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COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA: LESSONS FROM KALIMANTAN 27 June 2001 ICG Asia Report N° 19 Jakarta/Brussels
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Page 1: COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA: LESSONS FROM … · KALIMANTAN TENGAH KALIMANTAN TIMUR LAMPUNG MALUKU NUSA TENGGARA BARAT NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR RIAU SULAWESI SELATAN SULAWESI TENGAH

COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA:LESSONS FROM KALIMANTAN

27 June 2001

ICG Asia Report N° 19Jakarta/Brussels

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Table of Contents

MAP OF INDONESIA........................................................................................................ i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................... ii

I. CENTRAL KALIMANTAN: THE SETTING ...................................................... 2II. THE MASSACRE AND THE FLIGHT OF REFUGEES .................................... 2

A. PRELUDE: EARLIER CLASHES .............................................................................. 2B. THE SAMPIT MASSACRE AND ITS AFTERMATH.................................................... 4C. EXPLAINING THE MASSACRE............................................................................... 6

III. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SECURITY FORCES ..................................... 8IV. EVACUATION: TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT? ....................................... 11V. THE ORIGINS OF DAYAK RESENTMENT ..................................................... 13

A. MIGRATION........................................................................................................ 13B. LOSS OF LAND ................................................................................................... 15C. EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION ........................................................................ 16D. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS ............................................................................ 17E. THE POLICE AND MILITARY .............................................................................. 19F. CULTURE AND RELIGION ................................................................................... 19

VI. THE DAYAKS AND THE MADURESE.............................................................. 20VII. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................... 22

APPENDICES:

A. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND INDONESIAN TERMS ........................................ 26B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ..................................................... 27C. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS ............................................................... 28D. ICG BOARD MEMBERS...................................................................................... 32

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The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

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ICG Asia Report No 18 27 June 2001

COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA:LESSONS FROM KALIMANTAN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Long-simmering tensions between indigenousDayaks and immigrant Madurese suddenlyexploded in the town of Sampit, CentralKalimantan, in the middle of February 2001.Within days, isolated killings perpetrated byboth sides had developed into a one-sidedmassacre of Madurese by enraged Dayaks. Inthe following weeks the killings spread to otherareas in the province and by early April almostthe entire Madurese population had fled theprovince. The massacre of about 500 – andpossibly many more - Madurese by Dayaks andthe flight of virtually the entire Maduresecommunity closely resembled two similarevents in the Sambas district in the northern partof West Kalimantan in 1996-7 and in 1999 andhighlighted the danger of violence spreading toWest and East Kalimantan

The violence in Central Kalimantan followedseveral decades of dislocation of the Dayakcommunity - which makes up more than half ofthe province's population. The demographiccomposition of the province has beentransformed, especially during the last twodecades, by the Soeharto government'stransmigration program and the influx of so-called 'spontaneous' migrants from otherprovinces seeking economic opportunities.Dayak society was also disturbed by theSoeharto regime's handing out of vast parcels ofKalimantan's forests to logging companies,many of which were connected to members ofthe Soeharto family, his cronies or the military,with the result that many forest-dwellingDayaks were driven from their traditionalhabitat. A 1979 law providing for uniformstructures of local government throughout

Indonesia had the effect of undermining theauthority of traditional village leaders and thecohesion of Dayak communities.Overshadowing this dislocation was awidespread feeling among Dayaks that theywere often looked down on by othercommunities as 'backward' and 'uncivilized'.

The dislocation experienced by Dayaks,however, does not fully explain the violence ofFebruary and March. If the massacres had beenprimarily a response to rapid demographicchange or the destruction of the forests, it couldhave been expected that Dayak anger wouldhave been directed against all the migrantcommunities. But the violence was focusedentirely on the Madurese and was eventuallyturned into a campaign to drive them out of theprovince. The Madurese community was notonly small compared to the Dayaks but was alsooutnumbered by other migrant groups,especially the Javanese and Banjarese. Whywere the Madurese in Central Kalimantan - likethe Madurese in West Kalimantan several yearsearlier - the sole target? How would the 'ethniccleansing' of the Madurese benefit the Dayakcommunity? Why were other migrantcommunities untouched?

There are no straightforward answers. The mostpopular explanations are expressed in terms ofcommon stereotypes. Dayaks often view theMadurese as arrogant, exclusive, prone toviolence and untrustworthy. Dayaks, on theother hand, have been portrayed - especially inthe international press - as barbarian warriorsbent on reviving their ancient headhunting

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Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons From KalimantanICG Asia Report N° 19, 27 June 2001 Page iii

traditions. As is usual in ethnic conflicts, thereis no agreed explanation of how the violencebegan. According to the Dayak version, Dayakgrievances against Madurese had beenaccumulating for years until Madurese attackson Dayaks in Sampit on 18-19 Februarytriggered the spontaneous massacre of hundredsof Madurese. On the other hand, the Madureseexplanation claims that certain Dayak interestsprovoked small-scale clashes as a pretext for themassacre that followed. But, so far, there hasbeen no complete explanation of the allegedmotives of these Dayak interests.

On one point, however, there is substantialagreement. Almost all sides note the failure ofthe security forces to prevent the conflict. Thepolice are widely blamed for the failure of theirintelligence network to anticipate the violenceand their inability to take firm early action toprevent its spread. By the time that the massacrehad got underway the police were overwhelmedand often stood by watching Dayaks burnMadurese houses and parade around Sampitwith human heads. Assigned to guardingrefugees after failing to prevent the killing,many police seemed more interested in makingthe most of opportunities to extort money fromdesperate Madurese. Co-operation with themilitary was by no means smooth and in anextraordinary incident police and army troopsactually exchanged fire at Sampit's port. Despitetheir poor performance in Sampit, the policeand the military were nevertheless able to atleast minimize - although not entirely prevent -the spread of violence to other major centresincluding Palangkaraya, Kualakapuas andPangkalanbun. Their task, of course, was madeeasier by the fact that most Madurese had fledrather than put the police and military to thetest. Nevertheless, the security forces succeededin protecting the lives of as many as 100,000fleeing refugees.

The Indonesian government and courts nowface the classic dilemma that often arises afterethnic conflict: how can accountability bepursued without further exacerbating tensions?In principle, the rule of law should be upheldand those responsible for murder, assault andarson should be tried in the courts. The failureto convict those responsible for ethnic violencecreates a sense of impunity that could encourage

renewed violence at later times and in otherplaces. It can also stand in the way of long-termreconciliation. But, aside from the inherentdifficulties in finding sufficient evidence, thejudicial settlement of cases of communalviolence not only ignores the fundamentalcauses of the conflict but can in itself createnew problems. The perpetrators of communalmassacres are usually convinced that theiractions were justified and they are oftenregarded as heroes in their own community.Their incarceration can then become not only anobstacle to eventual reconciliation but moreimmediately can trigger renewed violence. Thegoal should still be to uphold the law but notregardless of circumstances. In some cases, astark question cannot be avoided: how manylives are the upholders of the law prepared tosacrifice in order to uphold the law? The lawshould be upheld but not at any cost. Ultimatelythe authorities have to make fine judgementsbased on local conditions. Legal measuresshould therefore move forward in concert withefforts to address the legitimate grievances ofthe Dayaks – all toward the broader goal ofimproving security, promoting reconciliationbetween the Dayak and Madurese communitiesand creating conditions conducive to the returnof refugees.

Many of the following recommendations areconcerned specifically with the ethnic violencein Central Kalimantan. Nevertheless, despite theunique circumstances of Central Kalimantan,some aspects of the province’s experiencesuggests lessons that are relevant for otherregions in Indonesia.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for Central Kalimantan andMadura

1. All refugees have the right to return to theirhomes under broadly accepted standards ofinternational law. However, the return ofMadurese to Central Kalimantan will needto be delayed until the authorities canguarantee their safety and can then onlytake place gradually. It is unrealistic toexpect that all Madurese will be able toreturn.

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Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons From KalimantanICG Asia Report N° 19, 27 June 2001 Page iv

2. Encouragement should be given to theDayak community to accept the earlyreturn of Kalimantan-born Madurese, thosewith family ties in Central Kalimanatan andthose who had lived for many years in theprovince.

3. The immediate need of Madurese refugeesis for assistance in adjusting to a new lifeoutside Central Kalimantan. Foreigngovernments and NGOs can providehumanitarian assistance.

4. Government-sponsored 'peace meetings'between community leaders can create anatmosphere that reduces ethnic tensions butcannot in themselves bring aboutreconciliation.

5. The principle of upholding the law shouldnot be abandoned but, in doing so, theauthorities should adopt a flexible approachin order to avoid measures that couldfurther inflame ethnic passions and makeultimate harmony more difficult to achieve.The authorities should be sensitive topossible negative consequences of the strictapplication of the law.

6. Both Dayaks and Madurese involved in theinitial murders on the night of 17-18February should be investigated andcharged if evidence is sufficient.

7. If there is evidence to show that the killingswere planned and organized by certainDayak leaders, those leaders should bearrested and tried.

8. The police needs to be able to take earlyaction to nip ethnic eruptions in the bud.This requires a greatly improvedintelligence capacity and a willingness totake firm action against rioters. ICGsupports the National Human RightsCommission's call to 'immediately createsecurity forces that are adequate bothqualitatively and quantitatively to carry outtheir duties'.2

9. The police force should recruit more localpersonnel, especially Dayaks.

2 Statement of the National Commission on Human Rights,6 March 2001.

10. Minority communities, as victims, do notbear the blame for massacres. However, theleaders of such communities should beaware of cultural and other traits that createtension with indigenous communities andshould help members of their community tobecome more sensitive to local norms andconcerns.

11. In the new democratic atmosphere, Dayakleaders should use democratic channels toexpress community complaints and resolvegrievances rather than allow festeringresentments to build up and explode inviolence. Dayak leaders should emphasizethe need to resolve conflict by non-violentmeans.

12. Major measures have to be taken toimprove the socio-economic position of theDayak community. These measures shouldinclude steps to ensure that the loggingindustry is more sensitive to the needs oflocal communities and efforts to ensurewider participation of Dayaks in educationand employment in the modern sector ofthe economy.

13. The decision of the National Commissionon Human Rights to establish acommission to investigate human rightsviolations in Central Kalimantan should bewelcomed. In presenting the results of itsinvestigations it should take care that itsfindings do not further aggravateantagonisms between the two communities.

Recommendations for the Government ofIndonesia

14. More attention should be given in all partsof Indonesia to the grievances of'indigenous' communities which have beendislocated, deprived and marginalised inthe process of development. Specialmeasures should be taken to compensatethem for the loss of land, forests and otherresources caused by development projectsthat have primarily benefited others.

15. The Central Kalimantan experience showsonce again that it is necessary to createprofessional security forces capable of

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Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons From KalimantanICG Asia Report N° 19, 27 June 2001 Page v

dealing with outbreaks of ethnic andreligious conflict. This requires adequatefunding of both the police and the military.In regions with substantial ‘indigenous’populations, such communities should beadequately represented in the securityforces.

16. In ethnically divided regions, an acceptablebalance between ethnic groups in theregional bureaucracy needs to be preserved.Careful attention should be given to thepossible impact on inter-communalrelations of the reorganisation of localgovernment as part of the regionalautonomy program introduced in January2001.

Jakarta/Brussels, 27 June 2001

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ICG Asia Report No 18 27 June 2001

COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA:

LESSONS FROM KALIMANTAN

I. CENTRAL KALIMANTAN: THESETTING

Central Kalimantan's population of 1.8 millionis largely made up of indigenous Dayaksestimated to make up between half and two-thirds of the population.3 The Dayaks are theoriginal peoples of Kalimantan (Borneo) andcontinue to make up a substantial part of thepopulation not only in Central Kalimantan butalso in West Kalimantan and East Kalimantan -although they have become a small minority inSouth Kalimantan. Dayaks also make up asubstantial part of the population in EasternMalaysia.

The Dayaks, however, are not a single ethniccommunity but consist of more than 200 distincttribes with their own languages, customs andcultures. While most live in isolated villages inthe remaining rain forests and practise shiftingcultivation, many young Dayaks are nowreceiving modern education and moving intourban occupations. Unlike in West Kalimantanwhere Dayaks are distinguished from so-called“Malays” by being non-Muslim, at least half -and possibly as many as 70 per cent - of CentralKalimantan's Dayaks are Muslim.4 Thedominant tribal group in Central Kalimantan isthe Ngaju whose language has become thelingua franca of the province.

3 Until 2000, the Indonesian census did not record ethnicidentity. In the 2000 census a question was asked aboutlanguage spoken at home - a proxy for ethnic identity - butthe results have not yet been announced.4 Estimates made by various Dayak leaders in interviewswith ICG. Interviews for this report were conducted inCentral Kalimantan, Madura, Surabaya and Jakarta inApril and May, 2001.

Central Kalimantan’s non-Dayak populationconsists mainly of migrants and descendants ofmigrants from other parts of Indonesia,especially Java and South Kalimantan(Banjarese). Many of the migrants from Javaoriginally came to Central Kalimantan under thegovernment's transmigration program -designed to relieve population pressure in Java -but a substantial number migratedspontaneously in search of economicopportunity. Among those who migrated fromJava are the Madurese, who originate from thesmall island of Madura, just north of Surabayain East Java. However, the Madurese - who areMuslim - were by no means the largest ethnicgroup among the migrant communities,although they had become prominent in small-scale trade and transport and as labourers inplantations and logging concessions. It isdifficult to estimate exactly the size of theMadurese community before the recent exodusbut it is usually thought to have numberedaround 120,000-130,000 or about 6-7 per centof Central Kalimantan's population. Manymembers of the Madurese community had livedfor many years in Central Kalimantan and nolonger had close contacts with family andfriends in Madura. Many of the youngergeneration of Madurese had been born inKalimantan and knew no other home. Someamong them had intermarried with othercommunities, including Dayaks.

The largest concentrations of Madurese were inthe town of Sampit where it is usually estimatedthat they made up about 60 per cent5 of the 5 Other sources suggest that the Madurese population mayhave been as low as 30-40 per cent (e.g. Tempo, 4 March2001, p.2) and that the Dayak population was much higher

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Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons From KalimantanICG Asia Report N° 19, 27 June 2001 Page 2

population and controlled much of commerceand the timber industry. Roughly 20 per cent ofSampit’s population were Banjarese, 10 per centJavanese and 10 per cent Dayaks. Maduresealso made up 30-50 per cent of the populationof Pangkalanbun The Madurese population inthe provincial capital, Palangkaraya, was onlyabout 12,000 -- or about 7-8 per cent.

Central Kalimantan is Indonesia’s third largestprovince in area but accounts for less than oneper cent of the country’s total population with1.8 million people. Its population density isabout one-tenth the national average, and onlyone-hundredth that of Java. More than half theprovince is still covered by forests which,however, are shrinking rapidly as the loggingindustry expands. Central Kalimantan suppliesabout 60 per cent of Indonesia's logs while itssmall manufacturing sector is made up largelyof sawmills. In 1998-99, 49 per cent of CentralKalimantan’s log production came from theKotawaringin Timur district of which Sampit isthe capital.6

The ethnic cleansing of Central Kalimantan in2001 followed similar massacres of Madureseby Dayaks in 1996-7 and 1999 in theneighbouring province of West Kalimantan.The Dayaks of West Kalimantan were subjectedto the same pressures - migration from otherparts of Indonesia, the destruction of the forests,the opening of plantations and transmigrationsites, relative exclusion from political power,and the non-Dayak perception that they were'backward' - that were felt in CentralKalimantan. And like in Central Kalimantan,their rage was directed at the Madurese minoritywhich, at less than 3 per cent of the provincialpopulation, was even smaller than in CentralKalimantan. In contrast to Central Kalimantan,however, West Kalimantan’s Dayaks arevirtually entirely non-Muslim.7 Both outbreaks than 10 per cent. The true composition will only be knownwhen the 2000 census figures are released.6 Anne Casson, ‘Ethnic violence in an era of regionalautonomy: A background to the bloodshed inKotawaringin Timur’, RMAP Occasional Paper, ResourceManagement in Asia-Pacific Project, Research School ofPacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University,2001. P. 4.7 In Central Kalimantan, indigenous Muslims, Christiansand followers of traditional religion all continue to identifythemselves as Dayaks. In West Kalimantan, however,Dayaks who converted to Islam in the past were usually

of violence started in the northern district ofSambas. Estimates of the total number of deathsin the 1996-7 massacres ranged from 300 to3,000 but a Human Rights Watch reportconcluded that the number was probably around500, mostly Madurese.8 The official count ofthe number of Madurese killed during the firstthree months of 1999 was 186 but unofficialestimates are much higher. In the 1999 killingsthe initial conflict had been between Madureseand Malays – both Muslim communities – withthe non-Muslim Dayaks joining in later on theMalay side.9 It was only after virtually allMadurese had fled from Sambas that order wasrestored. By the year 2000 the number ofMadurese refugees in various refugee centres inWest Kalimantan exceeded 50,000 while manyothers had returned to Madura.10

There is no evidence to indicate a directconnection between the anti-Maduresecampaign in Central Kalimantan and the earliermassacres in West Kalimantan but the ‘success’of ethnic cleansing in the Sambas district mayhave shaped the thinking of some Dayakleaders.

II. THE MASSACRE AND THEFLIGHT OF REFUGEES

A. PRELUDE: EARLIER CLASHES

The Sampit massacre was preceded by signs ofrising tension between Dayaks and Maduresefor at least two decades, particularly in the twowesternmost of the province’s five districts -Kotawaringin Timur and Kotawaringin Barat -and the provincial capital, Palangkaraya.Conflicts involved fights between individuals,occasional murders and several rapes. However,

absorbed into the Malay community which had its originsin Muslim migrants from Sumatra, Sulawesi and theMalay peninsula who had settled over the centuries alongthe Kalimantan coast.8 Human Rights Watch/Asia, Indonesia: CommunalViolence in West Kalimantan. Vol. 9, No 10(C), December1997.9 A detailed account can be found in Edi Peterbang and EriSutrisno, Konflik Etnik di Sambas. Jakarta: Institut StudiArus Informasi, 2000.10 Kompas, 'Warga Pontianak Terperangkap PurbasangkaNegatif', Kompas 29 October 2000.

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Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons From KalimantanICG Asia Report N° 19, 27 June 2001 Page 3

these clashes were isolated incidents and did notspark major riots.11

In interviews with ICG many Dayaksmentioned the murder of a Dayak by aMadurese at Bukit Batu, Kasongan, in 1983which led to a peace settlement between leadersof the Dayak and Madurese communities inwhich the Madurese agreed that if anyMadurese 'spilt the blood' of a Dayak, theMadurese would voluntarily leave CentralKalimantan.12 However, this peace agreementfailed to prevent later conflicts.

More recently a quarrel involving a motorcycletaxi driver in January 1999 led to an inter-communal brawl at Kumai, the port ofPangkalanbun, in which two men were killedand several others severely injured.13 InSeptember 1999 a Dayak and his wife werestabbed by Madurese at Tumbang Samba.14 InJuly 2000 more fighting broke out at Kumaifollowing a quarrel between a timber trader anda labourer, one of whom was Madurese and theother an indigenous Malay. The ensuingfighting involved Madurese and local Malaysand resulted in three people being killed andseveral houses burnt.15

The Sampit massacre of 2001 can be moredirectly traced to events in the shanty town ofKereng Pangi in December 2000. Kereng Pangiis halfway along the 220-km highway linkingSampit and Palangkaraya on the fringe of theviolence-prone Ampalit gold mining area. In1986, the award of a 2,500-hectare gold-miningconcession to PT Ampalit Mas Perdana, a jointventure between the Jakarta-based Gajah 11 A list recording fifteen clashes between 1982 and 2000has been prepared by the Dayak organisation, LembagaMusyawarah Masyarakat Dayak dan Daerah KalimantanTengah (LMMDDKT). The list and other documents werepublished in two volumes with red covers and commonlycalled the Red Book vol.1 and the Red Book vol. 2.Volume One is entitled Konflik Etnik Sampit: Kronologi,Kesepakatan Aspirasi Masyarakat, Analisis, Saran (EthnicConflict in Sampit: Chronology, Agreement on SocialAspirations, Analysis, Proposals). The second is entitledUsul Penyelesaian Jalan Tengah Islah/Rekonsiliasi dariMasyarakat Daerah Kalimantan Tengah (ProposedSolution, the Middle Road, Resolution/Reconciliationfrom the Society of the Region of Central Kalimantan).12 Tempo, 11 March 2001. p. 24.13 Kompas, 2 February 1999.14 Kompas, 23 February 2001.15 Kompas, 7, 8, 9 July 2000.

Tunggal Group and an Australian miningcompany, created tensions with traditionalminers who continued their operations illegally.By the 1990s, the number of these miners hadswollen to around 3,000 - mainly migrants fromJava, Madura and South Kalimantan. From timeto time the company tried to clear the illegalminers from the area but they always returned.In January 1997 more vigorous action wastaken, including the destruction of equipmentused by the illegal miners. In response,hundreds of miners burnt down the main officeof the company and destroyed several trucks.Three employees of the company sufferedwounds inflicted with machetes. Although thisconflict did not take the form of an ethnic clash,it nevertheless involved migrants16 And despitethe company's efforts, illegal mining continuedin the area.

On the evening of Friday 15 December 2000, abrawl broke out at a karaoke bar in a brothelarea near Kereng Pangi. In the fight, a Dayakdied after being stabbed by three Madurese.17

At around midnight, several hundred Dayaksarrived in search of the three Madurese who bythen had fled. The disappointed Dayaks thenwrecked or burnt at least four Madurese-ownedkaraoke bars and nine houses. Although 150police reinforcements were sent to the area fromPalangkaraya and Sampit at dawn the next day,they were unable to prevent Dayaks fromattacking and burning houses, cars andmotorbikes of Madurese migrants while shopsand stalls in the local market were looted anddestroyed. On 17 December, Dayaks continuedto search for Madurese and four buses ownedby a Madurese businessman were set on fire. By18 December, hundreds of policereinforcements had arrived as well as acompany-sized army unit and later in the weekthe Kereng Pangi market was reopened.According to a local official, three people werekilled, 28 houses were burnt and another 10destroyed, and more than a dozen cars andmotorbikes were damaged.18 However, somesources claim that dozens of Madurese were

16 Jawa Pos, 25 January 1997, Media Indonesia, 31January 1997, Gatra, 15 February 1997.17 This description is taken from Kompas, Jakarta Post andBanjarmasin Post, 17-19 December 2000.18 Kompas, 12 January 2001.

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killed.19 In the wake of the rioting about 1,000Madurese fled into the surrounding jungle whileothers sought protection at the local police postand were soon evacuated to Sampit andPalangkaraya. Eventually at least 1,335Madurese, mostly traditional gold miners whohad come to Kalimantan during the previous 15years, were taken back to Madura.20 The failureof the police to capture the three Madureseaccused of killing the Dayak became acontinuing cause of resentment among Dayaksboth in Kereng Pangi and Sampit. Further, thesense of insecurity felt by Madurese wassharpened by the failure of the police to protectthem from the Dayak onslaught.

B. THE SAMPIT MASSACRE AND ITSAFTERMATH

Sampit, the capital of the Kotawaringin Timordistrict and the centre of Central Kalimantan'stimber trade, was a town of about 120,000 andthe only town in the province where theMadurese community - making up about sixtyper cent of the residents - was in a majority. Itwas here that the sense of being marginalisedwas most strongly felt among indigenousDayaks. But, while the Dayaks were a minorityin the town they formed an overwhelmingmajority in the surrounding hinterland.

In the weeks after the clash in Kereng Pangi, theMadurese community in Sampit feared thatrioting could spread to Sampit. MeanwhileDayaks claimed that the Madurese were stock-piling home-made bombs to use against Dayaks.This belief was strengthened by an accidentalexplosion in a Madurese district that wreckedthree houses, killed two people and seriouslyinjured four.21 By January rumours werespreading about imminent ethnic rioting inSampit. The chief of police in Sampit evenadmitted that the national police headquarters inJakarta had telephoned him about such arumour.22

Shortly after midnight on 18 February a groupof Dayaks attacked a house and killed five of its

19 Don Greenlees, 'Bar-room brawl began slaughter',Weekend Australian, 3-4 March 2001; ICG interview inPalangkaraya.20 Kompas, 12 January 2001.21 Banjarmasin Post, 21 December 2000.22 Banjarmasin Post, 2 January 2001.

Madurese occupants. Madurese then launchedan attack on a nearby Dayak house where theybelieved that the Dayak killers were hiding.However, the Dayaks were taken into custodyby the police who later charged some of themwith the murder of the Madurese. The Maduresethen burnt down the house of another Dayakwho, along with other members of his family,died in the fire.23 The Dayak Red Book24

however, claims that the five Madurese werekilled in an intra-Madurese quarrel for whichDayaks were blamed.25

Following these clashes, Madurese went on theoffensive and killed, according to differentaccounts, between 16 and 24 Dayaks. Expectinga Dayak counter-attack, Madurese guarded thestreets which in effect fell under Maduresedomination. The next part of the story, however,is also contested. According to the Red Bookand other Dayak sources, banners weredisplayed on 19 February carrying such slogansas 'The town of Sampit is a Second Sampang'(Sampang is a town in Madura), 'Welcome to aMadurese town', and 'Sampit is the Verandah ofMecca'. At the same time Madurese youthsparaded around the town on motorbikesshouting 'Where are the Dayak champions?','Dayaks are cowards', and 'Where is the BirdCommander?' (a reference to the magical Dayakcommander who emerges in times of crisis).26

Some Madurese, on the other hand, deny thatsuch banners appeared and that the ‘victory’parade took place. Others claim that banners

23 Tempo, 4 March 2001, pp. 27-29. The Indonesian pressinitially reported that the Dayak attack that killed fiveMadurese had been preceded by the burning down of aDayak house. Kompas, 19 February 2001.24 See footnote 9 above.25 'Kronologis Konflik Kerusuhan Antar Etnis di Sampit' ,paragraphs 13-14. Red Book, Volume 1. A Chronology ofevents from a Madurese viewpoint is presented in DariRatap Menuju Harap. Tragedi Pembantaian Etnis Maduradi Sampit (18 Februari 2001) (From Mourning to Hope.The Tragedy of the Massacre of Madurese in Sampit),issued by Ikatan Keluarga Madura, Kotawaringin Timur,Surabaya, 8 May 2001.26 'Kronologis Konflik Kerusuhan Antar Etnis di Sampit, 'paragraph 19, and 'Latar Belakang Terjadinya PeristiwaKerusuhan Etnis di Kalimantan Tengah,' Red Book, vol.1; Kaukus Kalimantan (Jakarta), letter sent to theCoordinating Minister for Political, Social and SecurityAffairs, signed by Let. Gen. (ret.) Z. A. Maulani and H. M.Hartani Mukti, SH, dated 11 March 2001. This version isalso supported by a non-Dayak member of the nationalparliament interviewed by ICG.

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were indeed placed in parts of the town but byDayaks, not Madurese, as a means of provokingDayaks to violence against Madurese.27

Madurese 'control' of Sampit, however, lastedonly two days. In reaction to the killings ofDayaks and the threatening attitudes of manyMadurese, thousands of Dayaks – and othernon-Madurese - fled from the town and spreadthe news about what had happened to thehinterland villages and to the townships alongthe road to Palangkaraya. On the evening of 20February, enraged Dayaks began to return toSampit with their hinterland supporters in aneffort to seize control of Sampit. While policeguarded the main roads, many of the Dayakscame along the River Mentaya and through thesurrounding jungle and side-roads. Within hoursMadurese homes were being set ablaze,Madurese were being killed and often beheaded,and thousands were fleeing into the jungle or tothe provincial capital, Palangkaraya, and otherhavens. On the night of 21 February, truck-loads of Dayak youths were seen paradingaround the town carrying the severed heads oftheir Madurese victims. With Dayak gangsblocking the roads out of Sampit, as many as10,000 Madurese had gone into the jungle,while about 23,000 eventually sought refuge atthe bupati’s (district head) office and in thepolice headquarters.28

The massacre in Sampit served as a signal toDayaks in surrounding regions to attackMadurese. On Sunday 25, a week after theoutbreak in Sampit, hinterland Dayaks broughtthe conflict to the provincial capital,Palangkaraya. Dayaks began burning Maduresehomes but there were few killings as mostMadurese had already fled.29 On the same day,118 Madurese were massacred at the small townof Parenggean when their police escort fled inthe face of a large Dayak mob.30 About 20,000Madurese were reported as trapped at the portof Samuda, about 40 km south of Sampit. Whena ship arrived to take them to Java, many of the 27 ICG interviews with prominent Madurese in Madura,Banjarmasin, and Jakarta, including a Madurese leaderfrom Sampit.28 Tempo, 11 March 2001, p.21.29 Kompas, 26 February 2001. Reportedly only sixMadurese and one Dayak were killed in Palangkaraya. RedBook, vol.1.30 John Aglionby, 'Denial follows Borneo massacre wake',The Guardian, 3 March 2001.

refugees were killed after getting lost in anunfamiliar town.31 In early March, largenumbers of refugees were waiting forevacuation at Pangkalanbun, Kualakapuas andMuarateweh.32

By the end of the first week of March virtuallyall the Madurese in the affected areas of theprovince around Sampit and Palangkaraya hadbeen evacuated. After a short lull, new violencebroke out as Dayaks from Sampit andPalangkaraya moved toward Kualakapuas in thesouth of the province where it was reported that18 had been killed in nearby townships.33 As aresult, within days, virtually all 5,000 of theMadurese in the area had evacuated toBanjarmasin, the capital of South Kalimantan,on their way back to Madura. Finally, at thebeginning of April violence broke out inPangkalanbun and its port, Kumai. Dayakleaders set a deadline for all Madurese to leavePangkalanbun but this time the governmentdrew the line and declared that it would protectremaining Madurese in the province. However,of the 45,000 Madurese in Pangkalanbun,20,000 had already left for East Java.34

By mid-April it was estimated that about108,000 refugees, the majority of whom wereMadurese, had fled from Central Kalimantan,most heading for Madura or other parts of EastJava.35 The influx of refugees imposed a majorstrain on that province’s resources.36 The stateshipping line, PELNI, mobilised six ships forthis task while other refugees were evacuated bynaval ships. Apart from those fleeing to Java,others went to South Kalimantan and othernearby provinces.

By early March the number killed in the regionhad reached 469, among whom 456 wereMadurese.37 According to the police, 1,192homes had been burnt and another 748damaged. Sixteen cars, 43 motorcycles and 114pedicabs had been destroyed.38 However, it wascommonly believed - without hard evidence -

31 ICG conversation in Samuda, April 2001.32 Kompas, 4 March 2001.33 Tempo, 1 April 2001, p. 35.34 Tempo, 15 April 2001, p. 3635 Jakarta Post, 21 April, 2001.36 Kompas, 8 March 2001.37 Tempo, 11 March 2001, p. 2138 Jakarta Post, 8 March 2001.

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that many more Madurese had been killed andtheir remains left in the jungle.39

The violence perpetrated on refugees did notend with their departure from CentralKalimantan. Not all refugees were Madurese.Intermarriage between Dayaks and Maduresewas by no means unknown and some Dayakhusbands chose to accompany their wives andother family to Surabaya and then to Madura.Two such Dayak men were the target ofrevenge killings in Ketapang, Madura, wherethey were not only murdered but, like manyMadurese in Central Kalimantan, had theirheads chopped off.40

C. EXPLAINING THE MASSACRE

As is common in virtually all cases of ethnicviolence, the perpetrators and the victims haveradically different explanations of why it tookplaced. One thing is clear, however.Antagonism between the Dayak and Maduresecommunities was deeply entrenched andrelations between the two communities wereextremely tense after the killings in KerengPangi in December.

Dayaks in general claim that the massacre was aspontaneous response of Dayaks to the events inSampit on 18-20 February when Sampit wasunder Madurese 'control'. Between 16 and 24Dayaks had been killed by Madurese in revengefor a Dayak attack on Madurese. No lessprovocative, if indeed true, was the display ofbanners and the shouting of slogans that weredeeply offensive to Dayaks. In fear of theirlives, thousands of Dayaks fled the town andspread the news in the hinterland where, it issaid, Dayak elders consulted ancestral spiritsand obtained approval for ‘war’ against theMadurese. After religious rituals in which theyreceived the spirits of past war commanders,enraged 'traditional' Dayaks, armed withmandau (a kind of sword) and tombak (a kind ofspear) set out to wrest Sampit from Maduresehands.41 It is claimed that the Dayaks who

39 A non-Dayak member of the national parliamentsuggested to ICG that the true figure was probably closerto 2000. A prominent Madurese leader from Sampit toldICG that 5000 had been killed.40 Kompas, 8 March 2001.41 Pandaya, ‘Dayak Katingan Community offer gesture ofpeace,’ Jakarta Post, 29 April 2001.

descended on Sampit were often in a trance.42

No distinction between men, women andchildren was made in their mission to purge thetown of Madurese. In smaller towns andvillages in the region, Madurese were evenmore defenceless against the Dayak onslaught.

The 'spontaneous' explanation has been doubtedby those who question the speed with whichrural Dayaks mobilised in response to the eventsin Sampit and suspect that the Dayak attack onthe Madurese was planned in advance.43 It hasbeen suggested that certain Dayak politicianshad been trying to garner political support bystirring up anti-Madurese sentiments. In mid-April, Professor H. KMA. Usop, a former rectorof the University of Palangkaraya, currentchairman of the Presidium of the LMMDD-KTand a defeated candidate representing the PDI-Pin the gubernatorial election of 2000, was calledto Jakarta for interrogation by the police andlater arrested in relation to allegations that hehad encouraged Dayak hatred of Madurese andthus indirectly instigated the rioting.44 On 12May he was placed under city arrest andallowed to return to Palangkaraya where hereceived a hero’s welcome.45

The allegations against Usop arose from theinterrogation of two Dayak officials in thedistrict government – Pedlik Asser and hisbrother-in-law, Lewis - who were identified asthe 'provocateurs' even before the massacre ofMadurese began on 20 February.46 According tothe police, Pedlik and Lewis had beenimplicated by the group of Dayaks who wereaccused of carrying out the initial murders offive Madurese on 18 February. The police claimthat Pedlik Asser and Lewis paid Rp. 20 million 42 Madurese informants noted, however, that the Dayaks -whether in a trance or not - were always able to distinguishbetween Madurese and non-Madurese. ICG interview.43 A similar question was raised after the massacre ofMadurese by Dayaks in the West Kalimantan district ofSambas in 1997. 'One of the mysteries of the killings inJanuary and February was how quickly the Dayaksmobilized and the coordination they displayed across alarge area with poor roads and few telephones'. RichardLloyd Parry, What Young Men Do. Granta. p. 107.44 Banjarmasin Post, 20 April 2001.45 Banjarmasin Post, 13 May 2001.46 Kompas, 20 February 2001, Jakarta Post, 20, 21February 2001. Pedlik Asser (often spelt as Fedlik Aser inthe press) was head of a division in the provincialDevelopment Planning Agency and Lewis was an officialof the Forestry Service.

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($2,000) to bring this group from their ownhome sub-district near the West Kalimantanborder to Sampit. After a two-day journey byriver, 38 hinterland Dayaks arrived in Sampitand, according to the police, were responsiblefor the murder of five Madurese. As relatedabove, they made their way to a Dayak house,which was soon surrounded by angry Madurese.On receiving a report that a house was underattack, the police intervened and rescued theresidents in the house – whom they weresurprised to find numbered as many as 38. Fortheir safety they were taken to Palangkarayawhere it was found that not only were theycarrying traditional Dayak arms but the armswere covered with fresh blood. The police hadstumbled by chance on the Dayaks who hadstarted the round of killings that eventuallydeveloped into a massacre after 20 February.47

Pedlik Asser, was the secretary of theLMMDD-KT branch in Sampit and associatedwith the provincial leader, Professor Usop,whose negative attitude towards Madurese heshared. According to the police, Pedlik was alsomotivated by his disappointment at beingpassed over in a reshuffle of top positions in thedistrict administration following the nation-wide implementation of regional autonomy inJanuary 2001. In the restructuring, the numberof positions in the top three civil-servicecategories was reduced from twenty to ten and,to make matters worse, the ten new appointeeswere all Muslims, while Pedlik and his brother-in-law are Christians. The ten new officialswere to be inaugurated on 19 February, the dayafter the riot broke out.48 It has also beenclaimed by the police that the detained Dayakswanted to take revenge on Madurese for thekilling of the Dayak – who also happened to bea Christian - at Kereng Pangi in December.49

Despite the resentment apparently felt by Pedlikat the exclusion of non-Muslims from topbureaucratic posts, it can be stated with fullconfidence that, among all the possible causesof the conflict in Sampit, the massacre was notprimarily motivated by religious sentiments.Anti-Madurese attitudes were common as muchamong Dayak Muslims - such as the prominentDayak leader, Professor Usop - as among 47 ICG interview with a senior police officer.48 Tempo, 11 March 2001.49 Gatra, 17 March 2001.

Dayak Christians. ICG's visits to areas ofSampit and Palangkaraya after the riotingrevealed many untouched mosques amidst theburnt remains of Madurese homes and otherbuildings associated with the Maduresecommunity. This should not be surprising as alarge proportion of the Dayak community isMuslim. In any case, the initial clash inDecember at a karaoke bar in a brothel area ofKereng Pangi seems an unlikely setting for thebeginning of a religious dispute.

The allegations against Pedlik Asser and Lewis,however, have yet to be proven in court but, iftrue, show that certain Dayak leaders sponsoredviolence against Madurese. However, it is notobvious that they had in mind the massacre thatactually occurred and the eventual ethniccleansing of the entire province. So far noexplanation has been given of the motive for thekilling of the five Madurese in the early hoursof 18 February. Were they personal enemies ofcertain Dayak leaders or were they just chosenat random – as a senior police officer claimed toICG - in order to create an upheaval? And if thegoal was to create an upheaval, it seems quitelikely that the purpose was to achieve somelocal political goal - such as the embarrassmentof the district or even provincial politicalleadership - rather than to drive all theMadurese out of the entire province. A plannedlimited commotion may have run out of controlwith consequences that none of the'provocateurs' had imagined.

Whether or not Usop or other Dayak leaders infact instigated the rioting, it is clear that mostdid nothing to prevent the massacre after it hadcommenced. ICG interviews with Dayakleaders reveal no regret about what happened.Whether initially planned as 'ethnic cleansing'or not, many Dayak leaders seem to havewelcomed the opportunity to rid the province ofits Madurese. Madurese were told that they hadno choice but to leave the province as Dayakleaders claimed that they could no longercontrol the enraged Dayak masses. It is true thatsome prominent Dayak leaders later supportedgovernment attempts to protect Madureserefugees but only on condition that theMadurese would be evacuated from theprovince.

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III. THE PERFORMANCE OF THESECURITY FORCES

Since 1999 the police have been entrusted withinternal security while the army and the otherbranches of the military are responsible fordefence.50 Nevertheless, the police are permittedto call on the military for assistance when theyare unable to cope alone with a challenge. Inthat case army troops are transferred to thecommand of the local police chief. However,several observers have noted that the police areoften reluctant to call on the army for assistancebecause this would imply that the police lackthe ability to handle the situation.51 On the otherhand, police suggest that the military issometimes slow to respond to police requestsfor assistance in order to highlight the failure ofthe police.52 In Central Kalimantan, the policeproved incapable of preventing the Sampit riotfrom developing into a massacre andreinforcements from the army were slow, forwhatever reason, in responding.

In December the police had succeeded incontaining the violence in Kereng Pangi. Policereinforcements were sent to the area quickly anda company-sized army unit (about 100 men)arrived three days after the outbreak.53 Indealing with this riot the police had adopted apersuasive approach. Fearing that the shootingof Dayak rioters would trigger uncontrollableviolence, the police concentrated on preventingthe spread of the rioting while 'sweeping' thearea to collect 'sharp weapons'. Having failed tocapture the three Madurese who had murderedthe Dayak, the police wanted to avoidprovoking the Dayaks further by arrestingDayak rioters.54

50 Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control. ICGAsia Report No.9, Jakarta/Brussels, 5 September 2000. p.4.51 ICG interviews in Palangkaraya. There appears to belittle mutual respect between the police and the army inCentral Kalimantan. In a conversation with ICG, a middle-ranking police officer in Palangkaraya claimed not onlywas the army behind the ethnic conflict in CentralKalimantan but was responsible for ethnic and religiousconflict throughout Indonesia in order to create conditionsfavourable for the military's return to political power.52 ICG interview with police officer.53 Banjarmasin Post, 19 December 2000.54 ICG interview with police officer.

The police response to the outbreak in Sampit -a much larger town than the township of KerengPangi - was far less effective. Police officersthemselves admit that their intelligence inregard to the Dayak community was poor.Police intelligence officers are mainly fromoutside Kalimantan, especially from Java, andlack knowledge of Dayak languages and Dayaksociety. Caught unprepared, they were unable toprevent the series of killings on 18 Februarythat set the scene for the later massacre.However, as described above, the police moreor less inadvertently – 'with God’s help' as oneofficer put it - arrested the 38 Dayaks whoappeared to have been responsible for thekilling of five Madurese. They were then takento Palangkaraya where Dayak demonstrators ledby Professor Usop of the LMMDD-KTdemanded their release. Eventually, in theabsence of the provincial police chief who wasstill in Sampit, his deputy and the provincialgovernment secretary were taken hostage andforced to permit the conditional release of thedetainees who soon absconded.55 AlthoughDayaks claimed that the police had seizedweapons from Dayaks while taking no actionagainst Madurese,56 in fact about 18 Maduresewere arrested, including one who is still beingdetained in connection with the murder ofDayaks on 18 February.57

In Sampit the police soon lost control as Dayakstook over the town. Initially only 300 policewere stationed in Sampit and most were spreadout in the town’s twenty police posts.58 Early inthe week, even after the arrival orreinforcements, the provincial police chief,Brig. Gen. Bambang Pranoto, admitted that the900 men under his command were hopelesslyoutnumbered by the thousands of Dayaks whohad come into the town from the hinterland.59

Many observers noted that the security forces

55 ICG interview with police officer.56 Statement issued by the Presidium of the LMMDD-KTon 21 February 2001.57 ICG Interview with a senior police officer and aMadurese leader from Sampit. The Madurese detained inconnection with the murder of Dayaks is a relative of thefamily killed in the initial Dayak attack.58 Police source.59 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, 'Savage Attacks TerrorizeMigrants on Borneo', Washington Post, 23 February 2001;Kompas, 23 February 2001.

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did nothing to stop the violence.60 Houses werebeing burnt without obstruction and truckloadsof armed Dayaks were permitted to passthrough police checkpoints while Dayakroadblocks were not dismantled. Although anight curfew had been imposed, no steps weretaken to enforce it. Instead of attempting to stopthe violence, during the first few days the policechief concentrated on protecting governmentbuildings where some 13,000 Madurese weretaking refuge. The police were also occupied inrescuing Madurese in isolated villages outsideSampit.61

Reinforcements were slow in coming fromBanjarmasin and Jakarta. On 21 February acompany (120 men) of the police paramilitaryforce, the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) already inSampit was joined by three more companieswhile one more company was sent toPalangkaraya.62 By 22 February the totalstrength of the security forces in Sampit wasnine companies (1,080 men) including two fromthe army.63 Major reinforcements seem to havearrived only in the second week when four armybattalions and one Brimob battalion were sent toCentral Kalimantan.64 According to theIndonesian National Military (TNI) spokesman,Air Vice Marshal Graito Usodo, it had beenimpossible to transport troops quickly to Sampitbecause the air force had only a few Herculestransport aircraft in service.65

Outside Sampit the police performance inprotecting Madurese was also weak. As alreadynoted, on Sunday 25, at the small town ofParenggean, a small contingent of about a dozen 60 The belief that Dayak warriors possess magical powersis widespread in Kalimantan, not only among Dayaks. It isnot unlikely that many ordinary police feared ‘flyingmandau’ and believed that some Dayaks were invulnerableto bullets. One non-Dayak politician explained to ICG howpolice had been unable to protect Madurese because theDayaks sent their mandau independently to behead theirenemies. A police officer admitted to ICG that his menwere sometimes afraid to go into dark areas of Sampit atnight.61 ICG interview with senior police officer.62 Jakarta Post, 22 February 2001, Tempo, 4 March 2001,p. 2763 Kompas, 23 February 2001, Tempo, 11 March 2001.p.20.64 Jakarta Post, 2 March, 2001. According to a militarysource, two of the army battalions were from Java, onefrom Banjarmasin and one already in Palangkaraya.65 Kompas, 2 March 2001.

police escorting a convoy of Madurese refugeesran for their lives when confronted by an armedDayak mob who then massacred 118 refugees.66

The capacity of the police to contain theviolence was clearly limited. According to thenational police chief, General SurojoBimantoro, at the time of the outbreak ofviolence in Sampit, the total number of policestationed throughout the entire province wasonly 3000.67 In the Kotawaringin Timor district- which itself is larger than Central Java - mostof the police are spread out in small postsconsisting of only 5-6 men in each.68 The policewere hampered in their efforts to obtainintelligence on Dayak movements and toprevent Dayaks coming to Sampit by the Dayakpreference to travel via forest trails rather thanalong the main roads. The security forces alsoseemed reluctant to take firm action againstrioting mobs. Both police and army officersregularly claim that they are reluctant to shooton crowds for fear of being accused of humanrights abuse or provoking angry mobs to evengreater violence.69 Nevertheless, police fired onrioters on several occasions, including inPalangkaraya where five were shot dead whilelooting.70

Despite the failure to prevent the massacre inSampit, the police arrested a large number ofDayaks accused of involvement in the rioting.At the beginning of March, 196 had beendetained.71 By early May this number hadgrown to 233 and 98 cases had been sent to theAttorney-General's office for prosecution.72 InMarch Dayak demonstrators had demanded therelease of 84 Dayaks who, according to theprovincial police chief, had been responsible for'murder and arson' but this time they were not

66 AFP, 28 February 2001.67 Kompas, 4 March 2001.68 Jawa Pos, 4 March 2001.69 ICG conversations with army and police officers.70 Media Indonesia, 2 March 2001. Police reluctance tofire on Dayaks was indicated by resistance to theprovincial police chief’s order to shoot rioters on sight.The local police chief in Kualakapuas admitted that he hadbeen reprimanded by the national police chief for failing toshoot. He reportedly said ‘I was surprised that I alwaysmissed. I was trained to shoot in the United States. But wemanaged to arrest five of them’. Jakarta Post, 23 March2001; Kompas 27 March 2001.71 Media Indonesia, 2 March 2001.72 Tempo, 6 May 2001.

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freed.73 A senior police officer explained to ICGthat it was very difficult to charge rioters onmurder charges unless the killing was actuallywitnessed by the police. Usually the police onlyfound the often headless bodies.74 Most of thedetainees were arrested for carrying weapons.

Members of the security forces were alsoaccused of exploiting the desperation ofMadurese refugees to extort money. Refugeescomplained that to take a truck from Sampit tothe port at Samuda 40 km away they had to payRp. 1.5 million ($150) per truck to the police.Payments also had to be made to leave refugeecamps and again to enter the harbour area.Police personnel also offered to purchase carsand motorbikes from fleeing refugees atdiscount prices. One Madurese businessmansold a late-model jeep with a market value ofRp. 200 million ($20,000) for only Rp. 10million ($1,000).75

The performance of the security forces reachedits nadir on 27 February when the police andarmy exchanged fire at the Sampit port. Anarmy battalion was entrusted with the securityof the port while a joint force - includingmembers of the police, the army and the Sampitcivil government - was in charge of transportingrefugees to the port. Although the ship wasalready full, a private jeep carrying a dozen orso refugees under the protection of members ofBrimob was stopped by the army guards. Asone refugee said, 'We had already paid thepolice officers to be allowed to board the ship,even though it looked overloaded, but thesoldiers wouldn't let us on'. Having been sentback by the military, the Brimob membersmobilised their colleagues to launch an attackon the soldiers guarding the ship. Withinminutes the army and police were shooting ateach other. Shots were still being exchangedlater in the afternoon. One soldier died as aresult of the shooting and three soldiers andthree police were seriously wounded. Oneunidentified man, probably a refugee, was alsokilled.76

73 Banjarmasin Post, 12 March 2001.74 ICG interview with senior police officer.75 Tempo, 11 March 2000, p. 28, Kompas, 25 February2001.76 Kompas, Jakarta Post, 28 February 2001, Kompas 1March 2001, Tempo 11 March 2001, p.25. A senior policeofficer claimed to ICG that the Brimob’s motives were

To prevent further fighting between the policeand the army, the two forces were immediatelyredeployed. The army was put in charge ofPalangkaraya and the police in charge ofSampit.77

The Brimob attracted further criticism on 8March when President Abdurrahman visitedPalangkaraya. The president was met bydemonstrators, calling themselves the Anti-Madura Movement, who insisted that Maduresenot be permitted to return to Central Kalimantanunless, as one of their banners put it, 'they arecapable of giving up their culture of violence'.78

After the president's departure thedemonstrators continued to listen to speechesbut some threw bottles and pushing and shovingoccurred between the police and demonstrators.Suddenly a truck full of Brimob personnelarrived on the scene and opened fire, killingfour demonstrators. In retaliation the crowdattacked the police and one local Brimobpoliceman was killed and two others seriouslyinjured.79 The Brimob troops responsible for theshooting were reinforcements from Jakarta.Observers at the scene claim that they sawnothing that could justify resort to shootingalthough some stones may have been thrown80

and the police offered no explanation for the useof live rather than rubber bullets. The next dayan estimated 6,000 demonstrators remained inthe streets, some wielding swords. The car ofthe provincial police chief and a Brimob vehiclewere burnt and the police and their familieswere forced to take refuge in the heavilyguarded police headquarters.81

In April Brimob troops were again involved inwhat seemed to be excessive violence. Brimobforces were deployed to prevent Dayaks fromSampit going to Pangkalanbun to drive outMadurese. In one incident on 6 April threeBrimob personnel and a Dayak were killed nearthe 41km post along the road from Sampit to humanitarian as one of the refugees had been badlywounded by a spear and needed early evacuation.77 Jakarta Post, 2 March 2001.78 Kompas, 9 March 2001.79 'Kronologis Tragedi Bundaran Besar, Kamis, 8 Maret2001.’ Statement prepared by Rahmadi G. Lentam,Lembaga Advokasi Hukum and HAM, Palangkaraya. 12March 2001.80 ICG interviews in Palangkaraya.81 Kompas, 9, 10 March 2001.

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Pangkalanbun. Later in the day, Brimob forcesreturned to the area where they beat up residentsand burnt houses in a revenge attack which leftat least two Dayaks dead. Even Dayakpassengers on passing buses were beaten.Acknowledging that the troops had become'emotional', the provincial police chief promisedto have them withdrawn from the area.82

The performance of the security forces cameunder sharp criticism. The Jakarta human rightsactivist, Munir, claimed that the Al-MiftahFoundation, a Madura-based Islamicorganization with a branch at Sampit, hadreported in January to the president, the policeand members of the DPR that the Madurese inSampit were in danger but no preventive actionhad been taken.83 Former commander of thearmed forces, General Wiranto, who happenedto be visiting Palangkaraya for a sports meeting,also criticized the security forces for failing toisolate the conflict quickly.84 A Westerndiplomat pointed to deeper causes of the poorperformance. According to him, 'The best menare not sent there because it is viewed as a semi-retirement post. It is where they can makemoney from illegal logging, gambling andprostitution rackets. Internal security is the lastthing on their mind'.85

Nevertheless, despite their failure in Sampit, thesecurity forces drew some lessons from thatexperience. Although Dayak attacks on otherconcentrations of Madurese at Kualakapuas andPangkalanbun resulted in some Madurese beingkilled and houses burned, the spread of massiveviolence was prevented and members of theMadurese community were at least evacuatedunder police protection in a relatively orderlymanner.

IV. EVACUATION: TEMPORARY ORPERMANENT?

Government at the provincial level inPalangkaraya and the district level in Sampit islargely dominated by Dayaks. The provincialgovernor and most of his senior staff are of 82 Kalteng Pos, 7, 9 April 2001.83 Tempo, 11 March 2001, p. 24.84 Media Indonesia, 25 February 2001.85 Derwin Pereira, 'Armed forces "misread" Kalimantanclashes', Straits Times (Singapore), 5 March 2001.

Dayak or part-Dayak descent while in Sampitthe bupati is of mixed Javanese and Dayakdescent (although his political enemies claim hehas Madurese blood). Only three members ofthe provincial parliament, four of theKotarwaringin Timur district parliament andtwo of the Palangkaraya city parliament wereMadurese.

The bupati of Kotawaringin Timor, Wahyudi K.Anwar, had successfully mobilised the supportof local community and religious leaders toprevent the spread of the riot at Kereng Pangi inDecember and initially attempted to do the samething in Sampit in February. But the influx intoSampit from the hinterland of thousands ofDayaks determined to take revenge on theMadurese meant that established urban Dayakleaders could exercise little restraininginfluence, even if they had been so inclined.

As the conflict spread, the provincialgovernment decided that all Madurese in theprovince should be evacuated.86 In a statementon 2 March, the provincial governor, AsmawiAgani, said that the evacuation policy wasadopted after consulting community leaders andwas intended to avoid more casualties. Heasserted that the policy was only 'temporary'and declared that Central Kalimantan 'continuesto be open and ready to accept all ethnic groupswho can prove their capacity to live in harmonyand peace with local citizens'.87 In support ofthis policy, he issued an instruction to districtheads to take action to protect the property ofrefugees and to prevent the transfer ofownership of immovable property.88 Theprevious day, the provincial DPRD rejected aproposal that a state of civil emergency bedeclared in the province on the ground thatsecurity had been largely brought undercontrol.89

The central government had little choice but toendorse the provincial government's policy 86 This decision is contained in a letter dated 23 Februaryand signed by the Deputy Governor, Nahson Taway.Jakarta Post, 3 March 2001.87 Statement by the Governor of Central Kalimantanentitled 'Kebijaksanaan Pemerintah Propinsi KalimantanTengah dalam Penyelesaian Pertikaian Antar Etnis diKalimantan Tengah’, 2 March 2001. Red Book, vol 1.88 Kompas, 3 March 2001.89 Pernyataan Sikap Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat DaerahPropinsi Kalimantan Tengah. Red Book, vol.1.

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although the Minister of Internal Affairs,Surjadi Sudirdja, reasserted the principle thatany Indonesian could live anywhere inIndonesia.90 However, the Co-ordinatingMinister for Political, Social and SecurityAffairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, took theview that the return of Madurese refugees toCentral Kalimantan should not take placehurriedly but would depend on local securityconditions.91 Neither the President nor the VicePresident questioned the policy publicly.

The policy was rejected by many otherIndonesians who regarded it as a form of 'ethniccleansing'. The governor of South Kalimantan,Sjahriel Darham, said that the Madurese shouldbe allowed to remain in Kalimantan 'under tightsecurity'. This view was supported by MohamadNoer, a Madurese and former governor of EastJava.92 Several prominent Madurese, includingMohamad Noer, issued a statement on 28February in which they 'hoped that the policywould not be continued and that efforts wouldbe made to give them the opportunity to "livetogether" as they had for dozens of yearsbefore.'93

The Central Kalimantan rioting had spread afterPresident Abdurrahman Wahid had leftIndonesia on a visit to the Middle East andNorthern Africa. Despite calls that he shouldinterrupt his journey to deal with the Sampitcrisis, he remained abroad until early March.The vice president, Megawati Soekarnoputri,had visited Palangkaraya on 1 March but nonew initiatives had followed her visit.

The president himself made a short visit toCentral Kalimantan on 8 March where heclaimed that the rioting had been caused by a'small number of Dayaks' and announced fivemeasures intended to ameliorate some of theDayak grievances. The five measures were:

! Return of 'sacred land' to the Dayaks.! Rehabilitation of public facilities, especially

for education and health.

90 Jakarta Post, 4 March 2001.91 Bernas, 6 March 2001.92 Jakarta Post, 4 March 2001.93 Pernyataan Kebulatan Tekad Keluarga BesarMasyarakat Madura, 28 February 2001. Red Book, vol.1.

! Provision of scholarships to Dayak children– 100 from primary to high school, and 100for university.

! Provision of rice to victims of the riots.! Construction of a public meeting hall.94

As noted above, his promises failed to satisfymany Dayak leaders and was followed by ademonstration opposing the return of Madureserefugees.

Two days later he visited refugees in Madura.He promised to guarantee the safety of thosewho returned to Kalimantan and offeredresettlement on 'an island' to those who wereunwilling to return. However, he said that theMinister of Forestry would be making aninventory of 'traditional land considered assacred' by Dayaks and that migrants occupyingsuch land would be offered new landelsewhere.95 He also attempted to reassure theMadurese refugees who had fled in fear of theirlives only a week or two previously that 'It's nottrue if Dayaks are said to hate the Maduresepeople … They even called Madurese migrantsthe promoters of development out there'.96 TheMadurese were no more impressed with hispromises than were the Dayaks in Palangkaraya.

The president's assessment of the situation inCentral Kalimantan was treated virtuallyuniversally as out of touch with reality.Although government leaders continued todescribe the evacuation as 'temporary' and manyMadurese themselves expressed the hope thatthey would soon be able to return, in factsuccessful ethnic cleansing had taken place.Like the Madurese refugees still languishing inrefugee camps in West Kalimantan two yearsafter the 1999 massacre in Sambas, most ofCentral Kalimantan's Madurese cannot expectan early return 'home'.

In an attempt to promote reconciliation betweenthe two communities, the central governmentsponsored a peace meeting in Jakarta on 21-22March. The meeting was attended by 136representatives from Central Kalimantan, theother three Kalimantan provinces and Maduresefrom East Java. The participants agreed to abroad statement that recognised the rights of 94 Kompas, 9 March 2001.95 Kompas, 11 March, 2001.96 Jakarta Post 11 March 2001.

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Indonesians to live anywhere in their countryalthough it also stated that the return ofMadurese to Central Kalimantan could onlytake place gradually after proper preparation.97

The atmosphere of the meeting, however, wasspoilt the previous day during a preliminarymeeting with the Minister of Internal Affairswhen a Madurese delegate drew a pistol andthreatened the prominent Dayak leader,Professor Usop. Usop then withdrew from themeeting and 32 Dayak representatives cancelledtheir flight to Jakarta.98 At the end of themeeting, the peace agreement was presented tothe Vice President, Megawati Soekarnoputriwho expressed the hope that such a tragedywould not be repeated. Meanwhile, as thedelegates gathered in Jakarta, Dayaks in CentralKalimantan were burning the homes of fleeingMadurese in the southern district ofKualakapuas.

By May 2001 Madurese remained only inPangkalanbun where the local governmentsponsored a mixed Muslim and traditionalDayak ceremony to ‘ward off disaster’ (tolakbala). Not only did Dayaks participate but alsoMalays and representatives of the Maduresecommunity.99 In other parts of CentralKalimantan, Dayaks also carried out peacerituals but without the presence of Madurese.

After a series of district congresses, aKalimantan People’s Congress was held inPalangkaraya on 4-7 June. Although dominatedby Dayaks the 750 participants includedrepresentatives of the migrant communitiesexcept the Madurese. A central issue subjectedto heated debate at the congress was whetherMadurese should be allowed to return toMadura. As Professor Usop, one of the drivingforces behind the congress, explained, theparticipants were divided between ‘hardliners’and ‘softliners’. The hardliners simply rejectedthe return of Madurese while the softliners wereprepared to accept them provided certain 97 Tekad Damai Anak Bangsa di Bumi Kalimantan, 22March 2001.98 Gatra, 31 March 2001.99 Banjarmasin Post, 14 May 2001. In response to theconflict in Central Kalimantan, government-sponsoredpeace pacts were signed by Dayak, Madurese and otherethnic groups in South Kalimantan (Jakarta Post, 30 March2001), the Ketapang district in West Kalimantan borderingCentral Kalimantan (Kompas, 22 March 2001) and EastKalimantan (Kompas, 8 March 2001).

conditions were met. In the end what Usopcalled the ‘middle road’ was adopted. Prioritywould be given to Madurese with family ties toDayaks, those who had already lived in CentralKalimantan for at least ten years, and those withpermanent jobs and property in the province.But the concessions had a catch. Maduresewould also be required to apologise to theDayaks for the recent ethnic conflict and pay afine according to Dayak tradition.100

It seems unlikely that many Madurese wouldaccept the Dayak conditions, particularly therequirement that they apologise for a massacrein which the Madurese were the main victims.Moderate Madurese have agreed that theirreturn would be selective and gradual but thehostility expressed by Dayak ‘hardliners’suggested that Madurese returnees would befacing considerable risks.

V. THE ORIGINS OF DAYAKRESENTMENT

Ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan has takenplace against a background of dislocation andmarginalisation of the Dayak community.Especially during the three decades of PresidentSoeharto's military-backed New Order, Dayaksincreasingly found themselves losing theirability to control their own lives. A huge waveof immigration pushed Dayaks aside in theirown homeland while the booming loggingindustry forced forest-dwelling Dayaks either tomove or adopt new life-styles. At the sametime, Dayak political leadership was displacedby Javanese administrators appointed by Jakartaand traditional authority in the Dayakcommunity was undermined by the centralgovernment's quest for uniformity ingovernmental structures throughout the nation.Dayaks culture was considered 'backward' and,as a final insult, traditional Dayak religion wasclassified as a form of Hinduism.

A. MIGRATION

Kalimantan has long attracted migrants who setup trading posts and towns along its coastalregions. In response the original Dayakpopulation has gradually retreated into the

100 Kompas, Harian Tempo, 8 June 2001.

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interior. Until the end of the 1970s CentralKalimantan continued to have anoverwhelmingly Dayak population but rapidgovernment-sponsored migration of 'outsiders'has radically changed the composition of itspeople. Historically the Dayaks have notresisted the intrusion of 'outsiders' but the hugeinflux in recent years has threatened to reducethe Dayaks to a deprived minority in their ownland.

According to the 2000 census, CentralKalimantan has a population of only 1.8million, making it one of Indonesia’s smallest –but fastest growing – provinces. 101 Indeed, theprovince’s population has almost doubled in thelast 20 years.102

The very rapid growth of Central Kalimantan,like the other three Kalimantan provinces, hasbeen due to the migration of peoples from otherparts of Indonesia. A major part of this growthhas been a result of the government'stransmigration scheme which brought settlersfrom 'overcrowded' Java, Madura, Bali andelsewhere to the 'underpopulated' outer islandswhere they were provided with land to growrice and various commercial crops.Government-sponsored transmigration has beenaccompanied by 'spontaneous' voluntarymigration as people in Java and elsewhere heardabout opportunities in Kalimantan. In manycases 'spontaneous' migrants joined familymembers or neighbours who had already joinedofficial transmigration projects. The numbers inmigrant communities expanded further as theoriginal transmigrants had children andeventually grandchildren in their new homeregions.

Government transmigration had begun at thebeginning of the 1900s when Indonesia was stillunder Dutch colonial rule. Initiallytransmigrants were sent to agricultural projectsin Sumatra. It was only after independence thatthe new Indonesian government began to openprojects for transmigrants in Kalimantan. Apartfrom relieving population pressure in Java, theprogram was based on the nationalist belief thatIndonesians shared a common sense of identity

101 Jakarta Post, 4 January 2001.102 Kompas, 5 January 2001. Over the two decades thepopulation increased from 954,000 to 1,802,000.

and that national unity would be strengthenedby the mixing of ethnic groups.

The numbers sent to Kalimantan were relativelysmall before the establishment of the military-dominated Soeharto government in 1966-7.Between 1953 and 1968 only 42,000transmigrants were placed in agriculturalprojects throughout Kalimantan, with onlyabout 3,500 transmigrants arriving in CentralKalimantan by 1968. Under the Soehartogovernment transmigration increasedsubstantially. Between 1971 and 1980,Kalimantan received more than 100,000transmigrants with about 13,000 going toCentral Kalimantan. Despite the growth innumbers, by 1980 government-sponsoredtransmigrants made up only two per cent of thetotal Kalimantan population and only one percent of Central Kalimantan's population.103

It was only after 1980 that the nationaltransmigration program was expanded far morerapidly, not only in Kalimantan but in otherareas outside Java. In each of the two decadesafter 1979 the number of transmigrants placedin Central Kalimantan reached almost 180,000.By the time that the transmigration program wasabandoned in 2000, transmigrants amounted toabout 21 per cent of Central Kalimantan'spopulation. To see the full impact of thismigration it is also necessary to add in thechildren and grandchildren of the earliergenerations of transmigrants as well as'spontaneous' migrants. The overwhelmingmajority of the transmigrants were placed inthree districts - 43 per cent in Kapuas, 24 percent in Kotawaringin Barat and 22 per cent inKotawaringin Timor.104

Nothing better illustrates the Soehartogovernment's insensitivity to the potential socialconsequences of mass migration than thepresident's grandiose scheme to open a giganticagricultural project on one million hectares ofpeat land in Central Kalimantan. Aiming toincrease food production to meet the needs ofan expanding national population, the projectwas launched in 1996 and expected to becompleted by 2002. According to the plan, rice 103 Indonesia: The Transmigration Project in Perspective,Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1988. P.75 and datafrom Dinas Transmigrasi, Palangkaraya.104 Data obtained from Dinas Transmigrasi, Palangkaraya.

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and other crops would be grown by 316,000families (some 1.7 million people) who wouldbe placed in the project over five years105 –completely swamping the indigenouspopulation. Indeed the planned newtransmigrant population would have almostequalled the whole province's population at thattime,106 and turned the Dayaks into a minoritycommunity. Fortunately the whole schemecollapsed in the wake of the East Asianeconomic crisis of 1997 and now caters to only15,000 families farming 35,000 of the onemillion hectares.107

Available census statistics do not indicate theplace of origin of migrants who have come toCentral Kalimantan during the last decade. Themost recent data comes from the populationcensus of 1990, which recorded 250,000 peopleliving in Central Kalimantan who hadpreviously lived outside the province. Of these,60 per cent had come from Java and 34 per centfrom other Kalimantan provinces. BecauseMadura is administratively part of East Java, theMadurese are counted as coming from Java.According to transmigration officials, Maduresedo not make up an especially large proportionof transmigrants. However, one official toldICG that Madurese have a stronger tendencythan others to leave transmigration sites to workon plantations and in logging, as well as inlower-class urban occupations in markets, landand river transport, petty commerce and as portlabourers. However, Madurese are not the onlymigrants involved in these occupations. SomeMadurese have also become prominent inbusiness and own timber companies, petrolstations, hotels, retail shops, and sea and landtransport companies108 but Madurese were byno means dominant in the commercial sector,except in the town of Sampit.

Madurese are usually estimated to have madeup about 120-130,000 - or about 6-7 per cent ofthe total population of Kalimantan - before therecent exodus.

105 Kompas, 24 April 2001.106 Kompas, 13 February 1997.107 Information provided to ICG by an official at the DinasTransmigrasi, Palangkaraya.108 Kompas, 19 March 2001.

B. LOSS OF LAND

The influx of 'outsiders' has resulted in Dayaksbeing forced to leave land that they previouslyoccupied and used. In the past most Dayakslived in traditional communities in the rainforests where they practised shifting cultivationand traded in forest products.The fundamental Indonesian law on land tenureis the Basic Agrarian Law No. 5, adopted in1960 during the rule of President Soekarno.109

The main objective of the law was to providefor land reform by limiting the size of peasantholdings, especially in Java where thecommunist party was growing in strength.However the law also contains provisionsdealing with customary land rights. Article 3states clearly that customary land tenure onlyapplies to the extent that it does not conflictwith 'national and State interests, based onnational unity'. In the official explanationattached to the law (Part A.II.3) it is stated thatcustomary communities will be consultedbefore rights to use land are granted but thatsuch communities are not permitted 'to obstructthe granting of usage rights' when such grants'are truly necessary for broader interests'. Theexplanation specifically mentions efforts bycustomary communities 'to reject the large-scaleand orderly opening of forests to implementlarge projects in the context of increasing foodproduction and migration'. The law, in Article19, also provides for land registration and theprovision of land titles - a concept that cannoteasily be adapted to customary rights overforests.

After Soeharto’s New Order came to power newlaws were adopted which provided thegovernment with legal powers to allocate landfor the forestry and mining industries. TheBasic Forestry Law of 1967 states explicitly thatcustomary rights 'to obtain benefits from theforests' are only recognized to the extent thatthey 'do not disturb the achievement of the

109 Undang-Undang No.5 Tahun 1960 tentang PeraturanDasar Pokok-Pokok Agraria. See also Stefanus Masiun,'National Frameworks Affecting Adat Governance inIndonesia, and Dayak NGO Responses', in Janis B. Alcornand Antoinette G. Royo, eds., Indigenous SocialMovements and Ecological Resilience: Lessons from theDayak of Indonesia. Washington, DC: BiodiversitySupport Program, 2000.

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purposes intended by this law'.110 Similarly, theMining Law of 1968 gave the governmentpower to allocate customary and other land formining. With the passage of these laws, no legalbarriers remained to prevent the governmentfrom opening transmigration projects andallocating forestry and mining concessions inareas occupied by Dayaks.

The rapid destruction of Kalimantan's forests bythe holders of logging concessions - many ofthem either members of Soeharto's family, hisbusiness associates or corporations linked to themilitary - has been a fundamental cause ofDayak concern. Although 66.9 per cent ofCentral Kalimantan was officially classified asforest in 1999, the proportion has declinedrapidly from 84 per cent in the mid-1970s.However, not all the ‘official forest’ is stillforest due in part to forest fires and illegallogging as shown by satellite imagery thatestimated that natural cover had been reduced to56 per cent by 1999.111 In recent years anincreasing amount of forest land has beenconverted to oil palm plantations.

The destruction of the forest has not beencaused by the big logging companies alone.Illegal logging is rife in Central Kalimantan –usually protected by elements in the police andthe military. Illegal logging had become sowidespread in the Kotawaringin Timor districtthat the local government, incapable ofpreventing it, issued a regulation in June 2000which in effect legalised illegal logging bytaxing it.112 According to one source, many ofthe illegal loggers were Madurese whosebehaviour antagonised local Dayaks. Others saythat the recognition of illegal logging led toincreased rivalry between Madurese and Dayakswho were also involved in the illegal trade. It isnot impossible that these factors contributed tothe rising tension in Sampit that broke out earlythe next year. Ultimately, however, the 110 Undang-undang No 5 tahun 1967 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan Pokok Kehutanan, Article 17.111 See ‘Peta Penutupan Lahan Propinsi KalimantanTengah’ on the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops’websitehttp://mofrinet.cbn.net.id/e_informasi_enfi/GIS/vegetasi.htm112 Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Kotawaringin Timur,Nombor 14 Tahun 2000 tentang retribusi Industri KayuBulat, Kayu Gergajian, Kaya Olahan dan Peredaran HasilHutan serta Pangganti Nilai Tegakan, 21 June 2000.

regulation was disallowed by the centralgovernment as it conflicted with national laws.

Dayaks have usually not openly resisted thecutting down of the forest and the conversion ofland to transmigration sites, plantations andmines. Provided that they are consulted andgiven some compensation, they tend to seek thepath of least resistance by either moving deeperinto the forest or continuing to grow food cropson the edge of the concessions. Some of theconcession holders allow local Dayaks tocontinue to collect rattan and other forestproducts. One of the most common causes ofconflict occurs when Dayaks fell a tree or twofor their own use and are then charged withtheft of timber, which they consider is rightfullytheirs. Elite Dayaks interviewed by ICG inPalangkaraya seemed quite relaxed about theexpansion of the logging industry, whichprovides revenue for the provincial governmentand possibly payments to individual Dayakpoliticians. On the other hand, an interior Dayakexpressed deep anger at the nonchalance ofurban Dayaks. 'Animals are protected, but notpeople', he complained.113

A common grievance among urban Dayaks isnot that the forest has been cut down but thatthe profits have flowed largely to Jakartawithout benefiting the local people. Indeedmuch of the labour on logging concessionsconsists of members of the migrantcommunities. This is partly a result, however, ofa disinclination on the part of Dayaks to work inthese industries.

C. EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION

Official Indonesian statistics do not providedata on the participation of ethnic groups inemployment and education. In CentralKalimantan, it is generally accepted that non-Dayak communities are predominant in townswhile Dayaks are predominant in the hinterland.It can be assumed, therefore, that Dayaks areheavily concentrated in the 55 per cent of thework force that is employed in the categorycovering agriculture, forestry, hunting andfishing. On the other hand, Dayaks are poorlyrepresented among those with highereducational qualifications. In CentralKalimantan, 63 per cent of the work force does 113 ICG interviews in Palangkaraya.

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not have post-primary-school qualifications and80 per cent lack qualifications beyond thejunior-high-school level.114 Nevertheless, itshould be noted that Dayaks are among thosewho have benefited from the expansion oftertiary education and a small but growingDayak middle class is now employed inadministrative positions in local government.

D. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

During the New Order period, the Dayakmajority felt largely excluded from thegovernment. It was only during the last fewyears of the Soeharto regime that more Dayakswere appointed to positions in localgovernment. In any case, civilian government inthe provinces under the New Order was usuallyovershadowed by the military, in which Dayakswere rarely found at higher levels. At thepresent time, however, Dayaks dominate localpolitics and the Dayak community can nolonger complain that it is under-represented.

After independence Kalimantan wasadministered as a single province, but on 1January 1957 it was divided into West, Southand East Kalimantan. The plan to include thearea that is now Central Kalimantan as part ofSouth Kalimantan led to Dayak protests towhich the government responded a few monthslater by forming Indonesia’s only Dayak-majority province of Central Kalimantan on 23May 1957.

Dayaks were initially well represented in theprovincial leadership. The first governor, RTAMilono, was a Javanese but he was succeededby a Dayak, Tjilik Riwut, who had beenprominent in Indonesia's nationalist struggle forindependence. Tjilik Riwut, however, had beenclose to President Soekarno and was replaced in1967 by the new Soeharto regime. Althoughgovernors were formally elected by theprovincial parliament during the New Order, inreality they were appointed by the presidentwhose wishes were never disturbed by theformality of the election. Soeharto continued tofavour Dayak governors - Reinout Sylvanus andWilly Ananias Gara - for the next sixteen yearsbut then turned to the Javanese administratorson whom he often relied in the outer-islandprovinces. From 1984 the next three governors, 114 Kalimantan Tengah Dalam Angka, 1999. pp. 53, 55.

Gatot Amrih, Soeparmanto and WarsitoRasman, were all Javanese but, unlike in manyother provinces, none was a military officer.

The fall of Soeharto in 1998 saw thedemocratisation of provincial government. Free,genuinely competitive, elections were held in1999 for the first time since 1955 not only at thenational but also at the provincial and districtlevels. In addition to five members appointed torepresent the military and police, the fortyelected seats were divided between the mainpolitical parties more or less reflecting thenational results. Megawati Soekarnoputri's PDI-P won 14 seats, Golkar - the government partyof the Soeharto regime - won 11, the MuslimPPP took 5, Abdurrahman Wahid's PKBobtained 3 and Amien Rais's PAN won 2 withseveral smaller parties taking 1 each. No party,however, was particularly identified as the partyof the Dayaks because Dayaks were prominentin the leadership of all the major parties.

The election of the new governor was hard-fought but marred by vote-buying allegations.In a lengthy process that required three separaterounds of voting, Asmawi Agani, representingGolkar, defeated Professor Usop of theLMMDDKT in a close 24-20 vote.115 Asmawiis of mixed Malay-Dayak descent while hisdeputy, Nahson Taway, is a Dayak.The maindefeated candidates were also Dayaks,indicating political rivalries within the Dayakcommunity. Although elected on 20 January2001, the installation of the governor and hisdeputy was delayed until 8 March while theallegations of vote-buying were investigated.116

During the Soeharto period government at thedistrict level had been largely in the hands ofnon-Dayaks until the last few years whenseveral Dayak bupati were appointed. It was notunusual under Soeharto for military officers tobe appointed as bupati. Since the fall of theNew Order, however, local government hasbecome dominated by Dayaks and currentlythree of the five bupati and the mayor ofPalangkaraya are Dayaks or of mixed Dayakdescent.117 The bupati of Barito Selatan is aJavanese who has spent most of his life in 115 Banjarmasin Post, 21 January 2000.116 Kompas, 29 February, 1 March, 29 May 2001.117 The mayor of Palangkaraya is a Dayak who hadpreviously served as an army officer.

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Kalimantan while the bupati of Kualakapuas isof Banjarese descent.

Democratization was accompanied bydecentralization with the adoption of Law No.22 on Regional Government in 1999. Theradical new law promised to transform regionalgovernment by transferring central governmentpowers not to the provinces but to the districts.Among other powers, the law gives the regionsauthority to ‘manage the national resourcesavailable in its territory’.118 In anticipation ofthe implementation of the law in 2001, districtgovernments throughout Indonesia began tolook for opportunities to raise revenues fromsuch areas as logging and mining even beforethe new legislation came into effect. InKotawaringin Timur the district’s locallygenerated revenue rose sharply in 2000compared to 1999.119 The result has been asharpening of political competition for controlof local government and the accompanyingresources. Although hard to prove, it is quitelikely that anti-Madurese political rhetoric inrecent times has been stimulated by rivalriesbetween Dayak-led parties seeking Dayakvotes. Another by-product of regional autonomyis the need for local governments to reorganisetheir administration in order to cope with aninflux of civil servants previously employed bythe central government. In Kotawaringin Timur,as in many other districts, this meant thatestablished senior officials were sometimesdisplaced in reshuffles of positions. Amongthose displaced in Sampit were Pedlik Asserand his brother-in-law who have been accusedof expressing their anger by sparking the anti-Madurese riot.

At the village level traditional Dayakgovernment was severely disrupted during theNew Order period. In 1979 the centralgovernment adopted a law on villagegovernment which was applied throughoutIndonesia and was intended, as stated by the lawitself, 'to make the position of village

118 Undang-undang No. 22 Tahun 1999 tentangPemerintahan Daerah, article 10(1).119 See Anne Casson, ‘Ethnic violence in an era ofregional autonomy: A background to the bloodshed inKotawaringin Timur’, RMAP Occasional Paper, ResourceManagement in Asia-Pacific Project, Research School ofPacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University,2001. P. 21.

government as far as possible uniform'.120 Inplace of the traditional customary forms ofvillage government that continued to bepractised in many parts of Indonesia, a newstructure was adopted which in effect replicatedthe traditional system of village government inJava. Following the Javanese model, non-urbanvillages would be placed under an electedVillage Head (Kepala Desa) while urbanvillages would be placed under appointed heads(Lurah) who would be granted the status of civilservants and made responsible to the head of thesub-district (Kecamatan) bureaucracy. Otherpositions within village government were to bestandardised throughout Indonesia.

Before 1979 Dayak villages were governed bytraditional customary institutions. Althoughusually headed by a single leader - often calledDemang - the details of the structure ofgovernance evolved differently fromcommunity to community. Some communitiesconsisted of only a few thousand people in afew villages whereas others were moreextensive and the system of governance morecomplex.121 This, however, was all changed bythe 1979 law.

As one Dayak intellectual in West Kalimantanput it, 'The Law on Village Government No.5,1979 is the most destructive law againstindigenous peoples in Indonesia'. Traditionalvillage leadership was undermined as distinctcommunities were merged into larger villages inaccordance with the national standard. In WestKalimantan the component parts of the newvillages were often two or three kilometres, andsometimes as much as eight to ten kilometres,apart with the result that some villagers did noteven know their village head. Under the new'modern' system, it was difficult for respectedcustomary leaders to be elected as village headbecause the law stipulated that candidates forvillage head should have graduated from highschool.122 As the traditional leadership lost itsmoral authority, its capacity to ensure social 120 Undang-undang No. 5 Tahun 1979 tentangPemerintahan Desa.121 Stefanus Masiun, 'National Frameworks Affecting AdatGovernance in Indonesia, and Dayak NGO Responses', inJanis B. Alcorn and Antoinette G. Royo, eds., IndigenousSocial Movements and Ecological Resilience: Lessonsfrom the Dayak of Indonesia. Washington, DC:Biodiversity Support Program, 2000. P.20.122 Ibid. Pp.24-25.

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order was diminished. If in the past traditionalleaders had been able to deal with minorcriminal behaviour and youthful rebellion, nowthe police were called in and, as another Dayakintellectual said to ICG, 'the law of the junglewas introduced'.123

The 1979 law has been replaced by Law 22 onRegional Government, mentioned above, butthe uniform structure of village governmentestablished in 1979 remains in place.

E. THE POLICE AND MILITARY

It is a common perception among Dayaks thatthe police and military are biased against them.In part this arises from the small number ofDayaks among police and military personnel.Statistics on the ethnic makeup of the police andarmy in Central Kalimantan are not availablebut it is clear that much of the officer corps inboth services is from outside CentralKalimantan, mainly from Java. Only oneDayak, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Zen Maulani, wasappointed as Commander of the TanjungpuraMilitary Region covering all of Kalimantan,where he served from 1988 to 1991.124 The firstDayak to be promoted as provincial policechief, Chief Commissioner Lodewyk Penyang,only received his appointment in April 2001 inthe wake of the rioting. A retired soldier toldICG that a significant number of Dayaks had infact joined the army or the police but manypreferred to be posted outside their homeprovince because they felt uncomfortable aboutthe possibility of being placed in a positionwhere they might be compelled to act againsttheir own people.125 It should be noted,however, that Madurese, too, were rare in thepolice in Central Kalimantan.

It is also common knowledge that the police andmilitary have been involved in protecting thelogging, mining and plantation companies thatare now occupying land that was previously inDayak hands. The police and military are notonly involved in normal measures against 123 ICG interview in Palangkaraya. To understand whypolice involvement was associated with 'the law of thejungle', see Indonesia: National Police Reform, ICG AsiaReport No. 13, Jakarta/Brussels, 20 February 2001.124 Maulani was later appointed as Head of the StateIntelligence Agency (Bakin) under President Habibie from1998 to 1999.125 ICG interview in Sampit.

criminal behaviour but members of the securityforces are often recruited directly by companiesas security guards.126 Dayaks therefore feelintimidated from making protests against whatthey see as unjust treatment.

The police in particular are generally perceivedby Dayaks as failing to protect their interests.Dayaks almost universally believe that that thepolice do not take firm action against membersof other ethnic groups who commit crimesagainst Dayaks. Indeed it was the failure of thepolice to apprehend the Madurese killers of aDayak at Kereng Pangi in December 2000 thatseems to have set in train the events that led tothe massacre in February and March 2001. Onthe other hand, Dayaks claim that when Dayakscommit crimes, they are normally arrested.Such stereotypical perceptions are of coursecommon in virtually all ethnic conflicts.However, an alternative interpretation suggeststhat the police might indeed discriminate on thebasis of ethnicity but for quite specific reasons.Unlike Dayaks who are generally poor andrelatively unrepresented in the businesscommunity, Madurese are much more likely tohave relatives or other patrons who can pay offthe police if they get into trouble.127

However, it is not only Dayaks who areconvinced that the security forces are biasedagainst them. Following the Sampit andPalangkaraya rioting Madurese also claimedthat the police sided with the Dayaks.128

F. CULTURE AND RELIGION

Dayaks have long resented the attitudes of otherethnic groups who have tended to look down onDayaks as 'uncultured' and 'uncivilised'. Dayakanger was clear in some of the statements issuedby the LMMDDKT following the upheaval inFebruary. Although directed specifically at theMadurese, the deep resentment at being 126 Throughout Indonesia it is normal for police andmilitary personnel to be 'hired out' in order to supplementinadequate wages. See Indonesia: Keeping the MilitaryUnder Control, ICG Asia Report No.9, Jakarta/Brussels, 5September 2000, pp. 16-17; Indonesia: National PoliceReform, ICG Asia Report No. 13, Jakarta/Brussels, 20February 2001, pp. 10-11.127 This explanation was put forward by a veteran Dayakleader, Fridolin Ukur, in an interview with Tempo, 1 April2001.128 Kompas, 19 March 2001.

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considered backward applied more generally toall outsiders. In the words of one document,signed by Professor Usop, the Chairman of theLMMDDKT's Presidium, 'We have long livedlike this with insults and contempt that claimsthat our ethnic group is stupid, dull-witted,destroyers of the environment, and that we don'tknow our place'.129 Dayaks were particularlyangered by the common claim that the shiftingcultivation practised by Dayaks over thecenturies had led to environmental degradation -while the work of the logging companies is seenas a contribution to national development.

Dayaks had also been humiliated by thetreatment of traditional Dayak religion duringthe New Order period. Although by now mostDayaks in Central Kalimantan are eitherMuslim or Christian, the traditional religion ofthe dominant Ngaju sub-group - Kaharingan - isstill respected. Indeed it is often claimed byDayaks themselves that Muslim and ChristianDayaks continue to be influenced by the cultureassociated with Kaharingan.130 During the NewOrder, however, only five religions wereofficially recognised - Islam, Catholicism,Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism. TheNew Order's passion to place every group into aregulated category combined with almost totaldisrespect for 'backward' peoples resulted inKaharingan being treated as a form ofHinduism. Thus, official statistics on religiousaffiliation record that 195,646 Hindus lived inCentral Kalimantan in 1999!131

VI. THE DAYAKS AND THEMADURESE

The experiences of the Dayak communityduring the last twenty or thirty years haveprovided many grounds for grievance. Dayakshave good reason to feel that their interests havebeen neglected by the central government whichhas treated the resources of Central Kalimantanmore as a source of wealth for members of theJakarta elite than as an opportunity to improvethe well-being of the majority community in the 129 ‘Latar Belakang Terjadinya Peristiwa Kerusuhan Etnisdi Kalimantan Tengah’, Red Book, vol. 1.130 J.J. Kusni, Negara Etnik: Beberapa GagasanPemberdayaan Suku Dayak. Yogyakarta: FuSPAD, 2001.p. 101.131 Kalimantan Tengah dalam Angka, 1999, p.137.

province. It would not be difficult to understandDayak hostility directed toward the nationalgovernment and its provincial representatives,the big business interests that have dominatedthe logging and plantation industries, and thepredominantly non-Kalimantanese police andmilitary forces. It would also be easy tounderstand Dayak resentment against the influxof migrants from other parts of Indonesia whonow play a substantial role in the provincialeconomy.

But why is Dayak hostility directed almostexclusively at the small Madurese community?

Some of the common explanations that havebeen suggested are clearly inadequate. Theinterpretation that emphasizes religious rivalryis based on the common misperception that theDayaks in Central Kalimantan are non-Muslimwhereas in fact most are Muslim. And, althoughMadurese are Muslim, so are most Javanese andvirtually all Banjarese but these communitieswere left untouched.

Another common explanation places theemphasis on the 'socio-economic gap' betweenDayaks and Madurese. While it is true thatmany Madurese moved into urban occupationsand achieved some success, the Madurese werefar from dominating the Central Kalimantaneconomy. Madurese were prominent in suchsectors as retail trade, local markets andtransportation but these fields are hardly thepinnacles of provincial commerce. However,Madurese were very prominent in commerce inSampit which is where the massacre began butDayaks themselves deny that they weremotivated by economic considerations. SeveralDayak leaders pointed out to ICG that 'if theDayaks were motivated by social jealousy, wewould have attacked the Chinese, not theMadurese'.132

It has also been suggested that Madurese madeup a large part of the work force in the loggingand plantation industries and were thereforeseen by Dayaks as taking over Dayak land. But,in fact Madurese were only part of that workforce which also consisted of members of otherethnic communities, including Dayaksthemselves.

132 ICG interviews in Palangkaraya

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The most common explanation given by Dayaksthemselves is cultural. Dayak leadersemphasized to ICG that the Dayaks had nocomplaints against the Javanese, the Banjareseand other communities that treated Dayakculture with respect and were able to adjustthemselves to Dayak values. Indeed, severalDayak informants admitted that there weresome 'good' Madurese, especially among thosewho had lived many years in Kalimantan andthose who belonged to second- and third-generation families.133 But, Dayaks describedMadurese in general as having a deep sense ofethnic solidarity (exemplified by their tendencyto pray at exclusively Madurese mosques),being prone to violence, ever-ready to cheatnon-Madurese, and contemptuous of Dayakvalues. Madurese themselves acknowledge thattheir culture approves duelling in response toslights to honour and the Madurese languagehas indeed contributed the work ‘carok’ (duel)to the Indonesian language. To Dayaks, theMadurese failed to observe the time-honouredprinciple, 'di mana bumi dipijak, di situ langitdijunjung' (wherever your foot rests, there theheavens are honoured), which impliesacceptance of the customs of the place whereone lives.

Among the examples of ‘Madurese behaviour’given in interviews with ICG and in theLMMDDKT Red Book are the following:

! A non-Madurese who bargains with aMadurese stallholder in a market will beabused if he fails to make a purchase.

! Madurese stall-holders threaten non-Madurese if they sell goods at lower prices.

! A senior Dayak civil servant related how hehad ordered some furniture to be brought toPalangkaraya by boat from Banjarmasin.The furniture was then brought byMadurese labourers directly to his housealthough he had not asked for assistance.The Madurese then demanded payment at arate set by them.

133 One prominent Dayak leader said that during themassacre he had protected his next-door neighbour, whohad been a 'good' Madurese, and helped him escape fromthe province. The neighbour's house was still standing, incontrast to the homes of many other Madurese inPalangkaraya. ICG interview.

! Madurese are notorious for renting land andthen refusing to leave when their lease hasexpired.

! Madurese are said to often harvest cropsgrown on land owned by others, be involvedin crime and bribe police.

! Madurese always carry a sickle which theywill use if they get involved in a conflictwith others.

While these complaints may seem minor, andare hardly sufficient to justify a massacre, theyfuelled Dayak antagonism toward theMadurese. On the other hand, Dayaks describetheir own culture as accommodating andconflict-avoiding – despite the recent violence.Thus when Dayaks are forced to leave a forestwhich has been awarded to a Jakarta loggingcompany, they do not resist but simply moveelsewhere. When a Dayak is insulted in themarket, he just goes away rather than getinvolved in a fight. When the Maduresedelivered the furniture to the senior civilservant's house he just paid them to avoidtrouble - a typical Dayak response, he claimed.But, according to many Dayaks, thesegrievances were not forgotten and continued tofester until the accumulation of experiencesover several decades burst out in the massacrethat occurred in February 2001.

One remarkable feature of the massacre was thereluctance of other ethnic communities toexpress sympathy for the Madurese. On thecontrary, non-Dayak community leaders gavetheir public support to the removal of Maduresefrom the province. While it seems to be true thatmany of the Dayak feelings toward Madureseare shared by other ethnic groups - anti-Madurese attitudes are not uncommon even inJakarta - it is also likely that they were reluctantto defend the Madurese for fear of thenbecoming targets themselves.

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VII. CONCLUSIONS

The outbreak of vicious ethnic conflict inCentral Kalimantan in February 2001 can onlybe understood against the background of anacute sense of dislocation, deprivation andmarginalisation felt by the Dayak community inthat province.

Questions remain unanswered, however, aboutthe immediate origins of the violence. Was theDayak onslaught completely spontaneous orwas it planned and organized? Was the murderof five Madurese on the night of 17-18 Februarythe result of a personal quarrel or was itintended to spark the conflagration thatfollowed? Had Dayaks already been mobilizedto attack Sampit before 20 February? If theconflict was indeed planned, who planned it andwith what purpose? A key question of factinvolves claims about Madurese behaviour on18-20 February. Were anti-Dayak bannersreally placed around the town and did Madureseyouths taunt Dayaks? Or were the banners putin place by Dayak ‘provocateurs’ as someMadurese allege? Until these questions areanswered, a full explanation of the outbreak ofthe ethnic violence cannot be given.

Confronted with a massacre that the securityforces could not prevent, the provincialgovernment opted for 'temporary' evacuation ofthe Madurese population. Although governmentofficials continued to assert that all Indonesianshave the right to live anywhere they choose inthe country, the inability of the security forcesto maintain security meant that for Maduresethe right to live in Central Kalimantan in effectmeant the right to be killed there. The ethniccleansing of Central Kalimantan is now almostcomplete and perhaps irreversible although thegovernment finally decided to defend asymbolic Madurese presence in Pangkalabun onthe coast near the West Kalimantan border.Both the central and provincial governmentscontinue to speak of the eventual return ofMadurese to Central Kalimantan and manyMadurese want to return.134 The Dayak-dominated Kalimantan People’s Congress has 134 At a meeting of Madurese refugees in Madura, ICGwitnessed refugees threatening to hold a demonstration atthe provincial parliament to demand their return toKalimantan

agreed to the eventual limited return ofMadurese but has imposed conditions that mostMadurese will have difficulty in accepting. Theexperience of the Sambas refugees in WestKalimantan suggests that an early return isvirtually impossible. All sides talk of a 'coolingdown' period but there is no agreement on howlong this period should last. At best any returnwill be phased with priority given to Madureseeither born in Kalimantan, those with familyties to Dayaks, or long-term residents.

The current reality in Central Kalimantan is thatthere will be no more conflict between Dayaksand Madurese because, apart fromPangkalanbun, there are no longer anyMadurese left in the province. It is, of course,possible that another ethnic minority couldbecome a scapegoat if long-term concerns of theDayaks are not met. Recent history in bothCentral and West Kalimantan suggests,however, that the key point of friction has beenin Dayak-Madurese relations. There are nostrong indications that the purge of anotherminority community is likely.

In circumstances where the early return of mostMadurese to their homes in Central Kalimantanseems impossible, immediate attention needs tobe given to measures aiming to ameliorate thecurrent sufferings of refugees and provide somehope for the future. The inability of thegovernment to provide adequate alternatives forthe refugees from Sambas in West Kalimantanhas seen the numbers in refugee centres grow toaround 50,000 at present. As demonstrated by ariot involving Madurese refugees in Pontianak,the capital of West Kalimantan, in October2000, the presence of such a large unsettledcommunity can be a source of further ethnicoutbursts. The Madurese from CentralKalimantan have been 'sent back' to Maduraalthough many have no close ties with theirethnic 'homeland'. The presence of close to100,000 refugees in an already poor region hasimposed huge strains on local government andcould lead to future conflict between refugeesand non-refugee Madurese. President Wahid’spromise of 'an island' has not inspired muchhope that a solution is at hand.

The standard government approach to resolvingethnic conflict has been to sponsor peaceagreements between community leaders

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representing the warring communities. Thisapproach has often been criticized because itonly involves elites who do not necessarilyexercise much influence over the combatants inthe field. Some have argued that such meetingsare not only useless but counter-productivebecause they promote unrealistic hopes that areinevitably followed by disappointment. Inneither Central nor West Kalimantan did peaceagreements after local clashes prevent latermassacres and ethnic cleansing. In the case ofthe Kalimantan peace meeting held in Jakarta inMarch, recriminations continued to be made andlittle progress was achieved. On the other handagreements between leaders can at least createan atmosphere conducive to preserving thepeace although they cannot in themselves solvethe fundamental problems that stand in the wayof reconciliation. The important point is thatsuch peace agreements should not stand alonebut be followed by concrete measures topromote a degree of mutual confidence evenwhen full reconciliation remains unachievable.

In pursuing legal action in the wake of therecent ethnic violence, the authorities will needto balance the strict application of the law withthe goals of maintaining social order in thepresent and reconciliation in the long run. Fulladherence to formal legal justice could easilyaggravate the Dayak sense of being the victimsof injustice in the wider sense. Many Dayakscontinue to believe that the Madurese wereresponsible for the rioting and needed to be‘taught a lesson’. It is not unlikely that guiltyverdicts against Dayaks accused of killingMadurese would provoke a violent reactionfrom at least part of the Dayak community andcould even set off a new round of rioting.135

There is no a priori answer to this dilemma. Theauthorities will have to make fine judgmentsabout the extent to which the Dayak communitywould resist legal action against those involvedin the massacres. Legal action should perhapsbe delayed to allow for a ‘cooling down’ period.Charges against Dayaks would need to bebalanced by charges against Madurese -especially those responsible for murders in

135 Jefferson Dau, a Dayak lawyer appointed to theCommission of Enquiry established by the NationalCommission on Human Rights, argued that ‘if ethnicgroups in conflict bring each other to court, the result willbe the re-emergence of revenge and reconciliation cannotbe achieved.’ Banjarmasin Post, 23 May 2001.

Sampit on 18 and 19 February.136 However,Madurese must not be charged without strongevidence just to achieve this balance.

One of the most important lessons to be drawnfrom the Central Kalimantan case, as well as thetwo massacres in West Kalimantan, is that thelaw should be applied quickly and effectively toprevent isolated clashes between individualsdeveloping into wider conflict. One of thecommon Dayak grievances was that the police,for whatever reason, favoured Madurese andthat they had not acted vigorously enough toarrest the Madurese responsible for the death ofa Dayak at Kereng Pangi in December 2000.This view of police partiality seemed confirmedwhen Dayaks were murdered during the twodays of Madurese 'control' of Sampit inFebruary 2001. Madurese, on the other hand,felt threatened when the police failed to arrestDayaks who were involved in the retaliatoryattacks on Madurese following the murder ofthe Dayak in Kereng Pangi. And they weredismayed when 38 Dayaks detained for theirrole in the killings in Sampit on 17-18 Februarywere released in Palangkaraya following ademonstration led by Dayak communityleaders. Firm police action in the early daysmay have been able to nip growing ethnicviolence in the bud and thus avert the massacrethat followed. In this respect, police intelligenceseems to have failed to prepare the authoritiesfor the disaster that eventually took place.Police efficiency might be improved if itrecruited more local personnel, especiallyDayaks.

The main blame for any massacre cannot beplaced on its victims. That said, minoritycommunities in Kalimantan having a history ofconflict with ethnic or religious majoritieswould be well advised to adjust their behaviourand attitudes to those of the majority. This doesnot mean that they should abandon entirely theirown distinctive culture and values but that theyshould be sensitive to the perceptions of others.The common lower-class Madurese habit ofcarrying a sickle when going about everydaybusiness is an obvious example of a 'culturalattribute' that could be abandoned withoutdealing a fatal blow to Madurese culture itself. 136 Two Madurese leaders, H. Marlinggi and H. Satiman,were arrested on 29 May 2001 for interrogation in relationto allegations that they instigated conflict in Sampit.

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It is here that Madurese community leadersshould take the lead in persuading the rest of thecommunity to make the necessary adjustments.

Dayak community leaders also should act torestrain their followers from committing acts ofviolence. The apparent lack of regret for themassacres shown by many Dayak leaders is amatter of concern as is the tendency to treat asheroes men responsible for the murder ofunarmed Madurese, including the elderly,women and small children. The presence of astrong ‘hard-line’ group at the KalimantanPeople’s Congress does not augur well for thefuture but it should also be noted that manyDayaks are willing to countenance the return of'good' Madurese. In the new democratic eraDayak leaders should encourage the Dayakcommunity to express and resolve its grievancesthrough democratic channels and avoid violentmeans.

As has been emphasized in this report, theperpetrators of the massacre are members of acommunity, which feels that it has been treatedbadly in the past - not so much by Madurese asby the whole society. The dislocation andmarginalisation of the Dayaks, especially duringthe last two decades of the New Order, createdan angry and alienated community that wasready to take its revenge on another communitythat was certainly not responsible for the fate ofthe Dayaks but had offended them in otherways. The measures proposed by PresidentWahid, including upgraded educational andhealth facilities, seemed to recognize the needto improve the socio-economic conditions of theDayaks but fell far short of the kind of programrequired to compensate them for what they havealready lost. In this regard, the president'spromise to return 'sacred land' may have failedto grasp the essence of the problem but it atleast acknowledged past violation of Dayakcultural values. ICG welcomes theestablishment of a commission of enquiry bythe Indonesian National Human RightsCommission to investigate the violations ofhuman rights in Central Kalimantan. In carryingout its investigations and presenting its findingsit is to be hoped that the commission will focuson the goal of restoring harmony between thetwo communities. In virtually all communalconflicts, the rival communities firmly hold to

radically different explanations about how theconflict began in the first place. An undue focuson 'who started it' can - even if the findings areobjectively true - easily aggravate mutualhostility rather than pave the way towardsreconciliation.

The experience of Central Kalimantan alsopoints to general lessons that might be broadlyapplicable to other parts of Indonesia. The mostgeneral conclusion to be drawn concerns so-called 'indigenous' communities that have beendislocated, discriminated against, deprived andmarginalised. Although these communitiesoften lack modern organisations to fight fortheir rights and seem to accept their fate, theyusually nurse a deep sense of resentment againstthe unjust treatment that they have suffered atthe hands of governments, corporations andrelatively 'advanced' ethnic communities. Fromtime to time these alienated communitiesexpress their resentments violently against othervulnerable communities even though theirtargets are not necessarily responsible for theirsufferings. The national government shouldtherefore give serious attention to thefrustrations of alienated communities which innormal times lack the means to bring their owncause to the attention of national policy-makers.Special measures should be taken tocompensate them for loss of land, forests andother resources.

The comments made above about theperformance of the security forces in CentralKalimantan apply in various degrees to mostprovinces in Indonesia. As has been explainedin earlier ICG reports on the military and thepolice,137 both forces are seriously under-fundedwhich means that their members have tosupplement their own incomes by other means.The need of individuals to find additionalincome often forces them to engage in practicesthat alienate the rest of the community. In thesecircumstances, high standards ofprofessionalism can hardly be expected.Indonesia badly needs an internal security forcecapable of dealing promptly and effectivelywith ethnic and religious clashes. One difficultyexperienced by police in Central Kalimantan is 137 Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, ICGAsia Report No.9, Jakarta/Brussels, 5 September 2000;Indonesia: National Police Reform, ICG Asia Report No13, Jakarta/Brussels, 20 February 2001.

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that predominantly non-Kalimantan policeofficers lacked adequate intelligence aboutdevelopments within the Dayak community.There is a need to recruit more police personnelfrom ‘indigenous’ communities not only inKalimantan but also in other parts of Indonesiawhere such communities are large.

The experience of Sampit also points to a moregeneral potential source of ethnic conflictarising from the government’s decentralisationprogram. One result of this policy has been toplace enormous new resources at the disposal ofsome district governments, especially inresource-rich areas, with the result that thesudden growth of the spoils of office hasstimulated sharper political competition. In thecontext of democratisation in ethnically diverseareas, there is an increased danger thatpoliticians will be tempted to turn to ethnicmobilisation in order to win popular support.ICG does not go so far as a recent HumanRights Watch recommendation that there'should probably be a complete moratorium onany administrative boundary changes or localadministration restructuring until a credible lawand order presence is in place and the situationin Jakarta becomes more stable'.138 But theSampit case provides a warning that thepossible impact on ethnic relations needs to becarefully considered when such administrativemeasures are adopted.

Jakarta/Brussels 27 June 2001

138 Indonesia: The Violence in Central Kalimantan(Borneo): A Human Rights Watch Press Backgrounder,New York, 28 February 2001.

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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

Bupati Head of district government

Daerah Kalimantan Tengah (Central KalimantanDayak Community ConsultativeInstitute)

LMMDDKT Lembaga Musyawarah MasyarakatDayak dan

Mandau Traditional Dayak sword

PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia –Perjuangan (IndonesianDemocratic Party of Struggle)

TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia(Indonesian National Military)

Tombak Traditional Dayak spear

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APPENDIX B: ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is aprivate, multinational organisation committed tostrengthening the capacity of the internationalcommunity to anticipate, understand and act toprevent and contain conflict.

ICG’s approach is grounded in field research.Teams of political analysts, based on the ground incountries at risk of conflict, gather informationfrom a wide range of sources, assess localconditions and produce regular analytical reportscontaining practical recommendations targeted atkey international decision-takers.

ICG’s reports are distributed widely to officials inforeign ministries and international organisationsand made generally available at the same time viathe organisation's internet site, www.crisisweb.org. ICG works closely with governments and thosewho influence them, including the media, tohighlight its crisis analysis and to generate supportfor its policy prescriptions. The ICG Board -which includes prominent figures from the fieldsof politics, diplomacy, business and the media - isdirectly involved in helping to bring ICG reportsand recommendations to the attention of seniorpolicy-makers around the world. ICG is chairedby former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari;former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evanshas been President and Chief Executive sinceJanuary 2000.

ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels,with advocacy offices in Washington DC, NewYork and Paris. The organisation currentlyoperates or is planning field projects in nineteencrisis-affected countries and regions across threecontinents: Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, theDemocratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone,Sudan and Zimbabwe in Africa; Burma/Myanmar,Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistanin Asia; Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia,Montenegro and Serbia in Europe; and Colombiain Latin America.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitablefoundations, companies and individual donors. Thefollowing governments currently provide funding:Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,

Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,Norway, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Sweden,Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Foundationand private sector donors include the AnsaryFoundation, the William and Flora HewlettFoundation, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation,the Open Society Institute, the Ploughshares Fund,the Sasakawa Foundation, the Smith RichardsonFoundation, the Ford Foundation and the U.S.Institute of Peace.

June 2001

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APPENDIX C: ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS

Released since January 1999

AFRICA

ALGERIA

Algeria: The Press in Crisis, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999Algérie: La Crise de la Presse, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999The People’s National Assembly, Africa Report N°10, 16February 1999Assemblée Populaire Nationale: 18 Mois de Législature, AfricaReport N°10 16 February 1999Elections Présidentielles en Algérie: Les Enjeux et lesPerspectives, Africa Report N°12, 13 April 1999

The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La Crise Algérienne n’est pas finie, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000

BURUNDI

Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of the Suspensionof Sanctions, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Le Burundi Après La Suspension de L’Embargo: AspectsInternes et Regionaux, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Quelles Conditions pour la reprise de la Coopération auBurundi? Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Co-operation, Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Burundian Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor in theBurundi Peace Process, Africa Report N°19, 30 November 1999L’Effet Mandela: Evaluation et Perspectives du Processus dePaix Burundais, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the PeaceProcess in Burundi, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000Unblocking Burundi’s Peace Process: Political Parties,Political Prisoners and Freedom of the Press, Africa Briefing,22 June 2000Burundi: Les Enjeux du Débat. Partis Politiques, Liberté de laPresse et Prisonniers Politiques, Africa Report N°23, 12 July2000Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom of thePress and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N° 23, 12 July 2000Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, AfricaBriefing, 27 August 2000Burundi: Ni guerre ni paix, Africa Report N° 25, 1 December2000Burundi: sortir de l'impasse. L'urgence d'un nouveau cadre denégociations, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

How Kabila Lost His Way, DRC Report N°3, Africa ReportN°16, 21 May 1999Africa’s Seven Nation War, DRC Report N°4, Africa ReportN°17, 21 May 1999The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic ofCongo, Africa Report N°18, 20 August 1999Kinshasa sous Kabila, à la veille du dialogue national, AfricaReport N°19, 21 September 1999Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, AfricaReport N° 26, 20 December 2000From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention,Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001

RWANDA

Five Years after the Genocide: Justice in Question, AfricaReport N°11, 7 April 1999Cinq Ans Après le Génocide au Rwanda: La Justice enQuestion, Africa Report N°11, 7 April 1999

Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies?Africa Report N°15, 4 May 2000Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda:l’urgence de juger, Africa Report N°30, 7June 2001

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy,Africa Report N° 28, 11 April 2001

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July 2000Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Briefing,25 September 2000

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ASIA

BURMA/MYANMAR

Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?, AsiaReport N° 11, 21 December 2000

INDONESIA

East Timor Briefing, 6 October 1999Indonesia’s Shaky Transition, Indonesia Report N°1, AsiaReport N°5, 10 October 1999Indonesia’s Crisis: Chronic but not Acute, Indonesia ReportN°2, Asia Report N°6,31 May 2000Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: The Issues, Asia Briefing, 19 July2000Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia ReportN°9, 5 September 2000Aceh: Escalating Tension, Asia Briefing, 7 December 2000Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, AsiaReport N° 10, 19 December 2000Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross HumanRights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20February 2001Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February2001Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia, AsiaReport N° 15, 13 March 2001Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, IndonesiaBriefing, 21 May 2001Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, AsiaReport N° 17, 12 June 2001

CAMBODIA

Back from the Brink, Asia Report N°4, 26 January 1999Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8, 11August 2000

CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia ReportN°7, 7 August 2000Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences,Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report N°14,1 March 2001Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty andSocial Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001

BALKANS

ALBANIA

The State of Albania, Balkans Report N°54, 6 January 1999Albania Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 11 May 1999Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March2000Albania Briefing: Albania’s Local Elections, A test of Stabilityand Democracy, 25 August 2000Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans report Nº111,25 May 2001

BOSNIA

pBrcko: A Comprehensive Solution, Balkans Report N° 55, 8February 1999Breaking the Mould: Electoral Reform in Bosnia &Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 56, 4 March 1999Republika Srpska: Poplasen, Brcko and Kosovo – Three Crisesand Out? Balkans Report N°62, 6 April 1999Why Will No-one Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? BalkansReport N°64, 21 April 1999Republika Srpska in the Post-Kosovo Era: Collateral Damageand Transformation,Balkans Report N°71, 5 July 1999Rule over Law: Obstacles to the Development of anIndependent Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, BalkansReport N°72, 5 July 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: TheAnatomy of Hate and Fear, Balkans Report N°73, 2 August1999Is Dayton Failing? Policy Options and Perspectives Four YearsAfter, Balkans Report N°80, 28 October 1999Rule of Law in Public Administration: Confusion andDiscrimination in a Post Communist Bureaucracy, BalkansReport N°84, 15 December 1999Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, BalkansReport N°86, 23 February 2000European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, HandbookOverview, 14 April 2000Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, Balkans ReportN°90, 19 April 2000Bosnia’s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers,Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the InternationalCommunity Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans ReportN°103, 02 November 2000Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, Balkans ReortN°104, 18 December 2000Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate theCroats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 106, 15March 2001

No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,Balkans Report Nº110, 22 May 2001

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KOSOVO

Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward, BalkansReport N°58, 12 March 1999Kosovo: The Road to Peace, Balkans Report N°59, 12 March 99Kosovo Briefing: Atrocities in Kosovo Must be Stopped, 29March 1999Kosovo Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 2 April 1999Kosovo: Let’s Learn from Bosnia, Balkans Report N°66, 17May 1999The New Kosovo Protectorate, Balkans report N°69, 20 June 99Kosovo Briefing: Who Will Lead the Kosovo Albanians Now?28 June 1999The Policing Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo, BalkansReport N°74, 6 August 1999Who’s Who in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°76, 31 August 1999Waiting for UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo, BalkansReport N°79, 18 October 1999Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom? Balkans ReportN°78, 2 November 1999Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth, Balkans Report N°82,26 November 1999Starting From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over,Balkans Report N°83, 10 December 1999Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s UnfinishedBusiness, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000What Happened to the KLA?, Balkans Report N°88, 3 March 00Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, BalkansReport N°96, 31 May 2000Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, 26 June 2000Elections in Kosovo: Moving toward Democracy? BalkansReport N°97, 7 July 2000Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica’s Victory, Balkans Briefing, 10October 2000Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001

MACEDONIA

Challenges and Choices for the New Government, BalkansReport N°60, 29 March 1999Toward Destabilisation? Balkans Report N°67, 21 May 1999Macedonia Briefing: Government Holds Together, Eyes Fixedon Upcoming Presidential Poll, 11 June 1999Macedonia Briefing: Update of Recent Political Developments,14 June 1999Macedonia: Gearing up for Presidential Elections, BalkansReport N°77, 18 October 1999Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, BalkansReport N°98, 2 August 2000Macedonia government expects setback in local elections,Briefing Paper, 4 September 2000The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, BalkansReport N°109, 5 April 2001Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report N°113, 20 June 2001

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro Briefing: Milosevic to Move on Montenegro, 23April 1999Montenegro Briefing: Calm Before the Storm, 19 August 1999Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans ReportN°89, 21 March 2000Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition?,Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: Testing the NationalTemperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: More of the Same, BriefingPaper, 23 June 2000Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30 November2000Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans ReportN°107, 28 March 2001Montenegro: Time to Decide, Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001

SERBIA

Sidelining Slobodan: Getting Rid of Europe’s Last Dictator,Balkans Report N°57, 15 March 1999Milosevic’s Aims in War and Diplomacy, Balkans Report N°65,11 May 1999Yugoslavia Briefing: Wanted for War Crimes, 1 June 1999Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo,Balkans Report N°70, 28 June 1999Transforming Serbia: The Key to Long-Term Balkan Stability,Balkans Report N°75, 10 August 1999Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30 May2000Serbia’s Grain Trade: Milosevic’s Hidden Cash Crop, BalkansReport N°93, 5 June 2000Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the SeptemberElections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) andof Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19September 2000Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’sMoment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2000Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Sanctions Briefing, BalkansBriefing, 10 October 2000Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, Balkans Briefing,20 December 2000A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for regional Stability,Balkans Report N° 112, 15 June 2001

REGIONAL REPORTS

War in the Balkans, Balkans Report N°61, 19 April 1999Balkan Refugee Crisis, Balkans Report N°68, 1 June 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting BalkansPeace, Balkans report N°108, 26 April 2001

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ICG ISSUES REPORTS

HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, ICG Report, 19 June 2001EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes forConflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report N°2,26 June 2001The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): CrisisResponse in the Grey Lane, EU Briefing, 26 June 2001

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APPENDIX D: ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Martti Ahtisaari, ChairmanFormer President of Finland

Stephen Solarz, Vice-ChairmanFormer U.S. Congressman

Gareth Evans, PresidentFormer Foreign Minister of Australia

Morton AbramowitzFormer U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; former U.S.Ambassador to Turkey

Kenneth AdelmanFormer U.S. Ambassador and Deputy PermanentRepresentative to the UN

Richard AllenFormer Head of U.S. National Security Council andNational Security Advisor

Hushang AnsaryFormer Iranian Minister and Ambassador; Chairman,Parman Group, Houston

Louise ArbourSupreme Court Judge, Canada;Former Chief Prosecutor, International CriminalTribunal for former Yugoslavia

Oscar Arias SanchezFormer President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize,1987

Ersin AriogluChairman, Yapi Merkezi

Paddy AshdownFormer Leader of the Liberal Democrats, UnitedKingdom

Zainab BanguraDirector, Campaign for Good Governance, SierraLeone

Alan BlinkenFormer U.S. Ambassador to Belgium

Emma BoninoMember of the European Parliament; former EuropeanCommissioner

Maria Livanos CattauiSecretary-General, International Chamber ofCommerce

Eugene ChienDeputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan

Wesley ClarkFormer NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Jacques DelorsFormer President of the European Commission

Uffe Ellemann-JensenFormer Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gernot ErlerVice-President, Social Democratic Party, GermanBundestag

Mark EyskensFormer Prime Minister of Belgium

Yoichi FunabashiJournalist and author

Bronislaw GeremekFormer Foreign Minister of Poland

I.K.GujralFormer Prime Minister of India

Han Sung-JooFormer Foreign Minister of Korea

El Hassan bin TalalChairman, Arab Thought Forum

Marianne HeibergSenior Researcher, Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs

Elliott F KulickChairman, Pegasus International

Joanne Leedom-AckermanNovelist and journalist

Todung Mulya LubisHuman rights lawyer and author

Allan J MacEachenFormer Deputy Prime Minister of Canada

Graça MachelFormer Minister of Education, Mozambique

Barbara McDougallFormer Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada

Matthew McHughCounsellor to the President, The World Bank

Mo MowlamFormer British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

Christine OckrentJournalist

Timothy Ong

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Chairman, Asia Inc magazine

Wayne OwensPresident, Center for Middle East Peace and EconomicCo-operation

Cyril RamaphosaFormer Secretary-General, African NationalCongress; Chairman, New Africa Investments Ltd

Fidel RamosFormer President of the Philippines

Michel RocardMember of the European Parliament; former PrimeMinister of France

Volker RuheVice-President, Christian Democrats, GermanBundestag; former German Defence Minister

Mohamed SahnounSpecial Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General

William ShawcrossJournalist and author

Michael SohlmanExecutive Director of the Nobel Foundation

George SorosChairman, Open Society Institute

Eduardo SteinFormer Foreign Minister of Guatemala

Pär StenbäckFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Thorvald StoltenbergFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

William O TaylorChairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe

Ed van ThijnFormer Minister of Interior, The Netherlands; formerMayor of Amsterdam

Simone VeilFormer Member of the European Parliament; formerMinister for Health, France

Shirley WilliamsFormer British Secretary of State for Education andScience; Member House of Lords

Grigory YavlinskyMember of the Russian Duma

Mortimer ZuckermanChairman and Editor-in-Chief, US News and WorldReport


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