Complete - Equal Protection Cases.docx

8/14/2019 Complete - Equal Protection Cases.docx

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G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,vs.HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA,respondents.

Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & JoseLaureta for petitioner.

Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated

September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of theCourt of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No.72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of thepetitioner and against the respondents, declaring OrdinanceNo. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminaryinjunction is made permanent. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board ofManila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor

Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968.2

City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANYPERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BEEMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE

ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OROCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT

FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THEMAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

3

Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 65374prohibits aliens from being employed

or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or businessenumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without firstsecuring an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying thepermit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular

missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of boththe Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those workingin their respective households, and members of religious orders orcongregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.

Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less thanthree (3) months to six (6) months or f ine of not less than P100.00 but notmore than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction.

5

On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who wasemployed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila,Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of

the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop theenforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring saidOrdinance No. 6537 null and void.

6

In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as hisgrounds for wanting the ordinance declared null and void:

1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in theCity of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory andviolative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;

2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinctionbetween useful and non-useful occupations, imposing afixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportionto the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe anystandard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus,violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation oflegislative powers:

3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being appliedonly to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life,liberty and property and therefore, violates the due processand equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

7


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On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunctionand on September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No.6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.

8

Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor AntonioJ. Villegas filed the present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assignedthe following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in thelatter's decision of September 17,1968:

9

I

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUSAND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THATORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULEOF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.

II

RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE

AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THATORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLEAGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVEPOWER.

III

RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED ASERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULINGTHAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUEPROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THECONSTITUTION.

Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot bedeclared null and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity oftaxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely taxor revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenuemeasure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it beingprincipally a regulatory measure in nature.

The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenuemeasure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit.While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure anemployment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and

judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications foremployment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part

which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory buta revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 fromaliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purposeof the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.

The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but becauseit fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individualaliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the

Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that theclassification should be based on real and substantial differences having areasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The sameamount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he iscasual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employeeor a highly paid executive

Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide theMayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where anordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standardto guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained byrequiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and

entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary andunrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, suchordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power toallow or prevent an activityper selawful.

10

In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board,11

where a law granted a government agency power to determine the allocationof wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against theinterpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officeran arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard fromwhich it can be measured or controlled.

It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12that the authority and discretion togrant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manilaby the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legaldiscretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.

Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest anystandard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power whichhas been granted to him by the ordinance.

The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equalprotection rule of the Constitution.


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Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the CityMayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount todenying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in ameans of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is notobliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, hecannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guaranteeincludes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the dueprocess and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and

citizens.

13

The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, withoutpronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSUPREME COURT

MANILA

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee,vs. CAYAT,Defendant-Appellant.

Sinai Hamada y Cario for appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.

MORAN, J .:chanrobles virtual law library

Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat,a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the

justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffersubsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court ofFirst Instance, the following information was filed against him:

That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio,Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the

above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes,did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and

have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquorswhich the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves tomake prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.

Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admittedall the facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge forthe reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the

pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged andsentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiaryimprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court onappeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is amember of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act NumberedThirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession,or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind,other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of suchtribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage ofthis Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of

any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or anyprovincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroyany such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two ofthis Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by afine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term notexceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.

The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the followinggrounds:chanrobles virtual law library

(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of thelaws;chanrobles virtual law library

(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution:and.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of thestate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian

tribes." It is said that as these less civilized elements of the Filipinopopulation are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat


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them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or lessentitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the

Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomesimperative to examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policyof the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and consistentlyfollowed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice andtribulation but always with conscience andhumanity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvaryingsolicitous attitude toward these inhabitants, and in the different laws of theIndies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) havebeen persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the"spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanishregime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "dutyto conscience and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "inthe obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the moral and materialadvantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance affordedthem by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines,Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during the American

period. President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission ofApril 7, 1900, said:

In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission shouldadopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of ourNorth American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government,and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace andcontentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwillingto conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wiseand firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant andactive effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices andintroduce civilized customs.

Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexedwith the problem of determining "those practicable means of bringing abouttheir advancement in civilization and material prosperity." ( See,Act No.253.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them inthe path of civilization," the present government "has chosen to adopt thelatter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the nationalconscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior, quoted inRubi vs.Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, theirhomes and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communitiesthrough a network of highways and communications; the benefits of publiceducation have to them been extended; and more lately, even the right of

suffrage. And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, theLegislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the

blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid andsteady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the

Act must be understood and applied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtual law library

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of theequal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violatedby a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to

be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germaneto the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.(Borgnis vs.Falk Co., 133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs.Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs.Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660;People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs.Vera and CuUnjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.)chanrobles virtual law library

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on realand substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is notbased upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellantasserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-

Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to thegeographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of alow grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settledcommunities." (Rubi vs.Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinctionis unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiarconditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases ofcertain members thereof who at present have reached a position of culturalequality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of theclassification thus established.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtuallaw library

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition

"to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer,wine, or intoxicating liquors of any k ind, other than the so-called native winesand liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomedthemselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionablydesigned to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. Ithas been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lowercourt disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, therebyhampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life andcivilization.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its

enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditionsexist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the


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assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizinginfluence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization ofa people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures ofprotection and security.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evidentfrom a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain

number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not anargument against the equality of itsapplication.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any policeofficer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize andforthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession ofany member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of lawprovided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case atbar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are notalways necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to thediscretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases.

(McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval inRubi vs.Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law meanssimply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the generalpowers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall bereasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to theregular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicablealike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs.Ling Su Fan, 10Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S.,302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized by thegovernment in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used inviolation of law may be confiscated (U.S. vs.Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), orwhen the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case

(Moreno vs.Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439,442).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It hasbeen said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of allpowers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity.

Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education andgood order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop itsresources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs.Connolly, 113U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to bewhimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual,

the same must be upheld.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order inthe non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral andintellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization andunification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose canbe no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greaterPhilippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior

or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in thepromotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of theirinherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed bytheir Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, ifthere is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, byappropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure forthem the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placingthem with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeedgratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far f rom retrograding, are definitelyasserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorneyimpressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eagerto take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are

now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the bestinstitutions here and in America. Their active participation in the multifariouswelfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government iscertainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. Butwhether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or completeabrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within theprerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutionalscheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquirewhether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists,and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and theadequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it,are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the

application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer,the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populisuprema est lex.When the public safety or the public morals require thediscontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand ofthe Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by anyincidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. Theprivate interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests ofthe nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs.Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed.,989).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Conception, JJ.,concur.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC.,plaintiff-appellant,vs.THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OFORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc Cityand ORMOC CITY,defendants-appellees.

Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon &Taada for plaintiff-appellant.Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J. :

On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc Citypassed

1Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all

productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., inOrmoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per exportsale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."

2

Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc SugarCompany, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 forP5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.

On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court ofFirst Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, acomplaint

3against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal

Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutionalfor being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III,Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI,Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 ofthe Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither aproduction nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of itscharter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as theLocal Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a

customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 ofRepublic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was withindefendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that thesame did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trialand submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on

August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of theordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered citybroadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes,licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.

Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc SugarCompany, Inc. Appellant alleges the same statutory and constitutionalviolations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned earlier.

Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the CityTreasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the OrmocSugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent toone per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America andother foreign countries." Though referred to as a tax on the export ofcentrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production ofsugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar

produced is exported.

Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board tolevy such an export tax, in view of Section 2287 of the Revised

Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power toimpose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in thepower of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upongoods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, andany attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guiseof an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall bevoid."

Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June19, 1959, gave chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districtsauthority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees.

Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised AdministrativeCode and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co.v. Municipality of Roxas

4held the former to have been repealed by the latter.

And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipalexport or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due toSection 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternativeuntil Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall anyunfavorable results.


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The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutionallimits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause andrule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any personbe denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs.Salas,

5We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or

things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the

subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is basedon substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these aregermane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only topresent conditions but also to future conditions which are substantiallyidentical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to thosewho belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questionedordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar producedand exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the timeof the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true,was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be

reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. Thetaxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude anysubsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for thecoverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, itcannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only toOrmoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund becausethe taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v.Binalbagan).

6At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient

basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutionaluntil declared otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, thechallenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellantpaid under protest. No costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President,BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANOM. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila,ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid,JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court,Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, MetroManila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THEJUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of theMETROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by itsPresident. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT

COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THEPHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; bythemselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial andShari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courtsthroughout the Country, petitioners,vs.HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department ofTransportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in hiscapacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTALCORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J. :

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. Itis asserted by the petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impairedby the statute and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court isitself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that shouldordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system ofgovernment, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon thechallenge, because no other office has the authority to do so. We shalltherefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of

an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 asimplemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SupremeCourt, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan TrialCourts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commissionand its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official

functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. TheNational Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with theminsofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices inregistration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has beenallowed to intervene.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that:(1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express itspurposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses ofCongress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributedamong the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory andencroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, thepresumption of the constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the jointact of the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to havefirst been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it wasfinally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionallyflawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itselfupheld. To doubt is to sustain.

I

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of theConstitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embraceonly one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling"legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means ofprovisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which mighttherefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3)to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislativeproceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is beingconsidered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon,by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

1


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It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 whichwithdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the titleof the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation,Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulationof the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."

The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:

The State shall pursue the following objectives of anationwide postal system:

a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail andother postal matters, from sender to addressee, with fullrecognition of their privacy or confidentiality;

b) to promote international interchange, cooperation andunderstanding through the unhampered flow or exchange ofpostal matters between nations;

c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to caterto different users and changing needs, including but notlimited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, andthe like;

d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by andwithin the industry to finance the overall cost of providing thevaried range of postal delivery and messengerial services aswell as the expansion and continuous upgrading of servicestandards by the same.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, readsas follows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders,executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or partsthereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act arerepealed or modified accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are herebyrepealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth

Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking

privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 andthat of the Vice President, under such arrangements andconditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized usethereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of thechallenged act violates the Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or tobe as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It hasbeen held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonablycovers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead thelegislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutionalrequirement.

2

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of thegeneral objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only beunreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.

3As has been

correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically statedin its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed inthe title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object inview, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is properto create in the same act the machinery by which the act isto be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction,and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If suchmatters are properly connected with the subject asexpressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should alsohave special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v.Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "Therepeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subjectmatter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealingsection in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent onthe subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to anact and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previouslegislations connected therewith."

4

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is theeffect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect ofa law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.

5As observed in

one case,6

if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend itwas never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by


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implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule wouldbe neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from someagencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A.No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postalservice system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealingclause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the

said law.

II

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering therepeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O.207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of SenateBill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in theConference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) ofthe Constitution, reading as follows:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law

unless it has passed three readings on separate days, andprinted copies thereof in its f inal form have been distributedto its Members three days before its passage, except whenthe President certifies to the necessity of its immediateenactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon thelast reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,and the yeasandnaysentered in the Journal.

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House ofRepresentatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House andthe Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conferencecommittee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject ofany disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph couldnot have been validly added as an amendment.

These argument are unacceptable.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism forcompromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is notlimited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is describedthus:

A conference committee may, deal generally with the subjectmatter or it may be limited to resolving the precise

differences between the two houses. Even where theconference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction,legislative custom severely limits the freedom with whichnew subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill.But occasionally a conference committee producesunexpected results, results beyond its mandate, Theseexcursions occur even where the rules impose strictlimitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This issymptomatic of the authoritarian power of conferencecommittee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In aNutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill inquestion was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and theHouse of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with itscertification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V.Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by bothHouses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by PresidentCorazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyondthe certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers ofCongress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez

7laid down the rule

that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters thathave to be entered in the journals like theyeas andnays on the final readingof thebill).

8The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we

held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,9where we explained the

reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippinelegislature when they are, as we have said, clear and

explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of theorganic laws by which the Philippine Government wasbrought into existence, to invade a coordinate andindependent department of the Government, and to interferewith the legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners'charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill thateventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final formwere not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolledbill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e.,in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound

by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government,to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.


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III

The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equalprotection clause.

It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawingthe franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the Presidentof the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and

Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections;former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and StatisticsOffice; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public officesand officers.

10

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law isbased on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protectionclause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from theJudiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of NationalLanguage; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit InsuranceCorporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of thePhilippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee;

the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of SpecialProsecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the FilipinoLanguage; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council forthe Welfare of Disabled Persons.

11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process,as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fairplay. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article IIISec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty againstany form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness ingeneral may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if theparticular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the

sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that allpersons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rightsconferred and responsibilities imposed,

12Similar subjects, in other words,

should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some andunjustly discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of thelaws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimesresult in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting maturebooks to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youthbut violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among

equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification ismeant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certainparticulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

13

What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Isthe franking privilege extended to the President of the Philippines or theCommission on Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely asacourtesyfrom the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of

the importanceor statusof the grantee or because of its need for theprivilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, withoutany basis at all for the selection?

We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute asa whole was carefully deliberated upon, by the political departments before itwas finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enoughcare or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwittingwithdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.

We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy,for it is unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this

serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departmentsthe government. The same observations are made if the importance or statusof the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the frankingprivilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office andeven some private individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilegewas the perceived needof the grantee for the accommodation, which would

justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest ofproviding for a smoother flow of communication between the government andthe people.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments ofthe government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied the frankingprivilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of thegovernment that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as therespondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justifythe distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny theJudiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from thePostal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the totalvolume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frankmails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include theservice of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of


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Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frankmails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and thosecoming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. Therespondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mailfrom the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that thefranking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very

much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those whoneed it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a personmay be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but notan operation that can save his life.

If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the frankingprivilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogetherfrom allagencies of government, including those who do not need it. Theproblem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored,which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needsit. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the frankingprivilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in acategory to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of thePresident of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the frankingprivilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in factgreater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we mayappreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why theSupreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while wemay concede the need of the National Census and Statistics Office for thefranking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not

recognized in the courts of justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need forwithdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines LadiesSteering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or theirwidows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for thepurpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been establishedprimarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certainfunctions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended

to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its

charter.14

Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriageof mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege inthe discharge of their own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized atP10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that itderives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, ontop of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking

privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in theadministration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege canonly further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, asemphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependenceof the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyersand litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowestappropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative andExecutive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, orless than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine theincreased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to

every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No.7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under thepolice power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be adiscriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of thelaws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinctionmade by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions thatmake real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the frankingprivilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not

intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and powerto correct.

IV

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is notexpressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with theprescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violativeof Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "bedeprived of the equal protection of laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it iscertain to provoke. While ruling against the discrimination in this case, we


13/43

may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise ofour ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicialconduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that weare prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors.We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to befair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A.

No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SETASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court,the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, andthe National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all ofwhich offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporaryrestraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMOCABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners,vs.THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THEBUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION,respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:

This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary

Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operatorsof Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks todeclare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10,1977, of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52,dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domesticcorporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificatesof Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and toany other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners AceTransportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the membersof TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public

convenience.

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issuedMemorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of

Old and Dilapidated Taxis

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure thatonly safe and comfortable units are used as publicconveyances;

WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila,has, time and again, complained against, and condemned,the continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis;

WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may beassured of comfort, convenience, and safety, a program ofphasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;

WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board ofTransportation, the latter believes that in six years ofoperation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost ofhis taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments;

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Boardhereby declares that no car beyond six years shall beoperated as taxi, and in implementation of the same herebypromulgates the following rules and regulations:

1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 andearlier are ordered withdrawn from public service and

thereafter may no longer be registered and operated astaxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowedfor operation;

2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 areordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may nolonger be registered and operated as taxis. In theregistration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 andlater shall be accepted for registration and allowed foroperation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:

1980 Model 1974

1981 Model 1975, etc.

All taxis of earlier models than those provided above arehereby ordered withdrawn from public service as of the lastday of registration of each particular year and theirrespective plates shall be surrendered directly to the Boardof Transportation for subsequent turnover to the LandTransportation Commission.


15/43

For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular,the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro- Manila shall becarried out only after the project has been implemented inMetro-Manila and only after the date has been determinedby the Board.

1

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of

Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, datedAugust 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars andother personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implementsaid Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to beallowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. To quote saidCircular:

Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units withyear models over six (6) years old are now banned fromoperating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such theunits involved should be considered as automaticallydropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any

further dropping order from the BOT.

Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Regionhaving year models over 6 years old shall be refusedregistration. The following schedule of phase-out is herewithprescribed for the guidance of all concerned:

Year Model AutomaticPhase-OutYear

1980

1974 1981

1975 1982

1976 1983

1977

etc. etc.

Strict compliance here is desired.

2

In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registrationyear 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; andthose of model 1974, in 1981.

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed asCase No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop itsimplementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 andsubsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier

models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, theyare roadworthy and fit for operation.

On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation andUrgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case washeard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial anddocumentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they wouldsubmit additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation,Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case forResolution."

3

On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a"Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition"praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10,1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they mayhave under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982.

Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of thecase, but was later informed that the records of the case could not belocated.

On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the

following queries were posed for consideration by this Court:

A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questionedmemorandum circulars in accord with the manner requiredby Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding thepetitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?

B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with theprocedural requirements imposed by Presidential DecreeNo. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of theassailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners'

constitutional rights to.


16/43

(1) Equal protection of thelaw;

(2) Substantive dueprocess; and

(3) Protection againstarbitrary and unreasonable

classification and standard?

On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:

Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power

4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification,regulations, practices, measurements, or service to befurnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators ofpublic utility motor vehicles.

Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency tofollow in the exercise of its powers:

Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powersgranted in the preceding section, the Board shag proceedpromptly along the method of legislative inquiry.

Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in itsdiscretion, may require the cooperation and assistance ofthe Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary,particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencieswithin the Department of Public Works, Transportation and

Communications, or any other government office or agencythat may be able to furnish useful information or data in theformulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in theimplementation of this Decree.

The Board may also can conferences, require thesubmission of position papers or other documents,information, or data by operators or other persons that maybe affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employany other suitable means of inquiry.

In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process,

petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to submit their position

papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to theissuance of the questioned BOT Circular.

It is clear f rom the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accordedthe Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary informationor data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatorythat it should first call a conference or require the submission of positionpapers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected,

this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given widediscretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, thatthey were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state withcertainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiryprior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances arenot the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desiredby the BOT.

Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars isneither violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon.Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):

Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, areconstitutionally required for the protection of life or vestedproperty rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation orloss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicialproceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or eventwhich has to be established or ascertained. It is not essentialto the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated togovern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises,unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years isarbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends

upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and,therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration atthe time of registration. As public contend, however, it is impractical tosubject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak ofthe fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards,possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standardmust be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product ofexperience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their costrecovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generallydilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the publicspecially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24

hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of


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reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of dueprocess has been met.

On Equal Protection of the Law:

Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equalprotection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manilaonly and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be

pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned inMemorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:

For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular,the rules herein shall immediately be effective in MetroManila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall becarried out only after the project has been implemented inMetro Manila and only after the date has been determinedby the Board.

4

In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of theCirculars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process

of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.

The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is thattaxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected toheavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of commonknowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city,a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protectionclause can hardly be successfully claimed.

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, theoverriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from thedangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of itspolice power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all thingshurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society.

5It may also regulate

property rights.6In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the

necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise ofgovernmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups mayplausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".

7

In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to othertransportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equalprotection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and

sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. Itpermits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided

classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which makefor real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of theclass.

8What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform

operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similarcircumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilegeconferred and the liabilities imposed.

9The challenged Circulars satisfy the

foregoing criteria.

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not sufferfrom any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, theinfringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical andundeniable.

10

WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is herebydismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA,EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf of applicants foradmission into the Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-88

and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tileNational Medical Admission Test (NMAT).petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judgeof Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the National CapitalJudicial Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARYLOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OFMEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONALMEASUREMENT (CEM),respondents.

FELICIANO, J. :


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The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for theschool year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did notsuccessfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required bythe Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, andadministered by the private respondent, the Center for EducationalMeasurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National

Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibitionwith a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture andSports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for EducationalMeasurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382,as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition forsecuring certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding withaccepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering theNMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on thepetition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied saidpetition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered aspreviously scheduled.

Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with thisCourt to set aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition forissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946,known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in thefollowing manner:

Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern(a) thestandardization and regulation of medical education(b) the

examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.(Underscoring supplied)

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education whichis composed of (a) the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his dulyauthorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or hisduly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or hisduly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or hisduly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical

Association; (f) the Dean of the College of Medicine, University of thePhilippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical

Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical

Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Educationspecified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

(a)To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into arecognized college of medicine;

(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physicalfacilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals,

equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances,laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating anddelivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used fordidactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;

(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimumqualifications of teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio;

(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculumleading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine;

(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical

curriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty andinstrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum mayprescribe admission and graduation requirements other than thoseprescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shallbe enrolled in the experimental curriculum;

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medicalschool and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and tocollect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos eachwhich shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of MedicalEducation;

(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departmentsof the hospitals for training which comply with the minimum specificphysical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and

(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rulesand regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoingfunctions. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medicalschools:


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Admission requirements. The medical college may admit anystudent who has not been convicted by any court of competent

jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and whopresents(a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in scienceor arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical schoolfrom the Board of Medical Education;(c) a certificate of good moralcharacter issued by two former professors in the college of liberalarts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed toinhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the

preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemedadmissible.

x x x x x x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education,Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniformadmission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as anadditional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admissioninto medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that:

2.The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrumenttoward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into themedical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medicaleducation in the country.The cutoff score for the successfulapplicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determinedevery year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation withthe Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating ofeach applicant, together with the other admission requirements as

presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for theissuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission intothe medical colleges.

3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of MedicalEducation, each medical college may give other tests for applicantswho have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility foradmissionthat will yield information on other aspects of theapplicant's personality to complement the information derived fromthe NMAT.

x x x x x x x x x

8.No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibilityfor Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year studentin any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87, without

the required NMAT qualification as called for under thisOrder.(Underscoring supplied)

Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Centerconducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the school year1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent Centerconducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the schoolyear 1987.1988.1avvphi1

Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunctionmay be issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic

Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pendingresolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute andadministrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. Itscarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminaryinjunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative orderhas made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in themind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing aclear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course theconstitutionality of the statute or order assailed.

1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitutionwhich are, in their assertion, violated by the continued implementation ofSection 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS OrderNo. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:

(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of everyhuman person and guarantees full respect of human rights. "

(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of theyouth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical,moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in

the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage theirinvolvement in public and civic affairs."

(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education,science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotismand nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote totalhuman liberation and development. "

(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote theright of all citizens to quality education at all levels and takeappropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. "


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(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a r ight to select aprofession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable andequitable admission and academic requirements."

Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "Statepolicies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. Thepetitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extentor in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collidewith the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, inother words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. Thisburden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked isrelatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral oroperational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier wherethe constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article IIis cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basicobjectives of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. Thepetitioners have not made their case, even aprima faciecase, and we arenot compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulationimpugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutionalprovisions pointed to by the petitioners.

Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that oncemore petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulationthey assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary we may note-inanticipation of discussion infra that the statute and the regulation whichpetitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at thelevel of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase ofSection 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not reallyenjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessibleto allwho might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professionalschool but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualifyunder "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and(f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutionalprinciple which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing toestablish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board ofMedical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of legislativepower, which both flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of theseparation and allocation of powers among the three great departments ofgovernment,

1must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes

which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex

and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our

present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years agoin Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:

2

One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principleof separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non

potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest delegare, adoptedthis practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E.Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which isalso recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) hasbeenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government,giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle of"subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and Englandbut in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal andOsmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly,with the growingcomplexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects ofgovernmental regulation and theincreased difficulty of administeringthe laws, there is a constantly growing tendencytoward thedelegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward theapproval of thepractice by the courts."

3

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule makingauthority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education arenecessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. JusticeF

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