Compilation of Digest Consti1

8/10/2019 Compilation of Digest Consti1

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MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS, G.R. No. 122156

Digest:

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEEON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL,

respondents.

This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus on the grounds of "The

Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution i.e., "in the

grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national

economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified

Filipinos."

Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of thePhilippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,

decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and

outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the

eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or

an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to

strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding, Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm edged Manila Prince

Hotel, a Filipion firm by a margin of P2.42 per share for 15,300,000

shares. Prior to the declaration of the winning bidder, the petitioner

matched the offer of Renong Berhad and sent a manager's check as bid

security which the respondent GSIS refused to accept.

Petitioners herein invoked Sec 10, par 2, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution and argued that the respondent hotel is part of the

national patrimony as part of the tourism industry and is thus part of

the national economy.

Respondents on the otherhand argued that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,

of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy

since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing

legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must

be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be

done."

Among other things, that even if such is the case, Manila Hotel does not

fall under the term national patrimony. That, granting that the Manila

Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision

invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of

the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor

the land upon which the building stands. That, submission by petitioner


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of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well

be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the

exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken

place. And finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse

of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its

discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse

its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion

of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by

law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has

no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an

imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987

Constitution is a self-executing provision requiring implementing

legislations.

2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony.

3. Whether or not the matching bid is premature

4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.

Held: In their resolution of the case, the Supreme Court held that,

"Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of

the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract."

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in

Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a

provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the

aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies

sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or

protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is

self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the

liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can

be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there

is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the

legislature for action.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to

enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all

provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional

provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of

self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and

practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

The SC further acknowledged that such provision is mandatory. And thus

the petition is granted.

LANDMARK CASE:


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G.R. No. 191149, March 17,2010 618 SCRA 639

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,Petitioner,vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

Facts:

Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149 asspecial civil actions for certiorariand mandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent Presidentthe list of at least three nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice.

All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent President can appointthe successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. That question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendentalimportance to the Nation, because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any Presidents most important appointment.

Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamuscan compel the JBC to immediately transmit to thePresident, within a reasonable time, its nomination list for the position of chief justice upon the mandatory retirement ofChief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance with its mandated duty under the Constitution in the event that the Courtresolves that the President can appoint a Chief Justice even during the election ban under Section 15, Article VII of theConstitution.

Petitioners De Castro (G.R. No. 191002), Soriano (G.R. No. 191032) and Peralta (G.R. No. 191149) all assert their rightas citizens filing their petitions on behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issue of the appointment of the nextChief Justice.

Issue:

Do the petitioners have legal standing to file a petition?

Does the JBC have the discretion to withhold the submission of the short list to President?

Does the Supreme Court bound to Always follow the Principle of Stare Decisis?

Conclusion:

The court dismissed the petitions for certiorari and mandamusin GR no. 191002 and GR no.191149.The motions forreconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all beenresolved by the decision of March 17, 2010. Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose ofclarification and emphasis.

Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court haserred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela (A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998, In Re Appointments datedMarch 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of

Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabananatuan City, respectively.)

The contention has no basis.


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Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent andnot to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed ofimperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the samejurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. Thedecisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts maybe appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down.

No, On February 26, 2010, the OSG also submitted its comment, essentially stating that the incumbent President canappoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement by May 17, 2010.A writ of mandamus can issue tocompel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President, considering that its duty to prepare the list of at least threenominees is unqualified, and the submission of the list is a ministerial act that the JBC is mandated to perform under theConstitution; as such, the JBC, the nature of whose principal function is executive, is not vested with the power to resolvewho has the authority to appoint the next Chief Justice and, therefore, has no discretion to withhold the list from thePresident.

Not all the time, The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because theprohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. Itargues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1),Article VIII of the Constitution; that in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme CourtJustices, the framers neither mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments, or its effects on suchperiod, or vice versa; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they couldhave easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (ExecutiveDepartment) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIIIample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure itsindependence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for

the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme CourtJustice.

The OSG posits that although Valenzuelainvolved the appointment of RTC Judges, the situation now refers to

the appointment of the next Chief Justice to which the prohibition does not apply; that, at any rate,Valenzuela evenrecognized that there might be the imperative need for an appointment during the period of the ban,like when the membership of the Supreme Court should be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting

on a particular important question requiring expeditious resolution be divided;and that Valenzuela also recognized thatthe filling of vacancies in the Judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, most especially if there is any compellingreason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the prohibition.

Lastly, the OSG urges that there are now undeniably compelling reasons for the incumbent President to appoint the nextChief Justice, to wit: (a) a deluge of cases involving sensitive political issues is quite expected;(b) the Court actsas the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is the sole judge of all contests relating to the

election, returns, and qualifications of the President and Vice President and, as such, has the power to correct

manifest errors on the statement of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC); (c) if history has shown that

during ord inary t imesthe Chief Justice was appointed immediately upon the occurrence of the vacancy, from the

time of the effectivity of the Constitution, there is now even more reason to appoint the next Chief Justice

immediately upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno; and (d) should the next Chief Justice come from among

the incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, thereby causing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent


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upon the JBC to start the selection process for the filling up of the vacancy in accordance with the constitutional

mandate.

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242

Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as tworepresentatives from Congress began sitting in the JBCone from the House of Representatives and one from the

Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and

2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At

present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit

in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory

that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of

Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the

Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their

respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VII

of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from bothHouses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real interest in

questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The respondents also question petitioners

belated filing of the petition.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this

case; and

(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom

are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:

(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual

case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have standing

to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will

sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party

will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality

of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an

official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is imperative to havelocus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and

question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members

of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the

highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by

the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is

the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object

of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention

for rectification of legal blunders.The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his

standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal


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stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of

Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise

screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not

at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all

over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of

nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the

JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens

who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No

particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to,

but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member

composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in

voting.

It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government to

legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the

process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is

necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,

however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the

workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The

Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are

nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are

legally recognized. They are not nullified.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011

R E S O L U T I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I. THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and

AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the

subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of

the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts

that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of

the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified

farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land

distribution. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said

6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which

the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their

thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.


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The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the

option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which

option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be

given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the

qualified FWBs.

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the

suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to

decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the

nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on

this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the

implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the

operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favourable to the FWBs because not only were

they allowed to retain the benefits and home lots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also

given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating

that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.

Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition

under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favour of the constitutionality

of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may

justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.

[G.R. No. L-10520 | February 28, 1957] TAADA vs. CUENCO

FACTS:


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Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same

Electoral Tribunal. Respondents allege that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct

or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Ele ctoral Tribunal; and (b ) that the

pet ition stat es no cause of acti on, because "petit ione r Taada has exhausted his right to nominate

after he nominated himself and refused to nominatetwo (2) more Senators.

ISSUE:Whether or not the issue is a political question.

RULING:

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike

the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77Phil., 192)-relied upon by the

respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either

directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House.

Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of

the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. Secondly, al though

the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Se na to r s wh o sh al l

f o r m p a r t o f t h e S e n a t e E l e c t o r a l T r i b u n a l , t h e f u n d a m e n t a l l a w h a s p r e s c r i b e d t h e

mann er i n whi ch th e au thor i ty shal l be exer c ised . As t he a utho r of a ve ry enlighteningstudy on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:

" T h e c o u r t s a r e c a l l e d u p o n t o s a y , o n t h e o n e h a n d , b y w h o m c e r t a i n p o w e r s s h a l l

be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been

validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate

branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, th ing as the

performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the

duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely se ek in g to de te rm in e

whe th er the Con sti tut ion has be en vio lat ed b y any th ing don e or attended by either an

executive official or the legislative."

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the

P h i l i p p i n e s . Y e t , t h i s d o e s n o t d e t r a c t f r o m t h e p o w e r o f t h e c o u r t s t o p a s s

u p o n t h e constitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire

i n t o t h e l e g a l i t y o f s t a t u t e s e n a c t e d b y t h e t w o H o u s e s o f C o n g r e s s , a n d a p p r o v e d b y

the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that


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of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. In fact , whenever

the conflicti ng claims of t he parties to a litiga tion ca nnot proper ly be settled without inquiring

into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass

upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law

and paving the way to its eventual destruction. As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges

on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In short, the term "pol it ica l questio n"

connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other

words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under

the Constitution, are to be decided by t he people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to

which fu ll dis cretionary author ity has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the

Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called u pon t o

d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e e l e c t i o n o f S e n a t o r s C u e n c o a n d D e l g a d o , b y t h e S e n a t e , a s

members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and

s p o k e s m a n o f t h e p a r t y h a v i n g t h e l a r g e s t n u m b e r o f v o t e s i n t h e S e n a t e - o n b e h a l f

of i t s Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate

Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having t he second largest

number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not

clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be

mandatory in nature . It is c learly within t he legi timate prove of the judi cial department to pass

upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

W h e t h e r a n e l e c t i o n o f p u b l i c o f f i c e r s h a s b e e n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h l a w i s f o r t h e

j u d i c i a r y . Moreover, where the legisl at ive de part ment ha s by statute prescri bed el ec tion

procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in

conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way

to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine

the principal issue raised by the parties herein. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the

Senate , as members of the Elector al Tribunal, valid and lawful?

Section 11 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads:


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"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole

ju dge of al l contest s re lat ing to the electio n, returns , an d qu al if icat ions of their respective

Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, threeof whom shall be Justices of the

Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or

of the House of Representatives, as thecase may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon

nomination of the partyhaving the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest

number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."

Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who

belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been

made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the

Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators,

who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number

of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and

which he represents.

Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal

shall be compose of nine (9) membe rs," s ix (6) of whom "shal l be members of the Senate or of the

House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3)

Senators by the maj ority party , and their electi on by the Senate, a s members of the Senate

Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby

"waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators

Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate

Elec toral Tribunal, Sai d Senator Primici as and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned

provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate Ele ctoral Tribunal;

and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the

appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is

valid and lawful.

What has been said above, relative to the conditions ante cedent to, and concomitant with, the

adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the

majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the

equilib rium between the ma jority and the minor ity par ties therein , with the Justices of the

Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure

prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral T r i bu n a l s i s v i t a l t o t h e ro l e

the y a re cal led upo n t o p lay . i t con sti tut es the es sen ce of sai d Tribunals. Hence,

compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void.


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It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate E l e ct or a l

T r i b u n a l , i n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t o s e v e n ( 7 ) , i n s t e a d o f n i n e ( 9 ) , m e m b e r s ; b u t , i t i s

conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of

our Constitution.

F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e s p i r i t o f t h e l a w p r e v a i l s o v e r i t s l e t t e r , a n d t h e s o l u t i o n h e r e i n

adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations cannot be

decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by

the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the

second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact tha t

the Citizens Party has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should

nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus,

numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Taada did not

nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position,

therein, of the Citizens Party.

Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the s a m e w er e

s a n c t i o n e d , t h e N a c i o n a l is t a P a r t y w o u l d h a v e f i v e ( 5 ) m e m b e r s i n t h e S e n a t e

Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the

Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the

philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein

would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would

be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political

considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precise ly

what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate

Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the

Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than

three (3) memb ers thereof to said Electora l Tribuna l; that the party having the second largest

number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three(3) Senators who shal l

sit as members in the Electoral Tribuna l; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may

be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the

Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly


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make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the

election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not

prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended

by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members o f the Senate Electoral Tribunal,they were appoint ed by its Chairma n, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure

members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs . Chief

Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction

and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures,

in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and

of, the decision in the case at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano JesusC u e n c o a n d F r a n c i s c o A . D e l g a d o h a v e n o t b e e n d u l y e l e c t e d a s M e m b e r s o f t h e

S e na t e Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are

hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal

and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the

qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz,

Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes.

Cutaran vs. DENR

FACTS: Cutaran et. al, assails the validity of DENR Special Order 31, Special Order 25, and Department

Administrative Order 2 for being issued without prior legislative authority. Special Order (SO) 31 (1990):

Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral

land claims nationwide. Department Administrative Order (DAO) 2: Implementing Rules and Guidelines

of Special Order no. 25. The same year SO 31 was issued, relatives of petitioners filed separate

applications for Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) for the land they occupy inside the Camp John

Hay Reservation. These petitions were denied. Also pursuant to the SOs the heirs of A peg Cervantes

filed application for CALC for some portions of the lands in Camp- John Hay Reservation, overlapping

some of the land occupied by the petitioners. The petitioners contend that if not for the respondents


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timely resistance to the Orders, the petitioners would be totally evicted from their land. Petitioners filed

in the CA petition to enjoin respondents from implementing Orders on the ground that they are void for

lack of legal basis. Court of Appeals ruled that SO31 has no force and effect for preempting legislative

prerogative for it was issued prior to the effectivity of RA7586 (National Integrated Protected Systems),

but it sustained SO25 and DAO2 on the ground that they were issued pursuant to powers delegated to

DENR under RA7586. Petitioners now contend that CA erred in upholding the validity of SO25 and DAO2

and seek to enjoin the DENR from processing the application of CALC of heirs of Carantes.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Special Order no. 25 and Department Administrative Order no. 2 are valid.

RULING: The Court ruled that it is not a justiciable controversy. The petition was prematurely filed.

There is yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve. The adverse legal interests involved are

the competing claims of the petitioners and heirs of Carantes to possess a common piece of land. since

the CALC application of the heirs of Carantes has not yet been granted or issued, and which the DENR

may or may not grant, there is yet no actual or imminent violation of petitioners asserted right to

possess the disputed land. Justiciable Controversy has been defined as : a definite and concrete dispute

touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court

of law through the application of a law. Subject to certain well-defined exceptions, the courts will not

touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or

performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. This

Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners speculation that the DENR will approve the application of

the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently

cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this

Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the

heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR.

KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO (G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995)

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A.


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RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO,

EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,

CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO,

JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN.

WIGBERTO TAADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,

vs.

MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine

Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING

MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Ponente: MENDOZA

FACTS:

]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it

is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case

[decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232

SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the

Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming

Management Corp. (PGMC)]. Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment

Lease Agreement (ELA) is a different lease contract with none of the

vestiges of a joint venture which were found in the Contract of Lease

nullified in the prior case; (2) that the ELA did not have to be submitted to a

public bidding because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No. 301,

1 (e); (3) that the power to determine whether the ELA is advantageous to

the government is vested in the Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for

lack of funds the PCSO cannot purchase its own on-line lottery equipment

and has had to enter into a lease contract; (5) that what petitioners are

actually seeking in this suit is to further their moral crusade and political

agenda, using the Court as their forum.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office


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and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. is invalid.

HELD:

NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was dismissed.

Pertinent to the issue, the SC held:

x x x

(3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not

contrary to the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;

(4) that under 1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity

Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of

an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or joint 2

venture with another party, so long as it itselfholds or conducts such lottery;

and

(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to

be submitted to public bidding as a condition for its validity.

RATIO:

E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies,

materials and equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of

equipment like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found in 6 and 7

but they refer to the lease of privately-owned buildings or spaces for

government use or of government-owned buildings or spaces for private

use, and these provisions do not require public bidding. It is thus difficult to

see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the ELA when the only feature of

the ELA that may be thought of as close to a contract of purchase and sale

is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a

contract of purchase and sale.


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Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former joint venture

agreement the present lease contract is [more] advantageous to the

government. The question is whether under the circumstances, the ELA is

the most advantageous contract that could be obtained compared with

similar lease agreements which the PCSO could have made with other

parties. Petitioners have not shown that more favorable terms could have

been obtained by the PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO

concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

PADILLA, concurring

I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this case.

As to whether or not the ELA is grossly disadvantageous to the

government, it should be stressed that the matter involves, basically, a

policy determination by the executive branch which this Court should not

ordinarily reverse or substitute with its own judgment, in keeping with the

time honored doctrine of separation of powers.

VITUG, concurring

I most humbly reiterate the separate opinion I have made in Kilosbayan,

Inc., et al., vs. Teofisto Guingona, Sr., etc., et al. (G.R. No. 113375,

promulgated on 05 May 1994).

Back to the core of the petition, however, the matter of the legal standing of

petitioners in their suit assailing the subject-contract appears to me, both

under substantive law and the rules of procedure, to still be an insuperable

issue. I have gone over carefully the pleadings submitted in G.R. No.

118910, and I regret my inability to see anything new that can convince me

to depart from the view I have expressed on it in G.R. No. 113375.


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3

FELICIANO, dissenting

With very great respect, it is submitted that the above conclusion has been

merely assumed rather than demonstrated and that what is in fact before

this Court does not adequately support such conclusion.

REGALADO, dissenting

I am constrained to respectfully dissent from the majority opinion premised

on the constitutional and procedural doctrines posed and interpreted in

tandem therein. I also regret that I have to impose on the majority with

this virtual turno en contra when I could have indicated my disaccord by

just joining Mr. Justice Davide in his commendably objective presentation

of the minority position. I feel, however, that certain views that have been

advanced require a rejoinder lest they lapse into the realm of unanimous

precedents.

DAVIDE, dissenting

I register a dissenting vote.

I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan, Inc., et

al. vs. Guingona, et al.

(hereinafter referred to as the first lotto case)

regarding the application or interpretation of the exception clause in

paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A.. No. 1169), as

amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue of locus standi of the

petitioners to question the contract of lease involving the on-line lottery

system entered into between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office

(PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC).

Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law of the case, res


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judicata, and stare decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of

the people, specially the lawyers and litigants, in the certainty and stability

of the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the floodgates to endless

litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements and weakens this

Courts judicial and moral authority to demand from lower courts obedience

thereto and to impose sanctions for their opposite conduct.

LAMP VS. SEC OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA,

Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO

BRION, ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ,

ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P.

PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA,

SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL,

JR., and BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR.

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,

and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the

Members of the Congress

G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012

FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation

of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for2004 (GAA of 2004).

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantlingall forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore,prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not

empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending fundsfor their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose andselect projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore,impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.

RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculationscirculated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.

ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the

implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.

HELD:

I.

A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In thiscase, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petitioncomplains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists adefinite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the

controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely dependsfor illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by


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taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wastedthrough the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issuesinvolving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction overthe petition.

II.

The Court rules in the negative.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded tostatutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not adoubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustainlegislation because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature thatpassed it but also of the executive which approved it.

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases offunds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiarysupport that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress,the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

PORK BARREL:

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be funded from thePDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, whichreviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by theExecutive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise thespending per se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafterspend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, theconstitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact._______________

NOTES:

POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;(2) (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, hemust have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of itsenforcement;(3) (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and(4) (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

G.R. No. 91649

H. B. Basco vs. Philippine Amusement ang Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)

FACTS:

The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation "PAGCOR" (P.D. 1869), was created to regulate and

centralized thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise on permitted by law.

PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter. All of its shares of stocks are

owned by government.

PAGCOR is beneficial not just to the government but to the society in general.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate Casinos. PAGCOR is a governmental agency, in which being

an intrumentality of the government, is exempted from local taxes.


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Petitioners filed a petition, questioning the validity of P.D. 1869 or PAGCOR, and that the same is null and void for

being contrary to morals, public policy and public order.

ISSUES:

Whether or not P.D. 1869 or PAGCOR is unconstitutional and shall be nullified.

Petitioners contend that:

P.D. 1869 allegedly constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees, and that itsexemption clause in its charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy;

P.D. 1869 allegedly violates the equal protection clause of constitution;

P.D. 1869 allegedly violates and inconsistent with constitution, unders:

article II, sec. 11 (Personality and dignity), sec. 12 (Family), and sec. 13 (Role of youth);

article XIII, sec. 13 (Social justice); and

article XIV, sec. 2 (Educational values).

RULING:

The court founds:

THAT, the power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which congress may

provide by law, with which the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose

taxes. And it is consistent with the principle of local autonomy under constitution.

THAT, equal protection clause violation of PAGCOR in legalizing gambling has no valid ground to sustain.

THAT, monopolies as provided by constitution is not necessarily prohibited and that the state must still decide

whether public interest demands for it to be regulated or prohibited.

THAT, unconstitutionality of P.D. 1869 has no valid ground, and its alleged violation with the articles II, XII and XIV

that are merely statements of principles and policies are basically not self executing, in which a law should be

passed by congress to interpret, clearly define and effectuate such principles.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Case:

G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, et al vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE , et al

Facts:

Petitioners claim that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the

Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings andthat afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they

complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S.

No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done was to

amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill

remains a House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. No. 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.


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Held:

R.A. No. 7716 did not violate Art. VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

Art. VI, Section 24 of our Constitution reads:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall

originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

In sum, while Art. VI, Section 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate

may propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute

measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:

(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or altering its language; (3) to

make and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at

all.

To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the House by prescribing that the num ber

of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting clause must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may be

incorporated in place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule prescribing this

form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could h ave

made.

David v ArroyoGR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Facts:

As the nation celebrated EDSA 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring astate of

national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carryout necessary and

appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorismand lawless violence.This

declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA PeoplePower I

celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the

media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the dispersal,

petitioner was arrested without warrant. A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of

emergency.Issue:Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial

review.Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue.Ratio

Decidendi:The Solicitor Generals refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by

theCourt. According to the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot

andacademic if: there is grave Constitutional violation, the situations exceptional character andparamount

public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles toguide the bench, bar and


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public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet evading review.Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on the

grounds that his personal rights wereinvolved. The petitioner qualifies under the direct injury test.

The personal and substantialinterest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury

qualifies him toimpugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he sustained are the

illegalarrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the court entertained his petition ashe has

adequately shown that he entitled to judicial protection.However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as

invalid although they may be abusedand misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the

manner of application. Thevalidity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its

general purpose and its efficiencyto accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a

particular case.The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants

President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into consideration that legislative

power isvested only in congress.The Court partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional

insofar as it allows the Presidentto call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However,

commanding the AFP toenforce laws not related to lawless violence are declared unconstitutional. Such

proclamationdoes not also authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utilities or

businessaffected with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is

constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but portion where acts

of terrorism has not been defined and punishable by congress is held unconstitutional.

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