COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IN JAPAN:

THE MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION

DANIEL SNEIDER SHORENSTEIN APARC SEPTEMBER 30, 2014

AGENDA 1.  The Historical Basis for Japanese defense

policy 2.  The Historical limits on Japan’s Defense role 3.  The Gradual Evolution of Japan’s Defense role 4.  The Abe administration’s Proposed Changes 5.  The Realities of Japanese Defense spending

and capability 6.  The Diplomatic Dimension – the problem of

Historical Revisionism and Collective Self-Defense

CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN

RENUNCIATION OF WAR Article 9.

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU AND ARTICLE 9

CLB interpreted first paragraph of Article 9 to mean that renunciation of threat or use of force did not deny right of self-defense in case of clear attack on Japan itself. Second paragraph does not preclude acquisition of military weapons provided they are for use in self defense against direct attack. The right of collective self defense – use of force in defense of another state – exists in principle, as in UN Charter, but exercise of that right is violation of Article 9.

JAPAN-US SECURITY TREATY ARTICLE V Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. ARTICLE VI For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU AND USE OF FORCE

Three inseparable principles govern the ability of Japan to use force against other nations in its own defense: 1.  There is an imminent and illegitimate act of

aggression against Japan; 2.  There are no other means of stopping that

aggression; 3.  The use of armed force is confined to the

minimum necessary level.

JAPAN’S SELF IMPOSED DEFENSE LIMITS

•  No offensive weapons systems such as long range aircraft, aircraft carriers or marine infantry.

•  Cap on defense spending at 1 percent of GNP

•  Limited joint contingency planning with US

•  No export of weapons

•  Three Non-Nuclear Principles (Sato in 1967:

Japan would not manufacture, possess or introduce into its territory nuclear weapons. Rely on US for deterrence.

GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY 1.  1969 – Sato says security of Far East and of Korea in particular

essential to Japan’s own security 2.  1976 – Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation 3.  1983 – Japan makes weapons tech available to US 4.  1987 – spending passes 1 percent of GNP, cap dropped 5.  1991 – Japan unable to join Gulf War coalition but minesweepers

sent to Persian Gulf and funds provided 6.  1992 – Peacekeeping Forces law enacted 7.  1997 – Second Guidelines, joint ops in areas surrounding Japan 8.  2001 – Anti-terrorism law, refueling mission in Indian Ocean 9.  2004 – SDF sent to Iraq but only in non-combat role 10.  2004 – Japan and US agree to cooperate on BMD 11.  2007 – Defense Agency upgraded to Defense Ministry

CROSSING LINES ON DEFENSE CAPABILITY

SHIFTING FOCUS OF DEFENSE FORCES

CURRENT OPERATIONAL LIMITS ON THE SDF 1.  Japan cannot dispatch troops to a foreign war zone 2.  The SDF cannot defend US ships or planes that come

under attack outside Japan’s territory 3.  SDF can join UN peacekeeping operations but its forces

cannot use cannot use force to protect forces from other nations deployed on same UN mission

4.  Japan cannot provide logistical support that is integrated with the use of force by another military

5.  Japanese SDF can participate in multinational joint training but only for non-combat operations (it does conduct joint combat training with US)

ABE TAKES STEPS TO ACCELERATE DEFENSE POLICY CHANGE 1.  2006 – formation of the Yanai Commission Panel for the

Reconstruction of the National Security Legal Foundation 2.  2013 – Slight increase in defense spending after decade

of stagnation and lowering of spending 3.  April 2014 – Allowing export of defense equipment and

technology under new principles 4.  May 2014 – Report of the Advisory Panel on

Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security 5.  July 1 2014 – Cabinet Decision on Development of

Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People

FIRST YANAI REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS First Yanai Commission report set out “positive list” of situations which required a change in interpretation of the Constitution regarding CSD. Report cited four cases: 1.  Defense of US vessels on the high seas 2.  Interception of ballistic missile that might be on its way to

the US 3.  Participation in UN PKOs and peacekeeping operations

4.  Logistics support for other countries in PKO operations, ie unified operations (“ittaika”)

SECOND COMMISSION REPORT New report argues that security environment surrounding Japan “has become even more severe” since 2008. Cross border threats worsened WMD threat from North Korea greater

Cyber attacks

The rise of China

“This makes it imperative that Japan fulfills an even greater role for ensuring peace and security in the region, as the risks have been increasing.” Most important, US-Japan security cooperation requires larger Japan role

SECURITY AROUND JAPAN

SCRAMBLES VS CHINESE AIRCRAFT

INCURSIONS OF CHINESE VESSELS

BROAD ARGUMENT MADE Therefore, report says, security of Japan can no longer be fulfilled with only individual self defense. Exercise of right of CSD now can be defined as meeting the requirement for “minimum extent necessary”. If a situation “could lead to a direct attack against Japan” or “undermine trust in the Japan-US alliance, thus leading to a significant loss of deterrence” or affect the international order, or “whether there could otherwise be serious effects on Japan,” then CSD is justified.

JULY 1, 2014 CABINET DECISION The Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense.

Chinese and Korean protest against Japanese militarism. Moves toward CSD interpreted as steps toward Japanese military buildup, return to the 1930s. Is Japan heading toward military buildup of that nature?

PROTEST IN CHINA, KOREA

COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN DEFENSE SPENDING

TRENDS IN JAPAN DEFENSE SPENDING

0  

100  

200  

300  

400  

500  

600  

700  

800  

China   Russia   ROK   Japan   US  

2001  

2009  

2013  In $

Bill

ions

Various Sources: Roughly estimated in nominal US$

DEFENSE BUDGET ESTIMATES

LIMITS TO LARGER JAPANESE DEFENSE ROLE 1.  No clear public support for more aggressive Japanese

security role beyond self defense 2.  Massive Japanese fiscal deficits and demands for social

spending to deal with aging population means no funds available for defense buildup

3.  Japanese defense spending is highly inefficient – large personnel costs due to all volunteer force and very high procurement costs due to subsidy of domestic defense industry

4.  Demographic trends mean shrinking population of manpower eligible for military service – eligible male population peaked in 1994. By 2030, will be almost half that level.

CSD AND THE HISTORY PROBLEM Abe policies on one hand are part of the gradual evolutionary trend of Japanese defense and security policy, with the encouragement of the US US officials, from President down, have “welcomed” CSD steps Marginal value for US in more flexible Japanese role as result of CSD policy Problem for US and others is overlay of CSD and other changes with Abe’s historical revisionism, view of wartime history that evokes images of prewar period. Abe and LDP advocacy of amendment of Article 9 well known. Is Cabinet decision on reinterpretation simply a means to amend by stealth, and to retreat from postwar order?