Compilation civpro

8/13/2019 Compilation civpro

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ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. JUDGE JOSE B. HERRERAG.R. No. L-3609 J!"#!$% ', '93

(!)*s+ Petitioner and private respondent entered into an agreement thereby for and in consideration of P55,430.00, the formeragreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land with a special condition that should private respondent as purchaser complete the

construction including the painting of his residential house on said lot within two (2 years, petitioner, as owner, has agreed to

refund to private respondent the amount of P!0.00 per s"uare meter. #hen the aforesaid special condition was fulfilled, private

respondent, accordingly notified in writing the petitioner of the same and re"uested for his refund amounting to P4,$20.00.

%pon failure of petitioner to pay his obligation, $v!* $so"/"* filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with *C*% Co#$* o1 M!"2!, B$!") II MTC4 against petitioner. &his petition was dismissed on the ground that the claim of private respondent in his complaint, being less than P!0,000.00, is within the e'clusive urisdiction of the city court.

Iss#+ #hether or not the city court ( )&* has urisdiction over the case. +o, it is the &*.

H2/+ &he action involved in this case is one 1o$ s)1) $1o$5!") and not for a sum of money and wherefore incapableof pecuniary estimation because what private respondent see-s is the performance of petitioners obligation under a written

contract to ma-e a refund but under certain specific conditions still to be proven or established.

/n a case for the recovery of a sum of money, as the collection of a debt, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary

estimation because the obligation to pay the debt is not conditioned upon any specific fact or matter. ut when a party to a

contract has agreed to refund to the other party a sum of money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions and only

upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him under the written contract be demanded, the action is one not capable

of pecuniary estimation.

&he payment of a sum of money is only incidental which can only be ordered after a determination of certain acts the

performance of which being the more basic issue to be in"uired into.

1lthough private respondents complaint in the court a quo is designated as one for a sum of money and damages, an analysis

of all the factual allegations of the complaint patently shows that what private respondent see-s is the performance of

petitioners obligation under the written contract to ma-e the refund of the rate of P!0.00 per s"uare meter or in the total

amount of P4,$20.00, but only after proof of having himself fulfilled the conditions that will give rise to petitioners obligation,

a matter clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation.

&herefore, the complaint filed by the private respondents in the *ity *ourt of )anila, ranch // ()&*, is hereby ordered

dismissed for lac- of urisdiction. /t should be filed in the *ourt of irst /nstance (+ow &*.

G.R. No. 90703. S*58$ , '990.:

NESTOR SANDO;AL, Petitioner , v. HON. DOROTEO CA


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C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,vs. HON. ROMEO J. HIBIONADAG.R. No. 09'6 Nov58$ 9, '990

(ACTS+&he petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville 9evelopment *orporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to

private respondent udicial bodies.

P.9. +o. 5, promulgated 6uly !2, !A and otherwise -nown as ;&he 7ubdivision and *ondominium uyers

Protective 9ecree,; provides that the +ational 8ousing 1uthority shall have e'clusive authority to regulate the real

estate trade and business.

P.9. +o. !344, promulgated 1pril 2, !$, and empowered the +ational 8ousing 1uthority to issue writs of

e'ecution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.9. +o. 5, specified the "uasi>udicial urisdiction of the

agency as follows:

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of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be

inade"uate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the inurious effects of the order complained of, or

where appeal is inade"uate and ineffectual. +evertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of

appeal, where such loss is occasioned by the petitioners own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. &his petition should

therefore be dismissed on the ground that it was resorted to as a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal.

1ssuming arguendo that there is no procedural defect in this case, it must still fail for the trial court correctly ruled that it has

no urisdiction over the subect matter in the civil cases filed by petitioners. 6urisdiction thereon was originally vested in the

+ational 8ousing 1uthority (+81 under P.9. +o. 5, as amended by P.9. +o. !344. %nder eyes alleged that she is the claimowner of !! mining claims all located in the province of

Fambales. 7he e'ecuted a 7pecial Power of 1ttorney constituting her father, *elestino ). 9iEon, as her attorney>in>fact with

full powers to ;transfer, assign and dispose of her !! mining claims.;

n 6anuary 2!, !A, *elestino ). 9iEon, acting as such attorney>in>fact for private respondent and other claimowners,

entered into an 1greement, with 9iEon )ine whereby the latter was granted the right to e'plore, develop, e'ploit and operate

the 5 mining claims owned by the claimowners including the !! claims of private respondent.

7even ( years later, private respondent and the other claimowners e'ecuted a 9eed of atification of 1ssignment, confirming

the assignment, transfer and conveyance unto 9iEon )ines and its assigns and successors of the rights to possess, occupy,

e'plore, develop and operate all the aforesaid mining claims.

1lmost three (3 months after the 9eed of atification was e'ecuted, private respondent revo-ed 7pecial Power of 1ttorney of

6anuary !5, !A, stating that ;while there is no "uestion that / still have complete and full trust and confidence in the

udgment and wisdom of my father, it is not my wish to add any more to his already many a mounting problems.;

+otice of the revocation was served on 9iEon )ines on )arch 20, !5 and on enguet on 1ugust 2A, !5.

8owever, in spite of said notice, 9iEon )ines and enguet entered into an perations 1greement whereby the formertransferred to the latter the possession of the 5 mining claims.

8elen now claims that the peration 1greement lac-s legal basis due to her revocation of the 7P1, private respondent prayed

that the perations 1greement be declared null and void and inoperative insofar as it covers her eleven (!! lode mining

claims. /n the alternative, private respondent prayed that should the validity of the perations 1greement be upheld,

defendants therein be ordered to observe and comply with the sharing of profits stipulated in the 1greement of 6anuary 2!,

!A. 7he further prayed for the award of attorneys fees and e'penses of litigation as may be proved during the trial.

enguet filed a )otion to 9ismiss on the following grounds: ! the court is without urisdiction over the subect matter and

nature of the action= 2 the action is barred by prior udgment and laches= 3 the action to declare invalid the 9eed of

atification has prescribed= and 4 the venue of the action was improperly laid. 9iEon )ines filed its own motion to dismiss.

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agreement with respect to private respondents landholdings at Poblacion +orte, *armen, ohol, under which petitioners were

to pay private respondent a certain amount or percentage of their harvests. 8owever, despite repeated demands and with no

valid reason, petitioners failed to pay their respective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay

him bac- rentals and damages.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lac- of urisdiction of the trial court over the subect

matter. &hey contended that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations, hence, the subect matter of the

complaint fell s"uarely within the urisdiction of the 9epartment of 1grarian eform (91 in the e'ercise of its "uasi>

udicial powers under 7ec. !, pars. (a and (b, ule // of the evised ules of the 9epartment of 1grarian eform

1dudication oard.

&he trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and denied the motion for reconsideration. Private respondent sought

annulment of both orders before respondent *1 which rendered udgment reversing the trial court and directing it to assume

urisdiction over the case on the basis of its finding that the *1? (1 AA5 and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform

cannot be seen to encompass a case of simple collection of bac- rentals by virtue of an agreement, as the one at bar, where

there is no agrarian dispute to spea- of (since the allegation of failure to pay the agreed rentals was never controverted in the

motion to dismiss nor the issue raised on application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of these laws.

n !$ 6anuary !3 the appellate court reected the motion for reconsideration. Petitioners maintain that thealleged cause of action of private respondent arose from an agrarian relation and that respondent appellate court failed to

consider that the agreement involved is an agricultural leasehold contract, hence= the dispute is agrarian in nature. &he laws

governing its e'ecution and the rights and obligations of the parties thereto are necessarily .1. 3$44, .1. AA5 and other

pertinent agrarian laws. *onsidering that the application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of said laws are

matters which have been vested in the 91, this case is outside the urisdiction of the trial court.

ISSUE: 1re egional &rial *ourtsC vested with urisdiction over cases for money claims particularly collection of bac- rentalsfrom leasehold tenantsL

RULING+ +M 7ection ! of mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Iss#+ *an the Professional egulation *ommission lawfully prohibit the e'aminess from attending review classes, receivinghandout materials, tips, or the li-e 3 days before the date of the e'aminationL

R#2"=+ #e realiEe that the "uestioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is ;to preserve the integrityand purity of the licensure e'aminations.; 8owever, its good aim cannot be a cloa- to conceal its constitutional infirmities. n

its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an e'aminee cannot even attend any review class, briefing,

conference or the li-e, or receive any hand>out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any

review center or the li-e or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar

institutions.

&he unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives

will be barred from ta-ing future e'aminations conducted by the respondent P*. urthermore, it is inconceivable how the

*ommission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every e'aminee during the three days before the e'amination

period.

/t is an ai'iom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of

rules and regulations. &o be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. /f

shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authoriEed to be issued, then they must be held to be

invalid.

esolution +o. !05 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the e'aminees right to liberty guaranteed by the*onstitution. espondent P* has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the

licensure e'aminations. &hey cannot be restrained from ta-ing all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their

ambition to become public accountants. &hey have every right to ma-e use of their faculties in attaining success in their

endeavors.

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NONITO J. BERNARDO, petitioner,vs.

CALTE? PHILIPPINES4, INC., respondent

1*&7:

• &he appeal on certiorari at bar ' treats of the urisdiction of the egional &rial *ourt over the controversy between

petitioner and respondent in light of 7ections 3 (par. 2 NaO and of plant, were invoiced at the new rates . . . in accordance with the

Purchase and 7ale 1greement .

• 9emands subse"uently made by ernardo for delivery of the petroleum products paid for by him, '0 were refused

by *alte' unless ernardo paid the difference between the old and new prices. *alte' claimed, in ustification of its

refusal, '' that when ernardo demanded ;delivery of his orders, the prices had already increased due to the


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which as already stated, e'tends to ;(all disputes between any operatorGdealer and an oil company regarding dealership

agreement e'cept those arising out of their relationship as debtor and creditor . . . .; /t is rather one cogniEable by the egional

&rial *ourt, as a dispute indeed ;arising out of their relationship as debtor and creditor.;

1s the facts ma-e clearly apparent, there is no ;unsettled dispute as regards the pricing of the . . . (petroleum products,; as the

egional &rial *ourt opines in its challenged rder of 1ugust !4, !!. n the contrary, the parties are in agreement about the

prices of the petroleum products in "uestion which became effective on 9ecember 5, !0 at A ocloc- P.)., and those

prevailing prior thereto. &heir disagreement is as regards which of the two sets of prices shall apply to the transactions subect

of ernardos complaint.

+either do the parties impugn the validity or the propriety or wisdom of the specific e'ercise by the matter is determined by the allegations of the

complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein H amatter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial. +or may the urisdiction of the court be made to depend upon

the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the "uestion of

urisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.

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/t is in the view of the *ourt that the resolution of this aspect of the case falls within the e'clusive province of the P7*.

%nder section 20(g of the Public 7ervice ?aw, the P7* is the body invested with the power and authority to approve a sale or

transfer of a certificate of public convenience.

&he *ourt has indeed sustained the power and authority of the P7* (a to approve provisionally the transfer of a certificate of

public convenience where the conditions laid down by section 20(g are satisfied,A and (b to grant provisional authority to a

vendee to operate a franchise pending determination of the legality of the sale.


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;(3 entrenched is the rule that urisdiction over the subect matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or

some of the claims asserted.

&herefore, petition is granted and orders of &* &acloban are reversed and set aside.

EUITABLE PCI BAN, INC., P**o"$ v. HON. SAL;ADOR Y. APURILLO " s )!!)*% !s P$s/"= J#/=,R=o"!2 T$!2 Co#$* o1 T!)2o8!" C*%, B$!") , !"/ YS REALTY DE;ELOPMENT, INC., Rso"/"*s

1*&7:

@R7 ealty 9evelopment, /nc. was a client of Philippine *ommercial /nternational an- (P*/ and


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&he designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific performance. &he doc-eting fee

should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.

1s reiterated in the )agaspi case the rule is well>settled ;that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the doc-et fee

regardless of the actual date of filing in court . &hus, in the present case the trial court did not ac"uire urisdiction over the c ase

by the payment of only P4!0 as doc-et fee. +either can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest urisdiction upon the

*ourt. or an legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. *onse"uently,

the order admitting the amended complaint and all subse"uent proceedings and actions ta-en by the trial court are null and

void.

*1 aptly ruled that the basis of assessment of the doc-et fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint

and not in the amended complaint.

&he *ourt cannot close this case without ma-ing the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original

complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P$

million is alleged in the body of the complaint. &his is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the

correct filing fees if not to mislead the doc-et cler- in the assessment of the filing fee. &his fraudulent practice was

compounded when, even as this *ourt had ta-en cogniEance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through

another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being as-ed for in the body of thecomplaint.

/t was only when in obedience to the order of this *ourt of ctober !$, !$5, the trial court directed that the amount of

damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced

amount of P!0,000,000 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. &he design to avoid payment of the re"uired

doc-et fee is obvious.

&o put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the

amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be

considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. 1ny pleading that fails to comply with this re"uirement shall not bib

accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be e'punged from the record.

&he *ourt ac"uires urisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee. 1n amendment of the

complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest urisdiction in the *ourt, much less the payment of the doc-et fee based on

the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

G.R. Nos. 993-3 (8$#!$% '3, '99SUN INSURANCE O((ICE, LTD., SIOL4, E.B. PHILIPPS !"/ D.J. ARBY, petitioners,

vs.

HON. MA?IMIANO C. ASUNCION, P$s/"= J#/=, B$!") '0>, R=o"!2 T$!2 Co#$*, #o" C*% !"/ MANUELCHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.

1*&7:

• Petitioner 7un /nsurance ffice, ?td. (7/? for brevity filed a complaint with the egional &rial *ourt of )a-ati,

)etro )anila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the udicial

declaration of its nullity against private respondent )anuel %y Po &iong.

• Private respondent filed a complaint in the egional &rial *ourt of IueEon *ity for the refund of premiums and the

issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. &he complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,

compensatory, moral, e'emplary and li"uidated damages, attorneys fees, e'penses of litigation and costs of the

suit. 1lthough the prayer in the complaint did not "uantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be

inferred from the body of the complaint to be about ifty )illion Pesos.

• nly the amount of P2!0.00 was paid by private respondent as doc-et fee which prompted petitioners counsel to

raise his obection. 7aid obection was disregarded by respondent 6udge 6ose P. *astro who was then presiding over

said case.

• )eanwhile, the *ourt en banc issued a esolution in 1dministrative *ase +o. $5>!0>$52>&* directing the

udges in said cases to reassess the doc-et fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment.

• %pon submission of amended complaint and reassessment of doc-et fees respondent was re"uired to pay

P3,$A.00 as doc-et fee. &his was subse"uently paid by private respondent. n ctober !A, !$A, or some seven

months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional doc-et fee of P$0,3A.00

and another PA2,432.0 on 1pril 2$, !$$.

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&hus, the *ourt rules as follows:

&t is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading# but the payment of the prescribed

doc1et fee# that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. 2here the filing

of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the doc1et fee# the court may allow payment of the fee

within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims# third party claims and similar pleadings# which shall not be

considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said

fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2here the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the

prescribed filing fee but# subsequently# the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading# or if specified the

same has been left for determination by the court# the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the

judgment. &t shall be the responsibility of the ler1 of ourt or his duly authori/ed deputy to enforce said lien and

assess and collect the additional fee.

2. Private respondent claims that the ruling in anchester cannot apply retroactively to his case for at the time said civil case

was filed in court there was no such anchester ruling as yet. urther, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the

ruling of this ourt in agaspi v. +amolete# wherein this *ourt held that the trial c ourt ac"uired urisdiction over the case even

if the doc-et fee paid was insufficient.

&he contention that anchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. 7tatutes regulating the procedure of the

courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are

retrospective in that sense and to that e'tent.

D.. +os. $$05> 9ecember 20, !$

MA?IMO TAC AY vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT O( TAGUM

(!)*s+U Rso"/"* P"/! instituted an !)*o" 1o$ $)ov$% o1 osssso" against &acay, Panes and +oel at the RTC o1 T!=#5D!v!o /2 No$*.U P"/! is the owner of the land measuring 0s" meters and that the previous owner allowed the defendants to occupy such by mere tolerance.

U #hen P"/! came in need for the use of the land, he demanded them to vacate the land and to pay rentals but the latterrefused.

U P"/! then instituted a complaint praying that he be declared the owner of the land and that the defendants pay monthlyrentals since ebruary !$ as well as nominal, actual and moral damages and attorneyCs fees and that Pineda be granted

further reliefs and remedies.

U &he /1"/!"*s then filed for dismissal alleging that the T$!2 )o#$* // "o* !)#$ #$s/)*o" ov$ * )!s for thereason that the K)o52!"* 1!2/ *o s)1% * !5o#"*s o1 /!5!=s !"/ 1o$ 1!2#$ *o !22= * 8!s) $#$5"* !s *o* !ssss/ v!2# o1 * s#8)* 2o* " /s#*.U &he motion to dismiss was later on denied by 6udge )atas.

U &he motions to dismiss in *ivil *ases 22!! and 220 were also denied:

NaO declaring that since the ;action at bar is for eivindicatoria, 9amages and 1ttorneys fees definitely this *ourt has the

e'clusive urisdiction,;

(b that the claims for actual, moral and nominal damages ;are only one aspect of the cause of action,; and

(c because of absence of specification of the amounts claimed as moral, nominal and actual damages, they should be

;e'punged from the records.;

U &he /1"/!"*s later on filed a oint petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for & praying that theorders be annulled on the ground of grave abuse of discretion and re>asserts that the court did not ac"uire urisdiction.

Iss#+ ON * RTC !)#$/ #$s/)*o"

H2/+ YESU &he actions are "o* basically for the $)ov$% o1 s#5s o1 5o"%.

U &hey are principally for $)ov$% o1 osssso" o1 $!2 $o$*%, in the nature of an accion publiciana.

D*$5"!*v o1 * )o#$*Fs #$s/)*o" " *s *% o1 !)*o"s s * "!*#$ *$o1, "o* * !5o#"* o1 * /!5!=s!22=/2% !$s"= 1$o5 o$ )o"")*/ * * ss# o1 **2 o$ osssso", !"/ $=!$/2ss o1 * v!2# o1 * $o$*%.

U 1 real action may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or e'emplary

damages= and such an action would fall *" * )2#sv, o$="!2 #$s/)*o" o1 * R=o"!2 T$!2 Co#$*. U B!*!s P!58!"s! B2!"= '9 provides that R=o"!2 T$!2 Co#$*s s!22 $)s )2#sv o$="!2 #$s/)*o" inter aliaover 3all civil actions which involve the title to# or possession of# real property# or any interest therein# except actions for

forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings# original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon

etropolitan Trial ourts# unicipal Trial ourts# and unicipal ircuit Trial ourts.3

U &he rule applies regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or not.

U &he rule also applies even where the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages= the amount of those

damages would be immaterial to the "uestion of the *ourt.

PILIPINAS SHELL vs. COURT O( APPEALSG.R. No. 6''9 A$2 '0, '99

1*&7:

Private respondent 1drian dela PaE is a holder of ?etters Patent +o. !4!32 issued by the Patent ffice on ebruary

2, !$! for his alleged invention, *oco>diesel fuel for diesel engines and its manufacture. n )arch , !$3 private

respondent filed a complaint with the egional &rial *ourt for infringement of patent with prayer for payment of reasonable

compensation and for damages herein petitioners Pilipinas 7hell Petroleum *orporation, *alte' (Phil., )obil il Philippines,

/nc., and Petrophil *orporation. &here was no mention in the complaint of the amount of damages being claimed but private

respondent alleged, among others, that the conservative estimate of the combined gross sales of defendants (petitioners herein

and Petrophil *orporation of plaintiffs (private respondents herein invention is P34,2!3,$0.00 annually computed at the

rate of 20 million barrels (volume being yearly sold by the mar-eting arms of defendants at the price of P2.3$ per liter. /n the

hearing of +ovember !3, !$4 private respondent estimated the yearly royalty due him from defendants (petitioners herein and

Petrophil *orporation to be P23A,52,350.00.

Petitioners discovered that private respondent paid only as filing fee the amount of P252.00 based on his claim for

attomeys fees in the amount of P200,000.00 and orally moved for the dismissal of the complaint for failure of private

respondent to pay the correct filing fee.

&he trial court issued an order allowing private respondent to pay the re"uired additional doc-et fee after the

prosecution of the case, to be deducted from whatever udgment in damages shall be awarded by the *ourt.

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&he failure to perfect an appeal in the manner and within the period fi'ed by law renders the decision final and e'ecutory.

*onse"uently, no court can e'ercise appellate urisdiction to review such decision.viiiN!5O %pon the other hand, the

e'traordinary action to annul a final udgment is limited to the grounds provided by law and cannot be used as a stratagem to

reopen the entire controversy and thereby ma-e a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final

and e'ecutory.i'N!AO 1ccordingly, this review shall consider only matters pertaining to the urisprudential grounds for the

annulment of a final udgment:'N!O

S''' 1nnulment of udgment may ''' be based on the ground that NeitherO a udgment is void for want of urisdiction or

the udgment was obtained by e'trinsic fraud.

Petitioner does not allege e'trinsic fraud, but bases her petition only on alleged lac- of urisdiction and due process.

irst /ssue:

4urisdiction over the 'erson of the 0efendant

Petitioner insistently argues that the 6anuary !, !4 &* 9ecision, insofar as it awarded attorneyCs fees, was void from the

beginning because the intestate court had lost urisdiction over the person of 9oBa 1dela (the attorneyCs client due to her

death.

&he argument is untenable. &he basic flaw in the argument is the misapplication of the rules on the e'tinction of a civil

action'iN!O in special proceedings. &he death of 9oBa 1dela did not ipso facto e'tinguish the monetary claim of private

respondent or re"uire him to refile his claim with the court hearing the settlement of her testate estate. 8ad he filed the claim

against 9oBa 1dela personally, the rule would have applied. 8owever, he did so against the estate of 9on 1ndres.

&hus, where an appointed administrator dies, the applicable rule is 7ection 2, ule $2 of the ules of *ourt, which re"uires the

appointment of a new administrator

'ayment of $eparate 0oc1et 5ees &s !ot !ecessary

#hile not e'actly a ground for annulment, the *ourt has held that it is the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee that vests a

trial court with urisdiction over the subect matter or nature of the action. 'iiN24O Petitioner avers that the intestate court had no

urisdiction to award the disputed attorneyCs fees before private respondent paid doc-et fees, as re"uired in 6acson v. +eyes.'iii

&he argument is untenable. &he *ourt re"uired in 6acson the payment of a separate doc-et fee, since the lawyerCs Smotion for

attorneyCs feesT was in the Snature of an action commenced by a lawyer against his client.T /n contrast, the private respondent

filed a claim for his attorneyCs fees against the estate of 9on 1ndres. &he difference in the modes of action ta-en renders

6acson inapplicable to the case at bar.

7econd /ssue:

%eirs of 0o7a *dela 2ere !ot 0eprived of 0ue 'rocess

1sserting that she and the other heirs of the deceased administratri' were denied due process of law, petitioner disputes the

following finding of the *1:'iv

S#e can neither view with favor the petitionerCs contention that the award was made without giving the heirs of 9oBa 1dela

due process of law. /t must be remembered that long before the ''' 6udgeCs "uestioned 9ecision was rendered, the petitioner

was named special administratri' of the V share of 9oBa 1dela in the estate of 9on 1ndres '''. 1s such special

administratri', the petitioner should have been aware of all her duties and responsibilities, one of which was to protect the

estate from any disbursements based on claims not chargeable to the estate. 7he should have -nown that notice to her of the

attorneyCs lien would have amounted to notice to the heirs of 9oBa 1dela as well.T

1ccording to her, want of due process prevented the heirs from contesting the claim and submitting evidence to show that

partial payments had been previously given to private respondent.

&he *ourt is not convinced. /f admitted by the administrator or e'ecutor, a claim according to ule $A of 7ection !! 'vN2$O may

be allowed by the court without any hearing. espondent court found that the claim was indeed admitted and uncontested

S&hen, after becoming aware of the rendition of the respondent 6udgeCs 9ecision wherein the "uestioned award of attorneyCs

fees was decreed, which was as good a time as any to assail its propriety, the petitioners maintained her silence and chose not

to file any motion for the reconsideration of the 9ecision or appeal therefrom. 9ue to the petitionerCs own fault and

negligence, the 9ecision became final and e'ecutory. &he petitioner must therefore bear the conse"uences of the ma'im

WN


13/29

petitionerCs arguments in his motion to dismiss, the lower court (&* 7outhern ?eyte granted petitionerCs aforesaid

motion.

• Private respondent went to the egional &rial *ourt of *ebu *ity to re>file the same complaint. Private respondent avers

that upon showing the official receipts as proof of payment of the doc-et fees in the egional &rial *ourt of 7outhern

?eyte (ranch 2A to the *ler- of *ourt of the egional &rial *ourt of *ebu *ity (ranch A, the latter advised his

counsel to file a formal re"uest with this *ourt, thru the *ourt 1dministrator, for an SauthorityT to apply the payment for

doc-et fees previously made to the egional &rial *ourt (ranch 2A, 7outhern ?eyte to the doc-et fees to be paid to the

egional &rial *ourt *ebu *ity (ranch A.

• Private respondent, thru counsel, wrote a letter addressed to the 7* *ourt 1dministrator, re"uesting for an authoriEation

to consider the filing fees previously paid to the egional &rial *ourt (ranch 2A of 7an 6uan, 7outhern ?eyte as

payment for the filing fees to be paid in the egional &rial *ourt of *ebu *ity (ranch A where the case was to be re>

filed.

• &he 7upreme *ourt 9eputy *ourt 1dministrator ernardo P. 1besamis sent a reply informing the private respondent that

he can re(>file the case at the &* *ebu *ity and present the official receipt corresponding to the filing fees paid at

&*, ranch 2A 7an 6uan, 7outhern ?eyte.

• Private respondent presented the letter>reply of 9eputy *ourt 1dministrator 1besamis to the cler- of court of the &*

(ranch A of *ebu *ity upon re>filing his complaint. n the basis of the aforesaid letter>reply, the cler- of court

doc-eted private respondentCs complaint without re"uiring private respondent to pay anew the prescribed doc-et fees.

• Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of lac- of urisdiction and lac- of cause of action. Petitioner argued that

private respondent Sdid not pay (even a single centavo of the filing fee= hence, the court (&* of *ebu *ity, ranch A

did not ac"uire urisdiction over the case.T

• &he &* of *ebu *ity (ranch A, presided over by 6udge ?oreto 9. de la Kictoria, issued an order denying petitionerCs

motion to dismiss.

• Petitioner elevated 6udge de la KictoriaCs order for review on certiorari to the *ourt of 1ppeals which agreed with the

trial courtCs dispositions.

• /n his present petition, petitioner contends that Sto relieve dilao from paying the doc-et fee in the *ebu *ourt by ust

presenting the receipts issued by the ?eyte *ourt would be tantamount to a withdrawal of the doc-et fee paid to the ?eyte

*ourt.T

• Petitioner further contends that the case later filed in the egional &rial *ourt of *ebu *ity (ranch A by private

respondent is a Sdistinct and separate case from that of the ?eyte court as it has a new doc-et number.

• Private respondent dilao contends that Sit is incorrect for petitioner to insist that dilao failed to pay the re"uired filing

fees.T 8e (dilao was not granted an Se'emptionT from the payment of filing fees by 9eputy *ourt 1dministrator

1besamis but merely an authority to apply the filing fees he paid.

ISSUE+

• #hether respondent dilao may re>file in another *ourt the case that was dismissed on the ground of improper venue

without having to pay again the doc-et fee of P25,A00 that he has paid in the earlier case.

RULING+

• /n the case at bar, in the strict sense, private respondentCs complaint cannot be deemed to have been Sre>filedT in the &*

of *ebu *ity (ranch A because it was not originally filed in the same court but in the &* of 7outhern ?eyte (ranch

2A. &hus, when private respondentCs complaint was doc-eted as *ivil *ase +o. *!A33A by the cler- of court of the&* *ebu *ity (ranch A, it became an entirely separate case from *ivil *ase +o. P>4! that was dismissed by the

&* of ?eyte due to improper venue. 1s far as *ivil *ase +o. P>4! is concerned, while undoubtedly the order of

dismissal is not an adudication on the merits of the case, the order, nevertheless, is a final order. &his means that when

private respondent did not appeal therefrom, the order became final and e'ecutory for all legal intents and purposes.

rom a procedural point of view, therefore, to Sre>fileT the case before the same court would be an obvious faux pas. 1s

a remedial measure, the plaintiff whose complaint was dismissed due to improper venue can still file another complaint,

but this time in the court of proper venue. +ote, however, that the dismissal of the complaint filed in the court of proper

venue did not stop the running of the prescriptive period within which to file his complaint in the court of proper venue.

&heoretically, the plaintiff may decide to file a complaint containing substantially the same allegations and prayer as the

previously dismissed complaint, or he may decide to amend the same and pray for a different relief. /n this case, the

principle remains unchanged, that is, the court (of proper venue will only ac"uire urisdiction over the case only upon

payment of the prescribed doc-et fee thereon.

• *onse"uently, the 9eputy *ourt 1dministrator committed an error when he stated in his letter reply to private

respondentCs counsel that he can Sre>file the complaint in the &* *ebu *ity (ranch A and present the official receipt

corresponding to the filing fees paid in the &* ranch 2A, 7an 6ose, 7outhern ?eyte.T

• &here is no way for the *1 letter to be misinterpreted by dilaoCs counsel because the tenor of the letter of dilao to

the *1 dated 20 6une !4 clearly stressed that he was re"uesting for an authoriEation (from the *1 to apply the

filing fees he paid in *ivil *ase +o. P>4! to cover the f iling fees in a case he intends to file with the &* of *ebu *ity

(ranch A. /n fact, both the egional &rial *ourt of *ebu *ity (ranch A and the *ourt of 1ppeals held the opinion that

this procedural remedy can be obtained from the ffice of the 9eputy *ourt 1dministrator.

• &he *1 has neither the power nor the authority to e'empt any party not otherwise e'empt under the law or under the

ules of *ourt in the payment of the prescribed doc-et fees. &he principles laid down by this *ourt in )anchester and in

7un /nsurance were formulated en banc, no less than the *onstitution mandates that no doctrine or principle laid down by

the court in a decision en banc may be modified or reversed e'cept by the court sitting en banc. &o now e'empt or

otherwise authoriEe private respondent dilao not to pay the prescribed filing fees would not only be in derogation of this

principle but also of the general rule in pleadings, practice and procedure that the mista-e of counsel binds his client.

• &he *ourt 1dministrator cannot grant any relief or remedial measure which is beyond his powers and functions. /t may

be noteworthy to mention here that even in the 7upreme *ourt, there are numerous instances when a litigant has had to

re>file a petition previously dismissed by *ourt due to a technicality (violation of a pertinent *ircular, and in these

instances, the litigant is re"uired to pay the prescribed doc-et fee and not apply to the re>filed case the doc-et fees paid in

the earlier dismissed case.

• *oming bac- to the case at bar, and pursuant to the rules laid down by this *ourt in 7un /nsurance, we hold that under the

peculiar circumstances of this case private respondent did not really intend to evade the payment of the prescribed doc-et

fee. 8is counsel simply strayed away from the rules to e'plore the possibility of an e'tra legal remedy. 7ince his case

has already been doc-eted as *ivil *ase +o. !A33A in the &* ranch A *ebu *ity, the procedural remedy of paying the

prescribed doc-et fees is still available to him provided, of course, that the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period

has not yet set in.

SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON !"/ ALEJANDRO L. DE LEON, **o"$s, v. THE COURT O( APPEALS,GLICERIO MA. ELAYDA II, (EDERICO ELAYDA !"/ DANILO ELAYDA, $so"/"*s.

1*&7:

Private respondents filed in the egional &rial *ourt of IueEon *ity a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of

sale of two (2 parcels of land against petitioners.

13


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Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not ac"uire urisdiction over the case

by reason of private respondentsC nonpayment of the correct amount of doc-et fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to

the fees already paid based on the claim for P!00,000.00 for attorneyCs fees, private respondents should have paid doc-et fees

in the amount of P2!,A40.00, based on the alleged value of the two (2 parcels of land subect matter of the contract of sale

sought to be annulled.

&he trial court denied petitionersC motion to dismiss but re"uired private respondents to pay the amount of doc-et fees based

on the estimated value of the parcels of land in litigation. &he appellate court held that an action for rescission or annulment of

contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the doc-et fees should not be based on the value of the real

property, subect matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded.

/77%


15/29

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contendingthat the case is cogniEable by the 8ousing and ?and %se egulatory oard

(8?% and not the trial court because it is sued as a subdivision developer and the property involved is a subdivision lot.

&he trial court denied the motion to dismiss holding that it has urisdiction over the subect matter= that the allegation that the

lot involved is a subdivision lot is not a ground to deprive the court of its urisdiction. PetitionerCs motion for reconsideration

was denied.

8ence, the instant petition.

ISSUE#hether or not the case at bar is cogniEable by the 8?%.

HELD&he petition lac-s merit.

7ection ! of P9 !344 vests the +ational 8ousing 1uthority (now 8?% with e'clusive urisdiction to hear and decide the

following cases:

(a unsound real estate business practice=

(b claims involving refund and any other claims filed by s#8/vso" 2o* o$ )o"/o5"#5 #"* 8#%$ against the $o)*

o"$, /v2o$, /!2$, 8$o$, o$ s!2s5!"= and(c cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by 8#%$s o1 s#8/vso" 2o* o$)o"/o5"#5 #"* against the o"$, /v2o$, /!2$, 8$o$ o$ s!2s5!"./t is a settled rule that urisdiction over the subect matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint and is not affected

by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. therwise, urisdiction would become

dependent upon the whims of the defendant. &he allegations in private respondentsC complaint clearly vest urisdiction in the

trial court. +othing therein shows that the "uestioned property is a subdivision lot and sold by petitioner as a subdivision

developer. )ere assertion by petitioner that it is a subdivision developer and the land involved is a subdivision lot, will not

automatically strip the trial court of its urisdiction and authoriEe the 8?% to ta-e cogniEance of the complaint. /ndeed, it

does not always follow that each sale made by petitioner is underta-en in its capacity as a subdivision developer, in the same

manner that sales made in such capacity are not at all times intended for subdivision development.

&here is no allegation in the complaint that the lot purchased by petitioners is part of a tract of land partitioned primarily for

residential purposes into individual lots and offered to the public for sale. &here is li-ewise no allegation that the tract of land

includes recreational areas and open spaces. +or does the ;*ontract to 7 ell;, which forms part of the complaint, describe the

subect property as a subdivision lot. #hat the contract strongly suggests is that the property is simply a lot offered by

respondents, as vendors, to the petitioners, as vendees, for sale on installment. 1s can be clearly gleaned from the same

contract, respondents are not acting as subdivision owners, developers, bro-ers or salesmen, nor are they engaged in the real

estate business. #hat is plain is that the parties are acting only as ordinary sellers and buyers of a specific lot, a portion of a big

tract of land co>owned by the heirs of )ariano araon. +either are there underta-ings specified in the contract that respondents

shall develop the land, li-e providing for the subdivision concrete roads and sidewal-s, street lights, curbs and gutters,

underground drainage system, independent water system, landscaping, developed par-, and 24>hour security guard service.


16/29

/n their *omment, private respondents aver that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court in reinstatingthe complaint upon the payment of deficiency doc-et fees because petitioners did not obect thereto within the reglementary period. esides, 1tty. Petalcorin possessed no legal personality to appear as counsel for the heirs of ertuldo until he complieswith 7ection !A, ule 3 of the ules of *ourt.

ISSUE+(!#+ the petitioners may challenge the courtCs urisdiction. (+= and(2 #+ the non>payment of the proper doc-et fee at the time of the filing of thecomplaint automatically causes the

dismissal of the action.(+

RULING+1lthough the 7upreme *ourt, *ourt of 1ppeals and the egional &rial *ourts have concurrent urisdiction to issue writs of

certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, "uo warranto, habeas corpus and inunction, such concurrence does not give the petitionerunrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

&he rationale for this rule is two>fold: (a it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this *ourt= and (b it wouldcause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adudication of cases, which in some instances had to beremanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better e"uipped to resolve theissues because this *ourt is not a trier of facts.

&hus, this *ourt will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts,and e'ceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, ustify theavailment of the e'traordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the e'ercise of its primary urisdiction.

/n this case, no special and important reason or e'ceptional and compelling circumstance analogous to any of the above caseshas been adduced by the petitioners so as to ustify direct recourse to this *ourt. &he present petition should have been initiallyfiled in the *ourt of 1ppeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. ailure to do so is sufficient causefor the dismissal of the petition at bar. &he unavailability of the writ of certiorari and prohibition in this case is borne out of thefact that petitioners principally assail the rder which they never sought reconsideration of despite receipt thereof on )arch2A, !. /nstead, petitioners went through the motion of filing a supplemental pleading and only when the latter was denied,or after more than three months have passed, did they raise the issue that the complaint should not have been reinstated in thefirst place because the trial court had no urisdiction to do so, having already ruled that the complaint shall be e'punged.

'4 1fter recogniEing the urisdiction of the trial court by see-ing affirmative relief in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents, petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial courtCs urisdiction./f a party invo-es the urisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the courtCs urisdiction in the same case.

+evertheless, there is a need to correct the erroneous impression of the trial court as well as the private respondents that petitioners are barred from assailing the rder which reinstated the case because it was not obected to within the reglementary period or even thereafter via a motion for reconsideration despite receipt thereof.

/t must be clarified that the said order is but a resolution on an incidental matter which does not touch on the merits of thecase or put an end to the proceedings. /t is an interlocutory order since there leaves something else to be done by the trial courtwith respect to the merits of the case. 1s such, it is not subect to a reglementary period. eglementary period refers to the period set b y the rules for appeal or further review of a final udgment or order, i.e., one that ends the litigation in the trialcourt.

)oreover, the remedy against an interlocutory order is generally not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with thecase in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to ta-e an appeal in the manner authoriEed by law. nlywhen the court issued such order without or in e'cess of urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailedinterlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford ade"uate and e'peditious relief willcertiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. 7uch special circumstances are absolutelywanting in the present case.

4 &ime and again, the *ourt has held that the )anchester rule has been modified in 7un /nsurance ffice, ?td. (7/? vs.1suncionN45O which defined the following guidelines involving the payment of doc-et fees:

a. /t is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee,that vests a trial court with urisdiction over the subect>matter or nature of the action. #here the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the doc-et fee, the court may allow payment of the fees within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

b. &he same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third>party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be consideredfiled until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. &he court may also allow payment of said fee within areasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

c. #here the trial court ac"uires urisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subse"uently, the udgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the udgment. /t shall be theresponsibility of the *ler- of *ourt or his duly authoriEed deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee is a urisdictional re"uirement, even its non>payment at the time offiling does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive orreglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.N4AO &hus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud thegovernment, the )anchester rule does not apply.

%nder the peculiar circumstances of this case, the reinstatement of the complaint was ust and proper considering that thecause of action of private respondents, being a real action, prescribes in thirty years, and private respondents did not reallyintend to evade the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee but simply contend that they could not be faulted for inade"uateassessment because the cler- of court made no notice of demand or reassessment. urthermore, the fact that privaterespondents prayed for payment of damages Sin amounts ustified by the evidenceT does not call for the dismissal of thecomplaint for violation of 7* *ircular +o. which re"uired that all complaints must specify the amount of damages sought notonly in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer in order to be accepted and admitted for filing. 7un /nsuranceeffectively modified 7* *ircular +o. by providing that filing fees for damages and awards that cannot be estimatedconstitute liens on the awards finally granted by the trial court.

&hus, while the doc-et fees were based only on the real property valuation, the trial court ac"uired urisdiction over theaction, and udgment awards which were left for determination by the court or as may be proven during trial would still besubect to additional filing fees which shall constitute a lien on the udgment. /t would then be the responsibility of the *ler-of *ourt of the trial court or his duly authoriEed deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fees.

/t is worth noting that when ertuldo filed his 1nswer he did not raise the issue of lac- of urisdiction for non>payment ofcorrect doc-et fees. /nstead, he based his defense on a claim of ownership and participated in the proceedings before the trialcourt. /t was only in 7ept. 22, !$ or more than seven years after filing the answer, and under the auspices of a new counsel,that the issue of urisdiction was raised for the first time in the motion to e'punge by ertuldoCs heirs.

1fter ertuldo vigorously participated in all stages of the case before the trial court and even invo-ed the trial courtCsauthority in order to as- for affirmative relief, petitioners, considering that they merely stepped into the shoes of their predecessor, are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial courtCs urisdiction. 1lthough the issue of urisdictionmay be raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be

barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel.)oreover, no formal substitution of the parties was effected within thirty days from date of death of ertuldo, as re"uired by

7ection !A, ule 3 of the ules of *ourt. +on>compliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and udgment of the trial court infirm because the court ac"uires no urisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or ofthe heirs on whom the trial and the udgment would be binding. &hus, proper substitution of heirs must be effected for the trialcourt to ac"uire urisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future claim by any heir that he was not apprised of the

16


17/29

litigation against ertuldo or that he did not authoriEe 1tty. Petalcorin to represent him.

's* /v4 G.R. No. '630 (8$#!$% , 00MANUEL ;. BA;IERA, vs. ESPERANA PAGLINAAN&G.R. No. '060 (8$#!$% , 00MANUEL ;. BA;IERA, vs. STANDARD CHARTERED BAN

1*&7: )anuel aviera, petitioner in these cases, was the former head of the 8 7ervice 9elivery and /ndustrial elations

of 7tandard *hartered an->Philippines. 7* did not comply with the conditions set forth by the 7P. 1lthough unregistered

with the 7complaint demanding compensation for his lost investment.ut 7* denied his demand on the ground that his investment is ;regular.;

n 6uly !5, 2003, petitioner filed with the 9epartment of 6ustice (96, represented herein by its prosecutors, public

respondents, a complaint charging the above>named officers and members of the 7* oard of 9irectors and other 7*

officials, private respondents, with syndicated estafa. or their part, private respondents filed the following as counter>charges

against petitioner: (! blac-mail and e'tortion and blac-mail and perury.

n 7eptember 2, 2003, petitioner also filed a complaint for perury against private .

n ebruary , 2004, petitioner also filed with the 96 a complaint for violation of 7ection $.! of the 7ecurities egulation

*ode against private respondents,

n ebruary 23, 2004, the 96 rendered its 6oint esolution dismissing all the complaints and counter>charges filed the herein

parties.

Petitioner filed with the *ourt of 1ppeals a petition for certiorari alleging that the 96 acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lac- or e'cess of urisdiction in dismissing his complaint for syndicated estafa and a separate petition for

certiorari assailing the 96 esolution dismissing the case for violation of the 7ecurities egulation *ode.

Petitioner claimed that the 96 acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lac- or e'cess of urisdiction in holding that

the complaint should have been filed with the 7


18/29

n 6uly !4, !2, petitioner Kicente 9acanay, as administrator of the testate estate of &ereso 9. ernandeE, filed in the

egional &rial *ourt (&* of *ebu *ity a c ase for recovery of real property against respondent spouses ?uissa and aul

7amaco and oberta and ryan Rersaw.

n 9ecember 22, !2, respondent spouses 7amaco filed their answer with counterclaim.

n )ay !2, !3, petitioner amended his complaint to implead respondent 6ohnson )ercader. n 1ugust 3, !3, respondent

)ercader filed his answer with counterclaim. espondent spouses Rersaw were declared in default as they did not file an

answer despite service of summons by publication.

n )ay !5, !4, petitioner filed his second amended complaint which the court granted. n )arch 30, !4, respondent

spouses 7amaco filed their answer with counterclaim, while respondent )ercader filed his on )ay 30, !4.

n 9ecember !2, !5, the &* dismissed petitionerCs complaint for lac- of merit.

+ot satisfied, petitioner appealed to the *ourt of 1ppeals (*1. n ctober 2, !, the *1N!5O affirmed the &* in toto.

Petitioner then filed in the 7upreme *ourt a motion for e'tension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. 8is motion

was denied in a minute resolutionN!AO because of procedural lapses on his part.

n 6uly !2, 200!, respondent )ercader filed a motion for e'ecution of the &* decision. Petitioner opposedN22O the motion,

contending that he should not be made personally liable for the amount awarded by the &*. &he &* udgment should be

considered as a claim against the estate of &ereso ernandeE. &hus, the writ of e'ecution should be referred to the court where

the estate of &ereso ernandeE was being settled.

n 1ugust 30, 200!, the &* granted respondent )ercaderCs motion for e'ecution.N23O 1ccording to the &*, there was no

impediment to the e'ecution of its decision because it had already become final and e'ecutory. )oreover, considering that the

decision sought to be e'ecuted S(did not involve money claims,T the writ of e'ecution could not be directed against the estate

of &ereso ernandeE.

PetitionerCs motion for reconsideration went unheeded.

efusing to give up, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari in this *ourt. 8e reiterates his position that he should not be

made personally liable to pay the P0,000 awarded by the &* in favor of respondent spouses 7amaco and respondent

)ercader.

/77%


19/29

ISSUE+ !.#hether or not the *1 has urisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari in der rule A5 where the issue is the urisdiction of the &* 6udge to try the alleged violation of .1. A425

2. #hether or not respondent &* has the urisdiction to try over violations of .1. A425 or 9angerous 9rugs act.

RULING+ '.4 &he *ourt of 1ppeals erred in holding that it had no urisdiction over petitioners special civil actionfor certiorari under ule A5 of the ules of *ourt.

&his error of the *ourt of 1ppeals was due to its misapplication of 7ection 5(2(c of 1rticle K/// of the *onstitution and of

that portion of 7ection ! of the 6udiciary 1ct of !4$ vesting upon the 7upreme *ourt e'clusive urisdiction to review, revise,

reverse, modify, or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final udgments and decrees of inferior courts

in all cases in which the urisdiction of any inferior court is in issue. /t forgot that this constitutional and statutory provisions

pertain to the appellate H not original H jurisdiction of the 7upreme *ourt, as correctly maintained by the petitioner.

1n appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is but a continuation of the original suit, not a commencement of a new

action, such as that of a special civil action for certiorari. &he general rule is that a denial of a motion to dismiss or to "uash in

criminal cases is interlocutory and cannot be the subect of an appeal or of a special civil action for certiorari.

.4 1pplying by analogy the ruling in 'eople v . $imon, the imposable penalty in this case which involves @.>;A9 grams ofshabu should not e'ceed prision correccional . #e say by analogy because these cases involved mariuana, not

methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu. *learly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in *riminal *ase

would at most be only prision correccional whose duration is from A mos and one (! day to si' (A years. 9oes it follow then

that, as the petitioner insists, the &* has no urisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of 7ection 32 of .P. lg. !2 by

.1. +o. A!, which vested upon )etropolitan &rial *ourts, )unicipal &rial *ourts, and )unicipal *ircuit &rial *ourts

e'clusive original urisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not e'ceeding si' (A years irrespective of the

amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penaltiesL

$ec. B?. 4urisdiction of etropolitan Trial ourts# unicipal Trial ourts and unicipal ircuit Trial ourts in

riminal ases. - Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of +egional Trial ourt and of the

$andiganbayan# the etropolitan Trial ourts# unicipal Trial ourts# and unicipal ircuit Trial ourts shall exercise, ?)

Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (:) years irrespective of the

amount of fine# and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties# including the civil liability arising from such

offender or predicated thereon# irrespective of 1ind# nature# value or amount thereof, 'rovided# however# That in offenses

involving damage to property through criminal negligence# they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

&he e'ception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot disregard. y virtue thereof, the

e'clusive original urisdiction of the )etropolitan &rial *ourts, )unicipal &rial *ourts, and )unicipal *ircuit &rial *ourts in

criminal cases does not cover those cases which by provision of law fall within the e'clusive original urisdiction of &* and

of the 7andiganbayan regardless of the prescribed penalty. therwise put, even if such cases are punishable by imprisonment

not e'ceeding si' years (i.e., prision correccional# arresto mayor , or arresto menor , urisdiction, thereon is retained by &*

or the 7andiganbayan, as the case may be.

&he aforementioned e'ception refers not only to 7ection 20 of .P. lg. !2 providing for the urisdiction of egional &rial

*ourts in criminal cases, but also to other laws which specifically lodge in &* e'clusive urisdiction over specific criminal

cases, e. g ., (a 1rticle 3A0 of the evised Penal *ode, as amended by .1. +os. !2$ and 43A3 on written defamation or libel=

(b 9ecree on intellectual Property (P.9. +o. 4, as amended, which vests upon *ourts of irst /nstance e'clusive urisdiction

over the cases therein mentioned regardless of the imposable penalty= and (c more appropriately for the case at bar, 7ection 3

of .1. +o. A425, as amended by P.9. +o. 44, which vests on */, *ircuit *riminal *ourts, and the 6uvenile and 9omestic

elations *ourts concurrent e'clusive original urisdiction over all cases involving violations of said 1ct.

.1. +o. A! can by no means be considered another special law on urisdiction but merely an amendatory law intended to

amend specific sections of the 6udiciary eorganiEation 1ct of !$0. /n a manner of spea-ing, .1. +o. A! was absorbed by

the mother law, the 6udiciary eorganiEation 1ct of !$0. &hat *ongress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws

vesting e'clusive urisdiction in the &*s over certain cases is clearly evident from the e'ception provided for in the opening

sentence of 7ection 32 of .P. lg. !2, as amended by .1. +o. A!. &hese special laws are not, therefore, covered by the

repealing clause (7ection A of .1. +o. A!.

+either can it be successfully argued that 7ection 3 of .1. +o. A425, as amended by P.9. +o. 44, is no longer

operative because 7ection 44 of .P. lg. !2 abolished the *ourts of irst /nstance, *ircuit *riminal *ourts, and 6uvenile and

9omestic elations *ourts, this *ourt should not lose sight of the fact that the &* merely replaced the *ourts of irst

/nstance as clearly borne out by the last two sentences of 7ection 44. /n short, there was a change in name only H from *ourts

of irst /nstance to +egional Trial ourts. &he /nterim ules and Duidelines elative to the /mplementation of .P. lg. !2

promulgated by this *ourt on !! 6anuary !$3 also provides that the reference to the courts of first instance in the ules of

*ourt shall be deemed changed to the regional trial courts.

*onse"uently, it is not accurate to state that the ;abolition; of the *ourts of irst /nstance carried with it the abolition of theire'clusive original urisdiction in drug cases vested by 7ection 3 of .1. +o. A425, as amended by P. 9. +o. 44. &he same

1dministrative rder +o. !04>A recogniEes that violations of 1. +o. A42A, as amended, regardless of the "uantity involved,

are to be tried and decided by the &* therein designated as special courts.

&he &* then did not commit any error in denying petitioners motion to dismiss *ivil *ase.

C#8$o vs L!=#"! M#2*-#$os Coo.

(!)*s+ *ubero along with some other fol-s enter into a 6K1 with elle *orp to develop several hectares of *1P land owned by *ubero and fol-s in &anuan atangas. %pon learning of this deal, ?aguna #est files e' parte motions to have adverse

claims attached on the subectlots, claiming that ?# had a prior 6K1 with the predecessors in interest of *ubero and fol-s and

that these same 6K1s were registered as adverse claims over the previous titles of thesubects lots. elle for its part alleges

that the 6K1 between ?# and the predecessors in interest are void ab initio since they were e'ecuted within the !0 year

prohibitory period under 1 AA5 (*1 law of $$. &* dismisses the case, holding that the matter must be brought before

the 911 first since it involves a "uestion over which 911 has primary urisdiction. &he ) is reected hence the

present petition for review on certiorari.

Iss#+ 9oes 911 have original urisdiction over this matterL

H2/+ @es. /n the recent case of /slanders *1P>armers eneficiaries )ulti>Purpose *ooperative 9evelopment, /nc. v.?apanday 1gricultural and 9evelopment *orp.,23 this *ourt elucidated on the scope of an agrarian dispute, viE:&he

9epartment of 1grarian eform (91 is vested with primary urisdiction to determine and adudicate agrarian reform

matters, with e'clusive original urisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform e'cept those

falling under the e'clusive urisdiction of the 9epartment of 1griculture and the 9epartment of tenant or

lessor>lessee relationship.


20/29

agrarian reform. &hus, the 911 has urisdiction over disputes arising from the instant 6oint Production 1greement entered

into by the present parties./n cases where allegations of violation or circumvention of land reform laws have been raised, this

*ourt has declined to address them, it stating that petitioners must first plead their case with the 911. &here is no reason

why this *ourt should now hold otherwise. onus eading: (9istinction between original and e'clusive urisdiction: riginal

urisdiction means urisdiction to ta-e cogniEance of a cause at its inception, try it and pass udgment upon the law and facts,

while e'clusive urisdiction precludes the idea of co>e'istence and refers to urisdiction possessed to the e'clusion of others.

DEPARTMENT O( AGRARIAN RE(ORM, petitioner,vs.

ROBERTO J. CUENCA !"/ Ho". AL(ONSO B. COMBONG JR., " Hs C!!)*% !s * P$s/"= J#/= o1 *R=o"!2 T$!2 Co#$*, B$!") 63, L! C!$2o*! C*%,

(ACTS+1ll controversies on the implementation of the *omprehensive 1grarian eform Program (*1P fall under the urisdiction of

the 9epartment of 1grarian eform (91, even though they raise "uestions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. 1ll

doubts should be resolved in favor of the 91, since the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and

adudicate agrarian matters.

Petition for eview! under ule 45 of the ules of *ourt

esolution3 of the *ourt of 1ppeals;1s previously stated, the principal issue raised in the court below involves a

pure "uestion of law. &hus, it being clear that the court a "uo has urisdiction over the nature and subect matter of

the case below, it did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed order denying petitionerCs

motion to dismiss and granting private respondentCs application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary inunction.

oberto 6. *uenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land

situated in rgy. 8aguimit, ?a *arlota *ity and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane, +oe ortunado, )unicipal

1grarian eform fficer ()1 of ?a *arlota *ity issued and sent a +&/*< *Kdescribed landholding under the compulsory coverage of .1. AA5, otherwise -nown as the

*omprehensive 1grarian eform Program (*1P. &he +&/*< *K


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*onflicts involving urisdiction over agrarian disputes are as tortuous as the history of Philippine agrarian reform laws. &he

changing urisdictional landscape is matched only by the tumultuous struggle for, and resistance to, the brea-ing up and

distribution of large landholdings.

%wo &asic Rules

irst, urisdiction is conferred by law.$ 1nd second, the nature of the action and the issue of urisdiction are shaped by the

material averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

'rant of $urisdiction

1ll the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to the then *ourts of irst /nstance !2 (now the &*s were granted to

the *1s. &he latter were further vested by the 1gricultural ?and eform *ode (1 3$44 with original and e'clusive

urisdiction over the following matters:

;(! 1ll cases or actions involving matters, controversies, disputes, or money claims arising from agrarian relations:

' ' '

;(2 1ll cases or actions involving violations of *hapters / and // of this *ode and epublic 1ct +umber eight

hundred and nine= and

;(3 1, the 91 was also made ;responsible for implementing the *omprehensive

1grarian eform Program.;

+onetheless, we have held that the &*s have not been completely divested of urisdiction over agrarian reform matters.

7ection 5A of 1 AA5 confers special urisdiction on ;7pecial 1grarian *ourts,; which are actually &*s designated as such

by the 7upreme *ourt.22 %nder 7ection 5 of the same law, these 7pecial 1grarian *ourts have original and e'clusive

urisdiction over the following matters:

;! Wall petitions for the determination of ust compensation to land>owners,C and

;2 Wthe prosecution of all criminal offenses under ' ' ' NtheO 1ct.C;

&he above delineation of urisdiction remains in place to this date. 1dministrative *ircular +o. 2>2002 23 of this *ourt stresses

the distinction between the "uasi>udicial powers of the 91 under 7ections 50 and 55 of 1 AA5 and the urisdiction of the

7pecial 1grarian *ourts referred to by 7ections 5A and 5 of the same law.

#e stress that the main subect matter raised by private respondent before the trial court was not the issue of compensation (the

subect matter of

udicial urisdiction of the 91. &hus, the 91 could not be ousted from its authority by the simple e'pediency of appending

an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.

/n view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by respondent in relation to the urisdictional

issue. #e need only to point that in case of doubt, the urisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy

involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies, ;even if the "uestionNsO involved NareO also

udicial in character,;30 as in this case.

SIMEON M. ;ALDE vs. CHINA BANING CORPORATIOND.. +o. !5500 1pril !2, 2005

(ACTS+

• n 6anuary !!, !$, respondent C"! B!""= Co$o$!*o" (*hinaban-, represented by its senior vice>president

Dilbert 9ee, and C$!*v Too/ Co$o$!*o" (*forma document with blan- spaces still unfilled.

• &he trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of plaintiff *hinaban- to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time.

8owever, upon *hinaban-Cs motion for reconsideration, the trial court reinstated the complaint, and, on *hinaban-Cs

further motion, declared defendant *


22/29

debun-ed petitionerCs protestation in his memorandum that his liability under the same surety agreement was

e'tinguished pursuant to 1rticle 20 of the *ivil *ode when *hinaban- granted *


23/29

Procedure, is authoriEed to determine ;errors of fact, of law, or both.; $ &hese rules are e'pressly adopted to apply to appeals

in criminal cases, and they do not thereby divest the 7upreme *ourt of its ultimate urisdiction over such "uestions.

1nent the argument that petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari under ule A5, it might be pointed out that this

remedy can only be resorted to when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and ade"uate remedy in the ordinary course of

law. !0 1ppeal, being a remedy still available to petitioner, a petition for certiorari would have been premature.

/n fine, petitioner had ta-en an appropriate legal step in filing a notice of appeal with the trial court. rdinarily, the *ourt

should have the case remanded to the *ourt of 1ppeals for further proceedings. &he clear impingement upon petitionerCs basic

right against double eopardy, !! however, should here warrant the e'ercise of the prerogative by this *ourt to rela' the

stringent application of the rules on the matter. #hen the trial court increased the penalty on petitioner for his crime of bigamy

after it had already pronounced udgment and on which basis he then, in fact, applied for probation, the previous verdict could

only be deemed to have lapsed into finality.

S!$!* O"o"s

)


24/29

/ vote therefor to affirm the decision of the *ourt of 1ppeals.

ROBIN M. CANO, **o"$, vs. THE CHIE(, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, EDGAR C. GAL;ANTE, !sPo2) D$)*o$ 1o$ P$so""2 !"/ R)o$/s M!"!=5"*, PNP, !"/ * DEPARTMENT O( INTERIOR AND LOCAL

GO;ERNMENT, $so"/"*s.

&his petition for review on certiorari assails (a the order of &* of IueEon *ity dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner

against respondents for payment of bac- salaries and allowances amounting to P 30!,0!$= and (b the order of &* denying his

motion for reconsideration.

(ACTS+or the alleged bungled investigation of the slay, a complaint for grave misconduct

was filed with the +ational Police *ommission(+P* under the 9epartment of /nterior and ?ocal Dovernment against

petitioner, then Police *hief /nspector of the *alauan Police 7tation. &he *hief of the P+P found petitioner guilty and ordered

his summary dismissal from the service, in a decision on 6uly !2, !5. Petitioner appealed his dismissal to the +ational

1ppellate oard of the +ational Police *ommission (+1P?*). +1P?*) reversed the decision of the P+P *hief.

&he +1P?*) decision having been allowed by both parties to become final and e'ecutory, petitioner was restored to fullduty status effective )ay !5, !. 8e also received all benefits and emoluments pertaining to his post pursuant to P+P

7pecial rder +o. !34!. #ith the modification of his penalty to 3 months suspension, petitioner filed a claim for payment of

bac- salaries and other allowances corresponding to the period he was allegedly unustly discharged from service until he was

restored to full duty status, or from 1ugust , !5 to )ay !5, !. 8owever, this claim, computed by the P+P egional

Police *omptrollership and inance 9ivision to be P30!,0!$ was denied by respondent Police 9irector


25/29

9espite -nowledge and receipt of payment from 1frica, 9ueBas failed to deliver what was incumbent upon him

under the underta-ing. 8e unustifiably incurred delay in the construction of the new building and wrongfully

deprived 1frica and her family of the use and enoyment of the subect property.

• &he parties brought the matter to the *ourt of 1ppeals assailing the 9ecision of the &*. &he appellate court,

however, found no cogent reason to depart from the trial courtCs conclusion. &hus, on 1pril 2, 2004, it rendered

the herein assailed 9ecision affirming with modification the &*Cs ruling.

ISSUE+#hether or not the 7upreme *ourt may be necessitated to determine the weight, credence, and probative value of the evidence

presented by the parties to a litigation.

RULING+Petitioner endeavors to convince the *ourt to determine, yet again, the weight, credence, and probative value of the evidence

presented. &his cannot be done in this petition for review on certiorari under ule 45 of the ules of *ourt where only

"uestions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by the 7*.

1 "uestion of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a "uestion of fact

when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. or a "uestion to be one of law, the same must not involve

an e'amination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. &he resolution of the issue

must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. nce it is clear that the issue invites a review of

the evidence presented, the "uestioned posed is one of fact. &hus, the test of whether a "uestion is one of law or of fact is not

the appellation given to such "uestion by the party raising the same= rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the

issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a "uestion of law= otherwise, it is a "uestion of

fact.

/t has already been held that the determination of the e'istence of a breach of contract is a factual matter not usually reviewable

in a petition filed under ule 45. #e will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the *ourt of 1ppeals especially

where, as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the trial court, since we are not a trier of facts.&he established rule

is that the factual findings of the *ourt of 1ppeals affirming those of the &* are conclusive and binding on us. #e are not

wont to review them, save under e'ceptional circumstances as:

!. when the inference made is manifestly mista-en, absurd or impossible=

2. when there is grave abuse of discretion=

3. when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conectures=

4. when the udgment of the *ourt of 1ppeals is based on misapprehension of facts=

5. when the *ourt of 1ppeals, in ma-ing its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to

the admissions of both appellant and appellee=

A. when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based=

. when the *ourt of 1ppeals manifestly overloo-ed certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if

properly considered, would ustify a different conclusion= and

$. when the findings of fact of the *ourt of 1ppeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by

the evidence on record.


26/29

?/+D+


27/29

&he private respondents motion for reconsideration of this order was denied by the hearing officer.

&he respondents appealed by certiorari to the 7

shopping and were further ordered to pay double costs in this instance.

G.R. No. '0>96 M!$) 6, '99

SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON !"/ ALEJANDRO L. DE LEON, petitioners, vs.THE COURT O( APPEALS, GLICERIO MA. ELAYDA II, (EDERICO ELAYDA !"/ DANILO

ELAYDA,respondents.

(!)*s+ n 1ugust $, !!, private respondents filed in the &* of IueEon *ity a complaint for annulment or rescission of acontract of sale of two (2 parcels of land against petitioners. %pon the filing of the complaint, the cler- of court re"uired

private respondents to pay doc-et and legal fees in the total amount of PA!0.00.

n 7eptember 2A, !!, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not ac"uire

urisdiction over the case b y reason of private respondents nonpayment of the correct amount of doc-et fees. Petitioners

contended that in addition to the fees already paid based on the claim for P!00,000.00 for attorneys fees, private respondents

should have paid doc-et fees in the amount of P2!,A40.00, based on the alleged value of the two (2 parcels of land subect

matter of the contract of sale sought to be annulled= that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is a real action and, therefore, the amount of the doc-et fees to be paid by private respondent should be based either

on the assessed value of the property, subect matter of the action, or its estimated value as alleged in the complaint, pursuant

to the last paragraph of [(b of ule !4!. 7ince private respondents alleged that the land, in which they claimed an interest as

heirs, had been sold for P4,3$,000.00 to petitioners, this amount should be considered the estimated value of the land for the

purpose of determining the doc-et fees.

Private respondents filed opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that outright dismissal of their complaint was not

warranted on the basis of the alleged nonpayment of the correct amount of doc-et fees, considering that the amount paid by

them was that assessed by the cler- of court

27


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n ctober 2!, !!, the trial court 7 denied petitioners motion to dismiss but re"uired private respondents to pay the amountof doc-et fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint.

Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the trial court. &hey therefore, brought

the matter to the *1 which, on ebruary 2A, !2, rendered a decision annulling the orders of the trial court. &he appellatecourt held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the

doc-et fees should not be based on the value of the real property, subect matter of the contract sought to be annulled or

rescinded. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied in a resolution dated )arch 25, !2 of the

appellate court. 8ence, the petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE+ #hether in assessing the doc-et fees to be paid for the filing of an action for annulment or rescission of a contract ofsale, the value of the real property, subect matter of the contract, should be used as basis, or whether the action should be

considered as one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and therefore the fee charged should be a flat rate of P400.00 as

provided in ule !4!, sec. (b (! of the ules of *ourt.

RULING+ 1n action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimationand, so, the doc-et fees should be the fi'ed amount of P400.00 in ule !4!, [(b(!. /n support of their argument, they cite the

cases of 6apitan v. $candia, &nc. and autista v. 6im. /n ?apitan th

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