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College of Management and Technology
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College of Management and Technology

College of Management and Technology

Design of MIRIS and Hyperion SMRs for use inSMRs for use in

Vista Class Cruise VesselsVista Class Cruise Vessels

Dr Paul R Chard-TuckeyDr Kirk Atkinson

December 1st 2011College of Management and Technology

December 1st 2011

Vista ClassVista Class300m X 30m 91,000GRT 24knots

16 decks 1,000 crew 2,000 passengers

63MW diesel

3,000t heavy fuel1

150t marine gas oil

12t per hour

Noordam Queen Elizabeth Queen Victoria

College of Management and Technology

1. Reuters 3 Nov 11

Study ScopeStudy Scope

• Navalisation & Economics ~ PC-T• Core Design & Reactor Physics ~ Kirk• Core Design & Reactor Physics Kirk• Shielding and Materials ~ Kirk• Thermal Hydraulics and Dynamics ~ PC-T

S f t d S it PC T• Safety and Security ~ PC-T

College of Management and Technology

Candidate SMRsCandidate SMRs

• MIRIS – Integrated PWR• Hyperion – Liquid Metal Fast ReactorHyperion Liquid Metal Fast Reactor

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MIRISMIRISI t l PWR• Integral PWR

• Uranium oxide fuelled• 120 MWt output• Overall height 10.3 mg• Inner diameter 4.1 m• Eight once throughEight once through

type SGs and MCPs• Integral PressuriserIntegral Pressuriser• 36 MWt nat circ

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HyperionHyperion

• LMFR• 70 MWt• Uranium Nitride fuel• Lead Bismuth coolant• Lead Bismuth coolant• Unpressurised• He Gas system• No intermediate loop

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http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/advanced/hyperion.html

RequirementsRequirements• Offer alternative power sourceO p• Design to be supplied with modern design

safet casesafety case• Licence Conditions• Achieve in a cost effective manner

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RequirementsRequirements• Performance capability• Refueling/replacement• High integrity and reliability of electricalHigh integrity and reliability of electrical

systemMinimal manning• Minimal manning

• Dose Targets < BSL• HAZID• Adequate security• Adequate security

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Comparison CriteriaComparison Criteria

• Incorporated into decision matrix• Weighting factors out of 5Weighting factors out of 5• Scoring factors out of 10

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Navalisation and EconomicsNavalisation and Economics

• Power Requirements & Operating CyclePower Requirements & Operating Cycle• Manning Requirements • Secondary & Electrical System Designs• Reactor Protection• Reactor Protection• Economics• Summary

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Power RequirementsPower Requirements

• Ship hull and appendages modelling using NavCad code

• Holtrop model utilised• Assumptions made:Assumptions made:

– Two azimuth thrusters– Two stabiliser finsTwo stabiliser fins– Seawater temperature of 15 oC– Sea state 2 wind conditions– Sea state 2 wind conditions – Centre of buoyancy 2 % aft

• 35 Mw @ 24 kts

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• 35 Mw @ 24 kts

Power Requirementsq• Thermal Power

Including losses and hotel load– Including losses and hotel load

180

200

120

140

160

80

100

120

Power (MW)Th HypTh MIRIS

20

40

60Th MIRIS

01 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Speed (Knots)

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p ( )

Power RequirementsPower Requirements

• MIRIS max output: 120 MWt• MIRIS at 24 knots requires 172 MWtq

• Hyperion max output: 70 MWt• Hyperion max output: 70 MWt• Hyperion at 24 knots requires 129 MWt

• Both designs would require 2 plants to meet the total power demand

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Operating CycleOperating Cycle

• Based over a three year period• Cruises include:

– Mediterranean – North Europep– Fjords & Baltic – Caribbean & Mexico– Around the World– North America & CanadaNorth America & Canada– Transatlantic Crossing

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Operating CycleOperating Cycle

• Effective Full Power Days (EFPD) calculated over 7 year period: 1508 EFPDy p

F l C ti C l l ti• Fuel Consumption Calculations:– MIRIS: 3020 EFPD with 634 kg U-235g– Hyperion: 4300 EFPD with 902 kg U-235

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Secondary System DesignsSecondary System Designs

• Full electric propulsion incorporated into both designs

• Secondary systems identified for both designsSecondary systems identified for both designs

Secondary coolant flow rates calculated for both• Secondary coolant flow rates calculated for both designs

MIRIS 298 5 k / f 100 %– MIRIS 298.5 kg/s for 100 % power– Hyperion 29.4 kg/s for 100 % power

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EconomicsEconomics

• Vessel of this size produces 712 kg of CO2per kilometre travelled p

T diti l f l t i i f• Traditional fuel costs in region of $18,000,000

N IMO l ti ld lt i• New IMO regulations could result in $3,500,000 extra in fuel costs

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EconomicsEconomics

• Worst case ship built cost estimated at €800,000,000, ,– Including secondary systems, shielding and

protection systemsprotection systems

Shi ld t fit ft 10• Ship would return a profit after a 10 year period – Based on current revenue figures

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SummarySummary

• Hyperion best meets Navalisation and Economics requirements

• Hyperion technology readiness low• Hyperion technology readiness low– MIRIS would be better option for 5 to 10 year

implementation timelineimplementation timeline

I i fit t hi ith l f• Increase in profits to ship owner with removal of traditional fuel costs

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Core Design and Reactor Physics

• Core Descriptionsp• HPM Stochastic Modelling Process• HPM Deterministic Modelling Process• HPM Deterministic Modelling Process• Analysis of HPM Core Characteristics

S f K Fi di• Summary of Key Findings• Conclusions

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Core Description - MIRIS

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Core Description – Hyperion P M d lPower Module

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Hyperion Stochastic Modellingyp gFirst Stage – 2D CAD Drafting

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Hyperion Stochastic Modellingyp gSecond Stage• Development of simple

3D homogeneous core model using MONK Monte Carlo neutronics code

• Value for keffectiveeffective (k-value) validated against Hyperion g yPower Gen data

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Hyperion Stochastic ModellingHyperion Stochastic ModellingThird Stage – Heterogeneous Model

HPM Heterogeneous MONK Model Improved HPM Heterogeneous MONK Model

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HPM Heterogeneous MONK Model Improved HPM Heterogeneous MONK Model

Analysis of HPM Core Characteristics

T t C ffi i t f R ti it• Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity• Axial and Radial Flux Profiles

Th h Lif R ti it P fil (i lif )• Through-Life Reactivity Profile (inc. lifespan)• Void Coefficient of Reactivity• Power Density• Rod Worth

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Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity, αT

Effect on Reactivity per Degree Change in Coolant and Fuel Temperatures

HPM MIRIS

-1.513E-05 -5.912E-4

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Final αT Results

Radial Flux Profile

Q t di l fl fil f f ll

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Quarter-core radial flux profile for a fully un-rodded HPM core arrangement

Through-Life Reactivity

HPM through-life reactivity profile

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HPM through life reactivity profile

Summary of FindingsHyperion MIRIS

Key Advantages • Less high level waste • Strong negative αTy g g• Negligible poison inventory • Greater lifespan

g g T

• Strong negative void coefficient

• Proven PWR• High power density • Proven PWR technology

Key • Novel fuel type • Significant axial Disadvantages • Rounded flux profile

• Weak αT

• Significant power peaking

power peaking• Lifespan limited by

short and long • Significant power peaking• Immature design

lived poisons

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Conclusions

• MIRIS identified as the most suitable of the two designs to satisfy the requirementy q

• Limited amount of information from HPG may have had a significant impact on the analysis

• Useful information fed back to Serco for the development of WIMS 10a

• First Fast Reactor Analysis of its type conducted within the Nuclear Department.

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Shielding & MaterialsShielding & Materials

• MaterialsD R i t• Dose Requirements

• Expected Gamma Dose Ratesp• Shielding Options

MCBEND• MCBEND• ConclusionsConclusions

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Lead Bismuth CoolantLead Bismuth Coolant• Opaque to gamma radiationp q g

•Transparent to neutrons

• Low melting point 124C

• High boiling point 1670C

• High thermal capacity

Mi i l th l i /• Minimal thermal expansion / contraction

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• Allows natural circulation

Uranium Nitride FuelUranium Nitride Fuel

• High melting point 900Cg g p

• Excellent thermal conductivity c.f. UO2

• Difficult to prepare• Difficult to prepare

• None prepared to date for p pthe Hyperion programme

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Dose RequirementsDose Requirements

• No breach of legal limits

• No dose above background levels to t l ( 0 15 S /h )guests or normal crew (≤0.15 µSv/hr)

• Minimise doses to reactor operators

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Expected Doses Point SourceExpected Doses – Point Source• Standard dose MIRIS 4.93E+17 Bqcalculations using a point source

Att ti th h i

Hyperion 5.02E+17 Bq

Kr-85 I-135• Attenuation through air only

• Very high dose rates

Kr-85m Xe-133Sr-90 Cs-134I-131 Cs-137• Very high dose rates

Dose Rate (Sv/Hr) in: Air

I-133 Ba-140

(S / )

At (m): 0.1 0.5 1 5 10

MIRIS: 8.20E+06 3.28E+05 8.20E+04 3.28E+03 8.20E+02

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Hyperion: 9.49E+06 3.79E+05 9.49E+04 3.79E+03 9.49E+02

Shielding MaterialsShielding Materials• Requirement to attenuate against bothRequirement to attenuate against both

gamma radiation & neutronsHi h D it M t i l G• High Density Materials – Gamma

• High Hydrogen Content – NeutronHigh Hydrogen Content Neutron• Three Initial Options Considered:

― All shielding at the compartment edge― All shielding as a “sarcophagus” ― A combination of the above

• 6000 tonne target definedCollege of Management and Technology

• 6000 tonne target defined

Option OneOption One

•12.5 cm Pb shield at the outer edge

34 5 P l th hi ld•34.5 cm Polythene shield

•Mass Pb = 2462 tonnes•Mass Pb = 2462 tonnes

•Mass Polythene = 538 tonnesy

•Total Mass = 3000 tonnes

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Option TwoOption Two

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CompromiseCompromiseA combination of the t o options• A combination of the two options:― 50 cm Lead & 50 cm Polythene Main Shield

10 L d & 10 P l th RC Ed― 10 cm Lead & 10 cm Polythene RC Edge Shield

• Total Shield Mass:• Total Shield Mass:― MIRIS – 3892 tonnes per reactor

Hyperion 2722 tonnes per reactor― Hyperion – 2722 tonnes per reactor

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MCBENDMCBEND

• A Monte Carlo program for general radiation transport solutionsp

• Sources to consider:P t G– Prompt Gamma

– Prompt Neutron– Delayed Gamma– Coolant GammaCoolant Gamma

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Model MIRISModel - MIRIS

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MIRIS ZonesMIRIS - ZonesPressuriser Spool MCP

I l t / O tl tSteam Generator

Inlet / Outlet Pipes

Coolant Zone

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Active Core

Model HyperionModel - Hyperion

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Hyperion ZonesHyperion - ZonesInlet / Outlet Pipes

Coolant Zone

Central Void

RPV Edge

Water JacketActive Core

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ConclusionsConclusions• MIRIS uses well understood materialsMIRIS uses well understood materials

choicesH i t i l i k• Hyperion materials require more work

• Both reactors meet set dose requirementsq

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Thermal Hydraulics and Reactor Dynamics

• Methodology

Thermal Hydraulics and Reactor Dynamics

Methodology• Normal Operation

– Load Following– Self Regulatingg g– Xenon 135 Influences

Loss of Flow & Natural Circulation• Loss of Flow & Natural Circulation• Loss of heat sink• Summary

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Methodology MIRIS & HyperionMethodology MIRIS & Hyperion

• Hand calculations:– Natural circulation velocity– Axial coolant temperature profiles– Radial coolant/fuel centreline temperature profiles– Axial pressure profiles

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Methodology MIRIS & HyperionMethodology MIRIS & Hyperion

• Modelling – MATLAB/Simulink:– Six Group Point Kinetics– Thermal Hydraulics

o Plus radial coolant/fuel centreline temperature model

– Heat Removal System– Thermal feedback system– Flux model– Xenon 135 numeric density model– Xenon 135 reactivity influence model

College of Management and Technology

Methodology MIRIS & HyperionMethodology MIRIS & Hyperion• Modelling – MATLAB/SimulinkModelling MATLAB/Simulink

FluxXe-135 Numeric

Xe-135 Reactivity

ThrottlePosition

2o HeatBalance dTs

dT

FluxNumeric Density

ReactivityInfluence

Position Balance

ReactorKinetics

ThermalHydraulics

LoopDelay

1o HeatBalance

RodPosition

dTh

LoopDelay

ThermalFeedback

dTc

DelayFeedback

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Power Reactor Loop Heat Removal

Methodology MIRIS & HyperionMethodology MIRIS & HyperionX 135 N i D it M d l• Xenon 135 Numeric Density Model

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Normal Operation –Steady State Conditions

Parameter SI Unit MIRIS HyperionSpecific Heat Cp J/kg.K 5896.48 154.89±14Mass Flow Rate mdot kg/s 3000 2100.6759Prandtl Number Pr - 0.92 0.014Reynolds Number Re - 7.85E5 4.67E4Nusselt Number Nu - 1.15E3 22.70Coolant Thermal Conductivity Kf W/m.K 0.53 14.5Fuel Thermal Conductivity Ks W/m.K 3.5 20Average Temp Tave = Tb K 588.39 773.15Axial Change in Temp Th - Tc K 6.78 215.14Clad Surface Temp Ts K 625.10 785.26p s

Fuel Surface Temp Tf K 662.44 810.13Fuel Centreline Temp Tm K 1140.23 1001.16

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Normal Operation –Load Following

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Loss of Flow AccidentLoss of Flow Accident

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Differences in ResponseDifferences in Response

• Primary System Design• Delayed Neutron Fractiony• Prompt Neutron Generation Time• Feedback Coefficient ‘α ’• Feedback Coefficient αT

• Thermo Physical Properties• Fuel Material Properties

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SummarySummary

• Normal Operation• Loss of Flow• Natural Circulation

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Safety and SecuritySafety and Security

• Severe accident analysisS it• Security

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Severe Accident AnalysisSevere Accident AnalysisId tif hi h l t t f d i• Identify which elements to carry forward in accident dose calculations

• Establish and identify core inventory• Establish and identify core inventory• Gain confidence in results by comparison

methodsmethods• Identify plausible accident scenario• Identify release into containmentIdentify release into containment• Establish containment conditions• Establish leakage from containmentEstablish leakage from containment• Calculate dose rates in adjacent compartments

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Isotopes Activity equationIsotopes Activity equation

• Krypton 85 and 85m

• Activity = FY(1-eλt)• F = fission rate

• Iodine 131-135F fission rate

• Y = yield• Strontium 90• Caesium 134 and

• λ = decay constantCaesium 134 and 137X 133 d• Xenon 133 and 135

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• Barium 140

ORIGENORIGEN

• Water cooled reactor specific• Solves ODE from set starting conditionsSolves ODE from set starting conditions• Uses look-up tables of cross-sections

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Containment ConditionsContainment Conditions

• FP released as aerosol• Steam and water vapour presentSteam and water vapour present• FP inflow• FP removal • FP outflow• FP outflow

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Finite Element Aerosol Simulation Tool (FEAST)• Time• Mass inflowMass inflow• Mass outflow (used in dose calculations)• Mass to walls• Mass suspended• Mass suspended

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FEAST ResultsFEAST ResultsAerosol mass for 1mm leak

32 kg in RC

1.00E+01

1.00E+02

1.00E-01

1.00E+00

g)

mass in

mass out

1.00E-03

1.00E-02

Mas

s (k

g

masssuspended

1.00E-05

1.00E-04 mass to walls

1.00E-060.00E+00

2.00E+04

4.00E+04

6.00E+04

8.00E+04

1.00E+05

1.20E+05

1.40E+05

Time (s)

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Time (s)

0.02 kg release

Dose Results 1mm Diameter Leak

Exposure time (s)

Cloud shinedose (Sv)

Inhalation dose (Sv)

Skin dose (Sv)

3.00E+02 2.71E-05 6.85E-04 3.60E-02

3.60E+03 1.70E+00 2.58E+01 1.37E+033.60E 03 1.70E 00 2.58E 01 1.37E 03

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International Nuclear SecurityInternational Nuclear Security

• IAEA guidance• IAEA conventionsIAEA conventions• Licensee’s responsibility• Reduced protection at sea

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Security at SeaSecurity at Sea

• Physical barriers• Ship designShip design• Defence in depth• Armed guards1

• Employee vetting procedures• Employee vetting procedures

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1. FT 13 Oct 11

OverallConclusions

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Final SelectionFinal SelectionProject Pillar MIRIS Weighted HPM Weighted j g

Scoreg

Score

Navalisation and 142 169Navalisation and Economics

142 169

Core Design and Reactor 114 64Physics

Shielding and Materials72 81

Shielding and Materials

Thermal-Hydraulics and Dynamics

44 44

Safety and Security160 162

Totals: 532 520

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Totals: 532 520

Any Questions?y

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Spare slides followSpare slides follow…….

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Project InterfacesjOUTPUTSINPUTS

Safety & Security•Reactor Protection Requirements

O ti l P fil

Safety & Security•Plant Reliability Figures

•CSF Breakdowns •Operational Profile

Shielding and Materials•Refuelling Process

•CSF Breakdowns

Shielding and Materials•Operational Doses Refuelling Process

•Manning Requirements

Thermal Hydraulicsd D i

p•End of Life Doses

Thermal Hydraulicsand Dynamics

NAVALISATION & ECONOMICS

and Dynamics•Secondary Pump Flows

•Secondary System Designs

and Dynamics•Size of Prim/Sec

Heat Transfer System

Core Design & Reactor Physics•Reactor Protection System

•Uranium Fuel Costs

Core Design & Reactor Physics•U-235 Loadings•Burn-up Rates

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Normal Operation –Steady State Conditions

Parameter SI Unit MIRIS HyperionParameter SI Unit MIRIS HyperionReactor Power P W 120e6 70e6Operating Pressure poperational bar 155 1Coolant Density ρcoolant kg/m3 694.46 10050y ρcoolant gSpecific Heat Cp J/kg.K 5896.48 154.89±14Coolant Velocity U m/s 3.31314 2Mass Flow Rate mdot kg/s 3000 2100.6759P dtl N b P 0 92 0 014Prandtl Number Pr - 0.92 0.014Reynolds Number Re - 7.85e5 4.67e4Nusselt Number Nu - 1.15e3 22.70Convective Heat Transfer h W/m2.K 2.18e4 1.08e5Cold Leg Temp Tc K 585 665.58Hot Leg Temp Th K 591.78 880.72Average Temp Tave = Tb K 588.39 773.15A i l Ch i T T T K 6 78 215 14Axial Change in Temp Th - Tc K 6.78 215.14Clad Surface Temp Ts K 625.10 785.26Fuel Surface Temp Tf K 662.44 810.13Fuel Centreline Temp Tm K 1140.23 1001.16

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p mRadial Change In Temp Tm - Tb K 551.84 228.01

Secondary System StudySecondary System Study C i i M h i l El i lCriteria Mechanical  Electrical Cost  2 2

Size and Weight  2 5g

Efficiency  3 5

Shock  2 4

Control Complexity  4 2

Reliability  3 4

A il bili 2 4Availability  2 4

Manning  3 5

Maintenance 3 5Maintenance  3 5

Noise  4 5

TOTAL 28 41

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Power RequirementsPower Requirements

• Hand calculations using Flat Plate MethodFD = 0.5pU2CDLBD p D

CD = 0.0986/[log10(UL/V)-1.22]2

FD = Frictional drag p = Seawater densityp yU = SpeedCD = Drag coefficient L = LengthB = BreadthV = Kinematic viscosity of seawater

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V = Kinematic viscosity of seawater

Power RequirementsPower Requirements

N f U 235 t St t f Lif• No. of U-235 at Start of Life– (Mass of U-235/U-235 Atomic Weight) x Avogadro’s

N bNumber

• No. of U-235 at End of Life– U-235 at SOL x e-(Capture Cross-Section x Flux x Time)

• No. of atoms available for fission:– U-235 at SOL – U-235 at EOL

• Effective Full Power Days: ec e u o e ays– (Atoms available for fission/Atoms required) x 3600 x

24

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Manning RequirementsManning Requirements

• Operators required to operate plant, carry out maintenance and perform defect repair

• Shift Rotation: 3 shifts with 1 standbyShift Rotation: 3 shifts with 1 standby

Shift Manning: 1x Senior Operator 2x Operator• Shift Manning: 1x Senior Operator, 2x Operator

• Optimum option for safety and cost

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Manning RequirementsManning Requirements

Manning Shift Annual Cost External gOption Option Company

Annual Cost 1 1 £1 971 000 £2 463 7501 1 £1,971,000 £2,463,750

4 2 £917,000 £1,146,250

5 3 £630,500 £788,125

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Secondary Schematic MIRISSecondary Schematic – MIRIS

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Secondary Schematic HyperionSecondary Schematic – Hyperion

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Electrical System DesignElectrical System Design

• AC system with novel Low Loss Concept (LLC) design

• Installation of LLC transformers– Phase shifts windings to remove unwanted current g

harmonics, thus improving efficiency• Azimuth Thrusters

– Z-Drive design with AC synchronous motor• Emergency GeneratorsEmergency Generators

– Diesel Generators with 6.5 MW capacity– 200 tonnes of Marine Diesel Oil required

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– 200 tonnes of Marine Diesel Oil required

Electrical System SchematicElectrical System Schematic

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Reactor ProtectionReactor Protection

• Critical Safety Function breakdowns reviewed

• Reactor protection system requirements defined and categorised in terms of nuclear safetyand categorised in terms of nuclear safety

N l t h l i• Novel technologies– High Integrity Displays– Equipment Health Monitoring

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Reactor ProtectionReactor ProtectionS f t I t it L l L D d M d f O tiSafety Integrity Level Low Demand Mode of Operation

(Failure to perform function per hour)

4 >= 10-5 to 10-4

3 >= 10-4 to 10-3

2 >= 10-3 to 10-2

2 11 >= 10-2 to 10-1

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Reactor Protection Fault TreeReactor Protection – Fault Tree

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SummarySummarySelection Weighting MIRIS HPM MIRIS HPM Criterion

g gFactor Score Score Weighted

ScoreWeighted Score

O ll C t 5 6 8 30 40Overall Cost 5 6 8 30 40

Size and Weight 4 5 8 20 32

Technology Readiness

3 7 2 21 6

C Lif i 8 9 40 4Core Lifetime 5 8 9 40 45

Refuelling C l it

3 5 6 15 18Complexity

Plant Efficiency 4 4 7 16 28

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Totals: 142 169

Project InterfacesOUTPUTS

Safety & Security

INPUTS

Safety & Security Safety & Security•Fuel inventory

•HAZOP

Safety & Security•Limits on enrichment

•Reliability requirements for core materials

Shielding and Materials•Core Composition

•Fuel InventoryShielding and Materials

•Requirement for shielding •Core Power

Thermal Hydraulics

which may affect neutron population

CORE DESIGN

and Dynamics•Power, dimensions,

temperatures, poisons, delayed t f ti

Thermal Hydraulicsand Dynamics

•Temperature of coolant re-t i th neutron fractions

NavalisationC Si d W i ht

entering the core

NavalisationE li t

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•Core Size and Weight•Emergency cooling system•Shutdown requirements

Result BenchmarkingCore Arrangement

keffective -Homogeneous

keffective -Heterogeneous

Hyperion Power Generation g g

Coreg

Core EstimateAll Rods Inserted 0.8782 0.8561 0.871

All Rods Withdrawn

1.0918 1.0707 1.081

Control Rods 0.9534 0.9293 0.956Inserted OnlyEmergency Rods Inserted Only

0.9994 0.9734 0.954Inserted Only (Control Out)All Rods & Emergency Balls

0.8523 n/a n/aEmergency Balls Inserted

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Errors and Uncertainties• Minor inaccuracies in the geometry of the HT-9

volumes/ LBE downcomervolumes/ LBE downcomer

- Analysis of cross-sections performed

• Uncertainties in the Nuclear Data Library (NDL) referenced by MONK

• Random errors in the preparation and execution of the code

• Statistical uncertainty in the Monte Carlo method

• Standard MONK error keffective ± 0.0004

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HPM Deterministic Analysis

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HPM Deterministic Analysis

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Error Reduction• Simple

homogeneoushomogeneous model produced to test code volumetest code volume interpretation:- Volumes enteredVolumes entered

manually

- Failed to narrow the existing discrepancy

- Discounted as the source of the error

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2D Nodal Homogeneous Model Geometry

Error Reductiono educt o• WIMS10a Beta 4

provided by Sercoprovided by Serco- WIMSECCO

CACTUS3D- CACTUS3D• Homogeneous model

re-run using fine-group g g p(1968) energy spectrum

• New approach adopted• New approach adopted using ‘Sub-Meshing’- Increase in accuracy: y

k-value to within 3.06 % of stochastic results

A S b M h d C li d

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A Sub-Meshed Cylinder

Power Peaking Factors• The ratio of the flux in specific volumes of the core to the

average whole core flux

F ll dd d MIRIS HPMFully un-rodded core

MIRIS HPM

Maximum radial PPF 1.336 1.3

Maximum axial PPF 1.405 1.38

Maximum core PPF Results for Fully-Unrodded yHPM and MIRIS Cores

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Selection Matrix• Each reactor scored against weighted selection criteria

Selection Criterion

Weighting Factor

MIRIS Score

HPM Score

MIRIS Weighted

HPM WeightedCriterion Factor Score Score Weighted

ScoreWeighted

ScoreTemperature C ffi i t f

4 8 3 32 12Coefficient of

ReactivityAxial and Radial 2 4 5 8 10Power Peaking

(Burn-up Profile)Void Coefficient 4 7 4 28 16

of ReactivityThrough-Life

Reactivity/ Core4 8 3 32 12

Reactivity/ Core Lifespan

Power Density 2 6 7 12 14

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Totals: 114 64

Project InterfacesProject InterfacesSafety SafetySafety

•Safety FunctionRequirements

•End of Core Life &

Safety•Normal Operation &Accident Condition

Gamma Shine DosesAccident Inventories

Navalisation•Monitoring Equipment

•HAZOP

Navalisation•Operation / Accident Doses•Monitoring Equipment

•Manning•Refuel Process

•Operation / Accident DosesSHIELDING & MATERIALS

Thermal Hydraulicsand Dynamics

•Temperatures & Pressures

Thermal Hydraulicsand Dynamics

•Operating Zone

Reactor Physics & Core Design•Core Composition, Power

•Fuel Inventory

Reactor Physics & Core Design•Neutron Shielding

Requirements

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Accident DosesAccident DosesDose

MIRISDose (Sv/Hr)

Width: Hull 8.02E-05Width: Hull 8.02E 05

Length: Adjacent Compartment 1.60E-04

Height: Passenger Location 4.01E-05Height: Passenger Location 4.01E 05

Dose Hyperion (Sv/Hr)

Width: Hull 5.66E-05

Length: Adjacent Compartment 1.13E-04

Height: Passenger Location 2.83E-05

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Model Doses MIRISModel Doses - MIRISDose (µSv/hr)

LocationPrompt Gamma

Prompt Neutron

Delayed Gamma

Coolant Gamma Total

Above Reactor 3.21E-06 3.12E-04 3.28E-04 5.25E-04 1.17E-03

Aft Machinery Space 5.47E-06 4.26E-05 9.12E-05 5.37E-05 1.93E-04

RC Side 1.85E-06 4.98E-05 3.55E-05 9.27E-05 1.80E-04

College of Management and Technology

Model Doses HyperionModel Doses - HyperionDose (µSv/hr)

LocationPrompt Gamma

Prompt Neutron

Delayed Gamma Total

Above Reactor 2 76E-06 3 15E-04 3 84E-04 7 01E-04Above Reactor 2.76E 06 3.15E 04 3.84E 04 7.01E 04

Aft Machinery Space 6.18E-06 4.03E-05 8.05E-05 1.27E-04

RC Side 2.17E-06 5.08E-05 4.12E-05 9.42E-05

College of Management and Technology

Project InterfacesOUTPUTSINPUTS

Project InterfacesOUTPUTS

Core Design & Reactor Physics•Temperatures

INPUTS

Core Design & Reactor Physics•Core power & axial profiles

R d th •Transient responses•Rod worths•αT calculations

•Delayed neutron data

Navalisation•1o to 2o heat transfer •system requirements

Navalisation•Secondary systems

•Pump characteristics

THERMAL HYDRAULICS

AND DYNAMCIS

Safety & Security•Normal & accident transients

•HAZOP

Safety & Security•Safety functional requirements

HAZOP

Shielding & Materials•Temperatures & pressures

Shielding & Materials•Operating zone

College of Management and Technology

Normal Operation –Self Regulating

College of Management and Technology

Normal Operation –Xenon 135 Influences

College of Management and Technology

Loss of Heat Sink AccidentLoss of Heat Sink Accident

College of Management and Technology

Loss of Heat Sink Accident -TRAC

College of Management and Technology

Methodology MIRISMethodology MIRIS

• Modelling – TRAC/PF1/MOD2:– 2 phase fluid code– Modifications for LOHS accident:

• Steam Generators• Auto SCRAM• Pressuriser delay valve• Safety relief valve• Safety relief valve• Containment with rupture valve

College of Management and Technology

Methodology TestingMethodology Testing

Reactor Model Test

Hand Normal Operation

MIRIS & Hyperion

Hand Calculations

Normal Operation

Natural Circulation

MATLAB /Normal OperationHyperion MATLAB /

Simulink Loss of Flow Accident

Loss of Heat Sink Accident

MIRIS TRAC L f H t Si k A id tMIRIS TRAC Loss of Heat Sink Accident

College of Management and Technology

Pillar SummaryPillar Summary

Selection Criterion

Weighting Factor

MIRIS Score

HPM Score

MIRIS Weighted

HPM WeightedCriterion Factor Score Score Weighted

ScoreWeighted

ScoreThermal Efficiency 4 4 6 16 24

4 7 5Plant Response 4 7 5 28 20Totals: 44 44

SMR Decision Matrix –Thermal Hydraulics & Reactor Dynamics

College of Management and Technology

Project InterfacesProject InterfacesINPUTS OUTPUTS

Navalisation and Economics

•Operating profile and

Navalisation andEconomics

SFR operating powersp g ppower requirements

•HAZOPShielding and Materials

•SFR, operating powers•Plant reliability figures

Shielding and Materials•SFR•Normal operation and

Accident Doses•HAZOP

•SFR•Inventory and accident

releaseThermal Hydraulics

SAFETY & SECURITY

Thermal Hydraulicsand Dynamics

•Accident modelingHAZOP

Thermal Hydraulicsand Dynamics

•Accident progression •SFR•HAZOP

Core Design•Fuel inventories,

• HAZOP

SFRCore Design

•SFR•Reliability figures

College of Management and Technology

• HAZOP y g•Limits on enrichment

Safety Case Methodology Flow ChartFlow Chart

Source: RRMP 32870

College of Management and Technology

Source: RRMP 32870

HAZID MethodsHAZID Methods

• CSF decomposition• Internal and external hazard reviewInternal and external hazard review• HAZOP 1• Fault Schedule production

College of Management and Technology

Example Fault ScheduleExample Fault Schedule Initiating

event causePreventative

measures PIE Protectivemeasuresevent cause measures measures

Continuous rod withdrawal Rod stop Loss of controlled

rod movementFast acting

SCRAM

esPostulated AccidentInitiating Cause

ses

quen

cePostulated Initiating

Event(PIE)

Accident

Cau

s

Con

seq(PIE)

C

PreventiveSafety

ProtectiveSafety

MitigatingSafety

College of Management and Technology

SafetyMeasures

SafetyMeasures

SafetyMeasures

Activity Results in Becquerel'sActivity Results in Becquerel sI t H i A ti it MIRIS A ti it (B )Isotope Hyperion Activity

(Bq)MIRIS Activity (Bq)

Kr - 85 2.37E+15 1.79E+15Kr 85 2.37E 15 1.79E 15Kr - 85m 7.80E+15 4.05E+15Sr - 90 1.77E+16 1.69E+16I - 131 9.19E+16 6.40E+16I - 133 4.97E+15 7.80E+16I - 135 3.68E+16 3.76E+16

Cs - 134 3.16E+10 6.84E+15Cs - 137 1.95E+16 1.91E+16Xe - 133 1.74E+17 1.44E+17B 140 1 56E+17 1 32E+17

College of Management and Technology

Ba - 140 1.56E+17 1.32E+17

Flow Chart BreakdownFlow Chart Breakdown

College of Management and Technology

Bow Tie DiagramBow Tie DiagramInitiating Cause

es

Postulated Initiating

Event

AccidentInitiating Cause

uses

quen

ceEvent(PIE)

Cau

Con

seq

C

PreventiveSafety

ProtectiveSafety

MitigatingSafetySafety

MeasuresSafety

MeasuresSafety

Measures

College of Management and Technology

Critical Safety Functions (CSF)Critical Safety Functions (CSF)

• Control of reactivity• Control of temperatureControl of temperature• Control of radiation exposure• Control of release of radioactive material

College of Management and Technology

Decomposition of MIRIS CSF 2Decomposition of MIRIS CSF 2

College of Management and Technology

Dose CalculationsDose Calculations

• Cloudshine dose• Inhalation doseInhalation dose• Skin contamination dose

College of Management and Technology

Regulation and Licensing

College of Management and Technology

UK Regulatory SystemUK Regulatory System

• Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)• Nuclear Installations Act (NIA65)Nuclear Installations Act (NIA65)• Permissioning• 36 Licence Conditions• Not applicable to modes of transport• Not applicable to modes of transport

College of Management and Technology

Merchant Shipping RegulationMerchant Shipping Regulation

• International Maritime Organisation (IMO)• Safe Return to PortSafe Return to Port • Safety of Lives at Sea (SOLAS 7)

College of Management and Technology

ConsiderationsConsiderations

• Not covered by NIA65• Sovereign state nuclear policySovereign state nuclear policy• Security of nuclear material• Berth status• Ship classification• Ship classification• IMO• Nuclear safety

College of Management and Technology

Proposed Regulatory SystemProposed Regulatory SystemInternational

MaritimeOrganisation (IMO)

International AtomicEnergy Agency

International Association

of Classification Societies

InternationalNuclear

Inspectorate LloydsR i t

Sovereign StateNuclear Regulator

(in case of UK the ONR

Register

(in case of UK the ONR

Ship Builders

Licensee(Corporate Body)

IndependentNuclear ship

Safety Committee

College of Management and Technology

SecuritySecurity

• Comply with Licence Conditions• Comply with international legislationComply with international legislation• Provide consistency between flag states• Licensee’s responsibility

College of Management and Technology

IAEA Physical Protection yObjectives• Protect from theft• Recover missing/stolen materialRecover missing/stolen material• Protect against sabotage• Mitigate consequences of sabotage

College of Management and Technology

UK SystemUK System

• Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS)• Produce security regulationsProduce security regulations• Site Security Plan (SSP)• OCNS inspections

College of Management and Technology

Safety and Security ScoringSafety and Security ScoringSelection C i i

Weighting F

MIRIS S

HPM S

MIRIS W i h d

HPM W i h dCriterion Factor Score Score Weighted

ScoreWeighted

ScorePassive 4 5 4 20 16Passive 4 5 4 20 16Active 4 5 6 20 24Inherent inDesign 4 4 6 16 24Containment 5 6 8 30 40Security andProliferation 3 7 5 21 15Inventory 3 6 6 18 18Inventory 3 6 6 18 18AccidentConsequence 5 7 5 35 25

College of Management and Technology

Totals: 160 162


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