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1Royal Holloway, University of London, UK

Corresponding Author:James Sloam, Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK. Email: [email protected]

New Voice, Less Equal: The Civic and Political Engagement of Young People in the United States and Europe

James Sloam1

Abstract

Declining youth participation in conventional forms of politics has become a central theme for academics and policy makers and has often been viewed as marking a crisis in citizenship. Yet there is overwhelming evidence to show that young people are not apathetic. They have their own views and engage in politics (more broadly understood) in a wide variety of ways that have relevance to their everyday lives. The following article compares and con-trasts the civic and political engagement of young people both within and among the United States, Britain, and Germany. The core arguments are that the forms of engagement practiced by young people are heavily structured in favor of highly educated and well-off citizens and that young people as a group have increasingly been marginalized from electoral politics. However, the different experiences across the three countries give scholars a clearer idea of how these problems might be overcome.

Keywords

young people, civic engagement, political participation

Article

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664 Comparative Political Studies 47(5)

Declining participation in traditional forms of politics has become a central theme for academics and policy makers and has often been viewed as marking a crisis in citizenship (Macedo, Alex-Assensoh, & Berry, 2005; Stoker, 2006). Political scientists have attributed this supposed crisis to various factors, including decreasing participation in civic life (Putnam, 2000), low levels of trust in political institutions (Maier, 2000; Newton, 2007; Pharr & Putnam, 2000), the individualization of lifestyles, values, and risks (Beck, 1992; Gid-dens, 1991; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), the depoliticization of public policy (Hay, 2007), and growing cynicism about electoral politics in the media (Cap-pella & Jamieson, 1997; Stoker, 2006). What is clear is that advanced indus-trial democracies have been characterized by low or falling voter turnout (Franklin, 2004; Huber, Rattinger, & Steinbrecher, 2007; International Insti-tute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1999; Patterson, 2002) and the dramatic decline and ageing of political party memberships (van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012). These trends are most striking among young people (15- to 24-year-olds),1 who have become alienated from mainstream electoral poli-tics in the United States, Britain, and Germany (Dionne, 1999; Maier, 2000; Wattenberg, 2003). According to Pippa Norris (2003), Political disengage-ment is thought to affect all citizens but young people are believed to be par-ticularly disillusioned about the major institutions of representative democracy, leaving them apathetic (at best) or alienated (at worst) (p. 2).

In this context, it is young people themselves who are diversifying civic and political engagement (Norris, 2002): from consumer politics, to commu-nity campaigns, to international networks facilitated by online technology; from the ballot box, to the street, to the Internet; from political parties, to social movements and issue groups, to social networks. There is overwhelm-ing evidence to show that young people are not apathetic about politicsthey have their own views and engage in a wide variety of ways (Dalton, 2009; Gaiser, Gille, & de Rijke, 2009; Marsh, OToole, & Jones, 2007; Sloam, 2007). In most established democracies young people are more likely than the general population to participate in protest politics and express their views in an online forum. They are also more likely than previous genera-tions of young people to sign petitions, join boycotts, and participate in dem-onstrations (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Although these alternative forms of engagement appear to reduce inequalities of participation based on age and gender, they tend to increase inequalities based on socioeconomic status (Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010; Sander & Putnam, 2010).

This article provides a broad investigation of the changing nature of youth civic and political engagement in the United States, Britain, and Germany. What is so special about young peoples politics? Younger citizens are more


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responsive to their political and socioeconomic environment during their transition to adulthood when an individual tends to take stock of him/herself and his/her society (Flanagan, 2009, p. 293). Therefore, examining youth participation can offer us a glimpse of the future evolution of western politi-cal systems (Hooghe, 2004, p. 331).

The representative capacity of mainstream politicians and traditional political institutions has weakened significantly in recent decades. Social, economic, and technological drivers have led to changes in political culturebreaking down traditional class cleavages through a more fluid labor market (Beck, 1992; Roberts, Clark, & Wallace, 1994), reshaping communities through the emergence of social networks (Castells, 2000; McClurg, 2003) and revolutionizing communication through the rise of the Internet (Bennett, Freelon, & Wells, 2010). Politicians and political parties have struggled to adapt to these changes. Although citizens have become more focused on policy and less on politics (Bang & Esmark, 2009; Norris, 2003), the steer-ing capacity of politicians has been undermined through the crowding of political space with interest groups and issue groups and the transfer of power to expert bodies (such as government commissions), the international economy (e.g., international banking), and international organizations (such as the European Union). This has often led to gridlock in public policy, as typified by the stalemate over the U.S. federal budget in 2011, and has weak-ened the ability of politicians and political institutions to deliver.

Furthermore, young people in advanced industrial democracies are today faced by a particularly tough environmentausterity budgets that reduce spending on public services (young people are high users of these services) and a hostile labor market for new entrants (high youth unemployment in most of these countries). The chaos created by the global financial crisis has also revealed a lack of intergenerational solidaritya power shift that is supported by demographic trends and falling youth turnout in elections.2 From worsening levels of child poverty, to the increased use of means testing for unemployment benefits (young people are more likely to be unemployed), to cuts in youth services and education budgets, to increased university tuition fees, public policy responses to the financial crisis have placed a disproportionate burden on the young. Although these developments may encourage young people to get involved in alternative forms of politics (to protest against government policy), they also are likely to further increase resentment and disillusionment with electoral politics, as illustrated by mass student demonstrations in London (December 2010), protests by young people across Europethe so-called indignados (or outraged)against high youth unemployment (2011), and the Occupy Movement in the United States and beyond (from 2011 onward).



A number of excellent studies have examined the changing nature of politics and citizenship across the industrialized world, concentrating on common trends in civic and political engagement and exploring the reasons behind these trends (Dalton, 2008; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Norris, 2002, 2011; Pattie, Seyd, & Whiteley, 2004). Further research on young people has provided insights into the nature of youth participation in individual countries (Dalton, 2009; Marsh et al., 2007; Sloam, 2012) and internation-ally (Norris, 2003; Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010; Sherrod, Torney-Purta, & Flanagan, 2010; Spannring, Ogris, & Gaiser, 2008; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001). The added value of this study is that it looks at the diverse expressions of young peoples politics within and between countries. The United States, Britain, and Germany share common characteristics but are distinctive in many ways. They are all rich industrialized societies with large economies and established demo-cratic traditions, but vary widely in their political institutions, histories, and civic-political cultures.

The study begins with a discussion of the methodology and general approach to the topic. Afterward, the article analyzes young peoples chang-ing repertoires of civic and political engagement in the United States, Britain, and Germany. It then proceeds to investigate the evolving socioeco-nomic contexts for their lives in these three countries and the impact this has had on participatory culture. Finally, it turns to young citizens changing relationship with the state and public policy. The article directly addresses issues of voice and equality (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995) in young peoples politics. The main arguments are that young people are engaged in wider variety of political activities, but that these forms of civic and political engagement are heavily structured in favor of highly educated and well-off citizens (marginalizing those who lack these resources), and that young people as a group are (increasingly) marginalized from the process of elec-toral politics. However, the different experiences of young citizens in the United States, Britain, and Germany give us a clearer idea of how these problems might be overcome.

MethodStudying young peoples politics has become an increasingly complex task (Sherrod et al., 2010). Their lives have changed dramatically in recent decades and have become more diverse (Furlong, 2009). Just as young people face increasing choice (e.g., through the expansion of higher educa-tion), they also face greater riskin particular, with regard to insecurities in


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the labor market (Beck, 1992; Bennett, 1998). Their multiple identities are shaped by relatively fluid categories of class, gender, ethnicity, and culture (Bauman, 2000). The prominence of life politics and identity politics (Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994)the personalization of politicshas led to the development of new conceptions of citizenship and repertoires of civic and political engagement that relate directly to young peoples everyday lives (Dalton, 2009; Marsh et al., 2007). For these reasons, it is essential to contextualize young peoples politics across diverse social, economic, and political contexts (Torney-Purta, 2009).

In examining youth participation in the United States, Britain, and Germany, this article focuses on resourceshere, age and educationthat previous studies have been shown to be particularly significant in deter-mining participation (Dalton, 2008; Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Verba et al., 1995). Age clearly has a major bearing on civic and political engagement (though it is much less the case in Germany than in Britain or the United States), but the relationship is not a linear one (middle age groups participate the most). As this article focuses on young people (rather than the impor-tance of age in general), the analysis depicts the relationship between the participation of 15- to 24-year-olds and overall participation in each country. Although an individuals level of educational attainment is strongly associ-ated with socioeconomic status (a key factor in determining civic and politi-cal engagement in its own right), education appears to have an independent, stronger relationship with participation (Bovens & Wille, 2008; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996), that is, citizens with college degrees tend to engage more even when they do not earn more than other citizens. The analysis of educational effects therefore depicts the relationship between citizens with college degrees and the overall population in each country.

Although this article offers a broad-based approach to the issues identi-fied above, it also draws on data from the European Values Study (EVS), the World Values Survey (WVS), and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).3 The EVS/WVS integrated data set (19812008) is used to observe long-term changes in the United States, Britain, and Germany. EVS/WVS integrated data and CSES (Module 2, 20012006) data are used to explore young peoples civic and political engagement in more depth. The advantage of the EVS/WVS integrated data is that they increased the sample size for young people (15- to 24-year-olds) to satisfactory levels (more than 400 in the United States, more than 350 in Germany, and more than 250 in Britain). The advantage of the CSES study is that it recorded participation in political activities (such as political campaigns and collective action for a political cause) not captured in the EVS/WVS studies.



However, a continuing problem is that the sample size for young people remained relatively small, so that data for youth participation across, for example, different levels of education in low participation activities become distorted and unreliable.4 Thus, even using integrated EVS/WVS data, only seven young people across different levels of education claimed to be active party members in Germany. The comparative data sets were therefore used only to explore national participation rates, youth participation rates, and the participation rates of college-educated citizens (without exploring the two subgroups in any more detail). A further issue was that, even combined, the EVS/WVS and CSES surveys recorded data for a narrow range of political activities. Van Deth, Ramn Montero, and Westholm (2007), in their study of citizenship and involvement in Europe, employ a much more comprehen-sive battery, finding that donating money and buying certain products (buycotts) were the second and fourth most common modes of participa-tion (but they do not feature in the EVS/WVS and CSES studies).

The argument here is that given the complexity of young peoples lives and the diversity of their repertoires of civic and political engagement (and the small samples size of young people in most international studies), the data should be layered and contextualized (Torney-Purta, 2009). In this arti-cle, evidence from extensive national studies provides more detailed infor-mation on youth participation in each of the three countries,5 and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data are used to define contrasting socioeconomic contexts. This study also addresses issues that are hard to control for in quantitative terms, such as the nature of demo-cratic institutions and civic-political culture.

Civic and Political EngagementPublic involvement has long been seen as crucial for a healthy democracy and political culture (Almond & Verba, 1963; Pateman, 1970). Despite major differences within and between different countries, we can indentify some common trends. Age and education in particular are confirmed as key indica-tors of civic and political engagement (see Figures 4 and 5 below). And young people are moving away from electoral politics toward alternative forms of participation, which are heavily structured by education (usually much more so than voting).

It is a well-established fact that voter turnout in first-order elections is much higher in Europe than in the United Statesand this is the case for both Germany and Britain. However, Figure 1 also shows a significant decline in voter turnout in Britain and Germanyof about 15 percentage


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points over the past 40 yearswhereas participation in U.S. presidential elections has remained steady (albeit at a much lower level) for decades. More relevant for this study is the comparison between overall turnout and the participation of 18- to 24-year-olds. Figure 1 shows that the gap between youth turnout and overall turnout in the United States has changed little over the past 40 years, has grown slightly in the Germany (youth turnout falling by 18 percentage points since the 1970sbut from very high levels), and has dropped off remarkably in Britain (28 percentage points over the past two decades) at almost double the rate of the overall decline.

With regard to nonelectoral politics, however, these negative trends areon the wholereversed. Using data from the Political Action Survey and pooled EVS/WVS data, we can identify significant increases in participation in nonelectoral forms of politics since the 1970s (Figure 2): The number of citizens signing a petition grew significantly in all three countries (to more than 70% in the United States and Britain), participation in consumer boy-cotts doubled in Britain and Germany and rose to more than 20% in the United States, and participation in a demonstration (an activity that is more common among young people than older people) rose markedly in Britain and Germany (increasing to almost 25% in the latter). Overall par-ticipation in all three activities rose significantly in the United States and dramatically in Britain and Germany over this period (Figure 2). Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 reflect falling levels of trust in traditional political institutions (especially in the United KingdomNorris, 2011) and help chart the decline in voting and movement toward new repertoires, agencies

0102030405060708090

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1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

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United States (youth vote)

United Kingdom

United Kingdom (youth vote)

Germany

Germany (youth vote)

Figure 1. Voter turnout and the youth vote (18- to 24-year-olds) in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.Sources: American National Election Studies, British Election Study, German General Social Survey.



(outside formal politics), and arenas (e.g., the Internet) of participation. Civic and political engagement has been transformed, and young people are at the vanguard of this transformation.

Yet despite these common trends there are major differences in how par-ticipation manifests itself across and is structured within the United States, Britain, and Germany. Using EVS/WVS and CSES data, Figure 3 looks at the frequency of young peoples civic and political engagement across the three countries. Figure 4 highlights the major differences in young peoples civic and political engagement (in relation to national averages). Figure 5 com-pares the participation of citizens with a college degree to the general popula-tions. Here, we get some quite interesting results.

There has been much concern about low levels of (youth) participation in traditional political and civic organizations in America (Macedo et al., 2005; Putnam, 2000). In the United States, voting rates are both relatively low and much more strongly linked to high levels of educational attain-ment than is the case in Britain or Germany (Figure 5). However, youth participation in democracy is strong across the board. Young Americans participate in greater numbers than young Britons and young Germans in political campaigning, contacting a politician or official, signing a peti-tion, joining in boycotts, and collective political action for a common cause (Figure 3). As a ratio of national rates of engagement, youth partici-pation in U.S. democracy is nevertheless similar to the equivalent scores in Britain and Germany (Figure 4). This suggests that the high levels of youth civic and political engagement reflect a vibrant national culture of partici-pation (and a low propensity to vote in presidential elections) rather than a

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

United States

Britain

Federal Republic ofGermany

Figure 2. Participation in petitions, boycotts and demonstrations in the United States, Britain and Germany since the 1980s.Sources: Political Action Study, European Values Study/World Values Survey.


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generational upturn. Although education is important in determining par-ticipation in nonelectoral forms of politics, the domination of these activi-ties by well-educated citizens is comparable to Germany and less than in Britain (Figure 5).

010203040506070

Percen

tage

of y

oung

peop

ele pa

rcipa

ng

United States

Great Britain

Germany

Figure 3. Civic and political engagement of young people (15- to 24-year-olds) in the United States, Britain and Germany.Sources: European Values Study/World Values Survey, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, national election studies (see Figure 1 above).

00.20.40.60.8

11.21.41.61.8

2

United States Great Britain Germany

Figure 4. Youth (15- to 24-year-olds) civic and political engagement in the United States, Britain, and Germany as ratio of the national mean.Sources: European Values Study/World Values Survey, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, national election studies (see Figure 1 above).



The vibrancy and diversity of youth participation in American democracy reflects the fact that participation in civic life (e.g., town hall democracy) is strongly embedded in U.S. culture and the idea of what it means to be American (Tocqueville, 1835/1969).6 Although comparatively low levels of voter turn-out and trust in parties and Congress in the United States have concerned many (Norris, 2011; Patterson, 2002),7 it was Putnams (2000) depiction of Americans as distanced from their communities and bowling alone that really struck a chord.8 The work of Putnam and others provoked a drive to revive civic and political engagement focused on the youngfrom rock the vote to the advocacy of civic education in schools and colleges (Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement [CIRCLE]/Carnegie, 2003; Colby, Beaumont, Ehrlich, & Corngold, 2007), to the promo-tion of service by successive presidents (Obama, 2009). These initiatives were at least partly responsible for the doubling of civic engagement among college students to record levels between 2001 and 2010 (Sander & Putnam, 2010). But the renewal and diversification of participation has resulted in a growing participatory gap between well-educated and less-well-educated young people. The 2006 National Survey of Civic and Political Engagement of Young People found that college students are much more active in electoral politics, voluntary work, and social and political institutions than their noncol-lege counterparts (Portney & OLeary, 2007, p. 6). When compared with age, gender, household income, employment, and ethnicity, the greatest indi-cator of whether young Americans are civically alienated or politically

00.5

11.5

22.5

3

United States

Great Britain

Germany

Figure 5. Civic and political engagement of citizens with college degrees in the United States, Britain, and Germany as ratio of the national mean.Sources: European Values Study/World Values Survey, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, national election studies (Figures 1 above).


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marginalized is a low level of educational attainment (CIRCLE, 2011, p. 34). Almost 59% of young people with less than a high school diploma belonged to these groups, compared with 39% of those with a high school diploma (but no higher qualifications) and only 13.5% of those with a college degree (CIRCLE, 2011, p. 34).

In percentage terms, youth turnout in British parliamentary elections is now close to U.S. levels for presidential elections, but far below the rates recorded in most European countries, including Germany (Fieldhouse, Tranmer, & Russell, 2007; Figure 3). The major concern is that youth turn-out has fallen so rapidly over the past two decades both in real terms and as a ratio of the electorate (Figures 1 and 4) and that so much of the youth vote is wasted in support for third parties in a nonproportional voting system (39% in 2010 compared to 17% in 1979; MORI, 2011). The decline in voter turnout is even more problematic given the fact that alternative forms of political action are so heavily dominated by citizens with university degrees (significantly more so than in the United States or Germany; Figure 5). If this proves to be a long-term trend (beyond the current generation of young peo-ple), it is very worrying indeed. Unlike in the United States, this cloud does not have a silver lining. General levels of civic and political engagement are comparatively low for the whole range of political activities in Figure 3 (particularly regarding the most general measure, collective action for a common cause). Aside from voting in national elections, young people in Britain nevertheless engage at a similar ratio of the national rate to the United States and Germany (Figure 4). Therefore, weak participation rates in nonelectoral forms of politics appear to be a national rather than an age-specific phenomenon.

The sharp decline in voting in Britain (particularly among young people in the 2001 and 2005 general elections), and public concerns about the loss of a sense of community and national identity prompted political scientists to explore why we hate politics (Hay, 2007) and to reaffirm why politics matters (Stoker, 2006). Despite numerous initiatives by successive govern-ments to reduce social exclusion, bring democracy closer to the people (e.g., devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in 1998), and improve young peoples democratic skills (the introduction of compulsory citizenship education into English secondary schools in 2002), recent evidence shows that trust in political parties and national government in Britain has plum-meted to very low levels (by international standards) since 1997 (Norris, 2011).9 The fact that young people vote so much less than older people in Britain (Figure 1) has a lot to do with political structures. The first-past-the-post electoral system provides little incentive for politicians to engage with



young people (who are small in number and do not tend to vote) and squeezes out third parties that are more popular among the young. The highly central-ized nature of public policy gives young people less of a reason to engage at a local level (where little power resides and participation is dominated by the middle-aged, the well-educated, and the well-off). Thus, in addition to low levels of participation in electoral politics, 16- to 25-year-olds areat 33%about a third less likely to participate in local civic engagement activities than are older groups (Department of Communities and Local Government Citizenship Survey [DCLG], 2010, p. 5).

When youth engagement does take place, it often takes the form of vol-unteering and protest. The 20082009 Citizenship Survey (DCLG, 2010) shows that, in contrast to other civic engagement activities, young people in England and Wales are just as likely to engage in nonpolitical volunteer-ing as older citizens. The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement Civic Education study found that English students had average or low levels of participation in most types of civic engagement activities but were much more likely to collect money for charity (55%) than their counterparts in the United States and Germany (40% and 23%, respectively; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Young Britons are also around twice as likely as the overall population to take part in demonstrations (Figure 4). Although the participation rate of young Britons in demonstrations is not high by international comparison, there is clear evidence that the number of large-scale protests has grown in recent years over issues of peace (against the Iraq War, 2003), global poverty (Make Poverty History, 2005), increas-ing university tuition fees (2010), and economic inequality and corporate greed (Occupy London, 2011) (Sloam, 2012).

The participation of young Germans in democracy is by most measures the most positive story. A far larger percentage of young people vote in German federal elections than is the case for the United States or Britain (Figure 3). Germany can also boast strong levels of youth engagement in nonelectoral forms of politics (more than matching the United States and far outstripping Britain; Figure 3). Young Germans engage in demonstrations or protest activity much more than their peers in the other two case studies. Community engagement is also strong.10 What is very noticeable in Germany is the lack of variance around the mean. The civic and political engagement of young Germans is much closer to the national average in most activities (voting, petitions, boycotts, collective action for a common cause) than in the United States or Britain (Figure 4). In fact, leaving political campaigns and contacting politicians or officials to one side, young people in Germany are actually more engaged than the population as a whole (Figure 4). Civic


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and political engagement is also (in general) less dependent on education than in the other two countries (Figure 5). The major concern as far as Germany is concerned is that political campaigning and contacting a politi-cian or official are very much dominated by older, college-educated citizens (much more than in the United States or Britain).

Although party identification has weakened in all three countries, the greater political choice in German elections allows alternative views and pro-test votes to be more effectively expressed. Thus, a more diverse society that has become increasingly disillusioned with mainstream politics (particularly after reunification) manifested itself in the decline of Germanys two catchall parties (Christian Democrats and Social Democrats),11 and the dramatic rise of the Greens (drawing support from increasing numbers of postmaterialists), the Left Party (drawing support from Eastern Germany and disillusioned social democrats), and recently the Pirate Party (drawing support from young Germans concerned with individual freedoms, particularly on the Internet). Although cynicism about electoral politics (Politikverdrossenheit) has increased (Heinrich, 2004), youth turnout in Germany is far higher than in the United States or the United Kingdom, and trust in politicians is relatively high (2.5 on a 5-point scale; Albert, Hurrelmann, & Quenzel, 2010). Participation in demonstrations is also common among young Germans and a central fea-ture of the countrys civic-political culture: from mass rallies in support of (and, later, in celebration of) reunification, to peace rallies against military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, to ecological protests opposing nuclear power and local railway projects, to antifascist rallies against neo-Nazi groups. The politics of protest has proved relatively successful in changing public policy, as illustrated by the reversal of the federal governments position on nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster in 2011.

Socioeconomic Change and Civic-Political CultureChanging patterns of civic and political engagement are conditioned by evolving socioeconomic contexts. In this sense, young peoples lives have changed immensely in recent decades. Academic authors, particularly soci-ologists, have addressed the social challenges facing (young) citizens in advanced industrial democracies. Young peoples lives are defined less by traditional social structures and more by choice and risk (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007). These changes are reflected by complicated and staggered transitions from youth to adulthood (Arnett, 2004). Key markers of adult-hood such as marriage, having children, leaving the parental home, and buying ones own home have become delayed. Young people must build up



their own CVs and personal profiles to locate themselves within a more flexible or dislocated labor market.

As citizens in late modernity have become more reflexive and more aware of the structural conditions in which they live (Giddens, 1991), civic and political engagement has become more responsive to socioeconomic change. This is particularly true for young people (Roberts, Clark, & Wallace, 1994). The increasing significance of lifestyle politics added to value change, and greater diversity has led to the emergence of democratic biographies based on young peoples own experiences in and perceptions of democracy (Dalton, 2009; Marsh et al., 2007). The popularity of Facebook and other social net-working sites illustrates how young people increasingly construct social (and political) biographies and their own sense of community in the modern world (Castells, 2000). When young people do get civically or politically engaged, they are increasingly involved in personally meaningful causes guided by their own lifestyles and shifting social networks, including local volun-teerism, consumer activism, support for issues and causes (environment, human rights), participation in various transnational protest activities (Bennett, 2007, p. 64).

Social, economic, and political change has also resulted in value change. A major trend in advanced industrial democracies has been the emergence and growth of postmaterial and secular-rational values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), which is also associated with the expansion in nonelectoral forms of civic and political engagement. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) record the growth in postmaterialism across postindustrial democracies between 1970 and 1999: [E]ach new birth cohort that enters the surveys is more postmaterialist than the previous one and remains so, producing a shift toward postmaterialist values as younger cohorts replace older ones (p. 101).12 In the United States and Germany, these changes have led to the proliferation of postmaterialist politicsin Germany, through electoral and nonelectoral politics (e.g., the rise of the Green Party and the peace and ecological movements); in the United States, through the rejuvenation of political campaigning and collective political action for a common cause. Young Britons, without the same opportunities for engagement, have become more involved with volunteering or charity work and direct action.

This article argues that these changes create both greater diversity among young people and political-cultural cleavages between winners (well-educated and well-off and engaged postmaterialists) and losers (low levels of education, not engaged, marginalized materialists). In postindus-trial knowledge economies, these divisions often appear along the lines of educational achievement (Figure 5).


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In this regard, it is important to compare and contrast the socioeconomic context for young people in the United States, Britain, and Germany. The proportions of young people not in education, employment, or training in the United States and Britain are worryingly high (14.4% and 14.5%, respectively, in 2010)exacerbated by the global financial crisis though still well above the OECD average (12.8%)but are much lower than the proportion in Germany (8.9%), where youth unemployment is also much closer to the mean (OECD, 2012). Both Britain and the United States also have much lower levels of social mobilitya key indicator of opportunitythan Germany and other advanced industrial democracies (OECD, 2010). Although the United States invests significantly more resources in education (OECD, 2011b), this is very unevenly spreadhence, the persistence of income inequalities (child poverty is almost double the OECD average) across generations (OECD, 2011a). Taken together, these indicators help explain why education is such an important variable in determining all types of civic and political engagement in the United States (in voting as well as nonelectoral forms of politics) and also why age is so central to explaining voter turnout in Britain. In Germany, there is less social exclusion among young people, and social mobility is close to the OECD average (OECD, 2010), which in part accounts for the much smaller differences in participa-tion between young people and the national mean.

Citizens, the State, and Public PolicyEstablished democracies have experienced major economic, political, and social upheaval over the past 40 years, which has affected the relationship between the citizens and the state. The individualization of politics that has taken place means that citizenship norms today more closely reflect the changing life experiences of young people than overarching collective (e.g., class) interests (Furlong, 2009; Marsh et al., 2007). Therefore, young peo-ples experiences of the statein particular, public institutions and public services that support their transition to adulthoodhave a major bearing on how they conceptualize citizenship and politics. As issue-based politics has increased in importance, public policy has become the primary goal of civic and political engagement.

Todays young people are characterized by a certain amount of political interest and motivation, which is only occasionally transformed into manifest action . . . when citizens perceive that they are needed (Amn & Zetterberg, 2010, p. 60). They are project oriented and want to deal with common con-cerns concretely and personally rather than abstractly and ideologically



(Bang, 2005, p. 168). However, these forms of participation are often more demanding of citizens resources, so are more likely to exclude the young, the less highly educated, and the less well-off: Nearly all can vote and most do. But very few citizens can (or do) file a lawsuit, make requests under a Freedom of Information Act, attend an Environmental Impact Review hearing, or attend local planning meetings (Dalton, Cain, & Scarrow, 2003, p. 262).

If young citizens are increasingly interested in engaging with policy, a lot depends on how easy or difficult it is to have a say and have an impact within a particular system of governance (as well as the countrys civic-political cul-ture). The first point to make is that it is very difficult for a citizen (especially a young citizen) to have an impact at the national level, where policy making is increasingly crowded. This is especially the case in federal systems. In the United States and Germany, the diversification of values and interests coupled to the prevalence of codecision making and veto players (e.g., the ongoing budgetary crisis in the United States; Scharpf, 2006; Tsebelis, 2002) has led to political stalemate (e.g., the increasing difficulties of coalition formation in Germany) and the paralysis of public policy.13 Even in the Westminster model, where policy making is far less constrained (and much more centralized), it is increasingly likely that alliances must be forged and coalitions built (e.g., the current ConservativeLiberal Democrat coalition). Civic and political engage-ment below the national level is more likely in decentralized systems of gov-ernment, such as the United States and Germany, given the numerous points of entry to politics and public policy at local and state levels.

Personal efficacy also plays a key role in actualizing young peoples poli-tics. Here, the political literacy, democratic skills, and self-confidence of young citizens are also of fundamental importance. In this respect, education and schooling is an essential prelude to participation (Pasek, Feldman, Romer, & Jamieson, 2008). We have already seen that high levels of educa-tional attainment are strongly linked to high levels of civic and political engagement (above and beyond socioeconomic status; Bovens & Wille, 2008). There is also significant evidence that politically literate citizens are more likely to participate in democracy, and that schools and universities play a key role in preparing young people for democratic life (Flanagan & Levine, 2010; Levinson, 2010). In all three countries there are examples of good practice: In the United States, schools and universities often promote civic engagement through service (CIRCLE/Carnegie, 2003; Colby et al., 2007); in Germany, social institutionsin particular, the well-resourced Federal Centre for Political Educationare central to the delivery of civic education across society; in England, citizenship education became a core component of the national curriculum in 2002 (DFEE/QCA, 1998).


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Moving beyond questions of efficacy, young people have developed con-ceptions of citizenship more relevant to their everyday lives. Dalton (2009) makes the distinction between duty citizens and engaged citizens. He argues that an increasing number of young people can be characterized as engaged citizens, who are tolerant and outward-looking, believe strongly in helping those who are worse off than themselves in their societies and else-where in the word, and frequently participate in nonelectoral forms of poli-tics. We can see from the discussion above that this conceptualization is supported by much empirical evidence, which points to a qualitative change in young peoples repertoires of civic and political engagement. However, two key dangers remaindisconnection from electoral politics at the federal or national level (as observed in Britain and the United States) and the social inequalities that dominate nonelectoral forms of political participation (in all three countries). In this sense, the idea of young people as engaged citi-zens obscures some hidden (worrying) truths about the current cycle of democratic rejuvenation.

DiscussionYoung peoples civic and political engagement has evolved rather than declined in the United States, Britain, and Germany. Overall participation rates in Germany and the United States (and to a lesser degree in Britain) sup-port the idea of a democratic phoenix. Nonelectoral forms of participation in activities, such as petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, and (more generally) collective political action for a common cause, continue to flourish.

On the other hand, young people are on the whole disconnected from elec-toral politics. In Britain, youth turnout has fallen rapidly to historic lows. Although voting rates among young Germans remain relatively high, their participation in campaign and contact activities is abysmally low. In the United States, youth turnout has plateaued (at very low levels) for decades. This article argues that increased engagement in nonelectoral politics does not make up for this lack of electoral participation: poor turnout figures (logi-cally) result in the low prioritization of youth issues by politicians (especially in nonproportional electoral systems such as the United States and Britain), whichin turnresult in the further alienation of young people from elec-toral politics and (potentially) a vicious downward spiral.

This state of affairs is not inevitable. The mobilization of young (well-educated) Americans by candidate Obama in 2008 showed what is possible. Nevertheless, when young people are mobilized (as in the case of Obama or Nick Clegg and the British Liberal Democrats in 2010) it often leads to



disappointment. Politicians are unable or unwilling to address young peoples concerns in government (e.g., the reversal of the Liberal Democrats pledge not to increase university tuition fees). The diversity of young people (making them a less cohesive group than, e.g., those older than 65), falling youth turn-out, and the demographic decline of 15- to 24-year-olds all diminish their collective weight in society. These changes have major implications for the exercise of young peoples voice in our democracies. In this regard, issue-based engagement in local government may be a more promising avenue for youth participation (Bang, 2005; Youniss & Levine, 2009).

This article has demonstrated that young people over the course of the past few decades have become more defined by (increasingly) diverse life-styles, identities, and values and that this is reflected by repertoires of civic and political engagement that are issue based, are oriented toward issue groups and public policy, and take place in arenas that facilitate horizontal forms of participation (in particular, through the new media). The positive aspects of these changes are that young people continue to be committed to democracy and democratic engagement and that in these nonelectoral, non-institutionalized forms of politics the gender and age gaps are reduced (or even reversed). The negative consequences of these changes relate to the question of equalitythe increased social-educational inequalities inherent in these alternative forms of participation.

However, the analysis paints a quite diverse picture across the three case studies. The participation of young Americans is encouraging in one senseflourishing engagement in a wide spectrum of political activities. But it is worrying in another sensevoting is already heavily structured by citizens socioeconomic status and levels of educational attainment. This effect is only exacerbated by the emergence of alternative forms of partici-pation. The problem of how to overcome these inequalities of participation poses some existential questions for American democracy. They relate directly to issues of social mobility and income inequality that featured strongly in the 2012 presidential race (largely thanks to the Occupy Movement).14 In Britain, the situation is more problematic. Changes in young peoples civic and political engagement in the United States and Germany mostly signify general trends across the population as a whole. But the rejection of formal politics in Britain reflects a damaging intergen-erational rupture in voting patternsa consequence of the socioeconomic and political marginalization of young people (as a group). The 2011 riots were not just the actions of hardened criminals, but also an explosion of anger against social exclusion and a lack of hope (Ministry of Justice, 2011).15 In Germany, the overall picture is quite encouragingyoung


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Germans are as engaged or more engaged than their older peers in many civic and political activitiesreflecting numerous opportunities for engage-ment and a strong civic culture. However, there is still marginalization on the fringes. In Germany exclusion is often based around questions of nationality rather than class,16 which leaves many young Germans of Turkish origin alienated from German democracy.

These results pose further questions and suggest some interesting new avenues for research. How might it be possible to foster these emergent forms of civic and political engagement while at the same time ironing out social inequalities? How can better linkages be created between electoral politics and young people?

Any efforts to rejuvenate politics must incorporate both a supply-side and a demand-side strategy. A supply-side approach looks to increase the potential rewards of participation through an open and responsive system of politics and governance. This article suggests that decentralized govern-ment enables greater opportunities for engagement. A strong civic-political culture of participationfrom the idea of service in the United States to the historical duty felt by many Germans to support democracyis also important in setting the norms that are reflected in youth participation. A demand-side approach should aim to provide young citizens with the politi-cal literacy, democratic skills, and self-confidence to pursue their political interests.17 In this regard, the article argues that low levels of educational attainment and social mobility (such as those seen in the United States and Britain) vastly reduce the prospects of youth engagement. For the present, however, young peoples politics is rapidly evolving, and politicians are failing to keep up.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. Although the age of young people is a matter of some debate (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007; Sherrod, Torney-Purta, & Flanagan, 2010), the 15 to 24 age range (1824 for voting) is most commonly used in studies of youth civic and political engage-ment.



2. According to UN population statistics, the proportion of 15- to 25-year-olds in the population fell from 19% to 14% in the United States, from 16% to 12% in Britain, and from 17% to 11% in Germany between 1980 and 2000.

3. Data from the Political Action Study are used to measure participation in protest politics in the 1970s.

4. Although a few international studies have focused explicitly on young people, and so benefitted from larger samples sizes, they have concentrated on narrower age groups14- to 15-year-olds in the International Association for the Evalu-ation of Educational Achievement Civic Education and International Civic and Citizenship Education studies (Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001)or a limited number of countries (e.g., The EU-funded EUYOUPART project; Spannring, Ogris, & Gaiser, 2008).

5. This article draws on in-depth research conducted by CIRCLE (the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement) in the United States (Portney & OLeary, 2007; CIRCLE, 2011), the Department of Communi-ties and Local Government Citizenship Survey (DCLG, 2010) in Britain, and the Shell Jugendstudie in Germany (Albert, Hurrelmann, & Quenzel, 2010).

6. The traditional focus in the United States on civic activism is even reflected in the language used by political scientistscivic engagement is generally pre-ferred to political participation (the latter is more common in Britain).

7. Trust in the U.S. Congress fell below 10% in 2008, well below comparable levels of trust in the German and U.K. Parliaments (41% and 27%, respectively; Norris, 2011).

8. However, Putnams (2000) work mainly referred to the decline in participation in traditional civic associations (see Dalton, 2008).

9. Only 24% of Britons trust their government. The figure is significantly higher in the United States and Germany (36% and 35%, respectively; Norris, 2011).

10. The four-yearly Shell Youth Study (2011) found that more young people are socially engaged: 39 percent frequently work on behalf of social or societal causes.

11. According to the Federal Returning Officer, the vote for Germanys catchall par-ties fell from a combined score of 91% in the 1972 federal elections to only 57% in 2009.

12. However, the trend toward postmaterialist values is not linear. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) emphasize that there was a clear tendency for each cohort to dip towards the materialist pole during the recession of the mid-1970s . . . early 1980s . . . and early 1990s (p. 102). This is particularly relevant in the current economic climate.


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13. The greater sensitivity of the German system to smaller parties offers opportuni-ties for cause-oriented groups that are linked to political parties (e.g., the envi-ronmental and peace movements).

14. President Obama, in his 2012 State of the Union address, vowed to make the tax code fairer and simpler for the middle class and make sure millionaires follow the Buffett Rule by paying at least 30% in taxes. Candidate Romney was targeted for his venture capitalist past even in the Republican primaries.

15. A Ministry of Justice (2011) report after the riots highlighted the high proportion of young people who took part, of whom more than a third were unemployed, two thirds came from the most deprived areas, and two thirds had special educa-tional needs.

16. The fact that Thilo Sarrazins (2010) book, Germany Does Away With Itself, which castigates Turkish immigrants for their poor socioeconomic performance, found significant support among the German public, speaks of a society where exclusion is often based around questions of nationality rather than class.

17. Research shows that civic education and institutions devoted to youth engage-ment (such as AmeriCorps) can be particularly effective in enhancing the partici-pation of young people from deprived backgrounds (Flanagan, Finlay, Gallay, & Kim, 2012).

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Author Biography

James Sloam is senior lecturer in politics at Royal Holloway, University of London, where he is also codirector of the Centre for European Studies. His recent work in the areas of youth civic and political engagement, political participation, citizenship education, and British and German politics has been published in Comparative European Politics, Parliamentary Affairs, the Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Representation, German Politics and Society, and the Journal of Political Science Education. His coedited book, Germanys Gathering Crisis, was published by Palgrave in 2008. He recently (2012) edited a special issue of Parliamentary Affairs (Oxford University Press) on youth, citizenship, and politics in the United Kingdom.


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