Client Update February 2014 Competition & Antitrust
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Competition Highlights –
ASEAN & Beyond
Introduction
Dear All,
A Happy New Year to all as we share the latest news from the region. The festive season
was fairly busy with 2013 ending with a number of interesting cases. It appears that 2014
will be as busy on the competition front across ASEAN. For background, Rajah & Tann’s
“Competition Highlights – ASEAN & Beyond” highlights as quick notes only, a number
of important competition related legal and economic developments in ASEAN as well as
key jurisdictions such as the European Union, Australia, India and the PRC.
The updates remind all of the importance of complying with competition laws across
different countries, even as India penalises Etihad for implementing a transaction before
clearance was given, Singapore issues a proposed decision in its first international cartel
case, and the seemingly heightened use of leniency across multiple jurisdictions.
Case and regulatory developments aside, the Rajah & Tann’s Competition Practice has
been boosted with the addition of Principal Economist, Tanya Tang. Tanya has nearly a
decade of experience working with the Infocomm Development Authority and the
Competition Commission in Singapore. Tanya’s addition to the team, at a time when
competition regulators are increasingly active, is welcomed. Tanya is a valuable resource
that will contribute across our ASEAN network of firms and the team will most certainly
benefit from her unique perspectives. The Practice has also been boosted, with bigger and
stronger teams in Vietnam and in Thailand. Indonesia remains a very strong practice with
top notch lawyers plus five economists on the ground.
We trust that you will find this issue informative, and we look forward to any comments
and suggestions. Feel free to contact the lawyers in your jurisdiction as set out at the last
page for your information.
Wishing you all a Happy and Prosperous Lunar New Year.
Kind regards,
Competition & Anti-trust Team
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Singapore
Board Changes At The Competition Commission Of Singapore (“CCS”)
With effect from January 2014, Mr Aubeck Kam Tse Tseun joins the CCS board. Mr Kam,
who currently serves as the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Communications and
Information of Singapore, has replaced Mrs Tan Ching Yee who stepped down on 31st
December 2013 when her term ended. There are no other board changes and Chairman
Mr Lam Chuan Leong and the other board members remain in office.
CCS Issues Proposed Infringement Decision Against Ball And Roller Bearings
Manufacturers
On 16 December 2013, the CCS issued a Proposed Infringement Decision (“PID”) against
four Japanese bearings manufacturers and their Singapore subsidiaries (“Parties”). CCS
began its inquiry into the cartel after one of the companies applied for immunity under
the CCS’ leniency program. In this preliminary decision, which is CCS’ first infringement
case in an international cartel, the CCS held that by engaging in “anti-competitive
agreements and unlawful exchange of information in relation to the prices of ball and
roller bearings”, the Parties had infringed section 34 of the Competition Act. The CCS, in
another first, has held both parents and subsidiaries would be jointly and severally liable
for the infringement.
CCS Publishes Occasional Paper On Whether Buyer Power Can Be Used As A Defence
On 8 January 2014, the CCS published an Occasional Paper discussing whether Buyer
Power can be used as a Defence. “Buyer power” is defined as the circumstance where “a
firm or a group of firms are able to obtain from suppliers more favourable terms than
those available to other buyers or would otherwise be expected under normal competitive
conditions”.
Using past cases in Singapore as case studies, the paper discusses the possibility of raising
such a defence in relation to cases of abuse of dominance, mergers and anti-competitive
agreements where, prima facie, the act would result in an adverse effect on competition in
the market. It concludes that such a defence may be used to avoid liability for
infringements in the following ways:
Abuse of dominance: the presence of countervailing buyer power may be used to
argue that the undertaking is not in a dominant position and, therefore, no abuse can
be found.
Mergers: the existence of countervailing buyer power may minimize the risks of
coordination between the remaining undertakings post-merger. It may also offset
non-coordinated anti-competitive effects so that no Substantial Lessening of
Competition (“SLC”) will be found to result from the merger.
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Anti-Competitive Agreements: except for cases involving black listed activities, buyer
power may be used to argue that there is no appreciable adverse effect on competition
in the market. The presence of buyer power can also be used to strengthen the case for
net economic benefit.
Malaysia
Malaysian Competition Commission (“MyCC”) Grants Conditional Block Exemption
For Liner Shipping Agreements
On 19 December 2013, following studies into the shipping industry and consultations with
stakeholders and relevant government agencies, the MyCC has issued a conditional Block
Exemption Order (“BEO”) for liner shipping arrangements. The agreements subject to the
exemption are Vessel Sharing Agreements (“VSA”) and Voluntary Discussion
Agreements (“VDA”) between liner operators made within Malaysia or which have an
effect on the liner shipping services in Malaysia. There are various conditions attached to
the exemption of VSAs and VDAs including, inter alia, that they do not contain any
elements of price fixing and are for a reasonable period of time only. In addition, the
agreements have to be filed with MyCC.
VSAs and VDAs typically involve coordination between shipping operators in respect of
their capacity and schedules and could involve the exchange of detailed market and
commercial data. Such activities, if not otherwise exempted, fall foul of section 4 of the
Competition Act 2010, which prohibits such anti-competitive agreements. The decision to
exempt these agreements was because they gave rise to significant identifiable benefits,
which include the frequency and quality of shipping services. However, VSAs will not
benefit from the BEO if they contain arrangements on rates of tariffs charged.
Notably, the BEO only exempts transport services provided by liner operators for ocean
transport, and excludes intra-modal transport services. Thus, any inland carriage of
goods, including services provided by logistics providers, forwarders, depot operators,
truckers, railroads, off-dock consolidation service providers, and off-dock storage and
warehousing service providers are not exempt. Separately, the BEO does not provide
immunity where parties abuse their dominant position.
The proposed BEO was issued further to an application filed by various associations in
Malaysia in December 2011. The BEO is expected to be in force for three years from the
date the order is published in the Gazette, and will be reviewed two years from the date of
its commencement. As at the date of this Update, the BEO has not been gazetted.
MyCC Issues Draft Guidelines On Leniency And Financial Penalties
On 15 January 2014, MyCC issued two separate sets of Guidelines for public consultation :
the Draft Guidelines on Leniency and the Draft Guidelines on Financial Penalties. Whilst
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the draft Guidelines on Financial Penalties are very brief and do not provide much detail
on the aggravating and mitigating factors used by MyCC when calculating the amount of
the fines to be imposed, the draft Leniency Guidelines include details on the procedure to
be followed, the conditions that can be imposed on the leniency applicant, and the stage at
which unconditional leniency will be granted. However, it is not clear from the draft
whether leniency will only be granted to the first leniency applicant or otherwise, a point
that will hopefully be addressed further to the public consultation.
MyCC Probes Alleged Cartel Behaviour In Ice And Stationery Markets
The MyCC has launched preliminary investigations into the ice manufacturing and
stationery industries for alleged price-fixing. On 24 December 2013, 26 ice manufacturers
had published an advertisement in a local newspaper advertisement their decision to
increase the prices of edible tube ice by 50 sen per bag and RM2.50 per block from January
2014. In a similar move, on 27 December 2013, the Federation of Stationers and Booksellers
declared that the price of stationery will be increased come the first quarter of 2014.
On 21 January 2014, MyCC issued interim measures to prohibit the 26 ice manufacturers
from implementing the agreed price increase. No similar action has been taken, as yet,
against the Federation of Stationers and Booksellers.
Schedule 1 To The Competition Act Amended
With effect from 1 January 2014, Schedule 1 of the Competition Act 2010 has been
amended to exclude commercial activities regulated under the Petroleum Development
Act 1974 and the Petroleum Regulations 1974 from the application of the Competition Act
insofar as such activities are “directly in connection with upstream operations comprising
the activities of exploring, exploiting, winning and obtaining petroleum whether onshore
or offshore Malaysia”.
Indonesia
Proposed Acquisition Of PT. Perusahaan Gas Negara (“PGN”) By PT. Pertamina
(“Persero”)
Following the Indonesian government’s approval for Persero’s proposed acquisition of
PGN, the KPPU is closely monitoring the implementation of the deal. PGN is Indonesia’s
largest natural gas transportation and distribution company while Persero is a state-
owned oil and gas company, with its subsidiary, PT. Pertamina Gas (“Pertagas”), in
charge of gas supply in Indonesia. While the purported aim of the merger is to ensure
“open access” between the gas pipes infrastructure owned by PGN and Pertagas so as to
strengthen national energy security, the merger will likely also reinforce PGN’s dominant
position in the market for gas pipes infrastructure.
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KPPU Commences Investigations into Potential Irregularities in the PT. Dayamitra
Telekomunikasi (“Mitratel”) Sale
The KPPU has announced that it has commenced investigations into certain practices of
PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, Tbk (“Telkom”), Indonesia’s largest telecommunications
company. Specifically, the KPPU is reviewing the tender process of Telkom’s subsidiary in
the telecommunications tower sector, Mitratel.
According to the Commissioner, Syarkawi Rauf, the KPPU believes that Mitratel had
amended its tender process, but such amendments were not made known to the KPPU.
Hence, the KPPU is interested in whether or not the amended process had an effect on the
relevant market. This is primarily also because there is an obligation on Mitratel to comply
with the relevant rules and regulations, and notify the relevant authorities of any material
changes to its business processes.
The investigation by the KPPU into the tender processes of Mitratel is supported by
Commission VI of the House of Representatives (“DPR”). Separate from the
investigations, DPR stated that it had made an official request to the Ministry of State
Enterprises to rescind the proposed sale of Mitratel, as the sale may potentially result in
huge financial losses for Telkom. According to the DPR, the potential losses suffered by
Telkom would have a detrimental effect on the country. In support of its request, the DPR
further stated that the sale of Mitratel fell within the ambit of Law No 17 of 2003
Regarding State Monetary Affairs. Hence, any such sale must obtain the prior approval of
DPR.
Vietnam
3G Fee Hike Does Not Violate Competition Law
On 30 December 2013, the Vietnam Competition Authority (“VCA”) dismissed allegations
that a recent simultaneous price hike in 3G data packages by the country’s three largest
mobile network operators, Viettel, MobiFone and Vinaphone was anticompetitive.
Specifically, the VCA found no evidence of collusion between the three operators, noting
that: (i) each operator’s proposals for price increases were lodged with the Ministry of
Information and Communications at different times; (ii) each operator had submitted
different scheduled start dates and price increases for packages other than 3G data
packages; and (iii) the common start date of 16 October selected by all three operators for
their price hike was not the result of collusion but actually an adherence to the common
practice where 3G tariffs are payable either in the beginning or middle of the month.
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China
Beijing Court Issues Judgment Against Seafood Cartel
On 21 November 2013, the Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court ruled that a
horizontal agreement between members of the Beijing Seafood Wholesalers’ Association
(the “Association”) to maintain minimum retail prices of scallops from Zhangzi Island
and to prevent the sale of these scallops to non-members was in violation of the
Antimonopoly Law. The Association was ordered to cease all infringing conduct
immediately. This is the first reported case where a Chinese court found and ruled against
a restrictive horizontal covenant. The Association has filed an appeal against the decision.
China’s Top Antitrust Regulator Poised For Major Expansion In 2014
On 11 December 2013, Xu Kunlin, Head of the Bureau of Price Supervision and Anti-
Monopoly at the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) announced
in an interview with China Daily, that the NDRC will hire at least 170 more employees in
2014. About 20 of these new employees will be based in Beijing while the rest will join
local units to investigate anti-competitive practices. Xu said that with more staff, the
NDRC can increase oversight over business practices that may lead to ”unreasonably high
prices for consumers” especially in industries that ”harm the consumers the most” such as
the aerospace, daily chemicals, automobile, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and
home appliances industries.
Other Jurisdictions
Europe
European Commission (“EC”) Fines Banks €1.71 Billion For Participating In Cartels In
Interest Rate Derivatives Industry
On 4 December 2013, the EC announced that it has fined eight international financial
institutions a total of €1,712,468,000 for their participation in illegal cartels in markets for
financial derivatives traded in the European Economic Area (“EEA”). Six of these
institutions participated in one or more bilateral cartel involving interest rates derivatives
denominated in Japanese yen (“YIRD”) while four of them participated in a cartel
involving interest rates derivatives denominated in Euro (“EIRD”). Both cases had
surfaced further to leniency applications by UBS and Barclays respectively.
With regard to the EIRD, traders from the four financial institutions discussed trading and
pricing strategies and colluded to fix the Euro Interbank Offered Rate, a daily reference
rate based on the averaged interest rates at which Eurozone banks offer to lend unsecured
funds to other banks in the euro wholesale money market. In relation to the YIRD, the
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traders exchanged information on their Japanese Yen London Interbank Offered Rate
submissions.
Under the EC’s cartel settlement procedure, the fines imposed were reduced by 10%.
However, proceedings are continuing against three financial institutions which had
decided not to settle the case.
EC Fines Johnson & Johnson And Novartis €16 Million For Delaying Market Entry Of
Generic PainKiller Fentanyl
On 10 December 2013, the EC announced that it has imposed fines of €10,798,000 on the
US pharmaceutical company Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”) and €5,493,000 on Swiss
company Novartis AG for colluding and entering into an anti-competitive agreement to
delay the market entry of a generic version of the painkiller Fentanyl in Netherlands. In
July 2005, after J&J’s patent expired, its Dutch subsidiary, Janssen-Cillag (“JC”), entered
into an agreement with Novartis’ Dutch subsidiary, Sandoz, for Sandoz not to enter the
market in exchange for monthly payments. The agreement eventually only ended in
December 2006 when a third party launched a generic version of the Fentanyl patch.
EC Clears Acquisition Of Nokia’s Mobile Device Business By Microsoft
On 4 December 2013, the EC cleared Microsoft Corporation’s proposed acquisition of the
majority of Nokia Corporation’s device and service businesses (“D&S business”) under
the EU Merger Regulation. The D&S business comprises the production and sale of
smartphones and feature phones. The EC concluded that the proposed acquisition would
not raise any competition concerns, noting that:
the merged entity will continue to face strong competition in the market, including
from Samsung and Apple,
the overlap between the merger parties’ activities was minimal, and
post merger, Microsoft is unlikely to stop or deny the supply of its operating systems
and related software to third party smartphones producers. This is because Microsoft
is not a big player in the mobile operating systems market and would need to leverage
on third party device suppliers to compete with other stronger competitors.
EC Opens In-Depth Investigation (Phase II) Into Telefonica Deutschland’s Acquisition Of
E-Plus
In December 2013, the EC started an in-depth investigation (Phase II) into the planned
acquisition of E-Plus Germany by Telefonica Deutschland (“Telefonica”).
Telefonica and E-Plus are currently competitors in the mobile telephony services market
and the acquisition will “combine two of the four mobile networks in Germany and create
a player of similar size to the currently two largest operators, Deutsche Telekom and
Vodafone”. The concern is this could result in the elimination of an important competitive
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force and lead to a SLC in the market. Additionally, post-merger, the remaining mobile
network operators could have greater incentive to collude or engage in anti-competitive
behaviour. The acquisition could also lead to fewer options for mobile virtual network
operators and service providers to choose from and results in a poorer bargaining position
for wholesale access terms. A decision is expected to be issued by May 2014.
Australia
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) Challenges Laundry
Industry Agreement On New Products
The ACCC has filed proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia against an alleged
”laundry detergent cartel” involving Australia’s leading suppliers of laundry products,
Colgate-Palmolive (“CP”), PZ Cussons Australia (“Cussons”) and Unilever. The case
commenced following an immunity application by Unilever under the ACCC’s Immunity
Policy for Cartel Conduct.
The ACCC has alleged that the parties have agreed to cease the supply of standard
concentrate laundry detergents from early 2009 and supply only ultra-concentrate
detergents thereafter. The three suppliers also standardised their ultra-concentrate
products to meet certain specifications across the full range of their laundry products. CP
and Unilever are also being accused of sharing market sensitive information, including on
the planned dates of price increases. According to the ACCC, Woolworths, one of the two
largest supermarket chains in Australia, knowingly participated in the laundry detergent
cartel by playing a key role in its implementation.
The ACCC Takes Action Against NSK For Alleged Car Parts Cartel
The ACCC has filed proceedings against NSK Australia Pty Ltd (“NSK”) in the Federal
Court of Australia alleging that NSK and at least two of its competitors participated in a
cartel for the supply of ball and roller bearings used in vehicles and industrial machinery
in 2008 and 2009. The cartel involved the exchange of information on the companies’
future pricing strategies, with the aim to maintain /control the price of bearings sold to
aftermarket customers.
India
Competition Commission Of India (“CCI”) Slaps Record Fine On State Coal Producer For
Abuse Of Dominance
On 9 December 2013, the CCI imposed a penalty of 17.7 billion rupees on state owned coal
miner Coal India (“CIL”) for abusing its dominant position by imposing unfair/
discriminatory conditions in its Fuel Supply Agreements (“FSAs”) with power producers
for the supply of non-coking coal. CIL had been criticised by power companies for
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supplying inferior coal at higher prices and having non-transparent contract conditions,
including those relating to the quality of coal.
In addition to imposing a financial penalty, the CCI issued a cease and desist order and
directed modifications to the FSAs. CIL has since filed an appeal with the Competition
Appellate Tribunal, challenging the CCI’s order.
Indian Government Exempts Shipping Vessel Sharing Pacts From The Prohibition Of
Anti-Competitive Agreements
On 11 December 2013, following consultations with CCI, the Shipping Ministry as well as
public stakeholders, the Corporate Affairs Ministry, renewed for another year, its
exemption of Vessel Sharing Agreements (“VSA”) from the anti-competitive agreements
prohibition of the Competition Act. However, the exemption for Discussion Agreements
(“VDA”) was not renewed. VSAs are agreement allowing carriers to share space in each
other’s vessels and, therefore, optimize capacity while VDAs are agreements that allow
the exchange of market information between shipping parties. The exemption of VSAs
applies to all liner operators that operate ships from any Indian port, regardless of
nationality. To be availed of the exemption, parties are required to file their VSAs with the
Director General of Shipping.
Etihad Airways’ Purchase Of Jet Airways Fraught With Turbulence
In October 2013, the Indian Government approved Etihad Airways’ (“Etihad”) purchase
of a 24% stake in Indian carrier Jet Airways (“Jet”) in a US$379 million deal (“Deal”). The
Deal was subsequently approved by the CCI on 12 November 2013. An appeal against
this decision has been lodged by an interested party.
Separately, on 19 December 2013, the CCI, despite the clearance, fined Etihad 10 million
rupees under Section 43 of the Competition Act. This was because Etihad went ahead with
parts of the Deal before CCI had approved the transaction, i.e. what is commonly known
as gun-jumping. The fine relates to Jet’s sale of landing and take-off slots at London’s
Heathrow Airport to Etihad pursuant to pacts entered into between the two carriers on 26
February 2013. The CCI has clarified that the implementation of the deal before clearance
would not impact the previous approval given for the Deal.
Japan
JFTC Issues Cease And Desist Orders And Fines To Engineering Companies For Bid
Rigging
On 20 December 2013, the JFTC announced its decision to impose a cease and desist order
and surcharge payments totalling ¥746.62 million on more than 40 engineering companies
for their involvement in bid-rigging practices on tenders relating to the provision of
overhead transmission facility works and underground transmission line works by the
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Tokyo Electric Power Company (“TEPCO”). The decision stems from a series of on-site
inspections conducted in November 2012. According to the JFTC, the engineering
companies colluded with one another by pre-assigning amongst them the successful
bidders for these tenders.
TEPCO employees responsible for procurement were also found by JFTC to have
facilitated the bid-rigging practices by inviting only a selected few companies to
participate in the tenders, and assisting the engineering companies in concealing their
anti-competitive conduct. JFTC has since urged TEPCO to improve its bidding system and
to take appropriate measures to ensure that such violations of competition law are not
repeated.
South Korea
Three Retailers Fined For Unfair Business Activities
On 20 November 2013, South Korea’s Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”) imposed a total
fine of ₩6.21 billion on three major retailers for engaging in unfair business activities
prohibited by the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. The three retailers are Lotte
Department Store, a major department store chain in South Korea, Lotte Mart, a chain of
convenience stores, and Homeplus, the South Korean subsidiary of British retail giant
Tesco PLC.Lotte Department Store received the largest fine of ₩4.57 billion using its
market power to force smaller vendors to disclose sales information of their products in
competing department stores. Lotte Mart was fined ₩330 million for reportedly forcing its
suppliers to sponsor a golf tournament. Meanwhile, Homeplus had to pay ₩1.3 billion for
reportedly using its market power to force smaller suppliers to, among other things,
absorb the cost of delivery to consumers of purchased products.
Fair Trade Commission Fines Automotive Parts Makers For Prices Fixing
On 23 December 2013, the KFTC announced that it has imposed a total fine of ₩114.6
billion on the South Korean subsidiaries of Japan’s Denso Corp and Germany’s
Continental AG and Bosch GmbH for fixing prices of automotive parts sold to Hyundai
Motor Co, a major South Korean automobile maker.
Taiwan
Fair Trade Commission Censures Apple Over Resale Price Maintenance Of iPhones
On 25 December 2013, Taiwan’s Fair Trade Commission (“TFCT”) fined Apple Inc.’s
subsidiary, Apple Asia LLC (“Apple”), TWD20 million for interfering with the retail price
of iPhone handsets sold by Taiwan’s three main mobile service providers. Under
distribution contracts that the three mobile service providers entered with Apple, each
mobile service provider was to provide to Apple details of the bundled mobile plans and
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retail price of iPhones that they intended to set for Apple’s approval prior to listing the
iPhones for sale.
The TFTC noted that Apple violated Article 18 of the Fair Trading Act which prohibits
resale price maintenance since Apple’s agreements with the three mobile service
providers effectively meant it determined the retail price of the iPhones. The TFTC also
stated that after the mobile service providers paid for the iPhones handsets, these
handsets belong to the mobile service providers and they should be able to freely decide
on the retail prices of these handsets.
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THE RAJAH & TANN LLP REGIONAL COMPETITION TEAM – PRIMARY CONTACTS
For more information on issues arising in specific countries please contact the persons below. For issues
arising in a country not listed below, please feel free to contact the Singapore team in the first instance.
General Contacts
Rajah & Tann LLP
9 Battery Road #25-01,
Straits Trading Building
Singapore 049910
t (65) 6535 3600
f (65) 6225 9630
www.rajahtann.com
Competition & Antitrust Practice
Contact:
t: (65) 6232 0111 / 6232 0104
SINGAPORE
Kala Anandarajah
Partner (Head, Competition & Antitrust)
D (65) 6232 0111 F (65) 6428 2192 [email protected]
Dominique Lombardi
Partner (Foreign Lawyer)
D (65) 6232 0104 F (65) 6428 2257
MALAYSIA (associate firm)
Kuok Yew Chen
Partner
D (603) 2273 1919 F (603) 2273 8310
Yon See Ting
Partner
D (603) 2273 1919 F (603) 2273 8310 [email protected]
INDONESIA (associate firm)
Yogi Sudrajat Marsono
Partner
D (62) 21 2555 7812 F (62) 21 2555 7899
Eri Hertiawan
Partner
D (62) 21 2555 7800 F (62) 21 2555 7899
Rikrik Rizkiyana
Partner
D (62) 21 2555 9937 F (62) 21 2555 7899
Vovo Iswanto
Partner
D (62) 21 2555 7800 F (62) 21 2555 7899
VIETNAM
Lim Wee Hann
Partner
D (65) 6232 0606 F (65) 6225 7725
Bui Khuong Diem Hoan
Senior Associate
D (84) 8382 12673 x 15 F (84) 8382 12685
THAILAND
Sui Lin Teoh
Director
D (66) 2656 1991 x 111 F (66) 2656 0833
Nattarat Boonyatap
Director
D (66) 2656 1991 x 108 F (66) 2656 0833
CAMBODIA (associate firm)
Heng Chhay
Managing Partner
D (855) 23 215 734 F (855) 23 726 417
LAO
Desmond Wee
Partner
D (65) 6232 0474 F (65) 6428 2198
MYANMAR
Chester Toh
Partner
D (65) 6232 0220 F (65) 6428 2208
Nyein Kyaw
Managing Partner
D (959) 7304 0763 F (951) 657902
CHINA
Benjamin Cheong
Partner
D (65) 6232 0738 F (65) 6428 2233
Linda Qiao Lina
Senior Associate
D (86) 21 6120 8818 F (86) 21 6120 8820
Rajah & Tann LLP is the largest law firm in Singapore and Southeast Asia with regional offices in China, Lao PDR, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar, as well as associate and affiliate offices in Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia and the
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