Colombia: Origins of the Conflict and U.S. Policy
Adam IsacsonCenter for International Policy
1717 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 801Washington DC 20036
(202) 232-3317 / [email protected] for NAIMUN,
February 15, 2008
1. A Difficult Country to Govern
2. State Weakness and Impunity
3. Armed Groups
4. The U.S. Role
5. Disappointing Results
6. What is Next?
7. Alternative Proposals
Difficult Geography
1. A difficult country to govern
Some of the World’s Worst Economic Inequality
3. The Region’s Real Problems
1. A difficult country to govern
State Weakness and Impunity
2. State Weakness and Impunity
“Ungoverned Spaces”
2. State Weakness and Impunity
Coca
2. State Weakness and Impunity
Poverty and Coca
2. State Weakness and Impunity
Conflict Throughout Colombia’s National Territory
3. Armed Groups
Illegal Armed Groups3. Putumayo: Dynamic of the Conflict
3. Armed Groups
FARC (Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia)
3. Armed GroupsMapa 2.4 Distribución espacial de acciones violentas
realizadas por las Farc, durante el período 1995-2002
Fuente: Dane, Marco Geoestadístico Nacional, 2001. Observatorio de Violencia–Presidencia de la República. 55
ELN (National Liberation Army)
3. Armed GroupsMapa 2.6 Distribución espacial de acciones violentas
realizadas por el ELN, durante el período 1995-2002
Fuente: Dane, Marco Geoestadístico Nacional, 2001. Observatorio de Violencia–Presidencia de la República.58
Paramilitaries
3. Armed GroupsMapa 2.8 Distribución espacial de acciones violentas
realizadas por las Autodefensas, durante el período 1995-2002
Fuente: Dane, Marco Geoestadístico Nacional, 2001. Observatorio de Violencia–Presidencia de la República.6262
The Combatants
Group Approximate Size
Leader Responsibility for civilian murders
Annual income
Colombian Armed Forces
220,000 military, 180,000 police
President Álvaro Uribe 5-10%
Defense Budget $6 billion
FARC (Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia)
13,000-18,000, plus support personnel and urban militias
Manuel Marulanda, seven-member
secretariat
30-40%(most kidnappings, about half of forced
displacement)
$250 million - $1 billion
ELN (National Liberation Army)
2,000-4,000, plus support personnel and urban militias
Nicolás Rodríguez, five-member
central command
0-5%(many kidnappings)
Less than $10 million
Paramilitaries 4,000-8,000
Very decentralized, after a questioned
demobilization process, over 20 new
groups
50-60%
Probably similar to FARC; much
income goes to private fortunes
Narcotics Trafficking
Organizations
At least 4,000 in 150+ gangs of varying sizes
DecentralizedSignificant
responsibility for common crime
More than $10 billion
3. Armed Groups
Failed Peace Processes
3. Armed Groups
The U.S. Role
4. The U.S. Role
$6.1 billion since 2000
$0 million
$250 million
$500 million
$750 million
$1,000 million
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008, request
Military and Police Aid Economic and Social Aid
Millions of U.S. dollars 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007,
estimate2008,
request
Military and Police Aid
Economic and Social Aid
306.6 743.6 236.9 398.9 624.4 614.8 597.8 632.2 615.9 603.4
8.8 231.4 1.4 115.5 136.7 134.5 134.7 132.2 132.2 139.5
Total 315.4 975 238.3 514.4 761.1 749.3 732.5 764.4 748.1 742.9
4. The U.S. Role
Top U.S. Military-Aid Recipients
1. Iraq2. Israel
3. Afghanistan4. Egypt
5. Pakistan6. Colombia
4. The U.S. Role
821,000 hectares (2.05 million acres) sprayed 2000-2006.
That’s 33 acres per hour, 24 hours per day.
4. The U.S. Role
•More than 90 helicopters granted since 1999
•At least 56,364 trainees since 1999
•Over $200 million per year for aircraft maintenance
•Nearly half of U.S. aid given through contractors
•About $150 million for pipeline protection
•Army Counternarcotics Brigade; Commando
Battalion; Anti-Kidnapping units; Mobile Special
Forces Brigades; Police Carabinero units; Navy
Riverine Brigade
•Support for “Plan Patriota” military offensive
Other Military Aid Initiatives
4. The U.S. Role
“White Elephants”
4. The U.S. Role
Another Sprayed AD Project5. Plan Colombia: Alternative Development
4. The U.S. Role
U.S. Finds No Change in Coca Cultivation
5. Disappointing Results
Cocaine Prices in the United States
5. Disappointing Results
“Because cocaine production in South America appears to be stable or increasing, cocaine availability could return to normal levels during late 2007 and early 2008.” - Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, October 2007
Security Gains?
1. Who gets the credit?2. Rural Areas
3. Extrajudicial Executions4. Paramilitarism
5. Military Scandals6. Guerrilla Military Capacity
5. Disappointing Results
Manual Eradication
(Demobilized paramilitaries eradicate coca in Antioquia)
9. What Is To Come
6. What is Next?
“Integrated Action”: The Same Old Militarized Counterinsurgency?
6. What is Next?
Militarization
6. What is Next?
“Peace is born from soldiers and police, even though the civilian government must do the negotiating.” - Alvaro Uribe, August 2007
Troubled Peace Efforts
6. What is Next?
A Better Policy
Orito, Putumayo
10.A Better Policy
7. Alternative Proposals
No More Shortcuts: Demilitarize the Policy
1. Rural Governance2. Displacement, Land and Victims
3. The Justice System4. A Strategy for Peace
5. Put Our Own House in Order
7. Alternative Proposals
Many Amendments
2000: Obey amendment to H.R. 3908 would have delayed most U.S. military aid to Colombia. Lost 186-239.
2000: Ramstad amendment to H.R. 3908 would have cut out most U.S. military aid to Colombia. Lost 159-262.
2001: Lee-Leach amendment to H.R. 2506 to shift funding from the Andean Counterdrug Initiative to the Global AIDS Trust Fund. Lost 188-240.
2001: McGovern et al amendment to H.R. 2506 to cut $100 million from the Andean aid to pay for increased assistance for anti-tuberculosis programs. Lost 179-240.
2002: McGovern-Skelton amendment to H.R. 4775 to cut language broadening the mission of U.S. military assistance in Colombia to include combat against illegal armed groups. Lost 192-225.
2003: McGovern-Skelton amendment to H.R. 2800 to cut military aid for Colombia and transfer it to HIV-AIDS programs. Lost 195-226.
2003: McGovern-Skelton-DeLauro amendment to H.R. 1559 to cut military aid for Colombia that was included in a bill to fund the Iraq war. Lost 209-216.
2005: McGovern-McCollum-Moore amendment to H.R. 3057 to cut military aid for Colombia. Lost 189-234.
2006: Opposition to Burton amendment to H.R. 4939 to increase military aid to Colombia by cutting Iraq prison construction from supplemental funding bill. Lost 172-250.
2006: McGovern-Leach-Payne et al amendment to H.R. 5522 to move $30 million in military aid from the Andean Counterdrug Initiative to the Emergency Refugee and Migration Account. Lost 174-229.
7. Alternative Proposals
A Small Step in the Right Direction
$0 million
$200 million
$400 million
$600 million
$800 million
2005 2006 2007 2008 est 2009 req
Military and Police Aid Economic and Social Aid
Millions of U.S. dollars 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008, estimate 2009, request
Military and Police Aid
Economic and Social Aid
306.6 743.6 236.9 398.9 624.4 614.8 597.8 632.2 615.9 603.4 442.1
8.8 231.4 1.4 115.5 136.7 134.5 134.7 132.2 132.2 139.5 240.8
Total 315 975 238 514 761 749 733 764 748.1 742.9 682.9
7. Alternative Proposals
Online Resources from CIP
“Plan Colombia and Beyond”
Blog:www.cipcol.org
Database of U.S. Aid to the Americas:
www.justf.org
Colombia Program Home
Page:www.ciponline.org/
colombia