Complexity and Intersubjectivity: Towards the Theory of Niklas Luhmann

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Complexity and Intersubjectivity: Towards the Theory of Niklas Luhmann Author(s): John Bednarz Jr. Source: Human Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1984), pp. 55-69Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008898Accessed: 07-12-2015 18:56 UTC

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Human Studies 7:55-69 (1984) ?Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands

COMPLEXITY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY: TOWARDS THE THEORY OF NIKLAS LUHMANN

JOHN BEDNARZ, Jr.

Seton Hall University

I

It is, perhaps, inevitable that powerful and original thinking will under?

go changes ? even radical ones - in the course of its development.

This is certainly true in the case of as powerful and original a thinker as Niklas Luhmann.1 Yet despite the unavoidable developments one

idea has remained fixed and constant for him as a theme unfying all

his studies from the beginning to the present. This idea is expressed as the ultimate function of social systems: the grasping and reduction of complexity.2 Luhmann believes that social systems grasp and reduce

complexity in a way that distinguishes them significantly from all other kinds of systems. I should like to explore now certain key con?

cepts in his presentation and demonstrate how it, in Burkhard Sievers

words, "...requires an a-cybernetic as well as an a-sociological theory of world interpretation."3 In so doing I hope to be able to indicate

how, in some of his earlier writings, Luhmann believes that transcen?

dental phenomenology is an indispensible means of uncovering this

world interpretation. In order to demonstrate this phenomenological

investigations, both of the later Husserl and Schutz, will be introduced to form the connection between Luhmann's concept of social com?

plexity and the intersubjective constitution of the social world.

We can begin with the concept of system itself. It possesses a history of its own, according to Luhmann, which develops in four stages,

culminating in a cybernetic interpretation. The first ? "classical" ?

concept of system reaches back to antiquity. Both Plato (1964, p. 484) and Aristotle (1963, p. 194) employ the word sy sterna in the sense of a whole compounded of several parts or members.4 And Aristotle

(1961, p. 280), for instance, says that a, "'Whole' means...[t] hat which so contains its contents that they form a unity; and this in two ways,



56

either in the sense that each of them is a unity, or in the sense that the

unity is composed of them." In the latter sense the whole cannot be

understood as a mere arithmetical sum of its parts.5 The parts are, as

it were, "held together" in such a way that it would be properly im?

possible for them to exist otherwise. Aristotle expresses this state of

affairs as the priority of the whole to its parts. The whole is prior be?

cause it possesses or is endowed with an arche (first principle) which alone forms the basis of their unity, just as the heart is the arche of the living organism (whole, system) according to Aristotle. A whole

(system), then, is a collection of parts which exist - both individually and as a whole -

only insofar as they are related together through the

agency of a first principle. As can be seen, this interpretation focusses

its attention solely upon the internal organization of the system. The

latter's environment is completely ignored. In order to appreciate the pervasiveness of the first conception of

system one must realize that, according to Luhmann, the second stage of development occurs only in this century. It is introduced with the

theory of equilibrium which still views the system as originating out of the unification of its parts. A significant difference, however, resides

in the functioning of the parts. Now the parts of a system are inter?

preted as a set of conditions which function or operate when some?

thing outside the system ? in its environment ? threatens. For W.B.

Cannon (1967, p. 24), to whom this innovation can be traced, the

"parts" are, "The coordinated physiological processes which maintain

most of the steady states in the organism..." He refers to the steady

states, in general, as homeostasis and the constant conditions (phy?

siological processes, "parts" of the organic system) as equilibria. The

latter must not only merely be present in order for a system to exist

but also must actually function when external disturbances occur.

Indeed, precisely the external disturbances ? under this interpreta? tion ? cause them to operate in order to preserve the organism. Cannon

then finds it easy to transfer this model from the biological to the social domain. "To assure the same degree of stability in the social

organism that has been attained in the animal organism the latter

suggests such control of the fluid matrix that its constancy would be maintained. That would involve, in the first instance, the certainty of

continuous delivery by the moving stream of the necessities of exis?

tence" (Cannon, 1967, p. 314). The latter includes food, clothing,

shelter, means of warmth, help in case of injury of any kind as the

minimum conditions. But warns Cannon (1967, p. 315), "The social

organism like the animal organism is subject to disturbances...," both



57

natural, like droughts and floods etc. and man-made, like war, revolu?

tions and economic catastrophes etc.

A clearer picture of the relation between the first and second stages of the development of the concept of system now begins to present itself. Common to both these interpretations is the belief that the

system (whole) can only exist through the conservation of its parts. In contemporary terminology this means that for both stages the con?

cept of system is understood as closed. The main difference between

them resides in a static (ontological) understanding of the integration of the parts for the first stage and a dynamic understanding in the second. Even the introduction of the environment at the second stage does nothing to change this aspect of the understanding of system - viz. its closedness -

except, of course, to make the integration of

the parts fluid, changeable. Only at the third stage of development does the concept of open system occur.

The concept of system openness distinguishes the third from the second stage of development of the concept of system. As the intro?

duction of this concept suggests, a decisive turn is taken in the rela?

tion between system and environment. Whereas at the second stage of

development the system merely reacts to changes in its environment, at the third stage the system genuinely interacts with it. System and

environment, now, are truly interdependent. The concept of the open system can be traced back to L. von Ber

talanffy6 who suggests that there are, "...many characteristics of living

systems which are paradoxical in view of the laws of physics..." (von

Bertalanffy, 1956, p. 3). And he has in mind here specifically the sec? ond law of thermodynamics which states that, "...in a closed system, a

certain quantity, called entropy, must increase to a maximum, and

eventually the process comes to a stop at a state of equilibrium." (von Bertalanffy, 1956, p. 3). The paradox here exists between certain

systems which obey the second law of thermodynamics and tend

towards maximum entropy, i.e. maximum disorder, and other systems which never exist, "...in a state of chemical and thermodynamic equi? librium but (are) maintained in a socalled steady state which is distant from the latter" (von Bertalanffy, 1956, p. 3). If all systems indeed tend inexorably towards a "state of most probable distribution" of

their elements, of maximum entropy, then the model of the closed

system would be sufficient for all analysis.7 But this is obviously not the case for living systems, for instance. Hence the model of a closed

system, von Bertalanffy believes, has to be supplemented by a model of a system in which not only the breaking down of its material com



58

ponents occurs but also their building up. In living organisms this oc?

curs through the process of metabolism. Thus, paradoxically, the living

organism can be subject to the laws of thermodynamics while at the

same time, as it were, forestalling them, as Schroedinger (1968) says,

"...by continually drawing from its environment negative entropy...." And in order to do this a system must have open boundaries otherwise

the state of most probable disorder cannot be delayed.8 The final stage of development occurs when the relation between

system and environment is understood in terms of a difference of

complexity.9 This is the cybernetic stage. It incorporates the findings of the third stage, i.e. systems, when open, maintain themselves through

exchange with their environment. Only now the environment of any

system is viewed as overwhelmingly complex which means that it al?

ways contains more possibilities than the system can actualize ? in?

corporate into itself. This forces the system to make selections. They are aided in the process of making selections through development of structures and processes which eo ipso reduce the complexity of the

environment and contribute to the system's own complexity. The

system, therefore, at this stage of development, maintains itself by

bringing its own complexity into a relation of correspondence ? Ash

by's law of requisite variety ? with that of its environment.10

With a certain amount of overlapping this is the way in which the

concept of system actually developed, says Luhmann. He, therefore, considers it a "trend" towards the understanding of the concept of

system as serving the reduction of complexity through the stabilization

of an inner/outer difference.

In this interpretation the concept of complexity assumes central

importance because any system's raison d'?tre is the reduction of the

overwhelming complexity of the world to a manageable format. How?

ever, this is particularly important in Luhmann's case because only

through this concept does a sociology which understands itself as the

theory of social systems ? as Luhmann's does ? manifest its basis in

the a-cybernetic and a-sociological theory of world interpretation al?

ready mentioned.

According to Luhmann (1970, p. 116) systems are essentially, "...islands of lesser complexity in the world...." More precisely, a

system is, "...anything actually existing...that maintains itself as iden?

tical in an extremely complex, changing ? as a whole unmanageable

?

environment" (Luhmann, 1977, p. 7). In this sense every system re?

fers to the world as its ultimate environmental horizon because it can

only maintain itself through interchange with its environment. In order



59

to do this, however, every system must reduce the complexity of the

world.

Various kinds of systems reduce the complexity of the world in dif? ferent ways. Physical and organic systems do this through built-in or

natural structures and processes. Psychological and social systems do

this through the use of meaning, according to Luhmann. In any event,

every open system presupposes a relation to the world ? as the limit

of its own environment - which is expressed as a difference in degree of complexity (Komplexitaetsgefaelle). Every open system is con?

fronted with an overwhelmingly complex world whose complexity it must reduce in order to exist. The term "overwhelming complexity" refers to the fact that the world excludes no possibility. Therefore it can never be interpreted as a system because every system implies an

outside and how can anything which excludes no possibility ever be conceived as having an outside?

Because the world is never a system its existence can never be threat?

ened. This, of course, does not mean that the world is unproblematic for Luhmann, only that it is unproblematic from the point of view of its existence. The world is only a problem from the point of view of its complexity. In other words, the world is always a problem because, "It contains more possibilities than those to which the system can

successfully react" (Luhmann, 1973, p. 5). In the case of physical and

organic systems the complexity of the world is reduced by the built-in or natural structures and processes which eliminate what is not rele?

vant.11

The overwhelming complexity of the world forces systems to make

selections because no system can ever accept all the possibilities that

the world has to offer.12 Selections are made automatically, as it were, in the case of some systems which therefore eliminate irrelevant world

complexity. Only when one comes to psychological and social systems does the situation change. The reason for this is that, "Man alone is

conscious of the complexity of the world and therefore of the selec?

tivity of his environment which thereby becomes a problem of his self-maintenance. He can thematically grasp the world, mere pos?

sibilities, and his ignorance and know himself as someone who must

decide. Both his concept of the world (Weltentwurf) and his own

identity become a determinate part of his own system-structure and the foundation of his behavior through his experiencing other men

who actually experience what is only a possibility for him, thus present?

ing him with the world. At the same time other men identify him as an object so that he can assume their range of vision and identify him



60

self (Luhmann, 1973, p. 5). With the introduction of man, however, an entirely new dimension is added to the complexity of the world

(social complexity) presents itself as dependent upon the, "...expe? rienced and understood egoicity {Ichhaftigkeit) of other men" (Luh?

mann, 1973, p. 5). It is, therefore, not an individual but rather an inter

subjective accomplishment. According to Luhmann, transcendental

phenomenological reflection is needed to demonstrate this.13

II

A central ? perhaps the main ? theme of Husserl's later works is the

concept of transcendental intersubjectivity.14 Here one of his major concerns is to demonstrate that transcendental subjectivity as the

source of all objectivity and meaning -

including that of the world itself - is transcendental intersubjectivity. By reflecting upon the contents of one's own phenomenologically reduced consciousness

he discovers a world consisting of other egos, a world which exists

for these other egos in the same way in which it exists for me and

whose meaning and objectivity is constituted by them. The other egos which present themselves to my phenomenologically reduced

consciousness do so, at first, anonymously. The reason for this, ac?

cording to Husserl, is that the subjectivity that presents itself to trans

cendental-phenomenological reflection can be investigated both as

subject and object. "In self-perception I am the subject of perception and at the same time the perceived object. It makes a difference wheth?

er I genuinely turn reflection purely upon my subjecthood {Subjekt?

sein) and conscious life or whether I take myself as an object in the

world, as a thing among things" (Husserl 1954, p. 456). Only in the former of these two attitudes {Einstellungen) is the subjectivity which

distinguishes itself as man as such uncovered.15 Precisely because this

subjectivity remains anonymous until another reduction uncovers it

all subjectivities, including its own, appear to it as objects, "as things among things" as Husserl says. Thus other egos, and not just my own,

appear at first only as objects, i.e. anonymously. This is further prompt? ed by the essential necessity that other men can only be observed

through their bodies. There is no direct access to the closed sphere of

interiority which is the pure subjectivity of other men. Other egos first appear as men, i.e. as embodied egos, objects in the world, things. That men have pure subjectivities can only, for Husserl, be uncovered

through subsequent investigation. The essential necessity of the initial



61

appearance of other men as objects confers upon them their anonymi?

ty. The concept of the anonymity of other men is exploited by Heideg?

ger16 and sociologically to a much greater extent by Schutz.17 Schutz

explains the anonymity of the alter ego in terms of an ideal-typical mode of being. He says (1960, p. 221), "[t]he alter ego belonging to the world of my consociates (Das mitweltliche alter ego) is anonymous ...insofar ?w its being can be posited only as an individuation of a typical

mode of being-thus (Sosein), in the mode of the possible, presumable, whose absence of contradiction is left undecided." In the anonymous

mode of being, therefore, other persons do not appear as individuals

but as instances of some type, where the type is defined in terms of various modes of behavior.18 Anonymity, however, is not an absolute

concept, but admits of degrees. Schutz explains this in terms of the in?

tension (content, Inhaltserfuelltheit) of the ideal type. In the extreme case of anonymity the typified persons appear as completely inter?

changeable. The only thing that connects them together is that they are "persons who behave in such and such typical ways" or more sim?

ply "persons of type A,B,C, etc." Any person who appears to me as

"a person of type A" etc. does so as completely anonymous. He ap?

pears to me only as typical modes of behavior. Schutz likes to illustrate

this with the example of mailing a letter. In mailing a letter I expect that there are other persons who behave in certain typical ways (hand?

ling the mail) whom I have never met and most likely will never meet, who will see to it that my letter reaches its destination. My action of

mailing the letter has meaning only upon my expectation that these other persons actually exist and that they perform their actions success?

fully. Their whole existence for me. is consumed in their being "persons who act in such and such a manner." I know nothing more of them nor

do I need to know anything more. In this case the ideal type has a

minimal intension and every instance of this type is exactly like every other.

Schutz also gives an example of a lesser degree of anonymity. In

this case I am thinking of an absent friend who has to make important decisions. Since this person is my friend I already know certain things about him. He, therefore, does not appear to me with the same degree of anonymity as the persons in the first example. Yet, because of his

absence, he appears to me only as "my friend N as such" or "the be?

havior of N confronted with important decisions."19

The anonymity of other persons is only eliminated when my rela? tion to them changes from a "you-relation" (Ihrbeziehung)20 to a



62

"we-relation," especially a pure we-relation. In order to establish a

"we-relation," however, persons must entertain a face-to-face relation?

ship. They must be present to each other spatially and temporally. This relation can be one-sided or reciprocal. When one-sided, I take

notice of you but you are not aware of me (for whatever reason). It

is reciprocal when you and I are both aware of each other's existence

directly. The latter is what Schutz means by the pure we-relation.

In this case both persons are present to each other "in person" and they share a common temporality. They "grow old together" as Schutz

says.

Only in the case of pure we-relations do other persons appear to me

in their full individuality which requires that I myself appear to them in the same way. This relation is, therefore, a necessarily intersubjective

accomplishment. To experience someone else in his full individuality means that I no longer experience him as anonymous. He no longer exists as a mere object for me but as a subject who experiences a com?

mon world with me but always from a different perspective. The essential necessity of the intersubjective constitution of the

world from different perspectives forms a central theme of Husserl's

Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and

Cartesian Meditations. Operating within the domain of transcendental

subjectivity, which is, for Husserl, the source of all objectivity and

meaning, there is one objectivity which does not present itself as a mere objectivity. My body

? the lived body, Leib ? presents itself in

a unique way. It has a, "...completely unique ontic meaning..." (Hus?

serl, 1954, p. 109) which is expressed in the concept walten.21 I have

immediate awareness of my body as lived, as united with my ego in a

special way. I am also aware in an immediate manner of other lived

bodies "similar" to mine.22 The way in which I experience other

similar bodies as lived bodies is through their behavior.23 Yet even with the experience of other bodies as lived, transcendental inter?

subjectivity has not been attained. The experience of lived-bodies as

such still belongs to my sphere of ownness, to my primordial "sur?

rounding world," as Husserl says. To be able to reach transcendental

intersubjectivity requires that an alter ego must present itself as such.

Husserl approaches this difficult problem through an analysis of the difference between the modes of ego-presentation and alter-ego appre? sentation. "I am here somatically, the center of a primordial 'world'

oriented around me. Consequently my entire primordial ownness,

proper to me as a monad, has the content of the Here - not the con?

tent varying with some 'I can and do', which might set in, and belong



63

ing to some There or other; accordingly, not the content belonging to

that definite There. Each of these contents excludes the other; they cannot both exist (in my sphere of ownness) at the same time. But since the other body there enters into a pairing association with my body here and, being given perceptually, becomes the core of an

appresentation, the core of my experience of a co-existing ego, that

ego, according to the whole sense-giving course of the association, must be appresented as an ego now coexisting in the mode There,

'such as I should be if I were there'. My own ego, however, the ego

given in constant self-perception, is actual now with the content be?

longing to his Here. Therefore an ego is appresented as other than

mine" (Husserl, 1969, p. 119). With the -

necessarily appresentative -

experience of the alter-ego the level of transcendental intersubjectivity is finally attained because both my own ego and that of at least one other are "paired associative

ly" in one consciousness.24 Extended to all other egos, a "community of monads" arises which supplies ever more "theres" to my inexorable

"here." These other egos (monads) present me with different view?

points of the world and, in this way, a "psychic constitution of the ob?

jective world" occurs. I then realize that I alone do not have access to

the world and that my experiences of it are not the only possible ones.

Insofar as there are other egos there is, "...in principle a realm of end?

less accessibilities (to the world), though in fact most other men re? main horizonal" (Husserl, 1969, p. 131). Even if I am, in principle, excluded from directly experiencing another ego, still I can know that he has experiences of the same world as I, except, of course, always in the mode "there" and that I myself am a "there" for him.25 The world,

therefore, never shrinks to my perception of it. There is always an end? less number of possible avenues of access to the world and because

these constitute its objectivity, we can say then that the objectively constituted world is a complex one.

Ill

Transcendental reflection demonstrates that social complexity is an

intersubjective accomplishment. Social complexity, however, remains, in Luhmann's words, only "anonymous and latent" as long as the

alter-ego does not present itself as such. "Only to the extent that the

other man appears in consciousness not only as an object in the world but as an alter ego, as the freedom to see things otherwise and to be



64

have differently, ...does the complexity of the world appear in an en?

tirely new dimension..." (Luhmann, 1973, p. 19). Uncovering the so?

cial complexity of the world - the "entirely new dimension" of world

complexity -

is, therefore, a philosophical, more exactly, a phenom?

enological task. But phenomenology - as Luhmann recognizes

- is

concerned with attaining "ultimate evidences." The transcendental

phenomenological epoche is performed in order to attain absolute

being, a domain of evidences which are apodictic). Precisely for this

reason, however, it comes under criticism from him. According to Luh?

mann (1970, p. 78), "Transcendental reflection upon what I actually

experience manifests itself not as a way to ultimate evidences, but as a

methodological technique of transforming all evidences into problems ?

including even the being of the world, which now appears as the

problem of the greatest, indeterminate complexity."26 Any transcen?

dental theory of society which bases itself upon an "unavoidable sub?

jectivism" (Kant) or upon "analyses of the life-world," understood as

mere descriptions of daily experiences, misses the true transcendental

problematic, according to Luhmann. The truly valid and important contribution transcendental-phenomenological reflection has to make

is in uncovering the problematic status of social complexity. We have already shown how social complexity arises through the

awareness of alter-egos as such. We have also seen that the alter-ego can never be directly experienced. Rather it is a closed sphere of in

teriority just like my own ego and can only be experienced through itS lived-body. This essential necessity presents a central problem for

a theory of social action which asks the question, "...whether the

other as such experiences the same things that I experience, sees the

same things, cherishes the same values, lives in the same time, carries

the same history with him" (Luhmann, 1970, p. 73).27 As can readily be seen, this problem

? which only appears with the recognition of

the alter-ego as such ? can only arise when it becomes known that

the alter-ego is not only an object but a subject too.

Social complexity expresses itself in terms of other (further) pos? sibilities of action and experience for me, i.e. the actual possibilities of other men become my own possibilities.28 Indeed, the complexity of the social world is constituted by my ability to assume the per? spectives of others, "...to see with the eyes of others," as Luhmann

says. The assumption of the perspectives of others, however, exacts a price: their unreliability. The, "...possibilities of further experience and action indicated in the horizon of (my own) actual experience are

only possibilities, therefore they can turn out differently than expect? ed..." (Habermas & Luhmann, 1971, p. 32).29 This state of affairs is



65

referred to by Luhmann as social contingency. The possibilities can

turn out differently than expected for a number of reasons. All these,

however, have their ultimate foundation in the essential insight that the alter-ego is closed to direct access.

The real social importance of the indicators of the further pos? sibilities (meaning, according to Luhmann) does not reside in their

ability to present us with the alter-ego possessing certain qualities and

characteristics. Rather it resides in the fact that they supply us with information about what the alter-ego expects.30 The further pos? sibilities of action and experience indicated in the horizon of my actual

experience, therefore, are indicated as the alter-ego's expectations be?

cause it is only on this basis that my expectations directed towards

the alter-ego can be protected from disappointment. The social world

is not contingent for me alone. It is contingent for the alter-ego too, which is a necessary consequence of the recognition of the existence

of the alter-ego as such (social complexity). Thus social contingency is double contingency.31 Meaningful social interaction, therefore, is

only possible if I am able to expect the alter-ego's expectations, not

his behavior. All social structures, then, says Luhmann, take the form

of the expectation of expectations. Transcendental reflection upon the contents of my actual experience

has revealed both social complexity and social contingency. Social

complexity is uncovered insofar as transcendental reflection reveals

the existence of the alter-ego who as such presents me with further

possibilities of action and experience. In this manner the social world

becomes an intersubjective (complex) accomplishment. Social con? tingency, however, is uncovered at the same time with the recognition that the alter-ego is a closed sphere of interiority, one not accessible

to direct experience from outside. The necessary consequence of this

is that the possibilities he presents me with can always turn out dif?

ferently than expected. Consequently I must be able to expect his

expectations, and not only his behavior if meaningful social interaction is ever to occur. In any event, a social theory that wishes to under?

stand and analyze social action on the basis of these two main prob? lems (social complexity and social contingency)

? as a cybernetic

theory of social systems does, according to Luhmann ? must have recourse to phenomenological investigations because only in this way do these problems obtain clear contours. The transcendental-phe

nomenological foundation of social theory is very one referred to

by Sievers at the beginning of this paper as the a-cybernetic and a

sociological theory of world interpretation.



66

NOTES

1. Significant in Luhmann's case is the readiness to develop his ideas by making, as Friedrich Sixel says, "...every effort to listen to and to learn from...," what

other have to say, cf. Friedrich Sixel (1976). The person Sixel has in mind here is Juergen Habermas. Luhmann has even changed significantly with regard to the content of this paper. In order to avoid the charge of "apriorism" I am sure

that Luhmann would not, today, use such terms as "transcendental" or even

"intersubjectivity." He still maintains, however, that the central category of

meaning can only be uncovered phenomenologically.

2. The German word Erfassung ?

which is translated here as "grasping" - comes

from the verb erfassen which can also mean "to include" or "to take in," cf.

The Oxford Harrap's Standard German and English Dictionary, (T. Jones ed.) Section E, p. 83. It is in this sense too that Luhmann employs the word. Social systems for him maintain themselves by including or taking in elements of their environment, thereby increasing their own complexity at the expense of their environment.

Ashby (1970, p. 202-209) introduces the idea of system-maintenance

through increased system complexity as the "law of requisite variety." 3. Cf. Burkard Sievers (1971, p. 29 footnote 18): "Es scheint, als mache die An?

wendung der allgemeinen Systemtheorie auf die Sozialdimension general eine

sowohl ausser-kybernetische als auch ausser-soziologische Theorie der Welt?

interpretation erforderlich."

Sievers appends the above footnote to the statement that, Luhmann's com?

bination of equivalence-functionalism as method and system/environment theory finds its supplementation in the metasociological domain in a theory of the intersubjective constitution of meaning which relies heavily on Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, especially his later work. (Der Aequi

valenzfunktionalismus als Methode und die System/Umwelt Theorie finden bei Luhmann im metasoziologischen Bereich ihre Ergaenzung in einer Theorie der intersubjektiven Konstitution von Sinn, die sich eng an die transzendentale

Phaenomenologie Edmund Husserls, speziell sein Alterswerk, anlehnt).

Thus Sievers' use of the concept "a-cybernetic and a-sociological theory of

world interpretation" refers to a deeper level of meaning which can only be uncovered phenomenologically, i.e. prior to any mundane (cybernetic, so?

ciological) use to which it is put. A more complete analysis of the role that meaning plays in Luhmann's

work can be found in "Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie" in J. Habermas and N. Luhmann (1971, pp. 25-100).

Luhmann's concern with meaning is not how it is uncovered phenomenolog?

ically ?

although he does admit that this is the only way in which it can be

introduced. Rather his concern is with how meaning functions within social

systems. With the admission, however, that meaning has to be introduced

phenomenologically Luhmann indicates that an intersubjective constitution of the world (an a-cybernetic and a-sociological theory of world interpreta?

tion) necessarily underlies the interpretation of social action as complex systems.

4. Cf. A Greek-English Lexicon, (H.G. Liddell & R. Scott eds.), 9th edition, Ox?

ford, 1940, p. 1735.



67

5. Cf. Aristotle (1966, 150a 15-21, pp. 634-636). 6. At least this seems to be suggested by Raporport. Cf. International Encyclo?

pedia of the Social Sciences, (D. Sills ed.), New York, 1968, vol. 15, entry

"Systems Analysis" pp. 452-453. Bertalanffy (1956, pp. 1-10) himself in? dicates that the concept of open system was first used, in thermodynamics,

by Defayin 1929. 7. The phrase "the state of most probable distribution" of the elements of a

system can be illustrated with the example of red and black balls in an urn.

It is very improbable in this case that, inside the urn, all red balls would be on one side and all black ones on the other. Or it would be very improbable that in an enclosed space all fast molecules would be in one half and all slow ones

would be in the other, i.e. one side of the enclosed space would be hot and

the other cold. No, in each case (of closed systems) the elements (balls, mole?

cules) tend to distribute themselves in a more probable way, until a state of

equilibrium is attained. The "state of most probable distribution," as can be seen from these examples, is one of disorder rather than order. Entropy is the

measure of this probability. 8. Schroedinger refers to negative entropy simply as "orderliness." Cf. Erwin

Schroedinger (1968, p. 146). "Indeed, in the case of higher animals, we know the kind of orderliness they feed upon well enough, viz. the extremely well

order state of matter in more or less complicated organic compounds, which serve them as foodstuffs. After utilizing it they return it in a very much de?

graded form - not entirely degraded, however, for plants can still make use of it."

9. Although the term "cybernetics" was coined by Norbert Wiener, Luhmann refers to Ashby as the source of his understanding of the fourth stage of de?

velopment. Cf. concerning the concept of complexity Ashby (1970, Chaps. 7, 8, 9, 11). Cf. also Luhmann (1975, pp. 204-220).

10. No system can ever bring itself into a relation of equal complexity with its environment because this would mean that it would have to be its environ?

ment. Then there would be no difference at all between system and environ?

ment and neither would exist.

11. The human eye, for instance, reacts only to those electromagnetic wave lengths within the visible spectrum. All other wave lengths are irrelevant. It eliminates

them, although they are still there in the world. 12. To do so would require that the system possess the same degree of complexity

as the world. This would mean, in effect, that the system would be the world, which is impossible.

13. Cf. N. Luhmann (1970, p. 73 & p. 78), and N. Luhmann (1973, p. 18). 14. Cf. especially E. Husserl (1969 and 1970). 15. Husserl (1954), in Section 29, characterizes this subjectivity as "geistige Ver

laeufe" and distinguishes them from "bloss Tatsaechlichkeiten psychophy sicher Verlaeufe sensueller Daten." The latter occur in the consciousness of

animals, for instance. The former constitute meaning-formations (Sinngehal?

ten) and are distinctive of man. 16. Cf. M. Heidegger (1963 25-27, pp. 113-130). 17. Cf. A. Schutz (1960, sections 36-40, pp. 196-236, especially section 39, pp.

220?229). Schutz's use of the concept of anonymity is explained by Gur? witsch (1962, pp. 50-72).



68

18. The use of the word "type" in Schutz is derived from Webers's concept of Ideal types. Cf. Weber (1976,section l,no. 11).

19. Cf. Schutz (1960, p. 222). 20. Walsh and Lehnert translate Ihrbeziehung as "they-relation." Cf. Schutz

(1967,p. 195). 21. Walten is translated by Carr as "holding sway." Cf. Husserl, 1970, p. 107,

footnote 3 for Carr's explanation of this translation. 22. Cf. E. Husserl, 1969, D. Cairns (trans), section 51. 23. Cf. Husserl (1969, section 52). "The experienced animate organism of another

continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious behavior."

24. Husserl (1969, section 51), for clarification of what is meant by "paired as? sociation" which is a concept of critical importance for a theory of transcen? dental intersubjectivity.

25. The essential impossibility of experiencing another ego, except appresenta tively, is, therefore, not an obstacle for Husserl to the constitution of transcen? dental intersubjectivity and the objective world. (Cf. Husserl, 1969, section

54.) 26. Niklas Luhmann (1970, p. 78). "Transzendentale Reflexion auf das, was ich

wirklich erlebe, erweist sich dann nicht als Weg zu letztgewissen Evidenzen, sondern als eine methodische Technik, alle Evidenzen in Probleme zu ver?

wandeln - einschliesslich sogar des Seins der Welt, das nun als Problem aeusser ster unbestimmter Komplexitaet erscheint."

27. Luhmann (1970, p. 73. "...ob der andere ueberhaupt dasselbe erlebt wie ich, dieselben Dinge sieht, dieselben Werte schaetzt, im selben Zeitrhythmus lebt, dieselbe Geschichte mit sich fuehrt."

28. Cf. N. Luhmann (1972, p. 32). 29. J. Habermas & N. Luhmann (1970, p. 32). "...die im Horizont aktuellen Er?

lebens angezeigten Moeglichkeiten weiteren Erlebens und Handelns nur Moeg

lichkeiten sind, daher auch anders ausfallen koennen, als erwartet wurde."

30. Habermas and Luhmann (1970, pp. 63?64). The important question of

meaning in Luhmann's social theory can only be mentioned briefly here. Cf. his essay on meaning referred to above in footnote 3.

31. Cf. T. Parsons & E. Shils (eds.) (1951, pp. 14-16), for the first presentation of the concept of "double contingency."

REFERENCES

Aristotle, Metaphysics. Translated by Hugh Trendennick. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1961.

Aristotle, Generation of Animals. Translated by A.L. Peck. Cambridge, MA: Har? vard University Press, 1963.

Aristotle, Topics. Translated by E.S. Forster. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966.

Ashby, W.R., An Introduction to Cybernetics. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1971.

Bertalanffy, L. von, General system theory. In General Systems, Vol. 1, 1956.



69

Bertalanffy, L. von, General System Theory. New York: Braziller, 1968.

Cannon, W.B., The Wisdom of the Body. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1967.

Gurwitsch, A. The commonsense world as social reality ? A discourse on Alfred

Schutz. Social Research (29), 1962.

Habermas, J. & Luhmann, N., Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie.

Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971.

Heidegger, M., Sein und Zeit. Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1963.

Husserl, E., Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale

Phaenomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phaenomenologische Philosophie. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954.

Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations. Translated by Dorian Cairns. The Hague: Mar?

tinus Nijhoff, 1969.

Husserl, E., The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.

Translated by David Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

Jones, T. (ed.), The Oxford Harrap's Standard German and English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Liddell, H.G. & Scott, R. (eds.), A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford Uni?

versity Press, 1940.

Luhmann, N. Soziologische Aufklaerung 1. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970.

Luhmann, N., Rechtssoziologie. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1972.

Luhmann, N., Vertrauen. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1973.

Luhmann, N., Soziologische Aufklaerung 2. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975.

Parsons, T. & Shils, E., Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951.

Plato, Epinomis. Translated by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Schroedinger, E., Order, disorder and entropy. In W. Buckley (ed.), Modern Sys?

tems Research for the Behavioral Scientist. Chicago: Aldine Publication Co., 1968, pp. 143-146.

Schutz, A., Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt. Wien: Springer Verlag, 1960.

Schutz, A., The Phenomenology of the Social World. Translated by Walsh & Leh nert. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967.

Sievers, B., System-Organisation-Gesellschaft -

Niklas Luhmanns Theorie sozialer

Systeme. Jahrbuch fuer Sozialwissenschaft (22), 1971.

Sills, D. (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Mac? millan & Co., 1968.

Sixel, F., The problem of sense: Habermas vs. Luhmann. In John O'Neill (ed.), On Critical Theory. New York: Seabury Press, 1976.

Weber, M., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Verlag, 1976.



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Complexity and Intersubjectivity: Towards the Theory of Niklas Luhmann

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