Comparative Risk Analysis Comparative Risk Analysis

& Threat Adaptability: & Threat Adaptability: Civil Aviation and Civil Aviation and

Biological TerrorismBiological Terrorism

November 2004

Terry O’SullivanCREATE Homeland Security Center

University of Southern California

Research Objectives:Research Objectives:Analyzing AdaptationAnalyzing Adaptation

By closing (or impeding) one method of terrorism, we may increase the risk of another– Terrorists may find easier alternatives, or Terrorists may find easier alternatives, or

adapt tactics to new impedimentsadapt tactics to new impediments– Alternatives Alternatives mightmight be even worse than the be even worse than the

original threatoriginal threat Public Policy Countermeasures Allocation

Decisions:– Comprehensive view of ALL possible risksComprehensive view of ALL possible risks– Terrorism is not the only security riskTerrorism is not the only security risk– ““Dual Benefit” solutions may be among most Dual Benefit” solutions may be among most

cost-effectivecost-effective

Threats to Civil Aviation Threats to Civil Aviation & Public Health:& Public Health:

First Stage: Assessing Threat Risks – Proliferation of Weapons, Agents, ThreatsProliferation of Weapons, Agents, Threats– Weapons/Threat CapabilitiesWeapons/Threat Capabilities– Susceptibility to attack Susceptibility to attack – Countermeasures to Reduce SusceptibilityCountermeasures to Reduce Susceptibility– Countermeasures to Improve SurvivabilityCountermeasures to Improve Survivability

Second Stage: Modeling Risks – Model threats using dynamic Bayesian structuresModel threats using dynamic Bayesian structures– Assess the Probabilities of different modes of attackAssess the Probabilities of different modes of attack

Later Stages: – Assess Economic Costs and Benefits of the Assess Economic Costs and Benefits of the

Investments, Investments,

Possible Terrorist Possible Terrorist GoalsGoals

Large-Scale CasualtiesLarge-Scale Casualties Disruption of Travel, Gov’t, Disruption of Travel, Gov’t,

LifestyleLifestyle Harm to Industries, InstitutionsHarm to Industries, Institutions Harm to Economy GenerallyHarm to Economy Generally Fear, Punishment and/or Fear, Punishment and/or

coercion coercion

External Weapons External Weapons

Threats to Commercial Threats to Commercial

AviationAviation

Commercial Aviation: Commercial Aviation: Terrorist Attack Terrorist Attack OptionsOptions

Tactics

External Weapons

Hijack, maybe use as

weapon

Suicide Attack on Airplane

Explosive on Plane

MANPADS

RPG/Etc MortarSniper Rifle

Sabotage

.50 Mach. Gun

Air Attack

Airport Ground Attack

Rocket-Propelled Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG-7s)Grenades (RPG-7s) Afghan Mujahideen used against low-flying Afghan Mujahideen used against low-flying

Soviet aircraftSoviet aircraft Could down civilian jet (taking off or landing)Could down civilian jet (taking off or landing) Could be lofted Could be lofted overover airport perimeter fences airport perimeter fences Night-vision capabilityNight-vision capability

Large Caliber Large Caliber Sniper RiflesSniper Rifles

A combination of long A combination of long range & power (1.5 miles range & power (1.5 miles +)+)

.50 cal. have been sold to .50 cal. have been sold to

al Qaeda, IRA, Iraq (used al Qaeda, IRA, Iraq (used against Coalition forces)against Coalition forces)

Could target fuel tanks, Could target fuel tanks, passengers, pilots, down passengers, pilots, down aircraft in worst caseaircraft in worst case

Muhammad-Malvo Muhammad-Malvo scenario?scenario?

Man-Portable Aerial Man-Portable Aerial Defense Systems: Defense Systems: MANPADS MissilesMANPADS Missiles* * Widely ProliferatedWidely Proliferated: : 500,000 to 700,000 500,000 to 700,000

have been produced since the 1960’s.have been produced since the 1960’s.

MANPADS: Causes for MANPADS: Causes for ConcernConcern

• Robust Black MarketRobust Black Market• Easily Transportable (e.g., in golf bag)Easily Transportable (e.g., in golf bag)

25- 35 pounds and are 4-5 feet in length25- 35 pounds and are 4-5 feet in length• No foolproof or comprehensive No foolproof or comprehensive

countermeasurescountermeasures• Three main types:Three main types:

• InfraredInfrared• Laser-ridersLaser-riders• Command Line of Sight (CLOS)Command Line of Sight (CLOS)

Russian Arms Manufacturer KBM Website

Previous Use of Previous Use of MANPADSMANPADS

Large and Slower Moving Large and Slower Moving Commercial Aircraft are Easy Commercial Aircraft are Easy Targets.Targets.

25 documented instances of use of weapons 25 documented instances of use of weapons against commercial aircraft, resulting in close against commercial aircraft, resulting in close to 1000 deaths.to 1000 deaths.

Very Effective in Combat Zones.Very Effective in Combat Zones. Using Stingers, Mujahideen rebels reportedly Using Stingers, Mujahideen rebels reportedly

scored 269 aircraft kills out of the 340 heat-scored 269 aircraft kills out of the 340 heat-seeking missiles fired against Sovietsseeking missiles fired against Soviets

No Documented Use in the USNo Documented Use in the US

2003 Baghdad, Iraq Airport Attack 2003 Baghdad, Iraq Airport Attack on DHL Cargo Airlineron DHL Cargo Airliner

Possible Counter-Possible Counter-MeasuresMeasuresfor MANPADS & Other for MANPADS & Other ThreatsThreatsReduce AttackReduce Attack Susceptibility Susceptibility

Pyrotechnic devices, Infrared (DIRCM)Pyrotechnic devices, Infrared (DIRCM) Airport perimeter control, Security measuresAirport perimeter control, Security measures ““Controllable Enabling” of MANPADS weaponsControllable Enabling” of MANPADS weapons Change in flight tactics (takeoff, landing)Change in flight tactics (takeoff, landing) Non-reflective/anti-infrared paints, gelsNon-reflective/anti-infrared paints, gels Designated “hardened” emergency airportsDesignated “hardened” emergency airportsIncreasing Increasing Survivability: Survivability: AttackAttack and/or and/or

SafetySafety MalfunctionMalfunction

Survivability Measures Survivability Measures Can Provide Dual Can Provide Dual Benefits Benefits for Civil Aviation Threatsfor Civil Aviation ThreatsTerror AttackTerror Attack and/or and/or “Natural”“Natural” SafetySafety

MalfunctionsMalfunctions Strengthening AirframeStrengthening Airframe (Explosive (Explosive

decompression)decompression) Key System RedundanciesKey System Redundancies, isolating flight , isolating flight

control linkages (new)control linkages (new) Fire Reduction SystemsFire Reduction Systems (Flight 800-type (Flight 800-type

disaster?)disaster?) Cockpit ArmorCockpit Armor (increase survival in crash?) (increase survival in crash?) Pilot Emergency Flying TrainingPilot Emergency Flying Training

Airline Industry Threat Airline Industry Threat SusceptibilitySusceptibility & & CountermeasuresCountermeasures

Counter-Counter-measuremeasure Infra-Infra-

redred

LaseLaser r

BeaBeam m

CLOSCLOS RPGRPGSnipeSnipe

r r RifleRifle

MacMach h

GunGun

MortaMortarr

FlaresFlares XX

DIRCMDIRCM XX

Anti-IR paintAnti-IR paint XX

Controllable Controllable EnablingEnabling XX XX XX

Flight TacticsFlight Tactics XX XX XX XX XX XX XX

Emergency Emergency AirportsAirports XX XX XX XX XX XX XX

Airport Airport PerimeterPerimeter ?? ?? ?? XX XX XX XX

MANPADS Air Attack Air or GroundOnly Ground

Airline Industry Threats Vs. Airline Industry Threats Vs. SurvivabilitySurvivability CountermeasuresCountermeasures

Counter-Counter-measuremeasure Infra-Infra-

redred

LaseLaserBearBea

mm

CLOCLOSS

RPGRPGSnipeSnipe

r r RifleRifle

MacMach h

GunGun

MortaMortarr

Airframe Airframe ImprovementsImprovements XX XX XX XX ?? ?? ??

Flight Control Flight Control Links IsolatedLinks Isolated XX XX XX XX XX XX

Fire Fire Suppression Suppression

SystemsSystemsXX XX XX XX XX XX XX

Cockpit ArmorCockpit Armor XX XX XX XX XX XX XX

Emergency Emergency Flight TrainingFlight Training XX XX XX XX XX XX

MANPADS Air Attack Air or GroundOnly Ground

Biological SecurityBiological Security::Bioterrorism and Bioterrorism and

Naturally Occurring Naturally Occurring Infectious Disease Infectious Disease

ThreatsThreats

Critical Threat Variables: Biological Weapons Attacks

Sidell at al., Sidell at al., Janes Chem-Bio HandbookJanes Chem-Bio Handbook, 2nd ed., 2nd ed.

Agent

DispersalMethod

Delivery

System

Environmental

Conditions

Keys to

Effective

Bioweapons

Attack

Critical Threat Variables: Naturally Occurring Disease Outbreaks

Pathogen

TransmissionMethod

Delivery

Mechanism

Environmental

Conditions

Keys to

Naturally Occurring

Outbreak

Psychological Variables Related Psychological Variables Related to Public Risk Perception: to Public Risk Perception: Smallpox vs. Anthrax vs. Smallpox vs. Anthrax vs.

HPAI/FluHPAI/FluPanic Increase?Panic Increase? SMALLPOSMALLPO

XXANTHRAX BIRD ANTHRAX BIRD FLUFLU

Highly ContagiousHighly Contagious X ?X ? X ?X ?

Large # CasesLarge # Cases X ?X ? X ? X ?X ? X ?

Belief Not CurableBelief Not Curable X ?X ? X X

High MortalityHigh Mortality X ?X ? X ? X ?X ? X ?

No Drugs, VaccinesNo Drugs, Vaccines (no real (no real

treatment*)treatment*)

(no real X(no real Xvaccine*)vaccine*)

Own Doctors Don’t Own Doctors Don’t Know/AfraidKnow/Afraid X ?X ? X ? X ?

X ?X ?

Draft Model

Critical Decisions Must be Made Within Complex Threat Environments

ConclusionsConclusions

Risk Analysis Modeling must simultaneously Risk Analysis Modeling must simultaneously account for a plethora of possible threats account for a plethora of possible threats

Benefit-Cost calculations will improve with Benefit-Cost calculations will improve with multiple-purpose, dual-benefit multiple-purpose, dual-benefit countermeasures to reduce risk(s)countermeasures to reduce risk(s)

Threats Analysis in many scenarios will Threats Analysis in many scenarios will include Psychological variables and Public as include Psychological variables and Public as well as Expert Risk Assessmentswell as Expert Risk Assessments

Terrorists and Nature both adapt to “the Terrorists and Nature both adapt to “the best laid plans,” and Risks thus are dynamicbest laid plans,” and Risks thus are dynamic