COMMENTARY_Political Change in North India-Interpreting Assembly Election Results

8/10/2019 COMMENTARY_Political Change in North India-Interpreting Assembly Election Results

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COMMENTARY

The consequences of the state assembly elections in November are soclear and in some ways so welcome that it is tempting to read offmeanings from consequences. The real meaning of the election resultsis, however, a different matter, A preliminary attempt to uncover it,

first, by outlining some of the statewise patterns and, second, bydiscussing some of the larger trends in north Indian politics.

THE outcome of the recently concludedassembly elections in the four north Indianstates of Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan,Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and theunion ter rit ory of Del hi has been interpretedvariously. The north Indian voter—it is

always a 'he'—is supposed to have votedfor secularism and successfully pricked theB JP ball oon. Those on the other side of thefence have discovered signs of durable Hinduconsolidation in this verdict. Man dal enthusiasts see it as a vote for social justice. Someanalysts have found it a negat ive vote againstthe incumbents. Others have viewed it as apopular approva l of the dismi ssal of governments in these states last year, a vote tostrengthen the hands of the present centralgovernment, a support for its polici es, a votefor moderation and so on. The activity ofinterpreting poli tics is never free of politi cs

of interpretation. But this time the dramaticbackground to these elections has turned thecontestation for ideological appropriationof the verdict par ticula rly intense and, giventhe room for interpretative play inherent inthis verdict, also more absorbing.

In analysing a verdict li ke this, it is usefulto draw a dis tin cti on between three levels ofanalysis. First of all, there is the level ofindi vidu al intentions and meanings embedded in. the act of voting. The second levelconcerns the translation of these actions intocollective choices, a pattern of electoralvictories and defeats. It is important toremember that the translation of ind ivi dua lactions into collective choice takes placethrough an impersonal mechanism no onecan design of control; the final outcome isalways an unintended consequence. Thethird level involv es concrete pol iti cal consequences which follow from the aggregation of these micro- coll ectiv e choices. Theserelate to the government for mati on, patternsof power sharing and policy-making onwhi ch the ori ginal actor, the voter, has lit tlecontrol. It is possible that in some cases thevoters' intentions may completely matchthe electoral outcome which may, in turn,clearly dictate a government formation inline with the original intentions. But that isclearly an exception rather than the rule.And even then the log ic of reasoning cannot

be from consequences to patterns and meanings. It must be the other way round.

The consequences of this assembly election are so clear and in some ways so welcome that the temptation to read o ff meanings from consequences is hard to resist.

The BJP's larger political ambitions havegot a setback and it has been forced to thinkabout widening its social and ideologicalbase. A large number of Muslims have gotback their confidence in the democraticprocess and its ability to redress its ownproblems. Political stability and moderationhave got a boost. The present central government gets a fresh lease of li fe . It can nowtake some long awaited domestic initiatives. And above all, it is likely to pusheconomic liberalisation and globalisationmore forcefully than before. Not everyonewould like these consequences, especially

the last one, but few would doubt these.The meaning of the verdict is, however, a

different matter. What follows is a prel iminary attempt to uncover the meanings embedded in the outcome of these assemblyelections, first by outlining some of thestatewise patterns and then by talking aboutsome of the larger trends in the north Indianpolitics.

STATEWISE PATTERNS

An explo ration of the statewise pattern inthis election can begin by noting one of itsunusual and significant outcomes, namely,the existence of a disti nct statewise pattern.States of north India have not developedregional political identities of their own inpost-independence India. Their politicalpatterns and trends have generally reflectedand shaped the larger political currents inIndia. The political turbulence of the lasttwo decades has seen several shifts andswings in the politics of this region, but inevery case the whole of north India n ' Hi nd iheartland' has swung in the same direct ion,if not with the same intensity. This is thefir st time in the last two decades that a single

round of elections has given power to threedifferent and competing political formations in north India. The question is: whataccounts for such a fragmented verdict? Or,is it really fragmented?

Hima cha l Pradesh and Delh i have given aclear verdict, though its beneficiaries aredifferent. In Himachal Pradesh the beneficiary is the Congress(I) which has managedto win 52 out of the total 68 assembly seatswi th the helpo f49 .2 per cent votes (Table 2).Its vote share would have been well above55 per cent and its dominance over theassembly total, but for the presence of about15 rebe l' candidates, seven of wh om succeeded in defeating the official Congressnominees. Thi s is signi fica nt, for had it beena pro-Congress wave, the Congress rebelswould have stood no chance. In more waysthan one, it is not a wave for the Congress(I ),but a wave against the BJP. Between the1990 assembly election, when the BJP-JDcombine (46 and 11 seats respectively) hadrouted the Congress (9 seats), and this election, the BJP lost as much as 18.3 per centvotes in the constituencies it contested in

1990. The swing of votes against the BJPcuts across the traditio nal pol itic al divi sionof the 'old' and the 'new' Himachal, of'upper' and 'low er' hill s, of tribal and non-tribal constituencies, of reserved and general seats and of urban and rural areas,though it has done relatively better with the'new' Himachal (especially Hamirpur andKangra), urban and upper caste voters. It issignificant that while most of the BJP'ssitting M L A s inclu ding Shanta Kuma r andnearly his entire cabinet lost, four of theparty's eight winners this time are newcomers. Mor e than an anti-B JP wave, it is a wave

against the former BJP government. TheBJP is down, but with 35.6 per cent voteshare (bette r than its share in 1982 and 1985)spread across all the 12 districts of the state,it is not out of the game—unlike all othernon-Congress parties. The JD has proved tobe a transient and now a non-existent forcein Himac hal wi th ju st 1 per cent vote (and anincre dibl e 39.1 per cent drop in the const ituencies it contested wi th BJP' s help in 1990).TheCPM and theCPI have swapped a singleseat but not impr ove d their votes very much.An d the BSP is yet to reach a tak e-off pointwith just 2.2 per cent votes concentrated inareas adjoi ning Punjab. Electo ral poli tics ofHimachal has now fully polarised aroundthe Congress and the BJP; the waves.of1990 and 1993 have levelled the unevenelectoral terrain in such a way that itmakes rapid rise and fall of these twoparties very easy.

The reasons for this clear verdict inHimachal lie in the widespread resentmentagainst what was popularly seen as ShantaKumar government's administrative highhandedness. Its handl ing of the governmentemployee's strike, the way it dealt with the

apple-growers and something as small asthe decision to levy a fee in governmenthospitals became popular symbols of thegovernment's insensitivity. These actionswent against the moral economy of the

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Political Change in North IndiaInterpreting Assembly Election ResultsYogendra Yadav



Himachal voters, against their shared notionof justi ce in the publi c arena. The BJP sti llclaims that these decisions were 'principled'.But what the results go to show, mini ma lly ,is the distance between administrative rationality and popular consciousness whichmade the BJP lose legitim acy wi th everyoneexcept its core trad ition al supporter.

In De lh i it is a vote against the inab ili ty ofthe ru li ng el ite to respond to the demands of

this rapidly expanding metropolis and thefast-changing composition of its electorate.In more concrete terms, it is a vote againstthe Congress style of 'managing' Delhithrough manipulative games at the centreand mafia-like tactics at the local level. TheCongress's refusal to let loca l poli tics evolv ein Delhi meant that a host of local developmental problems especially of the trans-Yamuna and Outer Delhi remained unattended. For those who live in slums andunauthorised colonies of Delhi, this electionwas not a routine exercise; most of themcould see it intimately connected to theirstruggle for survival, for their struggle toretain the piece of land they have acquired orfor their dreams to acquire one. The BJP,whi ch has consistently champ ioned the causeof a democratic set-up in Delhi and whichappears better organised and more wil li n g torespond to people's demands than the Con-gress, was the natural beneficiary. It is a

comme nt on the nature of Indi an society thatthe vastly contrasting and vertically splitelectorate, whether it resides in posh southDelhi colonies or in the slums andunauthorised colonies o f east De lh i or in thefast urbanising villages of outer Del hi , shareda commo n verd ict for a more responsive andbetter governance.

The fresh delimitation of assembly constituencies had posed a challenge to the BJP,

for now 41 out of a tota l of 70 constituenciesfell in east and outer Delhi, the traditionalCongress strongholds. The BJP's final tallyof 49 ou t of 70 seats and a vote share of 43.5per cent show that it was an uneven contestin all the seven parliamentary constituencies of Delhi (Table 1). It has gained 3.3 percent votes over its 1991 Lo k Sabha electionperformance, while the Congress has lost4.9 per cent. The BJP has improved its voteshare considerably in New Delhi and DelhiSadar; it has consolidated and improvedupon its stunning v icto ry of 1991 in the eastDelhi parliamentary constituency represented earlier by H K L Bhagat; and, mostimpor tant of a ll, it turned a defeat of 11,4 percent in 1991 into a lead of 4.7 per cent in thesemi-rural outer Delhi constituency. TheBJP has done well in all the sections ofsociety: it has won 10 out of the 15 ruralseats, 20 out of the 30 seats dominated byunauthorised colonies, eight out of the 13

reserved seats, and three out of the five seatsdominated by the Sikhs. Survey results alsoconfirm this picture of cross community/class votin g for BJP. Th e only excep tion areof course the Musl ims w ho preferred the JD,but where its candidate was weak, opted forCongress to defeat the BJP. The BJP couldwin only three of the eight constituencieswit h a significant number of Mus li m voters;two went to Congress and three to Janata

Dal. In all the JD won four scats but wasinstrumental in depriving the Congress of22 seats. With 12.8 per cent vote shareconcentrated among the Muslims, dalits,slum dwellers and villagers, it has registered a sign ific ant presence as the thi rd forcein Delhi politics.

In Rajasthan it is an unclear verdict, andnot just because it has resulted in a hungassembly. More importantly, the trend ofvotes does not show a clear preference foreither the Congress or the BJP both of whi chhave secured between 38 and 39 per centvotes in this election (Table 3). The BJPclaims a decisive 12 per cent swing from1990 but conveniently forgets that it is anarti fici al comparison because BJP had contested only 132 seats then. The 1991 parliamentary election is a better point of comparison ( but no t perfect, for the 'assassination factor' had favoured the Congress byabout 7 per cent in the second phase con-

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stitucncies). Then the Congress had led in99 assembly segments with 43.3 per centvotes and the BJP in 95 with 41.1 per centvotes. If the 'assassination factor' were to betaken out, the tal ly wo ul d have read 122 forBJP and 70 for Congress. The BJP's performance is much bel ow that level . The Congress has stopped in-between its dismalperformance in 1990, when its 33.4 per centvotes could g ive i t only 50 seats out of 200,

and its performance in 1991. It could havecer tain ly picke d up more than the 5 per centvotes and 26 seats that it has, but for asuicidal ticket distribution—bad even byCongress standards—resulting in a largenumber of rebel candidates (a total of 55accor ding to some reports, of wh ich at least12 have won), and poor campaigning.

This intense contest between the Congress and the BJP has squeezed out the JDfrom the position it had come to occupy inthe post-1977 politics of this state. The JDhad developed a base in the rural ja t belt ofthe north and the east Rajasthan, especiallyin the Shekhawati region. The BJP, whi chwas primarily an urban party with some

base in rural areas of western Rajasthan,Jaipur division and Kota division, was dependent on the JD to fight the Congress. Theresults of this election show that the BJPsupport base has expanded. For the first ti mesince independence, the Jan Sangh-BJP formation has emerged as a state-wide force inRajasthan. It has secured more than 32 percent votes in al l the four regions of the state.Despite the failure of Shekhawat's gamble

in contesting the Sri Ganganagar seat innorth Rajasthan, his party has succeeded inwinning 11 seats and creating a base in thefive districts of this region for the first time.It has expanded its hitherto nominal presence in the tribal-dominated Udaipur d iv ision. It has also retained its hold ove r Kotadiv is ion and thus won 34 seats to Congress' s17 in south Rajasthan. Bu t it has been unableto hold on to some of the gains it made in theeastern region in the 1991 Lok Sabha election: here the score reads 31 to 25 in BJP'sfavour (it was 51 to 17 in 1991). The 42 seatsof west Rajasthan have been equally splitbetween the Congress and the BJP (17 and19 respectively).

The BJP has continued its dominance inthe 14 urban constituencies by winning 12of these and securing over 50 per cent votes.There is clearly a negative correlation between the BJP's votes and the propo rti on ofscheduled caste population in a constituency, yet the party w on as many as 24 out ofthe 31 reserved seats. The BS P too makes itspresence felt in constituencies with highscheduled caste pop ula tio n by securing over

3 per cent votes, but it is nothing as compared to its performance in UP or even MP .The BJP has also made serious inroads intothe tribal constituencies hitherto dominatedby the Congress. Although it has won onlyeight of the 23 reserved (ST), constituencies(Congress has won 11), its vote share inthese constituencies is 2 per cent more thanthat of the Congress. There are only fiveconstituencies in Rajasthan with more than20 per cent Muslim population but theirvoti ng pattern is interesting. The turnout inthese constituencies was 11.5 percent abovethe state average, and the BJP won three ofthese. It seems that despite or perhaps because of Muslim vote for the Congress

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(India Today- MARG exit poll estimated itto be as high as 70 per cent), the BJP succeededin polarising the Hindu votes in its favour.

Despite this detailed statistical information, the verdict from Rajasthan remainsunclear. It is not clear, for instance, if thevoters have approved of Bhairon SinghShekhawat's government which was in noway significantly different from any Congress government. Or perhaps it was pre

cisely because there was so little to choosefrom that despite a record turnout of 61 percent, the voters went by their traditionalloyalties or caste/community or other localconsiderations. But there seems to be apol iti ca l logic at work even in these considerations. Mo re than half of the sitting ML Aswho contested from their earlier constituencies got defeated, the rate of success beinglower for the Congress than for the BJP (21out of 42 Congress ML A s , 38 out of 65 BJPMLAs, five out of 27 defectors of the JD toBJP or Congress). The people have beenparticularly severe on the defectors and the

imposed 're lat ives' of Congress leaders.The verdict in Madhya Pradesh stands

somewhere between that of Rajasthan andHimachal Pradesh. Congress has secured acomfortable majority of 174 out of 319 seatsfor which elections were held, leaving BJPfar behind at 113. The detailed constituency wise results have not been processedyet, but from preliminary estimates it seemsthe gap between Congress and the BJP votesis about 8 per cent. The Congress has gainedabout 9 per cent votes over its disastrousperformance in the 1990 election (56 seats,34.6 per cent votes). The BJP appears tohave lost about 2 per cent of its vote share of38.4 per cent in 1990 but only because itcontested only 266 out of 320 seats in thatelection. In real terms, it has lost about 6 to8 per cent of its popular support. The dropwas expected in view of the widespreadresentment against the Patwa regime whichwas believed to be even more corrupt, repressive and inefficient than the previousCongress regimes. Like the rest of northIndi a, MP shows signs of risi ng polit icisat ionwhich has not been matched by the rise ofalternative pol it ica l formations. In this context, it is significant to note that the BSP haswon 11 seats and has doubled its popularvote share to about 7 per cent. It seems to bereaching close to the stage from where ittook off in UP this time. It is also importantthat the Chhattisgarh Mu kt i Morch a and theKrantikari Samajvadi Party have openedtheir account with one seat each.

The growing unpopularity of the BJPgovernment in MP had become clear by the1991 Lo k Sabha election in whic h the Congress had led in 180 assembly segments andthe BJP in 131 (167 and 142 respectively,after excluding the 'assassination factor').

The "present verdict seems to be a replay ofthe 1991 verdict, except that the BJP has

fallen a little further. A preliminaryre gio n wise analy sis shows that theCongress's maximum gains are from theMahakaushal region which used to be itsstronghold but where it suffered a humil iating defeat in 1990. It has also come to splitthe seats evenly with the BJP in the latter'sown area of influence, Malwa, where againthe Congress was routed in the previouselection. The only place where the Congress

could save its face in the 1990 election wasthe tribal-domi nant region of Chhattisgarh;this time the party has consolidated its position further though the BJP has also pickedup about one-third seats. Only 15 of the 64seats reserved for the Scheduled Tribes havegone to the BJP, most of the remaininggoing to the Congress. It is also significantthat BJP has improved upon its previousperformance in urban constituencies, especia lly those with a significant Mus li m presence. Despite a setback and its inability tomake inroads into new areas or sections ofsociety, the BJP has secured higher votes

than the Jan Sangh-BJP formation couldever get in M P except in 1990. To thatextent, the BJP is a stronger political forcetoday than it was before the 1989 elections.

The most significant election in this roundof assembly poll s was no doubt that of UttarPradesh. It is here that the BJP governmenthad presided over the demolition of Babrimasjid; it is here that the BJP had asked fora clear mandate; and it is in UP that theoutcome is most significant from the pointof view of long-term political trends. TheBJPhas suffered a major political defeat, forit was the BJP which declared this electionto be a referendum. During the electioncampaign, the dismissed chief ministerKalyan Singh repeatedly declared that asingle seat less than the 221 the BJP won in1991 would mean its defeat. In that sense,the BJP stands defeated. The claim that theBJPhas secured more votes and lost out justbecause of the kind of electoral system wehave is besides the point here, for it was theBJP which chose this ground to fight itsbattle: The BJP's challenge was based precisely on the calculation that these electoralrules would work to its advantage.

Having said that, it is equally importan t tonote what this defeat does not mean. Whilethe voters have not overwhelmingly comeout to give BJP the kind of mandate itwanted, they have not rejected it either. TheBJP's vote share has gone up from 31.6 percent to 33.4 per cent, a net gain of 1.8 percent. Seen in the context of a signifi cant risein turnout as well, it definitely indicates arise in BJP's support base. More importantly, its support has expanded rather evenlyacross all the seven politico-cultural regionsof UP. In 1991 the BJP's vote was moreunevenly spread and there were two regions,

namely. Lower Doab and Poorvanchal, whereit fe ll short of 30 per cent. Now the party has

more than 30 percent vote in every region ofthe state. Paradoxically, that is preciselywhy it has lost a large number of seats to theSP and BSP which put together have 28.7per cent votes, 4.7 per cent less than the BJP.While the BJP vote has got spread thinly, theSP-BSP vote is concentrated and thereby ina better position to yield seats.

Though the BJP has had the consolation t

of emerging as the largest single party, its

seats have gone down from 221 in 1991 to177 this time. The SP-BSP alliance has got176 seats (109 and 67 respectively), nearlyfour times the 46 seats they jo in tl y held inthe dissolved assembly. The biggest loser isthe Janata Dal , do wn from 92 to 27 foll owedby the Congress, from 46 to 28. An analysisof the pattern of how seats changed handsshows that the BJP has retained 116 of itsseats, while gaining 33 from JD, mostlyfrom western UP, and 17 from Congress.The SP-BSP alliance has retained most of itsseats held (39 out of 46), and has gained 75from BJP, 37 from JD and 18 from Congress.

The UP outcome is best seen in terms ofits regions. It was the BJP vs the Congressin the hills of Uttarakhand. Here the BJP haslost 1.8 percent votes and has had to sp lit theseats this time. In Upper Doab, the 'Jatland'once dominated by the late ChaudharyCharan Singh, the BJP has improved itsposi tion both in terms of votes (2.7 percen t)and seats (13) mainly at the cost of the AjitSingh-led JD which has lost 7.1 per centvotes and 17 seats in this region. In LowerDoab also the BJP has gained 5.6 per centvotes but lost four seats mainly due to theconsol idation of non-BJP votes by SP-BSP.In Bundelkhand the voting pattern has notchange significantly but SP-BSP havepicked up five seats by combining theirvotes. In Rohilkhand, the region wit h highest Muslim population in UP, the BJP haslost 2.8 per cent votes and 10 seats. The SP-BSP alliance did not have much base tobegin wi th here as the Mu sl im voters tendedto vote for the JD. B ut this time the Musl imsturned out in large numbers (leading tocounter mobilisation and resulting in 7 percent higher turnout than the state average) tosupport Mulayam Singh whose alliancegained 7.9 per cent votes and 13 seats.Avadh saw a neck-and-neck fight betweenthe BJP and SP-BSP with both pollingroughly the same share of votes. A betterstrategy and tactical voting has got SP-BSP52 seats to BJ P's 37 (a net loss of 19 seats).In this region the Congress lost 17 seatsmainly in the districts dominated till recently by Indira Gandhi and her family. InPoorvanchal, the biggest and most denselypopulated region of the state, the BJP hasgained 3 per cent votes but lost 16 seats,thanks to a remarkable surge by the SP-BSP(9.2 per cent swing over 1991) wh ich uni ted

the non-BJP votes and enabled the allianceto capture 55 seats, a net gain of 43 over the




last election . In this traditiona l stronghold,the votes of JD have dropped by 8.6 per centand the total votes of Congress could noteven touch the 10 per cent mark. In overallterms, the SP-BSP alliance has gained 6.9percent votes in Uttar Pradesh while the JDhas lost about the same, 7.S per cent. TheCongress has lost 2.9 per cent votes over itsalready disastrous performance in 1991,making Uttar Pradesh the only state wherethe Congress has got less than 20 per centvotes in two consecutive elections.

The meaning of this landmark verdictwould become clearer if we look at caste/community voting pattern as revealed bythe India Today-MARG exit poll. It showsthat while there is some substance in theMuslim-Yadav-dalit alliance theory to account for the rise of the SP-BSP, the case isoften overstated. It is only among the Muslims that a majority of the community (55percent) voted for SP-BSP; its mobil isati onof dalits and the OBCs has been much less

successful at 36 and 33 per cent respectively, though it is still higher than the dalitvote for Congress (22 per cent) and the OB Cvote for BJP (28 per cent) or JD (13 percent). On the other hand, the upper casteshave voted almost en bloc (63 per cent) forthe BJP. I f we compare i t wit h the previoussurvey data on comm unit y vot ing pattern inIndian elections, this picture shows a highdegree of polarisat ion. A prel iminar y analysis shows that the BJP vote does not changesignificantly in constituencies with a highMu sl im p opulation, the SP-BSP have mademarginal gains while the Congress suffers

serious losses. It seems the BJP loss due toMu sl im voters have been made up by Hind uconsolidation, and vice versa for the SP-BSP. The SP-BSP alliance has succeeded inwinning 42 of the 88 seats reserved for theScheduled Castes, while the BJP has captured 34 and the Congress only si x. Bot h theSP-BSP and the BJP secured about 3 percent more votes than their respective stateaverages in the reserved constituencies; theCongress vote in these constituencies isabout 2 per cent less than its average. But ifwe classify the constituencies according tothe percentage of Scheduled Caste population, a different pattern emerges. In the 99constituencies with more than 25 per centScheduled Caste population, the SP-BSPhas secured 33.9 per cent votes and won 59of these. The BJP vote share goes downsteadily as the per cent of Scheduled Castepopu lat ion goes up. Clear ly, the SP-BSP, inparticular, has appealed to the imaginationof the lower castes and mino rit ies , enabl ingthem to exercise the vote as the 'weapon ofthe weak*. Whi le this constitutes a si gnif icant step in the political struggle for social

just ice, it does not by it se lf mean a vote forsocial justice. It is better seen as a recognition and assertion of pol iti cal self-identityby the subalterns.

BROADER TREND

This quick survey of the statewise patterns of the electoral outcome suggests thatthe verdict of the north Indian voters is notas fragmentary as it might appear in the firstinstance. It is not that the different states ofnorth India are on their way to developingdistinct regional politics, each with a different flavour and autonomous trends as is thecase with state politics in south India. Theoutcome is better read as the verdict of anelectorate with similar inclinations and ashared political vision but responding todifferently-structured political options.Hence the apparently contradictory outcomes. A closer look at the patterns discussed above also show some larger trendsat work in the north Indian Hindi heartland.These trends can be summed up under threeheads. First, the outcome indicates somelong-t erm trends about the fate of differentpoli tica l formations in north India. Second,

these elections tell us something about thelarger changes in the ideological field ofIndian politics or at least about contemporary politi cal discourse in north India. Thi rd,the verdict also contains some hints andsuggestions about popular political consciousness: its reception of the high discourse of ideologies and changes therein.

The most significant trend is the steadydecline of Congress power in north India.The outcome of the UP election shows it ina very dramatic fashion. The 1991 verdictand later trends suggest that the situation isnot very different in Bihar either. But moresignificantly, there are indications even fromthose states where Congress has apparentlydone wel l that the party might be on its wayout. The volatility of Congress seats (itsinability to hold on to a scat won in theprevious election) is higher than in the caseof its main rival, and higher than before.Surveys show that the Congress voters backtheir party positions less stron gly than others (e g, India Today-MARG Exit Poll).Field experience also suggests that the Congress voters arc much less enthusiast ic aboutand sure of their vote; in that sense even ifthe Congress gets a large number of votes,these are more 'shallow' and less durable.An d even the number is going dow n. I f wemerge the votes of all these four states andDelhi, the Congress gets about 28 per cent,as against 36 percent for the BJP. Perhaps itis time to take seriously the hypothesis thatthe Congress is in for a steady decline innorth Indian politics.

If there is any substance in this hypothesis, the question is: Who can fill the vacuumleft by the Congress? By now at least onething is clear: It cannot be the Janata Dal.The 1991 parliamentary verdic t had shown

a sharp erosion of Janata Dal support base;these assembly elections have confirmedthat trend. (This excludes the Bihar Janata

Dal of Lalo o Yadav whic h is by now and forall practical purposes a disti nct entity, l ikethe Samajwadi Party of Mulayam Singh.)The BSP does show the signs of a party onthe rise, but it suffers from the disadvantages of a limited, sectional appeal.

The trend indicates the possibility of theemergence of the BJP as the successor to theCongress. Notwithstanding the political set-back in this round of elections, the BJP hasconsolidated the major gains made duringits two major 'uni ted fronts' wi th the non-Congress forces in 1977-1980 and 1989-1990. As this election shows, even in itsworst defeats, as in Himachal Pradesh, theparty has succeeded in retaining a substantial support base. It is expanding into newregions (e g north Rajasthan, outer De lhi ) ornew sections (e g the Sikhs, the tribals anddalits). In that sense much of the seculareuphoria about the BJP defeat is misplaced .Bu t this is not to suggest that it is going IODCa cakewalk for BJP, or that its march to

victor y is inevitable. L ik e the BSP tt alsosuffers from the structural disadvantage ofexcluding a significant section of society,namely, the Mus lim s from its potential support base. And it has not yet succeeded inforging the right ideologica l instrument forcross-sectional mobi lis ati on.

This brings us to the second set oftrends—the politico -ideological —seen during this election. These ideological trendsare intimately connected to the politicaltrends discussed above. At the centre of theCongress's mobilisation and interest-aggregation capacity was the nationalis t ideology(with due accommodation of 'socialism')which bound the different groups it broughttogether and extended its appeal to all thesections of society. It is both a sign andconsequences of the decline of the Congressthat the old ideological package has lost itsappeal in the ideological market. The nation alis t currenc y has not lost its value altogether, but its old Congress formulationcannot work any more. The challenge ofsucceeding the Congress politically therefore gets translated into a challenge of ev olv-ing a new ideological package, perhaps anew rewo rkin g of the nationalist ideologyon more inclusivist lines.

This round of assembly elections did notshow any major discursive shift in northIndian poli tics, but there were some sig nificant subtle changes. First, all the major non-BJP parties (including the Congress andeven the Samajwadi Party) made attemptsto absorb at least a minimal element ofHindutva in their rhetorical practice. Second, the BJP made an attempt to tone downthe Hindutva ideological s tance byemphasising the political and the governance component of their programme. Th ird,

social justice ceased to be an ideologicalmonopoly of the Janata Dal—a sisterorganisation successfully appropriated it.

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And four, the SP-BSP alliance, especiallythe BSP, put forwa rd an identity-based ideology as a serious contender for democraticspace (its slogan Vote hamara, raj tumhara,nahin chalega' captured it so well).

It does not seem that any of these ideological modifications or innovations comeanywhere close to meeting the ideologicalchallenge mentioned above. If the Congressdiscourse of national unity and secularism

sounds too false or too distant, the ideological alternatives (BJP's Hindutva, JD's social justice or BSP's Bahujan Raj) are toothin. These 'thin ideologies' are too transparent a cover for particular political aggregations to have long-term stayingpower. Any serious alternative has to havethe 'thickness', the depth and the complexmediations of the nationalist ideology.

Finally, to move on to the third set ofconclusions, the verdict of this electiontells us something about the way the ordinary voters of this region think. And it isat this level that the tendency to read offpeople's mind from the consequences ofthe verdict is most damaging. Since theresults of this electi on are lik el y to benefitthe pol iti cs of secularis m, many have fallento the temptation of interpreting it as avote for secularis m. An att ribu tion of suchan alien idea to a common Indian is ratherproblema tic. Besides, reliabl e opinion poll

surveys have shown that the demolition ofBabri masjid was approved of by a majority of north Indians. The India Today -MARG poll estimated it then to be 54.2per cent. Subsequently, the idea of rebuilding the masjid at the same site hasbeen overwhe lmin gly rejected by the voters in various opinion polls. The IndiaToday-MARG poll showed that 82 percent of the people wanted Ram mandir in

Ayodhya and of them 51 per cent wantedit on that very site. It is also important toremember that surveys show a populardisapproval of the dismissal of the BJPgovernments, even in the state where BJPwas defeated. Moreover, it is quite evidentthat a large number of Hindus and Muslims followed community voting patternsin a politics of 'tactical voting' and'counter mobil isa tio n'. To call it a vote forsecularism is therefore clearly a case ofover-(enthusiastic) reading.

Nor is it a vote for Hindutva. I t is true thatthe aggressive politics of Hindutva in thelast few years has affected popular consciousness. But this election result does notreally confirm or reject that trend. When thevoters were asked in exit polls the reasonsfor their vote, Ayodh ya hardly figured anywhere in their list of reasons. It is true thatpre-structured opinion surveys do not succeed in capturing the complexities of pub

lic opinion and we have a long way to goin reading the mind of the voter. But evenif they are seen as crude signals, the message is clear. Some recent academic studies have drawn attention to the distancebetween remote ideologies like nationalism on the one hand and subaltern consciousness on the other. It seems something of that distance exists today betweenthe elite political ideologies of secular -

ism/communalism and the ordinary Indianvoter.Or so it seems on a preliminary view.

Understanding the modes of popular consciousness and the way they relate to contemporary Indian politics is a major intellectual challenge students of Indian elections have not even begun taking seriously.Only by entering into a dialogue withpeoples' beliefs and their own concepts andcategories, instead of imposing on themEnglish-speaking 'rationality', can we understand the true meanjng of an electionverdict. And that might also be a moredemocratic way of relating to democracy.

[I am grateful to Ashis Banerjee for sharing manyof his insights into Indian politics with me andallowing me to use these in this paper. I also wishto thank Javeed Alam, Rob Jenkins, Harsh Sethi,V B Singh and other colleagues at the Centre forthe Study of Developing Society for several stimulating discussions.!




aim. So the left trade unions are confronted with the two-fold tasks of buildingwider unity of the working class againstthe poli cy pursued by the Congress (I) government at the dictates of the Wor ld Bankand the I M F and of also buil din g a mi l itant trade union u nit y of the work in g classfor realising their ultimate aim. One taskwill supplement the other. Moreover, atthis jun ctu re there is the import ant task of

mobilising the working class against therise of communal forces organised by the'Sangh parivar'.

It is true that the SCITU has been carrying on its movement through differentphases for sometime past, yet it has notbeen able to check the implementation ofthe economic policy pursued by theNarasimha Rao government, not to speakof defeating this policy. The policy pursued by the Congress(I) government at thecentre can only be halted by the unitedbattle of wider sections of the workingclass and other democratic forces.

Due to pressure of objective circumstances, the INTUC's power of vetoingstrikes has been paralysed to a great extent, but at the same time it has been ableto retain its influence. Even in West Ben

gal, where the Left Front has been inpower for more than 16 years, the I N T U C sbase has not been shaken. Therefore, thecrucial question is to draw the workingclass still under the influence of theCongress(I) or the INTUC into the common struggle. It is also necessary to drawthe wo rk in g people under the influen ce ofthe BJP in such struggles, especially in theHindi belt where the BJP has been able to

spread its pol iti cal in fluence.Experience has shown that it is possible

to build such united struggles on certainaspects of the policy of the Congress(I)government at the centre. The INTUC haspublicly declared that it is against thepol icy of pri vat isa tio n of the publ ic sectorand is also against the so-cal led exit pol ic y.In fact, a united committee was formedwith the INTUC and the BMS against theprivatisation of IISCO. At the call of thiscommittee, a successful strike was observed in the public sector units of thesteel industry on September 7. Even thosesteel units which did not join the Bharatbandh on September 9 had joined theSeptember 7 strike. This shows that ifpressure can be built from below, widestpossible uni ty can be achieved. The strike

has at least halted the process ofpriva tisa tion of the IISC O. This also showswhat wider unity can achieve. Reports ofthe Bharat bandh indicated that there wasprac tic all y no active resistance fro m theIN TU C, not only in states where left forcesare strong but also in some other stateswhere left forces are comparatively weak.

A l l this definit ely shows that if pressurecan be mounted from the base, the widest

possible unity can be built on certain aspects of economic policy. Whether suchpressure can really be mounted dependsupon the initiative of the rank and fileworkers at the shop level or the departmental level of the left trade unions.

So it is incumbent upon the leadershipof the left trade unions to initiate suchactions as wou ld help releasing the ini ti ative at the base. In the prevailing circumstances, it depends upon the left tradeunions, particula rly the CI TU , what policythey pursue in leading trade unions. TheWest Bengal unit is not only the strongestunit of the CITU, it is also the strongestand largest trade union centre in the state.Moreo ver, West Bengal has a tradi tion ofleading many militant working classstruggles and other democratic struggles




in the past. It therefore occupies a keyposition in the pol itic al map of India.

Theoretically all concerned will admitthat a distinction should be made betweenthe functioning of the party and the tradeunion. The latter is a mass organisation towhich workers wedded to different po li tical ideologies have a right to belong. Butin practice this distinction is often forgotten. The experience has shown that there

is a tendency to control a trade union fromthe top. The decisions are often imposedupon the workers. This practice does nothelp observance of trade union democracy. The problem is to establish workers'democratic control over the trade unions,instead of the prev ailin g bureaucratic control of the party in many cases. This oftenresults in a certain alienation of the massesof workers from the leadership. An essential pre-condition for unleashing the initiative of the workers at the base is thequestion of observance of trade union democracy in its real sense. This is sure tohelp unleashing the initiative of the rankand file workers which in turn will help indevelop ing a broader unity of worker s.

In the name of leading the trade unions, aleadership-follower pattern has unfortunatelybeen introduced in the functioning of thetrade unions. The workers have little role toplay in the conduct of the trade unions andin their decision-making process. This hasresulted not only in curtailing democracyinside the trade unions, but also in preventing widening of their base.

In this connection, the following prob

lems should be discussed and looked into:(1) Whether the concerned party com

mittee which is supposed to lead a tradeunion should submit to the opinions of theworkers if the decisions of the concernedcommittee are against the mood and opinion of the workers. An old illus trat ion mayclarify the point.

The leadership of the pre-split CPI wasnot in favour of the Calcutta Tramwaysworkers' strike which took place in September 1945—the historic strike that initiated the great post-war wave of workers'actions. But the executive committee ofthe Tramways Union unanimously votedin favour of the strike . And the partyleadership submitted to the will of thetramways workers who conducted a gl or ious and successful strike. Similarly, theparty leadership was initially hesitant overthe continuation of the Calcutta Corporation workers' strike that took place inNov emb er 1945, after the betr ayal of thereformist leadership. The mood of theworkers was in favour of con tinu ing thestrike. The present writer who played anactive part in the conduct of the strike wasin favour of continuing it. Some otherlocal organisers of the undivided CPI alsosupported this decision. Here also the party

leadership submitted to the will of theworkers. The strike continued and wascrowned with success. Is such a turn ofevent possible under the present circumstances? As there is a tendency to controlthe union from the top, decisions are oftenimposed upon the work ers.

In 1989, a strike took place in an important rubber factory in West Bengal. A section of the dominant party leadership was

not in favour of continuing the strike afterthe labour minister's intervention. But thestrike was continued jointly by the CITUand the INTUC-led workers. Ultimately,the decision of the party was imposed uponthe workers through various means. And theworkers were made to withdraw the strike.In another case, in the recently held annualconference of an old union, the decision ofthe concerned party comm itte e regardin gcertain changes in the office-bearers andexecutive committee members was rejectedby an overwh elming majo rity of the outgoing executive committee. Still the decisionsof the concerned party committee were imposed upon the conference.

Does all this help release of the workers' initiative at the base and widen theunity of the working class?

(2) The communist-led trade unions arerightly against the slogan 'no politics inthe trade unions'. But the question iswhether trade unions should be divided onall polit ical questions? Different poli tica lquestions that the trade union may faceshould be judged on merit and dependingupon the concrete circumstances and com

position of the unions, the issue should bedecided throu gh wid e discussions andthrough the democratic process. Is it incumbent upon the left trade unions, including the CITU, to support each andevery decision of the Left Front and itsgovernment? Cannot the Left Front or itsministe rs err in their jud gmen t? Is there nodifference between the bureaucracy, thepolice and the ministry? It has been observed that every action of the police isdefended by the Left Front. Has the policechanged its character during the Left Front

regime? Is it no longer an instrument ofclass repression? The police resorted tofiring in the Gouri Shankar Jute M i l l onSeptember 21, 1990 where the workershad assembled to demand their dues. As aresult a worker was killed. Was it not theduty of the CPI(M)-led trade unions tocondemn such firing? This they never did.More similar instances can be cited.

When an election takes place, the INTUCsupports the candidates of the Congress(I).The behaviour of the left trade unions, including the CITU, is not at all different inthis respect. These trade unions support thecandidates of the Left Front without sometimes even discussing the issue in the respective union committees. This practice

assumes that no Congress-minded workercan remain in the trade unions affiliated toleft trade union centres. But is it not ourexperience that many workers belonging toC I TU and other left trade unions vote for aCongress candidate? Instances can be citedwhen an executive member of a CIT U unionfought an election as a BJP candidate. In thisconnection, it should be remembered thatwhereas the I NT UC is a d isrup tive and anti-

struggle force, the CITU stands for 'unityand struggle'. So it is not commendable tofoll ow I N T U C s policy and practice in thisrespect.

It is of course desirable that gene rallythe left trade unions should support theLeft Front and its government against theattacks of the Congress(I) and BJP. Butblind support to all actions and decisionsof the Left Front and its government is notalways conducive to building wider unity.

(3) It has been observed that there is atendency on the part of the party to build

a parallel union when the party is not in adominant position in a particular union.The communists always advocated fractional work even in a reactionary union.To organise a parallel union when theparty is not in a dominant position isdefinitely wrong and is not conducive tobuilding wider unity. Instances can becited when a particular party took initiative in organising a parallel union to an oldindependent union where different political forces worked together. Experiencehas shown that org anis ing such a p ara lle lunion has not helped the workers in anyway in solving their problems.

(4) There is another tendency: if theparty is in a majority in a particular tradeunion or trade union centre, it is interpreted as enjoying a majority among theconcerned workers or the working class inthe country. Such a tendency may bringdisastrous results.

Signs are already there that unitedstruggles are developing on an all-Indiascale and also in particular industries on anational plane. The bank and insurancework ers' threat of an indef inite strike from

November 2 met with partial success; therailway workers and the telecommunication workers are also on the move.

So it has become urgent to discuss theabove problems and take corrective measure where needed. Unless the above problems are seriously tackled, neither theinitiative of the workers at the base can bereleased nor wider unity can be built. Butfrom different aspects, the need of thehour is to build widest possible unity forfighting the reactionary forces representedby the Sangh par ivm . for hal tin g theeconomic policies of the Congress(I) central government and for defending therights and achievements gained by theworking class through decades of struggle.

Economic and Politi cal Weekly Special Number December 18, 1993 2779

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COMMENTARY_Political Change in North India-Interpreting Assembly Election Results

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