Combined Arms in the Bradly Platoon

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COMBINED ARMS IN THEBRADLEY INFANTRY PLATOON

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff Collage in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

DAVID H. LING, CPT(P), USAB.S., United States Military Academy,West Point, New York, 1981

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1993

Appro'ved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: CPT David H. LingThesis Title: Combined Arms in t-he Bradley Infantry Platoon

Approved by:

3 , Thesis Committee ChairmanCOL ~w ig hf . Dickson Jr., M.A.iBruce W. Menning,w.Accepted this 4th day of June 1993 by:

, Director, Graduate DegreePhilip 3 . Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those ofthe student author and so not necessarily represent the viewsof the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or anyother government agency. (References to this study shouldinclude the forgoing statement.)


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COMBINED ARMS IN THE BRADLEY INFANTRY PLATOON, by CPT(P)David H. Ling, USA, 90 pages.Advances in technology and evolution of doctrine providegrounds to review commonly-held assumptions about the levelat which combined arms warfare begins. This thesis examinesthe platoon equipped with the Bradley Infantry FightingVehicle to determine if combined arms warfare has devolved tofind its current roots at platoon level. 'This study accomplishes three objectives. First, forbackground it provides a brief history of the evolution ofcombined arms. Second, it focuses on aspects of maneuvertheory, organization, combat experience, doctrine, andweapons technology to support the conclusion that thecontemporary Bradley infantry platoon is the starting pointfor combined arms warfare. Third, this study contends thatthe devolution of combined arms warfare is a fundamentalprocess that can be understood only with reference to fullcontext. That is, a consideration of dynamics peculiar tothe Bradley platoon is only part of the picture. For theprocess to make sense, it must account for larger externalfundamentals, including the interaction over time amongtechnology, doctrine, theory, organization, and experience.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSWriting this thesis has been a major task made

possible through the assistance and support of manyindividuals. Without this help, I would not have completedthe work.

First, I want to thank my wife and family for theirsupport. The time spent in research, writing, and editingwas time taken from them in this "best year of our life." Weall made sacrifices.

Second, I want to thank COL Dickson and Dr. Menningfor guiding me through the project. It was their ability tocut through to the essence of the matter that made thedifference. Their professional interest was inspiring.

Finally, I thank the many fine officers who madesuggestions at various stages, thus demonstrating areassuring concern for another's success.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageTHESIS APPROVAL PAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iABSTRACT ................................................. iiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vCHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION.......................................l2. LITERATURE REVIEW.................................ll3. RESEARCH DESIGN.. ................................. 254. HISTORY...........................................355. ANALYSIS..........................................486. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................. 81INITIAL ISTRIBUTION LIST ................................ 5 '


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CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION

Advances in technology and evolution of doctrinehave brought combined arms warfare to new heights. Combinedarms is defined as two or more arms mutually supporting oneanother.1 The effect of this mutually supportingrelationship is that the strength of one arm offsets theweakness of the other. Put another way, the power of twoarms fighting together to defeat the enemy increases theirsingular effectiveness. Combining arms produces asynergistic effect that creates greater potential combatpower than would be the case if the arms were employedseparately.

The LineaseThe concept of combined arms organization has

developed over the past two centuries as a result of advancesin technology and changes in warfighting doctrine. Prior to1800, combat involved the clash of infantry, cavalry, andartillery corps. Opposing forces closed on one another, withinfantry locked in close combat, while artillery blastedholes in the linear formations, and cavalry remained poisedto crash into the holes to break the enemy. By the American


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Civil War, corps had become rudimentary combined armsorganizations with their own infantry, cavalry, artillery,and engineers. Advances in technology had made thebattlefield more lethal, especially for division size linearformations. Although the offense was considered the mostdecisive form of warfare, a combination of defensive firefrom rifled bullets of the infantry and well placed highexplosives and canister shot from the artillery was beginningto change the face of battle.

During World War I, stalemate in the trenchesresulted from a deadly combination of defending divisionsusing infantry machine gun fire and accurately extendedranges of artillery. The stalemate would be broken by theintroduction of new technology: tanks and aircraft workingin concert with advancing infantry and coordinated artillery.The German mechanized armies of World War I1 brought thepractice of combined arms to new heights in accordance withBlitzkrieg doctrine. Influenced by the British militarytheorists J. F. C Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart, GeneralHeinz Guderian applied the principles of mobility, firepower,protection, and leadership to create a synergisticpenetration force which capitalized on maneuver warfare andaimed at an enemy's rear.2 German combined arms formationsacted mainly at regimental level. After 1945, combined armsorganizations continued to evolve dynamically, thanks both to


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technological advances permitting mixed formations and torefined doctrine based on battlefield experience and theory.

The ProblemIn the 19901 s, the US Army continues to refine the

essence of combined arms warfare. Current doctrine addressesthe issue by means of guiding principles and tenets.Experience, including Operation Desert Storm, tells us thatarms working together remain imperative for success.Technologically, the U. S. Army has built a combat readyforce that is complementary with respect to the M-1 mainbattle tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, theM-3 Cavalry fighting vehicle, the Multiple Rocket LauncherSystem, and the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. While thislist is not all inclusive, it is meant to show that thesesystems are numerous and specific in nature. Each of theseweapon systems is designed to perform a specific function onthe modern battlefield. Each of the systems either providesa strength to cover another's shortcoming or a newer means toinflict casualties. Each of these systems is oriented on aspecific arm of the service. Invariably, the accepted wisdomis that to establish a combined arms effort, two or more ofthese types must fight together. If we look farther into thedepth of the systems, specifically the M-2 Bradley fightingvehicle, sub-systems may be identified. A three-man crewwith the vehicle and a five-man dismount team compose the two


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sub-systems. At the platoon level, the make-up is fourcrews, four vehicles, and two dismount squads which combinethe dismounted infantry of all four vehicles. The platoon isequipped with numerous weapons and implements to carry out avariety of missions associated with the Bradley infantryplatoon.

The Pu r~ os eThe potential combat power of tank and mechanized

infantry elements is increased when these type units are taskorganized to accomplish a mission. The brigade commanderstarts the process by cross attaching infantry and tankcompanies within battalions of his brigade. He does this bycross attachment based on his METT-T [Mission, Enemy, Troopsavailable, Terrain, and Time] estimate of the situation andthe needs of the battalions to accomplish their mission. Thebattalion commander addresses the same issues at his level.He task organizes his companies by cross attaching differenttypes of platoons to form company teams. In both instances,the commander has used the potential strengths of one arm tocompensate for the weaknesses of another arm, thus creating astronger force (or he has created a stronger element bycombining pieces). At present, the company represents thelowest level of combined arms tactics at which two or morearms of different characteristics fight together. Thepurpose of this study is to determine if combined arms should


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begin at next lower rung on the ladder, the platoon level.Or to state the question another way, if we recognize thatM-2A2 Bradley equipped infantry platoons have combat crewsand dismount maneuver squads, should we acknowledge thatcombined arms synchronization begin at the Bradley infantryplatoon level?

. Within combined arms context, U.S. Army doctrinedefines a Company/Team as having at least two platoons thatare from different arms.3 An example is a mechanizedcompany/team with one M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle platoon andone M-1 tank platoon under the command and control of aninfantry company commander. Current doctrine states that itis at this level at which combined arms starts because thecompany commander tailors the combat systems to the ground.The company commander forms a team of tanks and BradleyFighting Vehicles and uses them to accomplish a givenmission.

However, a survey of various non-doctrinal writtenworks and commentary indicates that combined arms trainingand operations may well begin at another level, that of theplatoon. The current study holds that this view may wellrepresent yet another stage in the progression of the art andscience of warfare. In short, evidence strongly supports thecontention that it is important to review our understandingof the beginning level of combined arms training. It may bethat the United States Army and possibly any army with a


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similar mechanized infantry capability have evolved to thepoint where synchronization of maneuver in combined armswarfare begins at platoon level.

Related to this primary issue is a series ofsecondary questions. They form logical subsidiary concernswhich must be dealt with either as background or as -legitimate supplementary analysis. These secondary questionsare:1. At what level should combined arms organizations begin?2. What are the tactical requirements or justifications of

this organization?3. Why are our combat units organized the way they are now?4. What is the role of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle in

combined arms warfare?5. What is the role of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle in the

military art?The combined arms concept is applicable across a

broad spectrum of combinations of many branches and units.The current study is limited in scope to the Bradley infantryplatoon. The Bradley infantry platoon itself is not allinclusive for a study of the beginning level of combinedarms. It is important to note that armored cdvalry platoonswere once organized with tanks, armored personnel carriers,and mortars. Such an organization is worthy of'a separatestudy that would include essential factors of reconnaissanceand security peculiar to the armored cavalry mission.


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Two assumptions govern this study. First, theBradley equipped infantry platoon organization will continueto retain a carrier element and a dismount element to executemission tasks as doctrinally assigned. Second, doctrinalemployment of M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles and thedismounted infantry elements of the platoon will remain aviable'combat force as long as heavy combat forces arerequired in modern warfare and as long as no appreciably newtechnologies are introduced.

Below are some key definitions that are to be usedthroughout this thesis:Armored personnel carrier (APC). Vehicle designed to carry

personnel to and from the battlefield while providinglimited protection from small arms and artillery fire.

Assault force. That force charged with passing through abreach in an enemy fortified position or strongpointand seizing an objective or completing the destructionof the enemy.

Bradlev Infantrv Fiqhtinq Vehicle (BIFV). Lightly armored,full-track fighting vehicle which providescross-country mobility, mounted firepower, andprotection from artillery and small-arms fire duringmounted infantry operations and support duringdismounted combat operations. Main weapons for thevehicle crew are the 25mm chain gun, coaxially mounted7.62 machine gun, and the TOW anti-armor missile. The


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vehicle requires a fighting crew of three as aminimum. Seating is provided for six dismountedinfantrymen.

Combined arms team. Two or more arms mutually supporting oneanother. A team usually consists of tanks, infantry,cavalry aviation, field artillery, air defenseartillery and engineers.

Fire and movement. The simultaneous moving and firing by menand/or vehicles. This technique is primarily usedduring the assault of enemy positions.

Intesrated Sisht Unit (ISU). A weapons control system usedin the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and M-3Cavalry Fighting Vehicle. This system is dualcapable, with clear, day sighting and thermal imagerysighting based on heat deferential. It has variablepower magnification and can be used to aim/controlthe fire from the 25mm chain-gun, TOW anti-tankmissile, and 7.62 mm coaxially mounted machined gun.

This study accomplishes three general objectives.First, it places the research question within the context ofcombined arms warfare. Second, this study analyzes aspectsof maneuver theory, combat organization, applied weaponstechnology, evolving doctrine and practical experience, todraw the conclusion that the current Bradley infantry platoonhas become the initiation level of combined arms warfare.


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Third, the study describes a fundamental process thattranscends the immediate issue of the M-2 platoon. Althoughthe Bradley platoon is the subject of immediate focus, thelesson inherent in its study is that the observer must lookbeyond "MTO&E1' to the larger issue of the interaction amongtechnology, doctrine, organization, and experience over time.Only then do the base contours of a complex problem standout in full relief.


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Endnotes1U.S. Army, FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Symbols(Washington: Department of the Army, 1985), p. 1-16.2Field Marshal Michael Carver, The A D O S ~ ~ ~ SfMobility (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p. 55.3U.S. Army, ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Mission Trainina Plan forthe Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company and Company Team(Washington: Department of the Army, 1988), p. 1-2.


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CHAPTER 2LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a large body of literature about combinedarms warfare. The current study categorizes the literatureinto four major groups. The first group comprises historiesthat trace the development of combined arms warfare from itsinception to the present. The second group focuses on thetheory of combined arms as set forth by such thinkers such asJ.F.C. Fuller, S.L.A. Marshall and Richard Simpkin. Theseand other military theorists provide leaven for criticalanalysis within the boundaries of recognized principles. Athird group of literature includes currently accepteddoctrines of the U.S. Army. This group embraces applicablefield manuals, Army Test and Evaluation Procedure manuals,and applicable policy papers. A final group of literatureincludes abstracts of application pertaining to combat unitsinvolved with combined arms training. Also in this finalgroup are a number of monographs and theses done on the artof war as it relates to combined arms warfare.

In 1984, Captain Jonathan M. House wrote Towardcombined Arms Warfare: A Survev of 20th-Centurv Tactics.Doctrine, and Oruanization. This research survey is


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extensive in detail and complete with supporting analysis oncause and effect. Captain House begins his survey with theadvent of the infantryman's rifle, mobile artillery, andlocalized massed armies during the American Civil War. Hequickly traces these developments to the period just prior toWorld War I, when machine guns and tanks were introduced.Captain House walks the reader though the next sixty years ofwarfare in a world where combined arms warfare was refined toa science by the Allied and Axis powers in World War I1 andby the Israeli Army in the Middle East wars of 1967 and 1973.

Captain House's work on combined arms warfare is aprimary point of departure for this research study. Heexplains how combined arms units evolved at division levelin World War I. He shows the devolution of combined armswarfare as it percolated down to regimental and brigadelevels in World War 11, the result of improved technologiesand refined doctrines. Finally, House explains the value andreasoning for combined arms at battalion level during theArab-Israeli Wars. House concludes his survey with fourtrends that he has seen permeating the evolution of combinedarms warfare. The present study centers on the one of thesefour trends:

First, major armies have tended to integratemore and more arms and services at progressivelylower levels of organization, in order to combinedifferent capabilities of mobility, protection, andfirepower while posing more complicated threats toenemy units.


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This assertion by Captain House must be reexaminedto ascertain whether combined arms has devolved to platoonlevel because of the changing capabilities. The value ofCaptain House's work lies in its detailed explanation of thereasoning behind combined arms warfare. His study serves asa point of departure because it was published before Bradleyinfantry was completely fielded in the United States Army:He discusses German Marder infantry and Soviet BMP infantry,but lacked data for a treatment of U.S. Army Bzadleyinfantry.

A second important historical account is John A .English's On Infantry, a treatise on the evolution ofinfantry. His book considers infantry evolution around theworld against the backdrop of changing technologies and theirapplication to the battlefield through changing doctrines.He begins with Prussian "Company Column" deployment in 1866.English devotes attention to this formation because it markedthe beginning of decentralized tactical formations.2

English concerns himself with small unit tactics.He provides a detailed analysis of the infantry squad,platoon, and company. He asserts that to gain a clearpicture of infantry tactics, a division should be looked uponas thirty or more companies grouped to accomplish missions inwar.3 Integrated into his book are the mechanics and methodsof employing new weaponry as an arm of the total force aswell as a part of the combined arms force.


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The importance of English's book lies in the way heaccounts for changes and shows that the infantryman's tacticsevolve to fit technology, while technology itself is fittedto tactics. English ends his book looking at currentmechanized infantries and projecting their importance infuture warfare, while focusing on their capabilities incombined arms warfare.

Historical writing often crosses over intotheoretical development. One such major influence is FieldMarshal Erwin Rommel's Attacks. (As a side note, Attacks isthe unabridged version of Rommel's more famous book titledInfantry Attacks, as published by "Infantry Journal" in1944.) Field Marshal Rommel's book is as much a historicalaccount of small unit action as it is a book of leadershipand unit training.4 He does not mention "combined arms"warfare per se, but he does emphasize a key point insuccessful small unit maneuver that is characteristic ofcombined arms. As a platoon and company commander in theGerman army during World War I, Rommel saw the necessity fora large element to support by fire the maneuver of a smallerinfantry element. This support could come either in theform of suppressive fire from machineguns, mortars,artillery, or from maneuvering infantry throwing handgrenades. An important conclusion of Rommel's study is theconcept that essential and superior supporting fire must be


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provided to facilitate the maneuver of infantry on theground.

Theory affords the intellectual basis for analysisof the combined arms concept and, in turn, facilitatessynthesis from a contemporary perspective. In 1925, John F .C. Fuller wrote The Foundation of the Science of War with thepurpose of establishing a military science. He wanted hisbook to be a catalyst causing military professionals to lookat past lessons, understand the present, and project into thefuture.4 More recently, two books by Richard simpkinemphasize that to be successful combined arms warfare must beapplicable across the continuum of war for a force. Finally,S.L.A. Marshall's Armies on Wheels (1941) provides arationale for the development of mechanized forces.

J. F. C. Fuller provides a wide spectrum ofcoverage, ranging from the most important consideration inwar, "man, the individual soldier," to the unknown potentialof airpower and mechanization. Key to his study are Fuller'selements of war: mental power, protective power, offensivepower, and mobile power.5 Fuller provides the guidingprinciples of war while simultaneously establishing theoryand principles for the science of tactical warfare. Fuller'swork on the science of warfare transcends the spectrum fromthe strategic level to the level of small unit action andleadership. The value of his study is the perspective thatit affords in asserting that the art war begins with "mental


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power, protective power, offensive power, and mobile power."6Enduring since 1925, his theories are applicable to studytoday, and afford insight into the problems of tomorrow.

Like Fuller, S. L. A . Marshall's thought is timeproven. In 1941, Marshall wrote Armies on Wheels to expresshis views on the future of mechanized warfare. Theunderlying themes of the book are four., First, the objectiveof mechanizing a force is to bring "unity of action out ofdiversity of parts." Second, the purpose of the leader is tocreate "diversity of action out of unity of thought." Third,warfare is the application of force through thought andaction in accordance with the situation and in avoidance ofdogma. Finally, Marshall held that the most importantelement in warfare is the spirit of the soldier who must 5cwilling to fight as part of a team to win.'

The importance of Marshall's work to this study liesin his reflections on power and movement. He relates theneed to understand the effects of mechanization at the lowestlevel and treats the subject from the perspective of a mancontrolling the use of machines instead of the capabilitiesof the machine dictating its use to man. Marshall's bookspecifically addresses the success of British tanks,motorized infantry, and foot infantry fighting in cooperationto win the battle of Sidi Barrani.8 This combined armseffort capitalized on the capability of each arm byillustrating instances of mechanized fire support for


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maneuvering infantry. Though written in 1941, Marshall'sfundamentals remain applicable to contemporary warfare.

In a more contemporary vein, Richard Simpkin haswritten specifically to address the issue of combined armswarfare. In Race to the Swift, Simpkin discusses warfarealong the low to high intensity continuum. His book providesinsight into the probable complexities of warfare beyondcurrently conceived notions. More importantly, he suggestsalternative ways to configure combat formations capitalizingon the firepower, mobility, and protection offered by eacharm. Simpkin strongly suggests that combined arms warfare Lsa constant across the continuum. He further analyzes theeffects and application of technology on the battlefieldtoday and the possibilities for the future.

A second book by Simpkin focuses on defining thsrole of mechanized infantry. Mechanized Infantry addressesthe need to qualify the mission of "armored infantry" inhigh intensity war.9 Simpkin writes in depth about theorganization of a mechanized force consciously designedaround a mechanized infantry fighting vehicle. The clearrelevance of this book to the present study involvesSimpkin's emphasis on the relationship among the presentdismounted force, the crew of the vehicle, and the firepowerof the vehicle. Simpkin expresses concern for identifyingthe mission of the mounted force, the dismounted force, andthe combined arms team in high intensity battle.


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Second, Mechanized Infantry looks at the use ofarmored infantry in a low and mid intensity warfare role.Simpkin states that a review of the role of armored infantryis necessary, especially in view of the likelihood of warfareon the northern European plain. He defines the task of eachinfantry section based on capabilities of mobility,firepower, and protection. He then supplies the rational fora serious reconsideration of organization, tactics, anddoctrine.

Current doctrine for Bradley Infantry is basedprimarily on three field manuals. They are designed toprovide a common training base by addressing the platoon asthe basic level for Bradley infantry tactics.5 The coremanual for the platoon is FM 7-7J. The Mechanized InfantrvPlatoon and Squad (Bradlev). This manual provides therational behind the employment of the M-2 equipped infantryplatoon. Other manuals related to the current study areARTEP 71-1-MTP, The Tank and Mechanized Infantrv Company andComaany Team and ARTEP 7-247-11-Drill, Battle Drills for theMechanized Infantrv Platoon and Squad (M-2 Equip~ed). Thisthesis will use these manuals as sources for the organizationand purpose of the Bradley infantry platoon.

The opening paragraphs of FM 7-75 capture theessence of the entire manual. The Bradley infantry fightingvehicle provides the infantry with "unprecedented firepower,armor protection, and battlefield agility."lo The underlying


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concept for this manual is a platoon of three dismounted fireteams (six men each) and four Bradley Infantry FightingVehicles (BIFV's).

The manual is a guide for the platoon leader in1or..mploying his platoon to accomplish his assigned miss'

The requirement for mixing firepower, protection, and agilitydemonstrates the need of group of highly trained soldiers.Tactical employment requirements dictate that qualifiedcrewmen and dismounted infantry be able to work together totake advantage of platoon strengths. A fundamental questionof combined arms training arises in conjunction with thequalification tasks levied upon a member of the crew ordismounts. Key to this study is an understanding of theconcepts in the company/team manual which refer to combinedarms warfare. The manual also cites relationships with 32other field manuals referring to areas such as explosives anddemolitions, ranger tactics, cavalry operations,communications and urban combat.

The specific tasks performed by crewmen anddismounts of the Bradley platoon are listed and explained inARTEP 7-247-11-Drill, Battle Drills for the MechanizedInfantry Platoon and Squad (M2-Ecruip~ea. The purpose of themanual is to prescribe the 17 standardized battle drills and37 standard tactical techniques recognized by the US ArmyInfantry School.11 Tasks are embedded in three naturalsubdivisions. The three may be grouped as fighting with all


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soldiers mounted, fighting as dismounted squads withvehicles, and fighting as two different elements. Collectivedrills and tactical techniques include nearly 100 individualtasks that define the specializations of the Bradley crewmanand dismounted infantrymen.

The doctrinal manual for the company/team lies onelevel up the order of progression. This manual, FM 71-1, TLeTank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, presentsguidelines for employing tanks and mechanized forcestogether, thus formalizing the concept of combined armswarfare. The relevance of the manual to this study lies inits discussion of the ten imperatives derived from AirLandBattle doctrine.12 Development of combat power throughcombined arms is clearly based on the mission, enemysituation, troops available (which arms of the service),terrain to be fought on, and time available to complete themission.

Mission training and evaluation outlines areprovided to the company team commander in the accompanyingARTEP 71-1-MTP, Mission Trainins Plan for the Tank andMechanized Infantry Company and ComDanv Team. As stated inthe manual, "it is imperative that" employment doctrine atplatoon level be read and understood by the company commanderbefore meaningful training can be conducted using the companyteam level program.13 The company/team commander mustunderstand the nature of the platoon's tactical employment


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requirements. In short, 'the company commander cannot applythe total combat power of the company/team unless he knowshow to use the potential of the platoons.

The final group of literature is exemplified byarticles such as "Secrets to Training Success at NTC" byCaptains Frank Childress and Michael Prevou. This is a firsthand account of training successes and failures as seen bytwo experienced observer-controllers at the National TrainlngCenter, Fort Irwin, Caiifornia.14 The purpose of thisarticle, as well as others like it, is to share iessonslearned in training for combined arms warfare as seer. at thecompany level and below. Pertinent to this thesis are thetactics, techniques, and procedures that have provensuccessfui in employing the Bradley platoon.

A similar contemporary reference is the discussionof mechanized infantry in Operation Just Cause. There is nospecific reference to BIFV1 s. in his operation because nonewas deployed as part of the force package. It is importantto note, however, the distinct use of the M113 ArmoredPersonnel Carrier (APC) with its .50 caliber machine gur! as asupport system for dismounted U.S. Infantry in the streets ofPanama in December 1989.15 It is also important tounderstand that as of March 1992, the active duty forcestructure is void of mechanized infantry using the ' ~ 1 1 3Armored Personnel Carrier as the primary system. Allmechanized infantry units have completed transition to the


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M-2 BIFV. This is a significant fact when power projectionrequires armored or mechanized forces to support operations.Future deployment of mechanized infantry will likely be inthe form of the M-2 equipped Bradley Infantry.

Materials related remotely and directly to infanrrycombat vehicles as part of modern combined arms team embracea broad spectrum of literature. Ultimately, that literaturedeals with the subject in theoretical, experiential, andapplied perspective. Taken together, various forms ofliterature provide the context and a data bank for a study ofcontemporary issues, including optimal training for theBradley equipped infantry platoon.


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Endnotes

LJonathan M. House, Towards Combined Arms Warfare: ASurvey of Tactics, Doctrine. and Orsanization in the 20thCentury (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College, 1984), p. 188.

2John A. English, On Infantrv (New York: PraegerPublishers, 1981), p. 1.SIbid., p . xvii.4Erwin Romrnel, Attacks (Vienna, VA: Athena Press, Inc.,1979), p. vi.sJ. F. C. Fuller, Foundation of the Science of War(London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1925), p. 16.

7s. L. A. Marshall, Armies on Wheels (New York: WilliamMorrow and Company, 1941), pp. 6-8.

9Richard Simpkin, Mechanized Infantry (Elmsford, NY:Pegamon Press Inc., 1980), p. 2.loUS Army, FM 7-75. The Mechanized Infantrv Platoon andSauad (Bradlev) (Washington, D.C.: Government PrintingOffice, 1987), p. 1-1.l1US Army, ARTEP 7-247-11-DRILL, Battle Drills for theMechanized Infantrv Platoon and Squad (M2-Ecrui~~ed)(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), p. vii.12US Army, FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry ComDanyTeam (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), p.-5.13U S Army, ARTEP 71-1-MTP. Mission Trainins Plan for theTank and Mechanized Infantry Com~anv nd Comuanv Team,(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 1-1.14CPT Franklin J. Childress and CPT Michael Prevou,"Secrets to Training Success at NTC," Infantry 80 (Jan-Feb92). p. 20.


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15Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker,O~ er at io n ust Cause (New York: Macmillan, Inc., 1991),p. 177-182.


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CHAPTER 3RESEARCH DESIGN

The nature of the subject and its relationship tothe research question dictate this thesis's method and scope.The author came to choice of subject because of lengthy

.first-hand experience with the training and deployment ofinfantry units equipped with Bradley Infantry FightingVehicles. It was immediately evident during this experiencethat something new was apparent in the way thatBradley-equipped units approached combined arms warfare. Acombination of circumstances, including changing technology,evolving organization, and emerging combat techniques, wereacting in unison to challenge conventional wisdom about wherecontemporary combined arms warfare begins.

Until recently, accepted wisdom has been thatcombined arms warfare begins at company-level and above.This and related assumptions have rested on theory. doctrine.and combat experience. The same assumptions have generallygoverned the ways in which the U. S. Army has trained andstructured its mechanized infantry forces to fight incontemporary and future war. The base concept has been thatinfantry and other elements of the combined arms task


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organize themselves for combat at the company level.Personal experience created the distinct impression

that many of the conventional assumptions governing combinedarms were being undermined by changing application in thefield. As infantry units assimilated their new vehicles andbegan training with them, platoon level units themseivesbegan displaying many of the attributes of a combined armsfighting force. Was this a mere anomaly or did this reflecta fundamental process?

But how to test this proposition was the question.Personal observations and impressions are only beginningpoints for the development of a hypothesis that so stronglychallenges conventional wisdom. Consequently, I acceptedthis proposition as a starting point for investigation. Inproceeding from hypothesis to thesis, the organizationalframework within which BIFV's are employed formed a logicallimitation. The same framework also governed the developmentof the primary and secondary research questions.

Of all the considerations relevant of moderncombined arms warfare, that of context emerged to occupy aprimary place during an initial investigation of materialsrelated to the research question. Modern militaryorganizations function within a contextual continuum. Thatcontinuum counts many components, including theory, doctrine,experience, and organization. This understanding led me tocarry this investigation a step further by placing the BIFV

2 6


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platoon within that continuum, within that context whichwould lend more than first-hand perspective into afundamental process that was changing the way in which modernmechanized infantry view themselves and their battlefieldroles.

The nature of the subject thus began to dictate theresearch method. It became clear during preliminary workthat the most appropriate research method to accomnodatedevelopment of the basic question was that ofhistorically-informed qualitative research methodology. Theabsence and inappropriateness of quantitative evidenceclearly indicated that empirical and quantitative methodswere inapplicable to the subject and its implications. Atstake were issues of intellect, larger experience andpractice, and prescription, most of which lay outside thelimits of quantitative-based research. The best approachseemed to be one that emphasized change within context, anapproach which rests heavily, but not exclusively, onhistorical analysis.

Once having determined the research question, themethod of qualitative research required the collection of asmuch material as possible bearing on the fundamentalquestion. For purposes of this thesis, the collection effortfocused on several distinct areas. These included a reviewof materials related to the evolution of combined armswarfare theory, practice, organization, and doctrine. These


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materials were gathered and categorized in a way thatfacilitated determination of trends over longer periods ofpractice. Could the research reveal a distinct trend intheory and practice that pointed logically in the directzcnof long term devolution?

Through this method, I have discovered how changesover time have brought about the concept of combined arms.1Historical development is important to the study becausecause-and-effect relationships are usually reflected in theinteraction over time among doctrine, technology, andapplications. Background forms the basis of our currentstate; experience explains how we got to the point ofcombined arms warfare as it is currently known.

The historical perspective on the subject ofcombined arms warfare and its evolution to lower levels isderived from the qualitative research of related materials.There is also a cross over between the historians, whoprovide the examples, and the theorists who develop thereasoning. Evidence from both fields is validated whencompared and grouped. An effort is made to cull downcombined arms material to document propensities at platoonlevel. These tendencies highlight tactical and techno:cgica:catalysts.

After historical development, it is imperative tounderstand the current state of the art in detail.Specifically, what is the status of the mechanized infantry


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platoon today? Combined arms began when separate arms wereused to protect another arm or to create opportunity for theuse of a second arm. This study reexamines the concept ofcombined arms as it pertains to tactical cooperation betweeathe primary combat arms: infantry, armor and fieldartillery.= Although combined arms includes all types ofinfantry in conjunction with other combat and combat supportbranches, this study concerns itself with Bradley equ~ppedinfantry in association with tanks and field artillery. Thestudy culminates with a specific analysis of the BIFVplatoon.

The start point for organizational discussion is themodified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) as it wasoriginally outlined for BFV infantry. This organization wasbased on requirements of previously known mechanizedinfantry equipped with the M113 series of vehicles. Missionrequirements paralleled each other. In other words, BFVinfantry were to do the same mission as M113 infantry. Bothtypes of infantry had three dismounted squads and fourvehicles in a platoon. It was envisioned that the BFV wonldbe a better infantry vehicle because of its improvedtechnology in upgraded weapons systems, survivability, andbattlefield maneuverability. All these were to complementthe M-1 tank. The characteristics of the M-2 BFV are thosespecified by 3 . F. C. Fuller when wrote about the three


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physical element of war as mobility, protection, andoffensive firepower.'

The second step in the organization discussionrelates to the evolution of BFV infantry to its currentarrangement of two dismount squads and four vehicles dividedinto two sections.' This arrangement reflects what FieldMarshal Erwin Rommel professed as integral to the success ofinfantry maneuver. He believed that a large support forcewas required to insure the protection of a smaller, highlyskilled maneuver force.5 The M-2 BIFV offers a powerfulsupport force capable of producing an overwhelming volume offire for the dismounted maneuver.

The weapons of the four vehicles in the platoonrequire an extensive comparison with the weapons thatsupported dismounted infantry in the past. Current weaponsput teeth into Fuller's triad. The 25 millimeter chain gun,the coaxially mounted 7.62 machine gun, and the integratedtube-launched, optically guided, wire-command linked missileanti-armor (TOW) missile system provide a highly technical,lethal combination. Additionally, we may discover that theBradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle has other possibilities.The vehicle's armored protection and carrying capaSilitiesprovide means to preserve the potential combat power of thevehicles' integrated weapons and those of the dismountedinfantry squads. Through its engineering, the BIFV is


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capable of moving with other combat forces to deliverdismounted infantrymen at a critical point in battle.

The two dismounted infantry squads must be a highlyskilled, flexible force. The missions of the squads aresimilar to those of any infantry but, this smaller force isin other ways unique.6 After arrival in battle within theprotection of the BIFV's, this force assembles, observes,decides, and acts. It is infantry fighting on foot thatcompletes destruction of the enemy force.'

Infantry on foot fighting in conjunction with theBIFVs and tanks create a synergistic effect in which thecombination of results is greater than the sum of theindividual parts.8 Combined arms tactics and operationsdiscussed in current field manuals demand a synchronized,well-practiced system of battle of all assets.

An examination of synchronization and theapplicability to the Bradley Infantry platoon requiresanalyzing the interaction among theory, experience,organization, technology, and doctrine. A historical reviewof combined arms warfare shows that interaction is usuallydominated by one of the above mentioned five factors. Thesame review also shows that combined arms warfare hascontinued to move to lower level organization as the otherfour have progressed.

This study's emphasis and methodology link theBradley Infantry platoon to the foundation of combined arms.


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Relevant theory emphasizes the applicability of the factorsof firepower, mobility, protection and leadership. Theplatoon is currently organized with tandem vehicle sectionsand dismounted infantry squads. Each of these sub-formaticnsis required by current platoon doctrine to execute missionsindependently or in a combined effort. Doctrine for theplatoon was developed after the fielding of the M-2 BIFV.Platoon organization was changed to fit the constraints ofthe vehicles, man power requirements and evolving tactics.Utilization of technologically advanced weapons systems alsofigure in expanding the combined arms role to the platoon.Experience tells us that the platoon leader is required tosynchronize the effort and capabilities of multiple parts.

A critical review of the tactics of using theavailable combat power is the culminating point of themethodology. The study looks at historical implications,assesses current capabilities, applies time tested theory,and proposes a suitable level to consider for the beginningof combined arms warfare.

It is possible that combined arms is the product ofmany causes that rely heavily on the evolution or improvementof doctrines. Looking at the past, we learn that improved ormore lethal weapons have caused armies to rethink employmentof forces. Soldiers have been forced to devise new ways towage the close fight in which infantry confront each otherface to face. Military forces have combined the strengths of


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many arms to overcome the weaknesses. The conclusion of thisstudy is that synchronization of combined arms warfare beginsat the Bradley Infantry platoon level.


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Endnotes

1Jonathan M. House, Towards Combined Arms Warfare: ASurvey of Tactics, Doctrine, and Orsanization in the 20thCentury, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College, 1984), pp. 2-3.

2Robert J. St.Onge, Jr., "The Combined Arms Role ofArmored Infantry," Monograph, SAMS, US Army CGSC, 1985. p. 8.33. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War(London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1925), p. 148.4U. S. Army, "WHITE PAPER: Bradley Fighting VehicleDoctrine, Organization, and Training," Fort Benning, GA:USAIS, 17 February 1989.SErwin Rommel, Attacks, (Vienna, VA: Athena Press,Inc,1979), p . 284.6Dwight B. Dickson, Jr. and Wesley E. Barbour, How toFiaht: The Bradley Infantry Platoon (Fort Riley, KS, 1990),p. 7-1.

eUS Army, FM 100-5 DRAFT. Operations (Washington, D.C.:US Government Printing Office, August 1992), p. 2-3.


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CHAPTER 4HISTORY

The concept of combined arms warfare is not new, butone that has evolved over hundreds of years. Changes inwarfare at the tactical level between 1750 and 1914 camelargely as a result of technological advances in infantry an?artillery weapons. The nature of warfare changed at thetactical level from a large unitary force standing in closeformation delivering inaccurate, short range fire to multiplesmaller entrenched units producing effective fire fromrepeating rifles, while dominant artillery destroyed frontalassaults.

Tactics in 1750 focused on a unitary force that wascomposed of infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Infantryaccounted for the majority of the force because of the needto generate maximum frontal firepower. Artillery was used 2sa weapon to tear holes in the ranks of the infantry.Cavalry, considered the decisive arm, pressed shock anddestruction through the holes created by artillery orinfantry fire.1 These forces moved as a single entity andfought on a limited scale battlefield.2


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The infantry weapon of the period, the smoothboreflintlock musket, required linear formations of multipleranks to provide a sustained rate of fire.3 Trainedinfantrymen could fire three rounds a minute, butinaccurately. This limitation required multiple ranks firingalternately to deliver effective fire against the enemy.Closed ranks were needed to create massed fire as well as toprotect against charging cavalry. Modified infantry squareswere often employed. The infantryman's ring bayonet providedthe ability to fight close-in as well as to defend againstcavalry. Infantry employment remained basically unchangeduntil the period of the French Revolution and Napoleon.

The use of artillery in the mid 18th century waslimited by its mobility. Artillery was slowly move2 to thefront of the infantry ranks by civilian draymen. Theartillery then fired solid and case shot into the ranks ofthe enemy, at a rate of one to two rounds a minute, untiladvancing enemy or cavalry either broke or provided aneffective counter.'

Cavalry was used to smash into the ranks of theinfantry at either a weak flank or a gap created by fire.The arme blanche (the sabre was known as the white arm) wasused to destroy infantry formations at an opportune time asperceived by the commander.5 These cavalry tactics remainedviable until the mid 1800's, when accurate rifled musket firecould destroy charging formations out to 500 meters."


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During the era of the French Revolution andNapoleon, there were four significant technical and tacticalchanges. The first innovation was the creation of autonomousdivisions to facilitate decentralized control, speed andflexibility. Combined arms had devolved from army todivision level. These separate divisions moved independently,allowing army commanders to tailor their forces to thebattlefield. Second, the column attack was developed tofacilitate greater control and the ability to mass at thepoint of attack or penetration. Before the column attack,extended infantry lines were nearly impossible to control andslow to deploy. Tactical innovation placed battalions incolumn moving forward toward the enemy. The command*r of t h ecolumn decided where to deploy his troops, either expandingout to the flanks or continuing to mass the force at a pointof penetration.' Combined arms warfare began to gain amaneuver perspective.

The third tactical change was the innovative use ofinfantry with the musket and bayonet. The infantry were x e din one of three ways. They were deployed either asskirmishers in front of the main body to disrupt enemyformations, as rank and file infantry in the main body, or asmass in reserve.

The last change was transition to mobile artillery.Artillery pieces became lighter, mounted on carriages, andmanned by soldiers. Commanders moved and massed fires where


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needed. Napoleon perfected the art of moving autonomousdivisions in column to create mass at one point on thebattlefield. Xis artillery moved and massed fires at thepoint of penetration, where large reserves of infantry andcavalry attacked.8 These tactics remained relatively staticuntil the era of the Crimean War and the American Civil War,when the impact of technology would produce additionalchange.

Warfare at the beginning of the Civil War usedtactics as prescribed by manuals based on Napoleonicexperience. Tactical change came with the advent of theMinie ball and percussion-cap ignition for the rifled musket.The Minie ball allowid the infantry to reload as fast as the

smooth bore musket, but enabled them to effectively engagetargets at ranges exceeding 500 meters. Percussion-capignition systems improved firing reliability. Shoulder firedweapons dominated the battlefield and produced ninety percentof the battle casualties of the war.9

The advent of accurate, long-range rifle fire hadother effects on the battlefield. First, it did away withcavalry as battlefield disrupter, relegating horsemen to theroles of raiding, security, and reconnaissance."J Riflemenalso made artillery primarily a defensive weapon because theinfantry could kill cannon crews as they approached closelyenough to fire. Tactical change dictated that the silhouetteof the individual become lower or protected. A defender


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using protective earthworks to engage at lohger ranges had adecided advantage over an attacking enemy. The tactics ofdefensive trench warfare used in June 1864 at Petersburg,Virginia, would approximate those of battlefields in Franceduring 1915-1918.11

- The re-emergence of artillery as a d o m i n a t i ~ ~or-ein conjunction with rifle fire was first observed in 1870during the Franco-Prussian War. This was also the last warin which infantry would stand in ranks to engage the enemy.Tactics of the war saw defenders in arepared positionscontinue to dominate the battlefield because artillery rangeand accuracy had tripled, thanks to rifling and betterpropellants. Repeating rifles meant that infantry firedfaster at ranges out to 1000 meters. Most tactical thinkersbefore World War I believed that offensive tactics required a"greater intensity of fire than the defender" at the point ofattack. Tactics now called for close coordination ofinfantry and artillery for the defense and the offense.12Combined arms warfare remained largely an affair coacerninginfantry and artillery.

By the end of 1914, defensive tactics came todominate warfare at the tactical level. The introduction ofmachine guns in prepared positions provided infantry a bettermeans to hold ground. Artillery was now able to "take"ground by firing at ranges of twenty miles to destroyearthworks. Many military thinkers believe8 in the offense,


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but were slow to assimilate the lessons of recent combat.The tactical impasse of defensive trench warfare would bepartially resolved only with the mass introduction of anarmored vehicle called the tank.13 Changes in tactics from1750 to 1914 had resulted mainly from technological advances

- in weaponry for the infantry and artillery. Whatever theinstrument, solving the impasse would require strictcoordination and team work of infantry, tanks and artillery.

By the'end of World War I, the United States Arnywas placing heavy machineguns and tanks in infantryformations as supporting fire systems. Superior fireaower insupport of the infantry was sound practice until the infantryoutdistanced the range of the immobile machine gun oroutdistanced the new armored support systems. Moderncombined arms warfare had its true beginning during WorldWar I, when the effects of artillery preparation, mobility oftank support, and the decisiveness of infantry attack werecoordinated. The level of this coordinated effort was at thelevel of army and division organization.14

During World War 11, armored formations possessedcomplementary assets, including armored infantry ba tt ai io x,tank-destroyer battalions, tank battalions and artillery.Organization of infantry, armored infantry, tanks,tank-destroyers and artillery had evolved within the contextof the division. Divisions had regiments of infactry, armor,


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and supporting artillery. Units were task-organized to gainthe benefits of branch particular strengths.15

German Blitzkrieg applisd combined arms formationsin the Panzer and Panzergrenadier Divisions. Blitzkriegaimed at maintaining the mobility lost during World War I,striking hard at the point of penetration, moving rapidly tothe enemy rear, and encircling the enemy force. Key to thesuccess of armored and mechanized formations was theintegration of technology with the progressive doctrine ofthe day. Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions were builtwith mobility, firepower, and protection in mind.

The key innovation merging technology and combinedarms warfare was the mechanical transport to carrytroops into battle.16

Division formations were based on brigades or regiments oftanks, mechanized infantry, regular infantry, artillery, andengineers. Forces were cross attached below brigade leveldepending on mission requirements.

Original panzer and panzergrenadier division were"out of balance." The 1939 Panzergrenadier divisiozinitially started with infantry to armor combat ratios of sixto one. The Panzer Division started with a two to one ratioof tanks to infantry. Both types of division would quicklychange to a more balanced ratio in response to the truerequirements of combat.17


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The modus operandi for panzergrenadiers haspersisted over time, with many aspects remaining viable eventoday. I n essence, the infantry was mechanized to maintainthe momentum and operational tempo of tank forcepenetrations. A key element of this combined arms operationwas the idea that the infantry remained mounted in theirvehicles until required to dismount. The Panzergrenadier'sprimary role was to dismount when required to clear the wayfor the armor forces to maintain attacking momentum. I nBlitzkrieg theory, the tank predominated. As World War Iiprogressed, technology would provide capable anti-tanksystems and doctrines would be refined to adjust for truecooperation between arms, with success building upon eachother's strengths.18 By 1943, German combat battalionsbecame balanced forces with tanks and mechanized or motorizedinfantry. The Panzergrenadiers were armed with anti-tankweapons, air defense machineguns, and obstacle breachiz ~equipment. 9

Meanwhile, the U.S. Army made strides towarddivisions being organized on the combined arms principle. I n1940, the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division was assembled wit5battalions of tanks, armored infantry, field artillery, aodengineers, all of which were organic to the division. Themechanized infantry in this unit traveled in the M-3Personnel Carrier, the famed "half-track," fashioned afterthe German APC Sdkfz251.20


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Armored formations began to dominate the flq~idbattlefield. The need to counter the power of a tank heavyformation produced "tank surrogates."2l Technolo.;y enkancedthe lethality of all arms and the specialty of each arm. Bythe end of World War 11, combined arms formations at the

4 brigade level had become accepted practice to ensure thestrength of each arm. Divisions remained organized withregiments of infantry and armor, but the division retainedthe ability to task organize its components into combinedarms regimental combat teams.22

The conduct of combined arms operations strugg!adwith the coordination of close air support, thus attemptinsto add another asset. Whatever the uncertainties of airintegration, by 1945, U.S., British, and Soviet forces werehabitually using cross attached organizations at brigade andbattalion level.23

Tragically, the art of combined arms warfare was abut forgotten because of massive demobilization after WorldWar 11, the political and military fixation on atomicweapons, and the assumption that mechanized divisions weretoo heavy and support-intensive to be useful.24 By 1951, thedivisions that remained on active duty were at best 7C

percent strength in manning and goorly equipped. The conceptof regimental combined arms teams occupied an important placein combined arms warfare, but cou!d not be developed, thanksto lack of training and equipment.


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After the Korean War, U. S. involvement in Vietnamdid little to revitalize combined arms warfare in a heavyforce environment. Only after Vietnam did the U. S. Armyrefocus its attention on the requirement for possible waragainst the Soviet Union. Possibility of conflict on theEuropean battlefield lobbied for mass armor formations andcombined arms forces fighting in brigade formations.

The 1986 version of the U. S. Army's Airland BattleDoctrine called for heavy combat battalions to be taskorganized with a mix of tanks, mechanized infantry, an2 othercombat support elements. Through the development oftechnology and changes in warfighting doctrines, combine?arms teams gradually evolved within the army structure toreach the current level of the company/team.zs

The structure of the company team is currently builtaround mission requirements determined by the BattalionjTaskForce (BN/TF) commander. If necessary, due to the nature ofthe battlefield and situational needs, the infantry or armorcompany commander may be given assets of tank, infantry,mechanized infantry, engineer and like platoons to accoaplisthis mission. The company/team (CO/TM) commander's combatpower is a set of complementary arms that generate more forcebecause of their mixed abilities working in concert thar ifthey were employed alone.

The next chapter in the combined arms evolutionaryprocess found its origins in the development, designed,


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documentation and fielding of the M-2 Bradley Infantryplatoon. This thesis emphasizes that the Bradley platoonleader is reqcired to synchronize the employment ofsignificant combat power from the sets of M-2's and thedismounted force in the platoon.


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Endnotes1Michael Howard, War in European Historv (Guernsey,Channel Islands: Guernsey Press Co. Ltd., 1976), p. 59.

4 Ibid.

6Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since theEishteenth Centurv (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UniversityPress, 1984), p. 44.'Howard, War in European Historv, p. 76.$Addington, The Patterns of War Since the ~isht ee nt hCentury, p. 18.sIbid., p. 44.

lOHoward, War in European History, p. 104.1lAlfred P. James, "The Battle of the Crater," Journal ofthe American Militarv Historv Foundation 2 (Spring 1938);reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, C620S~llabus/Book f Readinas (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, August1992), p. 121.12Howard, War in European Historv, p. 103.IsIbid., p. 104.14Jonathan M. House, Towards Combined Arms Warfare: ASurvev of Tactics. Doctrine, and Orsanization in the 20thCenturv (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College, 1984), pp. 1-3.

IsRichard Simpkin, Mechanized Infantry (Elmsford, NY:Pegamon Press Inc., 1980), p. 2.171bid.. p. 15.


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IsHouse, Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey ofTactics, Doctrine, and Oraanization in the 20th Century,p. 127.2oSimpkin, Mechanized Infantry, p. 16.21House, Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey ofTactics, Doctrine, and Orsanization in the 20th Century.p. 109.


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CHAPTER 5ANALYSIS

Combined Arms TheoryThe concept of combined arms warfare as it exists

today in the mechanized force is in large part the product ofthe legacy of J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart. These twofigures are regarded as among the best known theorists onmobile warfare.1 They generated the concept that was adoptedby a majority of the world's mechanized forces in the yearsbetween the world wars. Theory was refined through practiceand application on World War 11 battle fields. The idea ofcomplementary arms generating greater potential receivedadditional impetus from force restructuring in light oftechnological advances and doctrinal modifications.

As a theorist, J.F.C. Fuller proselytized theprinciples of war, the science of war, and the elements ofwar. Each is equally important and remains relevant today.Conceiving these ideas in 1925, Fuller's intent was toprovide a foundation for military scientific thinking thatwould contribute to further speculation and advances inpractice. It was his desire to motivate professionalsoldiers to look fifteen to twenty years ahead to envisionthe requirements, structure, and application of armed


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forces.2 His theories were to aid those with lessimagination and to break down the barriers that resistedrational change. He was willing to make assertions that wereconsciously aimed at challenging the status quo. As he putit:

The only way to prevent ossification of the mindis to accept nothing as fixed, to realize thatthe circumstances of war are ever changing, andthat organization, strategy and tactics must alsochange. Adherence to dogmas has destroyed morearmies and lost more battles and lives that anyother cause in war.3Fuller held that although situations may make changeimpossible, the professional, after calculated reflection,must be mentally prepared to change what is necessary whenthe time is right.

One of Fuller's contributions to the combined armsconcept was to propose conscious reference to the elements ofwar. He lists them as Mental power, Protective power,Offensive power, and Mobile power. In further explanation,he defines them as the power of Mind, Protection, Weapons,and Movement.' Current doctrine lists them as the Dynamicsof Combat Power, while redefining the Mind as leadership andcalling this the most important of the four.5

Fuller's theory on mobile warfare professed that thearmor force was to attack the will of the enemy army.Fuller's force was at first predominately tank heavy forexecuting a deep penetration through a hole that the infantryand field artillery had created in enemy dispositions. The


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armor force was to destroy the command and control structureguiding the enemy force, to destroy the supportinfrastructure supplying the enemy, and to break his will tofight. Prior to World War 11, Fuller would qualify hisassertions by prescribing that the penetrating force containtanks, armored infantry, anti-tank forces, engineers andartillery.6 The purpose of this force was to combine thecapabilities of each with an eye to facilitating continuedpenetration and exploitation, while adding protection to theforce as a whole and various additional skills.

Fuller's armored infantry was a highly trainedstanding force capable of a number of different tasks.Armored infantry was originally intended to be an anti-tankforce to protect the flanks of the tank force penetration.Fuller revised his proposal to prescribe a mechanizedinfantry capable of attacking anti-tank defenses, defendingcritical areas, protecting the tank force and constructingfield works 7

B.H. Liddell Hart was a disciple of Fuller and anoted military theorist in his own right. Following Fuller'slead, Liddell Hart proposed the type force that encompassedcombined arms to produce the "expanding torrent," a conceptgeared to destroy enemy dispositions in depth and at theircore.8 The expanding torrent was to produce the same effectof Fuller's penetration and exploitation. Liddell Hart sawthe need to attack at the weak point in the enemy defense,


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hold the flanks of the penetration with infantry forces, thenuse mechanized forces, again predominately armor, to exploitsuccess. The main differences between Fuller's and LiddellHart's concepts were the objectives and mix of forces.

Liddell Hart's force was originally composed oftanks, artillery, and carrier mounted infantry, with anoverall mission to follow the path of least resistance insid@enemy lines to destroy the "brain of the enemy force."g Hefurther emphasized the need to weigh the balance of the forcein terms of its infantry, armor, and field artillery. Astrong advocate for a composite combined arms force, LiddellHart proposed creation of brigade size packages. These wouldbecome building blocks for other forces. He suggestedbrigades composed of cavalry battalions (light tanks), lightarmor (mechanized infantry), medium armor (medium tanks), andlight infantry.

The brigades that Liddell Hart proposed were basedon an understanding of Fuller's elements of war. LiddellHart met firepower requirements by mixing the infantrymachine gun and mortar with tank direct fire supported byartillery. All forces were to possess the protection offeredby motor vehicle speed as well as armor bolted on tovehicles. The exception was the light infantry, who wereintended to make the infiltration penetration and hold itopen. Mobility was the key. Liddell Hart and Fullerdedicated their efforts to ensuring that the force of the


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future had the ability to maintain mobility for maneuverwarfare. There was no room in their thought for World WarI-style stalemate.

Simply put, J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart hadtaken the technological advances of the inter-war years andapplied them in logical fashion to solve the tactical impasseof World War I. Combined arms warfare was not a new conceptto them, as they already understood the importance ofcoordination and cooperation of arms fighting together. Theytook the combined arms concept into the realm of decisivecombat to advocate a war of maneuver. Liddell Hart andFuller continued to develop their theories and forcestructures based on new technologies, practical testing, andhard learned lessons of vicarious battlefield experiences.10Their persistent study of combined arms warfare led them torealize that the mix of formations would devolve to lowerlevels, in part because of the changing nature ofbattlefields.

As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, combined armswarfare has continued to devolve. Combined arms formationshave been created at lower levels due to increasingbattlefield lethality, durability of arms, capabilities ofthe individual soldier and doctrinal evolution. Thesechanges are in a major way a reflection of technologiesapplied to armed struggle. Major strengths of the U.S. Armytoday lie in its technological advantages and in a


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today lie in its technological advantages and in awillingness to doctrinally integrate leaps in technologywhich catalyze force change.11 Technological advantageprovides the force with the ability maintain a high tempo ofwarfare among units which are normally dispersed and whichmass only at a critical point and time to achieve desired - -effects. Weapons developments provide the means to aquire anenemy target at greater distances, move faster to aadvantageous position, and shoot farther with greateraccuracy and lethality.

BIFV Platoon DevelopmentThe development of the Bradley Infantry platoon

presented a significant technological and tactical innovationfor the infantry in the U.S. Army. The mechanizedinfantryman's vehicle was transformed from a simplisticbattlefield carrier to a fighting vehicle capable ofcontinued action once dismounted soldiers had left thevehicle. Dismounted soldiers were to evolve into a smallerforce that multiplied its impact through the synergisticapplication of combat power on the modern battlefield.12

The development of this added dimension in themechanized infantry force has required a flexible, dynamic,and aggressive style of leadership. The capabilities of theBradley platoon eclipsed those of the previous M113 equippedinfantry force in the majority of battlefield requirements.


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Regardless of the leap in capabilities, the mission of themechanized infantry force remained the same:

To close with the enemy by means of fire andmaneuver to destroy or capture him or repel hisassault by fire, close combat and counterattack.13

This mission remains the same for all U.S. infantryagain, but the Bradley infantry possesses the added-dimensionof their fighting vehicle's capabilities. The added BIFVdimensions of firepower, mobility, and protection complementthe increased capabilities of the dismounted force byphysically extending the mission of the mechanized platoon.The application of these capabilities is dependent on Missionrequirements, the Enemy situation, the Terrain to be foughtover, the availability of friendly Troops, and the Timeavailable for planning and execution (METT-T). The doctrinefor development and application of this force was a directprogression from its predecessor, the M113 mechanizedinfantry.14

The original Bradley platoon concept was based on athirty-five man platoon equipped with four BIFV's.15 Thisplatoon was organized into a headquarters squad and threemaneuver squads. Each of these squads was to man one of thefour vehicles. The original fighting doctrine for theBradley platoon was simply translated from application to theMI13 mechanized infantry.

Command and control within the platoon accounted forthe changing locations of the leadership element based on the

5 4


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employment of the platoon. The headquarters squad wascomposed of the platoon leader (PL), the platoon sergeant(PSG), the platoon master gunner, a radio and telephoneoperator (RTO), and the driver of the headquarters' squadBIFV. The platoon was augmented by an artillery forwardobserver (FO), the forward observer's RTO, and a mqdic forthe platoon as a whole.16 Survival of proper command andcontrol required that the PSG become the commander on thenumber four vehicle of the platoon, while the PL was thecommander of the number one vehicle. This required a manfrom the number four vehicle to move to the number onevehicle because of limited seating capacity. The designatedman was the assistant squad leader from the third squad.

The original Bradley platoon had three maneuversquads of nine men each. The M113 mechanized infantry hadthree squads of eleven men each. The reduction in size ofthe maneuver squads stemmed from the limited seating capacityof the BIFV. As in the M113 squad, the squad leader wasresponsible for his squad and his vehicle. As long as theplatoon was to fight mounted, command and control waseffective because leadership of platoon was in the turrets ofthe BIFV. The vehicles were manned by qualified crews, andthe platoon dismounts manned the port firing weapons.

The Bradley platoon maintained the ability to fightusing dismounted teams, but the act of dismounting theplatoon leadership at the desired location was a convoluted


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test of agility. There was no simple technique to dismountthe infantry teams and the leadership. Except for the numberfour vehicle, the Bradley vehicle commanders, the PL andsquad leaders had to exit their vehicles by either comingdown through the turret door into the dismount compartment orgoing out the top through the commander's turret hatch. Theturret hatch was not a safe option if the vehicle was underenemy fire, while exiting through the turret door was a slowprocess that limited employment of the vehicle-weaponsystems. Assistant squad leaders would take the place of theexiting vehicle commanders. The number four vehiclecommander remained the PSG. The need to switch vehiclecommanders engendered the need to maintain a minimum of sevengunnery qualified vehicle commanders.

Once the infantry was on the ground, the platoon wasconfigured with three dismounted maneuver teams under thecontrol of the platoon leader and four BIFV's with three mancrews under the control of the PSG. There were variations,but the platoon could now use all its assets, depending onthe mission and circumstance.

The platoon could operate in one of threeconfigurations once the infantry was on the ground.Depending on the mission to be executed, the platoon couldoperate with the infantry teams fighting in directassociation with their carrier vehicle; the three infantryteams could be assembled as one force fighting in the same


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engagement as the four BIFVs; or the infantry teams couldconduct operations independently of the BIFVs while thevehicles executed another task that was independent of orcomplementary to that of the dismounts.

The original design of the Bradley platoon had theelements of a combined arms organizatlimited effectiveness of training andThe strengths of the platoon were: afirepower when compared with M113; b

on, but structurecombat employment.the quantum leap inthe protection offered

by the armor of the BIFV; c) the mobility and speed designedinto the BIFV; and d) the technological advantage derivedfrom the Integrated Sight Unit providing the thermal-assistedability to see at night. Improvements were obviously aresult of the adoption of the M-2 Bradley Infantry FightingVehicle with its new technology. The infantryman that woulduse this vehicle had not changed.

The limitations of the original Bradley platoon weredirectly related to manning structure and organization forbattle. The platoon was established on the precedent of thethree squad and four carrier vehicle concept of the M113 era.The infantry were directly associated with a particularvehicle because of squad assignment and the established chainof command. This arrangement increased gunnery trainingrequirements, split training attention between crew andinfantry team skills, and made dismounted combat drilldifficult for the platoon as a whole. The overall result was


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ineffective use of the available amount of infantry andfirepower within the platoon.17

Current OrqanizationThe Bradley Infantry Platoon evolved to its current

modified structure to overcome the above difficulties. Thisnew structure focuses on stabilizing platoon command andcontrol by means of two designated sub elements. Structurenow breaks the tradition of the riding infantry and thevehicle crew belonging to the same squad. The modifiedstructure simplifies control, clarifies leadership trainingfocus, simplifies the leadership dismounting procedure, andreduces vehicle gunnery training requirements.

The platoon was reorganized in 1989 with severalinherent benefits. Platoon structure is now aligned withcurrent doctrine which states that platoons fight as mountedand dismounted elements. The platoon is divided intobalanced sections with equal numbers of personnel andvehicles. This arrangement provides for greater flexibilitywithin the unit. The new organization clarifies leadershipresponsibilities by dedicating leaders to functions.Clarification improves tactical employment and training. Theinfantry are now organized into two nine man squads thatfunction like any other infantry platoon, while executingmultiple dismounted tasks and withstanding the impact ofcasualties better than previous teams.10


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The four M-2's of the platoon fight using thewingman concept. Bradley infantry has been using thisconcept since 1986 as an adaptation from the armor branch.The concept dictates that the platoons vehicles operate intwo sections. The platoon leader's vehicle is considered thenumber one vehicle and is paired with the platoon number twovehicle, his wingman. The number three and four vehicles arepaired with the PSG in number four.

Ideally, mounted platoon movements and battle drillsare executed more efficiently under the wingman concept.19The platoon leader controls the platoon by coordinating withthe PSG in the second section. The wingmen of the platoonmove to complement, overwatch, and mirror actions of the PLor PSG. Through training, the crews of the vehicles masterthe employment capabilities of the BIFV. Using a series ofengagement drills and movement techniques, the twelve mencrews of the two sections constitute a lethal force with thesame degree of integrity as the dismounted infantry.

As the vehicles are divided into two sections, thedismounted infantry is divided into two squads. Each of thesquads is composed of two fireteams of four men each.20 Thesquad is led by a Staff Sergeant (E-6) who is dedicated tothat function. A squad is paired with a section of vehicles.A fire team and the squad leader ride on the number one orfour vehicle. The other fire teams ride on the wingmen


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vehicles. Dismounting from the vehicles, the two teamsassemble into an effective force.

The two squads at nine men each function in a mannersimilar to other infantry in the U.S. Army. Reorganizationinto two nine men squads with a dedicated leader for eachsquad supports the principles of simplicity and leadership byexample. The squad structure itself facilitates bettercommand and control as well as more effective combatemployment. Each squad is organized with two fire teams.Team A of a squad consists of an sergeant team leader, twoautomatic riflemen, and an anti-armor specialist. Team B ofa squad has the sergeant team leader, an automatic rifleman,a grenadier, and an anti-armor specialist. Depending on themission, the eighteen men of the two squads may be augmentedby an attached medic, a radio/telephone operator or a fieldartillery forward observer.21 The Bradley infantry squadbase of nine men appears small, but U.S. Light Infantrystructure is also designed in this manner. The strengths ofthe squad lie in its balanced structure, leader-to-led ratio,and mobility.

Historically, infantry squads around the world havefluctuated in size, ranging from eight to thirteen men. InWorld War I, German, French, and British infantry squads werebased on a twelve man structure because the squads needed tobe able to sustain casualties incurred when attackingdefending machine guns.22 This size squad further allowed


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the unit to create Marshal Ferdinand Foch's effective weightof bullets from organic weapons massing well aimed small armsfire.23 In World War 11, German Panzergrenadier squads wereten men and U.S. Infantry squads had grown from eight men totwelve. Both of these type squads incorporated machine gunsections with at least two soldiers dedicated to the functionof carrying ammunition for the machine gun support system.2'The infantry squads of the Bradley platoon accomplish thesame tasks as their predecessors without designating anammunition bearer for the machine guns within the squads.

Leadership within the altered Bradley platoon ismore directly aligned with the sections and squads. Theplatoon chain of command emphasizes the roles of the PL andPSG. The platoon is formally structured with two sections ofvehicle crews and two infantry squads. Compared with theoriginal organization, leadership responsibilities are nowmore clearly defined, especially at the crew and squad level.The previous Bradley commander was responsible for the

training and employment of his vehicle weapons systems aswell as the infantry team associated with the M-2.Currently, there are non-commissioned Officers (NCO's) whotrain and fight as the BIFV commander. Dedicated NCO's arenow responsible for leadership of the infantry squads andteams. Current platoon organization promotes an environmentto hone a higher degree of crew skills on the BIFVs andwithin the infantry squads. The three man Bradley crew is a


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more stabilized, effective aggregation because it is notbroken up when dismount occurs. Effective employment of thevehicle weapon systems is not interrupted to ensure safeexchange of turret personnel. Additionally, the platoon doesnot have to train as many personnel in the BIFV exactinggunnery skills. Infantry squad leaders may now focus theirattention on the eight men in the squad and sharpen the vitaltasks required of the squad, teams and individuals.

Leadership dismount drill has been streamlined whencompared with the original BIFV organization. The onlyleader in the platoon required to displace from a confinedturret during the dismount action is the platoon leader.Depending on the task or mission, the PL may elect to remainin the turret. As before, the PSG normally remains thenumber four Bradley commander and controls the four vehiclesif the platoon leader elects to dismount with the infantrysquads.25 It is this flexibility in employment of theplatoon's BIFV's and its infantry squads that fosters thecombat situation adaptability necessary for synchronizedcombined arms operations.

Bradlev Platoon Em~lovmentThe Bradley Infantry platoon is required to execute

a multitude of tasks and missions associated with either theentire platoon, the vehicle crews, or the dismounted squads.In total, there are 317 missions and tasks to be performed,


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depending on the requirements of the battlefield. Withinthis total, 2 0 7 ( 6 5 percent) concern the dismounted soldiersand squads, 81 ( 2 6 percent) deal with the mounted element,and 29 (9 percent) are executed by the platoon as a whole.26In effect, the platoon is responsible for skills that must bedeveloped according to three variations.

A problem within the Bradley infantry platoon is theobvious difference in the capabilities of the dismountedinfantryman and the vehicle. The BIFV can travel crosscountry at approximately 48 kmph and engage the enemy out to3 7 5 0 meters. The dismounted infantryman moves at the rate of3 - 5 kmph, and his effective engagement range is currently at1 0 0 0 meters. Leaders must understand these dissimilaritiesand either account for or take advantage of thedifferences *

Another important distinction is the type of terrainappropriate.to the best use of the two different kinds offorces. Mission dependent, the vehicles and dismounts may beused in separate roles. In the defense, the dismounts desirefields of fire commensurate with small arms and terrain thatthe infantry can use for protection from enemy fire effects.The mounted element will prefer terrain that maximizes longrange engagement capability and facilitates maneuver ifneeded. In the offense, the mounted force benefits fromterrain that allows best use of its tracked mobility,stabilized main gun system, armored protection coupled with


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terrain driving, and leadership massing the effects of two ormore vehicles. Dismounted squads best use terrain thatrequires the maneuver of "go anywhere" foot infantry,surgical or intense small arms fire, protection from thecover and concealment of ground effects, and personalleadership by example.

The platoon's mounted skills are primarily in thehands of the crews of the four BIFV's under the control ofthe platoon leader and platoon sergeant. Their tasks varyfrom maintenance of the turret and hull to combat tasks ofutilizing bounding overwatch movement technique. All combattasks for the mounted elements require practice in the battledrill associated with the task. Battle drills focus theactions of the crews under given circumstances to reducereaction times and to coordinate the fire and maneuver of thefour vehicles. Crews are capable of fighting their vehiclesin the platoon and section concept without the dismountedinfantrymen paired to ride in the combat system.

An example of these battle drills when the mountedelement is the sole contributor is reaction to direct oranti-tank, guided missiles (ATGM) drill. This drill is aneight step process that requires a coordinated reaction bythe four vehicles in unison. The technique employsobservation, analysis, decision and action to achieve theendstate of a BIFV moving to counter the threat and suppressthe enemy. This battle drill may lead to a follow-up drill


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for dismounting the infantry squads to attack and destroy theenemy. 8

The platoon's dismounted skills are focused on thetwo dismount infantry squads. The missions and tasks includedrills and techniques that are practiced to maintain combatreadiness as a dismounted section, squad, or platoon. Thetasks to be accomplished, the con

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Combined Arms in the Bradly Platoon

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