not permitted to serve abroad—to join in United Nations peace-keepingforces, and the National Security Study Group has called for Japan’s forces tobecome an effective denial force. Thus it would seem that more importance isbeing placed on military power, but whether there is a consensus to transformJapan’s forces into something new in scale and kind is unclear.

Clearly Japan has had a distinctive foreign policy throughout the postwaryears and has gained much by civilian diplomacy. Japan’s commerce hasavoided arms sales, and diplomacy has rejected military adventures. Thesecareful policies have brought political goodwill and security, although little drama.Perhaps Japan can contribute most to national and world security by promotingtechnology and cultural relations. Japanese skill and enterprise can do much toraise living standards and minimize human misery. To be successful, policies ofaid and investment require a clear strategy and cultural understanding; thus, acoordinated policy agency and the expansion of international studies in Japanwould be invaluable. Such changes may achieve more than dramatic increases inmilitary strength.


NOTES

1. Popular hostility to a pro-American foreign policy was partly responsible forJapan’s most serious postwar political crisis, see George R.Packard, Protest inTokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1966). For a brief digest of public opinion surveys on foreign policy issues, seeNHK Hoso Seron Chosa Kenkyusho, Zusetsu Sengo Seron-shi (Tokyo: Nihon HosoKyokai, 1975), pp. 162–87.

2. See Roger Swearingen, The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan: Escalating Challengeand Response (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), pp. 41–52.

3. For a survey of postwar relations with Asia, see Lawrence Olson, Japan in PostwarAsia (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970).

4. For a summary of postwar policy towards China, see Wolf Mendl, Issues inJapan’s China Policy (London: MacMillan, 1978).

5. For a brief account of the 1971 textile crisis, see Frank C.Langdon, Japan’sForeign Policy (Vancouver, B.C.: University of British Columbia Press, 1973), pp.166–70. For a more detailed treatment, see I.M.Destler, Hideo Sato, Priscilla Clappand Haruhiro Fukui, Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-JapaneseRelations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976).

6. The text of the September 29, 1972 Sino-Japanese agreement can be found inMendl, Issues in Japan’s China Policy, pp. 142–44.

7. In the same years Japan increased the number of experts sent to developingcountries from 2,629 to 4,211, see Statistics Bureau, Statistical Handbook of Japan1980 (Tokyo: Prime Minister’s Office, 1980), pp. 140–41. In 1975, 56.5 percent ofJapan’s overseas development assistance went to Southeast Asian countries and 79percent to Asia, see Kiyoaki Kikuchi, Japan’s Official Development Assistance(Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977), p. 8.

8. For a general discussion of ‘Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese ForeignPolicy’, see Saburo Okita, Japan in the World Economy (Tokyo: The JapanFoundation, 1975), pp. 187–200.

9. America’s sense of failure and decline is vividly expressed in Ezra F.Vogel, Japanas Number One: Lessons for America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1979).

10. Japan, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security 1979, p. 167.11. Ibid., p. 12.12. Recent social and economic changes in the United States are vividly described in

William Wallace’s article ‘The EEC is an uncomfortable bed for Britain to lie in,but it is the only group that can bring British influence to bear constructively on adistracted American administration’, The Guardian, May 15, 1980.

13. Japan, Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1979, pp. 37–40.14. The problems of Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation are outlined in Roger

Swearingen, The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan, pp. 121–42.15. In June 1974 an agreement for the joint production of coal in Yakutia included a

$450 million credit from the Japanese Export-Import Bank, ibid., p. 139.16. For the text of the September 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty, see Asian Security 1979,

pp. 195–96.


17. For the text of the Russian draft treaty, see Swearingen, The Soviet Union andPostwar Japan, pp. 289–91.

18. See Asian Security 1979, p. 71.19. For the major public documents relating to the Fukuda doctrine, see Japan,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Southeast Asia and Japan, The Dawn of a New Era:Prime Minister Fukuda’s Tour of Southeast Asia, 1977, pp. 13–32.

20. Statistical Handbook of Japan 1980, p. 84.21. Japan’s surplus with the EEC in 1978 was $5 billion; in 1979, it was $5.1 billion.

For a Japanese view of Europe’s economic relations with Japan, see MasamichiHanabusa, Trade Problems between Japan and Western Europe (Farnborough,Hampshire: Gower Publishing Company, 1979).

22. Yujiro Eguchi, ‘Japanese Energy Policy’, International Affairs, 56, no. 2 (Spring1980), pp. 266–67.

23. Japan, The Comprehensive National Security Study Group, Report onComprehensive National Security [English Translation: July 2, 1980], p. 58.

24. Ibid., pp. 60–65. Japan’s food needs are analysed in F.H.Sanderson, Japan’s FoodProspects and Policies (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978).

25. Japan, The Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group, Report on the Pacific BasinCooperation Concept [English Translation: May 19, 1980], p. 9.

26. Report on Comprehensive National Security, p. 72.27. ‘The Soviet Union’s expanded influence on Vietnam is particularly noteworthy in

connection with Japan’s own security. Soviet forces are in a position to use air andnaval facilities in Vietnam on a regular basis since the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. These Sovietmotions toward Vietnam are also affecting Japanese security’, Japan, Foreign PressCenter, Outline of First-Round Discussions: July 1980 (Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Security Policy Planning Committee), August 1980, R-80-12, p. 8.

28. Report on Comprehensive National Security, p. 52.


First published in Gordon Daniels & Reinhard Drifte (eds), Europe

& Japan: Changing Relationships Since 1945, Woodchurch, Paul

Norbury Publications, 1986, pp. 12–22

41Japan in the Post-War World: Between Europe

and the United States

JAPAN’S SURRENDER in August 1945 marked far more than a militarycatastrophe. Her defeat effectively destroyed all the diplomatic paths which shehad followed in the previous century. In a world of nuclear weapons and economicinterdependence a return to virtual isolation was impossible.1 With her armedforces destroyed a revival of the independent diplomacy of the early Meiji periodwould have been hazardous.2 Wartime campaigns against the BritishCommonwealth had made a new Anglo-Japanese alliance inconceivable, whilethe defeat and occupation of Germany and Italy excluded the possibility of a newTripartite Pact.3 Furthermore, ill-will in Japan’s erstwhile empire: Taiwan,Korea, Manchuria, China and much of South East Asia, made close links withsuch countries a very distant prospect.4

This combination of forces created a painful international environment, and anAmerican army of occupation ensured that all Japanese embassies and consulatesoverseas were temporarily closed. Four years after Japan’s surrender theCommunist revolution in China further delayed the prospect of Tokyo returningeasily to her pre-war exchange of manufactures for raw materials from the Asianmainland.

Hemmed in by these circumstances it was almost inevitable that Tokyo wouldbase its post-war foreign policy on the closest of relations with her ex-enemy, theUnited States. In The White House Years Henry Kissinger wrote ‘It is odd thattwo such different nations should have come together’ but the forces impellingTokyo and Washington into mutual cooperation were immensely powerful.5

The presence of an American army of occupation, for six-and-a-half years,was a vital factor in shaping Japanese attitudes. But Japan’s new outlook was farmore than a simple response to military force. By the standards of muchinternational behaviour America’s occupation policies were benign andwell meaning. Furthermore, by 1948, the United States had begun to convert therelationship of conqueror and conquered into a subtler and more complexalignment. American military leaders stood to gain much from links withJapanese intelligence experts who had specialised in the study of Soviet affairs.Japan provided invaluable bases in the Far East. American businessmen andcongressional leaders believed that the resurgence of the Japanese economy

would benefit both trans-Pacific trade and American profits. They also held thata prosperous Japan would be a stable anti-Communist partner.

Finally, there still existed a surprising number of American diplomats,missionaries, traders and scholars with deep experience of Japan who werecommitted to a process of intellectual and social healing—these official andunofficial envoys sought to rebuild the relations which had linked significantgroups of Americans and Japanese in the years before the Pacific War. ForJapanese cabinets fear of Communism, recognition of America’s economicpower, and hostility to rapid re-armament all helped to produce partnership withWashington and dependence upon American forces (in bases in Japan) fordefence against Communist China and the Soviet Union.

These political, commercial, military and cultural relations, which weresymbolised by the Peace and Security Treaties of September 1951, clearlybrought many advantages; not only physical security but generous treatment ofJapanese goods in the American market. The latter allowed Japan’s economicgrowth to continue long after the Korean war boom had come to an end. Indeed,by the 1970s the United States provided a market for almost one third of Japan’sincreasingly sophisticated exports.

Yet the history of the new alliance was not a Utopian chronicle. Its clearinequalities of power, status and behaviour riled many in a nation whose modernhistory had been proud and independent. The association of the Japan-UnitedStates alliance with the struggles of the cold war often appeared dangerous;while the inherent contradiction between Japan’s history and geography, whichwere Asiatic, and her political economy—which was dominated by NorthAmerica—created deep unease in many Japanese minds. America’s effectiveveto on formal diplomatic relations with China was also humiliating andappeared to prevent the development of what was, somewhat romantically,viewed as a vast potential market.

There were also emotive incidents which stirred anti-American feelings.Visits, of nuclear-powered warships to Japanese harbours and the suspicion thatthey might be carrying nuclear weapons, from time to time disturbed Japanesewho recalled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. American rule in the Ry� ky� islands wasat times characterised by a colonial atmosphere, and insensitivity to the wishesof local inhabitants.

But perhaps the most disturbing element in Japanese-American relations wasthe role of the United States in the Vietnam war. Japan’s conservative leadersstood politically, if not militarily, beside America in her hostility to the Hanoiregime, but the majority of Japanese people were disturbed by the human agonyinflicted by American forces on fellow Asians. Not only was the Vietnam wardeeply embarrassing, but it coincided with a period of peculiar difficulty in trans-Pacific relations. Within the framework of Japanese-American cooperation theUnited States did make continuous concessions to Japanese demands for publicrecognition of a more equal relationship. In 1960 and again in 1970 Washingtonre-negotiated the Security Treaty to improve the process of consultation between

392 JAPAN IN THE POST-WAR WORLD: BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

the two powers. America also agreed to return the Bonin Isles to Japaneseadministration and then to transfer Okinawa to Japan’s control.6

But by 1971 economic frictions were troubling the alliance for the first time.In 1961 and 1963 the United States had a favourable trade balance with Japan,but between 1964 and 1965 a Japanese surplus leapt from $377 million to $1901million. Even more serious, between 1967 and 1970 Japan’s favourable balancesoared from $1160 million to $3963 million, and within the next year it almostdoubled.

Harrassed by the Vietnam war America was increasingly exasperated by thesehumiliating statistics. At this time the American diplomat Alexis Johnsondeclared that this problem ‘had more of an adverse impact on America’sinternational financial situation than relations with any other single country inthe world’.7

America’s irritation also exposed Japan’s inner divisions in a mostembarrassing way. Prime Minister Sat� apparently promised that Japanese textileexports—which commanded 7% of the American market—would be restrained,but it proved almost impossible to ensure that Japan’s textile industry wouldcomply with this decision.8 In August 1971 America replied by placing a 10%surcharge on Japanese imports, and taking measures to force up the value of theyen. Japan backed down in the face of these measures and agreed to a three-yearexport limit in exchange for an end to the surcharge.

For Japan these events seemed to threaten the end of an era of stability. IfAmerica could not be relied on to maintain an open door, markets would have tobe sought elsewhere. What was more, America’s failures in Vietnam cast doubtsupon her capacity to defend Japan from possible assaults from communistpowers. President Nixon talked increasingly of Asians being responsible for theirown defence and Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Peking, also in 1971, created abrief panic in Tokyo. For a time there was fear that, as in the Second World War,China could become America’s Far Eastern partner.

However, within months Americans and Japanese had removed each others’anxieties, and the United States soon indicated that she approved of Japanbeginning diplomatic and commercial relations with the communist regime inPeking.

For Japan the process of establishing peaceful relations with the People’sRepublic of China was tortuous and full of subtle symbolism. But this newsituation—which was a by-product of the Sino-Soviet split—offered Japangreater security and diplomatic flexibility. It also suggested that if her exportswere obstructed in North America China might form a partial alternative market.In other words in 1972 Japan’s policy continued to be based on the Americanalliance, but the United States was no longer omnipotent and her markets couldnot absorb rising Japanese exports indefinitely.

If the 1960s saw the gradual accumulation of Japanese diplomatic difficultiesthese same years also brought rapid economic growth and the beginnings of a


rising Japanese interest in the third main centre of democratic politics andeconomic free enterprise—Western Europe.

Like Japan Europe had ended the war devastated, politically insecure and withlittle prospect of economic recovery. As in Japan, American aid, protection andpolitical encouragement generated stability and prosperity.9 Yet these similaritieshardly implied any close links between these two beneficiaries of America’s anti-Soviet stance. For some time European powers were primarily concerned withtheir own reconstruction and in continental Europe the tradition of close personaland political relations with Japan was far weaker than in the United States.10

As a result of geography, and French, British, Belgian and Dutch concern withcolonial problems, interest in Japan developed slowly. What was more, anti-Japanese feeling, particularly in the Netherlands, was more persistent in Europethan in the United States. Both Western Europe and Japan were economicallymuch weaker than Washington and were mutually suspicious in commercialmatters. Japan applied to join the GATT in 1952 but after considerable resistanceshe was only allowed to accede to the treaty in 1955.

But this was a limited as well as a late act of acceptance. Fourteen countriesincluding Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands rejected full GATTrelations and invoked article 35 which provided for non-application of theagreeement between particular parties. Some twenty-seven British, French andBelgian dependencies also invoked the protection of Article 35.

Understandably, the Japanese regarded this as unjust treatment which recalledthe unequal treaties dictated by European states in the nineteenth-century. Japanpressed for changes and the 1959 GATT meeting was held in Tokyo. However,Article 35 continued to be a thorn in Euro-Japanese relations and it was not until1962 that Britain gave up this protection, as part of a broad commercial treaty.11

In these same years moves towards European integration came to be a matterof some concern to Japan. For the powerful United States, European unityappeared a useful aid in bolstering the non-communist camp but to Japan itsimplications were wholly commercial and negative. In September 1960, threeyears after the establishment of the European Economic Community, onecommentator in Tokyo wrote:

‘Japan has no financial stake at all inside Europe and practically nofinancial connections elsewhere in the world, and no spare capital to makethem, even if they were economically and politically workable. And whileJapan is at present a strong and active commercial economy her strengthdoes not compare with Europe’s as a bloc or with that of America. TheJapanese foreign exchange reserves are currently at a peak of a trillion anda-half dollars. This, however, is only about half that of Britain’s reservesand Britain is a country only half Japan’s size’.12

In this situation Japan feared that the creation of the EEC would lead to anintrospective, narrow commercial policy in Europe, and that European economic


integration would create such massive competitive power that she would sufferin third country markets. At the same time, Japanese fears were heightened bywhat one public relations specialist termed Europe’s ‘pre-war stereotyped visionof Japan as a country where low wages, market flooding tactics and politicalassassinations are the order of the day’.13

Japan was also perturbed at the prospect of the Organisation for EuropeanEconomic Cooperation (OEEC) being transformed into a pan-Atlanticorganisation which would exclude her from the society of industrialised powers.However, America, and later Britain, gave support to Japanese membership ofthe new Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) andby 1964 Japan had emerged as a full member of the organisation.

It is hardly surprising that Europe had a somewhat archaic image of theJapanese economy at this time for the chief items of concern—as in pre-war days—were cheap cotton textiles; domestic sewing machines were another major itemof dispute. Conversely, Japan appeared alarmed that if Britain entered the EEC,this would pose a serious threat to her own emerging shipbuilding industry.

The early years of the Six saw increasingly active Japanese attempts—byministerial visits—to improve relationships with European capitals. At this timeJapan appeared as an under-privileged outsider struggling for a reasonablemeasure of recognition. As in later textile talks with the United States Japanesepolicy often suffered from inter-ministerial rivalry with the Foreign Ministrytaking a more conciliatory attitude than the Ministry of International Trade andIndustry (MITI).

In the mid 1960s, as in later years, Japan’s Foreign Ministry (Gaimush� )emphasised the export of Japanese capital and productive techniques as a meansof improving commercial relations. For the Gaimush� feared that trading frictioncould poison the whole atmosphere of Japan’s foreign relations, therebydestroying the possibility of successful negotiations on all economic matters.

Despite all these difficulties the 1960s saw a creeping liberalisation ofattitudes in both Brussels and Tokyo. In October 1969 Japan and the EEC agreedon freer trade in cotton goods and between 1960 and 1970 Japanese exports tothe Six grew from $173 million to $1303 million. Imports from the EECincreased from $209 million to $1117 million and from EFTA from $157 millionto $750 million.14 As late as 1967 Japan’s trade with the EEC was slightly indeficit but soon Japan’s surplus was to be a dominant theme in discussionsbetween Tokyo and Brussels.

Although Japan was beginning to succeed in Europe the significance for Japanof their mutual trade was still greatly overshadowed by trade across the Pacific.Yet this remained a time of optimism and economic growth in Europe, andattitudes towards Japan began to mellow. As Japanese products became moresophisticated the notion of Japan as a country of ill-paid primitives wasincreasingly discounted. As a result, by 1970 the European Parliament wascalling for a broader political and economic relationship with Tokyo.


Unfortunately, optimism and very high growth rates were soon to disappear.The Middle East War of 1973 and the development of oil diplomacy by the ArabStates not only drove up the price of oil but deeply affected relations betweenJapan and the United States. The Middle East was a crucial source of Japan’senergy and when the Arab States threatened to cut off Tokyo’s supplies Americawas manifestly unable to help—either politically or economically.

In November 1973, Japan bowed to Arab pressure and stated that she wouldreconsider her policy towards Israel, unless the latter withdrew from the Arabterritory which she had occupied during the 1967 Middle East War. Like thefailures of United States policy in Vietnam, the Middle East crisis raised furtherdoubts in Japanese minds regarding the American alliance; or comprehensiveAmerican protection.

Just as Japan had entered European diplomacy in the 1960s, so she wascompelled to enter Middle Eastern diplomacy in the 1970s. In fact the pursuitand securing of resources led Japanese foreign policy well beyond the triangle ofher links with the United States and the enlarged European Communities. LatinAmerica, Australia and South-East Asia were all seen as regions of growingeconomic importance.

In 1973, the rising value of the yen, which was largely the result of Americanmeasures, limited the rise in Japan’s trade surplus with the United States. Butwithin three years Japan’s surplus was again rising rapidly, and bickering overtrade became an important sub-theme in the relations of the alliance. In somerespects these arguments resembled conflicts which were to arise with Europeancompetitors. America explained her declining trade performance by drawingattention to Japanese import restrictions, particularly on agricultural products,such as citrus fruit. But Japan like Europe was endowed with strong andvociferous farmers organisations which made substantial concessions verydifficult. Japan eventually eased some restrictions.

Then the United States moved its criticism to other barriers—to the import ofcomputers, and to the right of American companies to tender for contracts forJapanese state and public organisations. Many of these arguments were merelysymbolic and political. For Japanese concessions, even if made, were unlikely toproduce a substantial shift in Japan’s surplus. On the Japanese side policy wasoften hard to formulate as divisions between the Foreign Ministry—whichemphasised the overall welfare of the alliance— and MITI—which was moreconcerned with economic criteria—often blurred Japan’s position.

These economic frictions and the increase in Japan’s surplus had furthereffects on the delicate web of relations between Tokyo and Washington.Washington’s frustration at Japan’s economic strength led to American pressureon Japan to ease America’s military burden in the Far East by increasing herland, sea and air forces. Washington also hoped that Japanese purchases oftechnically advanced American military aircraft would help to shift the tradebalance a few degrees in America’s favour. Japan was reluctant to move rapidlyin this direction. Throughout much of the 1970s rapid and substantial rearmament


was unpopular in Japan and at times there was fear that such moves might irritateJapan’s immediate neighbours.

If defence was one area of continuing if polite friction between Japan and theUnited States another more sensitive issue was unemployment in sectors of theAmerican economy, stemming from Japanese imports. Japan’s technicaleffectiveness in manufacturing and marketing small cars coincided with therising price of petrol and led to massive sales of compact cars which hadpreviously been thought unsuitable for the American market.

Increasingly, American manufacturers pressed for restrictions on Japaneseexports. But there were also more enlightened suggestions that Japanesecompanies should build factories in the United States to relieve unemploymentand soften the demand for protection. Yet any substantial Japanese response tothese proposals was scarcely within the power of diplomats; it was much moredependent upon the decisions of private companies, and such developments wereslow to gain momentum. Indeed, under the Reagan administration temporaryagreements on Voluntary restraints’ proved the main palliative in this field.

Despite these frictions between the Pacific partners, Japan has remainedcommitted to the alliance and has sought to support its military fabric as far aspossible. President Carter’s suggestion that United States forces might bewithdrawn from South Korea stimulated active Japanese resistance. Thiscontributed significantly to reversing American policy.

Japan’s sense of danger—that the East Asian military balance might be upset—seemed further justified by Russian behaviour in the disputed northern islandsbetween Hokkaido and the Kurile chain.15 In 1979 and 1980 Soviet forces onthese remote territories were significantly increased and the discovery of aSoviet spy ring in the Japanese self-defence forces produced further alarm. ThisJapanese unease was also augmented by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, theVietnamese conquest of Cambodia and increasingly close relations betweenMoscow and Hanoi. These events all changed Japanese views of defence andworld politics in the early 1980s.

In her search for markets and raw materials Japan had long pursued a so-called‘multi-directional’ diplomacy. Now Tokyo turned to a clearer and more overtcommitment to links with the United States and the non-communist world. Itmay be argued that Japan’s improved relations with mainland China, since 1972,have improved her military position, but what Japan sees as Soviet expansionismseems a particularly serious danger. This sense of threat has not only been voicedby American and Japanese political leaders—Prime Minister Ohira’sInvestigation Group into Comprehensive National Security, which reported inJuly 1980 clearly stated:

‘The military nature of the Soviet Union’s foreign relations is becomingincreasingly obvious. This was confirmed decisively by the Sovietintervention in Afghanistan. Soviet diplomacy strongly reflects thephilosophy of power.16


Even more striking has been the increasing feeling among the Japanese public,encouraged by the Japanese Government, that the Soviet Union’s militarystrength in the Far East demands an increase in Japan’s defence forces. This hasbrought no dramatic changes, but the purchase of anti-submarine ships andaircraft, increases in the defence budget, and the weakening of popular hostilityto the self-defence forces have all been significant developments.17

Japan’s military and non-military policies have not only become more clearlydirected to the support of United States policy, but her use of economic aid tostrengthen states in the front line of great power rivalry may have helped to easeAmerican pressure for yet more defence spending.

In 1980 and after Japan has given financial aid to areas well beyond South-East Asia, the region usually considered of immediate interest to her. Suchcountries as Jamaica, Pakistan and Turkey have all benefitted from this new turnin Japanese policy. Repeatedly, whether the issue has been the Middle East, Indo-China, Afghanistan or Poland, Japan has made overt statements opposing theCommunist use of force in settling international or domestic disputes. In thisrespect the political dimension of the alliance with the United States has come tobe more public, as America’s military protection has seemed increasinglyimportant.

Geography, military power and the absence of an historical relationship haveprevented Japan’s post-war relations with Western Europe paralleling those withthe United States or South East Asia. But in the last decade Tokyo’s relationswith Brussels have been transformed. Not only have memories of wartime Japanceased to exert a significant influence on Europeans minds, but in informal ways—such as the activities of the Trilateral Commission—and formal negotiations,the notion of a triangular partnership has gained increasing strength.

At a time when communist and third world powers pursue varieties ofauthoritarian and protectionist policies, Japan, America and Western Europe areincreasingly seen as angles of a triangle which are essential to the survival of aliberal political and economic order.

The new importance which Japan has placed upon economic relations withEurope has been symbolised by the establishment, in 1975, of the Japanesediplomatic mission to the European Communities. There have also been frequentexchanges of visits by powerful commercial and industrial delegations and anincreasing number of regular high-level consultations. Yet these exchanges havebeen far from harmonious.

Like Britain in its nineteenth-century heyday, Japan has strenuously opposedrestrictions on her industrial exports. This has often brought conflict with leadersin Western Europe. But in pursuing this policy Japan has often been helped by theuncertain nature of the European Community as a political unit. Given Japan’sgeneral consensus on commercial policy, it is hardly surprising that theCommunity failed, in 1972, in its attempt to negotiate an overall commercial treatywith Japan which would provide safeguards in the event of a sudden inrush ofJapanese products. At that time Japan successfully argued that the GATT already


provided such safeguards and that no further measures were necessary. Yetdespite such clashes and European condemnation of Japanese ‘non-tariffbarriers’ this failure to agree on a treaty produced no permanent disruption ofEuro-Japanese relations.

In fact Japan has constantly sought to soften European criticism of her exportstrategy by a number of direct and indirect measures. She has arranged forEuropean businessmen to have marketing conferences in Japan. She has lowereda number of tariffs in a series of liberalising measures and has agreed to‘voluntary’ export restraints on sensitive products. Japanese diplomats have alsopointed out the inaccuracy of some European claims regarding the totalinpenetrability of the Japanese market.

In 1978, Japan’s surplus with the EEC reached $5 billion and the Communitycalled for substantial symbolic action to reduce it. More than once, Japan hasundertaken to attempt to reduce her rising surplus—but by definition a pattern oflargely free trade cannot be subject to massive manipulation. Furthermore,Japanese companies have great independent power and would resist instructionsto fall in line with govermnent plans for large purchases of European equipment.It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the troublesome trade surplus is notthe result of exotic non-tariff barriers of a conspiratorial character. To a largeextent it is the product of Japanese technology, efficiency and marketing which arerarely matched by European enterprises.

Attempts to view these conflicts in simplistic terms have fortunately weakenedas both sides have come to recognise the complexity of the issues involved. Inthe 1980s both Japanese and Europeans have suggested ameliorating problemsby joint research projects, and the building of Japanese factories in Europe.Although high labour costs in such countries as West Germany have deterredJapanese investment, the number of Japanese factories in Europe has graduallyincreased. This trend has been particularly marked in the United Kingdom wherethe Thatcher Government has urged Japanese car and electronics companies toestablish plants inside the European tariff wall.

Japanese policy has at times been assisted by the varied and inconsistentrestrictions imposed by various Community countries and the mutual differencesamong European states. Furthermore, European admiration for Japaneseefficiency has also encouraged the idea of industrial cooperation. More recently,American and Japanese proposals for a ‘Pacific Community’ have created fearsthat Europe might be neglected. This has also strengthened moves in Europetowards improved relations with Japanese Government and industry. As a result,Japan has clearly moved from a position of some political and economicinferiority to a position of equality and self-confidence.

Increasingly, Japanese economic successes are understood rather thandenigrated in Europe and the broad interdependence of Europe and Japan isrecognised by both parties. Japan’s trade has been aided by the EuropeanCommunity’s many internal divisions but its success has been overwhelmingly


the result of her entrepreneurs’ triumphs in the very contest-free competition,which is said to epitomise transactions in the Euro-Japanese-American triangle.

It might be argued that the present situation is economically satisfactory forJapan, but if Japan’s position is to be more secure, understanding of Japanesecommerce and politics needs to be far more widespread in European society.Conversely, the Japanese might question whether, in a dangerous world, existingeconomic relations are sufficient to sustain friendship between Japan andWestern Europe.

It would be platitudinous to claim that personal contacts can resolve suchserious problems as unemployment, but even today the formal andinformal associations of politicians, businessmen and scholars which characterisetrans-Pacific relations do not exist in relations between Europe and Japan. ForJapan it is most important that she be more widely understood in Europe. But itis also important that Japan should view Europe with more interest andsympathy. That the Japanese Society for the Study of the European Communitiespublished its first yearbook as late as 1981 suggests a somewhat tardy beginning.18

When one recalls the programme of Fulbright scholarships which did much topromote understanding of the United States after the Second World War one canonly conclude that Japan still has much to gain from a more energetic culturalpolicy towards Western Europe. On repeated occasions officials of the JapanFoundation have asserted the paramount importance of South-East Asia andAmerica, and despite some improvements it is still doubtful if Europe receivesadequate attention.19

In the years since the Second World War Japan’s multi-level partnership withthe United States has survived commercial, emotional, political and culturalchallenges. Its origins were dictated by cruel circumstance but it has outlastedthe Anglo-Japanese Alliance which was a voluntary agreement. Now theAmerican-Japanese alliance as embodied by President Reagan and PremierNakasone is so mature that it resembles the partnerships which binds the élites ofEnglish-speaking or West European states.

However, relations between Japan and Europe are very different. At their basethey lack the hard military foundation of the Japanese-American alliance. At thehigher levels of intellect or in the forum of public opinion there remains a needfor closer relations, more information and greater informality. For relationsbetween Japan and Europe to be secure, they require supra-commercial andsupra-political dimensions. Without such enrichment the liberal triangle willremain an ineffective vision rather than a creative reality.

NOTES

1. Japan’s foreign relations were limited to restricted contacts with China, theNetherlands and Korea from the early seventeenth-century until 1854.


2. Japan carried out a vigorous independent diplomacy from the Meiji Restoration(1868) until the signature of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902.

3. Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940.4. For example, diplomatic relations with South Korea were not established until

1965.5. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1979) p.

322.6. The agreement to return the Bonin Islands was signed in April 1967, that to return

the Ry� y� s, including Okinawa in June 1971.7. Frank C.Langdon, Japan’s Foreign Policy (Vancouver, University of British

Columbia Press, 1973) pp.150–151.8. For the complexities of these negotiations see Kissinger, The White House Years,

pp.329–340.9. For a recent study of American-European cooperation after the Second World War

see R.J.Barnet, The Allies; America-Europe-Japan Makers of the Postwar World(New York, Simon and Shuster, 1983).

10. American military power excluded European states such as Britain, France and theNetherlands from any meaningful role in the Occupation of Japan (1945–52) seeRoger Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1982).

11. For a survey of early post-war relations between Japan and Europe see MasamichiHanabusa, Trade Problems Between Japan and Western Europe (Farnborough,Hants, Gower R.I.I.A. 1979) pp. 1–15.

12. Joseph Z.Reday, ‘Japan Will Have to Face Common Market Troubles’, JapanTimes, 23 September 1960.

13. Charles E.Allen of Hill and Knowland Inc. reported in the Japan Times, 9December 1960. Significantly, this was written shortly after the only post-warassassination of a major political leader—that of the Socialist, Asanuma, on 12October 1960.

14. EFTA—The European Free Trade Association, of which the United Kingdom wasa member before joining the EEC, in 1973.

15. For surveys of Soviet military activities in areas close to Japan see the DefenseAgency’s annual Defense of Japan (Tokyo) and the Research Institute for Peaceand Security’s (Tokyo) annual Asian Security.

16. The Comprehensive National Security Study Group, Report on ComprehensiveNational Security (Translation), 2 July 1980, p. 52.

17. In late 1984 a Prime Ministerial advisory group recommended the abandonment ofthe 1 per cent of GNP limit on defence spending. This indicated a considerableshift in Japan’s political mood.

18. Nihon-EC Gakkai Nemp� (1981). Later issues appeared in 1982, 1983 and 1984.All were published by Y� hikaku, Tokyo.

19. In 1991 Asia absorbed 34% of the Foundation’s overseas spending, North America15% and Europe 19%, Kokusai K� ry� Kikin, Kokusai K� ry� Kikin Nenp� , 57Nendo (Tokyo, 1982), p. 46.


First published in Juliet Lodge (ed.), The European Community and

the Challenge of the Future, London, Pinter Publishers, 1989, pp.

279–284

42EC-Japan: Past, Present and Future

WHEN THE LEADERS of six West European states signed the Treaty of Romein 1957 Japan had virtually no place in their political and economicconsciousness. Since 1949 the United States had provided their military shield,and Marshall aid had sustained their economic reconstruction. Equallysignificant had been the encouragement which Washington had given to thebeginnings of West European integration. Then, as now, the United States wasthe most powerful and positive element in the EC’s external relations. Incontrast, a negative force, the Soviet Union, was of almost equal significance.Moscow’s military power, and her control of Eastern Europe, had culminated inthe re-invasion of Hungary in 1956, and a steady stream of refugees from theEast frequently reminded Western Europeans of the austerity and inhumanity oflife in the People’s Democracies.

When European statesmen looked beyond North America and their owncontinent their interests lay principally in Africa and the Caribbean where France,Belgium and the Netherlands still ruled colonial empires. Thus the newCommunity’s extra-European policy was largely based upon schemes foreconomic aid, imperial preference and colonial or semi-colonial development.Indeed many writers would argue that the prejudices of empire still dominatedEuropean attitudes to Africa, Asia and the non-European world.

If Japan had any place in the contemporary European world view it was aparticularly unfortunate one. Memories of pre-war trade were deeplyunfavourable. The pirating of European designs, the dumping of inferior articlesand the exploiting of cheap ‘Asiatic’ labour were all considered typical ofJapanese commercial behaviour. Japan’s wartime alliance with Nazi Germanyand Fascist Italy evoked equally unhappy memories. Her military occupation ofFrench Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies and her ill-treatment of Dutchcivilians in Java and Sumatra had engendered antipathies which were to last foralmost half a century.

In contrast to European attitudes of suspicion and hostility, the United Stateshad demonstrated remarkable benevolence towards her defeated enemy. As earlyas 1948 American statesmen had viewed Japan as a potential bulwark againstCommunism and supported her economy with financial aid and technicalassistance. In 1951 this relationship had been reinforced by the United States-

Japan Security Treaty which provided American military protection for ademocratized and virtually disarmed Japan. America’s sympathetic attitudeswere also evident in her support for Japanese membership of major internationalorganizations. In 1956 Washington sponsored Japan’s entry into the UnitedNations, and eight years later she ensured Japan’s membership of the OECD.

The gulf which separated American and European policies was particularlyevident in the sphere of international commercial agreements. British andCommonwealth obstruction delayed Japan’s accession to the GATT until 1955,and even then Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands gave only grudgingacceptance. More specifically, all invoked Article 35 of the GATT whichpermitted selective non-application of the Agreement, should a signatory desireit. In 1959 and 1962 Japanese prime ministers visited Western Europe andsought concessions, but it was only in 1963 that Britain abandoned her adherenceto Article 35. In the following year France and the Benelux countries belatedlyfollowed suit.

If European.hostility to Japan softened in the 1960s there remained littlepositive affection. In 1964 the Tokyo Olympics did much to improve Japan’sinternational reputation, but President de Gaulle still characterized PrimeMinister Ikeda as a ‘transistor salesman’—rather than an architect of remarkablepolicies of economic growth. Indeed serious European interest in Japan andrecognition of her importance only emerged when Community countries beganto experience significant trade deficits with their new competitor.

In the early 1960s Euro-Japanese trade had been in general equilibrium, butfrom 1969 the Community experienced annual deficits. It was this issue,combined with a new awareness of Tokyo’s economic importance, whichinspired the EEC’s first attempt to negotiate a Community-wide commercialagreement with the Japanese government. In 1970 and 1971 CommissionerDahrendorf embarked on treaty negotiations and achieved a wide measure ofagreement. Both Europeans and Japanese favoured trade liberalization andfrequent meetings, but European policies were still too restrictive to secure fullJapanese agreement. The EEC feared a sudden inrush of low-priced Japaneseproducts and demanded that any treaty should include a ‘Safeguard Clause’.Such a provision would permit the imposition of emergency controls in times ofcrisis. However, Tokyo countered by claiming that Article 19 of the GATTalready provided for such emergencies. Japan refused to countenance thepossibility of any new restrictions upon her exports and Dahrendorf’snegotiations ended in deadlock. Once again, European attitudes had appearedunsympathetic and inflexible.

Soon worse was to follow. The rise in oil prices which followed the YomKippur war generated recession and unemployment in Europe and calls forprotection against Japanese exports. European alarm was further deepened by thechanging character of Japanese products. Increasingly textiles, pottery and lightindustrial goods were giving way to steel, ships, electronic goods and bearings.These were not only the products of heavy and advanced industries, they often

EC-JAPAN: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 403

outclassed their European equivalents. European criticisms of Japaneseeconomic policies were understandable, but they were often characterized byignorance, prejudice and serious misconceptions. European writings whichequated Japanese marketing with ‘aggression’ and corporate planning with‘conspiracy’ were not only common but surprisingly influential in majorCommunity countries. Such ill-informed attitudes often obstructed constructiveEuropean responses to Japanese competition. These European fears had theirmost potent impact in October 1976 when Mr Doko and a delegation of Japaneseindustrial leaders toured Western European capitals. Even in West Germany,which was a bastion of economic liberalism, Doko and his colleagues weresubjected to strident criticism. European threats of protectionism were alarming,but even more disturbing were simplistic criticisms of ‘Japan Incorporated’which suggested that the Japanese state was omniscient and omnipotent ineconomic policy. Doko’s bitter experience in Europe was later to be termed the‘Doko Shock’. This exerted a marked influence on Japanese governmental andcompany attitudes.

In short, Japan now sought to implement measures which would defeatprotectionism and simultaneously make some concessions to European demands.Now ‘Voluntary Export Restraints’ became an increasingly common device toavoid the dangers of market saturation. Doko also sought to encourage a measureof domestic reflation. It was hoped that this would moderate foreign criticismand the need for relentless exporting.

In the aftermath of the Doko visit Europeans and Japanese developedstrategies of conflict and compromise which avoided the excesses of bothprotectionism and laissez-faire. In part these new solutions were the product ofgreater knowledge and more sophisticated negotiation. In 1975 the EuropeanCommunity established a permanent delegation in Tokyo, and Japan founded itsown mission to the European Communities. Furthermore, from the autumn of1975 both Europeans and Japanese participated in the annual seven-powersummits of advanced industrial nations where the common political interests ofthe participants were increasingly recognized. All these changes were reflected ina broad ranging series of discussions, and an increasingly subtle blend of rhetoricand persuasion.

By 1980 Japan’s ever-growing surplus appeared likely to stimulate drasticprotectionist measures, and EC representatives criticized Japan with particularintensity. But by the end of the year crisis was averted—both parties soughtopportunities for compromise. Such complex patterns of negotiation were notwithout considerable political value. Harsh language could mollify angrypressure groups and compromise could avoid the erection of barriers which werelikely to impede the growth of trade. This new mood of qualified harmony wasalso the by-product of an important new direction in Community diplomacy. In1976 European criticism had concentrated upon the damage which stemmed fromJapanese exports. Soon after, the Community turned its attention to thepromotion of its own exports and the opening of the Japanese market.


One of the most imaginative aspects of these new policies was theestablishment of the Executive Training Programme (ETP) which providesscholarships for young European businessmen to spend a year in Tokyo,studying Japanese. This is followed by a further six months of ‘in-house’ trainingin a Japanese company. By 1987 over 170 such trainees had successfullycompleted this programme and constituted a corps of young ‘Japan hands’ ableto assist in the promotion of European exports.

Needless to say Community attacks on perceived obstructions to Europeanexports formed an even more crucial element in EC policy towards the Japanesemarket. Here issues were often a complex weave of reality and imagination. Inthe 1960s the Japanese market had been highly protected and many Europeancompanies had found it uneconomical to establish expensive sales networks inJapanese cities. However, by the 1970s Japanese ministers were committed to aserious policy of liberalization which received far too little attention in Europeanbusiness circles.

Unfortunately Japanese measures to reduce tariffs and increase quotas were nomore than a partial solution to European difficulties. Japanese inspectionprocedures were often cumbersome and lengthy and at times constitutedprotectionism in disguise. Yet Europeans could sometimes attribute bad motivesto creditable acts. When Japan attempted to reduce air pollution in her cities byimposing rigorous emission controls on all passenger cars many Europeansmistakenly saw this as a means of obstructing the importation of British, Germanor Italian vehicles.

Year after year European negotiators, like their American equivalents, claimedthat the Japanese market was also protected by a complex network of culturaland. organizational barriers. Some attacked Japan’s inefficient distributionsystem. Others criticized the high level of Japanese savings, and somebusinessmen termed the Japanese language a non-tariff barrier. Such social andcultural phenomena may have constituted barriers to European exporters but theywere difficult barriers for Japanese leaders to remove.

In fact, by the early 1980s Japanese governments were resorting to a remarkablerange of measures to appease their European and American adversaries. Importpromotion missions were despatched to European factories. Foreign laboratorieswere permitted to carry out inspection procedures, and the Office of the TradeOmbudsman (OTO) was established to resolve foreign complaints. Some ofthese measures were clearly tactical— particularly those which precededinternational conferences—but conditions for foreign exporters eased with theyears. However, these changing conditions rarely made a significant impact onthe scale of Japanese imports. At the heart of this problem lay the uncomfortablefact that few European manufactured goods could outclass their Japanese rivals.Furthermore, the expense of establishing an effective sales operation in Tokyowas often a major deterrent to potential exporters. Consequently the technicalopening of the Japanese market was slow to influence the scale of Japan’strading surplus.


The scale of these many problems may suggest that the European Communityposed no difficulties for Japanese exporters. However this was hardly the case.European states were in general more open and accessible than Japan but therewere marked exceptions. In 1983 the French government decided to impede theimportation of Japanese video cassette recorders by channelling them through asingle inspection point at Poitiers. This measure was abandoned some monthslater, but its spirit was clearly at odds with the liberal principles proclaimed byCommissioners in Brussels. Italian obstructions have been far more resilient. Formany years Italy has had an import quota for Japanese cars of little over 2,000per year. Such policies have provided ready ammunition for Japanese who wishto question the Community’s commitment to free trade and liberalinternationalism.

Despite many Euro-Japanese frictions, the years 1976–85 have been markedmore by flexibilities than rigidities. In particular European attitudes to Japanesemanufacturing investment in the Community have undergone a significanttransformation. In the 1970s Japanese plans to establish assembly plants orfactories in Europe were often the objects of heated criticism. Some saw them asthreats to local companies and workers while others were hostile to theintroduction of new industrial methods and mores. Nevertheless, the success ofJapanese factories in providing employment, however small, has done much todampen local criticism. Support for such factories has been particularly evidentin regions which have suffered from profound problems of industrial decline.Equally important has been the broadly educational role of such factories inintroducing patterns of training, industrial relations and quality control which areoften superior to local models.

The late 1970s and early 1980s have also seen significant changes in Europeanattitudes to other forms of industrial collaboration. The Rover Company’s linkswith Honda clearly aided an ailing British car producer; while ICL’s links withFujitsu were also of mutual benefit. Clearly all such arrangements embracerivalry and struggles for advantage, but the notion that both Europeans andJapanese can gain from such arrangements was far less widely accepted in theearly 1970s.

Despite all these major developments in industry and commerce politicalchanges may have been the most significant new elements in Euro-Japaneserelations in recent years. Since 1980 Japan has not only given general support tothe concept of European integration but has supported the Community’s stanceon significant political issues. In 1980 and 1981 Tokyo supported theCommunity’s opposition to Soviet policy in Afghanistan and Poland, and Japanhas taken economic initiatives which have complemented European interests.Japanese financial aid to Turkey and food aid to Southern and East Africa hasbeen helpful to Europe—in areas which are distant from Japan’s main spheres ofinterest.

This convergence of political attitudes has also been symbolized by the annualmeetings of members of the European Parliament and the Japanese Diet.


Although these gatherings may be criticized for their high ceremonial content,their working sessions have considerable significance. In specializeddiscussions, debate ranges over issues which extend well beyond trade andindustry. Both domestic and international problems appear on these inter-parliamentary agenda and encourage a sense of shared interests and objectives.

If the Doko shock inaugurated one era in Euro-Japanese relations, Japan’strade liberalization measures of 1985 may have inaugurated another. Afterrepeated criticism from European and American negotiators the Japanesegovernment launched its major Action Programme for the deregulation of trade.This plan not only embraces tariff reductions and the simplification of inspectionprocedures but proposes the liberalization of financial markets and governmentcontracts. The ultimate impact of these measures is difficult to judge, but someEuropean companies have already been awarded small symbolic contracts for thedesign of the new Kansai International Airport. These Japanese moves towards amore open economy were further reinforced in autumn 1985 when the PlazaAgreement permitted the Yen to float to higher levels. As a direct consequenceof this strengthening of the yen the European Community’s deficit with Japanhas fallen by small but significant amounts in 1987 and 1988.

These recent steps which seek the greater internationalization of the Japaneseeconomy were given greater impetus in 1996 with the publication of theJapanese government’s Maekawa Report. This major strategic document callsfor increases in imports, increases in domestic consumption and less dependenceupon exports for Japan’s prosperity. The implementation of the Maekawa Reportwill be a slow and complex procedure but its proposals show a profoundunderstanding of the political and economic dangers which emanate fromrecurrent trade surpluses with the United States and the European Community.

In conclusion, what steps should the European Community take to secure astable and rewarding relationship with contemporary Japan? First must come anappreciation of the realities of relations with the world’s second largesteconomy. Whatever the fate of Europe’s own scientific strategies, Japan is likelyto dominate an increasingly broad range of major industrial technologies. Thusany attempt to exclude Japan from close relations with Europe is likely to provedestructive rather than creative. Even the United States, which has close defenceties with Japan, has difficulty in keeping abreast of the most advanced Japanesetechnology. Hence the problem for Europe is even more serious. Given theserealities, Europeans should seek closer relations with Japan in a wide range ofscientific, cultural and commercial fields. Joint Euro-Japanese projects in suchfields as health, social science and technology would not only create anintrinsically closer relationship but would help to lay the spectre of anti-Japaneseprejudice which still haunts the corridors of Euro-Japanese negotiations.

Furthermore, if Europe is to monitor the rapid social, scientific and economicchanges which characterize contemporary Japan, much greater attention must bepaid to the teaching of the Japanese language in the member states of theCommunity. Of equal importance is the creation of some pan-European


institution for the study of the Japanese economy and its social foundations. It issimilarly important that such bodies as the European Parliament have at least aminimum of Japanese-speaking staff so that cooperation with the Japanese Dietmay be further developed.

Finally, one must note an obvious truism regarding the future of all Euro-Japanese relations. In matters of trade, culture, politics or technology. Japaneseleaders will always compare the power, unity and achievements of Europe withthose of their formal ally, the United States. The more unified, integrated andprosperous Europe becomes the more power it will command in its relations withJapan. In the future as in the past Europe will find competition with Japanarduous and daunting. To meet this challenge a single currency, a single foreignpolicy and an educational strategy are no more than essential beginnings.


Part VI

Radio, Cinema, Sport and Propaganda

First published in The Japan Society Proceedings, No. 137,

Summer 2001, pp. 42–55

43The BBC and Japan, 1925–1945

THE FIRST TWO VOLUMES of Lord Briggs’ magisterial history of the BBC,which cover the years 1925 to 1939, make no mention of Japan.1 This mightsuggest that in the years prior to the outbreak of the European War BBCcoverage of Japan was virtually non-existent. Conversely, one might assume thatduring the Pacific War (1941–1945) coverage of Japan would be especiallydetailed. However, neither of these suppositions is borne out by survivingrecords of BBC talks transmitted to audiences in Britain.2

If one examines BBC talks in these twenty years of peace and war one recallsa time when there were no resident BBC correspondents in Japan, and Britishuniversities were singularly lacking in Japanese experts. Hence, the question ofwho attempted to present knowledge and analysis of Japan to listeners is animportant one. Indeed, the changing composition of microphone voices was asignificant element in the changing scope and tone of BBC output.

More important still is the political context of BBC activity. Some historiansmay emphasise the susceptibility of British broadcasters to Governmentintervention and influence, but no documentary evidence exists of Foreign Officeinfluence on the BBC in peacetime, regarding coverage of Japan. At one pointthe Foreign Office did consider requesting the BBC to make criticisms ofJapanese commercial competition but the idea was not proceeded with.3

Nevertheless the BBC of the 1920s and much of the 1930s did have a politicaloutlook (though not all broadcasts on Japan were political in content), an outlook,which often linked together the standpoints of personalities of diverseprofessional and political backgrounds. Perhaps the key to this outlook lay in thecorporation’s motto ‘Nation Shall Speak Peace Unto Nation’. More specificallythe BBC emerged only six years after the Versailles peace settlement, when theLeague of Nations ideal of resolving conflict by mediation and education waswidely supported in British intellectual circles. In other words the BBC’spolitical and economic analysis of Japan tended to explain Japanese conduct—usually with considerable sympathy—rather then distort or criticize it.

In the years before the Manchurian Incident—between 1928 and 1931—evaluation of Japanese politics or diplomacy was usually left to one individual,Vernon Bartlett; a broadcaster who epitomised the League of Nations’ approach

to international questions.4 Bartlett had been wounded in the First World Warand was later employed in the League’s London office. He was, understandably,committed to the Geneva approach to the resolution of conflict. In January 1929in a talk entitled ‘The Far East and the League of Nations’ he commentedcharacteristically:

There are certainly times when countries can be too touchy where prestigeand patriotism are concerned. At the present moment…of the very greatestimportance both to Japan and to China that the dispute between themshould be settled. If the Nanking Government could come to terms withJapan, it would then be able to say that it had been recognised by all theimportant Governments in the world. If the Japanese could come to termswith the Nanking Government, the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods,which must already have cost Japan millions of pounds would stop…ifsome process could be devised whereby both Governments apologised atexactly the same moment their patriotic feelings might be allayed and allwould be well.5

Five months later when discussing Sino-Soviet relations Bartlett treated Japan’sstake in Manchuria with considerable sympathy stating:

The difficulties placed in the way of Japanese immigrants in Australia andthe United States…make it more important than ever before for Japan atleast to maintain her position in a country to which so many of hernationals and so much of her money have gone. I believe there are overseven hundred and fifty thousand Japanese subjects in Manchuria and overtwelve hundred miles of Japanese railway to be protected.6

In the following year Bartlett maintained the same cooperative tone inconsidering frictions over naval disarmament. He concluded ‘it should not beimpossible for Great Britain, the United States and Japan to draw up a treaty tolimit naval armaments even though Great Britain had to make somereservation’.7

At virtually the same time the internationalist Labour MP Philip Noel Bakerexpressed the same concept of a ‘world society’ in commenting:

Nowadays when the Japanese delegate to the Naval Conference can speakacross the ether to his public in their houses in far Japan, when the goodsexchanged in international trade are measured in hundreds of millions oftons a year…nowadays there is a world society that is real enough.8

Although politics was always a BBC preoccupation, almost equally importantconcerns were society and culture; yet further components of internationalunderstanding. Talks on Japanese society appear to have begun in 1928 with a

THE BBC AND JAPAN, 1925–1945 411

presentation on Japanese farming by the student of comparative agriculture, WRobertson Scott. However, the first sustained broadcast treatment of social andcultural matters was in 1930 when the art critic and poet Laurence Binyondescribed his impressions in three talks following an invited visit to Japan tolecture on British art.9 At a time when many Westerners suggested thatWesternisation had spoilt Japan it was natural for Binyon to confront the issue ofpossible friction between tradition and modernity in Japanese life. He did this ina way, which was appreciative and positive. He noted that it was the West, whichwas responsible for the end of Japanese seclusion, and in assessing the responseof young Japanese to East Asian and Western cultures he concluded warmlystating:

So far as I could observe it seemed…that these adaptable people had forthe most part solved a very difficult problem with some success.

They had taken over our Western inventions and conveniences as anormal part of their external existence but they seemed to have kept theirinner life and social traditions undisturbed and unimpaired.10

Binyon expressed his perception of a new cultural alloy brilliantly in describing awalk through a settlement near Miyajima.

Suddenly I stopped. A voice in one of the houses was reciting poetry…inevery house of the village it seemed someone was reciting… I thought ofour verse-speaking festivals at Oxford. Here were kindred spirits. It wasperhaps a little disenchanting to learn from our Japanese friend next daythat what we had heard was a single verse and a single recitation, thevillagers were all listening to the wireless. But that was just an instance ofthe way in which the Japanese accommodate our Western inventions quitenaturally to their own ways and uses.11

Clearly the outbreak of the Manchurian crisis in September 1931 focusedbroadcasters’ attention on war and diplomacy, and again Bartlett was theprincipal commentator, committed to balance rather then hasty condemnation. Inlate September he noted:

Japan has many rights, confirmed by treaty or by custom in Manchuria,some thousands of her own troops guard the South Manchurian and otherJapanese railways…in these circumstances a complete and dramaticwithdrawal—such as the withdrawal of Greek troops in the Greco-Bulgarian dispute would of course be out of the question.12

He continued, ‘drastic action might have driven the Shidehara Government…toback up the more fiery militarists’.


In November 1931 Bartlett continued to use all his mental agility to avoidcriticising Japan’s conduct. He commented:

When the Chinese government appealed to the League of Nations Councilfor its help in persuading the Government in Tokio to withdraw thesetroops the Members of the Council made it clear that in giving that helpthey were in no way taking the side of China against Japan…they weremerely reminding Japan that by the Kellogg Pact, the League Covenantand the Washington Nine Power Treaty Japan was pledged not to occupyChinese territory.13

Bartlett admitted that ‘Japan would appear to be coming very close to a breach ofthe Kellogg Pact’ but stated that ‘it is in order to clear Japan of this suspicionthat they urge her to withdraw her troops before she begins negotiations withChina’. Optimistically he concluded that ‘Japan realises the need for internationalorganisation just as much as any other Power, and even if she were to score avictory over Geneva, that victory would, in itself be a defeat’.14 In mid November1931 Bartlett edged closer to condemnation of Japan but even in this talk hebalanced his criticism by noting that ‘that part of Manchuria which has comeunder their control has been much better governed then large areas of Chinaproper’.15

The continuing importance of the Manchurian crisis and the paucity of expertknowledge of Japan was evident in the appearance of a new speaker.O.M.Green, who had edited the North China Daily News, now presented abalanced view of Japanese actions, but his principal fear was that Japanesemilitary action would indirectly strengthen the extreme left in the ChineseNationalist Party and damage British trade.16

When the Lytton Commission’s report on the Manchurian crisis was issued on2 October 1932 another new speaker was added to the BBC’s list ofcommentators on East Asia. Sir Frederick Whyte, whose main areas of expertisewere India and China rather than Japan—commented on the report. Whyte couldnot avoid conveying the element of criticism of Japan, which the documentcontained, but he also emphasised that Japan still had ‘room and time for secondthoughts’17 and that she ‘can get what she needs and wants by a better way thanshe has chosen’.

In parallel with these obfuscated criticisms of Japanese military action wentsocial and cultural commentaries which were favourable—not only to Japan butto her colonial policies.

In May 1932 in a series entitled ‘Travellers from the East’ H.B.Drake spoke ofhis holidays in Korea and Taiwan. Drake commented that under the ‘PaxJaponica Korea and Formosa were open to me to wander at will in ease andsafety’.18 Of officials in Taiwan he commented that they ‘were anxious forvisitors to tour the island… I think with justification they seem very proud oftheir work of unifying the incongruous within the embrace of their laws’.19 Soon


after, Delmar Morgan, another visitor, extolled Japan’s achievements, andvirtues as a holiday destination declaring ‘they have accomplished in sixty yearswhat no other race has ever done in double that time’.20 Morgan like Binyon wasimpressed by the spread of radio in Japan declaring, ‘you can follow a concert ora lecture…every five or six yards’ on a street.21

Perhaps the BBC hoped that cultural broadcasts might soften criticism ofJapanese conduct in Manchuria. It is particularly interesting that in November1932 the BBC gave the microphone to Tsurumi Yusuke—a onetime member ofthe Imperial Diet, to extol ‘The Rebirth of Japanese Culture’. While Westernersoften speculated about the cultural damage inflicted by Westernisation Tsurumimaintained that Japan was experiencing an era of cultural renaissance. Thebreadth of Tsuruimi’s talk is striking: he introduced the works of such writers asHiguchi Ichiyo, Yosano Akiko (who he claimed had ‘distinguished herself in thefeminist movement’) Shimazaki Toson, Natsume Soseki, Tanizaki Junichiro,Arishima Takeo and Kikuchi Kan. Tsurumi concluded, ‘What strikes me is therevival of the classical culture of Japan—rather then the development of Westerncultures. The latter, indeed have served to challenge the classical culture…and socall forth a new awakening’.22

Perhaps the significance of the creation of the Manchurian puppet state for theLeague of Nations, and potentially for British commerce in Asia, accounts forthe BBC mounting a major series of talks on the Far East in 1934. The quality ofthese broadcasts was varied as were the backgrounds of the contributors but theywere the nearest the BBC had come to giving special treatment to Japan. Perhapsthe most impressive contribution was by ‘a correspondent from Tokyo’ aliasGeorge Sansom, and was entitled ‘Japan is Changing’. Commenting on theJapanese scene in 1934. Sansom (the most linguistically and intellectuallyqualified British commentator whom the BBC had employed to date) made a richsequence of acute comments. These avoided clichés and stereotypes. He not onlynoted the Westernisation of women’s dress, ‘a large number of fine newspecimens of modern architecture’ and the ‘Innumerable cafes, restaurants, barsand dance halls that have sprung up’ but observed economic improvements.Sansom also perceived anti-Western reactions but concluded:

Today there are some signs that the prestige of the military is not so high.A year ago Japan was in a defiant mood…today she begins to feel herisolation…the only certain thing is that Japan is changing.23

A second sympathetic contributor was N.K.Roscoe on the theme of the Japanesefarmer. The talk was not only distant from any nostalgic romanticism, but likeSansom, Roscoe saw a dynamic element in Japanese society. He stated:

The Japanese farmer is remarkably keen to learn. During the wintermonths…he will come miles…and sit on a hard floor for as much as five


or six hours listening to lectures and taking notes. Our farmer is alwaysready to try out a new method.24

He concluded, ‘That’s the Japanese farmer, intelligent, hard working, honest,courteous and patient, the backbone of the Japanese nation’.25

Of greatest political significance among this series of talks was PeterFleming’s ‘The Meaning of Manchukuo’. In later years Fleming became morecritical, but in 1934 he praised many Japanese efforts at Manchurian colonialdevelopment. Asking the question ‘Do they (the Japanese) run it well?’ Heanswered:

I think on the whole they do. The Japanese are out to develop Manchuria.They will develop it better than the Chinese ever could have and in theprocess the thirty million inhabitants are bound to benefit. They will not ofcourse benefit as much as the Japanese but the Japanese are doing most ofthe work and may reasonably claim a lion’s share of the profits.26

Fleming recognised the difficulties, which the Japanese were encountering incrushing banditry but he concluded, ‘Japan is a very powerful ally and unless sheoverrates her own power and challenges Russia Manchukuo, her protege is goingto be a very important place’.27

In concluding this series Patrick Young emphasised the dynamism as well asthe poverty of the Japanese, and declared, as others would do later, that Japanesegoods would continue to undercut those produced in Europe until Japandeveloped even more industry in relation to the size of its population.28

The disposition of BBC commentators to express a basic sympathy with Japan’sproblems continued into 1935 when Arnold Toynbee commentatedphilosophically on Japan’s departure from the League of Nations. Toynbeesummarised his position as follows:

The truth is that the Japanese with their rapidly growing population, feelthat up till now they have not been given a fair deal by the rest of theworld. They have first been shut out from colonising the empty countriesround the Pacific, and they are now like the rest of us being shut out by thepolicy that we are all now following, from earning their living by sellingtheir goods on the world market. They want a New Deal.29

Toynbee politely condemned Japanese expansionist actions in China butconcluded ‘The question is whether we can all help Japan to satisfy her needs inthe world market in exchange for renewed cooperation in a system of collectivesecurity in which people do not help themselves by force.’30

If anything generated more critical statements concerning Japan’s policy itwas the broadening gap which separated Japanese actions in Manchuria and thereassuring statements of Foreign Minister Hirota Koki.


These discrepancies were most clearly noted in the series of Foreign Affairsbroadcasts given by Sir Frederick Whyte, who had acted as advisor to theChinese Nationalist Government. On 30 January 1935. Whyte noted:

…Other nations of the world would like to have proof in deed as well as inword that the door for their trade will still be kept open in Manchuria forthere is reason to suspect that it is being gradually closed.31

Whyte was also concerned at the almost structural incompatibility between theopinions of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Kwantung Army, which notonly embarrassed Japanese diplomats but undermined the prospects fordisarmament—whatever Hirota might say. In Whyte’s words ‘armaments are theresult of policy and…security can only follow a real understanding betweennations’.32 This speaker appreciated Hirota’s suggestion that an improvedrelationship with Britain ‘could be achieved’ but he was less enthusiastic aboutthe suggestion that Japan was anticipating a less close relationship with theUnited States.

Whyte’s continuing mistrust of the incoherent nature of Japanese policy mayhave been further deepened by his long standing links with Nationalist China andChina’s capacity to counter Japanese statements with alternative accounts ofborder conflicts. Whyte did note some temporary easing of relations betweenTokyo and Moscow but he remained deeply concerned at Japan’s assumption ofdominance in China. In what was the nearest he came to criticism of Japan heconcluded:

As Mr Hirota said not one word about the cooperation of other nations inthe task of Chinese reconstruction, his address…boils down to the simplestatement that China had better not rely on America, England or theLeague of Nations for help, and that she must accept the fact that Japanmeans to be the leader in Eastern Asia.33

In late February 1935 Whyte noted some signs of improved relations betweenJapan and China, however, as before, he noted the chronic disjunction betweenthe voices of Japanese diplomats and the desire of many Japanese for hegemonyin China. He commented:

Knowing Mr Hirota as I do I am absolutely prepared to accept his word aspledging the Japanese, as far as his personal pledge can, to a policy of fairdealing in China. But even his moderate words show that in his belief,China must accept Japan as the leader in East Asia.34

What distinguished Whyte’s commentatories from much earlier broadcastingwas his recognition of the global significance of Japanese actions. This wasparticularly clear in late March 1935 in a broadcast entitled ‘Europe’s Problem;


An Approach from the East’. According to Whyte Soviet concessions to Japanhad resulted from Moscow regarding ‘The tension between herself and Germanyas more dangerous then anything Japan can or will do to her interests in the FarEast…this gives Japan a comparatively free hand’.35

Britain’s commercial interest in China and her military weakness probablycontributed to the ambiguous nature of British judgements. This was mostmarked in Sir Frederick Whyte’s talk ‘British Interests in the Far East’ in May1935. On this occasion the upgrading of the British Legation in Peking to anEmbassy stimulated Whyte to analyse what factors lay at the heart of Britishconcerns. Among these was growing evidence of a Japanese oil monopoly inManchuria, which was effectively excluding British and American firms. Yetsuch criticisms were counterbalanced by a series of compliments to Japan, amiddiscussion of British interests. Whyte stated:

Ask anyone recently returned from Shanghai what the situation now is, andhe will tell you that the progress made by Japan in every direction isamazing. He will tell you that he admires Japan, and recognises that herachievement is the reward of a great effort in which merchant,manufacturer and Government alike, all unite to push the national interestforward.36

Quoting a British merchant he continued: ‘Japan is entitled to a big say outthere… I don’t want an anti-Japanese policy, still less an anti-Chinese policy. Irecognise that the day when Britain was top-dog in the Far East is passed and ifJapan is going to be top dog we have to make sure that she leaves some room forus’.37

Whyte concluded ‘British policy today seeks equality of treatment not anyspecial privileges’. This suggests that even when British interests werethreatened criticisms of Japan were balanced with due recognition of herachievements and interests.

Although the diplomatic dimension of Japanese activity received increasingattention in BBC broadcasts such material was frequently leavened with socialcoverage. This was kindly, rather than critical. What was more such programmesusually avoided the tint of exoticism, which was often present in popular writingabout Japan. In the summer of 1935 M.C.Essen who had taught for five years ina Japanese girls high school drew upon direct experience to inform listenersabout ‘Spring Cleaning by Law’. According to this observer ‘A paternalGovernment regulates spring cleaning and a worker is quite entitled to a day’sholiday to help’. Like other Western observers Essen noted an element ofegalitarianism in Japanese life stating:

Two or three large houses belonging to wealthy people in our district hadgodowns in which they stored their family treasures. These people wouldhave enough garden in which to place their household effects, and their


neighbours would only see their bonfire at the end of the day. But it is asignificant fact that wealth could not purchase immunity from the law ofcompulsory spring-cleaning.38

1936 saw the most dramatic event in Japan since the outbreak of the Manchuriancrisis—the abortive military coup of 26 February. Following this outburst ofpolitical violence the BBC appears to have sought ways of presenting the murderof statesman in a way, which would inflict least damage to Anglo-Japaneserelations. For the first time an ex-ambassador, Sir Francis Lindley, was calledupon to comment on ‘Recent .Events in Japan’.

Lindley clearly condemned political murder and described it as ‘the greatestblot on Japanese civilisation at the present time’. However he called for anattempt to comprehend its historical origins. In fact Lindley emphasised theethical basis of Japanese political violence stating ‘it has always been a traditionin Japan from the earliest times that violence is not to be condemned when a manor body of men have a grievance, or see an injustice which they think so seriousthat they are ready to sacrifice their lives in order to put it right’.39 In contrast tomost earlier broadcasters—and this indicated a more pessimistic view ofJapanese modernisation—Lindley attached great weight to Japanese traditionasking, ‘What is a lifetime in the history of a people?’. Lindley also suggestedthat liberal opponents of political violence remained influential in Japan. PerhapsLindley’s extraordinary attempts to present Japan in a favourable light were mostevident in his explanation of the ‘leniency with which the rebellious officerswere treated’. Above all he claimed that ‘the Japanese are temperamentallyopposed to pushing things to extremes’ and stated ‘one of the most strikingfeatures of the Japanese character’ is that ‘they always attempt to find acompromise in any dispute or struggle which arises’. Looking back to the Anglo-Japanese alliance he declared ‘In this as in other ways the Japanese for all theirdifferences of civilisation, and history and religion resemble our own island peoplewhich for so long was allied with them to our mutual advantage’.40

By 1936 the Manchurian puppet state had survived all diplomatic pressureagainst it but the BBC continued to give it extensive coverage.

In April the conservative commentator William Teeling visited Manchuria andreported on the progress of colonization. Although he had been guided byJapanese officials he saw Japan’s settlement project as much more uncertain thanearlier broadcasters had. Teeling was very aware of the colonists’ difficulties andconcluded ‘The only thing that is certain is that the settlers are having a very hardlife in a country…where they are not very popular, and nobody can be certainthat such artificial colonisation can ever be a success’.41

Throughout August and September 1936 the BBC re-focussed attention onEast Asia with a series of eleven semi-serious travel talks entitled ‘Round theCorner is the Far East’. The speaker was the travel writer, Richard Pyke. Manyof Pyke’s talks were picturesque travelogues but the increasing intrusiveness ofthe Japanese authorities in the affairs of visiting foreigners was also evident.


More significant was Pyke’s return to a theme raised by Binyon and other visitors—the difficulties which the Japanese might have in accommodating Western andEast Asian elements in their daily lives.

In contrast to Binyon, Pyke declared, ‘In Japan among the Japanese theforeign and the Japanese ways of life met and run parallel but hardly fuse. Willthe two styles, the two civilisations mix more? Or will one oust the othercompletely?’ Pyke acknowledged Japan’s economic achievements but noted thelow salaries of professional officials. Yet, he set against this his conviction that aJapanese public servant ‘will live in a cleanliness, a beauty, a comfort, anelegance of style and atmosphere which none of his counterparts and too few ofhis superiors enjoy or appreciate in Europe’.42

Indeed Pyke saw some convergence between Japanese domestic design andcontemporary Western style décor, and believed that there might be a fusion ofstyles. He also noted that even irreconcilable differences did not imply thesuperiority of one culture over another.

In late 1936 Japan signed the Anti-Comintern pact with Nazi Germany, andwithin a week the seasoned China expert O.M.Green assessed this majordevelopment. In his analysis he noted the problems which Japan now facedfollowing her continental expansion. Green’s sympathies were also apparent inhis overt praise for Chiang Kai-shek as ‘far sighted, a great statesman andpatriot’. Nevertheless even Green placed a mildly optimistic interpretation onJapan’s situation. Regarding the recent pact he commented, ‘perhaps the moststriking part of the whole story is the strong disapproval of the pact shown by allthe Japanese newspapers which say quite clearly that its disadvantages are likelyto far outweigh its advantages’.43

Green characterised Japanese policy in recent years as ‘one blunder afteranother’ particularly as Soviet-Japanese relations had seemed to be improvingbefore the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact. He also noted that ‘the Chinesewould be fully ready to trade with the Japanese on terms of friendship. But theJapanese military arrogance to China has aroused such hatred in the Chinesemind that it will be a long time before friendly dealings can be resumed’.44

Despite this critical assessment of Japan’s international conduct Greenconcluded that just as the Siberian Intervention had been halted in 1922 bypublic opinion ‘so it may be again as regards the Japanese forward movement inNorthern China. For the peace of the Far East one can only hope that it willbe’.45

In 1937 O.M.Green remained the BBC’s principal commentator on Japan—irrespective of whether issues were domestic or international. Green may havebeen a less expert observer of the Japanese scene than Sansom, but his coverageof Japanese domestic politics was now more detailed than that of hispredecessors. In February in a talk entitled ‘Army or People in Japan’ Green sawthe country as polarised between these two elements and even suggested thatsome army elements were defying the emperor’s wishes in the process ofCabinet building. In many respects Green’s views contrasted with those of


commentators who had perceived a blending of East and West in Japan; he sawJapanese tradition as overwhelmingly powerful. He commented, ‘Human naturehowever does not alter very much, that of Japan least of all despite thetremendous superficial changes that have been made…in the last seventyyears’.46

Green—in contrast to Bartlett—saw the Manchurian incident as little morethan a reactionary coup, and damned the 26 February incident far morecomprehensively than Sir Francis Lindley. If he saw any hope in a dark situationit lay in the Diet’s hostility to vast military expenditure, Green even hoped that amore robust and critical Diet might be elected in future months.

Green’s vocabulary was also striking in that he used the term ‘aggressive’ tocharacterize Japanese conduct in China—a term which had never been usedbefore by BBC broadcasters. Yet like virtually all talks this one had a tailpiecetinged with optimism; ‘the Japanese like all Orientals are very clever atcompromise. One cannot despair of wise councils yet taking effect in the Land ofthe Rising Sun’.47

With the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge incident in July 1937 Greenprovided another hasty analysis, which suggested that the issue of war or peacefaced a gloomy outlook. However a crumb of optimism remained— namely that‘Many men of the highest knowledge and judgement are still optimistic’.48

Even in the midst of the widening war in China the BBC still attempted tobring a greater element of understanding to the public mind. In September 1937N.Skene Smith who had spent six years teaching at the Tokyo University ofCommerce was invited to draw upon his direct experience to explain Japanesesociety. Skene Smith’s analysis was most impressive in its historical depth andsophistication. He indicted the poverty of Western knowledge and scholarship,and sketched the sources of modern economic growth, which had existed in theEdo period. His historical analysis placed great emphasis on economic factors.This may appear over simplistic but it avoided the even more simplistic Bushido-Militarism analysis which was employed by an increasing number of journalists.Of Japan’s past wars Skene Smith commented ‘nearly all broke out wheneconomic depression was about to set in and when armament expansion couldact as a substitute for relief works’. He ended his analysis ‘the pull ofinnumerable groups sets up various stresses and strains which control Japan’sactions. If we ignore their variety and are over eager to generalise we are sure togo wrong…whatever our feelings we ought to study the Japanese. They are veryactive, very complex but very, very human’.49

In March 1938 O.M.Green commented yet again on the war in China, and forthe first time gave great credit to the Chinese for their resistance. No mentionwas made of the Nanking massacre but he stated, ‘there appears not the slightestdoubt that China is absolutely united in determination to continue the war’.50

Green emphasised the economic burdens which Japan was now likely to face,and noted that the President of the Japanese Economic Federation had declaredthat Japan faced ‘the gravest situation ever known in her history’. It was


particularly difficult to spin any shred of optimism from this information, butGreen concluded, somewhat desperately, ‘if only Europe could be brought to astate of mutual understanding and peacefulness…it could hardly be doubted thatit would also make for peace in the Far East’.51

Despite the worsening situation in Central Europe, in January 1939 the BBCbegan to transmit a major series of programmes on ‘The Pacific’. This not onlyfeatured such well-established broadcasters as Sir Frederick Whyte butintroduced such distinguished academics as G.F.Hudson and Charles Webster.Within this wide-ranging series an entire programme was devoted to ‘Japan, asEmpire Builder’. In this the Oxford historian, G.F.Hudson reviewed Japan’s pastwith judicious balance deciaring ‘No European nation can approach Japan’srecord of internal and external peace in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,and this is a fact that we should always keep in mind’.52

Like other contributors to the ‘The Pacific’ series, Hudson emphasised themultiple international factors, which contributed to Japan’s difficulties. Amongthese he noted that ‘Japan’s chief raw material export, silk is specially subject togreat fluctuations of price and it depends for its demand on a high level ofprosperity in the world as a whole’. Hudson, like Toynbee, understood thenegative effects of Western economic policies noting ‘at a time when theGovernment of Japan was more liberal than it had ever been before the highestof American tariffs was clamped on’.53 In a tone of reconciliation Webster endedthe series by hoping that there would arise ‘a new Japan with whom othernations can live in peace and cooperation’.54

The two years between the outbreak of war in Europe and the Japanese attackon Pearl Harbor saw significant shifts in the priorities of BBC broadcastsregarding East Asia. Not only did identification with China strengthen (perhapspart of a growing desire to improve links with the United States) but MatsuokaYosuke’s pro-Axis diplomacy evoked particularly strong criticism. In May 1941Green described the Japanese Foreign Minister as ‘completely hypnotised byHitler’. Such a personal attack would have been unthinkable a mere two yearsbefore.55

In the months after September 1939, and particularly after December 1941,there was a significant repositioning of British intellectual resources. Areaspecialists from universities, journalism and Chatham House were increasinglydrafted into diplomatic, intelligence and propaganda activities. Withinbroadcasting, transmissions to India absorbed much high quality talent.

Perhaps these changes and military disasters in Asia, contributed to a loweringof quality of Japan coverage in the United Kingdom.

An even more marked trend was the perceived need, before as well as afterPearl Harbor, to draw British opinion closer to the United States. As a resultsignificant quantities of broadcasting time were devoted to American versions ofevents in the Pacific. When Joseph Grew was called upon to analyse Japan’ssociety and diplomacy a recognition of America’s new dominance in the Pacificwas clearly apparent.56


Nevertheless the repatriation to London of John Morris, who had spent someyears in pre-war Tokyo, brought a significant reinforcement to Japaneseexpertise at the BBC. Particularly surprising was the BBC’s willingness tobroadcast Morris’ implicitly critical views of British policy, in the midst of war.In December 1943 Morris gave a talk on the Home Service entitled ‘Under the Heelof Japan’. Despite its title this was a surprisingly reflective criticism of Britishimperial attitudes. Morris clearly appreciated the strengths as well as theweaknesses of Japanese psychological warfare, particularly it’s advocacy of anew order in East Asia. He ended his assessment:

If all we had to offer were a return to the old state of affairs in our FarEastern colonies we should not be welcomed back with open arms. Theywant to be helped more than they have been in the past towards a realfreedom and a real justice. So for us the reconditioning of these people willconfront us after we have beaten the Japanese…what new order do weoffer?57

The themes of human improvement and reconstruction which Morris had voicedwere increasingly apparent in later wartime broadcasts. In June 1944 VereRedman described ‘The Susuki family at home,’ in other words the life of theJapanese man and woman in the street. After a harsh beginning Redman lookedto the future and asked, of the Japanese ‘Has he the makings of a decentrespectable world citizen?’ He replied ‘of course he has, but in the atmosphereand under the influences I have described he will never become such. Until theyare removed by Japan’s military defeat’.58

In the immediate aftermath of Japan’s defeat the BBC purveyed two quitedistinct messages, of condemnation and reconstruction. Such an inexpert expertas Wickham Steed broadcast on Japanese ‘Warlords’ while others recounted thesufferings of prisoners of war in South East Asia.59 In contrast commentatorssuch as Barbara Ward continued the theme of re-education and reconstructionand emphased the links between Japan’s economic welfare and the welfare of theentire world. In a sense this marked a return to the internationalist philosophyvoiced by Bartlett, Toynbee and others in the early 1930s.60

What conclusion might be drawn from this survey of two decades of BBCradio coverage of Japan?

Firstly, British expertise on Japan, outside the diplomatic service, was verylimited in the interwar and wartime years. Consequently many broadcasts weremade by literary travellers, China specialists and idealistic supporters of theLeague of Nations. Irrespective of their backgrounds most peacetimebroadcasters followed a didactic policy of explanation rather than moraljudgement. At its worst the search for ‘balance’ and ‘understanding’ led to theconcealment of important information, and attitudes resembling appeasement. Atits best it provided sophisticated analysis rather than superficial judgements. Thissearch for ‘understanding’ continued almost to the outbreak of the European


War. Regrettably the years of the Pacific War saw both heavy handedpropaganda and a general reduction in the quality of radio coverage of Japan.Yet even in wartime strands of League of Nations idealism survived. Theygained new momentum after Japan’s defeat in August 1945.

Today, with knowledge of the Japanese language more widespread, and alarge group of foreign reporters resident in Tokyo, the possibilities of informedcommunication are greater than before. However one may question whether thereflective strengths of the best interwar broadcasts are fully apparent in the densecommunication networks of the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. A.Briggs: The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Vol. 1 The Birth ofBroadcasting. Oxford University Press. Oxford 1961. Vol, 2 The Golden Age ofWireless. Oxford University Press. Oxford 1965.

2. Most significant talks were reprinted in the BBC’s weekly magazine The Listener.Most scripts of the remaining talks are available at the BBC Archives, CavershamPark, Reading. Texts of BBC news bulletins are only available for the period from1939.

3. These conclusions are drawn from research carried out at the Public Record Office,Kew by Dr Philip Charrier of the School of East Asian Studies, University ofSheffield. I am grateful to Dr Charrier for his help on this point.

4. For Bartlett’s life (1894–1983) see Lord Blake and C.S. Nicholls (eds) TheDictionary of National Biography, 1981–1985. Oxford University Press. Oxford1990. pp. 29–30. An interesting ‘Auto-Obituary’—‘My Last Press Cutting’appeared in The Listener 5 August 1936 p. 243.

5. Vernon Bartlett ‘The Far East and the League of Nations’. The Listener 6 February1929 p. 137 (talk broadcast 31 January 1929).

6. Vernon Bartlett ‘The Russo-Chinese Dispute’ The Listener 31 July 1929 p. 153(talk broadcast 25 July 1929)

7. Vernon Bartlett ‘The Naval Conference and Peace’ The Listener 19 March 1930 p.494 (talk broadcast 31 March 1930).

8. P.J.Noel Baker MP ‘International Politics’ The Listener 19 March 1930 p. 509 (talkbroadcast 12 March 1930)

9. For Binyon’s Life (1869–1943) see L.G.Wickham Legg and E.T. Williams (eds)The Dictionary of National Biography, 1941–1950. Oxford University Press.Oxford 1959, pp. 79–81.

10. Laurence Binyon ‘Some Impressions of Japan—1’ The Listener 19 March 1930, p.490

11. Ibid p. 49012. Vernon Bartlett ‘Unrest in Manchuria’ The Listener 30 September 1931. p. 54413. Vernon Bartlett ‘Other People’s Crises’ The Listener 4 November 1931. p. 76414. Ibid p. 76415. Vernon Bartlett ‘Manchuria, The Danger Spot The Listener 18 November 1931. p,

85416. O.M, Green ‘War Clouds from the Far East’ The Listener 28 October 1931. p. 715


17. Sir Frederick Whyte ‘The Lytton Report’ The Listener 12 October 1932. p .50618. H.B.Drake ‘Holiday Countries of the Japanese Empire’ The Listener 11 May 1932.

p. 67219. Ibid p. 67220. E.L.Delmar Morgan ‘The Land of the Rising Sun’ The Listener 17 August 1932. p.

24821. Ibid p. 24822. Yusuke Tsurumi ‘The Rebirth of Japanese Culture’ The Listener 30 November

1932. p. 773. For Tsurumi’s career (1885–1973) see Japan, An IllustratedEncyclopaedia, Vol. 2. Kodansha,Tokyo 1993. p, 1634

23. A correspondent from Tokyo ‘Japan is Changing’ The Listener 21 March 1934. pp.479, 481.

24. N.K.Roscoe ‘The Japanese Farmer’ The Listener 28 February 1934. p. 35725. Ibid p. 35926. Peter Fleming ‘The Meaning of Manchukuo The Listener 14 February 1934. p. 26227. Ibid p. 26428. Patrick Young ‘A Long-range View of China and Japan’ The Listener 4 April 1934.

p. 55929. Arnold Toynbee ‘Japan and the League’ 3 April 1935. p. 584 (talk broadcast 27

March 1935).30. Ibid p. 58431. Sir Frederick Whyte ‘What is Japan Driving At?’ The Listener 30 January 1935. p.

18532. Ibid p. 18533. Ibid p. 18534. Sir Frederick Whyte ‘Gold Clause—N.R.A.—Nanking and Tokyo—The Open

Door’, The Listener, 27 February 1935. p. 36235. Sir Frederick Whyte ‘Europe’s Problem: An Approach from the East’, The Listener

27 March 1935. p. 5136. Sir Frederick Whyte ‘British Interests in the Far East’ The Listener 29 May 1935, p.

90837. Ibid p. 90838. M.E.Essen ‘Spring Cleaning by Law’ The Listener 15 May 1935. p. 84939. Sir Frances Lindley ‘Recent Events in Japan’ The Listener 11 March 1936. p. 47540. Ibid p. 47541. William Teeling ‘The Japanese in Manchukuo’ The Listener 10 April 1936. p. 61142. Richared Pyke ‘Double Lives’ The Listener 23 September 1936. p. 55443. O.M.Green ‘Reactions to the German-Japanese Agreement’, The Listener 9

December 1936. p. 1086 (talk broadcast 30 November 1936)44. Ibid p. 108645. Ibid p. 108646. O.M.Green ‘Army or People in Japan?’ The Listener 10 February 1937. p. 250 (talk

broadcast, 1 February 1937)47. Ibid p. 25348. O.M.Green ‘Peace or War in North China?’ The Listener 28 July 1937. p. 19349. N.Skene Smith ‘Japan from Within’ The Listener 8 September 1937, p. 50050. O.M.Green ‘Sino-Japanese Struggle’ The Listener 9 March 1938 p. 50151. Ibid p. 501


52. G.F.Hudson and C.K.Webster ‘Japan as Empire Builder’ The Listener 9 February1939. p. 291 .

53. Ibid p. 29354. C.K.Webster ‘The Present Situation’ The Listener 1 April; 1939. p. 78555. O.M.Green ‘Japan in the Toils’ The Listener 29 March 1941. p. 75356. J.C.Grew ‘Japan: A World Menace’ The Listener 22 July 1943. p. 97. (Originally

broadcast on the Forces Service)57. John Morris ‘Under the Heel of Japan’ The Listener 16 December 1943. p. 69858. H.V.Redman ‘The Susuki Family at Home, How the Japanese Live’ The Listener

20 June 1944, p. 71559. Wickham Steed ‘The Rise of the Warlords’ The Listener 6 September 1945 p. 257.

(Broadcast on the Overseas Service). Sergeant Frank Foster ‘Railway of Death’The Listener 15 November 1945, pp. 555, 562

60. Vernon Bartlett reappeared in December 1943 to discuss the postwar politicalreconstruction of Germany and Japan, ‘The World We Want: Can the Present WarPrevent War?’ The Listener 2 December 1943 pp. 637, 642, 643. Barbara Ward‘Days Charged With Destiny’ The Listener 16 August 1945. pp. 172, 187


First published in Ian Nish (ed.), Indonesian Experience: The Role

of Japan and Britain 1943–1948, ICERD, LONDON School of

Economics and Political Science, 1979, pp. 53–72

44Japan and Indonesia, 1940–46: Film Evidence

and Propaganda

IN EUROPE and the United States scholars have long been fascinated by therefined violence of Nazi film propaganda. Its resonant imagery and stridentideology have gripped the attention of historians of Germany, fascism, and thecinema, as well as specialists in the dark abstractions of the human mind. Incontrast, the celluloid propaganda of the second great axis power, Japan, hasaroused negligible academic interest. Indeed, some scholars might questionwhether the scale and sophistication of this cinematic field justify seriousacademic investigation.1 Japan’s cinema was already well established andartistically advanced by the outbreak of the Second World War and her rulersclearly regarded film as an ideological weapon of unprecedented sharpness andsignificance.2 By the late 1930s this awareness was further heightened by news ofthe political impact of the German cinema and the term bunka eiga—culture film(a translation of the term kultur film)—had an established place in the language ofthe Japanese cinema.3 Furthermore the need to mobilise the Japanese people inunprecedented unity in the war against China also dramatised the value of thecinema in political operations. Thus, by the time of Pearl Harbor, a new genre offeature film—kokusaku eiga4 (national policy films)—had begun to issue fromJapanese studios while newsreels and documentaries were also well establishedas sharp spurs to right thinking.5 What was more, this trident of features, newsand documentaries was not seen merely as a weapon of domestic mobilizationbut as a means of international or inter-racial communication to purvey Japan’sideology of decolonisation and pan-Asian harmony throughout East and SouthEast Asia.6 As a result, Japanese propaganda films possess a broad geographicalscope and cultural diversity, which was largely absent from the narrowlyEuropean products of contemporary Geman directors.

Indonesia in Japanese Newsreels, 1940±44

Clearly film documents relating to Indonesia during the years of Japaneseoccupation embrace both films produced for Japan’s own cinemas as well as forprojection in the Indies. Some footage shown in Tokyo probably outlived some ofthat exhibited in Indonesia and such material may well highlight something of

the place and priorities of the Netherlands Indies in the minds of Japan’s rulersand people.

In the absence of any major feature films depicting Indonesian history7 orpolitics, perhaps the major source of Japanese film illustrating events inIndonesia is the collected footage of Japan’s wartime newsreel company—Nippon Ny� su Eiga sha—which was founded in April 1940 by the amalgamationof existing newspaper-owned organizations.8 Throughout its 254 pre-war andwartime issues, events in the Co-prosperity Sphere were a major concern of itscameramen and editors. Indeed, the death of 45 cameramen during the years ofthe Pacific war is a clear indication of their energetic cinematic campaigning, andtheir proximity to the dangers of military action.9

From its twentieth issue in October 1940, Nippon Ny� su maintained a regularinterest in the Indies, though this region could never compete with China,Burma, Singapore and the Philippines in providing exotic locales or gruellingcombat photography. Furthermore distance itself and the punishing alliedblockade clearly diminished material on Indonesia which might have beendesired by the directors of Tokyo’s newsreel organisation.10

The Indies’ first appearance in this cinematic sequence predated the outbreakof war by almost a year, but in a sense it presented Japan’s major interest in theregion—namely natural resources. The visit of Commerce Minister KobayashiIchiz� to Java to press the Dutch authorities for raw materials—and hisinspection of colonial troops at the beginning of an ‘important conference aimingat the establishment of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’—was shown,though the abortive nature of the talks was never mentioned.11 In July 1941,when ex-Foreign Minister Yoshizawa Kenkichi returned from furtherunsuccessful talks, film of his arrival in Kobe and his reception by MatsuokaY� suke in Tokyo also indicated the theme of pressure on the Indies for resources,though the details of negotiations were not described in the cinema.12

Once war broke out, news treatment of the Indonesian archipelago embracedthree main concerns, military, political and economic, each of which subtlyreflected Japan’s view of her island conquests.

In military terms the swift destruction of Dutch military power providedrelatively little dramatic photogenic action. But the conquest of Netherlandsterritory contained two elements of interest. One was the spectacular use of navalparatroops in invasion operations in Celebes and Timor, and in the capture of oilwells at Palembang in Sumatra.13 Sequences of modern fast-striking parachutecorps clearly provided impressive visual images, while the capture of oil fieldshad an importance which was self-evident. Second to the parachute in thetreatment of the military campaign came impressions of Japan’s popularity and arapid return to social normality. In reel 94 of 17 March 1942 the headline ‘TheNetherlands Indies Finally Surrenders’ was followed by pictures of Dutchofficers entering a building at Karijacki airfield to hold surrender talks. Yet farmore impressive were sequences of widespread popular rejoicing in the streets ofBatavia with Indonesians chorussing ‘banzai’.14 Overall, emphasis was placed on

JAPAN AND INDONESIA, 1940–46: FILM EVIDENCE AND PROPAGANDA 427

the speedy return of law and order which was implicitly explained by referenceto the sincere gladness of the population at their release from white rule by felloworiental people. Prince Takamatsu’s visit to Java depicted a few reels later alsounderlined peace as well as imperial activity.15 Peace and quiescence was alsothe theme in sequences in the lesser Sunda isles which showed local inhabitantscooperating in organizing the final defeat of allied forces.16

As in official policy politics was slow to emerge as a theme in coverage ofIndonesia. Political propaganda, linked with the teaching of the Japaneselanguage, received its first celebration in June 1942 when the beginning of the‘Three As Movement’17 was depicted in Batavia. This sequence culminated in aprocession, on Japan’s Navy Day, of young people carrying the Japanese flag.18

As in the ‘Three As Movement’ itself this cinematic description emphasisedJapan’s role as much as Indonesian aspirations. Like a litany the phrase wasrepeated ‘the island of Java which has been restored to our hands by the GreatEast Asia war’.19

The second significant image of the political imprint which Japan was placingupon the Indonesian population came almost inadvertently in another item inwhich praise for the imperial army was again the uppermost theme. In March1943, a year after Japanese paratroopers had captured Palembang, an item in theseries ‘News from the Co-Prosperity Sphere’ showed ceremoniescommemorating the troops lost in action. In this sequence local military andyouth groups were shown for the first time in a newsreel. Ranks of uniformedmen and women appeared in the ceremonies, unarmed but clearly closelyassociated with the Japanese army.20

Six months later, in the autumn of 1943, the move towards the paramilitarytraining of Indonesians received clear recognition in a sequence devoted to theJava Police School. With the words ‘The Greater East Asia war is a war ofconstruction—the first step to construction is peace and order’, this depictedmass physical exercises, and Japanese instructors training police recruits in theuse of the Japanese sword.21

In newsreel coverage it was not for a further year that the growing role ofIndonesians in policing and defending their homeland received furtherillustration. On this occasion under the heading ‘Report from South East Asia’ thecameras showed teenage girls marching with moderate precision, half uniformedschoolboys posing around a piece of field artillery, and a girl student packingammunition. Most dramatic of all were scenes of Javanese giyutai involved inthe serious practice of assault training.22

In August 1944 Indonesia received its most jubilant treatment in Japanesenewsreels. Following Premier Koiso Kuniaki’s announcement that Japan wouldgrant the East Indies their independence, Nippon Ny� su showed joyous crowds inDjakarta cheering General Harada’s official transmission of Koiso’s message tothe Indonesian people. The commentator stated that after three hundred years ofAnglo-Dutch oppression the Indonesians had been liberated,23 though this wasnot yet a political reality. In its final sentence the commentary spoke of a week


of subsequent celebrations. At a time when most Japanese newsreels depictedlittle pleasure, this festive flourish must have been deeply impressive.

Clearly the peaks of political change in wartime Indonesia were illustrated inJapanese news films24 but much of their Indonesian content embracedcharacteristically Japanese themes of diligence, study, production and thepedagogic role of the Japanese occupation forces. In October 1942 thedevelopment of new paddy fields and the opening up of new lands in Borneo, asa result of Japanese leadership, crossed Japanese screens.25 In the followingmonth the production of quinine in the East Indies for medicine companiesformed a small magazine item26 while at the close of the year an item headed‘Cheerful Java’ not only showed the serious study of Japanese by Djakartachildren but the skills of singing, cooking and laundering, which had been passedon by Japanese teachers.27 In January 1943 Japan’s teaching mission wassuggested in scenes of the launching of a locally-made ship in the port of Batavia.28

Soon after there were scenes in a youth engineering school. These showed theuse of oxyacetylene cutters under a Japanese military instructor and continuedthe theme of production and the transfer of relatively simple technology bysoldiers who were likened to ‘gentle elder brothers’.29 The exploitation of saltfields in Madura by local people,30 and the acquisition of advanced fishing skillsfrom Japanese instructors are other examples of Japanese inspiredimprovements, which are vividly depicted in the newsreel record of the time.31 Itis perhaps symbolic that the only appearance of Indonesian traditional theatre ina newsreel was also in the service of increased output. The commentator statedthat laughter would stimulate greater production.32 In January 1945 theproduction of diamonds in South Borneo by primitive tools and panning for usein radio equipment was illustrated. With this Indonesia disappeared from NipponNy� su.33 Perhaps blockade and declining film stocks rather than artistic ordidactic choice had erased this significant theme from Japan’s diminishingnumber of cinema screens.34

Japanese Films Made and Shown in Indonesia. 1942±45

Clearly Japan’s occupation of Indonesia was a subject which had significance forfilm makers outside as well as within Japan’s metropolitan islands; and in twosenses Indonesia provided a particularly rewarding region for the making andshowing of films by Japanese authorities. Thus, Indonesia already had a smallyet significant chain of largely Chinese-owned cinemas, while Indonesianknowledge of Japan was extremely limited.35 Before 1942 Japanese films hadbeen rarely seen in Dutch colonial territories and Dutch descriptions of Japan asbackward and barbaric had apparently been so powerful that shots of Tokyo’sMarunouchi district and of Hara Setsuko in western dress were widely believedto be scenes from an American film which the Japanese were passing off as theirown creation.36 In addition to these significant factors the rural hinterland ofIndonesian cities provided ideal conditions for Japanese to exploit mobile


cinemas, to spread their propaganda message. Japanese cinema units oftenshowed the same films— particularly war documentaries, which were exhibitedin other occupied territories;37 but of more interest to the historians of Indonesiaare the films which were produced, with considerable imagination, in Java forshowing to local audiences. It is true that these may well have been shot by thesame cameramen who created the contents of Nippon Ny� su but the greaterattention which they paid to local events provides coverage of Javanesedevelopments which is often more detailed and refreshing than that produced forTokyo viewing. Perhaps Java’s nearest equivalent to Nippon Ny� su was theseries Djawa H� d� .38 This magazine series covered such incidents as the openingof the Consultative Council in 1943, as well as the medical examination of localdefence force recruits.39 These reels too, like Nippon Ny� su, illustrate theemphasis placed on skills acquired from the Japanese for production or theimprovement of social conditions. Rice wine-making, pottery manufacturingaccording to simple Japanese techniques, as well as local street cleaningcampaigns are all minor items which were included by the editors of DjawaH� d� .40

Among films originally made and shown in Indonesia were a considerablenumber of short, simple but undeniably political films, many of which areavailable in Britain and the Netherlands.41

The film Tonari-gumi—showing how the Japanese neighbourhood associationswere applied to Java as a basis for self-help and independence —is an impressiveinstance of the Japanization of Indonesian administration.42 A film showing thetraining of Heihos and Pemudas illustrates the dress, uniforms, and drill of theseunits,43 while the film Indonesia Raya made to teach the Indonesian nationalanthem, has images of temples, scenery and the varied cultures of Indonesia,which miake it an important relic of Japanese collaboration with Indonesiannationalism.44

This collaboration not only continued in human and political terms after thesurrender of Japanese forces, but also emerged in the first cinematic products ofthe autonomous Indonesian revolutionary movement. Using skills which werealmost certainly the product of collaboration with Japanese technicians, theIndonesian National Party issued newsreels in 1945 illustrating nationalistmeetings and activities, all of which are important milestones in nationalistpropaganda.45

British Military Film of Indonesia, 1945±46.

If Japan, and understandably Indonesia, have contributed the most expansive filmrecord of the years 1941–45, perhaps British cameramen have left the mostinteresting visual impressions of the crucial months of transition betweenSeptember 1945 and June 1946.46 During this period when British troopsunsuccessfully prepared for the reassertion of colonial authority their officialcameramen were active in Java, Sumatra, Bali and Celebes in recording a rough


and sometimes imaginative cross-section of the events which surrounded them.47

This monochrome film is silent and unedited, but as most reels are accompaniedby precise details of date, place and content, it has historical potential which in asense excels that of sound film, whose circumstantial details are unknown. It istrue that some sections of this film merely illustrate the ceremonial peaks ofBritish military activity: the visit of the Supremo, a wedding, a funeral, or LadyMountbatten’s visit to Batavia.48 But in three distinct areas this film attains highhistorical significance. It depicts in great detail the intense barrage of sloganswhich covered Djakarta’s walls and vehicles in October 1945.49 It shows muchof British negotiations with the embryonic Indonesian army, navy airforce andpolice,50 and illustrates the arrival by truck, train and ship of Dutch interneesfrom an assortment of internment camps, one of which is shown in severeunhygienic detail,51 Perhaps more than any other evidence this demonstrates thehumiliation of colonial rulers whose power had shrivelled into oblivion.

For these features of Indonesia in transition, for landscape, dress, markets andhuman movement, for Governor Van Mook’s press conference, and bored Britishprivates in Medan, these images of a unique political intermezzo are of enduringhistorical value.52

Clearly, written documents in Dutch, Japanese, Indonesian, and English, formthe essential evidence for each generation’s inquest on the history of Indonesianindependence. But surviving film does more than record the delicate surface ofhistory. It asserts the themes of progress, modernity and nationalism whichdominated Indonesia in an era of war and revolution.

NOTES

1. For an example of how seriously Japanese film propaganda was regarded by theUnited States see Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch,Japanese Films, a phase of psychogical warfare (R & A 1307) (Washington D.C.30 March 1944) 22 pp.

2. For a valuable survey of the impact of politics and war upon the Japanese cinemasee Tanaka Junichir� , Nihon Eiga Hattatsu-shi Vol. III (Tokyo, 1976 edition)Chapters 9 and 10.

3. Kinema Junp� sha, Nihon Eiga-shi (Sekai no Eiga Sakka 31) (Tokyo, 1976) p. 95.4. For a recent account of kokusaku eiga see Kinema Junp� sha, Nihon Eiga-shi (Sekai

no Eiga Sakka, 31) (Tokyo, 1976) pp. 78–95. Some important examples arediscussed in Noël Burch: To the Distant Observer, Form and Meaning in theJapanese Cinema (London, 1979) pp. 262–69.

5. During the war with China the showing of documentary and news films was madecompulsory in all cinemas, Tanaka Junichir� , Nihon Eiga Hattatsu-shi Vol. III(Tokyo, 1976 edition) p. 17.

6. For an account of the activities of Japanese film makers and distributors in East andSouth East Asia see Tanaka Junichir� , Nihon Eiga Hattatsu-shi Vol. III pp. 101–28and Joseph L.Anderson and Donald Richie, The Japanese Film, Art and Industry(Tokyo and Rutland, Vermont, 1959) pp. 148–58. Assessments of the relative


popularity of various films in occupied areas can be found in Kinema Junp� sha,Nihon Eiga-shi (Sekai no Eiga Sakka 31) pp. 125–26.

7. The only major Japanese film on the Netherlands Indies was Ran-In Tanb� -kiwhich received the Minister of Education’s Prize in 1941. See Tanaka Junichir� :Nihon Eiga Hattatsu-shi Vol. III p. 188.

8. Kindai Nihon S� g� Nenpy� (Tokyo, 1968) p. 322. The collected reels of NipponNy� su are now held by the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (N.H.K.).

9. Mainichi Shimbunsha, Nippon Ny� su Eiga-Shi, Kaisen Zenya kara Sh� senChokugo made (Bessatgu Ichi oku nin no Sh� wa-shi (Tokyo, 1977)

10. e.g. ‘But two hours after the ship bringing film equipment and technicians leftNagasaki bound for Djakarta it was sunk by an American submarine. It was notuntil the end of 1942 that the Japanese-backed Java Motion Picture Company wasorganised to produce news and culture films as well as dramatic features using localtalent.’ Joseph L.Anderson and Donald Richie, The Japanese Film, Art andIndustry (Tokyo and Rutland, Vermont, 1959). p. 157

11. Newsreel 20 (22 October 1940) Mainichi Shimbunsha, Nippon Ny� su Eiga-shi,Kaisen Zenya kara Sh� sen Chokugo made p. 38.

12. Newsreel 58 (15 July 1941) Ibid., pp. 133–4.13. Newsreel 88 (9 February 1942) Ibid., p. 183 and Newsreel 93 (17 March 1942)

Ibid., p. 193.14. Ibid., p. 195–6.15. Newsreel 103 (27 May 1942) Nippon Eiga-sha, Nippon Ny� su (Dai 101-go naishi

Dai 200-go) Nichi-Ei Ch� sa Shiry� Dai 2 Shu (October 1944) p. 4.16. Newsreel 105 (9 June 1942) Mainichi Shimbunsha, Nippon Ny� su Eiga-shi Kaisen

Zenya kara Sh� sen Chokugo made pp. 211–12.17. The ‘Three As’ indicated the slogan ‘Japan the Light of Asia, Japan the Leader of

Asia, Japan the Protector of Asia’, Fujiwara Akira, Imai Seiichi and � e Shinobu(editors) Kindai Nihon-shi no Kiso Chishiki (Tokyo, 1972) p. 495.

18. Newsreel 106 (17 June 1942) Nippon Eiga-sha, Nippon Ny� su (Dai 101-go naishiDai 200-go) Nichi-Ei Ch� sa Shiry� Dai 2 Shu pp. 9–10 and Nippon Nyusu Eiga-shi, Kaisen Zenya kara Shusen Chokugo made pp. 212–13.

19. Nippon Eiga-sha, Nippon Ny� su (Dai 101-go naishi Dai 200-go) Nichi-Ei Ch� saShiryo Dai 2 Shu (October 1944) p. 9.

20. Newsreel 144 (9 March 1943) Mainichi Shimbunsha, Nippon Ny� su Eiga-shi,Kaisen Zenya kara Sh� sen Chokugo made p. 279.

21. Newsreel 170 (8 September 1943) Mainichi Shimbunsha, Nippon Ny� su Eiga-shi,Kaisen Zenya kara Sh� sen Chokugo made p. 329. Soon after the increasingproximity of war was apparent in footage of Indonesian neighbourhoodassociations participating in air raid drill. Ibid., p. 337.

22. Newsreel 221 (24 August 1944) Mainichi Shimbunsha, Nippon Ny� su Eiga-sh,Kaisen Zenya kara Sh� sen Chokugo made p. 431.

23. Newsreel 226 (28 September 1944) Mainichi Shimbunsha, Nippon Ny� su Eiga-shi,Kaisen Zenya kara Sh� sen Chokugo made p. 440.

24. In reel 181 (22 November 1943) the swearing in of the Consultative Council inJava was shown as was Prime Minister T� j� Hideki’s meeting with Sukarno.Unfortunately this reel is missing from the N.H.K. Collection c.f, Nippon Eiga Sha,Nippon Ny� su (Dai 101-go naishi 200-go) Nichi-Ei Chosa Shiry� Dai 2 sh� p. 105


and N.H.K. Saabisu Sentaa Bangumi Shiry� -Bu, Fuirumu Shiry� Risto, NipponNy� su Hen (1) (Tokyo, 1978) p. 78.

25. Newsreel 125 (28 October 1942) Nippon Eiga-Sha, Nippon Ny� su (Dai 101-goNaishi 200-go) Nichi-Ei Ch� sa Shiry� Dai 2 Sh� pp. 25–26.

26. Newsreel 129 (24 November 1942) Ibid., p. 42.27. Newsreel 134 (28 December 1942) Ibid., p. 48 and Mainichi Shimbunsha, Nippon

Ny� su Eiga-shi, Kkaisen Zenya kara Sh� sen Chokugo made p. 258.28. Newsreel 136 (12 January 1943) Nippon Eiga Sha, Nippon Ny� su (Dai 101-go

naishi 200-go) Nichi-Ei Ch� sa Shiry� Dai 2 Sh� p. 51.29. Newsreel 138 (26 January 1943) Ibid., and Mainichi Shimbunsha, Nippon Ny� su

Eiga-shi, Kaisen Zenya kara Sh� sen Chokugo made p. 267.30. Newsreel 168 (24 August 1943) Ibid., p. 325.31. Newsreel 168 (24 August 1943) Ibid., p. 325.32. Newsreel 222 (31 August 1944) Ibid., p. 433.33. Newsreel 243 (25 January 1945) Mainichi Shimbunsha, Nippon Ny� su Eiga-shi,

Kaisen Zenya kara Sh� sen Chokugo made p. 473.34. As a result of bombing the number of Japanese cinemas was reduced from over 2,

400 to 845. Yamamoto Fumio, Nihon Masu Komy� nikeshon-shi (Tokyo, 1970) p.218.

35. The approximate number of cinemas in the various regions of the NetherlandsIndies at the time of the Japanese occupation was Java 240, Sumatra 75, Borneo30, Celebes 13, Bali and Lombok 7, Madura 3, New Guinea 1, Timor 1. In Javasome 95 per cent of cinemas were owned by Chinese. Tanaka Junichir� , NihonEiga Hattatsu-shi Vol. III pp. 119–123.

36. This was the case on the showing of the Japanese film Tokyo no Josei, Ibid., p.122.

37. For a list of important Japanese films shown in Indonesia—Ibid., p. 123.38. Some issues of Djawa H� d� are available in the collection of the Netherlands

Filmmuseum, Vondelpark 3, Amsterdam West, Netherlands.39. See Issue 14 of Djawa H� d� (Netherlands Filmmuseum).40. Ibid.41. A collection of these films is available in the Higher Education Film Library,

Scottish Central Film Library, 16–17 Woodside Terrace, Glasgow G3 7XN. Moreextensive collections are located in the Netherlands Filmmuseum, Vondelpark 3,Amsterdam West, and the Netherlands Information Service, the Hague.

42. Netherlands Information Service, the Hague. Extracts from this film appear in theOpen University Film The Impact of the Second World War on IndonesianNationalism (1973) (commentary by Professor D.C.Watt).

43. Training of Heihos and Pemudas Higher Education Film Library, 16–17 WoodsideTerrace, Glasgow.

44. Indonesia Raya Higher Education Film Library, 16–17 Woodside Terrace,Glasgow.

45. Berita Film Indonesia No. 1 (1945) and Berita Film Indonesia No. 3 (1945)(Department of Film, Imperial War Museum, London).

46. All these films are held in the Department of Film, Imperial War Museum,London.

47. See Appendix.


48. J/FUB/588 (25 April 1946) J/FUB/470 (18 January 1946) J/FUB/662 (25 May1946) J/FUB/556 (19 March 1946).

49. J/IND/139 (29 September 1945) and J/FUB/419 (21 October 1945).50. The Indonesian Army and Navy. appear in J/FUB/596 (3 May 1946) the Indonesian

Airforce in J/FUB/583 (no date) and the Police in J/IND/113 (5 October 1945).51. J/IND/142 (5 November 1945), J/FUB/585 (25 April 1946), J/FUB/443/2 (30

November 1945) and J/FUB/341 (16 September 1945), J/FUB/444 (30 Novemberand 1 December 1945).

52. J/FUB/430 (27 October 1945), J/FUB/420 (22 October 1945), and J/FUB/621 (11May 1946).

Date Place Number Subject

15 September 1945 Java J/FUB/342 Japanese OfficersBoard H.M.S.Cumberland forConference

16 September 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/341 Tjideng PrisonCamp, Batavia

19 September 1945 Java J/FUB/347 Japanese LabourCamp-Seletar

? September 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/348 Damage at BataviaDocks

? September 1945 Java J/FUB/349 JapanesePropaganda Posters

29 September 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/386 British TroopsLanding at Batavia,Java

29 September 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/388 Unloading Suppliesat Batavia

29 Septenber 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/390 Lady Mountbattenarrives at BataviaAirfield

29 September 1945 Batavia, Java J/IND/139 Unliberated Batavia30 September 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/389 Food Supplies arrive

in Batavia31 September 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/385 British Troops of 1st

Battalion SeaforthHighlanders arrivein Batavia

31 September 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/387 Arrival of 1stBattalion SeaforthHighlanders atBatavia Docks



31 September 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/391 Four DutchSubmarines put intoBatavia Docks

4 October 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/393 IndonesianPresident holdsMeeting withGovernmentOfficials, Batavia

4 October 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/394 Meeting ofIndonesianPresident withGovernmentOfficials, Batavia

4 October 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/395 IndonesianPresident with hisCabinet—Batavia

5 October 1945 Madura Island—Soerabaya, Java

J/IND/133 Soerabaya NavalBase Arsenal blownup by Japs.

8 October 1945 Sungei Patani J/IND/134 Final Surrender ofthe Japanese Armies

21 October 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/419 Political Posters andSlogans at Batavia

22 October 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/420 Dr. Van Mook holdsPress Conference


27 October 1945 Bandoeng, Java J/FUB/430 Political Unrest inBandoeng

31 October 1945 Java J/FUB/428 The IndonesianArmy TrainsTijikalenka

5 November 1945 Sourabaya, Java J/IND/142 Evacuation ofWomen andChildren fromSourabaya byRoyal Navy

5–6 November1945

Batavia, Java J/IND/148 Scenes in Batavia

16 November 1945 Sourabaya, Java J/FUB/437 Fighting inSourabaya



16 November 1945 Sourabaya, Java J/FUB/438 Fighting inSourabaya

16 November 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/441 First Air Link withHolland is made bySky master ofK.L.M. Airlines

17 December 1945 Sourabaya, Java J/FUB/493 Sourabaya Patrol24 November 1945 Java J/FUB/443/1 Ambonese Troops

hold up Indonesians18–26 November1945

Batavia,Ambarava, Java

AB 187 Evacuation ofDutch byR.A.P.W.I.

27 November 1945 Sourabaya, Java J/FUB/447 Activities inSourabaya, Java

30 November 1945 Batavia, Java J/FUB/443/2 Dutch Interneesreleased fromCamp at Somerangarrive at Batavia bySea

30 November–1December 1945

Central Java J/FUB/444 Java Operations toevacuateB.A.P.W.I.Personnel fromAmbarava Camp

1 December 1945 Java J/FUB/443/3 Discovery ofBodies ofMurderedPassengers andCrew of Aircraftwhich crashed nearBatavia

1946? Batavia, Java ? B/28 Native Islandersplay Mixed ArmyTeam atAssociationFootball on HomeIsland

4 January 1946 ? Batavia, Java J/FUB/508 Indonesian versusBritish ArmyFootball Match

1946? Sumatra AB 129 Attack on EnemyAirfield in Sumatra



7 January 1946 Batavia, Java AB 191/1 2962 SquadronR.A.F. RegimentRiot Patrol

7 January 1946 Tangion Priok,Java

AB 191 Evacuation byR.A.F. Sunderlandof Dutch Internees

17 January 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/464 Children’s Partygiven by 101 GPTCompany

18 January 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/470 British Wedding inBatavia

26 January 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/473 Dr. Hubertus J.VanMook Lt. GovernorGeneral of N.E.I.arrives at Bataviafrom Holland


31 January 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/476 Princess Beatrix(Holland) BirthdayParade

31 January 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/475 Princess Beatrix(Holland) BirthdayParade—Batavia

1 February 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/466 Arrival of Lt. Gen.Sir MontagueStopford in Batavia

1 February 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/467 Sir Archibald ClarkKerr arrives inBatavia

1 February 1946 Batavia, Java AB 193 Monsoon Conditionin Batavia

1 February 1946 Batavia, Java AB 194 Football MatchDutch civilians v.R.A.F.Batavia

2 February 1946 Batevia, Java J/FUB/468 Lt. Gen. Sir MilesDempsey arrives inBatavia for his JavaTour

2 February 1946 Makassar J/FUB/518 Disembarcation ofTroops from the



S.S.Orduna. Alsothe Taking OverCeremony by 80thBrigade from theAustralian 21stBrigade

8 February 1946 Grissee Sourabaya,Java

J/FUB/520 Sourabaya-GrisseePatrol

9 February 1946 Sourabaya, Java J/PM/521 General Stopford’sVisit to Sourabaya

15 February 1946 Antjol Kanaal,Batavia, Java

J/FUB/527 Batavia

16 February 1946 Makassar J/FUB/525 Life in and aroundMakassar

19 February 1946 Batavia, Java AB 196 Football Match inBatavia—Indonesian XI v.R.A.F. XI

19 February 1946 Batavia, Java AB 197 Birthday Parade inHonour of PrincessBeatrix of Holland

19 February 1946 Batavia, Java AB 198 Visit of A.C.M. SirArthur Barrett andInspection of Guardof Honour

19 February 1946 Bakassi, Java J/FUB/524 Reconaissance inForce to Bakassi

20–21 February1946

Lantja, Celebes J/FUB/532 Changing andBurning of JapaneseOccupationCurrency

2 March 1946 Denpasa, South Bali J/FUB/531 Bali Landings6 March 1946 Tanjon Priock

Docks JavaJ/FUB/540 Unloading of Food

Supplies for Troops7 March 1946 Denpasar, Bali J/FUB/538 Denpasar—Bali (1)

Japs.7 March 1946 Denpasar, Bali J/FUB/539 Denpasar—Bali (2)

SurrenderCeremony

15 March 1946 Macassar J/FUB/557 Gurkha Nautches(Dances)



19 March 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/556 Lady LouisMountbatten arrivesin Batavia

20 March 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/555 Stand Easy20 March 1946 Sourabaya. Java J/FUB/592/3 Lady Mountbatten in

Sourabaya3 April 1946 Sourabaya, Java J/FUB/5 71 First Allied Troops

leave Sourabaya4 April 1946 Bandoeng, Java J/FUB/574 General Sir Miles

Dempsey visitsBandoeng

18 April 1946 Batavia (Buitenzorg)Java

J/FUB/579 Australian WarCrimes Men killed inJava

20 April 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/5 81 M.P. keep Law andOrder in Batavia

? April ? 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/583 Indonesian Officials,Leaders arrive atBatavia

23 April 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/584 General Stopfordleaves for Singapore

25 April 1946 Mangerrai Station,Batavia, Java

J/FUB/585 First Internees arriveby Train at Batavia

25 April 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/588 Supremo visitsBatavia

29 April 1946 Kletek, South (of)Sourabaya, Java

J/FUB/593 Tanks and InfantrySouth of Sourabaya atKletek

30 April 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/595 Princess Juliana’sBirthday Parade

3 May 1946 Cheribon, Java J/FUB/596 Evacuees removedfrom Cheribon by Sea

8 May 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/597 Dr. Van Mook arrivesat Batavia Airfield

11 May 1946 Medan, Sumatra J/FUB/621 Three B.O.R.S. dayoff in Medan,Sumatra

15 May 1946 Medan, Sumatra J/FUB/608 Reconaissance inForce to RotterdamEstates A and B

17 May 1946 Medan, Sumatra J/FUB/609 Lt. Gen.E.C.Mansergh



officiating G.O.C. inA.F.N.E.I. visitsMedan, Sumatra

21 May 1946 Solo—Central Java J/FUB/612 First Interneesevacuated fromCentral Java by Air

25 May 1946 Medan, Sumatra J/FUB/622 The Funeral of Cpl. J.Innes R.A.F. inMedan, Sumatra

26 May 1946 Java J/FUB/611 Bandoeng Airlift26 May 1946 Medan, Sumatra J/FUB/619 Indonesian Buildings

taken over in Medan26 May 1946 Medan, Sumatra J/FUB/623 Britain vs. Holland

(Football Match inMedan)

13 June 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/634 King’s BirthdayCeremonial Parade—Batavia


13 June 1946 Medan, Sumatra J/FUB/639 King’s Birthday Parade inMedan

14 June 1946 Medan, Sumatra J/FUB/641 General Sir MontagueStopford’s Visit to Medan,Sumatra

15 June 1946 Medan, Sumatra J/FUB/640 R.N.’s Children’s Party inMedan

15–16 June 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/637 Arrival of GeneralStopford and his Unveilingof War Memorial, Batavia

29 June 1946 Batavia, Java J/FUB/650 Patiala Regiment’sFarewell Parade


First published in the Proceedings of the British Association for

Japanese Studies, Vol. 6, Part 1, 1981, pp. 74–79 & 239

45Japanese Broadcasting in the Pacific War

FOR MILLIONS of Japanese, the first and final acts of the Pacific War wereconveyed by simple radio receivers. On Monday, 8 December 1941 at 7 a.m., aspecial bulletin announced. ‘Before dawn Imperial Army and Naval forces beganhostilities with American and British forces in the Western Pacific’.1 Forty-fourmonths later, at noon on 15 August 1945, the Emperor in his first-ever broadcastannounced the acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation, the first step in theprocess of armistice and surrender.2 But were these merely isolated occasionswhen radio assumed an importance which it lacked throughout the Pacific War?Certainly the work of Japanese historians conveys this impression. HayashiShigeru’s standard work Taiheiy� sens� devotes only three pages to the story ofwartime radio broadcasting, while the Rekishigaku Kenky� -kafs six-volume studyof the Pacific War contains no significant treatment of broadcasting history.3 Butsuch neglect is scarcely justified. Japanese broadcasting began as early as March1925 and from the outset its significance was clearly understood. The first headof the Tokyo broadcasting station, Got� Shimpei, believed that radio coulddiminish inequality, improve family life, promote culture and aid the economy.4

Others, such as Communications Minister, Adachi Kenz� , recognised radio’spolitical and adminstrative importance, and in 1926 the government created theJapan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon H� s� Ky� kai) as a ‘privately ownedgovernment sponsored monopoly’.5

In the years which followed, Japanese radio programmes wereoverwhelmingly serious and educational. State control became more thorough,and overseas broadcasting began.6 During the China Incident, the governmentmobilised radio as a crucial element in domestic and foreign propaganda andfollowing government campaigns, over 45% of the Japanese population had accessto radio receivers.7

Thus, by the time of Pearl Harbor, Japan’s broadcasting service was alreadyexperienced in domestic and international war propaganda. Furthermore, itsorganisation was closely linked to interested ministries. military agencies and theCabinet Board of Information. There were also special divisions to shapeprogrammes for young people, women, teachers and other special interestgroups.8

The war in China had provided valuable experience for Japanese broadcasters,but it had developed unpredictably from a confused situation. In contrast, theattack on Pearl Harbor was a Japanese initiative and NHK was able to prepareprogrammes and technical arrangements well in advance. The Pacific Warpossessed yet another new dimension. Japanese leaders feared the possibility ofAmerican air attacks and this had clear implications for broadcasting.9 Inresponse to war, Japan tightened central control of radio and the two-channelservice was replaced by a single channel. This was in the interest of uniformityand to obstruct the possible use of radio waves by American bombers.

More apparent to average citizens were changes in programme planning whichwere implemented in December 1941. The prime aim of radio was to maintainsocial tranquility and raise morale. Thus martial music was played and radio usedto transmit government information and encourage the population. It was alsoagreed that air raid warnings would be broadcast to areas which might beaffected.10

In view of radio’s paramount importance, special arrangements were made inmany rural areas for additional electric power to be available so that officialdaytime news bulletins could be received for the first time.11

Now official military announcements were given a larger place withinbroadcasting schedules and the government’s case was also presented in a seriesentitled ‘Government Hour’.12 In these thirty-minute programmes, ministers,civil servants and military officers lectured citizens on matters of immediateconcern, while in a series, ‘Appeal to the people’, the Minister of Agriculturespoke on ‘The Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Food Problem’.Other ministers addressed the nation on related relevant themes. Famous figuressuch as Kikuchi Kan broadcast on the theme of ‘Our Resolve’ and an increasingnumber of cultural notables digressed on the inner meaning of the Great EastAsia War.13 There was also much symbolic relabelling of programmessuggesting the all-pervasive nature of the war effort. Women’s Hour became‘Home at War Hour’, while as part of the Japanisation of current vocabulary, theterm ‘announcer’ was replaced by the somewhat artificial word H� s� in.14

In many respects, the first phase of the Pacific War was an easier time forJapan’s broadcasters than the years of the China Incident. The new conflict couldbe presented as a clearcut struggle between Asia and the West, whereas events inChina had been the subject of confused and contradictory explanations. Whatwas more, the first six months of combat brought a series of unprecedentedvictories. These required little artifice to produce large audiences and wildpopular enthusiasm. In these months, there were moves to simplify programmes,and complexities were hardly necessary. There were frequent performances offamiliar marches and new songs were created to commemorate major victories. Asong celebrating the sinking of the ‘Prince of Wales’ and the ‘Repulse’ wasallegedly hatched within three hours, while others with such unpromising titlesas ‘The Attack on the Philippines’ and ‘The Occupation of Thailand’ appeared inrapid succession.15 Following the capture of Hong Kong, simple pleasure was

442 JAPANESE BROADCASTING IN THE PACIFIC WAR

generated by broadcasting an anthology of songs, poems and readings on thefashionable theme of the new East Asia. In the same weeks, twenty-five poets,including Takamura K� tar� , produced patriotic verses to form part of a series ofradio readings.16 Despite the obvious nature of such propaganda, broadcastersalso sought novel means of attracting popular interest and maintainingenthusiasm for the war. Ministers continued to air their policies but there werealso talks by anonymous farmers, teachers and students to suggest popularcommitment and nationwide determination.17

Yet in 1942 the war situation became more serious and broadcasters werefaced by their first significant difficulties. Perhaps to prepare people for a morearduous struggle, on 6 March the loss of the crew of a midget submarine whichhad attacked Pearl Harbor was announced. On this occasion, the morose tuneUmiyukaba was played and the Navy spokesman Hiraide departed from his usualcelebratory style to speak simply and poignantly of the deaths of young heroes.18

In 1942, broadcasters also seem to have reflected a more serious atmosphere byreturning to quality as an important element in programme content. A new radioprize was isstituted and as no first prize was awarded in its initial year its criteriaappear to have been reasonably severe. Eventually a second prize was awarded toa play which had little direct link with the war—one describing a rural villagewithout a doctor. This prize was to be an important aspect of qualitybroadcasting throughout the war years.19

But more profound difficulties gradually affected the strength and quality ofJapanese broadcasting. Existing transmitters proved inadequate for increasedaudiences. eners were frustrated, and eventually more money was needed toimprove services. Perhaps more important was the beginning of significantconcealment in the presentation of news to the people. In April 1942, B-25bombers from the ‘USS Hornet’ raided Tokyo in a surprise attack. In subsequentbroadcasts, NHK failed to provide details of the casualties and damage whichhad been suffered. In June, following the Battle of Midway, the naval authoritiesobscured the nature of Japanese carrier losses and again postponed knowledge ofJapan’s weakening position.20

Needless to say, the first year of war did not see Japanese broadcastingconfined to mainland audiences. Japan continued her overseas programmeswhich were beamed both to enemies and to potential allies. Attempts were madeto undermine American morale by emphasising heavy casualties and LatinAmericans were told of the burdens of their links with the United States. In Asia,Japan sought to spread consciousness of Oriental solidarity.21 Where possible,Japan used existing radio stations in conquered territories. If this was impossible,old equipment was repaired and new facilities installed. By January 1942,Japanese personnel were broadcasting from Manila and this pattern was to befollowed in Singapore, Malaya, Burma and the Netherlands Indies. In all theseregions, Japan utilised existing networks but in many outlying areas she providednew or better services. These activities were often aided by the co-operation ofindigenous staff who assisted in propagating Pan-Asianism and local culture.22 In


the Philippines, local folk music and legends formed important elements in thenew programmes, and extensive use was made of local dialects. In Java,withdrawing Netherlands forces destroyed all radio stations but by July 1943 allwere replaced and loudspeakers were set up in public places to introduce radio tothose who were unable to purchase conventional sets. These activities were notonly carried out by NHK technicians and broadcasters, but by specialist units inthe Army and Navy garrisons.

It was natural for radio to be given particular attention in these newlyconquered territories, for they contained diverse peoples and languages, andproblems of physical communication were immense. Such difficulties becameeven more serious when American naval and air forces came to dominate muchof the region. In this situation, radio communication and propaganda were theonly effective means of achieving a measure of unity in occupied lands. Stationsin conquered territories were not merely important for morale and solidarity, butthey acted as staging posts for purveying propaganda to more distant states.23

Transmitters in Burma could broadcast to India, while others in S.E.Asia couldreach Australia and the South Pacific. Perhaps the most important of Japan’sforeign broadcasts were those aimed at her enemies, for if these could succeed inreducing morale they might make an important contribution to the war. In thisfield, criticism of Japanese activities often disregards many of Tokyo’s inherentdifficulties, and fails to appreciate much imaginative broadcasting. L.D.Meo’sstudy of Japanese broadcasting to Australia indicates Japan’s lack of skilledpropagandists and makes much play with errors in Japanese English; but this isto overemphasise one aspect of Japanese activity.24 By late 1942, broadcastingfrom Tokyo to overseas areas totalled 65 hours per day and includedprogrammes in German, French, Italian, Dutch, Spanish, Russian, Mandarin,Cantonese, Malay, Hokkien, Thai, Tagalog, Portuguese, Arabic, Iranian, Hindiand Vietnamese.25 In achieving this coverage, Tokyo recruited a substantialnumber of Asian broadcasters and scriptwriters, who were probably as skilful asany of their compatriots. Indeed many were propagating a cause in which theyhad a sincere political interest.

The problem of securing English speakers of high calibre were severe, andprisoners of war such as the Australian, John Cousens, were compelled tobroadcast under duress. But even in this field some successes were notable. By1943, Japan’s capacity to monitor American domestic broadcasts made itpossible to refer to events in the United States with uncanny precision, while thegroup of Japanese-American and Japanese-Canadian women announcers whoparticipated in such programmes as ‘Hi no maru Hour’ allegedly achieved abigger audience than any comparable American programme.26 The collectivename for these announcers, ‘Tokyo Rose’, is an indication of their popularity andsuccess. In other words, Japan’s radio propaganda can scarcely be dismissed asstagnant or lacking in imagination.

In the later war years, Japan’s overseas propaganda often demonstratedparticular skill in avoiding the less attractive rhetoric of Pan-Asianism and


emphasising what were essentially Western values. The well-known Christian,Kagawa Toyohiko, often broadcast to North America and emphasised thefreedom of worship which he claimed existed in wartime Japan.27 Such talksimplicitly proclaimed the virtues of tolerance and pluralism rather than the rigidconformism which characterised much of Japan’s domestic propaganda.Japanese broadcasters were also quick to seize upon items of news whichindicated that Western behaviour did not always conform to Christian ideals. Incriticising American attacks on hospital ships or the use of Japanese skulls assouvenirs, Japan was appealling to Western as much as to Japanese values.28

Japan was perhaps slow to use some of the more sophisticated variants ofwartime broadcasting, such as ‘black’ stations, which were utilised by Britainand Germany; but in the conquest of South-East Asia, broadcasts to Dutch forcesmay have contributed something to their collapse. A slight variant on this tacticwas employed in the siege of Corregidor when broadcasts to American units andloudspeaker programmes aimed to erode enemy morale.29

In the later years of war, Allied bombing did much to impair Japanesebroadcasting in Burma and distant territories, but this same period saw manyinteresting developments in domestic radio. In late 1942, the governmentordained a cultural policy of a more severe and thoroughly national character anda thousand tunes, both Japanese and Western, were purged from all programmes.But perhaps more important was Japan’s developing food shortage, andagricultural production became the focus of many programmes. Farmers’broadcasts were increased and extended. Advice was given on vegetablegardening; and, finally, weed eating was recommended as a means ofsupplementing a worsening diet.30

In this period, when life was increasingly austere, NHK at times producedhigh quality programmes as a means of lightening the gloom and raising patrioticsentiment in an imaginative way. In the autumn of 1943, readings of YoshikawaEiji’s Miyamoto Musashi began. These were an outstanding success and, thoughthis series dealt with an heroic samurai, it appears likely that its literary qualityand effective presentation were the main reasons for its popularity.31 Thisprogramme continued intermittently until January 1945.

Conventional stereotypes of Japanese wartime propaganda suggest a finaldescent into wild irrationality and xenophobia but in some respects NHK appearsto have been immune from these unpleasant tendencies. In fact, by the end of1943, blatantly unreal titles such as ‘Record of Victories’ were expunged fromprogrammes and announcements of poignant mass casualties in the Pacific wereincreasingly heard.32 Realism was also apparent in broadcasts of the sounds ofAmerican aircraft and American bombs, and increasing emphasis on air raidprecautions in radio talks.

By May 1944, NHK had a role to play which was unique in the war years.With shortages, austerity and the closing of theatres and cabarets, radio becamevirtually the only medium of entertainment for the Japanese people. In earlieryears, the authorities had transformed life into an austere pilgrimage. Now it was


clear that this was depressing the public mood. As a result, radio policy changedto one of brightening up daily life.33 Now bearing almost the whole burden ofnational entertainment, NHK turned to entirely new programmes. These includedmaterial of high quality which in some senses contradicted the notion ofJapanisation which had permeated much government policy. ‘The Marriage ofFigaro’ and ‘Tannhauser’ and other operas were broadcast, while appearances ofministers with appeals for hard work were tactfully reduced to a minimum.34 Intheir place lectures on cultural themes, and stories such as Sugata Sanshir� cameto occupy an unprecedented place in wartime radio. Military marches still hadtheir place, but so had new orchestral music in a period of cultural floweringwhich unconsciously anticipated the coming peace.35

In 1945, what had been one of radio’s earliest preoccupations became a harshreality. As bombing increased, the importance of radio as an essential source of airraid warning information became unprecedented. Air raid warnings, more thanofficial programmes, became the most important reason for regular listening.36

Parallel with this development came the construction and preparation ofemergency transmitters in such places as the Dai Ichi Seimei building. By now,industrial decline and shortages of spare parts had led to a marked fall in thenumbers of working radio sets and NHK attempted to encourage valveproduction and promote co-operation between retailers, manufacturers and civilservants. Caught in an avalanche of economic decline, there was little that couldbe done to sustain production. However, NHK attempted to counter the crisis bysending mobile groups with good receivers to encourage communal listening inprovincial cities.37

NHK was also drawn into new and desperate activities of a more poignantcharacter in the final year of war. In the desperate battles for Iwojima andOkinawa, special broadcasts were beamed to surrounded garrisons to encouragecontinued resistance. In some instances, members of soldiers families appearedin farewell programmes. In the same months, broadcasts from kamikaze airfieldsformed a persistent element in radio programmes.38 Yet, in considering theunfortunates of war, NHK often produced programmes of high quality whichwere often similar to those produced by good quality stations in time of peace.39

In 1944, ‘Convalescent Home Hour’ was introduced as a programme forwounded soldiers. Patriotic excesses would scarcely have been welcomed bylimbless or shell-shocked men. As a result, such themes as art and Zen Buddhism,which were only indirectly patriotic, were its main elements. This seriescontinued after the war was over.

In April 1945, radio took on yet a further role which reflected the continuingdecline of Japan’s position. Internal communication became increasinglyconfused and difficult. Contact between government agencies and betweenTokyo and the provinces was increasingly tortuous. In earlier months, NHK hadborne the burden of providing a substitute entertainment industry. Now itassumed the role of an administrative communications system. Programmes weresimplified. There were considerable intermissions and special time was reserved


for government messages.40 By this time, broadcasting had become a passivetool rather than a creative agency.

Yet radio had two final crucial roles to play. On 15 August, the Emperor’sbroadcast showed how modern techniques and traditional symbolism could bejoined in a decisive formula. The Emperor’s brief and ambiguous broadcastbrought war to an end and ensured Japan’s surrender. But even this could notensure that extremists of left and right would not challenge the government orfoment revolution. Thus, on 17 August, the new prime minister, PrinceHigashikuni, broadcast advocating respect for the Constitution, control of theArmy and preservation of the existing order.41 Eight days later, Ogata Taketora,head of the Information Bureau, broadcast further pleas for tranquility. Farmerswere urged to produce more food and on 22 August the weather forecastreturned, as did ‘Children’s Hour’ and radio exercises. Radio was alreadypreparing for the politics and culture of the coming peace.42

Overall, Japanese radio in war, like Japan itself, was varied in its aims andactivities. Its overseas broadcasts were ambitious and at times cosmopolitan. Itsdomestic programmes projected both low patriotism and high culture. Moreimportant, Japanese radio maintained a surprising level of seriousness andquality. It was responsive rather than inflexible and provided some of the finerelements in a dismal cultural scene. It supported both unity in peace anduniformity in war and in August 1945 partially fulfilled Got� Shimpei’s ideals ofenlightenment and cultural advance.

NOTES

1. NHK: H� s� 50-Nen-Shi: (Tokyo, 1977), 139.2. For the text of the Potsdam Declaration and the Emperor’s broadcast, see R.J.C.

Butow: Japan’s Decision to Surrender. (Stanford, 1954), 243 & 248.3. Hayashi Shigeru: Taiheiyo Sens� (Nihon no Rekishi 25): (Tokyo 1967), 316–319.

Rekishigaku Kenky� kai, eds: Taiheiy� -Sens� -Shi: (Tokyo, 1971–1973), Vols. I–VI.4. As fn.1, 167–168.5. Ibid., 42–44 and Office of Strategic Services, Rsearch & Analysis Branch, Report,

2362: Public Information in Japan: (Washington DC, 20. viii. 1945), 31.6. For an outline of these developments, see Yamamoto Fumio: Nihon Masu

Komyunikeeshon-Shi: (Tokyo, 1970), 162–166.7. Ibid., 186 & NHK (as fn.1), 125–126.8. OSS (as fn.5), 32.9. As fn.1, 145.

10. Ibid., 144.11. Ibid., 145.12. Ibid., 145.13. Ibid., 146.14. Ibid., 149.15. Ibid., 148.16. Ibid.


17. Ibid., 146.18. Ibid., 149–150.19. Ibid., 150.20. Ibid., 158–159.21. As fn.6, 210–211.22. As fn.1, 155–157.23. Ibid., 152 and P.de Mendelssohn: Japan’s Political Warfare: (London, 1944), 42–

43.24 L.D.Meo: Japan’s Radio War on Australia, 1941–1945: (London & New York,

1968), 265.25. Mendelssohn (as fn.23), 37.26. As fn.1, 153 and M.Duus: Tokyo Rose: (Tokyo, 1979), 64–96. 27. For valuable analysis of Japanese broadcasts to North America, see the series,

Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service: Radio Rports on the FarEast: (Washington DC, National Archives).

28. Ibid.29. As fn.1, 154–156.30. Ibid., 161 and Fujiwara Akira: Taiheiy� Sens� (Kokumin no Rekishi 23): (Tokyo,

1970), 240.31. As fn.1, 161.32. Ibid., 162.33. Ibid., 167.34. Ibid., 167–168.35. Ibid., 168.36. lbid., 172.37. Ibid., 173.38. Ibid., 178.39. Ibid., 162.40. Ibid., 180.41. Ibid., 195.42. Ibid., 196.


First published in P.G.O’Neil (ed.), Traditional Modern Japan,

Tenterden, Paul Norbury Publications, 1981, pp. 151–155

46Tradition and Modernity in Japanese FilmPropaganda: Nippon Ny� su, 1940– 1945

DURING the first half of the twentieth century the cinema dominated popularamusement in all advanced societies.1 The power of films to amuse and excitecreated a new art and a new industry, and the persuasiveness of moving picturesgave them a social and political significance which was recognized by bothdemocratic and totalitarian regimes. In Japan as early as 20 October 1912 theTokyo police forbade showings of the French film Jigoma on the grounds that itmight incite crime and disturb social order, and in October 1925 the Home Ministryimplemented a nationwide system of film censorship.2 However, official interestin the cinema was not confined to purely negative precautions. In the interwaryears the Ministry of Education took an active role in encouraging documentaryproductions, while the example of German and Italian film legislation promptedgovernment activity in a wide range of cinematic policies.3

In October 1939 a new Film Law was put into effect which made showings ofnewsreels and documentaries compulsory in all cinemas; and governmentconcern with newsreels soon extended to action to amalgamate the existing Asahi,Mainichi, D� mei and Yomiuri organizations into a single Nippon Ny� su Eigasha‘Japan News Film Company’, which began its operations in April 1940.4 In itsformative period the new company issued three Special Weekly Film Reports,but on 11 June 1940 it issued the first edition of Nippon Ny� su, a regularnewsreel which appeared on 254 occasions before the ending of the PacificWar.5 Besides being projected in cinemas, Nippon Ny� su was also shown inschools and village halls by travelling film units, and constituted one of the mosthighly organized attempts at mass cinematic persuasion attempted during WorldWar II.6 Clearly the organization, methods and motivation of this propaganda werein no way traditional, but an examination of the content of this major voice ofofficial opinion may reveal the relative balance of tradition and modernity withinthe rhetoric of Japan’s wartime administration. Such an examination may alsoindicate something of the broader blend of illusion and reality whichcharacterised thought and action in wartime Japan.

Nippon Ny� su began its first regular issue with a sequence of the emperor, in alimousine, emerging from his palace for a visit to the Kansai to visit ancestraltombs.7 This was during the much publicized celebrations of the 2,600thanniversary of the Imperial Household, and might well be seen as a symbol of

tradition effectively used in preparation for total war. On several later occasionsthe emperor was depicted attending grand Shint� festivals for the war dead at theYasukuni Shrine,8 but for the most part the emperor appeared like any other headof state in time of war, in military ceremonies which had little connection withtradition or any form of religious activity. Attendance at numerous army parades,waving to happy crowds after the fall of Singapore, and a visit to TokyoUniversity to stimulate science and learning were typical of the emperor’scinematic appearances, but as the war gathered momentum he disappeared fromthe screen for substantial periods. He appeared in no major new role until thespring of 1945.9 At this time he was shown visiting the ruins of Tokyo after theworst American incendiary raid of the Pacific war.

It could be argued that the role of imperial princes, as projected by NipponNy� su, had more traditional parallels. They visited conquered territories such asJava and the Philippines, which recalled the significant symbolic activities ofprinces in the civil war of 1868.10 Yet even these activities, looked at in wideperspective, are somewhat difficult to distinguish from the acts of westernroyalty in time of war. If a certain distinctiveness remained, it lay perhaps in theformality, and safety, of the situations in which princes were depicted. Thereappeared little attempt to identify such personages with combat. Instead theywere associated with the restoration of law and order when the fighting wasalready over. In fact, the most overtly traditional projection of the ImperialHousehold had preceded the war, in the celebration of the archaeologically andhistorically bogus 2,600th anniversary of imperial rule. At this time newsreelsshowed monuments being unveiled, military reviews, and mass displays oftraditional martial arts.11 Yet, ironically, the two most genuine celebrations ofimperial tradition which were depicted during the years 1940–45 had littleconnection with mass mobilization—or the notion of the imperial state in arms.Traditional performances and ceremonies were mounted to commemorate theanniversaries of Sh� toku Taishi’s death and the Taika reforms, but in view of theirarchaic and peaceful character, these events could contribute little to theatmosphere of modern international combat.12

Scenes of shrine construction, ceremonies for the dead, and Shint� priests atvarious national celebrations gave a somewhat traditional dimension to weeklycinema bulletins,13 but though the ever recurring Yasukuni Shrine festivals hadno exact parallels in the West, they clearly had a significance for government andcitizens which was social and psychological as well as religious. Nonetheless,Shint� ceremonial was at times filmed in imaginative ways to add a pseudo-religious cachet to political or strategic objectives. Shint� shrines had alreadybeen constructed in Korea as part of the general policy of assimilating colonialterritories, and this example was clearly developed in the prologue to the Pacificwar and the conflict itself.

In autumn 1940 cameramen visited the Palau islands where several hundredcitizens were involved, with official leadership, in the dedication of a SouthernOcean shrine symbolising the empire’s southern advance.14 Shint� construction

450 TRADITION AND MODERNITY IN JAPANESE FILM PROPAGANDA: NIPPON NYUSU,1940–1945

in Sh� nan—the renamed Singapore—also received considerable film attention.15

Yet certain Shint� ceremonies resembled those of the peaceful post-war period.When the railway tunnel under the Shimonoseki straits was finally completed,there were Shint� rituals, but these were hardly the main focus of contemporarycelebration or cinematic interest.16 As the war reached its military climax, andJapanese military and economic success appeared in graver doubt than at anyprevious time, aspects of Shint� did appear more frequently on Japanese screens.In 1944, when the mobilization of the inhabitants of Saipan was presented, achild was described as praying fervently to the war god Hachiman and therewere Shint� overtones to the extensive depiction of suicide units and theirpreparations for attacks on American warships.17 Yet such religious events, likethe kamikaze assaults themselves, appear to typify one phase of the conflict ratherthan the overall mood of film propaganda.

If spirituality is often regarded as the overwhelming feature of muchpropaganda, its other face, a neglect of science, is often seen as typical of war-time Japan and its conduct of the conflict. Clearly, much scientific research couldnot be projected to a vast public for simple security reasons, but it may be thatthe comparative neglect of scientific innovation in Japanese news filmrepresented, albeit unconsciously, the retarded state of Japanese science and asomewhat traditional approach to warfare. Yet science was far from totally absentas a theme in Nippon Ny� su’s coverage of events. Such achievements as theelectrical detection of bullets lodged in the flesh of wounded men, observation ofan eclipse, the filming of a dog’s beating heart and the bringing of protectiveinjections to Burmese peasants indicate that the balance between science andtradition in the delineation of the war was far from simple.18

One element in Japanese tradition and history, sakoku (‘closed-country’)isolation, is sometimes assumed to have been revived in the intellectual andpolitical history of the Pacific war. In the sense that Japan was isolated from themajor centre of liberal scientific and social innovation, the United States, thisnotion may have some validity. But this concept of isolation requires carefuldeflnition before it can be readily accepted. Throughout the years 1940–43 notonly did diplomacy receive as much attention as Shint� or the imperial family innewsreel coverage, but conditions in Europe and Asia were major features ofJapanese newsreels.19 Clearly, the diplomacy which Japanese citizens saw on theirscreens was scarcely representative.

The Tripartite Pact, the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, and negotiations withFrench Indochina received cinematic attention, as did Japan’s treaty withThailand,20 That these events were deliberately chosen cannot be questioned, butthe desire of most newsreel editors and censors appears to have been toemphasize Japan’s position within an alliance rather than her solitary position,her international support rather than her isolation, and this is hardly compatiblewith a simplified notion of an island mentality.21 When western affairs almostdisappeared from Japanese screens in the closing stages of the war, it was probablydue to difficulties of communications and supplies rather than to any pre-modern


mentality or antique approach to Japan’s international predicament. Evidence forsuch a view can be found in coverage of German triumphs in the west, thebombing of Coventry, war in the Balkans and contacts by submarine with theThird Reich.22 Even more surprising was the thoroughness with which fragmentsof favourable news from Europe were shown, even when they signified a clearlyworsening situation. The rescue of Mussolini by the Germans, and Germandefensive moves in France in the summer of 1944 are but two examples of suchinformation.23

If an isolationist mentality was apparently absent from the newsreels’treatment of Europe, it was dramatically lacking in their interpretation of eventsin East and South-East Asia. What is more, in depicting these regions Japanesefilm propaganda was emphatically and uncompromisingly modern in most of itscontent. From its beginnings Nippon Ny� su placed emphasis upon the new orderin Greater East Asia and the liberation of Asian peoples from alien domination.This propaganda theme had already been apparent, in the creation of the Manchupuppet state, and the activities of its emperor received serious newsreel attention.24

Perhaps more striking was the considerable coverage given to events in theindependent kingdom of Thailand. Her diplomatic negotiations with Indochina,alliance with Japan, and military parades commemorating her revolutionreceived substantial mention.25

In dealing with both newly created puppet states and liberated areas NipponNy� su also gave vivid expression to the role of local nationalist leaders, local pro-Japanese armed forces and the building of new states and new societies.26 Therewas little of the traditional in the tone of such propaganda with its emphasis anmedicine, increased production, agricultural improvement and the politicalmobilization of the local population.27 At times traditional arts were shownserving a modern purpose, as in the case of touring propaganda theatres in Chinaand Indonesia, but when tradition was mobilized in the context of Japan’s Asianallies it was often the semi-modern tradition of nationalism rather than anythingpredating the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. In the case of the Chinese puppetstate, not only was there notable commemoration of the centennial of the OpiumWar and the beginnings of British imperialism, but careful mention was made ofthe inheritance of Sun Yat-sen, whose close connections with Japan were widelyknown.29 In the closing stages of the war the independence given to Burma andthe Philippines and promised to Indonesia was emphasized, and Burma’sdeclaration of war on the Allies was also the source of joyful screen headlines.30

Yet perhaps the most sustained treatment of Asian nationalism came in therepeated shots of the pro-Japanese Indian nationalist movement in Tokyo,Singapore and Rangoon, with anti-British rallies and extensive footage of theIndian National Army including well armed and uniformed ranks of women.31

However deceptive and unreal such images may have been, they looked forward,unknowingly, to the political atmosphere of the post-war world and not to anylong-honoured element in Japanese tradition.


In their treatment of women in Japan, as opposed to East and South-East Asia,the newsreels provide images which are too varied to be dismissed in clean andsimple categories. Clearly, the passage of time and the transformation of total warfrom theory to practice produced a subtly changing interpretation of women’srole. For much of the war a somewhat stereotyped view of women as mothersand members of stoic patriotic societies continued,32 yet Japanese women weredepicted in construction corps in New Guinea, and increasingly the role ofwomen in war production came to be a dominant theme in the cinema.33 ByFebruary 1944 Prime Minister T� j� ’s appeal to Japanese women to emulatethose of the United States in replacing men behind the lines was projected oncinema screens and, in the final phase of the war, women were shown carryingout factory work, and driving and signalling trains in poses and uniforms whichclearly had military overtones.34

In total, the message of the newsreels is complex and unsteady; with twenty-five hours of film and some 1,000 incidents it could scarcely be otherwise. Yetwithin them, tradition and stability are less significant themes than change,development and multicultural emancipation. In the final year of war, NipponNy� su presented a morose collage of discarded lives and reckless loyalism.35

Perhaps these brief images expressed an archaic tradition. But overall, Japan’sofficial newsreel challenged Asia’s colonial past and foreshadowed its futureliberation.

NOTES

1. For a recent brief account of the history of the Japanese cinema, see Liz-AnneBawden (ed.): The Oxford companion to film, London, 1976, pp. 363–5.

2. Kinema Junp� sha (ed.): Nihon eiga shi, Seika no eiga sakka 31, 1976, pp. 16–17,38– 9.

3. For the Ministry of Education’s interest in the cinema, see Tanaka Jun’ichir� :Nihon eiga hattatsu shi vol. 1, 1976 ed., pp. 408–9, and vol. 2, pp. 362–3. Germanand Italian influences are noted in ibid. vol. 3, pp. 14–15.

4. Ibid. vol. 3, p. 17, and Mainichi Shinbunsha (ed.): Nippon Ny� su eiga shi—Kaisenzen’ya kara sh� sen chokugo made, Bessatsu ichiokunin no Sh� wa-shi, 1977, p. 3.

5. Nippon Eigasha (ed.): Nippon Ny� su dai-ichig� naishi dai-hyakug� (Nichi-Eich� sa shiry� dai-issh� ), 1943, pp. 1–4, and Mainichi Shinbunsha (ed.): op, cit., p.487.

6. Tanaka: op. cit. vol 3, p. 143.7. Mainichi Shinbunsha (ed.): op. cit., p. 8.8. E.g., ibid., Newsreel 20 (22 October 1940), p. 35; Newsreel 99 (28 April 1942), p.

204; Newsreel 124 (20 October 1942), p. 240; Newsreel 151 (27 April 1943), p.292.

9. Ibid., Newsreel 14 (10 September 1940), p. 23; Newsreel 20 (22 October 1940), p.36; Newsreel 90 (23 February 1942), p. 185; Newsreel 19 (16 October 1940), p.32; and Newsreel 248 (22 March 1945), p. 478.


10. Nippon Eigasha (ed.): Nippon Ny� su dai-hyakuichig� naishi dai-nihyakug� (Nichi-Ei ch� sa shiry� dai-nish� ), 1944, Newsreel 103 (26 May 1942), p. 4.

11. Mainichi Shinbunsha (ed.): op. cit., Newsreel 19 (16 October 1940), p. 32;Newsreel 20 (22 October 1940), p. 36; Newsreel 23 (13 November 1940), p. 44;Newsreel 26 (4 December 1940), p. 5; and Newsreel 15 (15 September 1940), p.25.

12. Ibid., Newsreel 45 (15 April 1941), p. 106: and Newsreel 244 (1 February 1945), p.474.

13. E.g., ibid., Newsreel 5 (9 July 1940), p. 17; and Newsreel 53 (10 June 1941), p.122.

14. Ibid., Newsreel 24 (20 November 1940), p. 46.15. E.g., ibid., Newsreel 142 (24 February 1943), p. 276.16. Ibid., Newsreel 224 (14 September 1944), p. 437.17. Ibid., Newsreel 216 (22 July 1944), p. 421; and Newsreel 252 (9 June 1945), p.

484.18. Ibid., Newsreel 56 (1 July 1941), p. 125; Newsreel 140 (9 February 1943), p. 272;

Newsreel 53 (10 June 1941), p. 122; and Newsreel 124 (20 October 1942), p. 241.19. For a subject analysis of the contents of Nippon Ny� su 1–200, see Nippon Eigasha

(ed.): op. cit., 1943, Contents pp. 1–5; and op. cit., 1944, Contents pp. 1–5. For asimple listing of all newsreels, see NHK Saabisu Sentaa—Bangumi Shiry� -bu(ed.): Firumu shiry� risto—Nippon Ny� su hen (1), April 1978.

20. Mainichi Shinbunsha (ed.): op. cit., Newsreel 22 (6 November 1940), p. 42;Newsreel 51 (27 May 1941), p. 119; Newsreel 31 (7 January 1941), p. 67; andNewsreel 169 (3 August 1943), p. 327.

21. E.g., the Nanking regime’s declaration of war on the U.S.A. and Britain was aheadline item in Newsreel 136 (12 January 1943), ibid., p. 262, and the conferenceof East Asian ambassadors appeared in Newsreel 251 (10 May 1945), ibid., p. 482.

22. E.g., ibid,, Newsreel 29 (24 December 1940), p. 62; Newsreel 31 (7 January 1941),p. 68; Newsreel 44 (8 April 1941), p. 104; and Newsreel 161 (6 July 1943), p. 31 1.

23. Ibid., Newsreel 193 (9 February 1944), p. 367; and Newsreel 211 (15 June 1944) p.405.

24. The new Asian ideal was implicit in the Greater East Asian Games depicted inNewsreel 1 (11 June 1940), ibid., p. 9. The Emperor of Manchukuo’s visit to Japanwas shown in Newsreel 3 (25 June 1940), ibid., p. 13, and Newsreel 5 (9 July1940), ibid., p. 17. His speech on the 12th anniversary of Manchukuo’s foundationappeared in Newsreel 225 (21 September 1944), ibid., p. 438.

25. E.g., ibid., Newsreel 36 (10 February 1941), p. 83; Newsreel 82 (29 December1941), p. 167: and Newsreel 161 (6 July 1943), p. 312.

26. E.g., ibid., Newsreel 107 (22 June 1942), p. 214; Newsreel 113 (5 August 1942), p.224; Newsreel 166 (11 August 1943), p. 322; and Newsreel 43 (1 April 1941), p.101. The spirit of the new Asian states was well illustrated in Newsreel 221 (24August 1944), ibid., p. 431, and Newsreel 226 (28 September 194.4), ibid., p. 440.

27. E.g., ibid., Newsreel 141 (16 February 1943), p. 275; Newsreel 168 (24 August1943), pp. 325–6; and Newsreel 147 (30 March 1943), pp. 284–5.

28. Ibid., Newsreel 44 (9 April 1941), p. 103; and Newsreel 222 (31 August 1944), p.432.


29. E.g., ibid,, Newsreel 233 (16 November 1944), p. 454; and Newsreel 236 (7December 1944), p. 462. For an account of Sun Yat-sen’s links with Japan, seeMarius B. Jansen: The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Cambridge, Mass., 1954.

30. Ibid., Newsreel 165 (3 August 1943), p. 320; Newsreel 166 (11 August 1943), p.322; Newsreel 176 (19 October 1943), p. 339; and Newsreel 226 (28 September1944), p. 440.

31. Ibid., Newsreel 116 (25 August 1942), p. 230; Newsreel 143 (1 March 1943), p.278; and Newsreel 204 (27 April 194.4), p. 387. For a study of relations betweenJapan and Indian nationalists, see Joyee C.Lebra: Jungle alliance—Japan and theIndian National Army, Singapore, 1971.

32. E.g., ibid., Newsreel 14 (10 September 1940), p. 24; Newsreel 17 (1 October1940), p. 28; Newsreel 19 (16 October 1940), p. 33; and Newsreel 20 (22 October1940), p. 38.

33. Ibid., Newsreel 145 (16 March 1943), p. 282.34. Ibid., Newsreel 195 (25 February 1944), pp. 372–3; Newsreel 212 (22 June 1944),

p. 409; Newsreel 219 (10 August 1944), p. 423; and Newsreel 222 (31 August1944), p. 432.

35. Cf. ibid., Newsreel 232 (9 November 1944), p. 450; Newsreel 234 (23 November1944), p. 455; Newsreel 235 (30 November 1944), p. 460; and Newsreel 237 (15December 1944), p. 464.


First published in the Historical Journal of Film, Radio and

Television, Vol. 12, No. 2, October 1982

47Japanese Domestic Radio and CinemaPropaganda, 1937–1945: An Overview

LONG BEFORE the creation of the modern Japanese state censorship andpropaganda had a signficant role in politics and cultural life. From the earlyseventeenth century Chu Hsi Confucianism was the ideology of government, andmoralistic exhortation was an important aspect of administration.1 Placards andedicts instructed all Japanese to be diligent and loyal and to behave in waysappropriate to their social status.2 By the eighteenth century literary and theatricalcensorship was detailed and effective, and did much to create the specialconventions of the kabuki theatre.3 Pre-modern censors sought to protect theregime and public morals, and as eductional standards rose official control ofpublications became increasingly important.

In 1868, following the Meiji Restoration, Japan’s new government began anenergetic programme of Westernisation. This reached its political climax withthe proclamation of the new constitution in 1889. Like earlier rulers, Japan’smodernisers saw propaganda and censorship as valuable tools of government,not only to strengthen the state but to spread ideals of modernisation and nationalunity. As a result, Japan’s economic and political advance was accompanied bythe development of official propaganda and press censorship.4 Thus it wasnatural that new media, such as radio and cinema, would be subject to censorshipand become vehicles for official policy.

As early as 1896 Japanese government officials began research into wirelesstelegraphy. and within seven years they had successfully transmitted a messageto the colony of Taiwan. In 1915 the Wireless Telegraphy Law (MusenDenshinh� ) was promulgated and after World War I the establishment ofbroadcasting stations became a practical possibility. In December 1923 theMinistry of Communications instituted Regulations on Private Radio-TelephonicBroadcasting Facilities (H� s� y� Shisetsu Musen Denwa Kisoku), the basic legalframework for the new medium. According to this, stations were to be privatenon-profit making organisations, largely financed by licence fees. Allprogramme content would require government approval, and no entertainmentprogrammes were to be permitted during working hours.5 The first head ofTokyo’s pioneer station Got� Shimpei regarded radio as an essentially seriousmedium. On the eve of the first broadcast he claimed that radio could improvethe level of popular culture, and help commerce and industry by spreading

economic information. Other leaders, such as Communications Minister AdachiKenz� , noted the important role which the BBC had played in the GeneralStrike, and emphasised radio’s political importance.6 These broad notions ofbroadcasting’s social and political power led to the abandonment of plans forprivate stations. In their place the government created the Japan BroadcastingCorporation (Nippon H� s� Ky� kai—NHK) as a ‘privately owned governmentsponsored monopoly’.7 Shares were owned by important newspaper companiesand private individuals but the central control agency was the Ministry ofCommunications. The appointment and dismissal of officials, programmeplanning, changes of rules and financial arrangements all required approval fromthe Ministry.8 Initially NHK operated stations in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, butit soon began to construct a nationwide network. In 1928 seven stations were inuse and the present Emperor’s enthronement ceremonies were covered by radio.Programmes included plays and traditional music but by and large their contentwas deeply serious. Foreign language courses, stock market reports and radioexercises soon became regular items and less than one-fifth of radio time wasdevoted to entertainment.9

As NHK’s significance increased there was much conflict between ministriesfor control of its organisation. From the beginning the Communications Ministrywas in command, but the Home Ministry, which controlled the police andmaintained political orthodoxy, mounted a powerful challenge. As educationalbroadcasting developed the Ministry of Education also sought a voice in NHKpolicy. After many battles the Communications Ministry remained in control butin 1933 the Central Broadcasting Council was created as an advisory and co-ordinating body. This included the Deputy Ministers of Communications, HomeAffairs and Education, and in 1934 equivalent officials from the Army, Navy andForeign ministries became members.10 In 1935 NHK helped to found the nationalD� mei News Agency. This supplied radio with most of its news andinformation. In 1936 the government founded an Information Committee undercabinet control to coordinate propaganda activities.11 In these years of military,expansion the tightening of official controls was a marked feature of Japanesebroadcasting: pre-transmission censorship was applied to all programmes andprevented the transmission of all of the following.

(1) Items that impaired the dignity of the Imperial House.(2) Items that disturbed public order and desirable customs.(3) Items referring to diplomatic or military secrets.(4) Items referring to confidential proceedings in the Diet.(5) Items relating to the contents of preliminary investigations prior to public

trials and others prohibited from Government announcements. (6) Items deemed to impair the honour of Government and public offices or of

the Army and Navy or items deemed to impair the credit of an individual orgroups of individuals.

(7) Items deemed to be political speeches or discussions.

JAPANESE DOMESTIC RADIO AND CINEMA PROPAGANDA, 1937–1945: AN OVERVIEW457

(8) Items deemed to be advertisements of business or individuals.(9) Items deemed to cause marked disturbance of public sentiments.12

Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, in September 1931, had provided a greatstimulus to broadcasting and the outbreak of war in China (in 1937) was an evengreater influence. Furthermore experience gained during this conflict was put togood use during World War II. The campaign in China soon spread fromskirmishes to a major struggle and popular interest increased rapidly. In surveyscarried out by NHK, relatives of servicemen showed a deep interest in allinformation regarding the scene and conditions of war.13 NHK responded with awide variety of appropriate programmes. There were more frequent newsbulletins, including special late night transmissions to rural areas where electricpower was not available during the working day. There were also commentarieson the fighting and statements of Japan’s objectives. The premier and otherministers began to appear before the microphone. But perhaps most importantwere programmes which attempted to link men at the front with their families athome. In 1938 NHK broadcast special programmes based upon a particular townor prefecture which expressed support for local men at the front. These showsoften contained folk songs and other regional elements and were transmitted toChina as well as to domestic audiences.14

Although the government was clearly in control of radio during the Chinaincident it was often prone to strange miscalculations. At first NHK broadcastcasualty lists, but this was soon prohibited after military intevention.15 If this wasone lesson for the future, radio preparation for air raids was another. InNovember 1937 Chinese planes approached the shore of south west Japan andair-raid warnings were broadcast. The importance of radio to air defence andpropaganda led to an official campaign to spread radio ownership. Cheap setswere manufactured and more offices were opened for the purchase of licences.16

In 1939 there was a nationwide poster drive encouraging ownership, andloudspeakers were erected in hundreds of railway stations, parks, squares andother public places. Listening was given further stimulus by broadcasts of qualitymaterial such as traditional stories, which were only indirectly patriotic. As aresult of these campaigns between 1938 and 1940 license holders(Appendix 14.1) increased from 4,165,729 to 5,668,031.17 In 1941, a newCurrent Affairs Broadcasting Planning Council was created. This was dominatedby officials of the Army, Navy and Communications Ministries and planned allprogrammes relating to war propaganda.

In 1940, as German military successes transformed the war in Europe,Japanese foreign policy moved closer to that of the Axis Powers. This shift ofinterest from war in China to a wider world was soon reflected in radio. Inparticular Japan’s Foreign Minister, Arita Hachir� began to broadcast on majorthemes of policy. On 29 July he broadcast a ‘special lecture’ onthe ‘International Situation and the Position of the Japanese Empire’. In this heclaimed that ‘Japan and other East Asian nations were in a position racially and


economically to adopt a policy of mutual assistance’. He advocated ‘coexistence,co-prosperity and stabilization’.18 This was regarded by many as one of the firstofficial declarations of plans to create a Co-prosperity Sphere. Following ForeignMinister Matsuoka’s visit to Berlin and the signing of the Tripartite Pact,Matsuoka appeared on radio voicing the pact’s virtues and the following dayPrime Minister Konoe reinforced the case for the new Axis alliance.

1940 was also a time of important changes in Japan’s political structure. Aftermuch argument all political parties were dissolved and were replaced by theImperial Rule Assistance Association. This so-called ‘new structure’ wasexplained and advocated over the radio by the premier and other importantleaders.19

As a wider war appeared increasingly likely, structures of governmentsupervision and control were further developed. The Cabinet Information Bureauwas established in December 1940 and look over many of the CommunicationsMinistry’s remaining powers over radio. The new Bureau declared its aim to be‘The establishment of a military state through the unity and solidarity of thepublic’ with the goal ‘of raising morale by radio particularly among farmers andyoung people’. Its second role was to ‘make known abroad the Emperor’s trueintent’ and in particular ‘broadcasts to China and Micronesia’ were to beexpanded.20 On the domestic service a ‘’Government Hour’ was reserved everynight for appearances by ministers and civil servants to explain topics of the day.At the school level broadcasts increasingly integrated education with warpropaganda.

When Japan entered World War II in December 1941 her broadcastingauthorities were well prepared. Special wartime schedules had been planned andprovision had already been made for broadcasts from the Diet and the premier’sresidence. On 7 December representatives of NHK were summoned to the ArmyMinistry to receive an announcement that war with Britain and the United Stateshad begun. At 7 a.m. the next day the following simple message was broadcast:‘Announcement by the Army and Navy Departments of Imperial Headquarters—at dawn, December 8th the Imperial Army and Navy entered into hostilities withBritish and American forces in the Western Pacific’.21 Existing schedules wereabandoned to be replaced by repeated readings of the Imperial Rescript declaringwar, the playing of military marches, news programmes and readings from � kawaSh� mei’s Bei-Ei T� -A Shinryakushi (History of American and British Aggressionin East Asia).22 The theme of the moment was the need to repel Westernaggression in the Far East and to emancipate Asians who lived under Europeancolonial rule or dominance. On the first day of the war there were fifteen extranews bulletins. On the same day Miyamoto Yoshino of the Cabinet InformationBureau broadcast proclaiming:

Now is the time for all people to rise for the nation. The government andpeople must be united. One hundred million Japanese must join hands andhelp each other to go forward. The government will inform the people


over the radio of where our nation will go and how they should behave. Allthe people of Japan please gather round the radio. We expect you to whole-heartedly trust the government’s announcements over the radio because theGovernment will take all responsibility and will give you the completetruth. Please obey all instructions which the government issues over theradio.23

As this exhortation indicated, the radio was to be used for the transmission ofmany detailed instructions, as well as for broader attempts to raise public morale.In every city, town and hamlet ‘neighbourhood associations’ had been created toassist in propaganda, savings, salvage and rationing. Each of their regularmeetings was timed to coincide with a special radio broadcast which gaveinstructions on important duties and issues of the day.24

Although radio’s chief role was to support Japan’s forward policy, war with theWest brought new dangers. Japan’s government assumed that Allied air raidswere a serious possibility and this had significant consequences for radio. Firstly,it was feared that enemy bombers would use Japanese radio broadcasts fornavigation purposes. To counter this danger Japan’s second radio channel, whichhad been founded for quality broadcasts, was closed down. All broadcasts on theremaining channel were then centralised, and transmitted from Tokyo. Inaddition, special studios were established in the Defence General Headquartersand local Army and Navy Headquarters. The studio at the premier’s residencewas placed at the disposal of the Cabinet Information Board with staff onpermanent call. The Government anticipated bomb damage to studios, andemergency facilities were constructed in schools and other public buildings.

During air raids all broadcasts were to be suspended, while as a furthersecurity measure all frequencies were to be unified. This also aimed to centraliseauthority. However these technical changes created confusion and soon a groupfrequency system was introduced. At night five frequencies were used, each onein an area which corresponded to an armed-forces region. At later stages in the warthe number of such regions was reduced to four, then increased to six and eight.

During these months of technical precautions and adjustments NHKtransmitted a wide variety of programmes which enunciated three principles ofpolicy: Japan had been compelled to declare war on the Anglo-American powersto survive and maintain her prestige; the main cause of war was the enemies’ambition to conquer the world; Japan’s purpose was ‘to establish a new worldorder to assist all nations to take their rightful place in a spirit of universalbrotherhood’.25 To assist in coordinating programme policy a new tripartiteProgramming Conference was created consisting of the Cabinet InformationBureau, the Ministry of Communications and NHK. As a result changes inschedules were soon introduced. Hours of broadcasting were expanded by oneand a half hours to end at 11.30 p.m. the ‘Government Hour’ continued. ‘Recordof Victories’ was a new series and a wide range of poets and novelists werecommissioned to produce literary works on martial and East Asian themes. Such


series as ‘Our Determination’ and ‘The People’s Resolve’ featured both culturaldignitaries and anonymous farmers. housewives and students who presented theimpression of a united nation.26 Even where the content of programmes remainedlargely unchanged new titles were introduced; for example, ‘Woman’s Hour’was renamed ‘Home at War Hour’. Many young Japanese listened to specialprogrammes in groups and afterwards pledged themselves to support the war. Inthe first months of conflict NHK broadcast a great deal of martial music andpatriotic celebration but even music was subjected to ideological restrictions. On2 January 1942 jazz and ‘sensual’ Western music were forbidden and thusremoved from broadcasting schedules. This foreign music was replaced byJapanese melodies and traditional Japanese war songs. An increasing number ofsongs were hurriedly composed and broadcast to celebrate some victory ormilitary exploit27 such as ‘The Occupation of Thailand’, ‘The Attack on thePhilippines’ and ‘The Annihilation of the British Eastern Fleet’. This was aeuphoric period when Japanese military successes surprised even optimisticcitizens. A succession of victories in South East Asia and the Pacific made itunnecessary to distort or fabricate news to any great extent. Radio spokesmen forthe Imperial Army and Navy became popular personalities and were as popularas successful military commanders. Interest in radio advanced as never before. In1943 7,346,929 families had licenses, and in 1944 radio listening reached itswartime peak.28

Yet the more serious aspects of war were never far away. People were oftenurged to be ready for special emergency radio announcements and on 18 April1942 the United States launched its first symbolic air attack led by GeneralJames Doolittle on the Japanese mainland. On this occasion a warning wasbroadcast by radio, though it was too late to be effective. Even before this, aparticularly sombre announcement had been made (months after the event) of theloss of the crew of a midget submarine which had been sunk while attempting toattack Pearl Harbor. On this occasion the enthusiastic marches of the first phaseof war were replaced by melancholy music.29 As Japan’s fortunes declined radiowas increasingly the vehicle for musical laments.

Despite the overwhelming presence of war news and information in Japaneseprogrammes, appeals to patriotism were also made at a higher level. This policymay have stemmed from a recognition that part of the population constituted asophisticated audience. It may also have reflected pride in Japan’s high level ofcultural achievement. In 1942 NHK created a new prize for radio drama and inthe following year created a permanent company of radio actors. The prizeclearly had reasonably high standards for in its first year no First Prize wasawarded. The play Ame Kakeru Yume (‘A Dream soaring through Heaven’),awarded the Second Prize, was devoted to a conspicuously human subject whichhad little connection with war, the difficulties of a village without a residentdoctor.30

By 1943 war news, however delayed or restricted, was increasingly serious.Battlefields were far from the mainland but American submarine and air activity


created shortages of food and raw materials. In response to these needs,broadcasting was reshaped to add impetus to production. Now broadcasts beganat 5.40 a.m. and ended at 9.30 p.m. so as to coincide with workers’ dailyschedules. A special series ‘To Industrial Soldiers’ was broadcast each morningto encourage factory workers who left their homes early. The food shortage wascountered with an increasing number of programmes for farmers, such as‘Farmers’ Hour’. Vegetable gardening by civilians was also encouraged in Inincreasing number of programmes in the ‘Home at War Hour’ series.31

One of NHK’s greatest strengths lay in the mounting of coordinatedcampaigns to emphasise and re-emphasise a particular aspect of the war. Forexample within a single day songs, literary works, talks and symposia would allbe transmitted to describe and enthuse about a special aspect of Japan’sstruggle.32 As in radio’s early days, Japanese broadcasters asumed that theiraudience could accept a surprising degree of seriousness. On 21 October 1943large numbers of university students paraded in the Meiji Shrine Stadium on theeve of going to war, undeniably an occasion of great poignancy. NHK broadcastthis sad occasion presumably hoping that it would strengthen national resolve.33

Throughout these years the Japanese population accepted a high level ofpropaganda and exhortation, but by 1944 they appeared to be tiring of thiswearisome fare. Now the Government recognised that life was becoming tooaustere to provide meaningful incentives to work. Furthernore entertainment inall fields was suffering from shortages of supplies and manpower. In response tothis, in May the government recognised the need for a new radio strategy. Theemphasis now turned to raising morale by entertainment.34 In theory these newprogrammes were attempts to evoke patriotic feelings by emphasising Japaneseculture; in practice they were often more popular than crude propaganda. As therealities of war became clearer, superficial slogans were ineffective and it wasimpossible to impress wounded soldiers with trite optimism. One of the mostimpressive series of the period was a series of cultural talks for convalescentswhich presented information on the more complex and beautiful aspects ofJapanese traditional culture. The history of art, Zen Buddhism and the teaceremony featured in these talks, and the series was so successful that itcontinued in the early months of peace.35 Other patriotic programmes of animpressive character were readings from famous literary works. YoshikawaEiji’s fictionalised account of the swordsman and artist Miyamoto Musashi (readby the famous actor Tokugawa Musei) was tremendously popular and continuedfor over a year.36 The final year of war also saw the mounting and broadcastingof prestige productions which also achieved great popularity. On New Year’sDay 1945 the famous kabuki play Kanjinch� (on the same theme as Kurosawa’sfilm The Men Who Tread On The Tiger’s Tail, 1945) was broadcast with adistinguished cast of 34 actors.37 Amid shortages and air raids this marked abrief and popular flowering of rewarding entertainment. Even masterpieces ofWestern, albeit German and Austrian, culture were broadcast in 1944; such


operas as ‘The Marriage of Figaro’ and ‘Tannhäuser’ featured in this series andwere reported to be popular.

Parallel with this temporary burst of quality the more serious and practicalaspect of broadcasting continued. In the summer of 1944 American B-29bombers attacked Western Japan and by November Tokyo was within range ofAmerican bases in the Mariana islands. In response to this immediate danger, anincreasing number of programmes covered aspects of civil defence and air raidprecautions. Recordings of American bombs exploding and American aircraftnoise often illustrated such talks.38 More important than the spread of civildefence propaganda was the special position of radio in Japan’s air raid warningsystem. When serious air raids began broadcasts were the only effective source ofinformation and in a very direct sense NHK’s broadcasts became essential forhuman survival. Whenever radar or observers noted approaching enemy aircraftthe local radio station was informed. The message was then relayed to Tokyo,from there messages were sent to all stations which were ordered to switch to thepreviously agreed group frequency system.39 Stations in the area concernedwould continue to transmit their normal programmes until the warning became‘immediate’, then programmes would be suspended. In 1945 air raid warningsand alerts became more and more frequent and normal programmes wereincreasingly disrupted. In the aftermath of raids government propagandistsbroadcast ambiguous reports which attempted to minimise the psychologicaldamage of the raids. ‘Though severe damage was inflicted on urban buildings,fires were successfully extinguished through the efforts of public authorities andcivilians’ was a typical formula of the time. No close detail was ever givenregarding areas which had been damaged. By 1944 fear of further damage to publicmorale was acute, and even significant earthquake damage was excluded fromradio news.40

Although broadcasting was largely exempt from the impact of economicdifficulties its audience ultimately suffered as the production of new setsdeclined drastically. In 1943 receiver production reached 565,000 sets but in thefollowing year valves were in short supply. Output fell to 72,862 sets and in1945 less than 3,000 receivers were manufactured in eight months.Replacements and spares were almost impossible to obtain so that many setswent out of use. In this critical time when radio was vital for survival, advisersvisited households helping them to repair and convert their sets to use fewer valves(radiotubes). NHK also sent staff with receiving equipment to areas where setshad been destroyed to facilitate group listening. This shortage of effective setscombined with flight and evacuation led to a large loss of audiences in the finalmonths of war.41

When islands within Metropolitan Japan, such as Iwo Jima and Okinawa,became battlegrounds a new form of propaganda was employed. Specialbroadcasts were beamed to beleaguered garrisons. These included inspirationalmessages from government leaders, such as the head of the Cabinet InformationBureau, and more plaintive appeals from members of servicemen’s families.


Special songs such as one commemorating the defence of Iwo Jima werebroadcast to men at the front. The fall of Iwo Jima and the loss of Okinawa werecommemorated in special programmes of mourning, with the Prime Ministerpraising the sacrifices of those who had died.42 Although defeat wasunmentionable on Japanese radio, the increasingly desperate nature of Japan’sposition was impossible to conceal. Yet the Japanese authorities appeared tobelieve that poignant news could inspire resolve. In the spring and summer of1945 outside broadcasts from kamikaze bases were frequent. Pilots wereinterviewed and the sounds of their aircraft were conveyed by radio to thecivilian population.43

Following the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and theentry of the Soviet Union into the Far Eastern war, the Japanese governmentmoved reluctantly to accept the allies’ surrender terms. On 13 August the Cabinetdecided to surrender but this decision brought new dangers. There was fear thatpatriotic elements in the armed forces, and right-wing, civilian groups, mightcontinue armed resistance or even attempt a coup against the government. PrinceKonoe was convinced that defeat might stimulate a Communist revolution. Inthis delicate situation only an unprecedented broadcast—a direct message fromthe Emperor—could hope to maintain national unity. On 14 August everyonewas warned to listen to can important broadcast’ at noon on the following day. Atthat time many gathered in groups to listen to radios in public places, theEmperor’s broadcast declared that due to

the general trends of the world and the actual conditions in our empire wehave decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by anextraordinary measure. We have instructed our government to inform theUnited States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China of our acceptanceof their joint declaration.44

Emotive terms such as ‘surrender’ and ‘defeat’ were carefully omitted from theEmperor’s text. To have spoken frankly could have created the very disturbanceswhich the broadcast sought to avoid.

NHK’s next and final phase of propaganda sought to ensure that the armisticecould be converted into a stable surrender. Some broadcasters looked evenfurther into the future and sought to begin mental preparations for the post-warworld. At first the Emperor’s message was repeated and Cabinet Ministersexplained its significance. Soon there were more positive attempts to influencethe popular mind. After two days the new Prime Minister, Prince Higashikuni,spoke over the radio urging co-operation between government and people. On 20August he cautioned against any rash action, which was a euphemism forresistance to allied invasion forces. This message was repeated on the hour forfive hours. By this time the censorship apparatus was loosened. Attention nowturned to food production with more programmes on agriculture and gardening.Special entertainment programmes were prepared for farming families.


‘Children’s Hour’ returned to the air as did the weather forecast andperformances by the NHK Symphony Orchestra. General Douglas MacArthurlanded in Japan on 30 August. The surrender was signed on 2 September.Japan’s war was at an end.45

Retrospectively one sees how, within a rigid framework of censorship andcontrol, Japanese radio played a complex and responsive role during eight yearsof war. In the China conflict it linked servicemen and their families; after PearlHarbor it stirred enthusiasm for the war; from the spring of 1942 some defeatswere concealed and in the following year it emphasised increasing production; in1944 high quality entertainment replaced austerity as a significant element inbroadcasting. In the final year of war radio played a crucial role in warningpeople of air attacks. Heroic suicide pilots featured in an increasing number ofprogrammes, and radio sought to maintain national morale, but in August 1945 ithelped prepare Japan for surrender and the post-war world. Japanese radio maywell have been crass in its chauvinism and dishonest in its presentation ofevents, but in its concern for national unity, production and Japanese tradition itreflected major enduring themes in Japanese modernisation.

In the same year that the Japanese carried out their first experiments inwireless the first moving pictures were shown in Tokyo. In 1896 an EdisonKinetoscope was imported from the United States and in the following year atheatre in Kanda, Tokyo, began showing films with Lumière equipment.46 By theend of the Russo-Japanese war Japanese cameramen were taking film at homeand abroad and by 1908 Japanese feature films, of a primitive sort, were beingcreated. Like much that was modern and Western the cinema was of greatinterest to forward-looking Japanese, and by 1912 the important Nikkatsu filmcompany had begun its activities. As in most countries production wasdominated by fiction films, while European and American films were widelyshown in Japanese cinemas. In the inter-war years the Japanese cinemadeveloped rapidly, but this growth coincided with official unease at thedevelopment of left-wing thought in intellectual and labour circles. As early as1911 the Tokyo police had taken action against the French film Jigoma onaccount of its potential for corrupting the young, and in 1925 the Home Ministryintroduced a nationwide system of government film censorship. As in the controlof radio, Home Ministry officials were principally concerned with possibledamage which might be inflicted on the Imperial House. In fact films whichmade light of Western monarchies were also regarded as subversive. Other areasof life protected by the censors were the armed forces, and ‘the social order’, and,as in most countries, although eroticism disturbed the censors, it was a lessimportant concern than political and military matters.47 Thus well before theinvasion of Manchuria the Japanese government had a well-developed system ofcensorship as well as directives which restricted the filming of the Imperialfamily.

Just as radio’s popularity was greatly enhanced by interest in foreign wars sothe cinema benefited from military adventures. In particular public interest in


warfare in exotic surroundins gave a great stimulus to the development ofnewsreels and news cinemas in the 1930s.48 In these same years, althoughfeature and documentary films were overwhelmingly the product of privatecompanies, government influence steadily increased. Immediately after theoutbreak of the China incident the Home Ministry issued clear guidelines for warfilms. They were to raise morale, not criticise the army, show no bloody orpitiful scenes of war, and to do nothing to lower the morale of conscripts andtheir families.49 Parallel to these negative regulations went an increasing tide ofopinion, both private and official, in favour of ‘national policy’ films whichwould support Japan’s international position. In 1933 the Osaka Mainichinewspaper film division responded to the Manchurian crisis by making Hij� jiNippon (Japan in Time of Emergency), which in some respects set the pattern formuch Japanese film propaganda.50 The script of the film was a long address bythe nationalistic General Araki Sadao. This extolled Japan’s virtues, her missionin Asia, and with appropriate film sequences showed the corrupting influencewhich Western culture brought to Japanese society. Western influence wasequated with decadence, laziness and lack of national pride. This film alsopresented a geopolitical theme which was often to be repeated in Japanesepropaganda; this was the notion of the encirclement of Japan by hostile countriesand in particular the threat which the Soviet Union posed to Japan, Korea andManchuria. Feature films of a policy character became much more numerousafter the outbreak of the war in China when the costs of an ever-expanding warmade it imperative to secure greater and greater sacrifices from the Japanesepeople. Among these were many films which set out to show the suffering,comradeship and courage of the Imperial Army. In the words of The CinemaYearbook of Japan for 1938 many films which treated the China incident were‘no more than cheap sensational films of poor quality without any artistic value’,but there were marked exceptions.51 Tasaka Tomotaka’s Gonin no Sekk� hei(Five Scouts), released in early 1938, was perhaps the first impressive film setagainst the background of the China war.52 This was a simple story of a patrolcarried out by five soldiers. One fails to return, is mourned, and finallyreappears. Then the soldiers move on to another engagement. Westerners mightview this as a melancholy tale presented in an austere manner but it correspondedclosely to Japanese ideas of the arduous nature of war and the stoical behaviourof Japanese troops. By 1940 such films had virtually become a genre inthemselves; the most outstanding was perhaps Tasaka’s Mud and Soldiers(Tsuchi to Heitai) (1940), described by the United States’ Office of StrategicServices (OSS) as,

Probably the most comprehensive treatment of war…the prize-winningpicture of 1940 describes the Hangchow landing in the China campaign.The film is the life story of a squad; dull days on the transport, landing atdawn, days of marching in the mud, nights in the trenches soaked in water,and drenched by pouring rain. cold food, cold lodging, monotony, hardship,


blisters, lice and dirt. As the war goes on the men in the squad getacquainted with each other. They hear about each other’s families. Theyread letters from home together, crack jokes, and when wounded rescueeach other from the enemies’ fire. But inevitably the squad grows smaller,and smaller. They show each other last kindnesses, cremate the body ofeach fallen comrade, often at the risk of life, and take the ashes along forthe eventual shipment home. Throughout the film there are several battles,several deaths, several rest periods, but always the mud of the road—anendless road with only rare glimpses of beauty such as a lotus in a pond, asunset, a clump of trees to remind them of home. It ends with a rest stop inan abandoned Chinese village.53

Another major theme of Japanese films in the years 1937–40 was Japan’smission in Asia. This was illustrated in numerous feature films illustrating theinterrelationships of Japanese and Chinese and their cooperation against variousenemies. In Watanabe Kunio’s Nessa no Chikai (Vow of the Desert) Japanesewere shown cooperating in the building of a road west from Peking. At a morepersonal level there was a romance between the Japanese director and a Chinesegirl. The villains were Communist terrorists who sought to sabotage the road andthe romance.. The director is murdered by a Communist terrorist, but finally theCommunist is converted to the Pan-Asian ideal.54 A much more popular,ingenious and successful film on a Pan-Asian theme was Fushimizu Osamu’sShina no Yoru (China Night) (1940). Again a Sino-Japanese romance formed thecentral element of the plot. In this case a Japanese naval officer has a dignifiedrelationship with a war orphan in Shanghai. Much of the interest in this film layin the conflict between worthy and unworthy Japanese, with a naval officerprotecting the orphan from molestation. As a result of these adventures theChinese girl abandons her hatred of Japanese and becomes a supporter of theirPan-Asian aims.55 Japanese propagandists recognised that their austere forms ofpropaganda were not equally acceptable in all countries and the ending of thefilm was modified for audiences in Malaya and the Philippines.

The picture as shown in China ends with the wedding of China to Japan.For Japanese audiences it goes further. Before the marriage isconsummated the hero is called to duty. He leaves his bride, is wounded byher countrymen, and loses his life on the battlefront. On learning, the newsshe commits suicide by drowning. Here the picture ends for Japaneseaudiences. As shown in Malaya and the Philippines the news of the deathproves false, and although wounded in the battle with Communistguerrillas, he returns just as she is about to throw herself into the river andsaves her. The film thus ends on a happy symbolic note of Japan rescuingChina, saving China from Communism, and the two living happily everafter.56


It would be wrong to think that the era of the China war only produced filmswhich were concerned with war, or romance in the shadow of war. Before PearlHarbor it was still possible to produce films which reflected other aspects ofJapan’s political.and military difficulties. In the 1930s there was considerableinterest in the British documentary movement and some films, in this vein,linked the arduous life of the virtuous peasant (which elsewhere might inspire aradical film) with Japan’s overseas expansion. In 1941, after three years planning,Yamamoto Kajir� (assisted by the young Kurosawa) made Uma (Horse) a semi-documentary story of a peasant girl who rears a colt until it is two years old. Setin a cold, austere region of highland Japan much of the film’s quality lay in itsskilful depiction of the seasons, agricultural labour, and the growth of the horse,the central object in the story, destined to be bought by the Imperial Army.57

The increasing number of links between politics and filmmaking were theproducts of conscious changes in official policy. Knowledge of the role ofcinema in Germany played a part in Japanese policy and in 1939 a Film Law(Eiga-h� ) was passed which subjected virtually every aspect of the industry to asystem of government licenses. From this time on no one could work in theindustry without government approval.58 In view of this it is hardly surprisingthat few Japanese actors or directors carried out acts of resistance againstgovernment policy. The difficulties of Japan’s economic position could also beused to justify various forms of indirect control which were as potent as the overtclauses of the Film Law. In 1937 the Japanese economy was placed on a warfooting with a policy of restricting all inessential imports. This measure,combined with a policy of reducing foreign influences, justified the exclusion ofan increasing number of American films and the increasing dominance by homeproductions of Japanese screens.59 Foreign films were deemed inessential; rawfilm was also in short supply. This genuine shortage could easily be used toprevent the supply of film to any director who was considered undesirable. By1940 government control had extended beyond control of production to rulesabout programming in individual cinemas. It was made compulsory to shownewsreels and documentary films, heavily coloured by ‘national policy’, as partof all programmes. Furthermore, a national routing of films around two plannedcircuits was enforced by government order.60

One more significant organisational change took place between the outbreakof war in Europe and the attack on Pearl Harbor. As a result of governmentpressure existing newsreel companies, owned by the major newspaper groupswere amalgamated in 1940 into one single Japan Film Company (NipponEigasha) which dominated all newsreel production during the war years.

Needless to say many of the films which had been produced during the Chinawar continued to be shown after Pearl Harbor. This was particularly true ofcinemas in outlying or conquered territories. However, documentaries gained anunprecedented importance in the early war years. Many of these were theproducts of special service film units which were attached to army and navyforces in the field or at sea. Perhaps the most successful of these were records of


Japanese victories in the opening months of the war. In the past documentaryfilms had been regarded as uncommercial and unlikely to be profitable but someof the new campaign films attracted large audiences.61 Not only were victoriesattractive experiences but most of them had been won in exotic and romanticsurroundings; even these documentaries retained the seriousness which marksJapanese propaganda.

In 1942 the army in the Philippines produced T� y� no Gaika (Victory Song ofthe Orient) which was not only shown in cinemas but in many schools, publichalls and community centres. Like numerous Japanese documentaries it beganwith an ideological statement. The colonial buildings of Manila (now peacefuland orderly after the Japanese occupation) were shown as an indication ofimperialist influence. Then American posters, stores, buildings and fashions wereshown as symbols of the corrupting influence of the West and, implicitly, thedamage which had been inflicted on oriental culture. Much of the remainder ofthe film depicted the campaign to destroy the last American redoubts in theBataan peninsula. Yet this version of the campaign showed no military action.Japanese soldiers were shown providing health care for Filipino villagers, butmuch of the film was a detailed and slow-moving depiction of the many servicesnecessary to a modern army in a major campaign. Transport, medical services,communications, food supplies and the movement of reinforcements were allshown as if to convey the complex and scientific character of Japan’s forces.There was some light relief in shots of soldiers playing volleyball but the bulk ofthe film was almost a didactic tract indicating the skilful organisation of theImperial Army. At times, artillery fire is heard but the enemy first appear asprisoners of war. Large piles of captured equipment are shown, the Americans’cowardice and failure to commit suicide is criticised, and the film ends with anill-organised victory parade of civilians and troops in Manila.62 Like muchJapanese propaganda in the early stages of war this film implicitly linked Japan’scrusade with modernity, and presented war as slow, arduous and hardlyglamorous. Similar films depicting campaigns in Burma (Biruma Senki) andMalaya (Marei Senki) were also produced by army units; the latter being notablefor its depiction of General Yamashita demanding surrender from the defeatedGeneral Percival. This film also showed the East pitted against the West anddepicted ‘an exhibition’ of British Commonwealth troops of many nationalitiesproviding a guard of honour for General Yamashita as he drove to hisheadquarters in Singapore.63

As in most countries, Japanese wartime propagandists often sought to combinethe romance of history with a contemporary message. In particular, films weremade of historical events which could present the Pan-Asian ideal as somethingwith deep historic roots. Incidents in the history of Sino-Western relations were auseful basis for such propaganda. A typical film of this genre was Doreisen(Slaveship) which described the treatment of Chinese coolies in a Peruvianship.64 This ship was forced by a storm to take shelter in Yokohama harbour.After numerous coolies had escaped from its hull and pleaded for help from the


Japanese, the Japanese liberated them and allowed them to return to their owncountry. The theme of Sino-Japanese friendship was obvious, and it was easy toforget that in fact a British diplomat had pleaded with the Japanese to treat theChinese with humanity. The events of the Opium War provided a more crediblebasis for an anti-Western film based upon history, while Pan-Asianism was alsoprojected in an epic, shot in Mongolia, depicting the career of Ghengis Khan.65

Yet, as in the field of radio, the cinema at times produced propaganda of highquality, whose connection with the war was far from direct. Mizoguchi Kenji’slengthy treatment of the eighteenth-century story of the 47 loyal retainers(Genroku Ch� shingura) was in a sense history, for it depicted a true story, but itwas also an incident which had become almost mythical. This film was anexcellent evocation of life in the eighteenth century, of the relations betweenlords and their loyal followers. Implicitly it supported the samurai ethic whichthe government claimed existed in the Imperial Army. Yet there was no overtideological statement in this film and violence—as opposed to plots and schemes—had a very small part in its action.66

Perhaps the success of war documentaries had an influence on the pattern offeature films which were made in the years which followed Japan”s initialvictories. The conquest of Hong Kong and the attack on Singapore werereconstructed with actors playing the part of soldiers and marines.67 Of thesereconstructions perhaps the most ambitious and successful was Hawai Marei OkiKaisen (The War at Sea from Hawaii to Malaya) which was made in 1942 at thesuggestion of the Navy to commemorate the anniversary of Pearl Harbor.68 Likethe documentary Horse this was made by Yamamoto Kajir� and mingleddocumentary and reconstruction in impressive ways. Many shots in the earlysections of the film depict the intensive drill, physical exercise and training oftrainee naval pilots, shot at an important base north of Tokyo. One critic hasstated that these shots are dishonest fot they carefully exclude all the violenceand harshness usually associated with discipline in the Japanese armed forces.69

Nevertheless these sequences effectively symbolise the notion that the modernmilitary skills of the pilot are based on discipline and physical strength. Thistheme was often part of Japanese propaganda which emphasised the importanceof men against weapons or machines. A second more social theme of this film isthat of the virtues of life in the Japanese countryside. The cadet returns to a‘typical’ farmhouse where everyone behaves with dignity and restraint; wherewomen are subordinate and all the sterling values of tradition are maintained.Inevitably the climax of this film is the attack upon Pearl Harbor where shots ofreal aircraft are combined with the clever use of models to depict Americaninstallations. Ties with Germany are perhaps symbolised by the use of Wagner’s‘Ride of the Valkyries’ as music to accompany the raid. Americans, via theirradio programmes, are depicted as decadent, pleasure-loving, and insignificantenemies. Yet as in the morose depictions of the China incident the ending ispoignint as the camera dwells for some time upon a plane which plunges into thesea.


As the war progressed and conditions became more serious new themes weretreated by Japanese directors; perhaps, as in radio, there was need to escape fromthe jingoism of the early war years. One contributor to a new variety of featurefilm was Kurosawa whose Ichiban Utsukushiku (The Most Beautiful) (1944)depicted an aspect of the war which was characteristic of 1943 and after. Thisfilm is set in an optical factory where Japanese women live and work together.Many shots show their diligent work of grinding, polishing, and checking lenses.The women are also shown participating in military drill, designed to improvetheir industrial morale. Besides dwelling upon a typically Japanese group the filmshows the various personal problems which threaten the unity and effectivenessof the group and hence the war effort. One girl becomes ill and her departuretemporarily depresses her fellow workers. However with redoubled efforts theyincrease production. Another girl falls from a roof and is sent to hospital. Againmorale falters, but a third woman, a natural leader, determines to rally her fellowworkers. Homesickness often depresses the girls; one allows a machine to run outof control. When the supervisor visits her home and leaves the factory, againspirits flag. One girl allows a defective lens to pass through the factory withoutadequate checks. This errant worker finally works through the night until shelocates the defective lens. Her sacrifice is greeted with acclaim and thecommunity is restored to a measure of happiness.70

Some wartime Japanese films had little overt connection with propaganda.Kurosawa’s Sugata Sanshir� dealt with j� jits� —and showed an American sailorabusing a rickshaw driver—but its connection with the war was marginal.71 Inthe later years of war shortages of raw film and damage to studios made all large-scale filmmaking increasingly difficult.

Beyond the world of feature films and full length documentaries the making ofshort documentary films was of considerable importance. Many shorterdocumentaries inadvertently depicted the decline in Japan’s position and thechanging mood of her war effort. At first documentaries depicted modern aspectsof the military forces, indications that Japan was a leader in various militarydevelopments. Divine Soldiers of the Skies (Sora no Shimpei) (1942) depicted thetraining of parachute units and the capture of Palembang by paratroops. But by1944 America’s superiority in air warfare was becoming clear and civil defencebecame an important theme for filmmakers with new documentaries illustratingthe effects of blast as well as how to cope with incendiaries by simple methods.72

Yet perhaps the best guide to the changing character of Japanese filmpropaganda can be seen in the weekly newsreels which were shown in allcinemas throughout the war.73 Understandably the early months of war producednewsreels of victories, but even these sequences had a distinctive mood. Oftengreat emphasis was placed on the happy reception given to Japanese troops byBurmese, Malays and Indonesians. Similarly a rapid return to law and order wasnoted. Furthermore imperial princes were often shown visiting newly conqueredterritories as if to symbolise the extension of benign imperial rule. In thetreatment of the populations of occupied lands much attention was devoted to the


economic and technical help which Japanese were bringing to these formerEuropean colonies, while at times the close racial links between Japanese andSouth-east Asians were mentioned.

From the beginning of the war newsreels, like radio talks, were used for thedirect presentation of government propaganda and this became increasinglyapparent in 1943 and 1944. The Minister of Agriculture appeared in front of thecameras to urge increased production. The Minister of Finance appealed fornational savings, but most dramatic of all was a newsreel in February 1944which urged women to emulate their American counterparts and enter factoriesto increase war production. Later there were impressive shots of women drivingtrains and working on modern assembly lines.

As on radio, the possibility of defeat was never mentioned in the cinema, butthe realities of war could not he concealed, even from the tightly censorednewsreels. As the allied blockade tightened it became increasingly difficult toobtain footage from South-East Asia and domestic items became more and moredominant. At times the apparent openness of the censors’ minds added to animpression of approaching disaster. In 1943 the miserable spectacle of studentsmarching in a rain-sodden stadium before leaving for the forces was shown on thenewsreels.74 To anyone not immersed in Japanese military values such scenescould only have depressed, not reinforced, public morale. Similarly there was noattempt to conceal Axis defeats in Western Europe, when such footage wasavailable. Mussolini’s rescue by Hitler which was a clear indication of Italianweakness appeared on every Japanese screen. The newsreels often echoed radioprogrammes as the closing months of war were depicted as the era of suicidepilots and grim austerity. In a sense propaganda had come full circle.. Thesombreness of war which had been clear in the classic feature films of the Chinaincident was. again the dominant theme in Japanese film propaganda.

From the beginning of the China incident Japanese films were deeplyinfluenced by censorship and directives of government policy. Despite this. andthe concealment of the physical horrors of war, much early propaganda conveyedthe true atmosphere of combat with its dirt, loneliness and suffering. China alsoprovided exotic scenery for films which proclaimed the ideal of Sino-Japanesefriendship, and implicitly Pan-Asian harmony. Historical films were also used torecount the vices of western imperialism and the shared interests of the peoples ofChina and Japan. Following the outbreak of war with Britain and the UnitedStates the anti-colonial message had even greater strength, and was a moreattractive theme than generalised hostility to the West. The Pacific War broughta new genre of Japanese propaganda, ‘the record of victory’. In contrast to theChina incident the Pacific War brought clear victories and the enemy was easilyidentifiable. As Japan’s series of triumphs came to an end her directorsreconstructed past victories and emphasised war production and civil defence.

Despite an overwhelming mood of seriousness Japanese film propaganda wasvaried, often professional,. and surprisingly imaginative. Like radio it rangedfrom high culture to conveying simple information and despite tight censorship


sometimes conveyed the mood of war with surprising accuracy. All Japan’s bestdirectors and actors co-operated with the wartime regime. This ensured that somepropaganda possessed an artistic quality which reflected Japan’s culturalsophistication.

Throughout the war years the Japanese government made effective use ofthese two major tools of mass media, cinema and radio, to support nationalmorale and provide essential information for its home population. The study ofthe content of this propaganda effort, as it developed in response to the changingfortunes of the war, provides important insights into the manner in which Japan’straditional values supported national unity, even as the demands of a modernstate at war were being met.

Appendix 14.1: Radio Receiving Licences (1924±1945) in Japan

Year Number of licences Rate of dissemination (%)

1924 5.45 0.1

1925 258,507 2.1

1926 361,066 3.0

1927 390,129 3.2

1928 564,603 4.7

1929 650,479 5.4

1930 778,948 6.1

1931 1,055,778 8.3

1932 1,419,722 11.1

1933 1,714,223 13.4

1934 1,979,096 15.5

1935 2,422,111 17.9

1936 2,904,823 21.4

1937 3,584,462 26.4

1938 4,165,729 29.4

1939 4,862,137 34.4

1940 5,668,031 39.2

1941 6,624,326 45,8

1942 7,051,021 48.7

1943 7,346,929 49.5

1944 7,437,655 50.4a

1945 5,728,076 39.2

Note: a, Peak year.Source: History Compilation Room, Radio and Television Culture Research Institute,

NHK History of Broadcasting in Japan. pp. 402–3 (Tokyo, 1967).


Appendix 14.2: Number of Cinemas (1930±1945) in Japan

Year Number of cinemas Year Number of cinemas

1930 1,392 1938 1,875

1931 1,449 1939 2,018

1932 1,460 1940 2,363

1933 1,498 1941 2,466a

1934 1,538 1942 2,157

1935 1,586 1943 1,986

1936 1,627 1944 1,759

1937 1,749 1945 1,237

Note: a. Peak year.Source: History Compilation Room. Radio and Television Culture Research Institute,

NHK History of Broadcasting in Japan p. 405 (Tokyo, 1967).

NOTES

Japanese names are given in the Japanese order—the family name first, followedby the given name, e.g. Kurosawa Akira.

1. Hall, John W. (1979) The Confucian teacher in Tokugawa Japan, in: Nivison.David S. & Wright, Arthur F. (eds.) Confucianism in Action, pp. 268–301 (StanfordUniversity Press).

2. Yokoyama Toshio (1978) Tourism, dandyism and occultism: the quest for nationalidentity in nineteenth century Japan, Proceedings of the British Association forJapanese Studies, Vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1–15.

3. Shively, D.H. (1968) Bakufu versus Kabuki, in: Hall, John W. & Jansen, Marius B,(eds.) Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan, pp. 231–61(Princeton University Press).

4. Altman, Albert A. (1975) Shimbunshi: the early Meiji adaptation of the Westernstyle newspaper, in: Beasley, W.G. (ed.) Modern Japan: Aspects of History,Literature and Society. pp. 52–66 (London).

5. History Compilation Room, Radio and Television Culture Research Institute,Nippon H� s� Ky� kai (ed.) 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting, p. 16 (Tokyo,1977).

6. Ibid., pp. 21–4.7. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, Public Information in

Japan, p, 31 (R and A Report No. 2362) (Washington, DC, 20 August 1945)(National Archives, Waishington, DC).

8. History Compilation Room, Radio and Television Culture Research Institute,Nippon H� s� Ky� kai (ed.) History of Broadcasting in Japan, p, 81 (Tokyo, 1967).

9. OSS, Public Information in Japan, p. 38.10. History of Broadcasting in Japan, pp.76–7.11. Ibid., p. 77.12. Ibid., p. 79.13. Nippon H� s� Ky� kai (ed,) (1977) H� s� 50-nen-shi, p. 115 (Tokyo).


14. Ibid., pp. 116 and 122.15. Ibid., p. 118.16. Ibid., pp. 125–6.17. History of Broadcasting in Japan, pp. 402–3.18. 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting, p. 86.19. Ibid., p. 87.20. Ibid., pp. 87–8.21. H� s� 50-nen-shi, p. 139.22. Ishida Takeshi (1968) Hakyoku to Heiwa (1941–1952). p. 2 (Tokyo).23. 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting, pp. 91–2.24. H� s� 50-nen-shi, p. 138.25. 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting, pp. 94–5.26. H� s� 50-nen-shi, p. 146.27. Shillony, Ben-Ami (1981) Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan p. 144 (Oxford

University Press), and H� s� 50-nen-shi, pp. 147–8.28. History of Japanese Broadcasting, pp. 402–3.29. H� s� 50-nen-shi, pp. 149–50.30. Ibid., p. 150.31. Ibid., p. 161.32. E.g. Office of Strategic Services, Transportation and Communications in Japan, p.

209 (R & A 3123) Assemblage 54 (12 May 1945) (National Archives, Washington,DC).

33. H� s� 50-nen-shi, p. 162.34. Ibid., pp. 167–8.35. Ibid., p. 162.36. Ibid., p. 161.37. Ibid., p. 164.38. Ibid., p. 166.39. 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting, p. 108.40. Ibid., p. 109.41. H� s� 50-nen-shi, p. 172.42. Ibid., pp. 168–70, 175–8. 43. Ibid., pp. 178–9.44. The background to the surrender is described in Butow, Robert, J.C. (1954)

Japan’s Decision to Surrender (Stanford University Press). The text of theEmperor’s broadcast is reproduced on p. 248.

45. H� s� 50-nen-shi, pp. 195–7.46. Anderson, Joseph L. & Richie, Donald (1959) The Japanese Film Art and Industry.

p. 22 (Tokyo and Rutland, Vermont). The most detailed account of the origins ofthe Japanese cinema in Tanaka Junichir� (1975) Nihon Eiga Hattatsu-shi, Vol. 1(Tokyo).

47. Kinema Junposha (1976) Niho Eiga Shi, pp. 16–17 and 38–9 (Tokyo).48. Yamamoto Fumio (1970) Nihon Masu Komyunikeeshon-shi, p. 193 (Tokyo).49. Nihon Eiga Shi, p. 78.50. A copy of this film is available in the Motion Picture Division of the National

Archives, Washington, DC.51. The International Cinema Association of Japan (ed.) (1938) Cinema Year Book. of

Japan 1938, p. 15 (Tokyo).


52. Nikkatsu Film Company. (A copy of this film is held in the Film Centre of theNational Museum of Modern Art (Kindai Bijutsukan) (Tokyo).

53. Nikkatsu Film Company (held in the Film Centre, Museum of Modern Art Tokyo).Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, Japanese Films, aPhase of Psychological Warfare. p. 12 (Report 1307) (Washington, DC, 30 March1944) (National Archives, Washington, DC).

54. Ibid., p. 6.55. T� h� Film Company (available in the Museum of Modern Art, Tokyo).56. Japanese Films, a Phase of Psychological Warfare, p. 15.57. T� h� (Museum of Modern Art, Tokyo).58. Tanaka Junichiro (1975) Nihon Eiga Hattatsu-shi, Vol. 3, pp. 13–15 (Tokyo).59. For the sudden fall of film imports in 1937 see Cinema Yearbook of Japan 1938, p.

53,60. Nihon Masu Komyunikeeshon-shi, p. 218.61. Ibid., pp. 217–18.62. (Motion Picture Division, National Archives, Washington, DC).63. Nippon Eigasha, 1942 (Imperial War Museum, London).64. Daiei, 1943, dir. Marune Santar� .65. Ahen Sens� (T� h� , 1943, dir. Makino Masahiro) and Jingisukan (Daiei, 1943, dir.

Matsuda Sadaji) (Museum of Modern Art, Tokyo).66. K� a, 1941–2 (Museum of Modern Art, Tokyo).67. E.g. Singap� ru no S� k� geki (Daiei, 1943, dir. Shima K� ji).68. T� h� , 1942 (Imperial War Museum, London).69. Sat� Tadao (1970), Nihon Eiga-shi, pp. 246–247 (Tokyo).70. T� h� (Museum of Modern Art, Tokyo).71. T� h� , 1943 (Museum of Modern Art. Toyko).72. Nippon Eigasha see Nihon Eiga-shi. pp. 97–8 and Sat� Tadao (1977) Nihon Kiroku

Eigaz� -shi, pp. 115–17 (Tokyo).73. For a brief analysis of Japanese newsreels see Daniels, Gordon (1981) Tradition

and modernity in Japanese film propaganda, Nippon Ny� su 1940–1945, in:O’Neill, P.G. (ed.) Tradition and Modern Japan, pp. 151–5 (Tenterden, Kent).

74. Newsreel Issue 177 (27 October 1943) see Mainichi Shimbunsha (ed.) (1977)Nippon Ny� su Eigashi, p. 345 (Tokyo).


First published in J.C.Binfield & John Stevenson (eds), Sport,

Culture, and Politics, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993, pp. 168–187

48Japanese Sport: From Heian Kyo to Tokyo

Olympiad

ALTHOUGH Japanese archaeologists have excavated stone tools and potterywhich are more than 10,000 years old no written accounts of Japanese life werecompiled before the first century. At that time Chinese chroniclers recordedmany features of Japanese society, but their writings reveal little of activitieswhich could be defined as ‘recreation’ or ‘sport’.1 Some six centuries later Chinesetravellers began to describe common Japanese pastimes and emphasised themany similarities which linked them to Chinese forms of popular entertainment.The History of the Sui Dynasty, which was edited between 629 and 636, states:

On the first day of the first month it is customary for them to have archerycontests, and to play games and drink liquor; their other festivals are ingeneral identical with those of the Chinese. They like chess, betting,juggling and dice games.2

As this quotation suggests, by the seventh century Japan was already the willingrecipient of many Chinese cultural influences. Buddhism, Confucian models ofgovernment and the Chinese writing system all enabled the embryonic Japanesecourt to rule more widely and effectively. Japanese rulers also emulated theT’ang government by compiling dynastic chronicles to confirm their legitimacyand power. The second such official history, the Nihon Shoki, was completed in720 and used myth, fact and legend to assert the divine origins of the imperialhousehold. Despite its more grandiose purposes this work also recounts incidentswhich reveal something of early Japanese sporting history. More specifically, itsaccount of events in 355 describes the introduction of hawking from the Koreankingdom of Paekche. According to this narrative a Korean visitor, Lord Chyu,explained the use of hawks for hunting and was given a falcon ‘to be fed andtamed’. After taming the bird he ‘fastened to its leg a soft leather strap andattached to its tail a small bell, then placing it on his forearm…presented it to theEmperor’. When the Emperor Nintoku went hunting this falcon is said to have‘speedily caught several tens of pheasants’.3

Hawking was not the only aristocratic sport which Chinese and Koreansbrought to the Japanese court.4 By 794 when the imperial capital was establishedat Heian Ky� (modern Kyoto) a Chinese form of polo, daky� , was being played

by members of the emperor’s entourage. This game was played by two teams ofseven horsemen who used long-handled racquets to strike coloured balls througha hole in an eight foot high screen.5 Another Chinese sport which was played byJapanese courtiers was kemari, a form of slow football which had beenintroduced in the seventh century. According to Ivan Morris this was ‘the mostpopular outdoor pastime for Heian gentlemen’ and was played by eight menarranged in a circle.6 The players ‘kicked a leather ball among each other, the aimbeing to prevent it from touching the ground’. One contemporary source claimsthat the Emperor Daigo once watched a game in which the ball was passed 265times before it touched the ground. Heian scholars and statesmen were alsodevotees of Chinese civil archery which placed great emphasis upon form,etiquette and correct demeanour.7 In contrast court ladies spent much timecloistered indoors; but at the appropriate season they would watch boat races, orroll huge snowballs in palace gardens.8

Besides the obvious pleasure and excitement which courtiers derived fromthese varied pursuits, sports or sports-like activities often possessed a religious orceremonial significance. One historian has suggested that players of kemari wereacting out a ‘sense of universal order and harmony’, while wrestling (sum� )developed a ceremonial as well as a sporting function in court life.9 Wrestlinghad long been a major element in local village festivals, but in the seventhcentury it was introduced into the imperial palace, and by 821 had become thecentre of important ceremonials. Every year palace officials recruited strong menfrom the provinces to wrestle during the celebration of Tanabata, the festival ofthe Weaver Star. Spectators at these contests were limited to the emperor and hisfollowers, and bouts were followed by Chinese court music and dancing.10

Sport and ritual were also combined in the annual horse races, kurabeuma, atthe palace and the nearby Kamigamo shrine. According to one authority, ‘Horseswere believed to be the steeds of the gods, and so horse racing…was intended asa means-of divining the intent of the gods’.11 These ritual races were often watchedby a wide variety of people and were copied at many provincial shrines andfestivals. In hundreds of Japanese communities boat races and wrestling matcheswere organized each year to please the gods and increase the prospects ofsuccessful farming and fishing. However, these festivities were also sources ofcollective pleasure and excitement, and it is difficult to determine whenenjoyment rather than the supernatural became the main focus of these events.

The next major phase in Japan’s political and sporting development was theemergence of the samurai, or warrior class, as the decisive element in society. Bythe twelfth century, the imperial court had lost much of its authority and in 1185the first military ruler, or sh� gun, was appointed. These new rulers soondemonstrated their ambition and authority by adopting imperial sports andrituals, and transferring them to new settings. From 1174 wrestling no longer hada place in palace festivities but the first sh� gun Minamoto Yoritomo (1147–1199)commissioned wrestlers to perform at the shrine of the war god, Hachiman, nearhis capital at Kamakura.12 In the previous century exhibitions of mounted


archery, yabusame, had been presented before retired emperors but Yoritomoalso incorporated these displays into the festivals of the Hachiman shrine.13 Inthe past some archers whose arrows had failed to strike the target had beencompelled to commit ritual suicide; however, Yoritomo made this an unlikelyeventuality by drastically enlarging the targets and their floral frames.

By the early thirteenth century leading warriors had also developed adistinctive form of equestrian archery which bore no resemblance to earlierceremonial marksmanship. In 1222 dog-shooting, with blunted arrows, wasofficially recognized as a samurai pursuit and flourished until the late sixteenthcentury.14 Dog-shooting contests provided informal training for battle and thechase, and some screen paintings suggest that it also became a spectator sport. Atleast one screen shows crowds of women, children and retainers watching a ringof marksmen prepare to shoot a diminutive hound.15

In this era of military rule and civil war sport-like activities were increasinglyrefined for combat rather than ceremony or pleasure. From the twelfth centurysum� became a form of samurai training which was encouraged and sponsoredby warrior chiefs. Perhaps this novel tendency reached its climax in the turmoilof the late sixteenth century when the great warlord Oda Nobunaga (1534–82)organized spectacular wrestling contests at his castle by Lake Biwa. Despite alloutward appearances these championships were not primarily designed asentertainments, for successful wrestlers were given official positions and maderesponsible for training samurai in unarmed combat. 16

Japan’s centuries of political violence and civil war were finally ended inSeptember 1600 when Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542–1616) won the decisive Battle ofSekigahara. Three years later Ieyasu was appointed sh� gun and soon establisheda political system which survived, largely unchanged, until 1868. The resilienceof the Tokugawa system was in part the product of military supremacy but it wasalso the result of skilful measures of social and ideological control. The newpolitical order was based upon a modified form of Confucian morality andprescribed a clear hierarchy of four social strata: warriors, farmers, craftsmen andmerchants.17 Mobility between these classes was virtually forbidden, anddetailed laws controlled the dress, food, housing and entertainments which werepermitted to a given social group.18 The shogunate’s greatest concern was tomaintain the dignity and status of the samurai by encouraging their pursuit ofmilitary arts, and denying participation in these activities to other classes.19 Thusthroughout the centuries of Tokugawa peace samurai continued to study a widevariety of martial skills which were taught by thousands of local instructors.Swordsmanship, sword-drawing, unarmed combat, spear fighting, archery,horsemanship and swimming were transmitted from one generation of warriorsto another; but in the absence of serious warfare martial training often became aspecies of mental conditioning which strengthened the self-confidence and poiseof the samurai class.20

Within the samurai elite warriors of high status enjoyed sport-like activitieswhich were the exclusive preserve of their class. Tokugawa Ieyasu and many

JAPANESE SPORT: FROM HEIAN KYO TO TOKYO OLYMPIAD 479

provincial lords became devotees of hawking while others led hunts whichstrengthened military or quasi-military skills.21 On some occasions lordsemployed vast crowds of beaters to drive deer, boar and rabbits towards huntersarranged in battlefield order.22

The complex regulations of the Tokugawa government notwithstanding,economic growth and urbanization brought changes to society which could neverhave been anticipated by the first sh� gun.23 Vast new cities such as Edo (modernTokyo), Osaka and Kyoto contained rich, pleasure-loving merchants whoconstituted a market for mass entertainment. These dramatic social changesencouraged the rise of sum� as a spectator sport. In many respects the emergenceof this new form of sum� challenged the fundamental assumptions of theshogunate, for its officials saw wrestling as a military art, a samurai preserve,which had no place in the world of popular entertainment.

Despite these official attitudes non-samurai sum� spread rapidly in theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In many towns and villages itinerantwrestlers of indeterminate class performed by the roadside, and at timeschallenged members of the crowd to wrestle with them.24 Such activities not onlyviolated government policy but provoked the Tokugawa authorities to issuedecrees which sought to eliminate this popular sport. In 1648, 1687, 1694, 1703,1717, 1719 and 1720 ‘street corner’ wrestling was formally banned, but thefrequency of such decrees demonstrated their impotence.25 Even worse, what hadbegun as a village amusement soon intruded into the sh� gun’s capital. Finally,the failure of official prohibition led to administrative compromise. Thisnormally took the form of permitting wrestling matches on the nominal groundthat the proceeds would be devoted to religious or charitable purposes.Nevertheless as late as 1743 official unease remained profound and theauthorities re-issued a decree which stated, ‘Commoners are employing wrestlersand holding displays in various quarters of the city…this is inappropriate forcommoners…and it must henceforth come to an end’.26

As before this decree proved ineffective, and new patterns of samuraibehaviour soon led to sum� ’s acceptance as a respectable form of entertainment.First, considerable numbers of feudal lords began to subsidize and patronizechampion wrestlers. In return these sportsmen wore the arms of their patrons ontheir clothing. Of even greater importance were links which were forged betweensum� promoters and one particularly significant family. In the late eighteenthcentury a line of hereditary Shinto priests, the Yoshida Oikaze house ofKumamoto, appears to have provided sum� promoters with help and advice inelevating the prestige of their sport in official circles. In the main this processrequired the addition of ‘traditional’ or quasi-religious elements to wrestlingmatches, and the lobbying of Tokugawa officials by the Yoshida family.27 Nowbouts were to be preceded by a series of ritual posturings and exhibitions ofstrength which recalled the court wrestling of the eighth and ninth centuries.28

The wrestlers’ aprons were to be decorated with the stylized paper hangingsassociated with Shinto ceremonial, and a title and rank of overall champion,


yokozuna, was to be instituted. Further elements of religious ceremonial were tobe added to particularly important contests. These included blessing the wrestlingring with a sacred bough.

These new ‘traditional’ developments added greatly to the prestige ofprofessional sum� and contributed to an event which demonstrated its superiorityover all other forms of popular entertainment. By 1791 the sh� gun TokugawaIenari was so impressed by sum� ’s religious trappings that he agreed to watch aseries of exhibition bouts at Edo Castle. The sh� gun watched further exhibitionsof sum� in 1794, 1802, 1823 and 1830, and his successor Ieyoshi followed thoseprecedents in 1843 and 1849. As a result sum� acquired unprecedented prestigeand a considerable intellectual following. Even more remarkable was its newdesignation as a kokugi, ‘national skill’ or ‘national sport’, which gave it a quasi-political significance. When the American envoy Commodore Perry visitedJapan in March 1854 to demand formal diplomatic relations the Tokugawaauthorities provided cultural displays which included demonstrations of weight-lifting and wrestling by 25 sum� champions.29 American sailors were hardlyimpressed by these inelegant performances but it is clear that sum� was now soprestigious that it was thought an appropriate appendage to internationaldiplomacy. Yet for all its newly-acquired status and patriotic symbolismnineteenth-century sum� had its roots in a rough and ready commercial sportwhich had little connection with official policy. More than anything else its neweminence symbolized the gradual decline of the sh� gun’s political and moralauthority.

Commodore Perry’s diplomatic overtures finally culminated in the signing ofJapan’s first modern treaty with a Western power. This was followed by furthertreaties and the opening of new ports for foreign trade and settlement. Theserapid political and economic changes now exposed Japan to new tides ofWestern influence and further undermined the authority of the sh� gun’sadministration.

In January 1868 patriotic warriors from southwestern Japan captured theimperial palace and soon defeated the sh� gun’s forces in battle. Within a year theshogunate had been destroyed and a new imperial government began aprogramme of modernization which was designed to protect Japan’s territory,culture and national independence.

Overwhelmed by a sense of national crisis and a Confucian contempt forleisure, it is hardly surprising that Japan’s new rulers had little place for sport intheir policies of modernization.30 Even their initial plan for national education,,the Education Code of 1872, ‘made no mention of physical fitness’ and ignoredphysical education in its guidelines for secondary schools.31 In fact theseomissions were so marked that foreign teachers who were employed to teachacademic subjects criticized the unbalanced nature of the new curriculum. It waslargely in response to these Western complaints that, in 1878, the governmentestablished a Gymnastics Institute ‘to train physical education instructors…forprimary schools’. The first head of the new Institute was George A.Leland, a


graduate of the Department of Hygiene and Physical Education at AmherstCollege in Massachusetts.32 Leland sought the development of physicaleducation in Japanese schools, but within narrowly prescribed limits. Like manyother Westerners he believed that the Japanese were physiologically too delicateand lightly built for heavy exercise or sports, and recommended bean bags andhoops as the most suitable equipment for Japanese primary schools.33

Despite Leland’s restricted views of Japanese potentialities, other Westernersand Japanese soon sought to introduce more robust sports to different sectors ofJapanese society. Americans who had been invited to teach English and sciencein Japan’s new universities and higher schools were often perturbed by the lackof sporting activity in these institutions, and Japanese who had studied abroaddeveloped a spontaneous enthusiasm for Western sports.34 Perhaps the mostimportant product of these new attitudes was the establishment of at least tenbaseball teams in major schools and colleges in the 1890s. Among these easilythe most successful was that which represented the elite First Higher School(Ichik� ) in Tokyo.35 Students at this distinguished institution not only came todominate the current world of Japanese baseball but regarded this new sport assomething requiring the effort, discipline and training associated with traditionalmartial arts. At a time when many Japanese wished to challenge the power of theWest, patriotic students saw the mastery of this Western sport as a significantstep in Japan’s struggle for international recognition. Thus in 1891 the FirstHigher School challenged the most obvious symbol of Western sportingprowess, the Yokohama Athletic Club in the port’s foreign settlements.36

For more than five years the American-dominated YAC rejected the Japanesechallenge, believing that the Ichik� team was too inferior to provide respectableopposition. Finally, in 1896, the Yokohama Club relented and agreed to a matchwith the Japanese students. When the teams met on 23 May the First HigherSchool triumphed by the remarkable margin of 29 to 4.37 In a series of ninesubsequent games between 1896 and 1903 the Japanese enjoyed eight victoriesand the Americans one, the total scores being 230 to 64. Superficially thesegames may appear to demonstrate nothing more than Japanese skill in acquiringforeign sporting techniques, but the Ichik� victories had a broader politicalsignificance. Not only had these successes been won against Western opposition,but baseball was known to be America’s national sport. Both Ichik� students andthe Japanese public responded to these baseball triumphs with deep patrioticemotion. One student wrote, ‘The aggressive character of our national spirit is awell established fact, demonstrated first by the Sino-Japanese War and now byour great victories at baseball’. Another commentator, a provincial schoolteacher, declared that Ichik� ’s successes were ‘an augury of our nation’s victoryover the entire world’.38

Although the First Higher School had achieved Japan’s first internationalsporting success its central role in Japanese baseball was relatively short-lived.Soon Japan’s major private universities, Kei� and Waseda, became pre-eminentand their prestige was apparent in 1905 when Waseda sent a team to tour the


United States. This was the first instance of a Japanese sports team visiting aWestern country.

Although baseball was the first modern sport to arouse patriotic emotionit was not the only Western sport to be adopted by Japan’s student elite. BothBritish and American teachers and missionaries saw track and field sports asactivities with moral and spiritual value and encouraged young Japanese toinclude them in inter-college contests. That youthful enthusiasm overcamematerial difficulties is clear from the following account of athletic competitionsin the 1880s:

The apparel of the competitors was by no means stereotyped. Some cameout in long trousers, others in shorts. What they wore above was accordingto taste, while the footwear was varied, some turning out in military boots,others in tabi [Japanese socks] and many barefooted. As for the barefootsprinters, to prevent slipping on wet fields they used to tie bits of straw tothe big toes. Starting was of the standing variety, the crouching start notbeing known…in those days.40

However, by the turn of the century university students were wearing spikedshoes and strict Western training was the order of the day. This combination ofdiscipline and commitment produced its first impressive results in 1900 whenFujii Minoru of Tokyo Imperial University ran the hundred yards in elevenseconds and achieved a height of 3.424m in the pole vault; this at a time whenthe world record stood at 3.427m.41

If the acceptance of Western sports represented the most important theme innineteenth-century Japanese sporting history, the reform of traditional sportsconstituted a further significant development. In the first decades ofWesternization, when the traditional mores of the samurai had been under attack,much of the warrior inheritance had been half-forgotten. Yet by the final years ofthe century Western notions of sport as a source of health, strength and disciplinehad fused with samurai skills to produce new martial arts for a broad public. Themost significant, although not the only, figure in this movement was Kan� Jigor�(1860–1938) a Principal of the Tokyo Higher Normal School.42 Kan� perceivedthe broad educational, physical and psychological value of a standardized formof unarmed combat, and on this basis developed modern K� d� kan judo.43 By thebeginning of the twentieth century not only was Kan� a nationally-known figurebut judo was being presented to the West as a symbol of Japan’s spiritualstrength and self-discipline.44

The final years of the nineteenth century also saw a sudden revival of Japan’smost distinctive spectator sport, sum� . Like much else that was associated withthe Tokugawa period, sum� had lost favour in the first fast tide ofWesternization. However, by the 1890s cultural nationalism was again in vogueand sum� ’s status as a distinctly Japanese sport brought it a new audience andrenewed popularity. The patriotic fervour which accompanied Japan’s military


victory over China in 1895 gave particular impetus to the revival of sum� as asource of national pride and excitement.45 Japan’s triumph over China provideddramatic evidence of the success of its policies of modernization. Seven yearslater its rising prestige was again apparent when London joined Tokyo in signingthe Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In 1905 Japan’s victory over czarist Russia finallyconfirmed its position as one of the major powers of the new century.

Along with these military and diplomatic successes Japan sought to achieveinternational prestige by participating in a wide variety of international sportingactivities. When the founder of the Olympic movement, Baron de Coubertin,sought to encourage Far Eastern participation in the modern Olympics henaturally turned to Japan as the most modern and assertive state in the region. Inthe spring of 1909 de Coubertin contacted the French Embassy in Tokyo, and theFrench ambassador passed on a letter to Kan� Jigor� . The Japanese ForeignMinistry supported Kan� ’s candidacy for membership of the InternationalOlympic Committee and he was unanimously elected at the Committee’sFourteenth Session.46 As a direct result of Kan� ’s activities the Japanese AmateurAthletic Association was established in 1911 to liaise with the InternationalOlympic Committee. This new association organized Japan’s first Olympictrials, and two athletes were selected to participate in the Stockholm Olympics of1912.47 In the years following the First World War Japan’s participation in themodern Olympics expanded rapidly, and in 1932 131 athletes, including 16women, represented Japan at the Los Angeles Games. By this time Japanesecompetitors had gained medals in four Games, and at Los Angeles Japanese maleswimmers won every event except the 400m.48 Japan’s rising prestige in theinternational Olympic movement was again confirmed when the InternationalOlympic Committee voted to hold the 1940 Olympiad in Tokyo. In the followingyear the IOC decided to hold the Fifth Winter Olympics in Sapporo, theprincipal city in Hokkaido.49

Although Japan’s participation in the pre-war Olympics was its most publiccontribution to international sport it was no more than a small part of itsinternational sporting endeavour. In 1912 an American, Franklin Brown,suggested that Japan, China and the Philippines should jointly organize a FarEastern Games and in the following year the first such event was held atManila.50 These triangular competitions were held regularly until 1934, whenSino-Japanese tension made the mounting of such championships impossible. Inthese games, as in the Olympics, Japan gained increasing successes in a widevariety of track, field and swimming events.

In addition to participating in these multilateral contests Japanese sportsmentook part in an increasing number of bilateral tours and exchanges. Collegebaseball teams frequently played on American campuses. Rugby teams touredCanada and Australia and swimming internationals against the United Stateswere held in Hawaii.51

As in the nineteenth century much international sporting activity remainedfocused upon colleges and universities, but by the First World War the rise of


large Japanese companies led to new patterns of participation in internationalsport. In 1917 one of Japan’s major tennis stars, Kumagae Ichiya, joined theMitsubishi Corporation which enabled him to play in the United States. In thesame year Shimadzu Zenz� won the Bengal tennis championship with thefinancial support of the Mitsui Bussan Corporation.52

The role of private companies in encouraging sport was not limited tosupporting a small number of distinguished stars. Many firms sought to promotecompany solidarity and prestige by .establishing employee teams which joinedinter-firm leagues and competitions. The development of rugby outside theuniversity sector was largely the product of company initiatives and by 1935there were some 320 such teams in the Osaka and Tokyo areas.53

A further important relationship between business and sport was evident innewspaper sponsorship of major competitions and events. In 1915 the OsakaAsahi newspaper established an Annual Middle School Baseball Championshipand nine years later the Mainichi newspaper created a National Invitational MiddleSchool Championship.54 These competitions not only promoted the sale ofnewspapers but became classic events in the Japanese sporting calendar. Eventoday these championships command nationwide interest and attention. In 1934the Yomiuri newspaper initiated further events which led to the beginnings ofJapanese professional baseball. Shoriki Matsutar� , the head of this majornewspaper company, invited a team of American professionals to tour Japan,which in turn prompted the selection of a Japanese national team to challengethem.55 This group of distinguished amateurs became the Dai Nippon BaseballClub—Japan’s first professional side.56 Two years later Japan’s first professionalleague was formed, the antecedent of pre-war and post-war professionalcompetitions.

Radio also helped to stimulate the sporting and athletic interests of theJapanese people. In 1925 Japan’s national radio network (NHK) beganbroadcasting important baseball matches, and two years later radio callisthenicsbecame a regular feature of its programme schedule.57

In the interwar years the growth of a new urban middle class and the furtherexpansion of Japan’s railway networks combined to open more and moremountain areas to summer and winter sporting activity. Mountaineeringremained a minority pastime, but hiking flourished, and skiing sustained a highlyefficient tourist industry. In 1932 one observer noted,

During the winter the railways run special excursions to suitable localities…and every country railway station is plastered with posters depictingskiers speeding down snow-clad slopes. It has also become a favouritesubject with advertisers during the winter—purveyors of sports goods,clothing, face cream and what-not seeking to impress by the up-to-datedness of their appeal.58


Japan’s rapid economic progress also enabled public and private organizations tocreate major new sporting facilities in Tokyo and the Osaka area. In 1924 majorathletic facilities were constructed in the Outer Gardens of the Meiji Shrine, andimportant baseball stadiums were built at Korakuen and Nishinomiya. All thesedevelopments stimulated the mass enjoyment of a wide variety of spectatorsports.

Although the 1920s and early 1930s saw advances in many aspects of Japan’seconomic and sporting life the effects of the great depression and the rise ofChinese nationalism created widespread fears regarding the security of Japan’seconomic and strategic interests on the Asian continent. These anxietiesculminated in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the rapiddeterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. In July 1937 these tensions exploded inundeclared war, and by December Japanese forces had occupied the Chinesecapital, Nanking. Despite rapid Japanese conquests Chinese resistance provedsurprisingly effective and the so-called ‘China Incident’ expanded into a vastwar of attrition. Faced with this exhausting conflict the Japanese governmentsought to mobilize every sector of society to support the war. A central theme ofthis policy was ‘spiritual’, or psychological, mobilization, and within this, sportand other forms of physical training were important elements.59

By late 1937 Japanese sporting activities were increasingly centralized andcontrolled by a completely new agency, the National Recreation Association(NRA).60 This new body was closely modelled on Nazi and Fascist recreationorganizations and sought to encourage physical fitness, patriotism and thecreation of an effective workforce. The NRA not only encouraged a wide varietyof existing sports but sought to redefine their purpose and develop completelynew ‘national defence sports’. Now cycling was not seen simply as a useful aidto physical fitness but also as an activity of great military value. A contributor tothe NRA’s journal claimed, ‘The bicycle runs lightly without the noise of anengine. The bicycle thus is a very useful vehicle for military patrol and is themost reliable vehicle under a state of emergency, especially if all transportsystems would be destroyed by an air raid’.61 Similarly the NRA saw the 100msprint as ‘helpful in making a dash at the enemy on the battle front or to providequick action in the work place’.62

More striking than re-assessments of existing sports was the development of awhole range of ‘national defence’ athletic events in 1937 and 1938. Theseformed central elements in major athletic tournaments and were also designed todestroy the ‘liberal ideology’ of earlier sports.63 In gatherings such as the Kant�Games of 1938 participants wore military uniforms and dragged sandbags inteams, dodged complex obstacles and participated in mock bayonet combat.64

The link between athletics and national policy was also evident in the institutionof the Physical Strength Examination Medal in 1939. The Physical StrengthExamination was a compulsory element in the physical education and evaluationof all males between the ages of 15 and 25 and included formal tests in the 100mand 2000m, the long jump, carrying 40 kilograms for 100m, throwing hand


grenades and chin exercises.65 Graded standards were set for the award of themedal.

Ideology was as important as this quasi-military training in wartime policiestowards sport. This was most evident in the creation of a new Japanesevocabulary to replace the English-language terminology of many Western sports.It was not simply that the names of sports such as ‘golf’ were replaced by Japanesewords; many baseball terms which had entered everyday Japanese speech wereabandoned in favour of highly formalized Japanese equivalents.66

The protracted ‘China Incident’ and the Second World War brought manyrestrictions to Japan’s patterns of international sporting contact. In 1937 fears thatthe China conflict might lead to a sporting boycott led to the abandonment ofpreparations for the Tokyo Olympics. Plans for the Sapporo Winter Olympicswere also shelved.67 Yet even after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor someinternational events were still possible—within Tokyo’s new Asian empire. Nowstudents from the occupied territories of the ‘Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere’ appeared at the Annual Athletic Games at the Meiji Shrine Stadium—symbolizing the strength and vitality of supposedly liberated peoples. InNovember 1943 Filipino students demonstrated ‘youth callisthenics’ at this eventand students from Annam in Indo-China also participated.68 The use of sport topromote the solidarity of Japan’s new empire was also evident in the provision.of gymnasia and basketball facilities in residences specially built for overseasstudents.69

Despite the patriotic and military roles which sports fulfilled in wartimeJapan, Tokyo’s declining fortunes slowly undermined much sporting activity.Shortage of transport facilities made nationwide events difficult to stage andlabour shortages became so acute that sport was virtually removed from mostschool timetables. These same factors brought the end of professional baseball in1944 and scrap metal drives led to the removal of iron seats from several majorstadiums.70 In 1945 American air raids inflicted yet further damage on importantsports facilities.

Japan’s defeat in August 1945 abruptly ended the regime of militaristic sportsactivity which had prevailed since 1937. In part this change stemmed from thedeclining prestige of the military in Japanese society but it was also the productof deliberate policies of democratization pursued by the occupying Americanarmy.71 These policies attacked all manifestations of military culture, includingtraditional and modern martial arts.

However, in an atmosphere of post-war depression and confusion, sport wassoon to acquire a new constructive imagery and significance. Now peacetimesports came to symbolize a civilian world in which youthful energy would be asignificant asset. This new vision of sport was, in part, promoted by the NationalRecreation Association which turned its attention to peaceful objectives. TheNRA now organized an annual National Games, the first, in 1946, being held—symbolically—in the old imperial capital of Kyoto, the only city to have escapedserious bombing during the war.72


As Japan’s economy recovered from wartime destruction large corporations re-emerged as major patrons of Japanese sport. By 1949 two professional baseballleagues had been established which were dominated by teams sponsored byprivate companies.73 The Yomiuri Giants continued the Yomiuri newspaper’slong historical connection with the development of Japanese baseball.

In addition to aiding Japan’s social reconstruction, sport contributed to therevival of her international prestige. In the early post-war years Japan wasexcluded from most international sporting organizations but by 1951, the year ofthe San Francisco Peace Treaty, she had been readmitted to many sportingbodies.74 In 1952 Japan returned to Olympic competition at Helsinki, and fiveyears later hosted the International Student Games in Tokyo. In 1958 the AsianGames, which had replaced the pre-war Far Eastern Games, were also held in theJapanese capital. Finally, in 1964, Tokyo provided the site of the 18th modernOlympiad.75 The efficient organization of the Olympiad, the construction ofimpressive new pools and stadiums and the acceptance of judo as an Olympicevent all contributed to Japan’s new reputation as a modern progressive powerwhose own sporting traditions merited international recognition.

Perhaps two major themes have dominated the complex pattern ofJapan’s sporting history. First, from the beginning of organized society in Japanpolitical and economic leaders have augmented their prestige and power bysupporting a succession of sporting styles, fashions and practices. Imperialcourtiers, medieval warriors, the rising merchant class, the Westernized elite ofthe nineteenth century and modern companies have all demonstrated their statusby importing, inventing and re-shaping major forms of sport, training andphysical exercise.76 Secondly, sport has played a vital if intermittent role inJapan’s long struggle for international recognition. Early emperors adoptedChinese pursuits to signify their civilization and significance, and nineteenth-andtwentieth-century leaders saw success in Western sports as a pathway towardsinternational dignity. This complex process reached its climax in the TokyoOlympics of 1964 which brought Japan a reputation for internationalism andmodernity without precedent in her recorded history.

NOTES

1. For a brief survey of eariy Chinese writing on Japan see Kodansha Encyclopedia ofJapan, I (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983), pp. 280–81.

2. Ryusaku Tsunoda and L.Carrington Goodrich (eds.), Japan in the ChineseDynastic Histories: Later Han Through Ming Dynasties (Kyoto: Perkins OrientalBooks, 1968), p. 39.

3. W.G.Aston (trans.), Nihongi: Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to AD697 (Rutland, VT and Tokyo: Charles E.Tuttle, 1972), p. 294.

4. For some impressive early poetry on the theme of hawking see Nippon GakujutsuShink� kai (translators), The Many� sh� (New York: Columbia University Press,1965), pp. 147–49, 161.


5. For daky� see Kokushi Daijiten Hensh� Iinkai (ed.), Kokushi Daijiten, IX (Tokyo:Yoshikawa Ky� bunkan, 1988), p. 101; B.H.Chamberlain, Things Japanese(London: John Murray, 1905), pp. 384–88; and I.Morris, The World of the ShiningPrince: Court Life in Ancient Japan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 165.

6. Morris, The World of the Shining Prince, p. 164.7. Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, IV, p. 340; B.Smith (ed.), Japan: A History in

Art (Tokyo: Gemini Smith, 1979), pp. 68–69.8. I.Morris, The World of the Shining Prince, p. 165.9. W.R.May, ‘Sports’, in R.G.Powers and H.Kato (eds.), Handbook of Japanese

Popular Culture (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p, 170.10. H.Bolitho, ‘Sum� and Popular Culture: The Tokugawa Period’, in G McCormack

and Yoshio Sugimoto (eds.), The Japanese Trajectory: Modernization and Beyond(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 19–20. For an excellent briefillustrated outline of sum� ’s historical development see the plates and commentaryin Kokushi Daijiten, VIII, pp. 156–57.

11. M.Yoshida, I.Tanaka and T.Sesoko (eds.), Asobi: The Sensibilities at Play(Hiroshima: Mazda Motor Corporation, 1987), p. 40.

12. Kokushi Daijiten, VIII, commentary between pp. 156–57.13. Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, VIII, p. 283.14. Kokushi Daijiten, I, p. 745; L.Frédéric, Daily Life in Japan at the Time of the

Samurai, 1185–1603 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. 174–75.15. Smith, Japan: A History in Art, pp. 162–63.16. Kokushi Daijiten, VIII, commentary between pp. 156–57; Bolitho, ‘Sum� and

Popular Culture’, p. 20.17. For a useful survey of social conditions in the Tokugawa period see C.J.Dunn,

Everyday Life in Traditional Japan (London: Batsford, 1969). 18. For restrictions on the theatre see D.H.Shively, ‘Bakufu versus Kabuki’, in

J.W.Hall and M.B.Jansen (eds.), Studies in the Institutional History of EarlyModern Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 131–61.

19. See Ryusaku Tsunoda, W.T.de Bary and D. Keene (eds.), Sources of JapaneseTradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 335–38, and Dunn,Everyday Life in Traditional Japan, pp. 35–37.

20. Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, V, pp. 118–19; Japan National TouristOrganization, Japan: The New Official Guide (Tokyo: Japan Travel Bureau, 1975),p. 304.

21. E.g. C.Totman, Tokugawa Ieyasu, Shogun (San Francisco: Heian International,1983), p. 97; Kokushi Daijiten, IX, pp. 9–10, and illustrations and commentarybetween pp. 12 and 13; Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, II, p. 241.

22. Dunn, Everyday Life in Traditional Japan, p. 37; Smith, Japan: A History in Art,pp. 214–15.

23. For urban growth in the Tokugawa period see G.B.Sansom, A History of Japan:1615–1867 (London: Cresset Press, 1964), pp. 110–19.

24. Bolitho, ‘Sum� and Popular Culture’, p. 22.25. ‘Sum� and Popular Culture’, p. 23.26. ‘Sum� and Popular Culture’, pp. 23–24.27. ‘Sum� and Popular Culture’, p. 27.28. ‘Sum� and Popular Culture’, p. 28.


29. Bolitho, ‘Sum� and Popular Culture’, p. 28, and G.B.Sansom, The Western Worldand Japan: A Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures (London:Cresset Press, 1950), pp. 279–80.

30. For a discussion of Confucian influences on attitudes to Western sports seeShirahata Y� zabur� , ‘Asobi o Sento ya Umarekemu-Kindai no Sp� tsu to Nihonjinno Shintaikan Joron’, Nihon Kenky� 1 (1989), pp. 175–88.

31. D.Roden, ‘Baseball and the Quest for National Dignity in Meiji Japan’, AmericanHistorial Review 85.3 (1980), p. 514.

32. Roden, ‘Baseball’, p. 515.33. ‘Baseball’, p. 515.34. ‘Baseball’, pp. 518–19.35. ‘Baseball’, p. 520.36. ‘Baseball’, p. 521.37. ‘Baseball’, p. 524.38. ‘Baseball’, p. 530.39. N.K.Roscoe, ‘The Development of Sport in Japan’, Japan Society of London,

Transactions and Proceedings 30 (1932–33), p. 64.40. Roscoe, ‘The Development of Sport’, p. 55.41. ‘The Development of Sport’, pp. 55–56.42. For Kan� ’s career see Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, IV, p. 147, and Kokushi

Daijiten, III, p. 490.43. Kodansha Encylopedia of Japan, IV, p. 82.44. In the early twentieth century lectures in London on such subjects as ‘Japanese

Loyalty’ were often followed by displays of traditional and modern martial arts.45. Sum� ’s revival was symbolised by the construction of the Kokugikan (‘National

Sports Building’) in 1909 (Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, VII, p. 274).46. ‘Japan and Olympism’, Olympic Review (November-December 1975), pp. 464–65

and 486.47. Roscoe, ‘The Development of Sport’, p. 56.48. Roscoe, ‘The Development of Sport’, pp. 58–59. For an interesting illustrated

history of Japan’s participation in twentieth century Olympic Games see MainichiShimbunsha, Bessatsu lchiokunin no Sh� washi, Sh� wa Sp� tsu-shi. Orinpikku 80-nen (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1976). The YMCA played a significant role inproviding the training and facilities for this. Tokyo YMCA had Japan’s first indoorgymnasium and swimming pool (E.R.Buckley,’ “Hitozukuri”—building men’,World Communiqué, Geneva (July–August 1964), p. 10.

49. ‘Japan and Olympism’, p. 466.50. Roscoe, ‘The Development of Sport’, pp. 56–57, and Mainichi Shimbunsha, Sh� wa

Sp� tsu-shi, pp. 24–25. This was largely a YMCA initiative (Buckley,’ “Hito-zukuri”’, p. 10).

51. E.g. Roscoe, ‘The Development of Sport’, pp. 62–66.52. ‘A word of praise is perhaps due to these big Japanese companies, which seem to

have recognised that these men were doing a great deal to enhance the prestige ofJapan, and facilitated their participation in international matches’ (Roscoe, ‘TheDevelopment of Sport’, p. 62).

53. Roscoe, ‘The Development of Sport’, p. 65.


54. Roscoe, ‘The Development of Sport’, p. 64; May, ‘Sports’, p. 174; KodanshaEncyclopedia of Japan, I, p. 142; Takayanagi Mitsutoshi and Takeuchi Riz� (eds.),Kadokawa Nihonshi Jiten (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 2nd edn, 1974), p. 952.

55. May, ‘Sports’, pp. 179–80.56. May, ‘Sports’, p. 174, and Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, I, p. 142.57. History Compilation Room, Radio and Television Culture Research Institute,

Nippon H� s� Ky� kai, 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting (Tokyo: NHK, 1977), pp.397– 98.

58. Roscoe, ‘The Development of Sport’, p. 69.59. For a general survey of society in wartime Japan see T.R.H.Havens, Valley of

Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two (New York: Norton, 1978).60. Hiroshi Sawamura, ‘A History of the National Recreation Association of Japan,

1938–52’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1988).61. Hiroshi Sawamura, ‘A History of the National Recreation Association’, p. 80.62. ‘A History of the National Association’, p. 85.63. Mainichi Shimbunsha, Sh� wa Sp� tsu-shi, p. 95.64. Mainichi Shimbunsha, Sh� wa Sp� tsu-shi, p. 97.65. Hiroshi Sawamura, ‘A History of the National Recreation Association’, pp. 83–85,

284.66. Mainichi Shimbunsha, Sh� wa Sp� tsu-shi, pp. 95–97; May, ‘Sports’, p. 174.67. May, ‘Sports’, p. 174.68. L.de Asis, From Bataan to Tokyo: Diary of a Filipino Student in Wartime Japan,

1943– 44 (University of Kansas: Center for East Asian Studies; New York:Paragon Book Gallery, 1979), pp, 75–77.

69. De Asis, From Bataan to Tokyo, p. 73.70. Mainichi Shimbunsha, Sh� wa Sp� tsu-shi, p. 97.71. See Kazuo Kawai, Japan’s American Interlude (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1960).72. Hiroshi Sawamura, ‘A History of the National Recreation Association’, pp. 156–57.73. Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, I, pp. 142–43.74. Japan National Tourist Organization, Japan: The New Official Guide, p. 303, and

‘Japan and Olympism’, p. 469.75. Takeuchi Riz� , Tanaka Akira and Uno Shunichi (eds.), Nihon Kingendaishi

Sh� jiten, Kadokawa Sh� jiten 25 (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1978), pp. 382–83;Japan National Tourist Organization, Japan: The New Official Guide, p. 305.

76. For a summary of very recent developments in Japanese sport see ‘Sports in the1980s’, in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan (Supplement) (Tokyo: Kodansha,1986), p. 49.


First published in The Japan Society Proceedings, No. 140, Winter

2002, pp. 49–60. Originally published in German by the German

Historical Museum, Berlin, 1998

49Japanese History as Film, Japanese Film as

History

LONG BEFORE the making of the first Japanese film in 1899, the re-enactmentof historical incidents was a powerful and persistent element in traditional formsof Japanese theatre. In the 17th, 18th and early 19th centuries events frommedieval and modern times inspired the writing of puppet plays (bunraku) andKabuki dramas. Thus, it was hardly surprising that, in the first years of thetwentieth century, Japanese film makers filmed Kabuki dramas, and ‘periodfilms’ (jidaigeki) became one of the major genres of the Japanese cinema. In theyears between 1908 and 1945 over 5000 ‘period films’ were produced and theycommonly constituted 40 per cent of Japanese proiuction. Many early ‘periodfilms’ were theatrical rather than historical, and attracted cinema goers by theirfrequent depiction of samurai sword fighting (chambara). But despite theirtheatricality, many of the episodes which were frequently filmed, such as thevendetta of the 47 loyal retainers (Ch� shingura), were based upon well-documented events in earlier centuries.

It is doubtful if the producers of most ‘period films’ were motivated byanything but financial success; but their works often reinforced popular andofficial views, that the most important element in Japan’s history was the elitesamurai class. This view was strengthened by action-packed films whichdescribed the careers of heroic swordsmen such as Miyamoto Musashi (1584–1645) and Sakamoto Ryoma (1836–1867). Although most ‘period films’ of theinterwar years were overwhelmingly entertaining they were usually permeatedby traditional values of courage and loyalty. Yet by the 1930s some directorsfocused upon the impoverished classes of the 18th and 19th centuries in wayswhich suggested uncomfortable links with contemporary poverty. Other directorscreated samurai heroes whose conduct was distant from traditional models ofmartial and moral virtue. In 1930 Ito Daisuke’s ‘Man Slashing, Horse PiercingSword’ (Zanjin Zamba Ken) featured a mastertess samurai who stole from poorfarmers, but later led them in revolt against the authorities. Yamanaka Sadao’s‘Humanity and Paper Balloons’ (Ninj� Kamif� sen) (1937) featured a samuraiwho was so poor that he was compelled to sell his swords. His wife supportedhim by making and selling paper balloons, to eke out a minimal existence.

In the 1930s Japan suffered from economic recession, fraying social cohesionand the growing power of military and nationalist influences. As a result, Home

Ministry (Naimusho) film censorship became increasingly severe. Left-wingtendencies symbolised by the creation of the Japan Proletarian Motion PictureLeague (1929) created particular alarm, and even ‘period films’ were subjectedto intensified scrutiny and severe cuts. Censors wished to expunge poverty,unorthodox thought and ‘decadent’ conduct from Japanese films so as to create amore wholesome, united and patriotic society.

Initially governments simply wished to control what were seen as unhealthytendencies, but the outbreak of war with China in July 1937 led to specificrecommendations to the film industry to create works which would strengthenthe nation and assist ‘national policy’ objectives. In 1939 the passing of a FilmLaw, based on the German model further tightened government controls. Thesenationalistic tendencies stimulated serious discussion of the concept of the‘historical film’ as distinct from the ‘period film’ of earlier years. According toDarrell William Davis’ recent work the distinguished journalist and criticHasegawa Nyozekan (1875–1969) saw the ‘historical film’ (rekishi eiga) as farmore than a series of exciting events enacted against a historic background. ForHasegawa the rekishi eiga (historical film) was to be a vehicle for preserving theJapanese past and transmitting specific cultural values to present day citizens.1

Above all ‘historical films’ were to depict elements in Japanese culture andtradition which epitomised national character and social virtue. Most films in thenew genre received financial help from government agencies and were set in theera of Tokugawa rule (1600–1868), a period before the impact of the West hadsignificantly diluted or modified Japanese values. The subject matter of suchfilms often resembled that of earlier ‘period films’ but its treatment wasprofoundly different. In many cases the depiction of combat was less importantthan the filming of sets and settings which expressed traditional Japanese ideasof beauty. Elaborate painted screens, grand chambers and excerpts fromtraditional drama were important features. Even in films in which samuraiconflict was a major theme, correct behaviour, dress and etiquette were givenimmense emphasis. Great attention was paid to the accurate reconstruction ofcastles, palaces and villas, and the enactment of formal expressions of loyalty.However, events and personalities, were (as in ‘period films’) often distorted. Insuch cases distortion served a specific ideological purpose: the propagation ofpatriotic loyalty, benevolent paternalism and social solidarity.

One impressive ‘historical film’ which was ideologically appropriate buthistorically inaccurate was Makino Masahiro’s ‘Shogun Iemitsu and his MentorHikozaemon’ (1940). This depicted the third Tokugawa shogun Iemitsu (1604–51) as a kindly and at times sensitive ruler—very different from the historicalIemitsu who imposed tight controls on his followers and intensified thepersecution of Christians. According to Makino’s film, not only did Iemitsu learnmuch from his aged advisor Hikozaemon, but something resembling a filialrelationship existed between the Shogun and his counsellor. Like other archetypal‘historical films’ this example was enriched by lavish backgrounds, such asteahouses and palatial interiors. In this case action was not provided by battles

JAPANESE HISTORY AS FILM, JAPANESE FILM AS HISTORY 493

and sword fighting but by scenes of music and dancing, much of which had littleconnection with the melodies or choreography of the seventeenth century. Thisdirector also introduced a further anachronism by suggesting that Iemitsurespected, rather than manipulated, the Emperor. Nevertheless this film created avision of history which was pleasing to government officials; a vision in whichpolitical skills were acquired within a quasi-Confucian relationship between ayoung ruler and his aged adviser.

Kinugasa Teinosuke’s ‘The Battle of Kawanakajima’ (Kawanakajima Kassen)(1940) was a further ambitious ‘historical film’ of dubious historicalauthenticity. It purported to describe battles between Takeda Shingen (1521–73)and Uesugi Kenshin (1530–78) in the civil wars of the sixteenth century, butexaggerated these conflicts’ historical importance. Kinugasa also placedemphasis on several unhistorical phenomena. A central theme of the film was co-operation and solidarity between warriors and civilians, aa concept apropriate fora country preparing for modern total war, but hardly a 16th century reality. A morespecific feature of Kunigasa’s work was the central position it gave to the peasantryin Japanese society, an interpretation which would have appealed strongly to theagrarian nationalists of the 1930s and early 1940s.

The last major historical film to be made before Japan’s attack on PearlHarbour in December 1941 was Mizoguchi Kenji’s Genroku Ch� shingura(1941). This lengthy remake of the story of the 47 loyal retainers was a work ofhigh artistic quality which was made at vast expense. It’s director took pains tostudy 18th century documents, and Mayama Seika’s (1878–1948) impressivehistorical play to provide his work with authenticity. The historical refinement,and beauty of his film were further augmented by shooting images reminiscentof classic screens and picture scrolls. Mizoguchi’s clear, slow and restrainedtreatment of a familiar theme won the approval of the Ministry of Education, butit’s elegant austerity had little popular appeal. It was hardly a box office success

In the years of Japan’s war with China ‘historical films sought to intensifynational unity by raising awareness of the strengths of what the government sawas Japanese tradition. With Japan’s declaration of war on Britain, the UnitedStates and the Netherlands in 1941 historical films had a new function—to commitJapanese citizens to a historical vision of Japan’s alignment with Asia, and herstruggle against Anglo-American imperialism. To achieve this commitmentmajor efforts were made to depict China not as a current or recent enemy but as afellow victim of Western aggression. Among Japanese films depicting Europeanexpansion the most spectacular and commercially appealing was MakinoMasahiro’s ‘Opium War’ (Ahen Sens� ) (1943). This work might best bedescribed as a ‘period film’ endowed with ideological correctness, for it paidlittle attention to historical authenticity. Makino failed to cast Western actors toplay the British villains George and Charles Elliot. Instead he employed Japanesestars. Similarly the Chinese sisters Airan and Hanran were played by Japaneseactresses. The action of Makino’s film swept spectacularly from India to Canton,but as entertainment its strengths lay chiefly in its employment of Japanese


acrobats and dancers to enliven important sequences. Ironically for a work ofnational propaganda, later Japanese writers have claimed that this film was muchinfluenced by W.D.Griffith’s ‘Orphans of the Storm’. In fact it was Chineseaudiences who responded most warmly to its heroes’ anti-Britishpronouncements.

Sino-Japanese solidarity was also the theme of Inagaki Hiroshi’s ‘The BeaconBurns in Shanghai’ (Roka wa Shanghai ni agaru) (1944). This lavish Sino-Japanese co-production described the samurai Takasugi Shinsaku’s (1839–67)brief visit to Shanghai in 1862 when he apparently warned eloquently of thedangers of Anglo-American imperialism.

The theme of Japan’s own resistance to Anglo-American expansion was theinspiration for a wide range of films set in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.Tsuji Yoshiro’s ‘The Pirate Flag is Blasted Away’ (Kaizokuki Futtobu) (1943)branded the Royal Navy as ‘pirates’ when depicting the British bombardment ofKagoshima in August 1863. A more melodramatic and fictionalised treatment ofBritish iniquity was presented in Ito Daisuke’s ‘The International SmugglingGang’ (Kokusai Mitsuyudan) (1944) which suggested that the head of the BritishLegation ‘Perkins’ had participated in international opium smuggling inYokohama in the 19th century. This was a wildly exaggerated account of aminor incident in which the British Minister’s role was in fact negligible.

The 20th century phase of Japan’s supposed unending struggle against Britainand the United States was presented in two films which focused upon theImperial Japanese Navy’s rise to power. Igayama Masanori’s ‘If we go to Sea’(Umi Yukaba) (1943) was a film version of the famous playwright Hojo Hideji’s(1902-) ‘Twenty Years of Blizzards’ which described Japan’s struggle againstthe Anglo-Saxon powers at Naval disarmament conferences. The following yearImai Tadashi’s ‘The Angry Sea’ (Ikari no Umi) (1944) explored the career ofVice-Admiral Hiraga Yuzuru (1878–1943) whose plans for a fleet of eightbattleships and eight battle cruisers had met obstructive Anglo-Americanhostility.

Parallel with cinematic attempts to establish Japan’s anti-imperialistalignment, films were also made to raise morale by celebrating the samuraiheroes who founded the modern imperial state at the time of the MeijiRestoration (1868). Many of these were political swordsmen who had often beenrepresented in pre-war ‘period films’. A particularly impressive example of aRestoration film was Inagaki Hiroshi’s ‘The Last Days of Edo’ (Edo Saigo noHi) (1941). This glorified Katsu Kaishu’s (1823–99) skill in saving the city ofEdo (modern Tokyo) from destruction in the civil war of 1868. In contrast, thebroad sweep of events in the Restoration was vividly portrayed in UshiharaKiyohiko’s ‘The Melody of the Restoration’ (Ishin no Kyoku) (1942) whichemployed Daiei Studio’s leading stars to play pro-Restoration activists SakamotoRyoma, Kido Koin (1833–77) and Saigo Takamori (1827–77).

Japan’s colonisation of Taiwan in 1895 and her conquest of Burma, Malaya,Indonesia and the Philippines in 1942 provided opportunities to bring new


tropical settings to wartime historical and quasi-historical films. Examples ofanti-Dutch propaganda were rare in Japanese films but Arai Ryohei’s ‘MightyClan of the Sea’ (Umi no G� zoku) (1941) used the story of the Japanese seacaptain Hamada Yahyoe’s visit to Taiwan to create an anti-Dutch polemic. In1628 Hamada had seized the leading Dutch official in Taiwan, Pieter Nuijts, inhis fort at Zeelandia. The Japanese had then successfully used his capture toextract diplomatic concessions. Besides its contemporary political relevance,Arai’s film had the attraction of rich sequences showing Taiwan’s exoticlandscape and aboriginal folklore.

Japan’s rapid conquests in the first year of war provided excellent material forofficial documentaries such as ‘Malayan War Record’ (Maree Senki) (1942),‘Burma War Record’ (Biruma Senki) (1942), and ‘Victory Song of the Orient’(T� y� no Gaika) (1942).

These lengthy works not only celebrated victories by modern forces butintroduced the novelty of tropical South-East Asian scenery to many Japanesecinema goers. Later when Anglo-American counter attacks ended Japan’smilitary successes, historical re-enactments of recent victories replaceddocumentaries in presenting combat in jungle settings. In 1943 Shima Kojidirected ‘All Out Attack on Singapore’ (Singaporu no S� k� geki) which wasmade on location in Malaya. Soon after, Koa Masato produced ‘The Tiger ofMalaya’ (Marai no Tora) (1943) which was filmed in similar settings.

Though it lacked a South-East Asian background, the model for thesehistorical reconstructions was probably Yamamoto Kajiro’s ‘The War at Seafrom Hawaii to Malaya’ (Hawai-Marei Oki Kaisen) (1942). Created to celebratethe first anniversary of the outbreak of war, this lavish film (financed by theImperial Navy) devoted much attention to an idealised account of naval airtraining; but its climactic sequences were impressive re-enactments, (usingmodels), of the Japanese Navy’s attack on Pearl Harbour, and the sinking of theBritish warships ‘Prince of Wales’ and ‘Repulse’ off Eastern Malaya.

As the war situation deteriorated following American counter attacks,historical films were specifically planned to provide psychological preparationfor a possible enemy invasion. For a clear historical parallel to current dangers,leaders turned to the 13th century when Japan had twice repelled Mongolinvaders. This episode was successfully recreated in Marune Santaro’s ‘Thus theDivine Wind Blows’ (Kakute Kamikaze wa Fuku) (1944) which used expensivespecial effects to recreate Japan’s naval victory in Hakata Bay.

Following atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet invasionof Manchuria, Japan accepted allied surrender terms on 15 August 1945. Withina month the American occupation army had arrived, and begun thedemilitarisation and democratisation of the Japanese population. For the UnitedStates Government and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)Douglas MacArthur, democratisation signified far more than politicalliberalisation, and extended the re-orientation’ or ‘re-education’ of the entireJapanese nation. To advance these processes MacArthur established a Civil


Information and Education Section (CIE) within his headquarters which wasresponsible for the ‘democratisation’ of film and other mass media. As a firststep to eliminating all manifestations of ‘feudalism’ and other undemocraticvalues from the Japanese cinema, CIE ordered the seizure of 236 ‘undemocratic’feature films. Many of these were pre-war and wartime historical films whichemphasised sword-fighting and other forms of ‘militaristic’ conduct.

In place of these, American officials sought to encourage the development of anew genre of historical film which would attack pre-war and wartime values andpolicies, and promote internationalism, democracy and personal freedom. Underthe new regime censorship existed but its criteria were totally different fromthose in wartime Japan. In every respect these new criteria impelled historicalfilm into fresh themes and periods.

Among early internationalist films was Inagaki Hiroshi’s ‘Last ChauvinistGroup’ (Saigo no J� i-t� ) (1945) which showed the help provided by British andAmerican citizens in modernising 19th century Japan. A further historical themewhich received strong American approval was the development of the ‘freedomand people’s rights’ movement in the late 19th century. This was a movementwhich had been excluded from earlier historical films. American officialsdisregarded the Pan-Asian, monarchical and nationalistic aspects of themovement as it saw its’ leaders as virtuous pioneer democrats. This simplistichistorical view was apparent in Matsuda Teiji’s ‘Brothers of the Meiji Era’(Meiji no Ky� dai) (1946) which used a star studded cast to demonstrate theidealism of nineteenth century democrats. A biographical treatment of the samemovement was provided by Inagaki Hiroshi’s ‘Political Theatre’ (S� shi Gekij�(1947). This film was specifically designed to commemorate the proclamation ofJapan’s new democratic constitution, and used the life of progressive playwrightSudo Sadanori (1867–1907) as an example of early democratic idealism. Anadditional theme of American policy was women’s liberation, which wasexpressed in a number of post-war historical films. Not only were women’srights and women’s liberation new themes, but in treating heroines withunconventional private lives such films were free to ignore the limitations ofearlier years. The director of major historical films of the 1930s, MizoguchiKenji, directed a biography of a remarkable theatrical personality entitled ‘TheLove of Actress Sumako’ (Joy� Sumako no Koi) (1947), This focused uponMatsui Sumako (1886–1919) Japan’s first major Western style actress. Asecond, competing film biography of Matsui Sumako was produced by KinugasaTeinoske. ‘Actress’ (Joy� ) (1947) was notable for presenting the heroine’sromantic private life with powerful realism. The themes of political liberty andwomen’s personal freedom were most closely inter-linked in Mizoguchi’s laterfilm ‘My Love has been Burning’ (Waga Koi wa Moeru) (1949). This polemicalbiography depicted Hirayama Eiko a woman activist in the 19th century freedomand people’s rights movement.

Perhaps the most impressive feature of American attempts totransform Japanese views of their country’s history was the emphasis which was


placed upon the inter-war and wartime years. More than anything else Americanoccupiers wished to establish the guilt of Japan’s political and military elites, andthe domestic and international suffering which had resulted from it. Given thesepolitical objectives cinematic history was to be simple, and crudely moralistic.

The difficulties of simplifying history and reconciling this process withpostwar complexities were clearly illustrated by the making, and subsequentAmerican condemnation, of the 1946 documentary ‘The Tragedy of Japan’(Nihon no Higeki). This compilation film was made with the activeencouragement of the Civil and Education Section of SCAP and was designed toexplain the origin of Japan’s defeat and impoverishment. Its director KameiFujio was a renowned maker of documentaries who had been imprisoned in 1941for his left-wing views. Thus he could be relied upon to attack Japan’s wartimeleadership. ‘The Tragedy of Japan’ used sequences from both newsreels andfeature films to condemn Japanese aggression and the war profits of Japaneseplutocrats. Central to its narration was a Marxist analysis of Japanese expansion,which blamed nationalistic capitalism for Japan’s military adventures. PerhapsKamei’s most controversial sequence was one which suggested that the Emperormight well be a war criminal. This aspect of ‘The Tragedy of Japan’ not onlydisturbed the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru but also conservatives inMacArthur’s command. Both feared that an attack on the Emperor wouldundermine social stability. Furthermore the United States Government alreadysaw the Emperor as an asset in implementing reform and resisting Communism.After a few showings MacArthur’s Civil Censorship Division banned ‘TheTragedy of Japan’.

Feature films were arguably more subtle and effective than documentaries indepicting the history of the 1930s and 1940s from a democratic standpoint. Animpressive semi-‘historical’ account of the years was Kurosawa Akira’s ‘NoRegrets for Our Youth’ (Waga Seishun ni Kuinashi) (1946). Made when left-wing influences were dominant in the Toho Studios this film was clearly basedupon well-known political happenings. This was evident in the film’s first framewhich contained an explicit political and historical statement This read:

Taking the Manchurian Incident as a start, militarists, zaibatsu andbureaucrats condemned as ‘red’ anyone opposing the invasion, thus tryingto create a national consensus. The ‘Kyoto University Incident’ was anexample: in 1933 Minister of Education Hotoyama, with such an intention,tried to expel the liberal professor Takigawa, from Kyoto University and metthe resistance of the whole university… This film is based on this incident,however all the characters in the film are creations of the film makers, whoseintention it is to depict the history of the development of the Soul of thepeople who lived according to their principles during the age ofpersecution…that followed this incident.2


The central figure in Kurosawa’s film is the professor’s daughter, Yukie wholeaves home to live with Noge one of her father’s left-wing ex-students. Noge isa scholar of contemporary China who is later arrested and executed for alleged‘spying’. [Noge is clearly modelled on Ozaki Hotsumi (1901–44) who wasexecuted in 1944 for his links with the Soviet spy Richard Sorge (1895–1944)].

After Noge’s death, Yukie lives with his parents in a farming villaage. Hereher experience of rural labour transforms and emboldens her, and she bravelyconfronts chauvinist villagers. After the war her father is reinstated in KyotoUniversity and Yukie begins political and cultural activities in Noge’s village.The film’s central message, like that of the American occupiers, was that idealsand fortitude are the foundations of freedom and democracy; and that principledindividuals are the most admirable figures in history. American antipathy toprewar style ‘period films’ remained an important feature of occupation policy.This resulted in the Japan Motion Picture Association placing strict limits ontheir production and distribution. However by 1950 a period film had beencreated which differed from all previous prewar, wartime or occupationproductions. Kurosawa’s Rash� mon was set in the Heian period (794–1185) anera usually ignored by earlier directors. Like many ‘period’ films it depicted asingularly violent incident but it had no clear ethical or political message.Derived from two short stories by Akutagawa Ry� nosuke (1892–1927)Rash� mon depicts an ambush followed by murder and rape—but the events areshown in a completely original way—from the conflicting viewpoints of avariety of participants. If this film had a single motif it was the frailty of humantruth.

With the ending of the American occupation in April 1952 the Japanese filmindustry was freed from virtually all governmental or military controls. Inresponse, film makers explored themes and subjects which had previously beencontrolled or prohibited.

One category of historical film which the American occupiers had strictlyprohibited was the patriotic epic. However, with the restoration of Japanesesovereignty some film makers attempted to use their new freedom to makehistorical films which would appeal to older and more nationalistic Japanese. In1957 Watanabe Kunio directed ‘The Meiji Emperor and the Great Russo-Japanese War’ (Meiji Tenn� to Nichiro Daisens� ). This wide-screen full colourspectacular traced Japan’s land and sea victories over Czarist Russia in 1904–1905 and depicted the Emperor Meiji (1852–1912) as a paternal, self-sacrificingruler who cared deeply for his soldiers and the common people. Not only was thefilm’s anti-Russian theme appropriate for the Cold War period, but it was the firstfeature film in which a Japanese Emperor had been clearly depicted. Perhapsboth these elements contributed to this expensive film’s overwhelmingpopularity and financial success.

Despite the commercial success of this historical film, the post-war attitudesof most Japanese film makers and cinema goers were profoundly hostile to warand militarism. Perhaps this reflected a widespread popular mood rather than the


wishes of anyone in governmental authority. As early as 1953 Imai Tadashi’s‘The Lily Tower’ (Himeyuri no T� ) made a powerful pacifist statement. Thishighly successful production illustrated the recruitment of Okinawan high schoolgirls as Japanese military nurses in 1945, and their deaths under Americanbombardment. An equally powerful critique of the Pacific War was IchikawaKon’s ‘The Burmese Harp’ (Biruma no Tategoto) (1956). Though based on achildren’s story by Takeyama Michio this work conveyed the human cost of warwith peculiar power. The film’s leading figure is Mizushima, a private in theImperial Japanese Army. Following Japan’s defeat, he disguises himself as aBuddhist priest and devotes himself to burying the corpses of Japanese soldierson Burmese battlefields.

lchikawa Kon also explored the final desperate months of Japan’s war in thePhilippines in ‘Fire on the Plain’ (Nobi) (1959). This cinematic version of OkaShohei’s (1909–1988) largely autobiographical novel depicts the barbaritiesperpetrated and experienced by both American and Japanese forces. Theseinclude the descent into cannibalism of starving Japanese. An even morerelentless critique of war and the Japanese military system was KobayashiMasaki’s ‘The Human Condition’ (Ningen no J� ken) (1959–61). This three partwork is set in Manchuria and begins in 1943 by tracing the cruel exploitation ofChinese prisoners, who were employed by the Japanese as forced labourers. PartTwo of the film shows its hero, Kaji, witnessing the inhuman treatment meted outto recruits in the Imperial Japanese Army. In August 1945 Kaji flees from hisarmy unit after it has been defeated by Soviet forces. In Part Three of the film heexperiences a third variety of inhumanity, life in a Soviet prisoner of war camp.In desperation he escapes, but dies, exhausted, in the snow. Kobayashi’s filmwas perhaps new in devoting significant attention to Soviet cruelty.

One specific type of historical film which had been forbidden by the Americanauthorities was any which showed the effects of nuclear attack on Japanese cities.Following the ending of occupation restrictions, Japanese organisations and filmdirectors were eager to treat this subject, which was of a great political andemotional significance. In 1953 Shindo Kaneto directed ‘Children of the AtomicBomb’ (Genbaku no Ko), a production which received financial support from theleft-wing Japanese Teachers Union. Shindo’s film showed the plight of Hiroshimachildren who had survived the dropping of the atomic bomb but it was ahumanistic rather than a political statement and disappointed its sponsors. TheTeachers Union then gave its support to Sekigawa Hideo’s film Hiroshima(1953), which combined careful historical reconstruction with a crude andmelodramatic attack on wartime and post-war American attitudes to Japan.

Despite a continuing preoccupation with the events of the Second World War,many directors continued to create films set in earlier periods of Japanese history.As before, the samurai retained an almost obsessive fascination for film makersand cinema goers, but ambitious directors imbued samurai films with new socialand moral purposes, Kurosawa’s prize-winning ‘Seven Samurai’ (Shichinin noSamurai) (1954) depicted the successful defence of a peasant community by a


group of hired warriors. Yet, it is far more than a poem of combat. In depictingthe effectiveness of collective protection Kurosawa was surely expressing his owndistinctive form of social humanism. Other films which focused closely onsamurai life were used to mount fierce attacks upon Japan’s pre-modern valuesystem and by implication the conservatives who still admired it. KobayashiMasaki’s ‘Harakiri’ (Seppuku) (1962) presented 17th century samurai whoproclaimed the morality of the warrior code but behaved with cruel hypocrisy.Kobayashi’s emphasis on the inhumanity of the samurai code left little scope forhistorical nostalgia.

Mizoguchi also depicted the social evils of the 17th century in ‘The Life ofOharu’ (Saikaku Ichidai Onna) (1952). By tracing the decline of a beautifulwoman from youth and social distinction to age, disease and prostitution thedirector demonstrated the savage manner in which women had been victimised inmuch of Japanese history.

When directors turned their attention to medieval times they sometimesproduced picturesque works which attracted audiences at home and abroad.Kinugasa’s ‘Gate of Hell’ (Jigokumon) (1953) presented the 12th century civil warbetween the Taira and the Minamoto families as a delicately coloured spectacle.In contrast Mizoguchi retained a clear moral purpose, and used life in the 11thcentury to attack the cruelties of the time. In ‘Sansho the Bailiff (Sansho Daiyu)(1954) Mizoguchi’s hero, Zushio, overwhelms the oppressive Bailiff, Sansho; butthe film’s overall theme is the inhumanity of a society in which slavery andinjustice were commonplace.

In the late 1960s Japan was already an affluent society but the Vietnam War,wide spread pollution and an apparent conservative monopoly of political powerstimulated the rise of radical, and at times revolutionary protest movements. Inthis time of widespread and even desperate social criticism a new generation offilm makers began to employ the historical film to construct revolutionarycritiques of society, and calls for almost total human freedom. Several directorsfocused their work upon the inter-war years, believing this to have been a timewhen various forms of idealism were suppressed by state authority. An earlyexample of this genre was Yoshida Yoshihige’s ‘Eros plus Massacre’ (Erosupurasu Gyakusatsu) (1969). This complex work hovers between characters livingin the late 1960s and the famous anarchist Osugi Sakae (1885–1923) who wasmurdered by military police in 1923. For Yoshida, Osugi’s desire for sexualfreedom for both sexes was as important as his formal political opinions. In 1973Yoshida also produced ‘Martial Law’ (Kaigenrei) which treated the life anddeath of Kita Ikki (1883–1939), a radical, pan-Asian supporter of the Emperorsystem. ‘Martial Law’ traces Kita’s life between 1921 and 1936 and depicts himas a flawed idealist, who was executed by the military police for his role in theattempted military coup of 26 February 1936. In the film Kita believes himself tohave been betrayed by the Emperor, while one of his followers is disillusionedby Kita’s own defects. Yoshida’s work links idealistic patriotism with erotic love,and highlights the suppression of youthful idealism by conservative state power.


Of all the new directors of Japan’s ‘new wave’ of the late 1960s the mostoriginal and radical was Oshima Nagisa. Many of Oshima’s films attackedtraditional symbols of orthodoxy and authority but his most controversial andhistorical film, ‘In the Realm of the Senses’ (Ai no Korida) (1976), is a study ofan obsessive sensual relationship between Abe Sada and her employer. ‘In theRealm of the Senses’ is based upon a famous crime which took place in 1936,and has been banned by the Japanese authorities on grounds of obscenity.Nevertheles, in contrasting an ultimate expression of physical freedom with themilitary discipline of the 1930s, Oshima was making a curiously originalcriticism of a repressive state.

Since the ebbing of the revolutionary wave of the late 1960s and early 1970sJapanese historical films have seen less major innovations. Earlier themes havebeen modified and re-expressed, and television has become a major visualmedium in the presentation of Japanese history; but there have been nodevelopments in historical films as dramatic as those of 1945, 1952 or the 1960s.

Since the mid-1970s the theme of the suffering and endurance of women hasbeen re-emphasised in films and television dramas, as awareness of women’shistory has spread and deepened. Typical of this trend was Kumai Kei’s film‘Sandakan 8’ (Sandakan hachiban shokan: B� ky� ) (1975). This explored thelives of impoverished women from Amakusa in Southern Japan, who werecompelled to work as prostitutes in South East Asia in the early 20th century.Nevertheless, a single television drama series, Oshin (broadcast in 1983)probably achieved more success in presenting the history of Japanese women inthe 20th century to a mass public. This saga of one woman’s stoic endurance ofwar, poverty and indignity, and her achievement of respectability and prosperity,not only possessed great emotional power, but appeared an allegory of theJapanese people’s struggles and achievements in war and peace.

Despite decades of peace and prosperity the causes, events and consequencesof the Second World War have remained historical subjects of continuinginterest to Japanese film makers and large sections of the Japanese population.Films which have responded to this continuing public mood have ranged fromthe quasi-documentary and documentary to novel animated works. OkamotoKihachi’s quasi-documentary ‘Japan’s Longest Day’ (Nihon no lchiban NagaiHi) (1967) revealed the intense elite conflicts which culminated in Japan’sdecision to surrender. 16 years later Kobayashi Masaki’s ‘Tokyo Trial’ (TokyoSaiban) (1983) used a powerful mosaic of newsreel footage to demonstrate thepolitical calculations which weakened the ethical basis of the Trials held by theInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East. Kobayashi’s semi-revisionistfilm also suggests that Japan might not have been the only guilty country in the20th century history of the Far East.

Continuities of emotion and idealism from the 1950s were often apparent inthe later work of older directors. Ichikawa Kon’s colour remake of ‘The BurmeseHarp’ which appeared in 1985, and Imamura Shohei’s ‘Black Rain’ (Kuroi Ame)(1988), which was based on Ibuse Masuji’s (1898–1993) semi-documentary


Hiroshima novel, both illustrated this significant trend. In the 1980s an animatedadaptation of the popular cartoon story ‘Barefoot Gen’ (Hadashi no Gen) madethe sufferings of Hiroshima children vivid to younger, less traditional cinemagoers.

The novel theme of nationalities brought together rather than divided by theeffects of war was present in Shinoda Masahiro’s ‘MacArthur’s Children’(Setouchi Sh� nen Yaky� dan) (1984). This study of Japanese provincial lifeduring the American Occupation shows the powerful impact of American forceson life in a local community. The film culminates in a baseball match between the‘Kosaka Tigers’ and an American side. During the game a Japanese dog makes acrucial intervention by removing the ball.

In later decades well established directors such as Kurosawa continued toexpand and develop the familiar samurai genre. In the early 1960s Kurosawa’sYojimb� (1961) and Tsubaki Sanjur� (1962) presented swaggering heroics whichsome Japanese saw as by-products of the American gangster form. Equallyimpressive were Kurosawa’s later civil war epics which made effective use ofcolour and wide screen processes. ‘Kagemusha’ (1980) depicted battles betweenTakeda Shingen, Oda Nobunaga (1534–82) and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616)in the 16th century, culminating in the overwhelming success of firearms in thebattle of Nagashino in 1575. Kurosawa’s later historical works (which haverequired American financial support) have been great visual triumphs, but havelacked the penetrating moral insights apparent in many of his earlier films.

In almost a century of development Japanese period and historical films haveundergone immense changes in subject matter, standpoint and financialorganisation. In the years up to 1930 period films were largely works ofentertainment whose subject was the samurai class, and their morality that ofswordsmen heroes. By 1930 samurai films occasionally manifested indirectsympathy for Japan’s poor, but with the rise of the national defence state in the1930s, censors removed such elements and instructed film makers to make‘historical’ films that would be didactic, and emphasise the patriotic virtues ofthe samurai. This distanced many ‘historical’ films from the world of massentertainment.

During the Second World War historical films were often subsidised bygovernment funds and fulfilled new didactic purposes, such as the promotion ofanti-Westernism and solidarity with Asia. To achieve these objectives films withinternational themes and exotic settings were frequently produced. Furthermore,the chronological range of historical films broadened to embrace incidents fromthe 13th century to 1942.

The American occupation saw a further, but distinctly differing broadening ofthe scope of the historical film. Women, pioneer democrats and critics of pre-warand wartime governments were given unprecedented prominence, as part ofAmerican democratisation. In contrast, the production of ‘feudalistic’ samuraifilms was tightly restricted.


With the restoration of Japanese Independence, in 1952, the Japanese cinemaachieved unprecedented political, commercial and artistic freedom. Patriotic filmswere made for a shrinking market but anti-war films dominated the historicalgenre. Most remarkably samurai films were created which sought to denigrate,not celebrate samurai morality. Overall, radical film directors saw the Japanesepast as a source of warnings rather than a subject for celebration. Equallyimportant has been a new inclusiveness in the spirit of the historical film. Broadersocial concerns and a new, intense individualism have produced works whichcelebrate women and diverse and unfashionable commoners. In the spectacularepics of Kurosawa the samurai film remained an important source of popularentertainment. But in recent decades the Japanese historical has continued toadvance, to mirror the entire past of an entire people.

NOTES

1. Davis, Darrell William, Picturing Japaneseness, Monumental Style, NationalIdentity, Japanese Film, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 69.

2. Hirano, Kyoko, Mr Smith Goes to Tokyo, Japanese Cinema Under the AmericanOccupation, 1945–1952, Washington and London: Smithsonian Institute Press,1992), p. 187.


Part VII

Japanese Studies and Anglo-JapaneseAcademic Cooperation

Unpublished paper submitted to the Anglo-Japanese Mixed Cultural

Commision, Edinburgh, 1986

50Japanese Studies in Anglo-Japanese Cultural

Relations

AS ALL MEMBERS of the Mixed Commission have already received mygeneral report I wish to confine my remarks to a small number of specific points.

First, I agree emphatically with Mr. Dimond’s emphasis on the enormousimportance of Anglo-Japanese, Euro-Japanese and Trilateral relations in thecontemporary world. However, this theme is not equally apparent in all thepapers which are under discussion.

Furthermore, one must note the marked discrepancy which exists between thecloseness of American-Japanese relations and the less developed links whichbind Britain and Japan. Clearly, the special intensity of Japanese-American linksis partly a product of the US-Japan Security Treaty. But it is also the result ofdeliberate cultural policies and different attitudes. Both these elements arereflected in the present condition of Japanese Studies in Britain.

Since 1979, both Oxford and Cambridge Universities have received generousfinancial assistance from the Nissan Corporation and Keidanren. In addition, theJapan Foundation has continued an imaginative range of programmes across abroad sweep of disciplines and educational levels. However, one must also setagainst this the loss of posts in various universities, and the virtual disappearanceof regular postgraduate support from official British sources.

As the Parker Report has indicated, these trends have been very damagingboth to the training of new scholars and the extension of Japanese Studies intonew disciplines. Furthermore, this is a field where many vital areas remaintotally unstudied in British universities. For example, there is not a singleuniversity scholar, able to read Japanese, who is professionally engaged in thestudy of contemporary Japanese foreign policy. Similarly, there is no oneengaged in the study of Japanese history before 1500. There is no one carryingout serious work on the contemporary Japanese mass media.

Against this background, in what ways might limited Japanese assistanceincrease the quality and range of Japanese Studies in the United Kingdom?Firstly, one should begin in the schools. Despite the view taken in the D.E.S.document there is considerable interest and enthusiasm for the teaching ofJapanese in schools; in Lancashire, Suffolk and other counties. Surely somelimited ‘assistantship’ scheme could help the enterprising groups who have

initiated this activity. Even crisis-ridden New Zealand has made significant stepsin teaching Japanese at the school level. One might also note the appetite forlanguage study among the general public. Assistants could help in this activity.Perhaps such teachers might be attached to extra-mural departments of someuniversities. Even in universities more, particularly specialist ‘assistants’ wouldbe welcome.

Second, I would ask whether our university language teaching is perfect? If not,then collaborative work with Japanese who specialise in teaching Japanese toforeigners could be valuable. Japanese help in teaching such specialised skills asinterpreting, and the translation of particularly complex materials, could be veryrewarding. Exchanges of personnel, seconding of staff and specialist conferencesin this field could all be of help.

Next, one might mention cooperation in the field of librarianship. In the USA,medium term visits by Japanese librarians have resulted in the publication of arange of bibliographical works which are of lasting value. These facilitate the workof students, research staff and faculty members. Such cooperative activity couldwell be carried out in British universities.

Next one might question whether, in academic terms, exchange is enough.Exchange may include close collaboration but does not always do so. If onecompares the scale of genuine collaborative activity between American andJapanese scholars (of Japan, and of the Social Sciences), with that betweenBritish and Japanese academics—Anglo-Japanese cooperation is negligible. Thisis not only damaging in terms of personal academic relationships but is a majorrestraint on the raising of standards in a whole range of Japanese Studies in theUK. It is likely that the respect with which American Japanese Studies areviewed in Japan is partly the product of long term collaborative activity. Aglance at any university library will indicate the marked scarcity of jointlyauthored Anglo-Japanese publications. Clearly, we in Britain can only developresearch and teaching in many fields of Japanese Studies with the assistance ofcollaborative activities. This is not simply a matter of getting together—at timesit may involve funding over longer periods. Some major US-Japanese projectshave stretched over five or more years. I am not sure that on either the Japaneseor British side we are yet thinking sufficiently in terms of sustained cooperation.Without it, talk of raising standards may be to encourage false hopes. It is alsoregrettable that we are still thinking largely in bilateral terms. Given theimportance of the Trilateral concept, should not British and Japanese agenciesconsider collaboration on a broader multilateral basis?

Such ideas may sound expensive but they may often involve methods ofspreading existing money over longer periods rather than vastly increasedexpenditure.

In addition, there are many areas in which our Japanese colleagues couldassist us at relatively little financial cost.

The general availability for university loan of NHK programmes on videotapewould not only aid language proficiency but would accelerate the acquisition of

JAPANESE STUDIES IN ANGLO-JAPANESE CULTURAL RELATIONS 507

new information regarding history and contemporary society. If a selection ofthis material could be provided with a dual language sound track this would beeven more helpful. Similarly, if Japanese language films could be loaned by theJapan Foundation and the Japan Information Centre, this would also enrichprogrammes of language teaching. Incidentally, how did the BBC react to theJapanese language tapes which were proffered by NHK at the last Commissionmeeting?

Again, in the field of personal exchange one might question whether a wideenough variety of non-academic Japanese are visiting educational institutions inthe UK, and whether their activities are sufficiently intensive. Outside theprogrammes of Chatham House and the International Institute for StrategicStudies relatively few Japanese diplomats, journalists, public servants oremployees of private companies visit Britain to lecture, or advise on researchprojects. For deeper understanding such visits are as important as those ofscientists, actors, artists or musicians.

If many of these suggestions require the reallocation of resources rather thanhigher budgets, one important activity poses an acute economic problem. Allteachers of Japanese agree that speaking, reading and writing skills benefitgreatly from a period of undergraduate residence and study in Japan. Indeed, ourteaching of European languages is based on such a concept. If the Anglo-Japanese language gap is to be narrowed, some permanent scheme for this totake place is essential. The optimum length of time, or type of course, requireserious discussion, but the creation of such a programme is central to the futureimprovement and expansion of language teaching. Perhaps this problem mightreceive the attention of the Monbusho in its programme of internationalization.

In Britain, the appetite for knowledge of Japan and its language in schools anduniversities, and among the general public, is greater than many realise. Todeepen and broaden understanding there is much relatively inexpensive helpwhich could be provided by our Japanese colleagues. There is much that wecannot do without Japanese personnel. There is much more to be achieved bycollaborative study of Japan or by comparing our two societies. As Sir PeterParker has pointed out, knowledge of the Japanese language— particularly inspecialised and sophisticated fields—is fundamental to closer relations. In thissense, Japanese Studies should have a more central place in our culturalcooperation. To assist this, some Anglo-Japanese committee or group is requiredto monitor collaboration and focus attention on issues which will determine thelong term quality of our relationship.


Unpublished paper submitted to a meeting hosted by the Foreign

and Commonwealth Office to discuss the Parker Report, 1987

51The Future of Japanese Studies in Britain

FORTY YEARS AGO, following the Scarborough Commssion’s enquiry,1

Oriental studies experienced five years of unprecedented expansion. Acombination of new posts, treasury studentships and earmarked fundingstimulated the rapid development of linguistic and cultural studies. In 1952earmarking was abruptly ended. Treasury studentships were reduced and newappointments were halted in most institutions. Nine years later the Hayter Sub-committee lamented this loss of impetus and again introduced the triple formulaof new posts, postgraduate studentships and a period of earmarked support.2 TheHayter Report added valuable new emphases; secure travel provision foruniversity staff, an emphasis on modern area studies and support for intensivesummer courses—which were never held. However, by the late 1970searmarking was over. Travel grants shrank amid university economies, and theArea Studies Panel of the Social Science Research Council was eventuallyabolished. After these two abandoned initiatives, Sir Peter Parker’s report is aninvaluable review in a third era of inadequate resources and blurred priorities.3

Any academic’s warm welcome for Sir Peter’s report must begin with a briefexamination of the ideas and organizations which have created past and presentcrises in Japanese studies.

In general our cyclical crises have been caused by the vagaries of public andacademic opinion. The generality of informed or uninformed national opinion doesnot regularly view Japan or Japanese studies as matters of importance. Hencecontinued, sustained support can never be assumed or taken for granted. Much ofthe same can be said of academic opinion. Despite the work of its enlightenedsub-committees, the University Grants Committee has not provided JapaneseStudies with full or even adequate protection. What is more, even large JapaneseStudies departments are small platoons on the broad battlefields of intra-university politics. Hence when resources are short and parochialism is in full cryit is almost inevitable that Japanese Studies will suffer disproportionatecasualties. Without generous Japanese donations even Japanese Studies inOxford and Cambridge would have been gravely weakened. In short, ourconstituency of domestic support is very limited and we can only grow andrespond to commercial and diplomatic needs if some countervailing power iscreated in the structure of national university administration. Both the Hayter and

Parker reports have praised the imagination and continuity of American federalsupport for language and area training but we still lack any legislation, plan ororganization which can protect, steer and encourage Japanese and other importantarea studies. As Sir Peter Parker has indicated, the creation of such anorganization is an immediate priority. This body might be named the StrategicLanguages Commission. It would, ideally, be linked with the UGC but wouldhave powerful representation from the diplomatic, industrial and commercialcommunities. Without the creation of such a group, Japanese Studies will alwaysbe prone to arbitrary losses of financial support—despite national needs or thenational interest. Properly constituted such a body could improve theresponsiveness of universities to commercial and diplomatic needs; it could notesignificant gaps in specialisation and generate public support for important areasof teaching and research. Only if such a body is established can the expansioninspired by the Parker Report form a secure base for the future growth ofJapanese Studies.

Given the acknowledged importance of contemporary Japan one would alsohope that a new system of permanent earmarking could be instituted. This wouldensure that national objectives are not eroded or ignored by individualuniversities. The need for permanent earmarking and a strategic policy unit arethe most pressing needs in our present situation.

Given this past history of major difficulties, Sir Peter Parker’s proposals forlimited staff and postgraduate expansion are unreservedly welcome. But equallyimportant is the need for future expansion to be conditional upon themaintenance of existing strength in all centres of Japanese Studies. Without this,new funds may merely be used to repair freshly torn holes in our academic fabric.

If expansion is to take place, it would be particularly helpful if new posts werecreated in economic and business related fields. Given Japan’s contemporaryeconomic and commercial power, such expansion is of inherent academicimportance. Furthermore, university assistance to British commerce is not merelylimited by the lack of academic flexibility or self-marketing, which werehighlighted in the Parker Report. So far, British—and European Community—universities have lacked the qualified personnel and resources to engage inserious research on most major sectors of the Japanese economy. Such researchis not only important to assist particular companies or enterprises, it is essentialfor the broad education of much of British political and economic opinion.

Of equal importance is the appointment of new staff, both British andJapanese, in the field of language teaching. This is not merely necessary to copewith the Parker Report’s projected doubling of undergraduate numbers —and anexpanded postgraduate community. In many respects we face the problems andpotentialities of a new era of language teaching. The generation of teacherstrained in the Pacific War has already passed into retirement. Unprecedentedstudent numbers call for research on more effective means of teaching largegroups. The exploitation of new audio-visual technology merits seriousinvestigation. (I have yet to see in a British university an audio-visual language

510 THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE STUDIES IN BRITAIN

laboratory as sophisticated as one I saw in Japan as long ago as 1970.) Thecreation of new teaching materials for university students and for personnel fromindustry and commerce is urgently required. Overall, the methodology ofJapanese language teaching has received relatively little professional attention inBritain in recent decades. Furthermore, we have little comparative data on nationalor international standards of undergraduate attainment. The collection of suchinformation is not only desirable, it is essential for the improvement of standardsof linguistic proficiency. If all students could spend a year in Japan this wouldclearly help in raising standards.

If such new appointments are to be fully effective and successful some earlierhalf-forgotten ideas merit revival. Intensive summer schools for academic andcommercial students could well be mounted. These might also recruit studentsfrom other European Community countries. Furthermore, grants for the creationof new teaching materials—originally mooted in the Scarborough proposals—should be reinstituted. Without such developments, sensitive, flexible responsesto varied linguistic needs will be difficult to engender. The refinement of suchpractical skills as interpreting and advanced conversation all demand newlanguage teachers and grants for projects related to language instruction.

Although such academic fields as economics, business studies and appliedlanguage training may be the preeminent priorities for the British economy,diplomacy has requirements which go well beyond linguistic proficiency orpolitical and economic information. As the Parker report states scholars areunofficial diplomats even if they prosecute research on recondite academicsubjects.4 In Anglo-Japanese relations closeness of contact, and arguably Britishprestige is partly the product of shared values and ideas. Here I do not refer tosuch trilateral concepts as free trade or a free press but common admiration ofthe peaks of cultural achievement. Intellectual dialogue with Japan will alwaysbe imperfect and incomplete on the basis of merely practical studies. In otherwords, humane intellectual interchange demands distinguished scholarly activityin such fields as fine arts, applied arts and literature. These activities commandand will continue to command high prestige in Japanese academic and nonacademic circles. To reduce our academic commitment to such fields is likely toinhibit the development of a close and sophisticated relationship between our twosocieties. That no British university but Oxford has even a lecturer in Japanesefine arts remains a matter of dubious national distinction.

For more than twenty years the geographical disposition of Japanese Studieshas been a repetitive but enduring theme of British academic discussion. Heresome salient points may bear restatement. All the four main British centresremain small by international standards and lack the broad interdisciplinarysweep of their distinguished American counterparts.5 This problem has beenmade more acute by the indifference of traditional academic departments to theappointment of staff specialising in Japan. Ideally appointments in traditionaldepartments could reinforce the strength of formally defined Centres. Thus apowerful case remains for the reinforcement of Japanese Studies personnel in the


universities containing the four main centres. In all these four universitiesJapanese Studies remain of medium scale and have failed to develop theaggressive intellectual momentum to be found in the biggest American centres ofJapanese studies. Similarly, our library resources for academic and appliedpurposes remain puny by the highest international standards.

Conversely, there are also powerful arguments for some geographicalextension of Japanese studies. The teaching of the Japanese language toundergrduates does not of itself require an expensive infrastructure of Japanesebooks or large numbers of staff. The simple extension of such activity could infuture be achieved by the grant of carefully costed packages of staff and teachingmaterials. Such expansion would not only spread expertise. It would alsobroaden the constituency of academic support for Japanese Studies.

As in 1961, some have advocated the creation of a new Centre or Centres innorthern regions of the United Kingdom. These could provide a more effectivenationwide coverage of Japanese knowledge. If such centres are created theyshould be based in universities which have already shown a clear commitment toJapanese Studies. Furthermore, these establishments should have clearlyprescribed regional responsibilities and subject specialisations.

Perhaps the most valuable product of the Parker Report has been a newopportunity to consider academic, commercial and diplomatic priorities inJapanese Studies. ‘Speaking for the Future’ has stimulated this unprecedentedmeeting of major interested parties. I earnestly hope that today’s discussion willencourage the creation of a new agency to strengthen and redirect our resourcesin area studies. Today’s gathering should also initiate a sequence of cross-interest meetings at which teaching, research, and the marshalling of informationare discussed with a sense of national purpose.

NOTES

1. Report of the Interdepartmental Commission of Enquiry on Oriental, Slavonic,East European and African Studies, London, 1947.

2. University Grants Committee: Report of the Sub-Committee on Oriental, Slavonic,East European and African Studies, London, 1961.

3. Speaking for the Future: A Review of the Requirements of Diplomacy andCommerce for Asian and African Languages and Area Studies (for the UniversityGrants Committee), 1986.

4. Speaking for the Future, p. 6, para. 12 and p. 28, para. 13.5. The four major Centres are Oxford, Cambridge, the School of Oriental & African

Studies (University of London), and Sheffield.

512 THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE STUDIES IN BRITAIN

First published in Yu-Ying Brown (ed.), Japanese Studies (British

Library Occasional Papers 11), London, the British Library, 1990,

pp. 15–21

52Japanese Studies in Britain, 1945–88

AT THE CLOSE of the Pacific War Japanese studies in Britain appeared activeand flourishing. Conflict with Japan had stimulated the creation of militarylanguage programmes and unprecedented increases in staff and studentnumbers.1 However, these appearances were deceptive. The School of Orientaland African Studies in London was the only university institution whereJapanese was taught and Japan seriously studied, and most of its teachers wereemployed on temporary wartime contracts.2 Furthermore, Japan’s position inBritish consciousness was soon to decline into near obscurity.3 Britain’s imperialinterests still dominated her view of the non-European world and estimates offuture trade saw post-war China as far more promising than defeated Japan4

Symbolic of these attitudes were the views of the Scarborough Commissionwhich reviewed the future of ‘Oriental, Slavonic, East European and AfricanStudies’ in 1947 in its report to the Foreign Secretary. According to thisinfluential body, one of the principal reasons for studying Japanese was itsimportance in the world of international Sinology.5 The ScarboroughCommission did propose the creation of a series of postgraduate studentships fortraining in Japanese studies but these were to be drawn from a pool of twenty-five Far Eastern awards, a small fraction of the 195 studentships allocated tostimulate academic activity in East European, African and Asian studies.6 Thishandful of training studentships was to play a significant, if limited, role in thedevelopment of Japanese studies in the United Kingdom. These awards firmlyanchored Japanese studies in the British university system and enabled somewartime students and teachers to develop their linguistic and analytical expertise.Soon the teaching of Japanese spread to Oxford and Cambridge, and the creationof posts in the social sciences and modern studies was seriously discussed. As adirect result of the Scarborough Report a new BA in Japanese was established inthe Oriental Faculty at Cambridge. At Oxford Japanese became a new subsidiaryelement in degree courses in Chinese.7

Despite these British initiatives the dominance of the United States inthe world of Japanese studies was soon apparent. Donald Keene temporarilyjoined the staff at Cambridge, and in later years Charles Sheldon taught Japanesehistory in the same institution. Both were graduates of the United States Navy’swartime Japanese language programme.

The limited strength of British Japanology in this period was also apparent inseveral major publications. In late 1940s and early 1950s many serious works onJapan did not emanate directly from university institutions. The most activecentre of such research and publishing in Britain was The Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs located at Chatham House. Here, one major project was thepublication of a multi-volume survey of international developments during theSecond World War. Within this series a volume on East Asia gave detailedtreatment to Japan, but a large section of this important volume was written byHugh Borton, a distinguished American scholar.

A second major contributor to this volume was F C Jones, Reader in Historyat the University of Bristol.8 Jones not only contributed to many of ChathamHouse’s annual surveys of international affairs but used the records of theInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East to produce a major interim studyof Japan’s wartime occupation policies Japan’s new order in East Asia.9 Jones wasprobably the most active British writer on Japan in the immediate post-waryears, but despite his nationality he had received his postgraduate training atHarvard. More mportant, his dependence on English language sources preventedhis work reaching the highest international standards.

Unfortunately, in these same years, several of the best qualified BritishJapanologists were attracted to positions in the United States and Canada. SirGeorge Sansom, who possessed outstanding linguistic and intellectual skills leftBritain to become head of the newly created East Asian Institute at ColumbiaUniversity.10 Ivan Morris, the author of Nationalism and the right wing in Japan.A study of postwar trends also crossed the Atlantic to work in the sameinstitution.11 Ronald Dore spent some years at the University of BritishColumbia, and Douglas Mills taught at the Berkeley campus of the University ofCalifornia.

Parallel to these positive and negative developments were important initiativeswhich stemmed from private benefactions. In 1950 St Antony’s College, Oxford,was established on the basis of a large French donation. This new foundationsoon created a Far East Centre which provided an academic base for GeoffreyHudson and Richard Storry. These two scholars pioneered importantprogrammes of Anglo-Japanese academic exchange.12

By 1960 a new generation of language and literature specialists hadconsolidated undergraduate and postgraduate studies in the School of Orientaland African Studies and Professor W G Beasley, a British graduate of the USNavy language programme, had begun major courses on Japanese history atLondon University.13 Yet overall, Japanese studies in British higher educationwere situated on the margins rather than the frontiers of academic activity.Geographically, Japanese studies were confined to the south of England andwork on the social sciences and modern history was extremely limited.

This traditionalism and intellectual isolation were problems which wereaddressed by the next major government inquiry into the state of area studies inBritain. In 1961 Sir William Hayter’s UGC Sub-Committee on Oriental,

514 JAPANESE STUDIES IN BRITAIN, 1945–88

Slavonic, East European and African Studies reviewed developments since theexecution of the Scarborough proposals.14 Hayter and his colleagues were deeplyconcerned at the lack of modern studies regarding Japan and other regions, andgave a distinctive turn to the history of Japanese studies.15 As a result of theHayter Report a new Centre for Japanese studies was established in Sheffield,which sought to encourage teaching and research on the Japanese aspects ofmodern history and the social sciences.16 These notions achieved their firstexpression with the creation of dual degrees which linked the study of theJapanese language with such subjects as economics, history, geography,sociology and political science. The growth of modern studies was furtherencouraged by the funding of Hayter posts in history and geography in theSchool of Oriental and African Studies. The Hayter Report also drew attention toissues which had been half forgotten in the austerity years of the late 1940s andearly 1950s. Postgraduate studentships, staff travel to Japan, and improvedlibrary provision were all encouraged by Hayter grants, and added furtherstrength to linguistic and research skills.17

In the 1980s, it is difficult to recall the indifference to Japan which wasprevalent at the time of the Hayter recommendations—and the considerableimprovements which were generated by these limited initiatives. In particular,the post-Hayter years saw a new wave of postgraduate activity which had noobvious precedent in the history of British Japanology. Unfortunately, thecreative wave of the 1960s and 1970s was soon halted by the ending ofearmarked funding for Japanese studies. Nevertheless, undergraduate numbersrose, Japan became a more common and acceptable field of study and majormonographs appeared. In particular, Professors Beasley, Dore and Nishpublished works on the Meiji Restoration, the history of Anglo-Japaneserelations, and education in the Edo period, all of which used primary materialand reached the highest, standards of international scholarship.18

If the 1940s and 1960s saw British governments attempt to stimulate Japanesestudies, the 1970s saw a marked increase in Japanese influence on Britishacademic activity. Not only was Japan’s remarkable economic success the sourceof envy, worry and concern, but Japanese government agencies and companiesconsciously sought to shape British opinion by financial gifts to universityinstitutions.

Large scale Japanese assistance to British universities began with PrimeMinister Tanaka’s visit to London in October 1973. Premier Tanaka’s gift of¥300 million for the promotion of Japanese studies was formally named theJapan Foundation Endowment Fund.19 This not only provided sources of fundsfor new activities but stimulated the creation of the British Association forJapanese Studies. This organisation was established in 1974 to assist the orderlydistribution of the Tanaka gift. It also became a forum for the discussion ofacademic teaching and research. Needless to say the long-establislied JapanSociety of London continued to provide a general forum for the discussion ofJapanese issues, but this body had few close ties with the academic world. In


1976 the BAJS held its first full academic conference at Durham, and as a directresult its annual Proceedings began to appear.20 No one would wish toexaggerate the importance of this annual publication but it provided anopportunity for young scholars to see their work in print, without complexnegotiations with established publishers. This series also enabled much work inprogress to be widely circulated—particularly articles based upon recentlyopened archives. This ‘home-made’ journal is now on the point of beingpublished in a new form by Oxford University Press under the title Japan Forum.

In the 1970s and 1980s Japanese financial help has been crucial to thedevelopment of Japanese Studies in Britain. In 1979 an endowment from theNissan Motor Corporation enabled Oxford University to make threeappointments in modern Japanese studies covering political science, economicsand modern history.21 Other large donations from Suntory and Toyota led to thecreation, in 1978, of the International Centre for Economics and RelatedDisciplines at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Thoughthis Centre’s work is not narrowly confined to Japanese affairs it has sponsoredsome twenty-one symposia largely concerned with the history of Japan’s relationswith the West.22 Other research projects have included studies of industrialrelations in Japan and the training of Japanese scientific and technical personnel.In addition, the Suntory Foundation donated funds for the establishment of a Sajilectureship in Japanese Social and Economic History at the LSE. SimilarlyKeidanren provided an endowment to enable Cambridge University to create itsfirst Chair of Japanese Studies.23 The strategic importance of these Japanese giftswas confirmed in 1986 by the findings of the Parker Report which surveyed thestate of Asian and African studies as they relate to diplomacy and commerce.24

This report, like the earlier Scarborough and Hayter enquiries, indicated that lackof a consistent policy had been deeply damaging. Indeed, without Japanese helpthe situation would have been almost critical.25 In some respects Sir PeterParker’s report echoed earlier suggestions for postgraduate training and modernstudies; but some of Parker’s proposals reflected the transformation in therelative positions of Japan and Britain which had taken place since 1945. IfScarborough gave little emphasis to Japan, Parker defined Japanese—along withChinese and Arabic—as one of the most vital languages for Britain’s economicfuture.21 In fact, Japan’s technological progress had given her language a specialimportance not shared by Chinese and Arabic. Conversely, Britain’s economicposition appeared so weakened that Parker saw Japanese as vitally important forthe nation’s commercial and industrial development. More specifically theParker Report proposed that the government provide sufficient funds to repairthe damage inflicted on Japanese studies by economies since 1979. It alsoproclaimed the necessity of doubling student numbers as soon as possible. Theimportance of student numbers was a central theme of the Parker Report, but theneed for training in economics and business studies linked to Japanese languagestudy, was also a major concern. This report also suggested that, where possible,universities should seek to respond directly to Britain’s commercial and


industrial needs.27 Although many of Sir Peter Parker’s suggestions may appearnatural in the context of the 1980s they demonstrate that matters which may becommon knowledge among Japan specialists still require wider acceptance inpolitical circles.

In response to the Parker Report the University Grants Committee made aseries of decisions which were more radical than anything since 1961. Japanesestudies were now viewed as aspects of national and regional economic policy. Inconcrete terms, the UGC proposed that Japanese Studies be strengthened inScotland and North East England—both regions with a considerable number ofJapanese factories. Later the University of Wales’ College of Cardiff wasprovided with funds for the creation of a new Welsh Centre for Japanese Studies—to complement the large number of Japanese manufacturing plants in thesurrounding area.28 It is generally proposed that all these new departments shouldcombine practical language training with such subjects as business studies, law,economics and engineering. Given the somewhat narrow intellectual basis ofsuch government proposals, the role of Japanese financial help in sustainingbroader linguistic and cultural studies has become even more significant.

As a result of these recent developments a new generation of scholars inJapanese studies has appeared whose work is surprisingly broad and varied—ranging from defence studies to Japanese business and finance. One might alsonote, and this is a separate trend, that research in social anthropology is now alarger element in British Japanese studies than in the past. This has led to thecreation of a social anthropology workshop in Oxford which has organised smallbut important seminars and conferences. Despite these welcome trends therecruitment of new faculty members, in many fields, remains extremely difficult.Such problems are in part the result of the past neglect of postgraduate studies.They are also the product of the very high salaries which are now available toJapanese graduates in the financial sector.

Nevertheless, there is much in the state of contemporary Japanese studies thatis varied and stimulating. Discussion of language teaching methods— whetherfor undergraduates or the general public—is more active than for many years.29

The study of Japanese technology has become a new focus of interest, and a newunit devoted to this field has been established at the University of Edinburgh.The use of computers for the gathering and distribution of information is also amatter of broad interest in many fields of Japanese studies. Notions of librarycollaboration have been further strengthened by these developments in computertechnology. In addition the provision of short study visits for undergraduates hasalso become a matter of increasing concern in virtually all centres of Japanesestudies. All these developments will ultimately contribute to higher academicstandards and improved linguistic proficiency.

Recently the loss of talented British scholars to North America has beenreversed and a significant number of Japanese and American academics havebeen appointed to British institutions. This has created a more varied andpotentially more stimulating academic community than at any previous time.


Finally, one may ask, is there anything distinctive about Japanese studies inBritain in the late 1980s? Perhaps themes of both weakness and strength areapparent from this brief survey. Economists and technologists with a knowledgeof the Japanese language remain disproportionately few—but a widespreadinterest in the economic and technical aspects of Japan’s development is perhapsmore apparent in the United Kingdom than in some European countries.Conversely, a deep concern with applied linguistic research regarding Japaneseremains relatively rare in the British academic community. British universitiesalso lack specialists in the study of Japanese fine arts, something which isespecially regrettable in view of the richness of British collections of the Edoperiod and earlier works.30 Despite widespread public interest in archaeology,Britain is also surprisingly lacking in scholars of the earliest phase of Japan’sdevelopment. Furthermore, given the strong British tradition of research intodiplomatic history it is surprising that little work is currently in progress on thenon-economic aspects of present day Anglo-Japanese relations.

Perhaps what distinguishes British Japanese studies most is its overall variety—the scope for individual experiment and enterprise in a highly pluralisticpattern of centres and departments. Nevertheless, concern must remain thathumanistic cultural studies receive relatively little attention in these pragmatictimes. This concern is not merely a product of traditional academic purism. Closecommunication with a wide variety of Japanese is substantially helped byknowledge and understanding of the non-economic aspects of Japan’s past andpresent day development.

It is easy to express regret at this aspect of the current situation but perhaps adeeper regret concerns British scholars’ failure to see the considerableadvantages which they possess, and the broader role which they could play in thedevelopment of international academic cooperation. As Western Europeans whohave competence in both English and Japanese, British scholars are ideallyplaced to act as academic intermediaries within the triangle of Europe, NorthAmerica and Japan—not to mention the English-speaking communities ofAustralasia and South East Asia.31 Given these advantages one hopes that BritishJapanologists will develop increasing links with scholars across three continents,all of whom seek a deeper understanding of Japanese civilisation.

NOTES

1. For an account of wartime language courses see � ba Sadao, Sench� -RondonNihongo gakk� (Tokyo, 1988).

.2. ‘There is now no post in Japanese anywhere in the United Kingdom outside theSchool of Oriental and African Studies.’

‘Since 1942, there has been a large increase in the number of lecturers andinstructors in the Chinese and Japanese languages at the School of Oriental andAfrican Studies needed to deal with service students. In the case of Japanese the


total number of teachers is about 30 and in that of Chinese about 10. Of these onlysix hold regular peacetime appointments.’

Report of the Interdepartmental Commission of Enquiry into Oriental, Slavonic,East European and African Studies (London, 1947), pp. 9, 103 respectively.

3. Britain’s declining role in post-war Japan is fully documented in Roger Buckley,Occupation diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan 1945–1952(Cambridge, 1982).

4. In particular it was believed that China’s post-war reconstruction would provide amarket for British capital goods, Report of the Interdepartmental Commission ofEnqiiiry…p. 107.

5. ‘In the case of Japanese there is the additional reason that it is of the utmostimportance to study what Japanese scholars have written about Chinese culture,particularly as regards those branches such as cultural and economic history andpolitical history, which have been neglected in Europe.’ Ibid. p. 107.

6. Ibid. p. 70.7. ‘During the 1947–52 quinquennium the Oriental Faculty increased its staff from 9

to 32. This nearly quadrupled the numbers. Eight of the posts were in Far Easternstudies, and after London Cambridge came to be the strongest university in thisfield.’ University Grants Committee: Report of the Sub-Committee on Oriental,Slavonic, East European and African Studies (London, 1961) p. 15. For a briefaccount of later developments in Japanese language teaching in Oxford see BrianPowell: ‘The BA in Japanese at Oxford’ Japan Forum Vol. 1, No. 1 April 1989 pp.101–106.

8. F C Jones Hugh Borton and B R Pearn: Survey of international affairs 1939–1946.The Far East, 1942–1946 (RIIA) (London, 1955).

9. F C Jones: Japan’s new order in East Asia; its rise and fall, 1937–1945 (RIIA)(London, 1954)

10. For a brief account of Sansom’s academic career in the United States see KatharineSansom, Sir George Sansom and Japan, a memoir (Tallahassee, Florida, 1972), pp.160–76. Regret at London University’s failure to secure Sansom’s services isexpressed in F J Daniels, Japanese studies in the University of London andelsewhere. An inaugural lecture delivered on 7 November 1962 (London, 1963) p.17.

11. (RIIA) (London, 1960).12. Early research carried out at the Far East Centre is reflected in four volumes of St

Antony’s papers (Far Eastern Affairs) which were edited by G F Hudson. ForRichard Storry’s work at St Antony’s, see Dorothie Storry, Second country: Thestory of Richard Storry and Japan 1913–1982 (Ashford, 1986).

13. For Professor Beasley’s inaugural lecture see W G Beasley, The basis of Japaneseforeign policy in the nineteenth century (London, 1955).

14. University Grants Committee: Report of the Sub-Committee on Oriental, Slavonic,East European and African Studies (London, 1961).

15. Ibid. pp. 3–516. Some of the objectives of the Sheffield Centre are articulated in Geoffrey Bownas,

From Japanology to Japanese studies (Inaugural leture delivered 14 December1966) (Sheffield, 1966).

17. UGC, Report of the Sub-Committee on Oriental, Slavonic, East European andAfrican Studies pp. 63–1110.


18. W G Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford, 1973); R P Dore, Education inTokugawa Japan (London, 1965); I H Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance; thediplomacy of two island empires, 1894–1907 (London, 1966).

19. ‘Nichi-Ei ky� d� seimei’ (3 October 1973), Gaimush� : Waga gaik� no kinky� (No.18) Vol. 2. Shiry� hen (Tokyo, 1974) p. 38.

20. This followed an initial planning conference at Emmanuel College, Cambridge in1975 The Proceedings, Vols I–II, were published by the Centre for JapaneseStudies, University of Sheffield.

21. The research carried out at the Nissan Institute is reflected in the series Nissanoccasional papers and the Nissan Institute, Japanese studies series of monographspublished by Croom Helm and Routledge.

22. Most of the papers presented at these Symposia have been published in theInternational studies series issued by the Suntory Toyota International Centre forEconomics and Related Disciplines.

23. Cambridge’s development plan under the Scarborough Report envisaged theappointment of a Professor of Japanese in 1955. In fact Professor Bowring wasappointed in 1985. (The author is grateful to Dr Peter Kornicki for thisinformation).

24. Sir Peter Parker, Speaking for the future, a review of the requirements of diplomacyand commerce for Asian and African languages and area studies (UGC, February1986).

25. Ibid, pp. 66–67.26. Ibid, p. 15.27. Ibid, pp. 19–21.28. New Chairs were created at the Universities of Stirling, Newcastle and Wales.29. The Japanese Language Association (JLA) has recently been established to

encourage language teaching outside the University sector. In 1987 the BAJSbegan discussion of language teaching materials and in 1988 the Department ofTrade and Industry sponsored a study of language teaching methods in Japan,North America and Western Europe.

30. The importance of these collections is reflected in the creation of the new ToshibaGallery at the Victoria and Albert Museum (1986) and the construction of newpremises for the Japanese collections at the British Museum. Both thesedevelopments are largely the product of generous Japanese donations.

31. One might note that the establishment of the European Association for JapaneseStudies was largely the outcome of a conference organised by St Antony’s College,Oxford, and the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, in 1973. It isworth adding that the forthcoming formation of the European Association ofJapanese Resource Specialists stems from the initiative taken at this JapaneseColloquium organised by the British library.


Epilogue

First published in Gordon Daniels and Chushichi Tsuzuki, The

History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600–2000. Vol. 5: Social and

Cultural Perspectives, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002, pp. 3–16

53Elites, Governments and Citizens: SomeBritish Perceptions of Japan, 1850–2000

IN THE NINETEENTH and twentieth centuries British perceptions of Japanhave been moulded and remoulded by complex and rapidly changingcircumstances. The transformation of Japan and the transformation of Britainhave shaped both realities and perceptions, while government cultural policies,developments in communications, and the spread of popular education have allbeen potent influences on British ideas. This essay will outline some major shiftsin British perceptions of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Japan, and suggestthe many forces which have created and modified elite and popular attitudes.

In the years preceding the American opening of Japan in 1854 Britishcommentators, writing for the aristocracy and rising middle class, alreadydemonstrated a significant interest in Japan’s condition. In London andEdinburgh news of the American naval expedition stimulated much writing onJapanese history and society. At this time no significant Victorian writer hadvisited Japan or studied its language; consequently all authors relied upon earlierEuropean accounts as their major sources of information. Virtually all eighteenthand early nineteenth-century European writing had described Japan’s relativelystable condition under the Tokugawa shoguns. Hence admiration for Japanesestability and social achievements was often expressed in British articles andreviews. A typical exponent of such views was the Times journalist AlexanderKnox who contributed a major review article ‘Japan’ to the Edinburgh Review, inOctober 1852.1 In the survey Knox wrote ‘Everything is so immutable in thisempire that things remain at the present in Japan pretty much as they were inKaempfer’s time’ (circa 1690).2 Knox did criticize Japanese ‘licentiousness’ and‘cruelty’, and resorted to biblical and medieval European metaphors to explainJapanese institutions, but overall his views were strongly positive. He saw Japanas distinct from other Asian societies and concluded ‘amidst Asiatics theJapanese stand supreme. Can the tribes of India, or the teeming swarms of Chinafor a moment contest the palm with the chivalrous Japanese… We can find nonation or tribe in history with whom we might compare the Japanese, but by aneffort of misplaced ingenuity’.3

By 1859 America’s treaty with the Shogun’s government had been signed, andAdmiral Stirling’s first Anglo-Japanese agreement had been followed by the Earl

of Elgin’s more significant treaty.4 These Anglo-Japanese diplomatic contactssoon stimulated the writing of popular and serious accounts of contemporaryJapan, all of which were based on direct experience. Within a year of Elgin’smission to the Shogun’s capital Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine had publisheda series of articles by Captain Sherard Osborn who had accompanied Elgin onhis flagship HMS Furious. Despite Osborn’s direct experience of Japan, hisdescriptions echoed Knox’s romantic and idyllic tone. A typical passageproclaimed ‘Japan shows signs of a high order of civilisation, energy and wealth,which modern Greece decidedly does not exhibit, whatever it did in oldendays’.5 Of particular significance was Osborn’s tribute to the intelligence ofJapanese officials and their adaptability:

When one saw how full of intelligence all the higher classes in Japan were— how capable of appreciating the skill and mechanism employed in anyof the marvels of scientific labour Great Britain contains…it was a subjectof regret that a screw schooner…should have been the only specimen sentof our mechanical or manufacturing skill.’6

Osborn’s experience of Japan may have been the main inspiration for his series ofarticles but Toshio Yokoyama has suggested that Osborn’s cousin did much toedit the manuscripts to satisfy the publisher’s desire for a pleasant traveloguewhich would attract non-specialist readers.7

In 1859 Osborn’s work was followed by Laurence Oliphant’s Narrative of theEarl of Elgin’s Mission to China and Japan in the years 1857, 1858 and 1859.Oliphant had served as Elgin’s secretary and experienced Japan before the onsetof anti-foreign violence and arson. Even more significant was his ignorance of thespecial prior preparation of cities and citizens for the visit of British envoys.8

Equally influential in the shaping of Oliphant’s work was his own awareness ofthe likely success of a rose-tinted travelogue in attracting readers. The attractionsof the book were further enriched by the inclusion of many colouredillustrations. Like Osborn, Oliphant concentrated on many positive aspects ofJapanese life and administration. He wrote ‘the whole system of municipalgovernment in the cities of Japan, seems very perfect’, while he praised theJapanese education system with particular enthusiasm, claiming ‘in that respect atall events…they are decidedly in advance of us’.9 Oliphant was often critical ofBritish society and this observation may have reflected his awareness of Britisheducational inadequacies, a decade before the 1870 Education Act.

With the opening of British diplomatic and commercial relations with Japan in1859 anti-foreign violence became a serious threat to British diplomats andmerchants. As a result the next major work on Japan provided a darker and morecomplex analysis. Rutherford Alcock’s The Capital of the Tycoon, published in1862, was an account of the author’s three-year term as Britain’s first diplomaticrepresentative in Edo. Alcock had travelled more widely in the Japanese interiorthan previous Englishmen and he admired the cleanliness of country villages.

ELITES, GOVERNMENTS AND CITIZENS: SOME BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN, 1850–2000 523

However, his experience of political killings and samurai attacks on foreigners(including the wounding of Laurence Oliphant) led him to view Japan as a feudalsociety. He wrote ‘with the Japanese we take a step backward some ten centuriesto live over again the feudal days’.10 More specifically he likened Japanesepolitical murders to ‘scenes of daily bloodshed and murder when Guelphs andGhibellines fought and slew each other’.11 Alcock’s depiction of Japan as acountry of primitive violence and natural disasters was one which would recur inlater British accounts of modern Japan.

Despite Alcock’s direct experience of Japan, his knowledge of the Japaneselanguage was flawed and limited. In contrast the refined linguistic skills of theex-diplomat Algernon Mitford led him to a profound empathy with Japan, and asophisticated understanding which marked a new stage in British perceptiveness.In articles which he contributed to the Cornhill Magazine in 1869 Mitford wroteof samurai not as the threatening swordsmen who appeared in Alcock’s work butas ‘gentlemen’ who appeared analogous to British aristocrats. What is moreMitford’s eyewitness account of a death by ritual suicide placed emphasis on the‘extreme dignity and punctiliousness’ of the occasion rather than its violence andinhumanity.12 Perhaps such attitudes reflected the increasing emphasis onstoicism and self-control in British public schools and the armed services.

The overthrow of the Shogun’s administration in 1868 and the establishment ofthe Meiji state soon stimulated new appraisals of Japanese politics and society.Indeed, the new government’s dramatic series of social, economic and politicalreforms impressed both experts and globe-trotting visitors. In 1872 Mitford, whohad celebrated traditional Japan, now wrote ‘Four years ago we were still in themiddle ages—we have leapt at a bound into the nineteenth century—out ofpoetry into plain useful prose.’13 In the same year the scholar-diplomatW.G.Aston adopted a similar tone in Macmillans Magazine and commented ‘oneedict followed another, many privileges of the upper-class were abolished…andthe lower class were raised in position…it seems as if a sudden passion hadseized up the people to pull down and abolish everything that was old’.14

Similarly after a short visit, the radical MP Sir Charles Dilke, who had no linguisticexpertise, also sensed the melodrama of Japanese change, stating ‘What can be,or ever has been, in the history of the world, more singular than the combinationof the extreme democracy of spirit of its government with the blind tradition thatis personified in the Mikado?’15

Rapid architectural and social change was manifestly evident in thetownscapes of Tokyo and major ports, but British evaluations of Japanesemodernization were also shaped by actions of the Meiji government designed toinfluence western minds and media.

In 1879 the Liberal MP Sir E.J.Reed, who had designed warships for Japan’snew navy, was invited to Japan by the Meiji government as part of a deliberateprogramme to gain overseas support for treaty revision. Having receivedgenerous official hospitality it is hardly surprising that Reed’s two-volume workJapan, which he wrote on his return, was fulsome in its praise of the current


regime.16 Reed celebrated Japan’s supposedly careful pace of change, claimingthat its government had resolved ‘to make forward neither too swiftly for thepeace and security of the nation, nor too slowly for the rapid development ofthose representative institutions, which, as they know, form the surest basis forinternal tranquillity and external respect’.17

In contrast, Isabella Bird, the first British woman writer to visit Japan,produced a remarkably frank travelogue, Unbeaten Tracks in Japan. In 1878 shetravelled long distances in Northern Honshu and Hokkaido, areas which weredistant from the prosperous towns and villages of the Kanto and Kansai. Thesenorthern regions were economically backward, and may have sufferedgovernmental neglect following their support for the Shogun in the civil war of1868–69. No one could deny Miss Bird’s courage or the kindness of herJapanese guide, but her travels would have been impossible without the supportof British diplomats in securing a passport for her journeys. These officials mayalso have seen her as a informal gatherer of useful intelligence. Miss Birdclaimed to present a ‘faithful picture of peasant life’ and dwelt much uponpoverty and sickness.18 In a typical passage she wrote: ‘It is painful to see theprevalence of such repulsive maladies as scabies, scald head, ringworm, sore eyeand unwholesome looking eruptions, and fully thirty per cent of the villagepeople are badly seamed with small pox.’19 At a place recorded as ‘Kurumatoge’ she commented: ‘The crowd was filthy and squalid beyond description.Why should the “quiver” of poverty be so very full? One asks as one looks at theswarm of gentle naked…children, born to…hard toil, to be like their parents,devoured by vermin and pressed hard for tax.’20 Despite her chronicle of povertyand suffering Miss Bird recognized the good intentions of the Meiji government.Much of what she saw clearly illustrated ‘the difficulties which the governmenthas to encounter in its endeavour to raise masses of people as deficient as theseare in some of the first requirements of civilization’.21

By 1889 Japan was not only served by numerous steamship lines but the fans,prints and lacquerware which she exported had contributed to a widespread viewin Britain of Japan as a land of delicate exotic beauty, a view which wasexpressed to some extent in the Gilbert and Sullivan operetta The Mikado.22 Thisview was also conveyed in part, by Rudyard Kipling in his published ‘letters’from Japan which he wrote in 1889.

Kipling’s family links with the artist Burne-Jones and the Arts and Craftssocialist William Morris probably contributed to his sympathetic view oftraditional Japanese dress, pottery and design. However, his long residence inBritish-ruled India made his evaluation of an independent Asian countryparticularly complex. Kipling’s positive responses to Japan’s daily life and scenerywere also helped by the existence of comfortable western-style hotels, English-language guidebooks and his reading of E.J.Reed’s pro-Japanese work; but hislack of linguistic knowledge contributed to very questionable judgements.23 Athis most complimentary he wrote: ‘Japan is a great people. Her masons play with


stone, her carpenters with wood, her smiths with iron, and her artists with life,death and all the eye can take in.’24

However, Kipling was deeply averse to Japan’s headlong westernization and asa stern conservative deplored any moves in a liberal political direction. Suchviews were probably strengthened by his observation of Japan’s current politicalinstability. He commented:

A constitution is the worst thing in the world for a people who are blessedwith souls above the average. It makes them vote; it makes them talk aboutpolitics, it makes them edit newspapers and start factories…the firstdemand of the artistic temperament is mundane uncertainty.25

The 1880s saw further visits to Japan by British admirers of Japanese landscape,craft and design; but by 1894 Japan’s successful economic and militarydevelopment had stimulated a major innovation in British interpretations ofJapan.26 In 1887 and 1892 Lord Curzon visited Tokyo, and in 1894 he publisheda major political and diplomatic analysis Problems of the Far East. Curzon hadalready established himself as a published authority on Russia in Central Asiaand Persia and the Persian Question and had served in the India Office.Furthermore his status secured him the help of British diplomats during his visit.The Japanese government’s ambitious programme of publishing reports andstatistics in English were further aids to his purposeful inquiries. The seriousnessof this author’s intent was clear from his opening statement ‘There will benothing in these pages of the Japan of temples, tea-houses and bric-a-brac, thatinfinitesimal segment of the national existence which the traveller is so prone tomistake for the whole’.27 Rather Curzon sought to explore ‘the effects of a nationstill in pupilage to assume the manners of a full grown man’. This author was notuncritical of many features of Japanese politics, but he was surprisingly willingto acknowledge Japanese virtues and see similarities between problems inLondon and Tokyo. During Curzon’s stay conflicts between the government andthe newly formed Diet were often close to deadlock but he interpreted thesedifficulties as somewhat akin to the conflict between the Lords and theCommons in Britain.28 More specifically he likened Ito Hirobumi’s governmentto ‘a Whig cabinet, composed of the great Whig families, the Cavendishes andthe Russells of modern Japan’.29 Following Japan’s victory over China in 1895,Curzon made some amendments to his first edition, but his comments remainedsympathetic and restrained. Of Japan’s future he wrote ‘Endowed not merelywith an intelligent and enterprising people but with ample riches—there is scarcelyany limit that need be set within a given area, to the commercial expansion ofJapan.’30 Perhaps conscious of the shared interests of an Imperial Britain and arising Japan in resisting Russian expansion, Curzon was careful to complimentJapan’s current rulers on their ‘temperate self-restraint’ and ‘liberal sentiments’before urging upon them ‘a friendly understanding with China, interested likeherself in keeping at a distance…the Muscovite from the north’.31


In the first years of the twentieth century Britain’s overseas policies anddomestic institutions were objects of widespread criticism and reappraisal. Suchcontroversies were given additional intensity by the growth of popularnewspapers and the electorate’s increased interest in political rivalries andinternational conflict. The belief that German and Russian expansion threatenedBritain’s imperial position contributed to the signing of the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance in 1902. Fear of German, French and American commercialcompetition generated a major debate on educational reform and nationalefficiency. Within this Henry Dyer played a vocal and energetic role. As a youngman Dyer had served as the first principal of the Imperial College of Engineeringin Tokyo, an institution which pioneered many aspects of engineering education.Enthused by memories of this experience, Dyer published Dai Nippon, theBritain of the East. A Study in National Evolution in 1904. This work clearlystated that ‘Britain should not be above learning a few lessons from Japan’.32 Morespecifically (unconsciously echoing Oliphant’s opinions in the 1850s) he noted‘the educational arrangements of Japan are very complete’.33 Dyer continued‘Those who have had the advantage of them have been fitted to take an activeand intelligent part in the great developments which have taken place’.34 Thiswriter was impressed by Japanese forms of practical education but he was alsoinspired by what he saw as its psychological or spiritual basis. He concluded

The chief lesson to be learnt from Japan is the need for a truly national spiritfor the accomplishment of great ends… Our greatest need is a consciousnational aim to which all our efforts would be constantly directed, and towhich the latest developments of science would be efficiently applied.35

In sections of his work Dyer exaggerated the self-sacrifice, self-control andidealism of the Japanese people, but this is hardly surprising. He retainedfriendly links with many of his ex-students in Japan and Japan’s growingstrength was a material reality. Furthermore the creation of the Anglo-Japanesealliance had endorsed Japan’s claim to be regarded as a disciplined andsuccessful modern state. Even more significant was Dyer’s reliance on English-language materials, many of which were provided by Japanese governmentofficials or Japanophile westerners. Among his most helpful informants Dyersingled out Dr Sakatomi, the Vice-Minister of Finance, who supplied ‘all themost important Government publications’, and ‘my old colleague CaptainBrinkley editor of “The Japan Daily Mail”.’36

From the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance the output of English-language sources from Japanese official agencies increased. FurthermoreJapanese writers such as Nitobe Inazo produced works on Japan which sought toevoke favourable responses amongst British readers.37 Ayako Hotta-Lister hasalso suggested that the Japanese Foreign Ministry may have given financialsupport to books which were, ostensibly, commercial publications.38 Some ofthese volumes could also serve a second purpose, for they fitted well with the


current enthusiasm for the reform of British institutions. The notion of Japan as apossible template for reform received yet further justification from Japan’svictory over Tsarist Russia in 1905. A typical contribution to this flow ofpublications was Alfred Stead’s Great Japan: a Study of National Efficiency.Stead had travelled widely and was a warm enthusiast for the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance.39 Like other books of this genre Stead’s work drew heavily upon booksand articles by Japanese authors which had been published in English. Many ofthese writers, such as Ito Hirobumi and Okuma Shigenobu, were members of thenewly created Meiji aristocracy, and their titles ‘Marquis’ and ‘Count’ probablygave their words particular resonance in Edwardian society.40 Stead interwovelengthy quotations from such sources with his own uncritical assessments ofJapan’s history and recent progress.

He paralleled other Japanophile writers in seeing ‘Bushido’ and thecomprehensive and overwhelming patriotism of the Japanese as the stimuliwhich had enabled them to achieve a moral modernity. He wrote:

There exists no distinction between the welfare of the individual and thewelfare of the State—whoever attacks the state attacks each and everyJapanese subject. The Japanese recognise to the full the duties of patriotismas well as the rights and advantages of citizenship. The individual interestalways gives way to the national… If common thought and anonymousself-sacrifice produce power, the secret of Japanese success in the world isnot far to seek.41

Of particular power—in view of their topicality—were Stead’s references toJapan’s moral conduct in her war with Tsarist Russia. Indeed he devoted wholechapters to Japan’s ‘Humane War’, her ‘Red Cross Society’ and her broad spiritof internationalism. In fact Stead saw Japan as ‘The pioneer of Internationalism’,rather than the leader of a pan-Asian movement against the West.42 According tothis view, Japan was not only successful in refined war and open trading but her‘International morals’ were ‘much higher than those of Europe’. Stead’s idealwas ‘a new triple alliance…when the United States, Japan and Great Britainshall stand together as the guardians of international justice and morality.’44

In the years following the Treaty of Portsmouth British opinions of her EastAsian ally became more divided and complex. Japan’s desire to erect highertariffs troubled some British journalists, while signs that Japan sought aprivileged commercial position in Manchuria and Korea created furtheranxieties.45 It was to counter these strands of journalistic and popular criticism,and to promote Japan’s exports that the Japanese government gave elaborate andexpensive support to the organization of the Japan-British Exhibition at theWhite City in London in 1910.46 The exhibition was intended to demonstrateJapan’s successful modernization and to transform the Anglo-Japanese Alliancefrom an alliance of governments into a broad alliance of peoples. However, likemany Edwardian exhibitions the White City event also aimed to attract and


entertain the public by presenting exotic Villages’. At the White City there wereAinu, Taiwanese and Japanese ‘villages’, as well as demonstrations of Sumo andJapanese musicianship. These unusual attractions probably did most to draweight million visitors, though informed observers paid most attention to theoutstanding displays of Japanese fine arts and design. Particularly remarkablewas the attempt which the exhibition’s organizers made to suggest close parallelsbetween the peoples of the two ‘Island Empires’. The Official Guide referred to‘the striking similitude between the Japs [sic] and our own people’ andconfirmed…‘the resemblance manifests itself in manner, physical stamp andshape of the head. To anyone acquainted with the principles of phrenology theresemblance is very marked…a good augury for the growth of sympathybetween the East and the West.’47

How successful the Japan-British Exhibition was in reshaping the perceptionsof millions of visitors is difficult to determine. But the British press respondedfavourably and even newspapers in such small provincial towns as Scarboroughnow accepted that Japan was an advancing and progressive state.48 Irrespective ofits uncertain outcome the Exhibition constituted the first mass encounter ofBritons with Japanese history and culture, and the first large-scale attempt by theJapanese government to shape British attitudes towards ‘the Island Empire of theEast’.

The events of the First World War concentrated the attention of the British pressand public on conflict in Europe and the Middle East. However, conceptions ofpost-war reconstruction produced a pioneering British analysis of Japanese ruralsociety. Believing that Japan’s small-scale agriculture might provide lessons forthe development of smallholdings in post-war Britain, W. Robertson Scott left forJapan in 1915. This scholar of agricultural communities had already carried outresearch in Denmark and the Netherlands and spent more than three yearstravelling even more widely in provincial Japan than had Isabella Bird in theearly Meiji years.49 The diversity of this researcher’s experiences is apparentfrom his Introduction to The Foundations of Japan which he completed in 1922:

I was present at agricultural shows, at fairs, wrestling matches, Bondances, village and county councils and the strangest of public meetings. Italked not only with farmers and their families but with all kinds oflandlords, with schoolmasters and schoolmistresses, policemen,shopkeepers, priests, cooperative society enthusiasts, village officials,county officials, prefectural officials, a score of Governers and an Ainuchief.50

Like other distinguished British visitors Robertson Scott met members of theJapanese academic and administrative elites, but his contacts also included suchnonconformist figures as the ‘no-church’ Christian Uchimura Kanzo. In hislengthy stay this writer appears to have developed some knowledge of colloquialJapanese and enjoyed the assistance of sympathetic interpreters. His web of


diverse informants and experiences produced a work which was rich ininformation, empathy and analysis. The Foundations of Japan expressedadmiration for progressive aspects of Japanese agriculture and recognized theindividuality and variety which was present in rural life. For its author ‘Japaneseaestheticism, the victorious Japanese army and navy, the smoking chimneys ofOsaka, the pushing mercantile marine, the Parliamentary and administrativedevelopments of Tokyo and a costly worldwide diplomacy are borne on thebacks of—the Japanese peasant and his wife’.51 Robertson Scott clearly favouredrural improvement over ‘erroneous conceptions of national progress’ and,unconsciously, anticipated some of the major economic and political problems ofthe 1930s. More significantly his advocacy of ‘more cooperation’, ‘improvedimplements’ and ‘paddy adjustment’ was to be echoed by American occupiersfollowing the Pacific War.52

Although the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was ended by 1923, British officialswho had worked in Japan in the alliance’s heyday retained their pro-Japanesewarmth. In 1930 Captain Malcom Kennedy, who had been posted to the TokyoEmbassy during the alliance, published The Changing Fabric of Japan. In thiswork Kennedy employed both Japanese and English sources to present aconservative, yet sympathetic assessment of the social changes which Japan hadconfronted since the First World War. Despite the rise of labour, the women’smovement and the growing power of the press Kennedy believed that socialcohesion could be preserved by the pursuit of moderate and balanced policies.Despite his military background and values Kennedy claimed that economicconsiderations dominated Japanese policy making in 1930. He concluded ‘whenit comes to the question of a slight naval sacrifice being necessary as the price ofa real economic gain, that sacrifice will be made, provided that the requirementsof national defence are not made to suffer unduly.’53

During the 1930s new domestic and international factors increasinglytransformed Japan and British perceptions of her. Japan’s military expansion inManchuria in 1931, and her creation of the satellite state of Manchukuo in 1932,significantly undermined Japan’s earlier reputation in Britain as a supporter ofinternational cooperation. Her departure from the League of Nations furtherdeepened popular mistrust at a time when support for ‘peace’ and ‘collectivesecurity’ was particularly widespread in Britain. Developments in Japanesedomestic policies created yet further disenchantment with the Japanese state andits culture. The replacement of civilian leaders by ministers with a militarybackground suggested the general militarization of Japanese society, while theviolent activities of exotically named patriotic societies further reinforced thistrend. Assassinations of civilian, business and political leaders and the failedmilitary coup of 26 February 1936 all revived notions of Japan as an inherentlyviolent, exotic and unstable society. If anything the events of the early andmid-1930s suggested a return to the samurai violence of the 1860s and 1870swhich had preceded and followed the Meiji Restoration.


The significance of such events for British public opinion was deepened bychanges in Britain which had followed the First World War. Popular awarenessof international affairs had grown and active popular concern at Japaneseexpansion was more widespread than at any previous time. These attitudes weregiven even greater intensity by the activities of such organizations as the Leagueof Nations Union; and the rise of new media of mass communication. Thedevelopment of photojournalism in the popular press, the spread of cinemanewsreels and growing radio coverage of foreign affairs coincided with events inEast Asia in which Japan appeared to threaten peace, and Britain’s political andeconomic interests; this, at a time when Japanese textiles were increasinglyentering British home and colonial markets. The outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 reinforced popular British antipathy to Japan, andcreated a perception that China was a victim state in international society.54

Amid these events not only were the mass media more powerful influences thanbooks written for an elite or general readership but writers who were inherentlysympathetic to Japanese life and society found it increasingly difficult towithhold disapproval and disillusion from their work. The Japanophileeconomist G.C.Allen, who had lectured ‘for three years in a Government Collegeat Nagoya’ in the 1920s, was but one example.55 In 1936 he paid a research visitto Japan and held consultations with close and long standing Japanese friends.On his return he wrote Japan: The Hungry Guest, a work which was completedafter the outbreak of the war in China. Writing of this conflict he sadly observed

Territorial expansion and the development of a flourishing export trade areto some extent, alternative policies for Japan… It is difficult to believe thatJapan is strong enough to pursue both of these policies successfully, andshe now seems to have trusted her fate to the former.56

Clearly the events of the Pacific War produced anti-Japanese propaganda inBritain, but it was the war’s realities rather than works of propaganda that hadthe biggest impact on British perceptions. In 1910 the Japanese government hadcreated the Japan-British Exhibition to engineer the first mass encounter ofBritish citizens with Japan’s culture and people. During the Pacific War thevictories of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy resulted in a second large-scale British experience of Japanese culture and conduct. The imprisonment andill-treatment of tens of thousands of British prisoners of war constituted thisexperience; and generated widespread hostility to Japan. This hostility reflectedboth the severity of the prisoners’ suffering and the numerical scale of this harshmeeting between British and Japanese servicemen.57

In the post-war world British books which describe or analyse Japan havebeen less significant than the mass media and direct experience in shapingpopular perceptions. For more than a decade after 1945 films such as A TownLike Alice and Bridge on the River Kwai revived and prolonged popularawareness of the suffering of British prisoners of war.58 In contrast, Japanese


films helped to initiate a new enthusiasm for Japanese artistry and aesthetics. Bythe mid-1950s British critics were hailing Kurosawa’s Seven Samurai as amodern masterpiece and in the 1960s the works of Ozu, Mizoguchi and Oshimaentered the repertoire of the National Film Theatre and cinemas specializing inforeign films.59 The organization of major Japanese film seasons was oftenencouraged by such cultural impresarios as Kawakita Kashiko. From 1973 thegovernment-supported Japan Foundation has organized successful film festivals,exhibitions and educational projects, while Japanese corporations donatedgenerously to major British museums.

In the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s a new amalgam of economic and culturaltrends refined and diversified British perceptions of Japan. Rising imports ofhigh-quality Japanese electronic goods impressed millions of consumers, whilevisits by large numbers of polite and freespending Japanese tourists helped todissolve notions of Japanese as spartan and inscrutable. Potentially of greaterimportance was the organization of a new form of mass Anglo-Japanese contact.In the late 1970s, the British and Japanese governments cooperated to establishthe JET programme to ensure a continuing and growing flow of British graduatesto teach English in Japanese schools. This ensured the transmission of directexperience of Japanese daily life to many thousands of British citizens.60

Early Victorian perceptions of Japan were often quasi-fantasies created by anarrow elite for a middle-class readership. In fact elements of exotic fantasywere seen as aids to a publication’s commercial success. In the late Meiji periodpublished descriptions were more diverse and approving, and were increasinglyinfluenced by the availability of Japanese government materials in English. Thistendency reached its apogee in the years of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, analliance which also inspired the holding of the Japan-British exhibition—apioneering attempt to introduce a broader British public to a three-dimensionalrepresentation of Japanese history and culture.

In the interwar and wartime years new mass media and hostile directexperiences created largely critical and bitter perceptions of Japan. However,since the San Francisco Treaty cultural, economic and citizen level contacts havegradually produced more diverse yet sympathetic attitudes. In more recent yearsinformation technology, satellite television, jet transport and enlightened culturalagencies have brought variety, complexity and increasing reality to Britishinterpretations of contemporary Japan.

NOTES

1. ‘Japan’, Edinburgh Review, vol. 96 (1852), pp. 348–83.2. Ibid., p. 359.3. Ibid., p. 351.4. For an introduction to early Victorian Anglo-Japanese relations see W.G.Beasley,

Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834–1858 (London: Luzac, 1951).


5. S.Osborn, ‘A Cruise in Japanese Waters’, Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine, vol.85 (1860), p. 60.

6. Ibid., p. 57.7. Toshio Yokoyama, Japan in the Victorian Mind: Study of Stereotyped Images of a

Nation, 1850–80 (London: Macmillan, 1987), p. 28.8. Ibid., p. 54.9. Laurence Oliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin’s Mission to China and Japan in

the years 1857, 1858 and 1859 (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood andSon, 1859), vol. 2, pp. 139 and 179.

10. Sir Rutherford Alcock, The Capital of the Tycoon, A Narrative of Three Years’Residence in Japan (London: Longman Green, 1863), vol. 1, p. xix.

11. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 353.12. A.B.Mitford, ‘A Japanese Sermon’, The Cornhill Magazine, vol. 20 (1869), pp.

196– 204; ‘Another Japanese Sermon’, Ibid., pp. 356–62; ‘The Execution by HaraKiri’, Ibid., pp. 549–54; Ibid., p. 551.

13. A.B.Mitford, ‘Wanderings in Japan—ll’, The Cornhill Magazine, vol. 25 (1872), p.319,

14. ‘Japan’, Macmillans Magazine, vol. 26 (1872), p. 496.15. C.W.Dilke, ‘English Influence in Japan’, Fortnightly Review, vol. 20 (1876) New

Series, p. 433.16. E.J.Reed, Japan, Its History, Tradition and Religions, With a Narrative of a Visit, 2

vols (London: John Murray, 1880). The author’s indebtedness to Japanesehospitality and sources of information is outlined in a lengthy Preface.

17. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 354, 18. Isabella Bird, Unbeaten Tracks in Japan, Virago Travellers edition (London:

Virago, 1984, first published 1880), note 1, p. 100.19., Ibid., p. 81.20. Ibid., p. 97.21. Ibid., note 1, p. 100.22. First performed at the Savoy Theatre, London, 14 March 1885. It ran for 672

performances.23. Hugh Cortazzi and George Webb (eds), Kipling’s Japan: Collected Writings

(London: The Athlone Press, 1988), p. 8.24. Ibid., p. 92.25. Ibid., p. 106.26. For example, in 1876–77. The designer Christopher Dresser (1834–1904) visited

Japan.27. George Nathaniel Curzon, Problems of the Far East (revised edition) (London:

Constable, 1896), pp. xii–xiii.28. Ibid., pp. 19–20.29. Ibid., p. 32.30. Ibid., p. 387.31. Ibid., pp. 386, 392, 394.32. Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, the Britain of the East. A Study in National Evolution

(London: Blackie and Son, 1904), p. 425.33. Ibid., p. 426.34. Ibid., p. 426.35. Ibid., p. 428.


36. Ibid., pp. ix–x.37. For example, Inazo Nitobe, Bushido, the Soul of Japan, first published in 1905.38. Ayako Hotta-Lister, The Japan-British Exhibition of 1910: Gateway to the Island

Empire of the East (Richmond: Japan Library, Curzon Press, 1999), p. 94.39. For Alfred Stead’s life (1877–1933) see Who Was Who, 1929–1940, vol. 3

(London: Adam and Charles Black, 1941), p. 1283.40. These titles were the outcome of the Peerage Act of July 1884.41. Alfred Stead, Great Japan. A Study of National Efficiency (London: John Lane,

The Bodley Head, 1906), p. 1.42. Stead devoted Chapter 14 to ‘Humane War’, p. 286ff., Chapter 15 to ‘Red Cross

Society’, pp. 323ff., and Chapter 19 to ‘The Pioneer of Internationalism’, pp.427ff.

43. Ibid., p. 444.44. Ibid., p. 475.45. Ayako Hotta-Lister, The Japan-British Exhibition of 1910: Gateway to the Island

Empire of the East (Richmond: Japan Library, Curzon Press, 1999), pp. 9–37.46. Ibid., pp. 74–99.47. Ibid., p. 178.48. Ibid., p. 113.49. For J.W.Robertson Scott’s life see E.T.Williams and C.S.Nicholls (eds), The

Dictionary of National Biography, 1961–1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1981), pp. 889–90.

50. J.W.Robertson Scott, The Foundations of Japan. Notes Made During Journeys of 6,000 miles in the Rural Districts as a Basis for a Sounder Knowledge of theJapanese People (London: John Murray, 1922), p. x.

51. Ibid., p. ix.52. Ibid., p. 370.53. M.D.Kennedy, The Changing Fabric of Japan (London: Constable, 1930), p. 270.54. The destructive nature of Japanese military action in China was often shown in

British Movietone News cinema newsreels.55. G.C.Allen, Japan: the Hungry Guest (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1938), p.

9.56. Ibid., p. 253. 57. A typical work describing Japanese ill-treatment of prisoners of war was Edward

Frederick Langley Russell (Lord Russell of Liverpool), The Knights of Bushido—AShort History of Japanese War Crimes (London: Cassell, 1958).

58. A Town Like Alice, directed by Joseph Janni (1956), The Bridge on the River Kwai,directed by David Lean (1957).

59. A major Ozu and Mizoguchi season was held at the National Film Theatre, Londonin 1963. An Oshima season was held at the National Film Theatre in 1969.

60. See David Chandler and David Kootnikoff (eds), The JET Programme: GettingBoth Feet Wet (Sheffield: David Chandler, 1999).


Bibliography

BOOKS

Guide to the Reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (ed.), London:Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1981

Europe Interprets Japan (ed.), Tenterden: Paul Norbury Publications,1984Europe and Japan: Changing Relationships Since 1945 (joint ed. with R.Drifte),

Woodchurch: Paul Norbury Publications, 1986Japanese for Industry and Commerce (with P.T.Harries), Sheffield & Oxford, 1989Britain and Japan, 1851–1991: Themes and Personalities (joint ed. with H.Cortazzi),

London: Routledge, 1991Japanese Information Sources (joint ed.), 1992Sir Harry Parkes, British Representative in Japan, 1865–1883, Richmond: Japan Library,

1996Social and Cultural Perspectives (joint ed. with C.Tsuzuki), Vol. V, The History of

Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002

OTHER WRITINGS NOT INCLUDED IN THISCOLLECTION

‘Japan in the World’ in Howard Smith (ed.) Inside Japan, 1981‘The European Community and Japan’ (with Ian Gow) in Juliet Lodge (ed.), The

European Community, Bibliographical Excursions, 1983‘The British Cabinet and East Asia, 1945–50’ in Chihiro Hosoya (ed.), Japan and

Postwar Diplomacy in the Asian-Pacific Region, 1984.

Film Index

I. ANGLO-AMERICAN FILMSBridge on the River Kwai 512Orphans of the Storm 472

The Purple Heart xiiA Town Like Alice 512

II. GERMAN-JAPANESE CO-PRODUCTIONThe New Land 178

III. JAPANESE FEATURE FILMSActress 474All out Attack on Singapore 473The Angry Sea 472Barefoot Gen 479Battle of Kawanakajima 471The Beacon Burns in Shanghai 472Black Rain 479Brothers of the Meiji Era 474The Burmese Harp 476, 479Children of the Atomic Bomb 477China Nights 178, 446Earth and Soldiers 178Eros plus Massacre 478Fires on the Plain 477Five Scouts 445Gate of Hell 478Genroku Ch� shingura (The 47 Ronin) 448,

471Harakiri 477Hiroshima 477The Human Condition 477Humanity and Paper Balloons 470If we go to Sea 472In the Realm of the Senses 478The International Smuggling Gang 472Japan’s Longest Day 479Kagemusha 480The Last Chauvinist Group 474The Last Days of Edo 472

The Life of Oharu 478The Lily Tower 476The Love of the Actress Sumako 474MacArthur’s Children 479Man Slashing Horse Piercing Sword 469Martial Law 478The Meiji Emperor and the Great Russo-

Japanese War 476Melody of the Restoration 472Mighty Clan of the Sea 478The Most Beautiful 179, 449Mud and Soldiers 445My Love has been Burning 474No Regrets for our Youth 475The Opium War 471, 472The Pirate Flag is Blasted Away 472Political Theatre 474Sandakan 8, 479Sansho The Bailiff 478Seven Samurai 477, 512Sh� gun Iemitsu and His mentor

Hikozaemon 470Slave Ship 448‘Sugata Sanshiro’ 449Thus the Divine Wind Blows 473The Tiger of Malaya 473Tsubaki Sanjur� 480Vow of the Desert 178, 445

536

The War at Sea from Hawaii to Malaya179, 448, 473IV. JAPANESE DOCUMENTARIES

Burma War Record 179, 448, 473Divine Soldiers of the Skies 450Horse 446, 448Japan in Time of Emergency 444

Malaya War Record 179, 448, 473Tokyo Trial 479The Tragedy of Japan 475Victory Song of The Orient 179, 473

V. JAPANESE MADE NEWSREELSDjawa H� d� 411Nippon Ny� su 408–410, 429–434

537

Index

Abe, Yoshishige 279Air Defence Law 149, 174Air Raid relief 103Air Raid shelters 99, 150Air Raid Warnings 442Alcock, Sir Rutherford 54–55, 504–505Allen, G.C. 227, 344, 512Allen, Louis xxiiiAllied Council for Japan 184–194, 241,

249, 262Allison, John. M. 308–309Amami, Oshima 309Anglo-Japanese History Project xxviii–

xxixAnglo-Japanese Alliance 22, 80, 85, 508,

511Anti-Security Treaty demonstrations xvArai, Hakuseki 327Arnold, General H. 138–139Asakai, Koichiro 240–244Asiatic Society 56, 75Association of British Chambers of

Commerce 221Aston, W.G. 73, 505Atcheson, G. 187–191, 241–243ATIS 265Athletics 461Attlee, C.R. 208Australia 213Azuma, Kagami 327

Ball, W.MacMahon 185, 186, 188, 210,230, 249

Bartlett, Vernon 394–396Baseball 460–463

Beasley, W.G. xv, 493Bell, Ernest (TUC) 215, 216Berendsen, Carl 245, 246, 250–253Berger, G. 331Bevin, Ernest xxiv, 203, 209, 212, 219, 294Binyon, L. 395Bird, Isabella 506Bizeni 38, 65Blakeslee, G. 259Bolland, E 294, 296Borton, Hugh 259, 342, 493Bowles, Gordon 275, 279Bownas, G. xviiiBrinkley, Francis 74, 508British Army Film (Indonesia) 411, 412,

415–419British Association for Japanese Studies

(BAJS) xxi, xxiii, xxviiBritish Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)

393–406British Commonwealth Occupation Force

(BCOF) 248, 288British Trade Exhibition (1965) xviiBritton, Dorothy xiii, xivBrown University xivBrunton, Henry 73Burma ‘independence’ 162Butler, R.A. 205B-29 88, 93, 94, 95, 149–154

Cabinet Information Bureau 177, 439Cabinet Planning Board 168Cabinet Planning Office 156Callaghan, James 199, 219, 226, 289Cambridge (University) 485, 489, 492

538

Canberra Conference 212Capron, Horace 73Censorship (film) 428Central Liaison Office 239, 240, 261Centre for Japanese Studies (Sheffield) xv,

xviii, 494Chatham House (R.I.I.A.) 487Cheke, Dudley 228Chiang, Kai-shek 155, 156China Incident 421, 437Choshu 29, 30, 32, 33, 37, 65Chu, Shih-Ming 185–190Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS)Civil defence 97Civil Information and Education Section

236, 277–284, 474–475College of Engineering (Tokyo) 508Columbia University 339, 343Cominform 297–298Connors, Lesley xivConstitution 235, 263, 308Controls (radio) 436Cooper, Robert xxCraig, Albert xviCraigie, Sir. R.Cripps, Sir. Stafford xxiv, 199, 211, 219Curzon, Lord 507

Dai Nihon Shi 327Dakyu 456Dan, Ikuma xivDavies, Harold 220–222Davis, Jerome 74de la Mare, Arthur 227, 230, 289Dening, Sir. Esler 201, 205, 213, 291Denison, Henry 74Derevyanko, Kuzma 185–87, 244Dilke, Sir. Charles 60, 61, 505Dodge, J. 307Doko, Toshio 385Dokushi, Yoron 327d’Olier, Franklin 140–141, 143Dore, R.P. 493Doshisha University 74Drumright, E.F. 201Dulles, J.F. 309, 312Dyer, Henry 508

Dyke, Kenneth 277

‘Education in Japan’ 77Eiga, Monogatari 326Eikoku, Sakuron 49Eliot, Sir. Charles 337–338Embree, J.F. 258Emperor’s broadcast 425, 443European Association of Japanese

Resource Specialists (EAJRS) xxviiiEuropean Economic Community 367, 375–

76, 379, 380European Parliament 387Evacuation of children 99, 109–115, 150,

163, 174Evatt, H.V. 246–247

Far Eastern Commission (FEC) 184, 210,212, 249–252, 262, 263, 343

Far Eastern Games 462Fearey, R. 259, 329Figges, John 295Film Law 446, 470Fisher, C.A. xvFleming, Peter 396Ford FoundationFox, Grace 50, 51Fraser, Peter 245–246, 249Free trade 27Freyberg, General 248Fujinkai (Taira) 127Fujita, Sh� z� xviii, xixFujiwara, Akira 351Fukuda doctrine 366Fundamental Law of Education 281

Gairdner, General 290–292Gascoigne, Sir. Alvary 200–201, 231, 291–

298GATT (Article 35) 375, 384Gayn, Mark 302Glover, T.B. 31, 33Gomersall, Sir. Stephen xxGovernment Section (GS) 263Great East Asia Conference 162Great East Asia Writers Congress 176Greater East Asia 431


Green, O.M. 396, 401, 402Griffis, W.E. 74Grün, George xivGukansho 326

Hackett, Roger xxiiHall, J.W. xviHall, R.K. 280Hankey, Lord 202, 216–217Hansell, General Haywood 94, 152Harvard University xviiiHasegawa, Nyozekan 470Hatoyama, Ichiro 309Hawking 455Hayashi, Razan 326Hayter, Committee Report xv, xvi, 488,

491Healey, Denis 200, 216Heike Monogatari 326Hersey, John xiiiHino, AshiheiHirohito, Crown Prince 8Hirohito, Emperor xiii, 164, 333, 475Hirota, Koki 399‘History of Non-Military Activities of the

Occupation of Japan’ 303History Study Society (Shigakkai) 327Hokkaido xiii, xxiii, 40, 66, 73, 240, 506Home Ministry 159, 165, 236, 470Honcho Tsugan 327Hosei University xvii, xxHouse, E.H. 57–62, 71, 74Hotta-Lister, Ayako 508Hudson, G.F. xiv, xv, 289, 403, 493Hunter, Janet E. xix

Ichi-go offensive 93Imai, Seiichi 349Imperial Rule Assistance Association 159,

331Imperial Rescript (Education) 274, 278Incendiary bombs 100Indonesia 359, 407–419Industrial Patriotic League 168Inouye, Kiyoshi 350International Christian University, Tokyo

xvii

International Institute for Strategic Studies— 487

International Labour Organisation (ILO)206

International Military Tribunal for the FarEast (IMTFE) 216, 249

Ito, Hirobumi 45, 81, 507, 509Iwakura, Mission 67

Jansen, M.B. xviJapan British Exhibition 80, 509–510Japan Communist Party (JCP) 267–268,

289–298Japan Education Committee 278–280Japan Education Reform Committee 280–

281Japan Foundation xxi, xxiii, 381, 485, 487,

512Japan Literature Patriotic Association 176Japan Proletarian Motion Picture League

470Japan Society 493Japan Teachers Union 284, 477JET 512Jidaigéki 469Jorden, Eleanor H. xviJudo 461

Kabuki 180Kades, Charles 263–264Kagoshima 73–76Kamikaze 425Kano, Jigoro 461‘Kanjinch� ’ 441Kato, Shizue 237Keidanren 485, 495Kennan, G.F. 213Kennedy, Malcolm 511Keynes, J.M. 208, 225Kipling, Rudyard 506Kissinger, Henry xx, 372, 374Kita, Ikki 472Knox, Alexander 503Kokusaku eiga 407Kokutai no Hongi 275Kono, Ichiro 309

540 INDEX

Konoye, Fumimuro 156–160, 164, 199,219, 263

Korea 83, 203Kume, Kunitake 32–37Kurabeuma 461Kurosawa, Akira 179Kyoto xvii 65, 324Kyoto University xxvKyushu, Kita 110

Lancashire 217–219Land Reform 187–188, 229–230, 237, 247League of Nations xiv, 393, 511Le May, General Curtis 94, 153, 164Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 310, 315Lindley, Sir. Francis 400London School of Economics xiii, xivLowe, Peter xxiiiLucky Dragon 309Lvova, Professor xxv

MacArthur, Douglas (Ambassador) 311,313

MacArthur, General Douglas xiii, xiv, xxv,165, 184–185, 190, 198, 204, 211, 234–235, 260–268, 276, 280, 281, 291–293,296–298, 343

MacArthur Memorial xxivMacDermott, D.F. 212, 227–228, 289, 290,

294MacIntosh, A.D. 249, 252Maekawa Report 388Mainichi Shinbun 177Manchester Chamber of Commerce 220–

221Manchuria xiv, 241, 339Marianas 151‘Marriage of Figaro’ 425, 441Masamura, Kimihiro 353Mason, R.H.P. 52–53Matsui, Sumako 474Matsumoto, Joji 263Matsuoka, Yosuke 438Matsuzawa, Hiroaki xxiiMayhew, Christopher 200, 211, 216McCoy, MajorMedieval history 321

Meiji Emperor 476Meirokusha 78Middle East 366, 377Midway 171, 422‘Mikado’ 506Ministry of Education 275–276, 280, 471Minobe, Ry� kichi xixMitford, Algernon 34, 45, 505Mitsui, Baron 203, 218Miyamoto, Musashi 469Modernization series 318Mori, Arinori 60, 77–78Morito, Tatsuo 281Morris, John 226–227Motoori, Norinaga 327

Nagai, Kafu 177Nagoya 110Nakamura, Takafusa 354Nakaoka, Shintaro 324Nambara, Shigeru 278Nara xxNash, Walter 245National Defence Athletics 464National Games 465National General Mobilisation Law 168National Health Insurance Bill 128National Mobilisation Law 156National Police Reserve 268National Recreation Association 464National Spiritual Mobilisation Central

League 147New Order 333New Order in East Asia 157Newsreels 450New Zealand 245–257Nihon H� s� Ky� kai (NHK) xvii, 179, 277,

421, 435–443, 463, 487Nihon Shoki 326Nippon Ny� su Eiga Sha 178, 408, 428–34,

447Nish, Ian xxiii, 23, 494Nissan Corporation 485, 495Nitobe, Inazo 508Nitze, Paul 140, 141, 143Nogi, General M. 83Northedge, F. xiv


Nozaka, Sanzo (Okano, Susumu) 288, 293,297

NSC 13/2, 267

Occupation 318, 320, 479Oe Shinobu 352Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 445Ohira, Masayoshi 378Oka, Sh� hei 477Okawa Sh� mei 179Okubo, Toshimichi 76Okuma, Shigenobu 58, 60, 62, 509Oliphant, Laurence 504, 505Olympic Movement 462Osaka-Kobe 110Osborn, Sherard 504Oshima, Nagisa 478Osugi, Sakae 478Oyama, Professor A. xxOzaki, Hotsumi 170, 176Overflights (Soviet) 308Overseas aid 362Overseas broadcasts 423Oxford University 485, 489, 492, 495, 496

Pacific War 319Palembang 408Pan-Asian propaganda 334Parker, Sir. Peter xxvii, 485, 487, 489Parker Report 488–491, 495–496Parkes, Sir. Harry xv, xvi, 3, 4, 5, 13, 18,

19, 27–40‘Patriotic March’ 180Pauley, Edwin 241Peace Treaty 206, 266, 373Pearl Harbor xi, 160, 421, 473Peninsular and Oriental Line (P and O) 69People’s Republic of China 362, 365, 368,

374Pickthorn, Frank 226Pink, Ivor 294–296Pollution 353Potsdam declaration 276Pre-history 317Press Code 277Prisoners of War (Japanese) 188, 193, 273,

(British) 512

Programming Conference 439‘Purple Heart’ xii

Radio Code 277Redman, Vere 404Red Purge 194Reed, Sir. E.J. 60, 71, 505, 506Reischauer, E.O. xv, xviiRekishi Eiga 470Rekishigaku, Kenkyukai 348, 353‘Report on Comprehensive National

Security’ 368Rice, Richard 332Riess, Ludwig 327Roesler, Hesman 74Roosevelt, President, F.D. 139Roscoe, N.K. 397Royal Institute of International Affairs 493Royama, Masamichi 351Russia 66, 80Ry� anji xvii

Saigo, Takamori 45, 75, 76St Antony’s College (Oxford) xvSaipan 93Sakamoto, Ry� ma xvii, xxvi, 324, 469, 473Sansom, Sir. George 226, 227, 250, 291,

336–346, 397, 493Saotome, Katsumoto xxiiSatow, Sir. Ernest 5, 25, 34, 35, 37, 44–48,

50, 51, 68, 73Satsuma 27, 31–33, 35, 37, 56, 65, 73, 75,

76Scarborough Commission 488, 490, 492School Education Law 281School of Oriental and African Studies

(SOAS) 492–494Security Treaty 310, 313, 350, 357, 373Scott, W.Robertson 510Sebald, William J. 194Seit� 82Shakai Shis� Kenkyukai 216Shanahan, Foss 248, 249Sheldon, CharlesShen, Yorkson 243Shidehara, Kij� r� 235, 263Shiga, Yoshio 289

542 INDEX

Shigemitsu, Mamoru 202, 216Shillony, Ben-Ami xxiii, 332Shimabara (Kyoto) 324Shimane 248Shinto 278Shiratori, Rei xxivSh� gun 26–39Sh� wa history 320Skene Smith, N. 402Skiing 463Sorge, Richard 170Spencer, Herbert 78Stanford University 345State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

(SWNCC) 260Stead, Alfred 508, 509STICERD 495Stoddart, Dr. G. 279, 280Storry, Richard xv, xxiii‘Sugata Sanshiro’ 425‘Summations of Non-Military Activities in

Japan’ 303Sumo 456–459Supreme Commander for the Allied Power

(SCAP) 209, 216, 261Swale, Alistair 77, 79

Taguchi, Fukuji xviiiTaira (Fukushima-ken) 124–131Taisho era 320Taiwani 58, 358Takeyam, Michio 477Tanaka, Kotar 276, 278, 281Teeling, William 400Tennis 462Textbooks 278, 282Textiles 166, 211, 310, 374Toho Studios 178Tokai University xxvTokio Times 71Tokyo Air Raid (9–10 March 1945) xxii,

91, 96–106, 173Tokyo Olympics xvi‘Tokyo Rose’ 423Tokyo Trials (IMTFE) 202, 330Tokuda, Ky� ichi 293Tokugawa era 319

Tomlinson, F.S. 294, 296Tosa 35–36Toyama, Shigeki 349Tracy, Honor 231Trade Union Congress (TUC) 215Trade with USA 362–363, 374Tripartite Pact 159Tsuda, Sokichi 348Tsunoda, Ryusaku 340Tsurumi, Yusuke 396Tsuzuki, Chushichi xxviiiTwenty-One Demands 84

Uchimura, Kanz� 510Ujihara, Sh� jir� xxiUK-Japan 2000 Group xxviiUnion of Democratic Control (UDC) 200,

222United States Education Mission 236, 279United States-Japan defence pact 213United States Strategic Bombing Survey

(USSBS) xxii, 114, 139–146Universities (Japan) 283University Grants Committee (UGC) 488–

489, 496USSR 157–159, 164, 184, 241, 263, 290,

358, 364, 369

Victory Songs 440Vietnam xvii, 269, 310, 319, 330, 359,

364, 369, 373

Wakamatsu 9–19Ward, Barbara xxiv, 208, 404Warner, Sir. Fred xxWashington Conference 84Watanbe, Etsuji xviiWeston, Walter 74Whaling 252Whitney, CourtneyWhyte, Sir. Frederick 396, 398, 399Wildes, Harry E. 302Willis, William 6–19, 45Women (in film) 479Women and Minors Bureau 237Women’s suffrage 236Writing system 280, 282


Yabusame 457Yahata Steel Works 93, 94Yamaguchi Prefecture 248Yamakawa, Hitoshi 156Yamamoto, Isoroku 160, 161Yasukuni Shrine 429Yokohama 110Yokoyama, Toshio 504Yoshida, Mitsukuni xxv, xxviYoshida, Shigeru 268, 310, 313, 361

Zaibatsu xiii, 187, 203, 351

544 INDEX

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