Community law enforcement

in rural Tanzania

Hilde Jakobsen

EurAmerica-based criminologists have projected the same nostalgia onto African realities that

urban-based criminologists have projected onto rural realities. The most influential example of this is

Nils Christie’s romanticisation of community law enforcement (CLE) in rural Tanzania. In this

chapter, I present the historical and anthropological literature on the main forms of CLE in rural

Tanzania.

My analysis reveals the following. First, CLE instantiates the colonial and post-colonial state strategy

of ruling by proxy rather than seeking a monopoly of legitimate violence. In other words, it is not the

opposite of state rule or colonial strategies, but rather an example of both. Secondly, CLE is the

enforcement of the established hierarchies, rather than a grassroots-style subversion of law and

order. Third, social ostracism is a key tool of CLE, and in contexts where community

interdependence is a prerequisite for sheer survival, this is a draconian means of securing

obedience.

What can criminologists learn from this African case? The mere fact that what is presented in

criminology as the opposite of state control and Western colonialism, is long since recognised by

Africanists as a quintessentially colonial strategy of state rule, should serve as a warning. Critical

criminologists can heed this warning by maintaining the same critical stance towards community

power and control that characterises their approach to state power and control.

This is an Author's Original Manuscript of a chapter in the

Routledge International Handbook of Rural Criminology,

which is edited by Joseph F. Donnermeyer.

The book can be found here: https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-International-Handbook-of-Rural-

Criminology/Donnermeyer/p/book/9781138799745

Please cite the published version:

Jakobsen, Hilde (2016). "Community Law Enforcement in Rural Tanzania". In J.F. Donnermeyer

(Ed.) The Routledge International Handbook Of Rural Criminology. New York: Routledge.

JAKOBSEN

2

Community law enforcement in rural Tanzania 1

Hilde Jakobsen

There have been several calls for the de-parochialisation of social theory in general

(Connell 2007) and criminology in particular (Aas 2012), and of the role of African empirical

realities in enabling this (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012). African examples of law

enforcement activities by community actors outside the formal justice system contribute to a

truly international criminological imagination in several ways. However criminologists have

barely touched the issue, with one notable exception, which, as I will explain, is not an

example to be followed.

Much of mainstream social science is based on the Westphalian notion that what

characterizes the legitimate subject of social inquiry, namely a modern state, is state

monopoly on the legitimate use of violence for of social control, that is, the coercive

enforcement of law and order. As this is increasingly being questioned (Walby 2013), it

makes sense to look at the contexts where this has never held. Africa in general has never had

a clear monopoly (Bagayoko 2012). Thus as law enforcement and the security sector is

increasingly recognized as multileveled and networked, it makes sense to learn from a

context where this is especially the case, and has been for generations – namely an African

post-colonial context (Leonard 2013).

As Abrahamsen and Williams (2010) point out in their comprehensive overview of the

security privatization in Africa, post-colonial states have continued the colonial strategy of

delegating law enforcement responsibilities to rural non-state security actors at the

community level. The ‘indirect rule’ strategy that the colonial state used to best serve the

interests of empire involved ruling through “native”, “indigenous” or “traditional” authority,

1 I use the term ‘Tanzania’ to refer to mainland Tanzania, not the United Republic of Tanzania which also consists of the Zanzibar archipelago. There exists a wealth of literature on Zanzibari community law enforcement that is beyond the scope of this chapter.

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in law enforcement as in governance in general. Inventing and instating “traditional” laws

and law enforcement structures was a cost-effective and pacifying measure. As a result, as

Ebo (2007)points out, in much of Africa, “there has hardly been a point in time when the

African state has had a monopoly of legitimate force. The security sector has typically

manifested both formal and informal tracks.”(p.10-11) The non-state institutions that have

enjoyed wide support and legitimacy are customary societal structures such as traditional

authorities (elders etc)

Bagayoko and colleagues (2012) have presented case studies from across Africa

showing that “African populations are confronted with a multiple-choice of private and

public, legal and illegal, informal and formal policing.” Wisler and Onwudiwe (2009) claim

that Western-style community policing is especially top-down, and that research on

community policing in Africa reveals “a bottom-up approach, with a great deal of informal,

unofficial policing negotiated more or less successfully with the state”. This chapter will

present research on community law enforcement in Tanzania that illustrates this. Its scope of

‘community law enforcement’ is wider than the ‘community policing’ of the Euro American

literature. There, ‘community policing’ is defined as “policing with and for the community”

(Tilley 2008)(Tilley 2008 p 376). This chapter also encompasses the policing by the

community. The term ‘community law enforcement’ can also be read as meaning ‘the

enforcement of community law’ (as opposed to formal state law). This ambiguity is

deliberate.

What counts as community law enforcement? As will be seen, this is one of the

questions that emerges from the literature. This chapter will not attempt to close that question

by defining the scope of community law enforcement in Tanzania. It is not an exhaustive list

of all cases of community law enforcement in Tanzania, but rather is intended to introduce

the reader to the topic through a review of some examples of community law enforcement. I

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will review the research that has been done by political scientists, historians and

anthropologists, on this criminological topic, and then make some suggestions for

criminological research on community law enforcement in Africa, pointing to some

promising approaches within rural criminology.

Tanzania

In economic terms, Tanzania is classified as a Least Developed Country (LDC). Its

GDP per capita is 608 US dollars. However, it is also known as a remarkably peaceful

country. While neighboring states have been plagued by conflicts between ethnic and

religious groups, Tanzania boasts a tradition of peaceful coexistence between Muslims and

Christians and 122 ethnicities. It is also the most economically equal society in East and

Southern Africa, with a Gini Index of 38 (UNDP 2013).

The majority of Tanzanians (70%) live outside the urban centers in households

engaged in small-scale agriculture (National Bureau of Statistics 2013a) Three in four adults

have agriculture, livestock or fishing as their primary activity (National Bureau of Statistics

2013c). Most households (70%) own their own land, and the mean area of land owned is 5.6

acres (National Bureau of Statistics 2013 a, 2013b, 2013c). One in ten Tanzanians live below

the food poverty line that measures extreme poverty, and 28 percent of Tanzanians live below

the basic needs poverty line. (National Bureau of Statistics 2013c, UNDP 2013).

Housing conditions give an idea of people’s everyday lives. A fifth of Tanzanians live

in houses with cement walls, and a further 50 percent have walls of baked or sundried bricks.

Sixty-five percent have iron sheet roofing, and 18 percent have electricity. However firewood

remains the main source of energy for cooking for seven of every ten households (National

Bureau of Statistics 2013 a, 2013c).

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Community Law Enforcement in colonial Tanganyika

The Tanganyika colonial state (1919-1961) typified the British model of indirect rule,

whereby historians claim the colonizers “invented” customary law. Together with local elites,

they “cobbled together local customs, colonial law, Christian morality and administrative

regulations; codified them; gave them penal and corporal sanctions; and made them

enforceable by authoritarian chiefs, contrary to negotiated pre-colonial practices”(Spear

2003)2. They set up a hybrid legal system, where British law applied to Europeans, while

Africans fell under the jurisdiction of customary law, administered by “native courts”.3

The challenge facing colonial administrators in Africa was how to achieve “hegemony

on a shoestring” (Berry 1992). Their choice to identify and strengthen “indigenous”

community law and its enforcement rather than to supplant their own Western institutions

was driven by expediency. The first Governor of Tanganyika stressed that it was “through the

people’s own institutions” that the natives were best controlled (cited in Schneider, 2006).

The second, Donald Cameron, wrote extensively on how, “their loyalties to their own

institutions… (which) form one of the most valuable possessions we have inherited, make for

law and order in the land as nothing else can.”(cited in Spear 2003, p.8).

Given this discrediting of colonial records of ‘indigenous’ law enforcement, any

description of law enforcement in pre-colonial times should be treated with caution.

Nevertheless, it appears that most ethnic groups in rural areas had a system whereby law was

enforced at the community level (i.e., within family, kinship and village groups). It also

appears that the law was shaped at community level and concerned local networks of

relationships, and can in this sense be understood as ‘community law’ (Carlston 1968, Cory

and Hartnoll 2005, Gulliver 1963, Moore 1992). In other words, pre-colonial law

2 Spear (2003) gives a corrective to this claim that the traditions were wholly invented, by pointing out that it downplays the negotiations that were ongoing. 3 By the Liwali’s Court Ordinance (192o) and the subsequent Native Courts Ordinance (1929)

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enforcement in rural Tanzania was largely community law enforcement. As these practices

were formalized into ‘customary law’, they continued to be enforced at the community level.

What formalization changed was the extent to which rural communities could shape the law

and its enforcement.

Community law enforcement in post-colonial Tanzania

On independence, the government of Tanzania continued the colonial process of

formalization. The Local Customary Law Declaration of 1963 created one “indigenous

common law”, and set up a village based structure of rural tribunals to enforce this law

(Tanner 1966). Like the colonial government’s “customary courts”, the purpose of these

“ward tribunals” was to contain conflict within rural communities, and to maintain order

there with minimal expense to the state (Lawi 1997, Msekwa 1977). These tribunals were

placed under the control of district-based local governmental authorities, and were sometimes

used to enforce unpopular state policies on rural communities. Nevertheless, they enjoyed

considerable legitimacy among rural respondents(Lawi 1997).

In the early 1980s, a new entity emerged by which law was not only enforced with and

on a rural community, but that actually originated in a rural community: the Sungusungu. As

a severe drought coincided with the return of troops and arms from neighboring Uganda,

rural residents of central Tanzania complained of a surge in cattle rustling. Two villages in

the Kahama district organized young men into a local defence militia to find and punish

rustlers. Within five years, SunguSungu militias were set up by villages across Mwanza,

Shinyanga and Tabora regions, involving in some form a fifth of all Tanzanians (Abrahams

1987). The movement became highly popular in rural areas, and monitored and punished also

other offenses, such as adultery, debt disputes, theft and witchcraft (Paciotti and Borgerhoff

Mulder 2004).

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The Sungusungu were organized around a secret council and led at the village level by

a chief and a chairman. Young able-bodied men in the village served as ‘guards’ (askari).

Leadership involved both powers of divination, to spiritually protect the foot soldiers and

identify suspects, and oratory skills to lead public meetings. When cattle were stolen, the

Sungusungu organized a mission whereby the young men, armed with bows and poisoned

arrows, would recover the cattle and bring the thieves to justice. Village residents pooled

their money into a sungusungu fund to provide food and supplies for the mission, and

replenished this with fines paid by the offenders.

In the rural areas where it was used, this form of community law enforcement was seen

as a huge success. The Sungusungu were credited with reversing the perceived surge in

violent crime, in returning thousands of stolen cattle, and of restoring law and order.

Nevertheless, their activities did constitute vigilantism, in that they were “actions taken to

control behavior deemed to be deviant, outside the purview of the official justice system”

(Fleisher, 2000, p 209). As with vigilantism elsewhere (or community-up policing as it is also

called), the sungusungus did not follow due process. Suspects were identified and punished

without evidence; some were beaten to death for minor offences, and confessions were

forced. Moreover, the “law” they enforced was not always state law. For instance, witchcraft

and leaving your husband are not offences by state law, yet were among the offences the

sungusungu punished and killed suspects for. The response from the formal police and justice

sector was to criminalize the Sungusungu. However the ruling party in the then one-party

state, CCM, overrode this. Seeing the Sungusungu as an additional law enforcement provider,

and as a symbol of an ideology of socialist self-reliance, President Nyerere declared the

Sungusungu heroes. He issued an amnesty for any member who had been convicted, and

amended the law to formalize their role in community law enforcement.

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In line with this formalization, the government both promoted the formation of

Sungusungu groups, and incorporated pre-existing ones into local administration.

Participation as well as monetary contributions was made mandatory, with shirkers reported

to the police (Cross 2014). Thus what started as a popular movement in rural communities

became “another instrument of state coercion” (Heald 2006). There were instances of the

government using the Sungusungu to force rural communities to exact labour and resources

from rural communities (Abrahams 1987, Cross 2014, Heald 2006). These activities

constitute the enforcement on state law on communities rather than the community’s

enforcement of law for and within the community. However the state allowed the

Sungusungu to continue with this latter type of law enforcement. This violent enforcement of

non-state law by the sungusungu was neither on behalf of the state nor rejected by the state

(Heald 2007)(Heald, 2007). In this sense, it instantiates the strategy used by colonial and

post-colonial states in Africa of ruling by proxy rather than seeking monopoly on legitimate

violence (Abrahamsen and Williams 2008).

Community Law Enforcement Today

The state-initiated sungusungu groups proved short-lived, and by the mid-90s,

Sungusungu activities had receded to the Sukuma and Nyamwezi areas where they

originated. They still operate there, though exclusively in the rural parts(Cross 2014). In the

most urbanized part, Mwanza, they are discredited partly because of their association with the

ruling party, since Tanzania now has a multi-party system in which urban Tanzanians tend to

support the opposition.4

According to a recent study of community policing in Mwanza, also the ongoing

reforms of the Tanzania Police Force are influenced by the Sungusungu movement. Cross

(2014) shows how the community policing programme within the Tanzanian Police Force is

4 Tanzania switched from a one-party to a multi-party electoral system in 1992.

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neither owned, initiated or controlled by the community, yet draws on popular perceptions of

the Sungusungu as community participation to build legitimacy. Whereas Euro American

donors are promoting “community policing” as a best practice model to aid-recipient

countries worldwide, in Tanzania it could, with reference to the Sungusungu, be presented as

“Tanzanian tradition”. However, Cross (2014) also points out that what was considered

typically Tanzanian in the Sungusungu case, at least in the state-sponsored ones, was that

participation was coerced. Cross’ (2014, 531) extensive fieldwork led her to the following

conclusion:

Rather than reflecting an outpouring of popular energies in pursuit of mutual aims,

where community policing was sustained it was largely due to its codification in by-

laws and the ability of leaders to impose fines or report shirkers to the police for non-

compliance, and at the cost of considerable time spent visiting the houses of those

scheduled to patrol and loudly threatening them until they emerged from their houses.

The idea that peasants had a duty to contribute their labour and resources to state-

directed projects has formed part of the Tanzanian ideology of nation-building, and since

independence, rural Tanzanians who did not participate in such “community efforts” could be

fined or imprisoned. We see this idea running through all of the forms of community law

enforcement presented here. Yet in the course of the past decade, this idea is increasingly

questioned, in Tanzania as elsewhere in Africa (Baker 2002, Cross 2014).

Recurring themes

Obligatory participation is not the only theme that recurs in the Tanzanian examples

that resonates in other African examples of community law enforcement. Another is the use

of social pressure, or community ostracism, as a tool of community law enforcement. In

many ethnic groups, according to the written records, pre-colonial law could be enforced by

the entire community refusing interactions needed for everyday, material survival with

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members who refused to be involved (Honeyman et al. 2004). The sungusungu of a village

could ordain that an uncooperative suspect receive the same treatment (Abrahams 1987,

Bukurura 1994).

Another commonality is that community law enforcement defends and maintains

specific social orders within the community. The Sungusungu’s use of violence, although in

defiance of the police and the judiciary, was still “establishment violence” in the sense that it

maintained the established socio-political order within the community (Fleisher 2000). The

colonial compromise was one whereby the traditional local authorities could enforce their

own rules at the local level, in return for maintaining the colonial order on behalf of the state.

Similarly, the Sungusungu were allowed by the state to enforce community laws that were

not state law, but which maintained certain socio-political orders and inequalities within the

community. The killing of old widows as witches and catching and returning “escaped

wives” are only the most extreme examples of this. In general, the processes of identifying,

arresting, prosecuting and punishing suspects were easily influenced by who had more power

in the community (Abrahams 1987, Fleisher 2000, Heald 2002). Similarly, Lawi (1997)

concluded from data on the village tribunals that they “clearly reproduce the dominant social

relations in the rural society, which … are not particularly democratic.” (p.8)

Finally, the literature on community law enforcement in Tanzania contains examples

of how Western researchers idealise rural African communities. It is in this category that the

only criminological study falls, but the romantic reification of ‘communities’ in the Global

South is unique neither to criminologists not to Tanzania (Dill, 2009). Nevertheless, the only

publication by a criminologist on community law enforcement in Tanzania is also the most

cited publication on this topic. I am referring to Nils Christie’s (Christie 1977) “Conflicts as

Property”.

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Christie describes a community tribunal on “the sunny hillsides of Arusha province” in

Tanzania. He presents it as an ideal for emulation, and indeed this account inspired the

restorative justice movement. However as Cain (Cain 2000) and Jakobsen (2015) have since

pointed out, the idealization is a gross one, glossing over the power relations both within the

community and between the community and state representatives, as well as the coercion

inherent to the tribunal itself. As Cross (2014) points out, some of the earliest scholarship on

the Sungusungu presented that in a similarly idealized way. Another form of community law

enforcement in Tanzania that has been idealized by Western academics is the “pot-breaking”

practice by which men in Arumeru select and punish scapegoats (Kelsall 2003).

Criminological directions

A Euro American reader might be forgiven for seeing the Tanzanian cases as exotic

stories, far removed from, even the opposite of, the subject proper of criminological inquiry.

However the historical fact that the one criminological account of community law

enforcement in Tanzania – namely, Christie’s (1977) – spurred an entire new course in the

criminological trajectory, is a striking example of how the tools and concepts we use have

already been shaped by a certain (mis)understanding of empirical realities elsewhere. The

way to sharpen criminology’s conceptual tools, and to test their mettle in terms of making

sense of social phenomena is to engage them with the variety of different shapes those

phenomena take across the world. This is why rural criminology needs to engage with rural

Africa.

How then can rural criminologists build on and extend the literature on community law

enforcement presented here? What can criminology learn from, and contribute to, knowledge

on rural African realities? Criminologists engaging with African empirical realities need to

beware of idealising community power as the opposite of, or antidote to, state power and

colonialism. In the above examples of community law enforcement in colonial and post-

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colonial Tanzania, we see how “indigenous” community law enforcement was a strategy of

colonial rule, and how the independent state continued to use this colonial strategy. Critical

criminology has called attention to the power dimensions of state law enforcement, showing

how it reflects who rules. However, when the phenomenon studied is a community one rather

than a state one, this critical stance is often replaced with well-intended appreciation. The

challenge is to maintain the same critical stance towards community power as critical

criminologists take towards state power.

Fortunately critical rural criminologists are well equipped for meeting this challenge,

having confronted the nostalgia that urban-based criminologists have projected on rural

realities (Carrington and Scott 2008, Hogg and Carrington 2003) – a nostalgia resembling

that which Euramerica-based scholars have projected onto African realities. While

criminologists have been interested in rural communities primarily as examples of what they

miss in the real focus of their inquiry, the urban, so the idealisation of African societies in

criminological literature reflects more what the researchers yearn for in their own societies,

than a critical analysis of African empirical realities (Jakobsen 2015).

Thus a criminology of community law enforcement in Africa would do well to draw

on the rural criminologists’ critical analyses of the assumption within theories of social

capital, collective efficacy and gemeinschaft that strong informal social ties are necessarily

and exclusively a good thing (Barclay, Donnermeyer and Jobes 2004). Much community law

enforcement exemplifies the very definition of collective efficacy: the ability of a community

to effectively mobilise its collective norms. Yet as Donnermeyer (Donnermeyer 2012) points

out, the effect of this all depends on what the norms that are being mobilized actually are.

What the norms are that are being enforced by rural Tanzanian communities, and whose

interests those norms represent, are questions that could be usefully explored by

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criminologists. As Lawi (1997) observed in the village tribunals, this requires studying actual

practices:

“In the context of rural Tanzania, where class divisions are not as yet clearly manifest,

age and sex identities play a greater role in social interaction more often than

generally recognized. In Babati, for example… it is largely the interests of male elders

which dominate. Although ideologically these interests present themselves as the

interests of the entire community, in practice it is often clear that they contradict those

of women and the younger generations.” (8)

How community law enforcement affects rural Tanzanian women is another topic

which insights from rural criminology could help throw light on. One example is the insight

that when it comes to violence against women, the same wealth of informal social ties by

which rural communities can control some forms of crimes, can actually facilitate and ensure

impunity for violence (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 2009, Gagné 1992). My own research

extends this approach to rural Tanzania. It allows me to show how violence against women

there can in itself be a form of community law enforcement, in that it enforces community

norms with the permission of the state in order to maintain a specific social order (Jakobsen

2015).

A third area in which rural criminology can contribute is in ‘crime-talk’. The existing

literature on community law enforcement in Tanzania takes claims made about crime rates at

face value. For instance, the sungusungu are presented as a rational response to a ‘surge in

crime’, without reference to the possibility of moral panic. An exploration how crime is

constructed in rural Tanzanian communities might find, for example, that the Sungusungu

were a response not so much to a crime surge, but to a perceived threat to “how the place

used to be”, or that, as rural criminologists have found elsewhere, “blaming the outsider

assisted in the promotion of internal social order” (Scott and Hogg 2015, 175).

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In summary, there are many lessons from past mistakes within criminological theory,

especially its neglect of the rural, that can be avoided when the focus is on Africa and other

regions of the global south. This requires, however, a more critical and less romanticized

approach to the examination of crime and criminal justice issues, or history will merely

repeat itself.

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