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    Afghanistan Neg SupplementAfghanistan Neg Supplement..................................................................................................................................1Inherency FL [1/2]...................................................................................................................................................3Inherency FL [2/2]...................................................................................................................................................4Inherency FL Ext. 1.................................................................................................................................................5

    SQ Solves Stability...............................................................................................................................................6SQ Solves Drugs...................................................................................................................................................7Long-term Approach Good......................................................................................................................................8Troops Good............................................................................................................................................................9Heg FL [1/2]..........................................................................................................................................................10Heg FL [2/2]..........................................................................................................................................................11Heg FL Ext. 1.........................................................................................................................................................12Heg FL Ext. 3.........................................................................................................................................................13Heg FL Ext. 4.........................................................................................................................................................14

    Withdraw Terrorism..........................................................................................................................................15

    Withdraw Narcotics..........................................................................................................................................16

    Afghanistan Wants US There................................................................................................................................17Drug FL [1/2].........................................................................................................................................................20Drug FL [2/2].........................................................................................................................................................22Drug FL Ext. 2.......................................................................................................................................................23Drug FL Ext. 4....................................................................................................................................................241NC CP Drugs....................................................................................................................................................25Drug CP Ext........................................................................................................................................................26Drug CP Impact Module Medicine..................................................................................................................27Drug CP Impact Module Medicine Ext...........................................................................................................28Drug CP Impact Module Medicine Ext...........................................................................................................29Drug CP Impact Module Farmers....................................................................................................................30

    Drug CP Impact Module Taliban.....................................................................................................................31Drug CP Impact Module Taliban Ext..............................................................................................................32Drug CP Popular....................................................................................................................................................33Drug War Good Stability....................................................................................................................................35NATO FL [1/3]......................................................................................................................................................36NATO FL [2/3]......................................................................................................................................................37NATO FL [3/3]......................................................................................................................................................38NATO FL Ext. 1....................................................................................................................................................39NATO FL Ext. 2....................................................................................................................................................40NATO FL Ext. 5....................................................................................................................................................41Leadership Key to NATO......................................................................................................................................44

    Politics Popular Public........................................................................................................................................451NC CP Surge.....................................................................................................................................................46CP Surge Solvency.............................................................................................................................................48CP Surge Solvency.............................................................................................................................................49CP Surge Impact Module Pakistan..................................................................................................................52CP Surge Impact Module Minerals..................................................................................................................53CP Surge Impact Module China......................................................................................................................54Warlords FL [1/2]..................................................................................................................................................55

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    Warlords FL [2/2]..................................................................................................................................................56Warlords FL Ext. 4................................................................................................................................................57***AFF ANSWERS***........................................................................................................................................58A2 Drug CP US..................................................................................................................................................59A2 Drug CP............................................................................................................................................................60

    A2 Drug CP Afghan Opposes.............................................................................................................................62A2 Drug CP Afghan Opposes.............................................................................................................................63A2 Drug CP Afghan Opposes.............................................................................................................................64A2 Drug CP International...................................................................................................................................65A2 Drug CP - International....................................................................................................................................66A2 Surge CP Defense.........................................................................................................................................67A2 Surge CP Offense..........................................................................................................................................68

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    Inherency FL [1/2]1. Afghanistan progress is evident across the board

    Doug Bandow, Think Tank Contributor, May 7 2010, Cato Institute

    Herat, AfghanistanMalou Innocent and I have escaped Kabul for the much more pleasant city of Herat , innorthwest Afghanistan near Iran and Turkmenistan. We havent left all of Afghanistans many problems

    behind, but the atmosphere here is far different than in Kabul. Set in a wide plain, Herat played an importanthistoric role as part of the Silk Road, the famed Asian trading route. Although captured by the victoriousTaliban, Herat showed little sympathy for its new overlords. After its liberation the city suffered from thedomination of warlord Ismail Khan, but sprouts of liberalism increasingly can be seen in Herat. Forinstance, though women are expected to cover their hair, womens organizations have proliferated andgained public acceptance.Violence is minimal, though an RPG attack six months ago effectively shut down whathad been the citys only five-star hotel, transformed into offices for Westerners. Set on a hill dramatically overlooking thecity, the building offered too tempting a target. Tight security is evident at the airport, hotels, government buildings, and

    NGO offices. But there are far fewer armed police on the streets, machine gun-topped Humvees atintersections, and fortress-like buildings. Most concrete goes to construction rather than barriers. Barbed wire isused sparingly, not by the mile, as in Kabul. The international presence is strong, but not as overwhelming as in the

    capital. We generated a lot of attention when we were on the street. Most reactions were positive. Children wanted theirpictures taken with us; students wanted to practice their English; adults wanted to introduce themselves. We exercisedcaution and were closely guarded, but never felt the sense of persistent menace as in Kabul. Most humbling was meeting

    with human rights activists. Our cultures differ dramatically in some regards, but what most Afghans desire is notmuch different than what Americans want: peace and prosperity, freedom and opportunity. Evident onthe street are the strong family and friendship ties that underlie Afghan society. A number of people have stepped outheroically in an attempt to build a better society. The consistent frustration of these activists is the Afghan government.Corruption is pervasive; the police cannot be trusted. While people disagree over Americas future role, virtually everyonedesires a more effective, representative, and honest Afghan government. And many of them believe that requires less,rather than more, international aid. Malou and I have a few more days in Afghanistan, and another city to visit. So far ithas been a fascinating and challenging visit. Many hard decisions must be made to reorient U.S. policy. Among thehardest of those decisions must be made regarding Afghanistan.

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    Inherency FL [2/2]2. Obama is committed to a one-year timetable hes breaking with military brass.

    Washington Times 6/20 [Sean Lengell, 6/20/10, " White House: Afghanistan withdrawal deadline firm "http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/20/white-house-afghanistan-withdrawal-deadline-firm/]

    The Obama administration has reaffirmed its promise to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan

    by July 2011, distancing itself from recent Pentagon comments that the move could take longer."There's a firm date," said White House Chief of State Rahm Emanuel on ABC's "This Week" on Sunday. "The July[2011] date, as stated by the president, that's not moving, that's not changing. Everybody agreed on thatdate." Mr. Emanuel's remarks were in contrast to comments by Gen. David H. Petraeus, who told a congressionalcommittee last week that any withdrawal would be "based on conditions" and that "July 2011 is not thedate where we race for the exits." Mr. Emanuel said the White House and Pentagon positions are "notinconsistent" because both agree that "what will be determined [in July 2011], or going into that date,will be the scale and scope of the reduction. "But there will be no doubt that [a withdrawal is] going tohappen" in July 2011, the aide said. Mr. Emanuel said the deadline has created a "sense of urgency" for the UnitedStates, its coalition allies, and Afghanistan's government and security forces to push toward greater stability in the country.

    The president's aide added that the administration's "surge" of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan this year -- a deployment

    that is about two-thirds completed -- also has done much to improve security in the country. "This is creating a windowof opportunity for Afghanistan," Mr. Emanuel said. "We are now at that point in Afghanistan that, for thefirst time in . . . nine years they are actually meeting their police recruitment requirements, as well astheir army recruitment requirements." Mr. Emanuel also said the war in Afghanistan has lead to theelimination of about half of al Qaeda's forces in the country in the past 18 months.

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    Inherency FL Ext. 1Civilian casualties down Afghanistan is stabilizing

    Michael O Hanlon, Journalist, June 29 2010, Delaware Online Marja is a mess. The U.S. military erred in raising expectations about its big February operation in Marja, a midsizetown in Helmand province where violence remains too high and Afghan governance too weak. But the trend in Helmand,

    where we have added a number of forces since 2009, is encouraging. Even Marja is slowly progressing. The military needsto do a better job documenting this progress. The province is in better shape than a year ago in terms of the return ofcommerce and agriculture and the reduction in violence against citizens. There arent enough trainers for Afghansecurity forces. Our allies have not quite met their promises, or our expectations, for additional trainers. But allies have

    deployed more than 5,000 additional combat troops this year, exceeding the pace expected. The number of U.S.trainers has risen, and the number of Afghan officers graduating from training has more than doubledsince last year. Growth trajectories for the Afghan army and police remain on schedule. Perhaps mostimportant, nearly 85 percent of Afghan army units are partnered with coalition units meaning thatthey plan, patrol, train and fight together. This is one of Gen. McChrystals many positive legacies . In southernand eastern Afghanistan last month I saw many signs of the Afghan armys willingness to fight. Thenumber of key districts where security conditions are at least tolerable, if not yet good, is up modestly. Directives torestrict the use of firepower when civilians may be present increase risk to our troops. George F. Will has raised thisconcern; the infamous Rolling Stone article did as well, quoting troops in the field. But evidence suggests its not true.Roadside bombs, against which firepower is tactically irrelevant, overwhelmingly remain the most frequent cause of

    casualties to coalition troops. The percent of casualties from firefights is up, but modestly and in any eventMcChrystal favored allowing troops in danger to call in supporting firepower. Meanwhile, the policieshave reduced civilian casualties from coalition forces, an important step toward winning greatersupport from Afghans. Some worry that President Obamas ambiguity about the timetable hurts the war effort. Iopposed that deadline and the presidents lack of clarity about its meaning. But there is still a logic to the vagueness: Itkeeps pressure on Afghan officials to deliver, it reminds Americans that this war will not last forever and it sustains thepresidents flexibility to adjust the war plan to conditions. Even relative optimists can understand why such flexibility isvaluable. If the strategy is bearing fruit by next summer, the U.S. drawdown is likely to be gradual, and the president shouldkeep saying so. There are indeed weaknesses in U.S. strategy, including problems with the Afghan police and an inadequateplan to fight corruption. Gen. David Petraeus and military and civilian leaders should focus on these and other matters. But

    on balance, we have many assets and strengths in Afghanistan and better-than-even odds of leaving

    behind a reasonably stable place if we persevere.

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    SQ Solves StabilityThe only way to tell if we are needed in Afghanistan is to wait it out and stay in

    Reginald Sikes 2/22 [DEFINING AFGHANISTAN POLICY AND RISK-AMERICAS ACHILLES HEEL? BY COLONELREGINALD L. SIKES, JR. United States Army 22-02-2010 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518423&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]

    Can America win the war in Afghanistan? Is it truly a war of necessity? Will the American peoplecontinue to support a protracted conflict, and now demands the necessity of additional forces? Onlytime will tell, but if history holds true, the domestic interests of the American people will eventuallyconverge to demand an exit from the conflict, until the next time the US is attacked.

    If we abandon afghan now it will never recover again

    Bron Hartman 2009 [The U.S. Should Not Give Up on Afghanistan Posted by Editoriar 2008 on Mon,11/09/2009 - 05:15 in Security Policy, South Asia By Byron HartmanStaff EditorNovember 8, 2009http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/96]

    Yet, there is an even more important truth that few in the foreign policy establishment are vocally articulating: the UnitedStates has made promises. It sounds simplistic, juvenile even. But to the Afghan people, abandoned by theU.S. government following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1988, nothing is more central. To theAfghans, this is about faith. It is about rebuilding the trust that was broken in the cold calculations of a post-Cold War

    peace dividend. It is about making good on the promises America made to the Afghan people, thosewho defeated a ruthless Communist enemy over twenty years ago and were left to pick up the shatteredpieces of a nation without U.S. assistance. Over one million Afghan civilians died during the Soviet-Afghan war.The 8-year old Afghan child that was left orphaned in Pakistani refugee camps in 1988 turned into the 29-year old AfghanTaliban commander that NATO forces are fighting now, violently resentful of the way the American government

    abandoned his country. If we fail in Afghanistan now, the Afghan children of today, abandoned to a neo-Taliban movement with global Al Qaeda ties, will almost certainly grow into the next Khalid SheikhMohammads and Imad Mugniyehs of tomorrow, engineering the murder of American citizens at homeand abroad. The impact of deserting the Afghans ranges far beyond the Hindu Kush and Helmand Province though; if

    the United States abandons Afghanistan again, it will never recover its standing in Central Asia. Nocountry in the region will be willing to place their trust in America. Americas NATO allies, whom itasked, cajoled and threatened into standing firm in Afghanistan will feel justifiably forsaken andmisled. Many of these allies fought costly domestic political battles and made economic sacrifices tocontribute additional forces.Breaking this trust with the NATO alliance would be an unprecedentedblunder that will undermine the very integrity of the United States most important alliance.

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    http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518423&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdfhttp://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518423&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdfhttp://www.iar-gwu.org/taxonomy/term/20http://www.iar-gwu.org/taxonomy/term/24http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/96http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518423&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdfhttp://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518423&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdfhttp://www.iar-gwu.org/taxonomy/term/20http://www.iar-gwu.org/taxonomy/term/24http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/96
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    SQ Solves DrugsUS Troops is key to stopping Poppy Cultivation

    Semple and Golden, October 7, 2007 (Kirk and Tim, staff writers for the New York Times US Presses Againto eradicate Afghan Opium Poppies The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/news/07iht-kabul.5.7788904.html Accessed June 8, 2010)

    KABUL With opium and heroin production exploding in Afghanistan, the United States hasrenewed its efforts to persuade the government of President Hamid Karzai to start using chemicalherbicides to destroy opium poppy, Afghan and U.S. officials said. Since early this year, Karzai has repeatedlydeclared his opposition to spraying the poppy fields, whether by crop-dusting airplanes or by eradication teams on the

    ground.But now, after the largest opium harvest in Afghanistan's history, Afghan officials say the government isreconsidering that stance. Some officials said a trial program of ground spraying could begin beforenext spring's harvest.The issue of chemical eradication has divided the Afghan government, its Western allies and evenU.S. officials of different agencies. The matter is fraught with political danger for Karzai, whose hold on power isweak.Many proponents of the spraying, including officials at the White House and the State Department, view it as thesingle best hope for curbing Afghanistan's poppy crop, which has become a major source of revenue for the Talibaninsurgency.But skeptics - including some senior U.S. military and intelligence officials, as well as European diplomats inAfghanistan - say the use of herbicides could provide a propaganda windfall for Karzai's opponents and push farming

    communities into the hands of the Taliban."There has always been a need to balance the obvious greater effectiveness ofspray against the potential for losing hearts and minds," said Thomas Schweich, U.S. assistant secretary of statefor international narcotics issues. "The question is whether that's manageable. I think that it is."Bush administrationofficials say they will respect whatever decision the Afghan government makes on the matter. Crop-eradicationefforts, they insist, are only one element of a new counternarcotics strategy that will include increasedefforts against traffickers, more aid for legal agriculture and development, and greater military supportfor the drug fight. Behind the scenes, however, senior Bush administration officials have been pressing the Afghangovernment to at least allow a trial spray program using glyphosate, a commonly used weed killer, said current and formerU.S. officials. Although ground spraying would likely bring only a modest improvement over the manual destruction ofpoppy plants, U.S. officials who support the strategy hope it would reassure Afghans about the safety of the herbicide andthus make possible much more effective aerial eradication.The problem is enormous.

    US military counternarcotics efforts have succeeded, Afghan Opium cultivation are droppingGavrilis, February 10, 2010 (George, international Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations The Good and Bad Newsabout Afghan Opium Council on Foreign Relationshttp://www.cfr.org/publication/21372/good_and_bad_news_about_afghan_opium.htmlAccessed June 14, 2010)

    Some rare good news is coming out of Afghanistan these days. Internationally led counternarcoticsefforts have gained momentum, opium cultivation is decreasing, and more provinces have gone "poppyfree," a term developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) that indicatesprovinces where opium growing has ceased or reached negligible levels. But the bad news is that manyof Afghanistan's poppy-free provinces remain critical enablers of Afghanistan's opium economy.Though poppy growing may be eliminated, criminal networks in a number of provinces now focus onrefining, stockpiling, and transporting opium. A broad range of authoritative international sources

    indicates these networks are at times aided by Afghan government officials who are little bothered bythe Western-led counternarcotics efforts that seek to eradicate opium crops and chase down Talibansmugglers.

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    http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/news/07iht-kabul.5.7788904.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/news/07iht-kabul.5.7788904.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/21372/good_and_bad_news_about_afghan_opium.htmlhttp://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=1&ved=0CAkQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.unodc.org%2F&ei=jeZqS82IG4Lf8Qa1poD7BQ&usg=AFQjCNEqhDM97BfL4RH1X1EKqjVttntwxQ&sig2=ZfiDe7osgI1SPt4Pw7jf_whttp://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/news/07iht-kabul.5.7788904.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/news/07iht-kabul.5.7788904.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/21372/good_and_bad_news_about_afghan_opium.htmlhttp://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=1&ved=0CAkQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.unodc.org%2F&ei=jeZqS82IG4Lf8Qa1poD7BQ&usg=AFQjCNEqhDM97BfL4RH1X1EKqjVttntwxQ&sig2=ZfiDe7osgI1SPt4Pw7jf_w
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    Long-term Approach GoodLong-term approach is key for afghan stability

    Alexander Their 2009 [The Future of Afghanistan Stability in Afghanistan Requires Fundamental U.S. Policy Shift anuary 2009| Book by J. Alexander Thier, editor. http://www.usip.org/peaceops/afghanistan/book.html]

    US policy toward Afghanistan will require a fundamental change in order to achieve long-term stability

    in that country, according to The Future of Afghanistan, a new U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) collection of essayswritten by some of the world's top South Asia analysts. "A focused, coherent, and long-term approach toAfghan and regional stability is necessary to get Afghanistan out of its vicious cycle of insecurity,insurgency, impunity, and corruption" says J. Alexander Thier, who edited the volume. Any effort to establishstability through troop increases alone will ignore larger issues and lead to short-term improvements at best. While recentviolence in Afghanistan must be brought under control, the U.S. and the international community mustget back to the basics by placing critical focus on rule of law, ec onomic empowerment and the regionalcontext.

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    http://www.usip.org/peaceops/afghanistan/book.htmlhttp://www.usip.org/peaceops/afghanistan/book.html
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    Troops GoodAmerican wars in Afghanistan are used to show dominance

    Mahboob Khawaia 6/14 [he Bogus War on Terrorism: How America and Britain Were Dragged to Wars in Iraq andAfghanistan? By Mahboob A. Khawaja Al-Jazeerah: CCUN, June 14, 2010 http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20Editorials/2010/June/14%20o/The%20Bogus%20War%20on%20Terrorism%20How%20America%20and%20Britain%20Were

    %20Dragged%20to%20Wars%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Afghanistan%20%20By%20Mahboob%20A.htm]The American led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are fought to maintain the US domination worldwide, tooccupy the untapped natural resources of the Middle East in particular the oil and gas, and to protectthe value of American dollar as a stable international reserve currency. In September 2000, the proactivepolicy paper written by the neoconservative intellectuals to envision the Project for the New American Century (PNAC):

    sets out the milestone seeking American domination over the rest of the world powers and to meet itsenergies needs plans to occupy by force all the oil resources in the Arab Middle East. The blueprint supportsmilitary occupation of the oil exporting Arab countries and regime change where it is necessary to fulfill the policyaims of the New American Century of global domination.

    American leadership is needed world-wide, no global problem can be solved without the US

    Stephen Lendman 6/10 [Obama's National Security Strategy (NSS): A New Direction or Continuity By Stephen Lendman 10

    June, 2010 http://www.countercurrents.org/lendman100610.htm]Obama's first plan describes a time when America "will have to learn to live within its limits - a world in which two warscannot be sustained for much longer and (other) rising powers inevitably begin to erode some elements of (US) influence

    around the globe." Seeking help to advance global hegemony, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, stressed "patienceand partners (to achieve) results more slowly," claiming "In a world like this, American leadership isn'tneeded less. It is needed more. And the simple fact is that no problem can be solved without us," orperhaps less of them would exist without US policies creating them - the fractious, threatening world The Times writersmention, reflecting more continuity than divergence from Bush. On May 27 in Foreign Policy, Peter Feaver wondered thesame thing in his article headlined, "Obama's National Security Strategy: real change or just 'Bush Lite,' " saying: Despitetrying to frame it as a new direction, in fact, he's continuing "a slightly watered down but basically plausible remake" of hispredecessor's. Beyond the hyperbole and talking points, "the conclusion is pretty obvious."

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    Heg FL [1/2]1. US Hegemony in Middle East is ending

    Chris Phillips 5/31 [US hegemony in Middle East is ending Talk of a Middle East cold war is inaccurate Russia and Turkeyare simply capitalising on the region's new power vacuum Chris Phillips Monday 31 May 2010http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending]

    While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region, squeezing the defiant few like Syria andSaddam Hussein's Iraq, today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filledby assertive regional and middle powers. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Irantypify this emerging newclimate. Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global, with Asia's share of GDP alreadyoutstripping that of the US or Europe . As ever, it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of theseinternational changes. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end, perhaps hastened byunnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness, it is much more likely that international relations inthe Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bi-polar cold war. In such circumstances, it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region, but China,India and Brazil will all bid for a role, too presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clientspursuing democratic reforms and peace with Israel. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with Chinamight signify the shape

    of things to come. Not that this era is yet upon us. The US remains the superpower and could still effect seriouschange in the region, should it desire. However, the recent actions of Russia and Turkey in the MiddleEast do show a new assertiveness from regional powers to pursue their own path in defiance of USwill, whether through arms deals, trade agreements or diplomatic coups. A new cold war is unlikely,but the age of unchallenged US hegemony in the Middle East could be ending.

    2. US does not face Overstretch in Afghanistan, we have unlimited power

    Robert J. Lieber, Summer2008, professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown University Falling UpwardsDeclinism, The Box Set World Affairs Journal http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Summer/full-Lieber.html

    In the realm of hard power, while the army and Marines have been stretched by the wars in Iraq andAfghanistan, the fact is that no other country possesses anything like the capacity of the United Statesto project power around the globe. American military technology and sheer might remain unmatched

    no other country can compete in the arenas of land, sea, or air warfare. China claims that it spends $45 billionannually on defense, but the truth comes closer to three times that figure. Still, Americas $625 billion defense budgetdwarfs even that. The latter amounts to just 4.2 percent of GDP. This contrasts with 6.6 percent at the height of the Reaganbuildup and double-digit percentages during the early and middle years of the Cold War.

    3. TURN: A. Withdrawing from afghan commitment would hurt U.S. credibility

    Paul Pillar and John Nagel 2/25 [Debating Afghanistan by Paul R. Pillar and John Nagl 02.25.2010

    http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22916]My sparring partner asserts that backing away from the commitment in Afghanistan would damage U.S.credibilitya logic eerily reminiscent of the chief rationale for the war in which I served as an army officer: the one inVietnam. The idea was as unexamined and invalid then as it is now. Governments (or terrorist groups) simply donot calculate other governments credibility that way.1 Nagls reference in this regard to how Pakistan wouldrevisit its recent decisions to fight against the Taliban is odd given that the most recent decisionannounced during avisit by the U.S. secretary of defense, no lessis that the Pakistani army would not launch any new offensives for as muchas a year.

    B. [International credibility key to US hegemony]

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    http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-endinghttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8685846.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8685846.stmhttp://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/13/the_end_of_the_world_as_we_know_ithttp://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/04/07/the_maturing_saudi-china_alliance_98904.htmlhttp://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/04/07/the_maturing_saudi-china_alliance_98904.htmlhttp://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22916http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-endinghttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8685846.stmhttp://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/13/the_end_of_the_world_as_we_know_ithttp://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/04/07/the_maturing_saudi-china_alliance_98904.htmlhttp://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22916
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    Heg FL [2/2]4. If we leave Afghanistan then there will be an increase of terrorism

    Nicholas Watt 6/30 [Liam Fox insists army cannot leave Afghanistan until job done Early exit could bring civil war, says defence

    secretary, although his comments appear at odds with Cameron's 2015 vow Nicholas Watt, chief political correspondenguardian.co.uk, Wednesday 30 June 2010 20.43 BST Article history http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jun/30/liam-fox-

    afghanistan-foreign-policy]Were we to leave prematurely, without degrading the insurgency and increasing the capability of theAfghan national security forces, we could see the return of the destructive forces of transnationalterror," he said. "Not only would we risk the return of civil war in Afghanistan, creating a securityvacuum, but we would also risk the destabilisation of Pakistan with potentially unthinkable regional,and possibly nuclear, consequences." Fox warned of an increased terror threat across the world if troopsleft too soon. "The second reason is that it would be a shot in the arm to jihadists everywhere, re-energising violent radical and extreme Islamism. It would send the signal that we did not have themoral resolve and political fortitude to see through what we ourselves have described as a nationalsecurity imperative."

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    Heg FL Ext. 1US heg is declining

    William Hawkins 2009 ["U.S. Hegemony Ends" By:William R. Hawkins FrontPageMagazine.com | Monday, March 09, 2009http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=34262]

    The day after the Afghanistan editorial (and two days after Secretary Clinton left China), The Peoples Daily ran another

    opinion piece entitled, The U.S. Hegemony ends, the era of global multipolarity enters. It started byreveling in the economic crisis that has swept America and signals a swift reduction of U.S. strengthas a unipolar power. Its conclusion was stark. Does the decline of U.S. geopolitical hegemony makemultilateral global governance more likely? Perhaps it is still too early to rush any conclusion, but atleast one thing is certain: the U.S. strength is declining at a speed so fantastic that it is far beyondanticipation. The U.S. is no longer 'King of the hill,' as a new phase of multipolar world power structure willcome into being in 2009, and the international order will be correspondingly reshuffled.

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    http://97.74.65.51/bioAuthor.aspx?AUTHID=432http://97.74.65.51/bioAuthor.aspx?AUTHID=432http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=34262http://97.74.65.51/bioAuthor.aspx?AUTHID=432http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=34262
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    Heg FL Ext. 3The US going home is a sign of weakness to other countries

    Thayer 07 [Bradley American Empire: A Debate http://books.google.com/books?id=nBl39Mozk8C&pg=PT117&lpg=PT117&dq=%22U.S.+power+protects+the+United+States.%22&source=bl&ots=hy975IGe3e&sig=kiOCmBBQ4vraJwnhSwVY3vsvb1w&hl=en&ei=jAYwTIS6CoP7lwfwgtSBCQ&sa=X&oi

    =book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22U.S.%20power%20protects%20the%20United%20States.%22&f=false (pg 41-42)]

    Second,U.S. power protects the United States . That sentence is as genuine and as important a statement aboutinternationalpolitics as one can make. International politics is not a game or a sport. There are no "timeouts," there is no halftime and no rest. It never stops. There is no hiding from threats and dangers ininternational politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats it confronts, then the conventional

    and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats .Simply by declaring that the United States is going home, thus abandoning its commitments ormaking half pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect its wishes

    to retreat. In fact, to make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In theanarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true inthe anarchic realm of international politics. If the United States is not strong and does not actively protect and advance its

    interests, other countries will prey upon those interests, and even on the United States itself.

    Means that the US will lose their hegemony

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    http://books.google.com/books?id=nBl39Mozk-8C&pg=PT117&lpg=PT117&dq=%22U.S.+power+protects+the+United+States.%22&source=bl&ots=hy975IGe3e&sig=kiOCmBBQ4vraJwnhSwVY3vsvb1w&hl=en&ei=jAYwTIS6CoP7lwfwgtSBCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAAhttp://books.google.com/books?id=nBl39Mozk-8C&pg=PT117&lpg=PT117&dq=%22U.S.+power+protects+the+United+States.%22&source=bl&ots=hy975IGe3e&sig=kiOCmBBQ4vraJwnhSwVY3vsvb1w&hl=en&ei=jAYwTIS6CoP7lwfwgtSBCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAAhttp://books.google.com/books?id=nBl39Mozk-8C&pg=PT117&lpg=PT117&dq=%22U.S.+power+protects+the+United+States.%22&source=bl&ots=hy975IGe3e&sig=kiOCmBBQ4vraJwnhSwVY3vsvb1w&hl=en&ei=jAYwTIS6CoP7lwfwgtSBCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAAhttp://books.google.com/books?id=nBl39Mozk-8C&pg=PT117&lpg=PT117&dq=%22U.S.+power+protects+the+United+States.%22&source=bl&ots=hy975IGe3e&sig=kiOCmBBQ4vraJwnhSwVY3vsvb1w&hl=en&ei=jAYwTIS6CoP7lwfwgtSBCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAAhttp://books.google.com/books?id=nBl39Mozk-8C&pg=PT117&lpg=PT117&dq=%22U.S.+power+protects+the+United+States.%22&source=bl&ots=hy975IGe3e&sig=kiOCmBBQ4vraJwnhSwVY3vsvb1w&hl=en&ei=jAYwTIS6CoP7lwfwgtSBCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAAhttp://books.google.com/books?id=nBl39Mozk-8C&pg=PT117&lpg=PT117&dq=%22U.S.+power+protects+the+United+States.%22&source=bl&ots=hy975IGe3e&sig=kiOCmBBQ4vraJwnhSwVY3vsvb1w&hl=en&ei=jAYwTIS6CoP7lwfwgtSBCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAAhttp://books.google.com/books?id=nBl39Mozk-8C&pg=PT117&lpg=PT117&dq=%22U.S.+power+protects+the+United+States.%22&source=bl&ots=hy975IGe3e&sig=kiOCmBBQ4vraJwnhSwVY3vsvb1w&hl=en&ei=jAYwTIS6CoP7lwfwgtSBCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAAhttp://books.google.com/books?id=nBl39Mozk-8C&pg=PT117&lpg=PT117&dq=%22U.S.+power+protects+the+United+States.%22&source=bl&ots=hy975IGe3e&sig=kiOCmBBQ4vraJwnhSwVY3vsvb1w&hl=en&ei=jAYwTIS6CoP7lwfwgtSBCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAA
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    Heg FL Ext. 4Removing troops from Afghanistan will put the country back into terror and instability

    Mail foreign service 6/26 [Cameron: I want British troops out of Afghanistan by the next election By mail foreign service Lastupdated at 1:16 AM on 26th June 2010http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1289610/Cameron-I-want-British-troopsAfghanistan-election.html]

    Discussing Mr Obama's preference for beginning a drawdown around July next year, Mr Cameron said: 'I prefer not tosee it in strict timetables. 'I want us to roll up our sleeves and get on with delivering what will bring thesuccess we want, which is not a perfect Afghanistan, but some stability in Afghanistan and the abilityfor the Afghans themselves to run their country so they can come home.' Yesterday the Prime Minister bracedBritain for more troop deaths in Afghanistan as the loss of four British soldiers made this the deadliest month for Nato since

    the 2001 invasion. The Prime Minister warned ominously of a 'difficult summer' ahead and admitted that the countrywas paying a 'very high price' in casualties. But he insisted that pulling out of Afghanistan would plunge it backinto terror and instability.

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    Withdraw TerrorismAfghanistan will still be unstable with terrorism after 2011

    Daniel Flitton 4/9 [July next year is our date with destiny for Afghan pullout Daniel Flittonhttp://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/july-next-year-is-our-date-with-destiny-for-afghan-pullout-20100408-ruyk.htmlApril 9, 2010]

    The second caveat to note is that July 2011 will mark the beginning of a withdrawal, not an end . Not being aNATO member, Australia is unable to take command of Oruzgan from the Dutch in August - but a modest boost in troops

    is possible. Even so, the defence white paper last year made it clear the government expects to be engaged in Afghanistanfor the next decade or more. ''It will remain a challenged state and a potential source of ongoing instabilityin the region,'' the paper says. ''This weakness will have broader implications because of Afghanistan'spotential as a base for global Islamist terrorism and its role in the narcotics trade .'' Many foreign soldierswill stay - especially to keep up pressure on al-Qaeda. But the military will not be the mainstay for Australia's involvement .The wider 7nternational plan is to focus on more aid and technical advice for the Afghan government. Abig military operation in Helmand province last month and a coming push in Kandahar are intended to clear the ground ofTaliban and allow newly mentored Afghan troops to take control.

    Withdrawal of troops would risk war

    Nicholas Watt 6/30 [Liam Fox insists army cannot leave Afghanistan until job done Early exit could bring civil war, says defencesecretary, although his comments appear at odds with Cameron's 2015 vow Nicholas Watt, chief political correspondenguardian.co.uk, Wednesday 30 June 2010 20.43 BST Article history http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jun/30/liam-fox-afghanistan-foreign-policy]

    An early withdrawal ofcoalition troops from Afghanistan would risk a return of civil war and act as a"shot in the arm to jihadists" across the world, the defence secretary, Liam Fox, warned today. In marked contrastto David Cameron, who pledged over the weekend to withdraw all British troops by 2015, Fox said Britain would bebetraying the sacrifices of its fallen soldiers if it left "before the job is finished".

    If we withdraw from Afghanistan Al Qaeda will gain more control

    Bron Hartman 2009 [The U.S. Should Not Give Up on Afghanistan Posted by Editoriar 2008 on Mon,

    11/09/2009 - 05:15 in Security Policy, South Asia By Byron HartmanStaff EditorNovember 8, 2009http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/96]Some argue that our interests can be best served by a limited counter-terrorism campaign targeting Al Qaeda leaders in the

    Pakistani border region. Al Qaeda is not the cause of instability in Afghanistan, but rather a symptom ofthe disease. The disease is the central governments lack of institutional capacity to provide securityand services. The withdrawal of U.S. military support may not lead to the immediate collapse of theAfghan central government, but it will result in the immediate loss of large areas to tribal, narcotic andmilitant interests. Al Qaeda will exploit these autonomous areas to establish new bases and training camps from whichto attack America and her allies around the world. What is most dangerous, though, is that the withdrawal of U.S.forces and the inevitable collapse of Afghanistan will provide Al Qaeda with space to operate. Theircapacity to strike could return to the same levels they enjoyed prior to the attacks on the Pentagon andWorld Trade Center. U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan would be portrayed not as a Taliban victory,but as an Al Qaeda one. Militant factions in the Muslim world deserted Al Qaeda in the aftermath of their failedcampaign in Iraq, but new militant foot soldiers would flock to the banner of an Al Qaeda victory , setting offa period of global instability not seen in modern history. Nothing will encourage and embolden Al Qaeda somuch as victory in Afghanistan.

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    http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/by/daniel-flittonhttp://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/july-next-year-is-our-date-with-destiny-for-afghan-pullout-20100408-ruyk.htmlhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/nicholaswatthttp://www.guardian.co.uk/http://www.guardian.co.uk/http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jun/30/liam-fox-afghanistan-foreign-policyhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jun/30/liam-fox-afghanistan-foreign-policyhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/afghanistanhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/liamfoxhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/davidcameronhttp://www.iar-gwu.org/taxonomy/term/20http://www.iar-gwu.org/taxonomy/term/24http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/96http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/by/daniel-flittonhttp://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/july-next-year-is-our-date-with-destiny-for-afghan-pullout-20100408-ruyk.htmlhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/nicholaswatthttp://www.guardian.co.uk/http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jun/30/liam-fox-afghanistan-foreign-policyhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jun/30/liam-fox-afghanistan-foreign-policyhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/afghanistanhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/liamfoxhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/davidcameronhttp://www.iar-gwu.org/taxonomy/term/20http://www.iar-gwu.org/taxonomy/term/24http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/96
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    Withdraw NarcoticsAfghan Government unlikely to continue counter-narcotics programs if the US leaves because of political

    pressures

    Kebede, 2008 (Solomon, writer for The Capital Ethiopia, Afghanistan and the Drug Trade, The Capital Ethiopiahttp://www.capitalethiopia.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12719:afghanistan-and-the-drug-

    trade&catid=3:business-and-economy&Itemid=14, Accessed May 19, 2010)After 2002 Afghan opium production rose to unheard of levels. By 2007, Afghanistan was producingenough heroin to supply the entire world. In 2009, Thomas Schweich, who served as US statedepartment co-ordinator for counter-narcotics and justice reform for Afghanistan, accused PresidentHamid Karzai of impeding the war on drugs. Schweich also accused the Pentagon of obstructingattempts to get military forces to assist and protect opium crop eradication drives. Schweich wrote in theNew York Times that narco-corruption went to the top of the Afghan government. He said Karzai wasreluctant to move against big drug lords in his political power base in the south, where most of thecountrys opium and heroin is produced. The most prominent of these suspected drug lords was AhmedWali Karzai, the brother of President Hamid Karzai. Ahmed Wali Karzai was said to have orchestratedthe manufacture of hundreds of thousands of phoney ballots for his brothers re-election effort in August

    2009. He was also believed to have been responsible for setting up dozens of so-called ghost pollingstations existing only on paper that were used to manufacture tens of thousands of phoney ballots.US officials have criticised his mafia-like control of southern Afghanistan. The New York Timesreported that the Obama administration had vowed to crack down on the drug lords who permeate thehighest levels of the government, and they pressed President Karzai to move his brother out of southernAfghanistan, but he refused to do so. Karzai was playing us like a fiddle, Schweich wrote. The USwould spend billions of dollars on infrastructure development; the US and its allies would fight theTaliban; Karzais friends could get richer off the drug trade. Karzai had Taliban enemies who profitedfrom drugs but he had even more supporters who did. But who was playing who like a fiddle? Was itthe puppet president or the puppet masters who installed him? As Douglas Valentine shows in hishistory of the War on Drugs, The Strength of the Pack, this never-ending war has been a phoney contest,

    an arm wrestle between two arms of the US state, the DEA and the CIA; with the DEA vainlyattempting to prosecute the war, while the CIA protects its drug-dealing assets. During the Nineteenthand Twentieth centuries, European powers (chiefly the UK) and Japan used the opium trade to weakenand subjugate China. During the 21st century, it seems that the opium weapon is being used against Iran,Russia and the former Soviet republics, which all face spiralling rate of addiction and covert USpenetration as the Afghan War fuels central Asias heroin plague.

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    Afghanistan Wants US ThereTURN: Karzai wants more US assistance to help out Afghanistan

    Larisa Epatko 5/10 [May 10, 2010 Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Afghanistan Hangs Over Karzai Visit BY: LARISAEPATKO http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/05/karzai-visit-to-dc.html]

    One of the tasks at hand is rebuilding relations after comments Karzai made last month asserting that the fraud-riddledelections were caused by United Nations and other foreign organizations seeking to prevent his re-election. His spokesmenlater sought to dial back his criticism, but in subsequent interviews with the media, Karzai did not back off his claims. In a

    letter printed in the Washington Post on Sunday, Karzai referred to the ups and downs of the U.S.-Afghanistanrelationship: "As in any genuine partnership, this has not been an easy ride. We have had our share ofdisagreements over some issues and approaches. What has kept us together is an overriding strategicvision of an Afghanistan whose peace and stability can guarantee the safety of the Afghan and theAmerican peoples." Karzai also called for more assistance equipping Afghan security forces andrebuilding services and institutions, which he said would help reduce the country's corruption -- ademand the Obama administration has placed on him. "Removing parallel structures that undermine the authority of our

    government is key," Karzai wrote. "Addressing corruption and waste in the delivery mechanisms, includingcontractual systems, is imperative. President Obama's decision to channel more funds through the

    Afghan government is a good step forward." The visit comes with the July 2011 withdrawal of U.S. troops just alittle more than a year away. President Obama, who set the deadline, needs to know that things are progressing towardending the war that his predecessor started and that he promised to bring to a close, said Torek Farhadi, who served as a

    senior adviser to the Afghan government from 2002-2004. But President Karzai, who just entered his second termlast year, is operating under a different timeframe and is seeking U.S. investments in security andinfrastructure in Afghanistan beyond the July 2011 troop withdrawal, Farhadi said.

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    More Afghanis say more US Forces Would Help Rather than Hurt

    Julie Ray and Rajesh Srinivasan, Poll Conductors, September 30 2009, Gallup PollWASHINGTON, D.C. -- As President Barack Obama mulls whether to commit more troops to Afghanistan, a Gallupsurvey during troop buildup earlier this year found nearly half of Afghans (49%) saying additionaltroops would help stabilize the security situation in the southern provinces. Thirty-two percent of

    Afghans said they would not. But opinions varied widely across Afghanistan at the time; residents in the troubledSouth were mostly mixed or uncertain, while those in the West largely disagreed that more U.S. troops would help thesituation. Top U.S. and NATO commander Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal Friday submitted his long-anticipated request formore troops to the Pentagon. But before the White House even considers his request, officials say the administration needsto complete its reassessment of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Obama himself has said he's skeptical whether deployingadditional troops -- beyond the 21,000 he committed earlier this year -- will make a difference in Afghanistan. Further, halfof Americans would oppose it. Afghans surveyed in June as additional U.S. troops started to arrive were more likely to beconvinced than skeptical that the infusion of troops would help stabilize the security situation in the southern provinces.Nearly half (49%) said more troops would help, while a sizable 32% thought they wouldn't and 19% didn't know. Butopinions varied widely across Afghanistan, suggesting residents' views about troop buildup in the South were largelyfiltered through their own local experiences. Afghans in the East and South, where additional U.S. troops deployed this yearhave been sent to combat the growing Taliban insurgency, were mixed as to whether more troops would help the securitysituation. In the once-relatively peaceful North and Central regions, residents solidly said more troops would help. And

    residents in the West were most skeptical, with a strong majority (69%) saying more troops wouldn't help. Afghans' viewsvary by ethnicity as well, which helps explain some of these regional differences but doesn't explain them alone. Pashtuns,who dominate Afghanistan's South and East, were mostly mixed, with 35% saying more troops would help the situation in

    the southern provinces, 38% saying they would not, and 28% saying they didn't know. Conversely, at least 6 in 10Tajiks and Hazaras, who are predominant in the North and Central areas, respectively, said more troops wouldhelp the situation in the South. However, sentiments were similar among different ethnic groups in the North andWest. In addition to more resources and a new strategy in Afghanistan, McChrystal wrote in his assessment report to theadministration that the United States must "redefine the fight" and "gain support of the people." Gallup's June survey

    suggests the Obama administration has some work to do in this regard. Afghans' opinions of the leadership of theUnited States had not changed much from 2008; they remained split in theirapproval of U.S. leadership, with50% approving and 42% disapproving. Overall, Afghans who said they approved of U.S. leadership were morelikely to say sending additional U.S. troops would help the security situation in the southern provinces (65%) than those

    who disapproved (35%). This pattern appears to hold across most regions in Afghanistan, though approval numbers inseveral regions, such as the West and South, were too Nearly half of Afghans surveyed in June amid U.S. troop buildupsaid additional troops would help stabilize the security situation in the southern provinces, but much has changed inAfghanistan since. Afghans have watched the security situation worsen and violence escalate and spread beyond Talibanstrongholds in the South and East, increasing the numbers of U.S., NATO, and Afghan casualties. It may be weeks beforethe president completes his reassessment of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and decides whether to deploy additionalcombat troops U.S. commanders have requested. Gallup's data suggest Afghans' views on additional troops are likely tovary across Afghanistan, depending on security and other factors in play.

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    http://www.gallup.com/poll/123188/Americans-Tilt-Against-Sending-Troops-Afghanistan.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/123188/Americans-Tilt-Against-Sending-Troops-Afghanistan.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/123125/Asia-Wait-Rate-New-Administration.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/123125/Asia-Wait-Rate-New-Administration.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/122360/Few-Voting-Age-Afghans-Confident-Election-Fair.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/123188/Americans-Tilt-Against-Sending-Troops-Afghanistan.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/123188/Americans-Tilt-Against-Sending-Troops-Afghanistan.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/123125/Asia-Wait-Rate-New-Administration.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/122360/Few-Voting-Age-Afghans-Confident-Election-Fair.aspx
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    Afghanis Embrace USAID and Security Efforts

    Cpl. Daniel A. Blatter, Soldier and Journalist, June 2010, International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan Afghan and ISAF forces are supporting the reconstruction and development of Now Zad District,once known for being the largest producer of fruit in Helmand Province, but that in recent years hassuffered destruction and been considered dangerous by its inhabitants. Said Thomas Gillick, the deputy

    manager for U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Helmand operations. "Our goal isto rehabilitate over 400 shops in the bazaar within approximately 70 days, and we are currently on day12 The development of the Now Zad bazaar is a USAID-funded project which is already seeingresults; the number of shops has grown whom approximately 25 in March to more than 140 today. Asthe population in Now Zad continues to grow at a rapid pace, it is important for the local bazaar to be able to house the

    coming businesses as well as food and supplies for the people. "Roughly 50 to 60 families are moving back intothe Now Zad valley per week," said Capt. Jeremy S. Wilkinson , U.S. Marine Alpha company commander."The local economy will be able to support them after the rehabilitation of the bazaar. It will llow the people whomove back in here to have jobs." There are more than 60 residents currently working on the bazaar project, and uponarrival of the tools needed, that number is predicted to grow to around 750. "Overall, the Now Zad villagecommunity and elders have been supportive of this project 110 percent," said Gillick. "The idea behindrehabilitating the bazaar is to promote commerce and to quickly get cash into the hands of [young] males so they will begainfully employed and less prone to planting improvised explosive devices, fighting, or becoming disenfranchised from

    the government," said Gillick. Since Afghan National Security Force and ISAF troops have been living andpatrolling close to the bazaar, security has improved. "One of the benefits that we have had with this project isthe safety and security that we feel when going into the bazaar," said Gillick. "There is no hostility whatsoever.The people embrace us and they are friendly."

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    Drug FL [1/2]1. Afghan Poppy cultivation is low due to US counter-narcotics efforts

    UN, September 2, 2009 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghan opium production in significant decline UNDOC.COM,http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/September/afghan-opium-production-in-significant--decline.html Accessed May 212010)

    2 September 2009 - Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is down 22 per cent, opium production isdown 10 per cent, while prices are at a 10-year low. The number of opium poppy-free provinces hasincreased from 18 to 20 out of a total number of 34, and more drugs are being seized as a result of morerobust counter-narcotics operations by Afghan and NATO forces. These are the findings contained inthe summary findings of the Afghan Opium Survey 2009, released in Kabul today by UNODCExecutive Director Antonio Maria Costa. This annual survey covers the planting cycle from May 2008to June 2009. "At a time of pessimism about the situation in Afghanistan, these results are a welcomepiece of good news and demonstrate that progress is possible", said Mr. Costa. possible", said Mr. CostaCultivation and production decrease Opium poppy cultivation has fallen to 123,000 hectares, down froma peak of 193,000 hectares in 2007. This year, the most significant decrease was recorded in HelmandProvince, where cultivation declined by a third to 69,833 hectares from 103,590 hectares in 2008. The

    dramatic turnaround in one of Afghanistan's most unstable provinces can be attributed to an effectivemix of sticks and carrots: strong leadership by the governor; a more aggressive counter-narcoticsoffensive; terms of trade that are more favourable to legal crops; and the successful introduction of"food zones" to promote licit farming.

    2. Cant end opium production, even with gentler measures too many vested interests across society

    want to preserve the status quo

    Barnett Rubin, director of studies and a senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New YorkUniversity, September 27, 2007, http://icga.blogspot.com/2007/09/counter-narcotics-in-afghanistan-iv.html

    Training people in the technical skills required for counter-narcotics (interdiction, prosecution, lawenforcement, and development) is necessary, but it is not a substitute for a state whose power holders anddecision makers exercise a degree ofautonomy from the sociallypowerful, who in Afghanistan include drugtraffickers. As a result, frustrated foreign advisors increasingly press for more control over operations and autonomy fromthe governmental apparatus, which leaves power-holders the choice of being seen as foreign puppets or of engaging insome form of resistance, whether covert (corruption) or overt (insurgency). Jon Lee Anderson of the New Yorker observedthis first-hand while reporting on a U.S.-supported eradication effort in Uruzgan province. When the Afghan force refusedto eradicate a field belonging to a local power holder, the DEA agent accompanying them (Douglas Wankel, a determinedand dedicated professional) tried to make counter-narcotics more equitable by forcing the reluctant Afghans to eradicate thefield. But even if the field is eradicated, such an operation does not strengthen the authority of the state or prevent futurepoppy cultivation in any sustainable way. Hence the problem confronted by the policies labeled as interdiction, lawenforcement, or anti-corruption are pieces of the same daunting task: consolidating at least a minimal state structure in the

    face of enormous resources in the hands of unofficial (and sometimes, but not always, criminal) power holders. For theforeseeable future, the government and its international supporters will be able to accomplish little in

    Afghanistan without the support of the de factopower holders. These are local leaders who combine functions aspoliticians, tribal or ethnic leaders, businessmen, landowners, commanders of armed groups of varying degrees of legality,parliamentarians, and government officials. Many were marginalized under the Taliban regime but returned as the allies ofthe U.S.-led Coalition and the new government. The mixture of functions varies among members of this group, as doestheir political orientation. Most have mastered several rhetorical repertoires for different audiences, and they manifestconsiderable pragmatism in their actions. These leaders have a healthy respect for the effective use of force, money, andrhetoric. Conversely, nothing more incites their contempt than wasteful and ineffective use of force, money, and rhetoric,which, rightly or wrongly, is what most of them see in the actions of the international community in Afghanistan, especially

    in counter-narcotics. Many of them derive much of their resources directly or indirectly from the opiate

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    industry, sometimes without ever actually seeing, handling, or even mentioning the substance in question. An Afghanofficial once pointed out to me that all Afghan politicians had brothers who were businessmen. Afghan leaders also havehalf-brothers, stepbrothers, cousins, uncles, and nephews, and so do their (possibly several) wives. During the Talibanperiod one Afghan leader asked for political asylum for himself and his family. When asked how large his family was, hesaid, About fifty households. An average Afghan household has about six members, and those of the wealthy andpowerful have more. These extensive, dense, and opaque family networks enable some of the powerful to denounce or

    oppose the drug economy while simultaneously (and invisibly) benefiting from it.

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    Drug FL [2/2]3. TURN: Drug War is key to stability it severs the link between terrorism and narcotics

    Rachel Ehrenfeld, writer for Forbes Magazine, 2/26/09 Stop the Afghan Drug Trade, Stop Terrorism Forbes Magazinehttp://www.forbes.com/2009/02/26/drug-trade-afghanistan-opinions-contributors_terrorism_mycoherbicides.html Accessed July 12010

    "The fight against drugs is actually the fight for Afghanistan ," said Afghan President Hamid Karzai when hetook office in 2002. Judging by the current situation, Afghanistan is losing.To win, the link between narcotics and terrorism must be severed . That is the necessary condition for asuccessful strategy to undermine the growing influence of al-Qaida, the Taliban and radical Muslim groups in Afghanistan

    and Pakistan. It is all about money--more precisely, drug money. The huge revenues from the heroin trade fill thecoffers of the terrorists and thwart any attempt to stabilize the region.Though not traded on any stockexchange, heroin is one of the most valuable commodities in the world today. While a ton of crude oil costsless than $290, a ton of heroin costs $67 million in Europe and between $360 million and $900 million in New York,according to estimates based on recent Drug Enforcement Administration figures.Since its liberation from Taliban rule,Afghanistan's opium production has gone from 640 tons in 2001 to 8,200 tons in 2007. Afghanistan now supplies over 93%of the global opiate market."This is a source of income for the warlords and regional factions to pay their soldiers," warnedformer Afghan Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalili in a May 2005 interview with Reuters. "The terrorists are funding theiroperations through illicit drug trade, so they are all interlinked."In 2004, the G-8 designated Britain to lead counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Its three-year eradication policy was

    designed specifically not to alienate the local population. It dictated the crop eradication be done "by hand." Moreover, theBritish entrusted the provincial governors with the eradication process, even though Afghan provincialgovernors, many of whom are powerful warlords, have been engaged in the drug trade for decades.Not surprisingly, the eradication effort failed miserably.Comment On This Story The exponential growth in narcoterrorism in Afghanistan led to a well-entrenchednarco-economy, strengthening the power of tribal warlords, the Taliban and al-Qaida . The growingviolence led NATO leaders, who met in Budapest in October 2008, to agree to allow their military forces to strike the drugtraffickers. However, NATO troops were not ordered to attack; in fact, NATO's European allies are "averse" to drugeradication programs for fear of alienating the local population and because of the risks associated with such operations.

    4. No brink their Senlis council evidence is from 06 weve sent more troops in since then the US hasbeen failing to nationbuild in Afghanistan for a while but their Pakistani scenario hasnt been

    triggered

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    Drug FL Ext. 2Cant solve opium until 2025 best-case scenario

    Mark Schneider, senior vice president of the International Crisis Group, Federal News Service, October 4, 2007REP. ACKERMAN: Do we have enough assets and resources dedicated to this proposition so that if we went andconcentrated in the areas, such as the province in which there's a 53 percent increase, which accounts for a great deal of that

    expanded new number, that we just don't allow the balloon to be squeezed there and the poppy production pop upsomewhere else in greater percentages? MR. SCHNEIDER: I mean, I think we do need to provide more resources. I think

    one of the most important things is to demonstrate that it's a long-term commitment. It took 15-17 years to reallychange Thailand in terms of a producer of opium poppies. And I think that in terms of overall sustainablecounternarcotics, it's going to take that long. Right now I think that you have a challenge, as well, ofdemonstrating to significant portions of the country that this is a long-term international commitment ,not only for the next two or three years. And so I would argue that to the degree that you can find ways to make that kind oflong-term authorization at significant levels, that would have a great deal of benefit.

    Poppy Reduction Impossible

    Paul Eckert, staff writer for Reuters, 8/3/07 U.S Sees Uphill fight against Afghan Opium Reuters,http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0332324120070803 Accessed July 1, 2010

    The $420 million spent by U.S. government agencies on poppy eradication in the war-torn country in 2006 was "dwarfedby the roughly $38 billion 'street value' if the entire Afghan poppy crop were converted to heroin," it said .The report byState Department Inspector General Howard Krongard said initial U.S. eradication goals for 2007 inAfghanistan, the source of about 90 percent of the world's opium, were "not realistic." The Taliban, whichruled Afghanistan under strict principals of Islamic law, drastically reduced poppy growing throughout the country in the

    years before it was ousted by the U.S.-led 2001 invasion for harboring al Qaeda militants.But in recent years poppygrowth has increased dramatically, especially in southern provinces where the Taliban has encouraged the profitablecrop.A U.S. government assessment team that visited seven locations in Afghanistan "found no realisticpossibility of outspending economic incentives in the narcotics industry," the report said.It added that"security in the poppy producing provinces was viewed as a growing concern and necessitated further reliance oninadequate air support for execution of counternarcotics programs." Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher toldreporters on Thursday, ahead a visit to Washington next week by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, that "The poppy issue

    this year is: There is going to be a lot of production in Afghanistan."But Boucher, the top U.S. diplomat for South andCentral Asia, said that growth of the raw material for heroin was increasingly concentrated in the "areas of the insurgency"and that production was decreasing in areas where Karzai's U.S.-backed government has established control. "So you'll

    probably go this year from six poppy-free provinces to at least double that number," said Boucher. Opium productionin Afghanistan rose by as much as 50 percent last year, according to a United Nations estimate. Thisyear's crop, recently harvested, could easily equal that, the United Nations says. The Afghan and Westerngovernments accuse Taliban insurgents of offering protection to opium farmers in return for taxing their crop and thenusing the funds to fend off Afghan and foreign troops.

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    Drug FL Ext. 4Afghan Government unlikely to continue counter-narcotics programs if the US leaves because of political

    pressures

    Kebede, 2008 (Solomon, writer for The Capital Ethiopia, Afghanistan and the Drug Trade, The Capital Ethiopiahttp://www.capitalethiopia.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12719:afghanistan-and-the-drug-

    trade&catid=3:business-and-economy&Itemid=14, Accessed May 19, 2010)After 2002 Afghan opium production rose to unheard of levels. By 2007, Afghanistan was producingenough heroin to supply the entire world. In 2009, Thomas Schweich, who served as US statedepartment co-ordinator for counter-narcotics and justice reform for Afghanistan, accused PresidentHamid Karzai of impeding the war on drugs. Schweich also accused the Pentagon of obstructingattempts to get military forces to assist and protect opium crop eradication drives. Schweich wrote in theNew York Times that narco-corruption went to the top of the Afghan government. He said Karzai wasreluctant to move against big drug lords in his political power base in the south, where most of thecountrys opium and heroin is produced. The most prominent of these suspected drug lords was AhmedWali Karzai, the brother of President Hamid Karzai. Ahmed Wali Karzai was said to have orchestratedthe manufacture of hundreds of thousands of phoney ballots for his brothers re-election effort in August

    2009. He was also believed to have been responsible for setting up dozens of so-called ghost pollingstations existing only on paper that were used to manufacture tens of thousands of phoney ballots.US officials have criticised his mafia-like control of southern Afghanistan. The New York Timesreported that the Obama administration had vowed to crack down on the drug lords who permeate thehighest levels of the government, and they pressed President Karzai to move his brother out of southernAfghanistan, but he refused to do so. Karzai was playing us like a fiddle, Schweich wrote. The USwould spend billions of dollars on infrastructure development; the US and its allies would fight theTaliban; Karzais friends could get richer off the drug trade. Karzai had Taliban enemies who profitedfrom drugs but he had even more supporters who did. But who was playing who like a fiddle? Was itthe puppet president or the puppet masters who installed him? As Douglas Valentine shows in hishistory of the War on Drugs, The Strength of the Pack, this never-ending war has been a phoney contest,

    an arm wrestle between two arms of the US state, the DEA and the CIA; with the DEA vainlyattempting to prosecute the war, while the CIA protects its drug-dealing assets. During the Nineteenthand Twentieth centuries, European powers (chiefly the UK) and Japan used the opium trade to weakenand subjugate China. During the 21st century, it seems that the opium weapon is being used against Iran,Russia and the former Soviet republics, which all face spiralling rate of addiction and covert USpenetration as the Afghan War fuels central Asias heroin plague.

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    1NC CP DrugsText: The United States Federal Government should legalize opium growth in Afghanistan for the

    purpose of medical drugs.

    1. Legalization of medical Opium would solve Afghani drug and security problem

    Dr. Frederic Grare, Southeast Asia Scholar, February 2008, Centre for International Governance InnovationDrug production and trafficking is therefore a major governance issue, at global and local levels, with seriousactual and potential security and diplomatic implications. Arising from the absence of governance at the locallevel, drug production and smuggling have become one of the main impediments to governance inAfghanistan. The problem, moreover, is disrupting the entire region as it feeds militancy, creating additional tensionsbetween Afghanistan and its neighbors. It is in this context that the Senlis Council, an international drug policy thinktank, launched an initiative for the creation of a licensing system in Afghanistan which would allowthe cultivation of opium for the production of essential medicines such as morphine and codeine. Theidea is to break the vicious circle of the drug economy in Afghanistan by moving the opium tradeinto a legal system controlled by and benefiting the state. Additionally, this would make opiumproduction a legitimate source of income that would contribute to stability and promote economic

    development. The paper argues, therefore, that, imperfect as they may be, current policies may well be optimum forAfghanistan given the country's present situation and the structural problems (inelasticity of the demand vs. extreme

    elasticity of the sources) inherent in the global war against drugs, where, increasingly, experts consider that only ademand reduction will lead to a decrease of supplies.

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    Drug CP Ext.Support for Karzais government is key to successful implementation of the Senlis Plan

    Dr. Frederic Grare, Southeast Asia Scholar, February 2008, Centre for International Governance InnovationAli Jalali again provides probably the most accurate description of the current situation in Afghanistan when he asserts that

    "Growing poppies is at present a low-risk enterprise in a high- risk environment. The key will be to

    turning it into a high-risk enterprise in a low-risk environment" (Ibid). Legalizing opium production in such acontext would only send the wrong message. State building is therefore central to the issue. It is a prerequisiteto an efficient reduction of opium and heroin production. State building will not eliminate drugtrafficking but no counter- narcotic efforts will be successful without prior strengthening of theAfghan state's capacities. Police, and more generally, law enforcement agencies, will have to bereinforced before the drug processing and trafficking can be stopped. This effort will have to be accompaniedby alternative livelihoods development in order to provide the farmers with a reasonable income, which the Senlis

    proposals would provide, at best, only for a limited number of farmers. Only when these conditions have been

    met could the legalization of opium production for pharmaceutical purposes be envisaged.

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    Drug CP Impact Module MedicineAfghani Poppy Legalization would Help Ease Massive Morphine Demand

    Romesh Bhattacharji, Former Narcotics Commissioner of India, May 2010, International Council on Securityand Development

    The actual need for painkilling medicines worldwide is not fully matched by figures measuring market

    demand.In particular, as most of the worlds population still has little access to painkilling medicines,the actual need for morphine remains largely unmet. Official figures from the INCB show that just a handfulof wealthy countries consume the significant majority of the global supply of poppy-based medicines.For instance, the United States, Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, together representing less than 20% ofthe worlds population, accounted for more than 95% of the total morphine consumption in 2005. This indicates asignificant underconsumption of morphine affecting the remaining 80% of the worlds population, whose combinedmorphine consumption represented less than 5% of the global total. Stressing the need for a balance between theobligations posed by UN conventions for fighting against the illegal narcotics, and the need to ensure and, in most cases,

    increase the availability of poppy-based medicines, the World Health Organisation (WHO) heavily promotesthe prescription of poppy-based medicines for the treatment of pain, and includes morphine is on itslist of essential medicines. Based on the known effectiveness of morphine and codeine, the WHO has created a threestep pain ladder known as the WHO Analgesic Method for Cancer Pain Relief, designed to provide a scientific basis to

    encourage health professionals worldwide to use poppy-based medicines to treat pain. To help address the impediments thathamper the availability and use of poppy-based medicines particularly in less economically developed and emergingcountries, at the request of the United Nations Economic and Social Council COSOC and the World Health Assembly, theWHO developed the Framework to the Access to Controlled Medications Programme in consultation with the INCB.Despite the World Health Organisations limited success in promoting poppy-based medicines for palliative care for cancer

    and HIV/AIDS in emerging countries, the sheer enormity of the global pain crisis demands ongoing sustainedaction by the WHO, governments and international regulatory boards. Moreover, given the increasing needfor cancer and HIV/AIDS related palliative care, demand for poppy-based medicines is set to rise dramaticallyin the next few years. Pain relief experts predict the global need for pain medication will increase. By 2020, there willbe a significant ageing population in Europe, North America, East Asia and Latin America. HIV/ AIDS projections in 53African countries suggest


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