Commentary on Transport Canada’s Remotely Piloted Aircraft ... · Operators are exploring drone...

Unmanned Systems Canada Systèms Télécommandés Canada

Commentary on Transport Canada’s Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Safety Assurance AC 922-001 Issue draft 01

Respectfully Submitted by Unmanned Systems Canada Regulatory Committee

Authored by: K.Ellis R. Lefebvre M. Campbell, P. Eng. D. Gibson

Version: V1.2 Date: 2019-02-21

USC-STC AC922 Commentary 2019-02-21

1. Executive Summary

Unmanned Systems Canada-Systèms Télécommandés Canada (USC-STC) is pleased to provide this document covering commentary to Transport Canada in an effort to assist in improving Advisory Circular 922.

This document captures the comments and input from our Regulatory Committee as well as input from industry on the impact of the Standard 922 and the associated Advisory Circular.

We provide a number of comments and recommendations on the AC structure and content overall, and more detailed comments on specific sections.

As part of our assessment process, USC-STC conducted a Rapid Survey of Industry Stakeholders covering the awareness and impacts of the implementation of the Safety Assurance “SAFE” RPAS. We have included a subset of that data for consideration.

USC-STC hopes that Transport Canada will take our input in the spirit that it is provided as well as that of other Stakeholders and consider the suggested changes for incorporation in AC922 for the next version of the document.

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Material and content in this document are © 2019 USC-STC and

may not be used without permission. V1.2


2. Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary 2

2. Table of Contents 3

3. Introduction 4

4. Industry Rapid Survey - Overview 5

4.1.High Level Conclusions from Survey 5

4.2.Survey Highlights 7

5. General Comments/Questions 11

5.1. Clarification of Requirements in the AC 11

5.2. Clarification of Risk/Probabilities and Hazards 12

5.3. GPS Position Accuracy for Controlled Airspace 14

5.4. Cost to RPAS Manufacturers and Industry 16

5.5. Need for Audits on RPAS Manufacturers Declarations 17

5.6. Ability to use Operational History of Existing RPAS 17

5.7. RPAS Purchased Prior to Dec 2017 and Grandfathering 18

5.8. Allow SFOC Use for Controlled Airspace Ops after June 1st 18

5.9. Declaration b) Near People and c) Over People 19

5.10. Continuing Airworthiness 20

5.11. Radio Section and Frequency Commentary in the AC 20

5.12. Configuration Management 21

5.13. System Modifiers 22

6. Summary 23

7. About USC 24

8. Appendix A - Risk/Hazard Assessment Model Discussion 25

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3. Introduction

As Transport Canada rolls out the new CARs for RPAS Operations in Canada, an important part of the introduction process covers the concept of Safety Assurance for RPAs and their associated systems.

RPA systems are proving their value daily in a range of areas in Canada including surveillance, construction, utilities, agriculture, resource exploration, meteorology, mapping filmmaking and photography.

As the Library of Parliament points out , “Government and Commercial 1

Operators are exploring drone use for jobs that are dull, dirty or dangerous.” Goldman’s Sachs predicts a 13B$ market place for the 2

period 2016-2020-for Civil and Commercial RPAS usage.

Clearly the release of the new RPAS Regulations will assist the Industry to grow and innovate by providing a stable, known regulatory environment that business and individuals can use to plan and manage their operations going forward. USC-STC has already commented on that value . 3

The commentary offered in this document attempts to assess the impacts and offer recommendations based on the subset of the regulations covered by Standard 922 and it’s accompanying Advisory Circular, AC922 (we will use AC for the balance of this document).

After the briefing session held in Ottawa by Transport Canada on January 24, 2019, Unmanned Systems Canada has assessed the AC and offers some commentary to Transport Canada in the hopes that they will consider these prior to the final version of the AC being released.

In general, Unmanned Systems Canada applauds the intent behind the AC, however, we recommend a number of suggestions and changes that could be made to the AC that will improve its readability, effectiveness and implementation for both RPAS Manufacturers and Operators in Canada.

https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/201723E1

https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/technology-driving-innovation/drones/2

https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/new-rpas-drone-regulations-released-for-canada/3

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https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/201723E


We also offer some commentary on the transition period from the current RPAS rules to the new ones, scheduled to come into force in June 1, 2019.

4. Industry Rapid Survey - Overview

USC-STC conducted an informational survey commissioned with the intent to gain some insight regarding impact of the AC on the industry.

We sent out requests via our database contacts as via closed social media industry groups to keep the focus to individual and organizations that were knowledgeable in the space.

We received responses back from organizations/individuals involved in the RPAS industry in Canada, from various segments of the industry and with varying level of experience and expertise, up to and including Operators holding National Complex SFOCs.

We have aggregated the data and have listed below some of the key questions as well as some initial conclusions.

4.1.High Level Conclusions from Survey

• Industry Participants are Very Aware of the New Regulations:

Survey Participants are very much aware of the introduction of the new RPAS regulations in Canada. The RPAS industry participants that we surveyed overwhelming stated that they were aware of the new rules and of the Safety Assurance or “SAFE” RPAS requirements.

• The Requirement for SAFE has caught the Industry’s Attention:

Many of those surveyed are adopting a wait and see approach to see if the Manufacturer of their RPAS will submit any declarations, while a significant percentage believe they will need to recapitalize their equipment with significant equipment purchases of RPAS in 2019 as their existing RPAS will not make the cut.

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• A Wide Range of RPAS Employed with the Majority Not Compliant:

There is wide range of RPAs being used in the Canadian market place, but, not surprisingly, almost 70% of survey participants indicated that they use DJI RPAS alone or in conjunction with other RPAs.

USC-STC plans to provide a more in-depth report on the Survey findings to our members and industry participants in the near future.

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4.2.Survey Highlights

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Lockheed Martin1%

Yuneec1%

IndroRobotics1%

N/A2%

Aeryon2%

Intel2%

SenseFly7%

Custom5%

Other14%

DJI67%

DJIOtherCustomSenseFlyIntelAeryonN/AIndroRoboticsYuneecLockheed Martin

Q3 Which RPAS/Drone systems do you use Commercially or Recreationally?


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5. General Comments/Questions

The following are the-comments and recommendations that follow from our assessment of the impact of the AC, based on USC-STC internal reviews and discussions.

We offer them in the broader context of the new Regulatory RPAS environment being introduced.

5.1. Clarification of Requirements in the AC

USC-STC is concerned that the structure and organization of the AC as currently drafted may result in difficulties in interpretation. In particular, the document presents combinations of requirements, background/supporting information, and ‘best practices’ in large blocks of text and graphics.

USC-STC recommends that the Advisory Circular be re-structured to position the critical and most important ‘must’ requirements up front, split out into groupings for each of the declarations.

The document must outline the requirements for each category, and the particular hazards that need to be addressed/assessed; it needs to be clear, specific and implementable to allow Manufacturers and Operators to more easily understand the requirements.

The specific requirements that apply to each class of RPAS operation i.e. (a) in Controlled Airspace, (b) Near People, and (c) Over People, should be clearly laid-out and highlighted.

To make the information more succinct and comprehensive, we recommend moving the guidance material and supplemental information all into Appendices.

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We recommend that TC organize the AC into the following sections:

1. Intent/Overview 2. a) Controlled Airspace Requirements 3. b) Near People Requirements 4. c) Over People Requirements 5. Supporting Appendices (Means of Compliance, ‘Best Practices’,

Examples)

USC-STC fully endorses Transport Canada’s approach of proposing a short/simple standard (Standard 922), and then placing the clarifying requirements, best practices and examples in an associated AC.

Adopting a document structure as outlined above will allow for the guidance material in the Appendices to continue to grow as means of compliance and industry best practices evolve, and will make the specific technical and documentation requirements as stated in the first sections of the document easier to comprehend.

5.2. Clarification of Risk/Probabilities and Hazards

On preliminary review, USC-STC is concerned that the level of testing identified in Appendix B for operations near and over people will be prohibitively expensive for any organization developing non-military RPAS in Canada.

It is entirely unrealistic to expect the same degree of impact testing and other destructive tests which have been adopted by the automotive, aviation and aerospace industries; especially considering the small number of total units sold by Canadian manufacturers.

There appears to be a stratification in safety objective probability level based on RPA weight in the system safety assessment approach identified in Appendix B, 4.(1)(b).

USC-STC considers this level of granularity to be inappropriate for RPA’s under 25 kg operating VLOS, and will cause confusion and misinterpretation of the system safety assessment criteria.

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Instead, USC-STC recommends that a single safety objective cumulative probability of failure level be identified for the entire class of RPA’s from 250 g to 25 kg.

Appendix C provides significant detail regarding the determination of the level of severity for a hazard, but the AC provides no guidance to manufacturers regarding the determination/estimation of the failure probabilities that result in the particular hazard.

As an example, according to the date in Table B-2, a small RPAS should have better than 1:100 cumulative probability of catastrophic failure per flight hour. To acquire the necessary data for this statistic, several thousand hours of testing would be required for each aircraft configuration.

We suggest that TC replace, or augment the tables of Appendix B-3 with a more conventional risk assessment matrix ,as shown in Figure 1. 4

The probability numbers in the sample table were extracted from the 5-15 kg category. USC-4

STC is not prepared to comment at this time if these are the correct probabilities; however the historical rate of fatalities for manned aviation is on the order of 10-5, which suggests that the numbers are not unreasonable by comparison.

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Figure 1 - Proposed Risk/Assessment Matrix


The use of the risk assessment matrix makes it clear to RPAS Manufacturers that the two ways of achieving the target level of safety are to reduce the severity of a particular failure mode (e.g.,through frangible structure design, or parachute recovery systems), or to increase the reliability of the system against failure.

The requirements for operations over people appear to be excessively onerous, in that no single failure may result in severe injury. This implies that redundant systems must be present in any RPAS operated over people. This will result in more complex, and heavier aircraft for designs that are unable to reduce the hazard severity.

Instead of establishing a requirement for redundancy, USC-STC suggests that an appropriate target level of safety for operation over people be identified, for example the areas of the green squares in the risk assessment table in Figure 1.

As part of this revision, USC-STC also recommends that TC add specific, well defined targets and best practice examples and guidance of how these risk and probabilities factors should be developed and documented for submission.

5.3. GPS Position Accuracy for Controlled Airspace

Standard 922.04, the Positional Accuracy requirements for conducting operations within Controlled Airspace are identified. The information note clarifies that the intent of this requirement for the purposes of communications with other users of the airspace to provide a minimum confidence related to the altitude and position reports from an RPAS pilot when required.

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Aside: Our analysis of Appendix B indicates that there may be a

discrepancy between the Tables B-1-3 and the requirements stated earlier in

the AC for Near and Over People Safety Objectives. We have provided a summary discussion in Appendix A of this document for Transport Canada’s

consideration.


While many GNSS systems are capable of meeting the specified accuracy level of +/-10 m horizontally, and +/-16m vertically, USC-STC has some comment and concerns regarding these requirements.

More specifically, we believe that specific hazards associated with operation in controlled airspace should be the motivation that drives the equipment accuracy and reliability requirement.

USC-STC proposes that the most critical hazard associated with RPAS operations conducted under VLOS in controlled airspace is unmitigated ‘fly-away' situations. We are not convinced that the GPS accuracy requirements alone as noted in Standard 922 constitute a method to provide an acceptable mitigation of this hazard.

USC-STC recommends that TC work with NavCanada and the RPAS industry to establish a unified and industry acceptable process in the event of a flyaway or other emergency that requires alerting ATC and other airspace users. This process should consider location, altitude, direction of flight, and speed as well as the estimated remaining endurance/range.

USC-STC notes that under the current regulations that basic ultralight aircraft are permitted to operate in controlled airspace without transponders or position reporting equipment at ATC's discretion . 5

We further believe that the requirements proposed in 901.71(2)(k) afford ATC the ability to introduce the technical requirements for an RPAS that are appropriate to access the particular airspace that is being requested, thus a generic position accuracy requirement is, in our opinion, superfluous.

USC-STC recommends that Transport Canada consult with NavCanada, regarding an acceptable position reporting accuracy requirement for Small RPAS operating VLOS within Controlled Airspace, based on ATC requirements.

Reference CAR section 602.92(2)5

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5.4. Cost to RPAS Manufacturers and Industry

The requirements proposed within the AC and the associated Safety Assurance Appendixes will require a high level of engineering organizational capability and experience to accomplish.

The CGII economic Impact analysis assumes that a large portion of the required testing and analysis has already been completed or will be undertaken as a part of new development.

For custom, purpose built aircraft, and for small and medium RPAS Manufacturers, it is likely that the extensive level of testing required was only being performed at the level contemplated by the AC by Compliant RPAS Manufacturers as part of the Compliant Declaration process.

This invalidates the cost estimates in the Canada Gazette. The actual costs may end up being several orders of magnitude more for the Industry at large to implement the types of analysis, supply management, configuration management etc, across all types of Declarations.

We think that the imposition of this level of testing for all Declarations will actually go against the desired intent of the Government to foster innovation and growth in the RPAS industry in Canada, an unintended effect.

USC-STC recommends the level of development, testing, analysis, documentation etc, be commensurate with the level of risk for each of the Declarations, with Controlled Airspace requiring a lower level of assessment process and the Over People Declaration the highest.

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5.5. Need for Audits on RPAS Manufacturers Declarations

USC-STC recommends that as the AC is implemented, and RPAS are declared, TC implement a structured audit process.

We think that this should be implemented as random, systemic audits of Declarations.

While it reduces TC’s workload to have self-audits and single page declarations, we think it would prove useful for Transport Canada to conduct audits regularly to continue to evolve the AC.

This would allow TC to extend their data set captured from the Compliant RPAS Manufacturers and add new industry experience, practices and costs impacts from the larger Canadian RPAS industry as they evolve to the new rules.

We think the statement should be:

“The Minister will systematically review and audit a subset annually of all declarations submitted to evaluate the compliance demonstration by the RPAS manufacturer. RPAS manufacturers are accountable to perform the appropriate tests, evaluations, and/or assessments and record the results in a form that can be inspected by the Minister on demand.”

5.6. Ability to use Operational History of Existing RPAS

As the ability to utilize “Credit for operational history of existing airframes in section 6.4(5)” would be very useful to RPAS Manufacturers, we recommend that Transport Canada provide enhanced guidance as to what would be appropriate, to answer the types of question that follow:

• What statistical data that is actually required? • What level of documentation is needed? • Is destructive testing required? • Is there a threshold for the number of hours on an airframe for

consideration in this category?

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5.7. RPAS Purchased Prior to Dec 2017 and Grandfathering

In previous versions of the draft regulations, the concept of grandfathering aircraft arose as a temporary measure to allow RPAS Operators to continue to use the existing fleet of RPAS for a defined, transitional period.

The new rules have removed this opportunity. USC-STC recommends that TC consider a Temporary Order put in place to reinstate this concept for two reasons:

First, this measure would avoid stranding the current fleet with the attendant cost impact to RPAS Operators, particularly those with significant numbers of RPAS and,

Second, it would allow Operators to have a reasonable period to transition to the new RPAS Declared Equipment allowing time for the necessary training, SOP and Maintenance updates needed to adapt to the new rules.

This temporary measure should be made available to anyone holding a Current Complex Standing SFOC, AND whose Pilots have passed the Advanced Pilot Certificate and Flight Review.

This process would allow these Operators to use their existing RPAS in a transitional mode since they have clearly demonstrated the knowledge, operational expertise and flight skills required for a) Controlled Airspace and b) Near People.

5.8. Allow SFOC Use for Controlled Airspace Ops after June 1st

We at USC-STC are concerned that transition period in 1H2019 will not be sufficient for the timely assessment, documentation and overall rollout of SAFE RPAS, given the release of the AC in late January and the subsequent comment period and revisions that are expected until March or April as contemplated by Transport Canada

This will impact RPAS Manufacturers ability to implement the required testing/analysis and process the required data into documentation, as well

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as leaving very little time for operators to budget, acquire, train and integrated new RPAs into their OPS procedures by June 1.

And this is coming at the same time that Operators need to transition their pilots to the new Pilots Certificate and Flight review process, also requiring significant time, training and cost in the process.

USC-STC recommends that TC put in a short term Plan “B” for a period of up to 12 months, that would allow Operators to operate non “declared” aircraft via the use of a specific SFOC.

This would provide Operators more time to transition safely and effectively and allow RPAS Manufacturers to have more time to internalize the new processes and develop the required testing, expertise and documentation required for the “SAFE” declarations.

5.9. Declaration b) Near People and c) Over People

USC-STC is concerned that the definitions of 'near' and 'over' people and associated reliability requirements do not factor into consideration the population density of the people in question, nor the relative time of exposure.

It seems intuitively obvious that an operation that takes place with extended flight time directly over a dense crowd (e.g., filming over a crowd at a concert) is inherently more risky than an operation that requires infrequent over-flight of a sparse crowd (e.g., filming a golf event).

It is unclear how to reconcile this dichotomy with the proposed requirements in Standard 922 and it’s accompanying Advisory Circular.

USC-STC recommends that Transport Canada clarify the degree to which operational mitigations can contribute towards achieving the desired target level of safety. Specific examples considering the high exposure time/high density case versus the low exposure time/low density case would be invaluable.

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5.10. Continuing Airworthiness

The AC mentions the concept of Continuing Airworthiness in section 5.7, while the CARs specifically exclude it.

The concepts of the maintenance manual, the recommendations by the RPAS Manufacturer on consumable part lifetimes, operational practices, inspection practices and so on is definitely required, as is the requirement to pass on advisories when there is a requirement for an upgrade or modification for performance or safety reasons.

Recent concerns around RPAS batteries reporting incorrect data that 6

occurred recently are a perfect example of why these processes should be in place, but the use of the term Continuing Airworthiness is not appropriate in the case of RPAS.

For a class of aircraft that does not have a COA as per the CARs, the concept of continuing Airworthiness does not make sense. We recommend changing this to another term that would not require changes to the CARs.

5.11. Radio Section and Frequency Commentary in the AC

USC-STC recommends taking out any specific discussion on particular frequency bands and utilization for use in RPAS systems.

The AC should merely have a requirement to have RPAS Manufacturers document the frequencies utilized in their RPA Systems and any operational warning, guidelines and procedures in their RPAS Operational Manuals and Specifications for the use of Pilots and Operators.

https://www.dji.com/newsroom/news/dji-issues-firmware-updates-for-tb50-and-tb55-6

batteries

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5.12. Configuration Management

(1) A manufacturer should have specific configuration control over their RPAS designs and construction in order to have sufficient traceability to track the life of RPAS components. Thus, configuration management is crucial in the establishment of service history tracking systems, and according to the declaration filed to the Minister. The manufacturer, may follow FAA AC20-153B, SAE EIA-649, ASTM or other equivalent industry standards in order to establish a configuration management system.

It may prove extremely difficult, if not impossible for small RPAS Manufacturers to comply with the requirements of this section of the AC.

Some of the components used in the assembly of an RPAS are traceable but the majority are not.

A case is point is LiPo batteries. These are a commodity product and are in most cases not traceable, as the cell manufacturers do not typically assign serial numbers to individual cells. Usually only the larger battery assembly is serialized by a later stage integrator or Manufacturer.

Similarly many of the components used in RPAS manufacturing are COTS (commercial off the shelf) products that may be multiply sourced due to economic or manufacturing requirement such as volume demands.

In others cases the OEM is unknown and the choice of manufacturer is out of the RPAS Manufacturer’s control. A common example is bulk carbon fibre material used in the construction of an RPAS frames and panels.

Supply chain management is a very significant challenge for small and medium sized RPAS businesses especially where the product lifecycle is short and where the underlying technologies, products and economics change very rapidly.

The impact to Small and Medium sized RPAS Manufacturers is significant.

Currently, most components are manufactured in Asia and the required configuration management processes are not implementable, simply

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because there is extremely limited information available from Manufacturers. The consequence is that alternate and much more expensive components must be sourced and in some cases may not be available.

USC-STC would suggest that the level of Configuration Management and Quality Assurance should be calibrated to the severity of the hazard from a failure of the RPAS and the intended use case for the RPAS.

For example, RPAS that are only used in Controlled Airspace would be required to implement a lower level of Configuration Management and QA than ones used in higher risk categories.

5.13. System Modifiers

USC-STC would also like to emphasize that TC’s intent with respect to System Modifiers may not work as intended under these regulations.

This may arise from a number of factors including:

• Lack of technical documentation available from the OEM, including technical specifications and modification guidance material

• Reluctance or inability of SMs to assume legal liability for the whole RPAS after modifications

• Testing and documentation requirements that may not be appropriate for the specific modification being made.

To offer an alternate approach, we recommend that TC consider using the key elements from the Supplemental Type Certificate approval process, as outlined in SI 521-005. 7

We think that this may be more appropriate to the level of modifications contemplated by TC in section 7.0 of the AC.

https://www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/ca-opssvs/si-521-005.pdf7

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6. Summary

USC-STC thanks Transport Canada for Canada for the opportunity to provide comments on the AC and provide recommendations for specific issues.

In our document, we have attempted to complete a fair and balanced review and to recommend alternates or suggestions where appropriate to strengthen the objectives of the AC.

Our Key Recommendations include:

• Structure the AC to ensure that key requirements and methods to fulfill the requirements are clearly laid out and sectionalized.

• Ensure that the level of development, assessment, testing, evaluation as well as the other applicable processes for each of the declarations is appropriate to the level of risk for each of the Declaration categories.

• Consider a longer transitional period and have a Plan “B” for non-“Declared” RPAS to reduce the economic impact on the RPAS fleet and industry over the next 12 months.

• Consider removing Declaration a) altogether and replace with an standardized operational process defined in concert with NavCanada.

• Reconsider the true impact and costs of the AC to RPAS Manufacturers.

In conclusion, we welcome any comments or questions from Transport Canada on clarifications and look forward to engaging in future conversations on this important part of the new RPAS Regulations.

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7. About USC

Unmanned Systems Canada / Systèmes Télécommandés Canada (USC-STC) is the national industry association representing entrepreneurs, businesses, students academia, industry, and government organizations working in the Aerial, Ground and Marine remotely-piloted and unmanned vehicle systems sector.

USC-STC is a Canadian-registered not-for-profit association founded in 2003 by a group of visionary entrepreneurs and industry experts committed to promoting and representing the interests of Canada’s Unmanned Vehicle Systems community.

This community of innovative thinkers has grown far beyond its government, research and military roots to include students, academia, industry, and investors who are innovating Canada with new inventions and applications in the Unmanned sector.

At USC-STC, we are committed to promoting public awareness, education and appreciation for the social, economic, and environmental benefits that unmanned systems can provide to individuals, communities and organizations.

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8. Appendix A - Risk/Hazard Assessment Model Discussion

The Regulatory Committee has taken a close look at the Risk Model proposed in Appendix B.

We suggest that TC take a closer look at Appendix B, Section 4.

More specifically, Table B-1 which outlines the criticality classifications states the Hazardous level would result in people on the ground sustaining severe injury (no fatalities), but it indicates that safety objective for this level of criticality is Extremely Remote.

This is in conflict with the statement in 4.0(1)(d)(i) which states that:

“The occurrence of any single failure of the RPAS which may result in a severe injury to a person on the ground within 30m of the RPA operation must be shown to be remote.”

It appears that the statement in 4.0(1)(d)(i) is correct, which implies that the safety objectives in table B-1, and B-3 are incorrect.

Our conclusion was that the risk assessment matrix approach as proposed in Figure 1 is more appropriate, and easier to understand.

It sets a target level of risk for operations ‘Near People’ as the moderate risk yellow squares in the matrix. Some of this risk is mitigated by the fact that the operation is still at a distance from people.

By comparison, the table proposes that the target level of safety for operations ‘over people’ be the low risk green squares in the matrix. The probability of a hazard occurring must be lower in this case since the likelihood is not mitigated by the distance from people.

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