MATTERS OF CONTROL: INTEGRATION TESTS AND NATURALISATION

REFORM IN WESTERN EUROPE

Abstract

It is unfortunate, but true, that in the new millennium there has been a shift away from

multiculturalism and the politics of difference towards integration and assimilation and a gradual

‘thickening’ of political belonging. While the Populist Right has pursued an Islamophobic and

anti­migrant discourse with a renewed dynamism, governments frequently comment on the

alleged weaknesses of the multicultural model and the advantages of thicker, communitarian

notions of community, as attested by the revision of naturalisation law and policy in the United

Kingdom, the Netherlands and elsewhere. In this paper I review integration policies in Europe,

seek to account for the diffusion of integration tests and argue that the fashionable language of

integration and/or tempered assimilation are politically dated and normatively deficient

approaches to diversity. I furnish the basic tenets of an alternative pluralist mode of inclusion

based on respectful symbiosis and the ‘letting be’ of groups of migrant origin. In the final section

of the paper, I explore an alternative to naturalisation that is more consonant with the pluralist

mode of incorporation and consider possible objections to my argument.

Keywards: citizenship, integration, naturalisation, multiculturalism, nationalism.

1. EPISTROPHE

Processes of homogenisation, which characterised the building of modern nation states and which

were the norm until the 1970s, became increasingly difficult to defend in the 1980s and 1990s.

The articulation of essentialist conceptions of national identity and pressures upon ethnic and

racial groups to assimilate into the system and culture of the host society were criticised for their

oppressive consequences and exclusionary effects. The hybrid identities of second and third

generation migrants, the development of diasporic cultures of transplantations and transnational

linkages did not only call into question the binary codes on which group identities were perceived

to have been formed, but they also projected a vision of community in which cultural differences

could be peacefully negotiated and profitably accommodated. The parallel trends of internal

differentiation and cultural globalisation, coupled with European integration and processes of

decentralisation, gradually induced transformations of national identities in Europe and

elsewhere, and opened up the possibility of creating more open, inclusive and reflexive

communities. But they were also accompanied by new challenges, such as the valorisation of

difference, group closures and deeply conservative reactions.

The New Right in Europe, for instance, embraced difference as a means of ‘purifying’

national community by excluding the ‘racial’ other. Non­national residents have the right to be

different, but in their own home state, since hybridity and multiculturalism undermine the alleged

ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the host national communities. Accordingly, racism mutated

to what Taguieff (1994: 124; Balibar and Wallerstein 1991) has termed cultural differentialist or

mixophobic racism. Conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic have also attacked the idea of

group­differentiated citizenship on the grounds that it leads to separatism and generates mutual

mistrust and conflict. The perceived withdrawal of communities into ethnic and racial ‘islands’

has been viewed to be a threat to the political and cultural integrity of the state, particularly in the

US and France (Vertovec 1995). In Western Europe, uncritical readings of Islam as being

antithetical to western culture and democracy have led to the re­introduction of policies for

‘social cohesion’, ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’, including the official promotion of national

identity, official lists of national values, language prohibitions in public transport, schools

universities and hospitals, compulsory language courses and tests for migrants, naturalisation

ceremonies and oaths of loyalty. In this respect, the trend towards de­ethnicisation and the

thinning out of national identities that scholars identified at the turn of the century has been

reversed (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Carrera 2006: 8­9).

As the discourse on integration and the promotion of social cohesion displaces

multiculturalism and the politics of recognition, integration courses and tests spring and become

ingrained in West European polities. 1 These are not confined to naturalisation; they are also

associated with entry (in the Netherlands, the UK, Germany and Denmark), permanent residence

(e.g. in the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and the UK), family reunification

(in the Netherlands, Germany) and access to social benefits (in Germany, the Netherlands,

Belgium, Sweden, Finland and Denmark). Whereas in the past integration policy was more

aligned to (a liberal) citizenship policy and non­discrimination, and was thus contrasted to a

restrictive migration policy, integration and migration issues have now become more closely

associated. Tougher integration policies are thus used as means of discouraging further migration

and restricting the entry of migrants. Integration is not securitised in the sense of being placed

outside the realm of normal politics because the survival of the state or the nation is somehow

threatened (Weaver 1995), but it has become a manifestation of the disciplinary power of the state

and a politics of control. Migrants and prospective candidates for citizenship have to succumb to

the power of the state and to embrace and accept the terms of civic integration as they have been

framed by the party in power.

In the UK, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 ‘thickened’ naturalisation

policy by including ‘integration’ requirements, such as ‘sufficient knowledge about life in the

United Kingdom’, in addition to language proficiency. It also modernised the current oath of

allegiance and introduced a citizenship pledge to be taken during citizenship ceremonies. Such

reforms were, allegedly, needed in order to end the current ‘mail order’ approach to the

1 Compare R. Baubock et al., Acquisition and Loss of Nationality, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 1996.

acquisition of British nationality, to give symbolic significance to the acquisition of citizenship

and to enhance the integration of migrants. As the White Paper stated (Home Office 2002a: 34),

citizenship ceremonies ‘can have an important impact on promoting the value of naturalisation

and immigrant groups welcome them’. The requirements of sufficient knowledge of English and

knowledge about life in the United Kingdom (Part 1(1), Home Office 2002b), 2 on the other hand,

have been seen as instrumental in fostering and renewing the social fabric of our communities

and rebuilding a sense of common citizenship’ (Home Office 2002a: 10). Linguistic and

knowledge about life in the UK tests have now become mandatory for those seeking to settle in

the UK and for newcomers. National officials are quite keen to complete what they see as ‘the

citizenship revolution’, by requiring migrants to demonstrate good behaviour and a willingness to

integrate. 3 Espousing the language of ‘good citizenship’, the former Communities Secretary, Ms

Ruth Kelly, and the Immigration Minster, Mr Liam Byrne, have proposed a points system for

citizenship acquisition which would require migrants to accrue credits by meeting residency

requirements, bringing new investment in the UK, passing English tests, demonstrating

knowledge of life in the UK, undertaking civic work and living in a law abiding way (The

Guardian, 5 June 2007). From this it follows that ‘anti­social behaviour’ or criminal behaviour

would result in reduction of credits.

Following these proposals, a Green Paper, entitled ‘The Path to Citizenship: next steps in

reforming the immigration system’ was published on 20 February 2008 (Home Office 2008). The

basic premise of the Green Paper is that migrants have to ‘earn’ their stay in Britain and,

subsequently, British citizenship. As the Home Secretary, Mrs Jacqui Smith, has stated, ‘it is

against this backdrop that we will now implement the next phase of reform: creating a new path

to citizenship, one in which the expectation will be on newcomers to ‘earn’ the right to stay by

2 The linguistic competence requirement already existed under the 1981 British Nationality Act, but it was rarely enforced in practice. 3 Compare Mr Tony Blair’s speech on ‘the duty to integrate’; ‘The Duty to Integrate: shared British Values, Speech on Multiculturalism and Integration delivered at 10 Dawning Street on 8 December 2006, London for the ‘Our Nation’s future’, available at http://www.number­10.gov.uk/output/Page10563.asp.

learning English, paying taxes, obeying the law and contributing to the Community. This reform

is part of the wider work being conducted across Government to reinforce our shared values and

increase the cohesiveness of our communities’ (Home Office 2008: Foreword). ‘Earned’ stay and

citizenship are based on a multiple gateway approach, that is, individuals’ settlement is broken

into distinct phases which are clearly differentiated by gates that open or close depending on

one’s success or failure in language and knowledge about life in the UK tests and the absence of a

criminal record. In particular, the new architecture of citizenship entails three stages to the

journey; namely, temporary residence, which lasts a total of five years for ordinary migrants and

two years for family members of British citizens, probationary citizenship, which can last from

one year to five years, and, finally, either citizenship or permanent residence. Migrants have to be

‘successful’ probationary citizens before becoming eligible for naturalisation. If, during the

probationary period, they are actively involved in community activities, such as volunteering,

running sports teams and playgroups, fundraising for charities and schools, serving on community

bodies and so on, the minimum period required for naturalisation will be six years – a year

longer than at present. If they fail to display the public spirited commitment required by the

Government because they may not have time to do so, may care for children or elderly relatives

or may be sick, the probationary period will extend to three years, thereby extending the overall

residency requirement to eight years (Home Office 2008: 29). And if they have a criminal

conviction for minor offences that carry non custodial sentences, the probationary period will

extend to 5 years. This means that the overall period required for naturalisation will be 10 years.

Progression from temporary residence to probationary citizenship and from probationary

citizenship to citizenship will depend on successful test performance, showing ‘visible and

substantial contribution’ to society and on good behaviour. During the probationary period,

applicants’ access to benefits and public services, such a council housing, social assistance and

subsidised higher education, will be restricted and if their citizenship application is unsuccessful

they will be asked to leave the country. A conviction for an offence that carries a prison sentence

will result in disqualification from eligibility for citizenship and in deportation. The Green Paper

also states that consideration will be given to the proposal that migrant parents’ progression to

citizenship or to permanent residence should be stopped or delayed if their children commit

criminal offences (Home Office 2008).

In designing the ‘journey to citizenship’, the UK has drawn on the experiences of other

countries (Home Office 2008: 17­18), such as the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, integration

courses and tests serve as a migration tool, aimed at discouraging migration under the guise of

facilitating the insertion of migrants into the society. Following the entry into force of the 1998

Newcomer Integration Act, migrants were obliged to attend integration courses, that is, language

and ‘social orientation’ courses, and non­completion resulted in administrative fines or reductions

in social benefits. Integration courses/tests for new arrivals are now compulsory and funded

mostly by the applicant. In addition, following the 2007 Integration Act, an individual’s failure to

pass a test within a certain period can result in a fine and the loss of entitlement to permanent

residence or the non­renewal of a temporary residence permit. These tests have also become

deterritorialised since the 2005 Act on Integration Abroad; migrants have to undergo a basic

linguistic and civic orientation test in the country of origin in order to gain permission to enter the

Netherlands. The same applies to spouses seeking family reunification, thereby indicating a

discursive shift way from the principle of protection of family life towards restrictive family

migration policymaking. In addition, integration procedures have become more stringent and

their personal scope has been broadened to include settled migrants who entered the country since

1998. It is interesting, however, that migrants from Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand,

Norway and the US are excluded from the ambit of these provisions, thereby giving rise to

legitimate criticisms that ‘integration’ is being used as a means of filtering the flow of population,

restricting the entry of migrants and of promoting an official mono­culturalism.

In Germany, integration tests, containing both language and civic orientation courses,

function as both migration and citizenship tools, since they form part of existing naturalisation

requirements and have now become compulsory for newcomers. Indeed, under the Residence Act

2004 (Section 44.a(1)), a failure to comply with them may result in administrative fines, non­

renewal of a temporary residence permit, non­acquisition of a permanent residence permit, a

reduction or loss in social benefits and even in deportation. Following a proposal about the

extension of such tests into the family reunification realm at the ‘second integration summit’ on

12 July 2007, the undertaking of language tests by spouses seeking family reunion in the country

of origin has now become mandatory. In Austria, Denmark and France, on the other hand,

‘integration contracts’ between the migrant and the host country entail language and socio­

cultural orientation courses and vocational training. ‘Integration contracts’ are mandatory and

their duration ranges between one and three years.

All these developments attest the sidelining of multiculturalism. Western governments

believe that community relations would improve by introducing a thicker notion of national

belonging and techniques of control (Bigo 2007; Huysmans 2006), rather than by promoting

processes of citizensisation (Tully 2002), that is, the transformation of subjects into full

participants in self­government. Because ‘too much diversity’ is perceived to result in either

segregation or fragmentation, allowing the flourishing of diversity within an overarching national

culture or assimilation are the preferred modes for migrant incorporation. But such approaches

tend to rely on a contestable understanding of multiculturalism and treat abstract notions such as

national values and national culture as unproblematic. By accentuating the importance of ‘social

cohesion’ and migrants’ voluntary identification with national values, they also tend to remain

silent on the structural obstacles and inequalities that hamper migrant incorporation and the

development of feelings of belonging.

2. INTEGRATION THEN AND NOW

Historically, states have responded differently to ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity.

Distinctive historical experiences, ideological orientations, political cultures as well as the social

class and national origins of migrants feature among the determinants of different policy

frameworks. Notwithstanding the existence of policy divergence and the different historical

contexts of migration processes, it is generally the case that difference, be it ethnic, racial,

cultural or religious, has been seen as a nuisance and/or a problem for social integration. Not only

has there been a strong legacy of discrimination in many states which has placed non­white

‘foreigners’ and residents outside the scope of the community (Martin 1985), but minority groups

have generally been under immense pressure to conform to the norms defined by the majority

communities.

Drawing on, and comparing, the merits and weaknesses of a range of state responses to

cultural diversity and of their implications, the canonical view in the literature in the 1980s and

1990s was that the pluralistic or multicultural mode of incorporation fares better than the older

modes assimilation, integration and liberal proceduralism. Assimilation requires minority

communities to renounce their particular ethnic or cultural identity and to embrace the culture of

the majority community. In the early 20 th century, Park and Burgess (1921: 735) defined

assimilation as ‘a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the

memories, sentiments and attitudes of other persons and groups, and, by sharing their experience

and history, are incorporated with them in a common life’. This process of fusion and

amalgamation was captured by the traditional portrait of the US as a melting pot in which old

traits would be eradicated and replaced by a new national identity. Becoming an American thus

required the casting off of foreign languages, traditions and values and the embracing of the

American way of life. France, too, has embraced assimilation designed to maximise national

cohesion and to enhance the French national identity. 4 Echoing the French model of a colour­

4 But compare, Peter Kivisto, ‘Social spaces, Transnational Immigrant Communities, and the Politics of Incorporation’, Ethnicities, 2003, 3(1), pp. 5­28;Multiculturalism in a Global Society (Blackwell, 2002).

blind approach to diversity, the High Council on Integration (1999: 19; see also Favell 1998)

stated that French policy must ‘obey a logic of equality’­ not a ‘logic of minorities’. Migrants are

thus moulded into French citizens via processes of socialisation, compulsory primary education

and military service. By so doing, they gain the acceptance of the ‘core’ society.

Integration, on the other hand, tolerates differences in so far as they are confined to the

private realm. In the public realm, minorities are required to embrace the nation’s ideals and to

identify with the common culture of citizenship, as defined by the majority community. This

invariably tends to be Anglo­Saxon and Christian in the UK. As Connolly (1996: 66) has

observed, national pluralism consists of a national trunk rooted in the soil of Christianity, ‘with

numerous limbs branching out so far as their connection to the trunk allows’. The proceduralist

mode, according to Parekh (1998; 2000), requires a formal, neutral framework upon which some

kind of minimal agreement has been secured. This mode is characterized by the cautious

recognition of group identities, the arrested development of diversity and the promotion of civic

national belonging. Like the language of integration, ‘the proceduralist view offers an incoherent

account of the unity of the state and leaves diversity to the precarious mercy of the dominant

culture’ (Parekh 1998: 80).

In contrast to the modes mentioned above, the pluralistic mode does not condition

political belonging on cultural conformity or ‘like­mindedness’. It is characterised by a relaxed

and inclusive attitude towards migrants, who are seen as citizens in waiting. The pluralist mode

also recognizes that migrant groups require recognition and support in order to achieve parity

with the dominant population in the socio­economic and educational fields and to become equal

and full members, thereby sketching a vision of society in which different communities ‘interact

with each other in a spirit of equality and openness’ (Parekh 1998, 2000). In such a plural

community, belonging is defined in terms of being together in a common adventure and sharing

responsibility for institutional design and democratic dialogue. In other words, it is premised on

all members’ commitment to an (open­ended) future, in the sense of working together towards

creating institutions that accommodate differences and respond to common needs, while

preserving and respecting the multifaceted and distinctive identities of its members. Young

(2000) makes the point that multicultural politics imposes a duty on all citizens to enter into

communicative engagement with one another, and puts forward suggestions as to how minority

constituencies can be heard and recognised as legitimate partners. The participation of all

members in such a ‘community of concern and engagement’ (Kostakopoulou, 1996, 2001; see

also Honohan, 2001) cannot but have a profound impact on their identities and culture, in the

sense of making them more critical towards their own culture and more open towards others.

It is, perhaps, pluralism’s emphasis on standing back from one’s own culture and

reflecting on it that have generated strong reactions against multiculturalism and diversity. Critics

on both the right and the left of the political spectrum worry that multiculturalism leads to an

essentialised vision of culture and the creation of bounded, homogenous communities, having

little interaction among themselves. The image of ‘a society of multiple enclaves’ and the risk of

political fragmentation feature centrally in such critiques, which more often than not downplay

the commonalities among the various communities, shared citizenship practices and hostile

attitudes towards ethnic groups. In Britain, for instance, the riots in Oldham, Burnley and

Bradford in summer 2001 were seen as signifiers of the existence of divided communities, the

members of which led parallel lives and ‘an almost complete segregation based on race’

(Community Cohesion, Home Office 2001) and the 7/7 bombings in London were viewed as a

clear testimony of the failure of multiculturalism, which the Government sought to address by

pursuing an active integrationist policy. This entailed, among other things, the highlighting of the

importance of embracing British values, patriotism and British identity and the thickening of

citizenship via the introduction of more stringent naturalisation requirements. Officials argued

that migrant citizens and residents had a duty to embrace British values, which include respect for

the laws, parliamentary and democratic structures, the traditional values of mutual tolerance,

respect for equal rights and mutual concerns, respect for different nations and cultures (Home

Office 2004: 15), despite the fact that overwhelming majority of the population have never

contested the normative power and functionality of such principles (Rattansi 2007: 166).

These assumptions have underpinned the widespread use of language and civic

integration (e.g., the life in the UK test) conditions. Although in November 2005 these applied

only to naturalisation, in April 2007 they became requirements for settlement in the UK, and,

following the Netherlands, in late December 2007 the Government announced their extension to

the domains of family reunification and entry in the UK. In the Consultation Paper, entitled

‘Marriage Visas: Pre­entry English Requirement for Spouses’ (Home Office 2007), the Minister

of State for Borders and Immigration, Mr Liam Byrne, stated that ‘foreigners’ wishing to marry a

UK national will be required to pass an English test in the country of origin before they are

allowed to settle in the UK. As he put it, ‘we want newcomers who come here with the intention

to settle to make a meaningful contribution to our society and to our economy. It is therefore right

that we should consider ways to assist a foreign spouse’s integration into life here right from day

one’. (Home Office 2007: Foreward). This message was reinforced by the Prime Minister, Mr

Gordon Brown, who announced two months later that ‘we will introduce a new English language

requirement for those applying for a marriage visa and planning to settle in the UK – both as part

of our determination that everyone who comes here to live should be able to speak English and to

make sure they cannot be exploited’ (The Independent 21 February 2008: 6) and the ‘earned stay

and citizenship’ proposals contained the Home Secretary’s Green Paper, entitled ‘the Path to

Citizenship: Next Steps in reforming the immigration system’ (20 February 2008). The latter

proposed, among the other reforms which were discussed in the previous section, the extension of

language requirements to economic migrants seeking entry under Tiers 1 (highly skilled) and 2

(skilled workers) of the new points based system (Home Office 2008).

It is interesting that in the new civic integration discourses and policy initiatives

integration is framed as a ‘two way’ process or a tacit contractual agreement between migrants

and the host society, from which a number of obligations and sanctions flow. 5 In particular,

migrants have an obligation to respect the values, culture and traditions of the host society which,

in turn, promises to endow them with protection against arbitrary expulsion and deportation and

equal treatment in the socio­economic and cultural spheres. Albeit its simplicity and popular

appeal, the contemporary framing of integration as a two way process is problematic for a number

of reasons. First, whereas in the past integration required the host society’s pro­active approach

to facilitate settlement and to adapt to the presence of newcomers, the emphasis has now shifted

to the migrant who has the responsibility to integrate and to prove his/her commitment to the host

society (Home Office 2008; Lord Goldsmith 2007; Joppke 2003, 2007). This creates the

impression that migrants have been the defaulting party, and must now redress this by being

willing and ready to integrate or by renewing theirs efforts to ‘earn’ permanent residency rights

and citizenship (Home Office 2008). Secondly, by shifting the focus of attention form the host

society to the migrant and from the legitimate claims for equal treatment and inclusion that

migrants might have to their duties and responsibilities to play a full role in society and to

integrate, the frame conceals that for long migrants have been contributing and sharing the

collective burden without at the same time enjoying the full benefits of membership, non­

discriminatory treatment and recognition as fully respected members. This discoursive

articulation effectively brackets structural constraints and durable prejudices and conceals the

hierarchy and power that is endemic in migration and citizenship policies. This becomes

unravelled when one examines the sanctions that follow possible non­performance; namely, non­

renewal of residence permits, deportation, unsuccessful naturalisation and fines, which reduce the

income of low income groups. The conditionality that accompanies the ‘two way process’ of

integration as well as its extension abroad, before migration, reveals that integration is not only a

mode of control and an expression of a politics of containment of difference, which characterised

5 See also the ‘Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union’, Council of the European Union, 2618 Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, 14615/04, 19.11.2004 and the Council Conclusions, 2807 Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg 12­13 June 2007.

the assimilationist policies of the 1960s and 1970s, but also a means of migration control

designed to reduce unwanted migration. In other words, the ‘two way process’, in reality, is a

‘one way’ process, as it focuses on the migrant only, but it, simultaneously, disregards his/her

point of view.

The third shortcoming of the civic integration discourse is its essentialist and racialised

dimensions. Not only minority and majority communities are portrayed as monolithic and

unchanging and nationalist narratives become rejuvenated, but also ‘political and media debate

around integration and other issues relevant to ethnic minority groups has shifted from a more

technical debate, in which different areas of disadvantage were examined and addressed, to a

more general debate on cultures and values of different groups and, ultimately, on the inherent

moral worth and mutual compatibility of such cultures and values’ (Council of Europe 2008, 35).

Islam is often portrayed to be antithetical to human rights, democracy and free expression and

Muslim citizens and residents’ critique of the Iraq war and their demands for the exercise of free

religious expression are not seen as signs of successful insertion into society but are interpreted as

manifestations of cultural and religious disaffection. In this respect, the European Commission

against Racism and Xenophobia is deeply concerned about these developments, not only because

they have allowed for racist and xenophobic expression to become, sometimes, quite explicitly, a

more usual occurrence with public debate itself, but especially because of the impact that the new

political and public debate has had on public opinion and on the actions of ordinary citizens’

(Council of Europe 2008, 34).

But how can one account for the spread of the discourse on and politics of social

cohesion and integration? Should such a diffusion be seen as a manifestation of discursive

isomorphomism leading to convergence in policies and practices (Joppke 2007)? Or should it be

seen as a process of translation of ideas and frames of meaning in particular political contents and

in ways that suit particular historical conjunctures and party political expediencies? The former

perspective detects a general redefinition of the management of diversity in Europe (i.e., from

multiculturalism to assimilation), thereby leading to policy convergence and highlights the role of

imitation, that is, of ad hoc borrowing of policy tools by national executives in different countries

who may have a similar understanding of the nature of the problem they are supposed to be

addressing. The latter perspective puts more emphasis on experimentation, the creative emulation

of ideas and their adaptation to specific national contexts. In addition, while the former approach

would point towards the articulation of a coherent discursive frame to which specific policy

prescriptions are attached, the latter leaves room for the identification of incoherences and

contradictions in the frame and the articulation of a layered discourse as national actors select

scripts and combine ‘old’ and ‘new’ ideas in innovative ways in order to respond to policy

concerns. By shedding light onto specific discursive fields and the translation of ideas in specific

national policy frames, the latter perspective thus open up space for discontinuities, local

alterations and, more importantly, for critical interventions.

3. ON LETTING BE

In the light of the above mentioned shortcomings of the integration discourse and policy,

alternative approaches need to be considered. It seems to me that the key to promoting

harmonious relations among communities and nurturing human capital is not to seek impose an

artificial unity or an ideal homogeneity, based on either values or judgement or, indeed, language.

Instead, attention should be put to developing a non­racialised frame of community that

welcomes migrants and treats them fairly because it recognises that migrant incorporation is a

long­term and multifaceted process that takes place ‘while people are getting on with their lives

and are doing things’, that is, as they become enmeshed in social life and form interdependent

relations.

One should not underestimate the importance of the context of reception for the

settlement and incorporation of newcomers, their socio­economic mobility and for the formation

of perceptions and attitudes towards the host society and its institutions (Dummett and Nicol

1990: 15, 92­111; Castles and Miller [1993] 1998; Castles and Davidson 2000; Rumbaut 1994;

Alba 1990). In addition, migration processes, notwithstanding the specific socio­political

contexts, have shown that migrants and their descendants nourish and transform the host society

with their creativity, ceaseless determination and hard work and over time become

indistinguishable from the autochthonous population on linguistic and socio­economic grounds,

provided that they do not encounter persisting discrimination and structural disadvantages. There

also exists strong evidence of linguistic assimilation over time, which is often accompanied by a

proactive approach to retain ethnic ties, customs and languages which are often fading away

(Castles and Miller 1998: 243, 248­52; Zhou 1999). Indeed, even for first generation migrants,

the process of ‘learning the ropes’, ‘fitting in’ and ‘communicating in a new language’ is not a

particularly lengthy one. This is because residence and one’s participation in a web of socio­

economic activities result in what may be termed the ‘sociogetic’ effect, that is a centripetal

dynamic connecting an individual to society and the gradual development of a feeling of ‘being at

home’ in the host country. In the host country, prospective and existing citizens appreciate the

synergies, knowledge, and richness opened up by their being together and their transformative

interactions and collisions.

In this respect, forcing a process that will eventually happen via the adoption of state­

programmes that impose undue costs on newcomers and create a less than welcoming

environment can have the perverse effect of undermining migrants’ incorporation and may delay

or even discourage the development of forms of allegiance towards the new society and its

system. Such programmes cannot but replicate contested ethnocentric presumptions of past

assimilationist policies since they frame integration on the basis of a juxtaposition of

irreconcilable cultural differences between insider and outsider groups that threaten the traditional

national identity ­ and not in terms of dynamic relationship that evolves over time. This view is

shared by the European Commission against Racism and Xenophobia (2008, 19, 34) which has

noted that the imposition of sanctions is not the most appropriate or effective approach in matters

of integration and that, regrettably, ‘cultures have been strongly stereotyped and values

automatically and arbitrarily assigned to one or another group’. 6

This is the result of frame­dragging, that is, the existence of cognitive frames and

discourses of nativism, biological or cultural racism and nationalism. Notwithstanding their many

differences, these discourses tend to depict it as natural to associate with one’ own and to have an

antipathy towards ‘outsiders’. Frame­dragging can be seen in old discourses about

‘mongrelisation’, that accompanied the entry of Southern and Eastern Europeans in the US

(Higham 1988) and ‘alien nation’ (Brimelow 1995) and in new discourses about the ‘swamping

of Britain’ and ‘Islamification’. Frame dragging makes the sociogetic effect less weighty and

relevant, as it entails the belittling of the entanglements and actual contributions and sacrifices

made by non­white citizens and residents, who are told that their own lives’ work and their

parents/grandparents’ multifarious contributions lead to the weakening of the fabric of society.

By avoiding essentialism and the unhelpful dualism of conformity v. cultural

incommensurability, the ‘letting be’ approach has the distinct advantage of opening up space for

the continuing cooperation of the various constituencies and for mutual respect for and

affirmation of diversity. Aiming at a respectful symbiosis among groups, the letting be approach

does not seek to control, subjugate, affirm a hierarchy, judge the other as inferior (e.g., less

democrat, less liberal, less civilised, less sincere). Instead, it evokes a different modality of

power, the power to be free from unnecessary regulation to get on with things, to take part in

practices of cooperation and to evolve within a constantly changing environment. By shifting the

emphasis away from national identification to participation in practices of cooperation, the letting

be approach does not expect people to unlearn the old and embrace the new in order to become

accepted in their new home, to prove that they are worthy of membership and to ‘earn their

rights’. Instead, it encourages them to take part in common socio­economic, political and cultural

6 Compare, S. Castles and A. Davidson, Citizenship and Migration (Macmillan, 2000) at p. 80.

activities, to engage in dialogue and to become stakeholders and co­citizens. 7 In other words, the

letting be approach envisions a community in which members see the other as co­other, that is,

equal to, and alongside, themselves. As Connolly (1996: 57) has eloquently put it, ‘is it possible

to imagine a multicultural pluralism where the centre itself is more pluralised? To imagine, for

instance, multicultural differences and interdependencies across several overlapping dimensions,

where no single source of morality inspires everyone and yet where the possibility of significant

democratic collaboration cross multiple lines is very much alive? Is it possible to imagine a

multicultural regime in which a floating majority, if and when it exists, becomes less anxious to

fundamentalise what it is?’

Such issues are, invariably, overlooked by accounts that portray diversity as a threat to

social cohesion. The latter narratives assume the existence of deficiencies in minority groups, be

in terms of language, skills, cultural traditions and norms, which will allegedly overcome through

their participation in integration programmes and demand conformity to terms of integration

which do not include a review of existing structures of inequality and discourses of division and

discrimination. Accordingly, legitimate concerns about fair treatment, continuing discrimination

and racism are often portrayed as expressions coming from disloyal and troublesome minorities

who must ‘learn to respect the laws, codes and conventions as much as the majority’ (Crick

Report 1998 :18). This is not to say that questions, such as how to go about nurturing the ties that

bind multiethnic democratic polities, how to promote interpersonal trust and to encourage full

political participation by all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic background, have easy answers.

Debates about the role of religion in the public sphere and the issue of religious education, for

instance, highlight the importance of reconciling legitimate concerns about promoting capacity

for citizenship and civic engagement with the need to avoid the institutional privileging of one

7 Compare the Commission’s Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment, COM (2003) 336 Final, 3/6/2003 and its First Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM (2004) 508 Final, 16/7/2004.

religion over others. 8 And other often­cited examples of multicultural challenges, such as the

Salman Rushdie, the French foulard (translated as headscarf) and the Danish cartoons cases show

just how easy it is for different interpretative communities to adopt intransigent positions and to

fuel divisive politics.

The key difference and, in my opinion, the appeal, of the letting be approach is that it is

premised on a social engagement model with dynamic learning in action for newcomers, settled

and autochthonous members. It recognises that people become naturally entangled within the

webs of socio­economic and political life by living within the territorial confines of a state,

participating and contributing to social life and therefore does not require them to prove their

commitment to society by engaging in performative acts, such as citizenship ceremonies and

public declarations of allegiance, demonstrating their ‘willingness to integrate’ and passing

probation tests. Instead, it welcomes minority constituencies as participants enjoying equal status,

protection and opportunities in the workplace, society and politics and recognises that

conversations across lines of difference require a reciprocity of understanding, that is a mutual

understanding of each other’s perspective and a commitment to ‘a journey toward broader

horizons through a process of reciprocal learning’ (Dallmayr 2001: 346; compare also Honig

2001). But what kind of policy transmutations could follow the letting be approach?

4. ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND

OBJECTIONS

If my argument that belonging to a community is best nurtured by institutional inclusion and full

participation in society and politics, rather than by integration tests, language proficiency tests or

citizenship quizzes, is correct, governments could facilitate the adaptation of newcomers by

8 On the recognition of religious groups, see Tariq Modood, ‘Anti­Essentialism, Multiculturalism and the Recognition of Religious Groups’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1998, pp. 378­99.

providing information about the institutions and practices of the host society in information packs

and CD ROMs which could be distributed at airports or be available in post­offices. Free and

non­compulsory tuition in the language of the host state could also aid the process of the

adaptation of migrants, thereby providing a favourable context of reception. Such courses could

be provided by local government, non­governmental organisations and community groups or be

funded by central government. 9

Similarly, although naturalisation has been intimately linked with nationhood, it is

possible to envisage revisions of naturalisation policy which incorporate multiculturalist ideas.

Baubock (1994: 73 ­114), for instance, has advocated the ‘egalitarian’ strategy of making the

transition to the higher status of citizenship an entitlement, thereby reducing the discretionary

power of the authorities of the host state and Rubio Marin (2000) has defended the policy of

granting automatic and unconditional grant of national citizenship to resident migrants. The main

advantage of both these proposals is that they make citizenship more inclusive without

challenging the relevance of nationality. However, little attention has been paid to nationality’s

long­term influence on naturalisation policy. Given the weight of its past and its symbolic

significance, ‘thin’ naturalisation is likely to continue to be rooted in and be configured by

ethnicity. It will also be susceptible to periodic ‘thickening’. Politicians interested in re­election

might be tempted to introduce additional and stricter requirements and to promote a renewed

interest in the constitution of ethnic identity and the community’s rich repertoire of historical

memories. The re­ethnicisation of naturalisation in the UK and the Netherlands and elsewhere in

Europe are cases in point.

An alternative policy option would be to replace naturalisation with a system of civic

registration, which would condition admission to full political membership on two requirements

9 Compare, here, the Swedish labour market programmes in the late 1960s, which provided language tuition, training in migrants’ language, adult education and support for migrant language newspapers. In this respect, it can be argued that integration tests not only raise questions about the fairness and liberal character of polities, but also hinder central investment with the aim to develop long term services for migrants.

only; namely, domicile and the absence of serious criminal convictions (Kostakopoulou, 2006;

2008). Generally speaking, such a model would transcend the nationality model of citizenship by

placing the centre of gravity on democratic norms and the social engagement model identified in

section 3 above. Aspiring citizens would be seen as partners and co­venturers. Accordingly, they

would not have to swear an oath of allegiance to the Crown or the constitution, display a good

command of the constitutional history and the language of the host state and most probably, albeit

not necessarily, to renounce all foreign allegiances. Instead, they would have to meet a residence

requirement and show that they are not likely to put the host community at risk by engaging in

criminal activities.

The former requirement reflects the fact that residence generates entitlements, owing to

peoples’ participation in a web of social interactions and the sense of ‘rootedness’ associated with

home ownership, business ownership, employment, participation in civil associations, family ties

and schooling. The ‘sociogetic’ effect of residence thus makes resident non­nationals

stakeholders in the running and the future of the community, thereby strengthening their claims

for political inclusion. Such claims cannot be successfully resisted by appeals to democracy, since

democracy requires inclusion (Dahl 1989) and the input of the governed in the rules and policies

that govern them. The latter requirement, on the other hand, ensures that an applicant does not

represent a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the host society. True, most countries

stipulate that applicants for naturalisation must have no criminal record and/or ‘a good character’,

and the latter can be subject to many interpretations. Historically, the test of ‘good character’

succeeded religious tests in naturalisation laws. The British naturalisation laws of 1740 and 1761,

for instance, contained religious tests and the 1740 law in particular prohibited the naturalisation

of Catholics. The first US naturalisation law of 1790 replaced the religious test with a test of good

character as a prerequisite for US citizenship (Ueda 1980). However, much depends on how

strictly or liberally this requirement is interpreted. Although relatively minor offences and past

convictions can by used to exclude people under the present system, under the civic registration

approach an applicant would be refused political membership if (s)he represented a genuine and

sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public policy (Kostakopoulou 2006).

Critics may object, here, that the civic registration model does not address the needs of

aspiring citizens by omitting requirements, such as acquisition of knowledge about the host

society, familiarity with its forms of life, and knowledge of its institutions and collective history.

After all, education in history, civic culture and the organising principles of the host society are

designed to facilitate the integration of applicants into the fabric of society and the employment

market, and to promote citizenship capacity. A pragmatic case could also be made for civic

integration requirements on the basis that they equip migrants with the skills they need in order to

compete in the workplace and to take part in social life. However, even if one accepted a

paternalistic and pragmatic justification for the intervention of the state in this area, it would be

difficult to explain the obligatory character of integration tests and the sanctions that are attached

to them. Nor could one account for the transfer of integration tests to the states of origin and the

restriction in the right of the family reunification that accompanies a spouse’s failure to pass the

test. In addition, it is not easy to understand how citizenship capacity is enhanced by asking

applicants questions, such as, which two telephone numbers can be used to dial the emergency

services and whether a television licence is required for more than one television in a home in the

UK, or what did Johannes Gutenberg invent and who was the doctor that discovered the cause of

cholera and tuberculosis in Germany. It seems to me that the assumption underpinning integration

programmes is that foreign nationals are, invariably, ignorant and incapable of exercising wise

political judgements, even though their exposure to a different history, political system and civic

culture at home equips them to make comparative political judgements and to reflect on the

institutions and traditions of the host society. Naturalisation itself is generally perceived to be an

enlightening opportunity, 10 despite the facts that in our global village most newcomers already

10 See K. Knapp, ‘The Rhetoric of Exclusion: The Art of Drawing a Line Between Aliens and Citizens’, Geo. Immigration Law Journal, Vol. 10, 1996, pp. 401­440.

know something about the institutions and practices of the host country, and even if they do not,

they are likely to acquire such knowledge within a very short period of time. The workplace, the

market, schools and community groups are sites of political education, and reading newspapers of

the host and home countries and books, watching television, and participating in discussions with

co­ethnics and nationals are more effective ways of acquiring knowledge about the country and

its political culture than taking part in naturalisation tests.

It is certainly the case that civic integration requirements could be justified on the basis of

liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalist scholars, such as Miller and Kymlicka, for instance, would

endorse such requirements, since states are nation­states and nations are viewed to be culturally

distinct political communities. According to this perspective, it is both natural and desirable that

governments take initiatives designed to promote national identity and culture by requiring

migrants to learn the national language and the nation’s history and culture, provided, of course,

that the latter are ‘soft’, do not discriminate and respect the equal moral status of individuals and

diversity. Another, more civic­ or republican­oriented, variant of this argument would put

emphasis on civic involvement and the need to prepare newcomers for shared citizenship. It

might be said that knowledge of the history and culture of the host society enables newcomers to

understand the rules that govern public life, interact with institutions in the public sphere and to

exercise responsible citizenship. Civic integration programmes thus build citizenship capacity by

enabling newcomers to effectuate their rights and obligations and to display their commitment to

the host society. In this respect, the sense of nationality that is being promoted is neither an

illiberal nor an unreasonable one, since the primary objective is to promote social inclusion,

employment, social cohesion and to give migrants and the families better life chances. As Joppke

(2003) has argued, with the exception of language, states have imposed liberal impositions on

newcomers. In assessing the liberal or illiberal nature of these impositions, however, one must

bear in mind the disjuncture between official justifications invoking republican ideals and liberal

values and concrete realities. The latter reveal the mandatory and sanctions­based character of

integration tests, a trend towards ‘tougher’ measures, such as the proposal for probationary

citizenship in the UK, the desire to limit unwanted migration and to restrict family reunification

by requiring ‘integration’ abroad, the reversal of the liberalisation of naturalisation policies and,

above all, a clear institutional component based on the re­evaluation of national citizenship and

national particularism.

But could the same be said about language class and linguistic tests? After all, from a

republican point of view, a common language is necessary for democratic deliberation and testing

migrants’ linguistic ability cannot but facilitate their integration into the public institutions.

Undoubtedly, competence in the language of the host society enhances participation in society

and public life. But this does not imply that lack of linguistic competence makes political

participation impossible. After all, the sources of political information are multiple, variable and,

quite often, multilingual. Nor does it follow that individuals will not be able to make a

contribution to the economy and society. It is interesting to note, here, that before 2 April 2007

there existed no general requirement that people who wish to settle in the UK must be able to

speak English. 11

Having said this, I do not wish to deny the fact that fluency in the host language increases

employment opportunities and facilitates social incorporation. Migrants themselves are acutely

aware of this and often do not need encouragement in order to register for language classes.

States may also decide to offer free tuition in the host language to all residents, regardless of legal

status or their intentions with regard to citizenship. Such initiatives aid the process of settlement

and build connections between newcomers and existing members. In contrast the imposition of

11 However, there was a language requirement for a person who wished to become British citizen (Schedule 1, Paragraph 1(1)(c) of the British Nationality Act 1981). Under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the language requirement also applies to those who apply for naturalisation as spouses of a British citizen or a British Overseas Territories citizen.

linguistic tests to which penalties are attached is likely to promote reactive ethnicity. 12 Having

said this, one must bear in mind that European Union legislation has consistently provided that

mobility of labour in the European internal market cannot be restricted via the imposition of

language tests, unless such tests are required by the nature of the employment post 13 . This is

because linguistic tests often serve as a means of direct discrimination and exclusion by denying

Community nationals equal access to employment.

This divergence between European Union and national legislations reveals that civic

integration programmes have stemmed out of host communities’ deep anxieties about cultural

difference and the fragility of ‘integration’. Newcomers must be ready and willing to ‘integrate’

by speaking the host language at home and in public and acquiring knowledge about the

country’s history and traditions. They need to be seen to ‘make the choice’ to conform to the

majority community’s (partial) notion of national identity, even though, in reality, the

development of feelings of belonging is linked to the respect they receive from the host

community and the opportunity to become participants in the shaping of its future ­ and not their

proven fluency in the language of the community by written tests.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, it may be concluded that the homogenising

impulses of nationalism have not faded way. Integration and assimilation have re­emerged as the

most suitable antidotes to the alleged failures of multicultural co­existence in contemporary plural

states. Major reforms in citizenship and migration laws and policies are naively premised on the

idea that integration courses, mandatory tests and a top­down policy of homogenising

acculturation will produce some magical effect on the settlement of citizenship and community

relations. ‘Integration’ thus becomes a solution to alleged failures in border control, a device for

12 People respond to the discrimination and hostility of the host society by drawing a protective boundary around the group and perceiving themselves as belonging elsewhere. On reactive ethnicity, see Alejandro Portes, ‘Conclusion: Towards a New World’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1999, Vol. 22(2), p. 465. 13 Article 3(1) of European Council Regulation 1612/68 on Free Movement of Workers (OJ Special Edition, 475 [1968] L 257/2). See also Case 379/87 Groener v Minister for Education [1989] ECR 3967, [1990] 1 CMLR 401.

the selection of migrants and an exercise in domination ­ instead of being seen as an issue of

citizenship, non­discrimination and investment in human capital. What is needed is a radically

revised approach based on a better understanding of how the context of reception, official

discourses and the symbolic politics of national identity shape not only the individual destinies of

migrants, but also community relations and the future of society.

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