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1 Compliance with International Law Jana von Stein Word Count: 11,128 1. Introduction Compliance with international law (IL) has long puzzled scholars and policymakers. Many early debates centered around the question of whether IL was even law at all, given its lack of a overarching enforcer (Austin 1832; Morgenthau 1948; Hart 1961). Later, IR scholars showed that international cooperation is not only possible and sustainable, but also common (Axelrod 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1986). Around the same time, Henkin (1979: 47) famously stated, “it is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of [IL] and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time” (italics are original; see also Fisher 1981). But by and large, most scholars agreed that it was puzzling – even surprising – that states abided by these obligations (Keohane 1984: 99; Franck 1990). If there exists no authority higher than the state, why do governments ever abide by the pacts they make with each other? How, if at all, are these pacts enforced? If states do comply, what does this tell us about law’s utility as a tool for bringing about real changes in how governments treat their citizens, how they apply antidumping measures, whether they curb pollution, and whether they defend their allies when war breaks out? This article engages these and related questions, drawing chiefly from the political science and IL literature. It starts by laying out some definitions, on core concepts like IL, compliance, and enforcement. In then provides a brief overview of foundational works that have helped define key legal doctrines that have helped to structure IR throughout the years. The remainder of the article explores the literature’s three main approaches to the compliance question. First, some scholars view noncompliance as chiefly a problem of enforcement. The lack of an overarching authority to punish rule-breakers poses challenges, but it does not render IL impotent. Rather, international inducements, reciprocity, reputation, and domestic politics/institutions can help to ensure that countries keep their promises – under the right conditions – by driving up the costs of noncompliance. A second group of scholars perceives most noncompliance not as a willful or calculated act, but rather as the result of capacity problems or poor management. From this viewpoint, the best path to compliance lies in writing transparent treaties, ensuring robust dispute resolution, and providing technical/financial assistance. Finally, a third group of scholars approaches compliance through the lens of identity, social context, and legitimacy. Governments keep their international promises when doing so is consistent with their identity, when they care how other actors – domestic and/or international – perceive them, and/or when they perceive the agreement as valid and fair. Throughout, I pay particular attention to what we have learned over the past 15 years. I draw examples from the qualitative and the quantitative literatures, although the emphasis lies more heavily on the latter. Previous reviews provide good overviews of
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Page 1: Compliance with International Lathe modern legal principle of rebus sic stantibus (‘things thus standing’), whereby treaties may become inapplicable if there is a fundamental change

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CompliancewithInternationalLawJanavonStein

WordCount:11,128

1.Introduction

Compliancewithinternationallaw(IL)haslongpuzzledscholarsandpolicymakers.ManyearlydebatescenteredaroundthequestionofwhetherILwasevenlawatall,givenitslackofaoverarchingenforcer(Austin1832;Morgenthau1948;Hart1961).Later,IRscholarsshowedthatinternationalcooperationisnotonlypossibleandsustainable,butalsocommon(Axelrod1984;AxelrodandKeohane1986).Aroundthesametime,Henkin(1979:47)famouslystated,“itisprobablythecasethatalmostallnationsobservealmostallprinciplesof[IL]andalmostalloftheirobligationsalmostallofthetime”(italicsareoriginal;seealsoFisher1981).Butbyandlarge,mostscholarsagreedthatitwaspuzzling–evensurprising–thatstatesabidedbytheseobligations(Keohane1984:99;Franck1990).

Ifthereexistsnoauthorityhigherthanthestate,whydogovernmentseverabidebythepactstheymakewitheachother?How,ifatall,arethesepactsenforced?Ifstatesdocomply,whatdoesthistellusaboutlaw’sutilityasatoolforbringingaboutrealchangesinhowgovernmentstreattheircitizens,howtheyapplyantidumpingmeasures,whethertheycurbpollution,andwhethertheydefendtheirallieswhenwarbreaksout?

Thisarticleengagestheseandrelatedquestions,drawingchieflyfromthepoliticalscienceandILliterature.Itstartsbylayingoutsomedefinitions,oncoreconceptslikeIL,compliance,andenforcement.InthenprovidesabriefoverviewoffoundationalworksthathavehelpeddefinekeylegaldoctrinesthathavehelpedtostructureIRthroughouttheyears.Theremainderofthearticleexplorestheliterature’sthreemainapproachestothecompliancequestion.

First,somescholarsviewnoncomplianceaschieflyaproblemofenforcement.Thelackofanoverarchingauthoritytopunishrule-breakersposeschallenges,butitdoesnotrenderILimpotent.Rather,internationalinducements,reciprocity,reputation,anddomesticpolitics/institutionscanhelptoensurethatcountrieskeeptheirpromises–undertherightconditions–bydrivingupthecostsofnoncompliance.Asecondgroupofscholarsperceivesmostnoncompliancenotasawillfulorcalculatedact,butratherastheresultofcapacityproblemsorpoormanagement.Fromthisviewpoint,thebestpathtocomplianceliesinwritingtransparenttreaties,ensuringrobustdisputeresolution,andprovidingtechnical/financialassistance.Finally,athirdgroupofscholarsapproachescompliancethroughthelensofidentity,socialcontext,andlegitimacy.Governmentskeeptheirinternationalpromiseswhendoingsoisconsistentwiththeiridentity,whentheycarehowotheractors–domesticand/orinternational–perceivethem,and/orwhentheyperceivetheagreementasvalidandfair.

Throughout,Ipayparticularattentiontowhatwehavelearnedoverthepast15years.Idrawexamplesfromthequalitativeandthequantitativeliteratures,althoughtheemphasisliesmoreheavilyonthelatter.Previousreviewsprovidegoodoverviewsof

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earlier,predominantlyqualitative,literatures(Kingsbury1998;Simmons1998,2010;RaustialaandSlaughter2002).

2. Compliance:DefiningtheTermsoftheDebate

Understandingdebatesaboutcomplianceisinpartanexerciseindefinitions.(Public)ILisgenerallydefinedasrulesthatgovernrelationsbetweenstates,and–insomecases–betweenotherlegallyrecognizedinternationalactors.Thisincludeswritteninternationalagreementsliketreaties,memorandaofunderstanding,etc.ButarenormsandcustomsalsopartofIL,whennotcodifiedinwrittenform?ManyviewcustomaryILasacrucialpartoftheinternationallegalarchitecture.Indeed,theseunwrittenstandardsofconductsometimesformthebasisofcourtdecisions(seeforinstancePaqueteHabana1900).Yetthebulkofthepoliticalscienceliteratureoncomplianceisconcernedwithwrittenagreements.Asaresult,althoughIusethemoreexpansivedefinitionofILthroughout,mostofthediscussionfocusesonwrittenagreements.Later,IconsiderwhynormsandcustomshavegainedlimitedattentionintheIRliterature,andwhatbenefitsanexpansionofscopemightbring.

Idefinecomplianceasthedegreetowhichstatebehaviorconformstowhatanagreementprescribesorproscribes(Young1979:104).Importantly,(non)complianceisaspectrum,notadichotomy.Ifocusonfirst-ordercompliance(adherencetorules),andsetasidesecond-ordercompliance(adherencetorulings).Thisisstraightforwardenough,butitisimportanttodifferentiatecompliancefromeffectiveness–thedegreetowhichanagreementhasanimpactonbehavior,therebyimprovingorsolvingtheproblemthatledtotheagreement’sformation(Young1997;Shelton2000;andMartin2013).

Thedifferencebetweencomplianceandeffectivenessiswellillustratedintheenvironmentalarena.Supposethatgovernmentsratifyatreaty,agreeingtohalvetheiremissionsofsomepollutantby2015.StateAmighthititstargetbecauseaneconomicdownturndrivesdownpollutant-relatedproduction,orbecauseatechnologicalinnovationreducesdemandforthepollutivesubstance.Thisiscompliancewithouteffectivenessbecausetheimprovementshavenothing(directly)todowiththetreatyitself.Conversely,in2015,stateB’semissionsmightremainwellabovethetarget.Butitmaynonethelesshavemadesignificantemissionsreductionsinanticipationofthe2015deadline.Thisiseffectivenesswithout(full)compliance.Inmanycases,ofcourse,complianceandeffectivenessworktogether.In2020,perhapsstateBwillbemuchclosertoitstarget(andthereforemuchclosertocompliance)becauseoftheagreement’scontinuedimpactonitsenvironmentalpractice.

Internationallegalscholarssometimesequateenforcementwithpunishmentbyacourt(e.g.,theICCoradomesticcourt)orotherinternationalauthority(e.g.,theUnitedNations[UN]SecurityCouncil).LikemostIRscholars,Iuseabroaderdefinition:enforcementisthe(threatof)applicationofsanctionsorsomematerialconsequenceifapartydoesnotcomplywithanagreement.

3. ThePoliticsofComplianceandEnforcement:Foundations

PractitionersandthinkersasfarbackasMachiavellihaveaskedwhether/whyleadersshouldcomplywiththeirinternationalcommitments.“AprudentPrince,”Machiavelli

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argues(1532:ch.XVIII),“neithercannoroughttokeephiswordwhentokeepitishurtfultohimandthecauseswhichledhimtopledgeitareremoved.”Theseprinciples–thatgovernmentsshouldnotcomplywhenitisnolongerintheirinterestorwhenconditionschange–havecarriedforwardtomorerecentwritings.Indeed,theyformthemodernlegalprincipleofrebussicstantibus(‘thingsthusstanding’),wherebytreatiesmaybecomeinapplicableifthereisafundamentalchangeofcircumstances(Desierto2012).Ifhumanswerehonestandkepttheirpromises,thenthePrinceshoulddothesame.Buttheydonot,andthereforethePrincewouldbefoolishtoabidebyhiscommitments–indeed,hewouldreceivethesucker’spayoff.Ultimately,thisisanargumentaboutreciprocity.ForMachiavelli,humannatureprecludesreciprocityfromprovidingasuccessfulmechanismforensuringthatpromisesarekept.Aswewillseelater,morerecentscholarshipalsolooksatreciprocity,butseesitasareliablemodeofenforcementthatcan,intherightcircumstances,pushgovernmentstokeeptheirpromises.Additionally,clausularebussicstantibushasevolvedovertheyears.Thesedays,mostcourtsonlytakethedoctrineseriouslyinalimitedsetofcircumstances.Article62oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreatiesprovidesagoodroadmap.

Grotius(1625)expressesaverydifferentperceptionascomparedtoMachiavelli.Thepactsthatleaderssignwithoneanother,heargues,aretoberespectedandfulfilledingoodfaith.Thistenetformsthefundamentalmodern-dayinternationallegalprincipleofpactasuntservanda(‘agreementsaretobeobserved’).Grotiusoutlinesatleastthreereasonswhyinternationalpactsshouldbeobeyed.First,theyarelegallyandmorallybinding.Thisprincipleisfirmlyrootedinhisbelief(Prologue15)that“Itisaruleofthelawofnaturetoabidebypacts”(seealsoBookII.16.1).Second,internationalagreementsareestablishedbymutualconsent.Theirvoluntarynaturemakesthemlegitimateandbinding.Third,andperhapsmostinterestingforsubsequentIRtheoriesthatemphasizethe“shadowofthefuture”(e.g.,AxelrodandKeohane1986),complianceisgenerallyinstates’long-terminterest.Indeed,“thestatewhichtransgressesthelawofnatureandofnationscutsawayalsothebulwarkswhichsafeguarditsownfuturepractice”(Prologue18).However,Grotiusdoesattachcertainexceptionstothegoodfaithprinciple,forinstancewhenthecontractisconcludedunderillegitimatecircumstancesorwhentheotherpartyengagesinlarge-scalenoncompliance.

Hobbes’s(1651)premisesonsovereignty,thestateofnature,andmutualcontractshaveimportantimplicationsforhowweunderstandcomplianceandenforcement.Ontheonehand,theadventofthesovereignnation-stateshouldbegoodnewsforinterstaterelations.Inadditiontoescapinga“solitary,poore,nasty,brutishandshort”lifeanddirectingactivitiestowardthecommonbenefit,citizensalsoreceiveprotectionfromotherstateswhentheyturnoverpowertoaSovereign(Hobbes1651XIIII).Thisleadsdirectlytoimportantprinciplesthatunderpinthemodernstate-system,suchassovereigntyandnon-intervention,whichHobbesviewsascriticaltoensuringpeacewithotherstates.Ontheotherhand,someofHobbes’spremisesaredeeplytroublingforIL.“Covenants,withoutthesword,”heclaims,“arebutwordsandofnostrength”(ch.17).“Wherethereisnocommonpower,thereisnolaw”(ch.13).Inthisview,thelackofan‘internationalLeviathan’meansnotonlythatILisineffectual;italsoimpliesthatILisnotreallylawatall.

ThequestionofwhetherILisreallylawremainedatopicofdebateforcenturies.IfweuseanAustiniandefinitionoflaw(Austin1832)–acommandgivenbyaSovereign,

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backedbythethreatofsanctions–thenitisclearthatILisnotlaw.Mostnowagreethatsuchadefinitionistoorestrictive.Forinstance,Hart(1961)arguesthatitisnottheexistenceofacentralenforcerthatdistinguishesalegalsystem,butrathertheunionofprimaryrules(definingwhatisandisnotallowed)andsecondaryrules(rulesaboutrules).Ultimately,inhisview,ILis“sufficientlyanalogoustolaw”tobeconsideredassuch(Hart1961:231).Bull(1977)concurs,butforslightlydifferentreasons:internationallawhasthestatusoflawbecausethosewhouseit–nationalandinternationalcourts,diplomats,andpoliticians–believetheseruleshavethestatusoflaw.Morgenthau(1948:255),too,acceptsthatILislaw,stating,“todenythatILexistsatallasasystemofbindinglegalrulesfliesinthefaceofalltheevidence.”

MostscholarsandpractitionersnowagreethatILexistsaslaw.Butthatisnotthesameassayingitiseffective.Mearsheimer(1994-95)arguesthatmostagreementssimplyarticulateidenticalorcomplementaryinterests,andthosethatdonotareunlikelytolast.Fromthisperspective,statesabidebytreatiesbecauseitisintheirimmediateinteresttodoso.Morgenthau(1948)maintainsthatintheabsenceofanoverarchingauthority,sanctionsaredecentralizedandbasedonself-help.Thisisaprimitivelegalsystem–andonethatdiffersradicallyfromdomesticlaw–foritplacestherighttoenforcethelawinthevictim’shands(Morgenthau1948:266).Consequently,enforcementisunevenintwomainrespects:(1)gravetransgressionsmayattractnoresponsewhereasminornoncompliancemaysolicitseveresanctions;and(2)thestrongaremuchmorelikelytoescapereprisals.Enforcement,then,isnotamatterofILbutofnationalinterestandthedistributionofpower.

ManydisagreewiththisperceptionthatILisineffective.Ifstateswoulddothesameanyhow,whybotherwritingagreementsdown?Ifstateshaveidenticalinterests,thedesiredoutcomecanbeachievedwithnocommunicationwhatsoever.Iftheyhavecomplementaryinterests,theycansimplyagreeinformally(Keohane1984).Inneithercaseisaformalarrangementneeded.Surelyinternationalagreementsdomorethansimplyspelloutidenticalorcomplementaryinterests;otherwiseitishardtounderstandwhytheyexist.Moreover,manyargue,skepticsofILoverstatethegapbetweenmunicipalandIL(StatonandMoore2011).Inreality,domesticcontractsoftenrelyonnon-governmentalmechanismsfortheirenforcement,whereasanumberofinternationalrulesareinterpretedifnotenforcedbyinternationalbodies.

Forinstance,reputationalconcerns,ratherthanthethreatofpunishmentfromonhigh,arenodoubtthedrivingforcebehindmanybusinesscontracts.Totakeanotherdomesticexample:ifmurderwerelegalized,wouldmostpeoplebeginmurderingeachother?Itseemsunlikely.Mostrefrainfrommurderingbecausetheyhavenodesiretodoso,believeitunethical,and/orfearreciprocation.AmoreaccurateportrayalofIL,then,wouldthinkoflawasaspectrumofcentralizationratherthanadichotomy(Bull1977).Finally,othersmaintainthatskepticsofILrelyonafar-too-narrowunderstandingofenforcement(Henkin1979;Fisher1981).Ratherthanrestinginthehandsofacentralorganizingbody,thesourcesofenforcementresideelsewhere.Thenextsectionconsidersthesesourcesofenforcement.Thespecificmechanismsarevarious,buttheyareunitedbyafocusonthecostsagovernmentpaysfornotabidingbyitsinternationallegalpromises.

4. ComplianceasaProblemofEnforcement

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A. InternationalInducements

Adherencemaybeimportantenoughtoastatethatitiswillingtopaythecostofinducingotherstocomply.Why?Insomecases,itisstrictlyamatterofpublicinterest.InthefamousBananasdispute,forinstance,theUnitedStates(US)andseveralLatinAmericancountrieshadamaterialinterestininducingtheEuropeanUnion(EU)tocomplywithGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT)andWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)provisions(AlterandMeunier2006).Inothercases,leaders–oratleasttheindividuals/groupstowhomtheyareresponding–aremotivatedbymorenormativeconsiderations.

Theanti-apartheideconomicsanctionsregime,forexample,cameaboutbecausecitizensandindividuallegislatorshadamoral/ethicalproblemwiththatsystemofracialsegregationandoppression(Black1999).Whilegovernments’motivationsinusinginternationalinducementsarediverse,theinducementsthemselvesrelyonacost-benefitlogic.(Idiscusscompliancemechanismsthatdonotrelyonrewardsorpunishments,suchas‘namingandshaming,’later).Theseinducementsmightbepositive–tradeconcessions,increasedforeignaid,and/orcooperationinotherissue-areas.Alternatively,theymightincludepunishmentssuchasdevelopmentassistancecuts,economicsanctions,and–rarely–militaryintervention.

Linkageisacommonmeansofinducingcompliance.Someissuesarelinkablebecausetheyaresubstantivelyrelatedandaffecteachother.Butthisneednotbethecase:sanctionslinkage,inparticular,isawaytoapplytheenginesofcompliancefromoneissue-areatoanother,presumablymoreintractable,area(Leebron2002).Hafner-Burton(2005,2009)arguesthatWesternstatescancompelabusivegovernmentstorespecthumanrightsbyexplicitlytyingthesetotradeconcessionsinpreferentialtradeagreements.Evengovernmentsthatareperfectlyhappytoabusetheircitizenscanbe“forcedtobegood”whenthecontinuationoftradeconcessionsdependsontheirrespectforhumanrights.

Issuelinkageisalsoaboutexpandingthesetofpossibleinducementsthatcansustaincompliance,whichtiesdirectlyintoideasof‘issuebarter’(Leebron2002:12-13).(Forsome,thistakesusintotheterritoryofreciprocity,wheregovernmentsmakeconcessionsononefrontinexchangeforconcessionsonanotherfront.Ikeepthesedistinct,suchthatreciprocityistrulyaboutmeetingonebehaviorwiththesamebehavior).Forexample,Poast(2012)notesthatmanymilitaryalliances,almostallofthemasymmetric,includetradeprovisions.Theseenhancecompliancebyincreasingthecostsofreneging:ifthestrongerstatedecidesnottodefenditsally,itwilllosethetradeconcessions.Hefindsnotonlythattradeprovisionsmakestatesmorewillingtorespecttheiralliancecommitments,butalsothatallianceswithtradeprovisionsaremorecredible.Intheenvironmentalarena,TingleyandTomz’s(2014)surveyexperimentfindsthatrespondentssupportissue-linkage:ifanothercountryincreasesitsconsumptionofgreenhousegases,respondentsstronglycondonepubliclyshamingand/orcuttingoftradewiththecountry–particularlyifithadbreachedinternationallaw.Interestingly,respondentsdidnotsupportdirectreciprocity(i.e.,raisingconsumptioninresponsetoanothercountry’sincreasedconsumption),evenwhentheothercountryhadratifiedarelevanttreaty.

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Internationalinducementsaretypicallydecentralizedandbasedonself-help,placingtherighttopunish/rewardinthehandsofthe(potential)victimand/orthepowerful.Asaconsequence,applicationcanbeuneven.Gravetransgressionsmayattractnoresponse,whereasminornoncompliancemaybemetwithseveresanctions.Additionally,thestrongaremorelikelytoescapereprisals–andtoadministerthem.Internationalinducements,then,mayhavemuchmoretodowithnationalinterestsandthedistributionofpowerthananythingelse(Morgenthau1948;GoldsmithandPosner2005).(However,seeOhlin2015,whoarguesthatinternationallawcanservetheinterestsoftheweakandthepowerfulalike.)

Yet,smallerstatesandnon-stateactorscanandhavepunishednoncompliers.LebovicandVoeten(2009)findthattheWorldBankreducesaidtocountrieswhenthe(nowdefunct)UNHumanRightsCommissionexplicitlycriticizestheirhumanrightsstandards.Schimmelfennigetal.(2003)combinebothmechanisms(afocusonrewardsandinvolvementofnon-stateactors),examiningEUdemocraticconditionalityandhowitworksas‘reinforcementbyreward.’Coordinationofmultilateraleffortscanbedifficult,however(Martin2000).Keyactorssometimesdisagreeonwhetheritisworthwhiletopunishnoncompliance.Alternatively,punishmentorrewardsmightbeinthecollectiveinterestofall,buteachmemberfacesincentivestofree-ride.Thisoftenresultsinanundersupplyofmultilateralinducementstocomply(Barrett2007).

Moreover,internationalinducementsarenotalwaysrenegotiation-proof.Ifapunishment(orareward)istoocostlytodispense,andtheagreementisnotself-enforcing,partiescannotcrediblycommittoimposingit(Barrett2007).Thisisparticularlyacuteinmultilateralcontexts(Guzman2008:66-68).Thepoliticalcostsofpunishingnoncompliancecanalsomakesanctioningparticularlycostly:coercivesanctionscanleadnontargetedstatestofeelthreatenedandtoquestionthesanctioner’smotives.Internationalorganizationscanhelpmakepunishmentlesscostlybyclarifyingambiguousrules,providingtransparencyandmonitoring,andsupplyinginformationaboutpowerfulstates’intentions(Thompson2009,2013).

B. Reciprocity

Scholarsandpractitionershavelongunderstoodreciprocitytobeanengineofcooperation(Schachter1991).Axelrod(1984)showsthat,evenwhenpartieshaveanimmediateincentivetodefect,tit-for-tatstrategiescaneffectivelypromotecooperationbydirectlylinkinganactor’scurrentbehaviortoitsexpectedfuturepayoffs.Applyingthislogictocompliancespecifically,themechanismisasfollows:ifbothpartiesgainfrommutualcomplianceandwillmatchnoncompliancewithnoncompliance,thethreatofreversiontotheno-agreementstatusquopreventseachpartyfromreneginginthefirstplace(Guzman2008;Ohlin2015).

Manyconditionsmustholdforreciprocitytoensurecompliance.Mostobviously,reciprocalnoncompliancemustharmthepartythatistemptedtorenege.Thisisrarelythecaseforhumanrightsagreements(HRAs),whichtypicallydonotcreatecross-nationalexternalities(Moravcsik1999;Hafner-Burton2005).Forinstance,theSwedishgovernmentmaybeoutragedbythetreatmentofwomeninSaudiArabia,butthreateningtomistreatSwedishwomenwillnotinduceSaudiArabiatoabidebythe

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ConventionontheEliminationofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW).Incontrast,reciprocityoftensufficesforagreementsaddressingwarconductortrade,sincebadbehaviorcreatescross-nationalexternalities,andretaliationcanbetargeted.Morrow(2007)findsthatmutualratificationofwarconducttreatiesproducesfewerviolationsthroughjointdeterrence(seealsoChilton2015).Tit-for-tatcanbeadouble-edgedsword,however:ifonepartyreneges,compliancebreaksdownquicklybecausereciprocityismoreeffectivewhenbothpartieshaveratified(Morrow2007,2014).

Theshadowofthefuturealsomustbesufficientlylongthatthelong-termbenefitsofmutualcomplianceoutweightheshort-termbenefitsofmutualreneging.Iftheydonot,afeudofreciprocalnoncompliancebeginsandtheshadowofthefuture‘burnsup’(Axelrod1984).AxelrodandKeohane(1986)arguethatwhereasactorshavereasontoanticipatethateconomicrelationswillcontinueforanindefiniteperiodoftime,thepossibilityofpreemptivewarcanmaketheshadowofthefuturelesscertaininsecurityaffairs.

Afinalchallengeforreciprocityasanenforcementmechanismisthatitisnotalwayspossibletolimitthe‘punishment’totheviolator.Thisisacommonprobleminenvironmentalaffairs,particularlywhenmultilateralinnature(Barrett2007).Considergreenhousegasemissions.Thepunishmentofreciprocalnoncompliancecannotbetargetedonlyatstatesthatarebreakingtheircommitments.Consequently,thethreatofincreasedemissionsisnotharmfulenoughtoconvincethetemptedpartytorespectitsobligations(Barrett2007;Guzman2008).Inmostcases,evenaseriesofbilateralaccordswouldnotdothejob.

C. Reputation

Henkin(1979:52)noteddecadesagothat“[e]verynation’sforeignpolicydependssubstantially[…]onmaintainingtheexpectationthatitwillliveuptointernationalmoresandobligations.”Whymightareputationforhonoringlegalcommitmentsmatter?Forsome,theansweristhatstatesinherentlyvalueareputationforrespectingIL–aperspectivethatIdiscusslaterinthisarticle.Forothers,theansweristhatreputationhasrealmaterialconsequences.Areputationforkeepingpromisescanmakeiteasierforgovernmentstosecurecooperationmorebroadly.Incontrast,areputationforunreliabilitymighthindercooperationbecausepromisesappearnon-credible(Keohane1984;Guzman2008;Stiles2015).Reputationisimportantforpredictingfuturebehavior,notforpunishingpastactions(Brewster2009).

Scholarshavefocusedchieflyonhowapoorreputationendangerscooperationinthefutureorinotherissue-areas.Gibler(2008)arguesthatifreputationmatters,itshouldbeeasierforgovernmentsthatabidebytheirpromisestoconcludeagreementsdowntheline.Insupportofthisidea,hefindsthatstatesthathonoralliancecommitmentsaremorelikelytocreatealliancesinthefuture.Simmons(2000)maintainsthatgovernmentscomplywithArticleVIIIoftheInternationalMonetaryFundTreatybecausetheywantmarketactorstoviewthemastrustworthyintheircommitmentstoprotectpropertyrightsinthefuture(seealsoNelson2010).Henceareputationforlaw-governedbehaviorcanbeusefulforreassuringmarketactorsaboutwillingnesstomaintainthesamepoliciesdowntheroad.

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Whetherastate’sreputationinoneissue-areaaffectsitsreputationinotherissue-areasseemstobeasubjectofgreaterdebate.TheSwedishgovernmentmaynotinferfromSaudiArabia’sfailuretorespectCEDAWprinciplesthatitisanunreliableWorldTradeOrganizationpartner.Thereason,DownsandJones(2002)argue,isthatthesourcesofcompliancecostsareunrelated.Totheextentthatgovernmentsareableto‘compartmentalize’theirreputations(Fisher1981:130),reputationmaynottravelwellacrossissue-areas.Guzman(2008:100-06)disagrees,arguingthatalthoughstatesnodoubthavemultiplereputations,thelatterareofteninterrelated(ChayesandChayes1995).Noncomplianceinoneareamighttellastate’spartnerssomethingaboutitsattitudestowardthelawmoregenerally.Italsoconveysinformationaboutagovernment’sunderlyingwillingnesstosacrificelong-termforshort-termgains(seealsoOhlin2015).

Anexampleofissue-areareputationallinkagecanbefoundinMoore(2003),whoarguesthatwhenastatebreaksitsHRApromises,investorsbecomemorewaryofinvestingbecausetheyconcludethatthestateisunwillingtorestrainthepresentuseofpowerintheinterestoflong-termbenefits.Theactofbreakingapromiseiskey,andinvolvesactorsmakinginferencesabouttrustworthinessinoneareafrombehaviorinanother.Tomz’s(2008)surveyoffersanovelapproachtogaugingcross-issuereputationalspillovers.Ifpresentedwithastatethatalwayscompliedwithitsinternationaleconomiccommitments,respondentsweresignificantlymorewillingtobelievethatratificationoftheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty‘matters’(i.e.,thataratifierwouldbesignificantlylesslikelythananon-ratifiertopursuenuclearweapons).Thislendscredencetotheideathatindividualsdodrawconnectionsbetweencommitmentsinseeminglyunrelatedissue-areas.

Concernsaboutreputation,however,mightnotalwaysweighinfavorofobeyingtreatythelaw.Governmentsmightinsteadwantareputationforbeingtoughorprotectingtheirinterests(Keohane1997;HiroseandPark2013).Iftheseconflict,governmentsmightdecidenottocomply.Inthelate1990s,forinstance,theUSseemedtohavegainedadditionalleveragefromrefusingtofulfillitsfinancialobligationstotheUN,ratherthanlosinginfluenceasaresultofadamagedreputation(Keohane1997).Additionally,leadershipturnovercallsintoquestiontheidea,oratleastnarrowsthescopeoftheargument,thatconcernsaboutreputationdrivecompliance.Statesusuallycontinueintothefuture;governmentschange.AsBrewster(2009,2013)notes,governmentsdonotbearthefullbruntofabadreputationbecausetheirtenureislimited.Particularlywhenthepartyatthehelmchanges,reputationsmayormaynotcarryover.InthecaseofthetreatmentofdetaineesundertheBushadministration,manyinternationalanddomesticaudiencesexpectedtheObamaadministrationtobehavedifferently.Consequently,thereputationalcoststotheUSasawholemayhavebeenrelativelylimited(Brewster2009,2013).

Testingreputationaltheoriesischallenging.Muchoftheevidencehasbeenanecdotaland/orlimitedbyendogeneityproblems.Themeasuresthatscholarshaveusedoftenpickuponsomanyothermechanismsthatitdifficulttosaywithmuchcertaintythatreputationisthecorecausalvariable(Gibler2008;Tomz2008).Recentsurveyexperimentsovercomethosedrawbacks.Forinstance,inarecentstudy,TomzandWeeks(2015)parseoutthetworeputationalmechanisms.Concernsaboutreputationalspilloverintootherissue-areasplayedasignificantroleinmotivatingrespondentstosupportmilitaryintervention,butthedesiretomaintainagoodmilitaryreputationin

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futureinteractionshadanevenstrongereffect.Interestingly,thisresearchalsouncoverssomeofthelimitsofreputation.Indeed,thesurveyfoundthatasenseofmoralobligationhadanevenlargerimpactonrespondents’decisiontosupportintervention.Ireturntothisfindinglater.Furthermore,ifthematerialcase(dollars,troops)fornon-interventionissufficientlycompelling,respondentssupportedviolatingtreatyobligationsfairlyreadily(Tomz2008;TomzandWeeks2015).Thechallengeforsurvey-basedresearch,ofcourse,isexternalvalidity.Citizensandleadersseemtocareaboutareputationforcompliance.Buthowdothesepreferencestranslateintopolicyandpractice?

D. DomesticInstitutionsandPolitics

Importantsourcesofenforcementlieinsidethestate.Scholarsgenerallyfocusontherolesofcourts,elections,legislatures,andnon-stateactors(andtheirinterplay).Slaughter(1995)laidmuchofthegroundworkforadialoguebetweenILandIRscholarsondomesticjudicialinstitutionsandcompliancewithIL.IndependentdomesticjudiciariesarethoughttoaidintheenforcementofILbecausethey(1)empowercitizenstochallengegovernment(in)actionlegally;(2)havetheauthoritytoevaluatewhethergovernment(in)actionadherestoexistinglaw;and(3)basetheirrulingsonlegalprinciplesratherthanongovernmentpreference,popularity,citizens’desires/indifference,etc.Adverserulingsrarelyleadtofull/automaticcompliance,buttheymakeitmoredifficultforgovernmentstocontinuereneging(vonStein2015).Inthehumanrightsarena,Simmons(2009)alsopointsoutthateveniflitigationisunsuccessful,itcanempowerpeopletothink,talk,andstruggleoverrightsthatbecomepartofthenationaldialogueandpoliticalchangeinthefuture.

Otherstakeinsightfromtheliteratureonleaderpunishmentandinternationalcooperation/conflict(McGillivrayandSmith2000),arguingthatdemocraticleadershavestrongerincentivestocomplywiththeirinternationallegalobligationsbecausecompetitiveelectionsmakeitrelativelyeasyforcitizensto‘punish’leaderswhorenegeontheirpromises(seealsoSchachter1991).Thereareatleasttworeasonswhypoliticalaccountabilitymightcompelleaderstobevigilant.First,itforcesatighteralignmentofcitizenpreferencesandpolicy(Stiles2015).Settingasideforthemomentthequestionofwhatcitizenswant,politicalaccountabilitycompelsleaderstobemoreconcernedaboutwhethernoncompliancewillcostthemthesupportofcitizenswhobenefitfromtheparticularagreementorfromthestate’sadherencetoILmorebroadly(Trachtman2008).Second,breakingrulescanreflectpoorlyfromavalencestandpoint,motivatingevencitizenswhohavenointerestinILbutareconcernedaboutcompetencemoregenerally(Leeds2003).

Putnam’s(1988)now-canonical‘logicoftwo-levelgames’ignitedavastliteratureonhowlegislativeconstraintsaffectstates’abilitytoconcludeinternationalagreementsandtosustaincooperation(Milner1977;Mansfield,Milner,andRosendorff2000;Martin2000;Davis2012).Legislaturescanfrustratecompliance–bydelayingorrefusingtopassimplementinglegislation,byrefusingtoshiftbudgetaryresources,andsoon(Pollack2003).Theseexpostmechanismsoflegislativecontrolcompelexecutivestotakelegislators’preferencesintoaccountatthenegotiationstage,particularlyforaccordsthatrequireformallegislativeratification.Legislativeinvolvementmakesnegotiationsmorecomplex,butitisalsoanasset,makingtheagreementsreached

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throughthisfractiousbargainingprocessmorecredibleandmorelikelytostick(Martin2000).

ThedomesticenforcementofILviacourts,elections,and/orlegislaturesreliesongovernmentactors.Butprivate(‘non-state’)actorsplayaroleinIL’sdomesticenforcementaswell.Ifocushereonsocialmovementsandfirms,settingaside–duetospaceconstraints–thenumerousothernon-stateactorsinvolvedindomesticenforcement.Thereisavastliteratureonhowsocialmovementsandfirmsaffectcompliancewithinternationallaw(c.f.,Sikkink1999;Stiglitz2007;Tsutsuietal.2012;andMuchlinski2014).Whilethesegroupsregularlyexistandoperatetransnationally,Ifocushereonhowtheyhelp(and,later,hinder)toenforceILdomestically.Socialmovementscanplayacrucialroleinprovidinginformationaboutgovernments’legalobligations,inmonitoringcompliance,andinbringingviolationstotheattentionofcitizensandotherinteresteddomesticactors(KeckandSikkink1999;Sikkink1999).Theseactionsarenotenforcementperse,buttheyaidwithenforcement,particularlyincombinationwiththeotherdomesticmechanismsdiscussedinthissection.

Socialmovementsalsoinvolvethemselvesdirectlyinenforcement,forinstancebyprovidinglegalaidtovictimsandbybringingwitnessestocourt;orbylaunchingcampaignsthatcanbecomepoliticallycostlyforleaders(Tsutsuietal.2012).TheGuantánamoBayDetentionsprovideaninterestingexample.DomesticUSactivists,hand-in-handwithDemocraticpoliticians,madethisapoliticallysalientissueinthe2006midtermelections.TheircriticismsincludedtheUS’sinternationallegalobligations.Socialmovementssometimesalsoengagedomesticenforcementbybringinginternationalactorsintothepicture,whichmightopenupapoliticalspacetopushforcompliancethroughdomesticchannels(KeckandSikkink1999;RisseandSikkink1999).

Ataverygenerallevel,wecansaythatfirmsinvolvethemselvesintheenforcementofILwhenitisintheirinteresttodoso,andwhentheyhavethenecessaryknowledgeandresources(c.f.,Davis2012;Muchlinski2014).Someofthemostcommonmechanismsarelobbyingandfilingcomplaintsand/orlawsuits.ReturningtotheBananasdispute,theUSfirmChiquita–whichhadmassiveoperationsinLatinAmericaandwaslosingmillionsofdollarstotheEU’srestrictiveregime–lobbiedUSpoliticiansintenselyandultimatelyfiledasection301petitiontotheUSTradeRepresentative,whichinturnledtoaWTOdispute.AcrosstheAtlantic,bananaimporterschallengedtheEU’sbananaregimeindomesticcourts.ThemostsuccessfulofthesewereinGermany,whereGermanjudgesconsideredwhethertheregimeviolatedtheGermanconstitutionandwhethertheseimportersdeservedcompensation(AlterandMeunier2006).

Whatdoestheempiricalrecordtellusaboutdomesticpolitics/institutionsandcompliance?Thereiscertainlyevidencethatdemocraciesabidebytheirinternationallegalcommitmentsmorethannon-democracies:theyaremorereliablealliancepartners(Leeds2003);theyare,withsomeexceptions,morelikelytocomplywiththecivilrightstreatiestheyhaveratified(Hathaway2002;Neumayer2005);andtheytaketheirobligationsunderthelawsofwarmoreseriously(Morrow2007,2014).Buttherearemanynullornegativefindingsaswell.DemocraciesarenomorelikelytoabidebytheirobligationsunderArticleVIIIoftheIMFTreaty(Simmons2000);theyarelesslikelytointervenetoprotecttheiralliesintimeofwar(GartzkeandGleditsch2004);

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andtheyarenomorelikelytorespecttheircommitmentsundertheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights(ICESCR)(Cole2015b).

Thesemixedfindingscanbeattributedtotwomainfactors.First,untilrecently,quantitatively-orientedscholarsoftenreliedononemeasure–Polityscore–totestargumentsabouttheimpactofcourts,elections,legislativeconstraints,andevensocialmovements.Thismeasurewasoverlybluntandaninadequateoperationalizationofthespecificcausalmechanisms(PowellandStaton2009).Scholarsarenowusingmorenuancedmeasures,withinterestingfindings.ThisimprovementisparticularlyevidentintheliteratureonHRAs.Initially,thegeneralconsensuswasthattheseagreementshadlittlediscernableimpactonhumanrightsoutcomes.Now,weknowthattheireffectsareconditional.Idiscusssomerelevantfindingsonthenextpage.

Asecondreasonwhytheempiricalrecordhasbeensomixedisthatwithfurtherscrutiny,itisevidentthatforeachmechanism,therearemanycontingenciesandevencountervailingpressures.Domesticcourtshavecomplexdoctrinedetailingwhentreatiescanbeinvoked(Dunoffetal.2010).Hencetheymaychoose,orbeobligated,nottoorderotherdomesticactorstofollowinternationalrules.Thismayhelpexplainsomeofthemixedfindings.Therelationshipbetweenelectionsandcompliancedependscruciallyonwhatvoterswantandonwhocarriespoliticalleverageandinformationaladvantages(Dai2006).Indeed,democraticleadersmayfinditmoredifficulttostickbyinternationalpromisesifthosepromisesaredomesticallyunpopular(GartzkeandGleditsch2004).Rickard(2010)alsooffersinterestinginsight,lookingatdemocraciesandfindingthatthosewithmajoritarianelectoralrulesaremorelikelytoviolateGATT/WTOrestrictionsonnarrowtransfers.Althoughlegislative-executiverelationscanenhancethecredibilityofpromises,theycanalsofrustratecompliancebymakingpolicychangemoreonerous(Setear2002).ThisiswhycompliancewithnegativeWTOrulingsishardfortheUSwhenthematterrequiresCongressionalinvolvement,butmucheasierwhenthePresidentcanmakechangesunilaterally(Davey2006).ThisisalsowhyEUmember-stateswithmoredomesticveto-playerstakemuchlongertobringdomesticlegislationintocompliancewithEUlaw(Börzel,etal.2012).

Armedwithbetterdatathatgaugedifferentmechanisms,researchersarebeginningtounderstandbetterunderwhatconditionsdomesticpolitics/institutionscanaidincompliance.Somescholarstakea‘moreisbetter’stance–i.e.,thatratificationmatterswhendomesticinstitutionsaresufficientlyrobust.Forinstance,vonStein(2015)findsthatadherencetoachildlabortreatyleadstonotablechildlaborreductionswhencourtsaresufficientlyindependent,incountrieswithcompetitiveelections,andwhencivilsocietyprotectionsaresufficientlystrong.Lupu(2015)lookstotheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR),andarguesthatratificationgeneratespalpablecivilrightsimprovementswhentherearesufficientdomesticvetoplayerstoplaceconstraintsonwhatexecutivescando.Otherscholarsarguethatratificationmatters‘inthemiddle’–whendomesticinstitutionsarerobustenoughthatcitizenscanusetreatiestodefendthemselves,butnotsorobustthatratificationisredundant(Simmons2009).

Stillothersarguethatdomesticinstitutions/politicstuggovernmentsindifferentdirections.Independentjudiciaries,chargedwithupholdingconstitutionsandprotectingminorityrights,canenhancecompliancewiththeConventionAgainstTorture(CAT)bymakingitcostlierforleaderstoallow/engageintorture(Conradand

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HenckenRitter2013;Conrad2014;Conradetal.2015).Butanother‘democraticinstitution’–contestedelections–canhavetheoppositeimpact,incentivizingleaderstoabuseweaklyenfranchisedindividualswhoareviewedasthreatsto‘order’(Conradetal.2015).Theseconflictingincentivesaffectgovernmentdecisionsatvariousstages:when/whethertoratify,when/whethertotorture,andwhattypeoftorturetoengagein.

5. ComplianceasaProblemofCapacity/Management

Statesareundernolegalobligationtojointreaties;hencetheyareboundonlytotreatiestowhichtheyconsent.ThisisoneofthemostfundamentalprinciplesofIL.Theimplicationisthatgovernmentstypicallyonlytakeoninternationallegalobligationsthatareintheirinterest(ChayesandChayes1995).Thisidearesonateswellwiththe‘enforcement’lineofthinking,discussedabove.Here,however,iswherethedivergencesbegin,firstaboutthe‘baseline’ofstateincentives.Scholarswhoseenoncomplianceasaproblemofenforcementtypicallyassumethat,intheabsenceofconstraints,governmentswillcheat.ThestartingpointforscholarslikeChayesandChayes–sometimescalled‘managerialists’–isquitetheopposite:governmentshaveageneralpropensitytokeeptheirinternationalpromises.Indeed,thecarestatestakewhennegotiatingandenteringintoagreementsisevidencethattheyhaveastrongunderlyingsenseofobligationtocomply.Inacontextoflimitedresources,itisoftenmoreefficienttofollowanestablishedruleratherthanconstantlyrecalculatingthecostsandbenefitsof(non)compliance.

Fromthisperspective,breachesoftreatyobligationsarerarelywillfulandcalculatedacts(RaustialaandVictor1998).Instead,theyarelargelyinadvertent(Cole2015a),resultingfrominadequateplanning,agreementambiguities,capacitylimitations,and/orsignificantchangesovertime.Inthiscontext,itisnotdifficulttounderstandwhyscholarsinthistraditionareskepticalofmechanismsthatdriveupthecostsofnoncompliance.Punitivesanctionsaredifficulttomobilizeandthereforeonlypracticallyavailableinspecialcircumstances(Young1994;ChayesandChayes1995).Insupportofthisidea,ChayesandChayes(1995)notethatevenwhenviolationsareunambiguous,retaliationisrare.Evenwhensanctionsaremobilized,theyareofteninefficientandsometimesmakemattersworse(Young1994;ChayesandChayes1995).Reprisalcanbeparticularlyproblematicwhenviolationsresultfromcapacityproblems,fortheysimplyexacerbatetheconditionsthatledtononcompliance.

Fromthisviewpoint,thebetterpathtocomplianceliesinmoretransparentagreementdesign,disputeresolution,andtechnicalandfinancialassistance(ChayesandChayes1991,1995;Young1994;BrownWeissandJacobson1998).Insupportofthisconclusion,ChayesandChayes(1991)findthatagreementsrarelyprovideforformalpunitivesanctions.Moreover,whenagreementsdoincludedisputeresolutionprovisions,thesefocusmoreonnegotiationthanonwhattodowhencooperationbreaksdownentirely.Thetreatiestheexamineemphasizetechnologytransferandtechnicalassistance(theMontrealProtocolisagoodexample)andtypicallydonotconditiontheseoncompliance.

Mitchell’s(1994)studyofintentionaloilpollutionatseaoffersaninterestingcomparisonoftwoverydifferentcompliancesystems.Onerequiredtankerownerstoinstallexpensiveequipment.Theotherestablishedpollutionlimits.Thefirstsystem

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madeviolationsmoretransparentinavarietyofways,whichultimatelyledtomuchhighercomplianceratesthandidthesecondregime.Althoughmanagerialistshaveoftenbeencriticalofeffortstopunishnoncompliance,Mitchell(1994)emphasizesthatequipmentstandards,byimprovingtransparency,canmakemonitoringandsanctioningmoreefficient.Thisresonateswithenforcement-basedapproaches(AbbottandSnidal2000).

Oftheauthorsdiscussedhere,Haas(1989)reliesperhapsmostheavilyonmanagerialandnorm-drivenarguments.EpistemiccommunitiesofecologistsandmarinescientistsinvolvedintheMediterraneanActionPlanprovidedcrucialtechnicalexpertise,buttheywerefarmoreconcernedwithenablingpartiestofollowtherulesthantheywerewithdesigningstringentpunishmentmechanisms.Inaddition,thesegroupscontributedtotheregime’ssuccessbyhelpingtodefinethetermsofthedebateandbyarticulatingapersuasiveargumentabouttheneedtotakeaction.

Fewwouldquestionwhethercapacitymattersforcompliance.Thatsaid,itisprobablynocoincidencethatthisapproachgetsthemosttractioninareaswherescientificand/ortechnicalexpertisearecrucial,suchastheenvironment.Inotherrealms,itislessevidentthatcapacity/managementgiveusasmuchpurchase.Itisnothardtofindexampleswheregovernmentswillfullydecidetoflouttheirinternationallegalobligations,havingcarefullyconsideredthecostsandbenefits.(And–perhapsmoredifficultbecausethesearethe‘dogsthatdidn’tbark’–countriesregularlydebatetheprosandconsoffollowingrules,andcomply.)Intradeaffairs,theUS’s2002steeltariffsarebutoneexample.Inthehumanrightsarena,examplesabound:governmentsinmanypartsoftheworldoperateexpensive,intricate,repressiveapparatusesincontraventionoftheirinternationalhumanrightsobligations.Managementorexpertisecannotsolvewillfulnoncompliance.Changingtheleader’scost–benefitcalculus–whetherwithcarrotsorsticks–hasbeenfoundtoworkinsomecases(Hafner-Burton2005;Simmons2009;ConradandRitter2013).

Treatycompliancedebatesinitiallytendedtoviewenforcementandcapacity-basedexplanationsascompeting,andevenconflicting,mechanisms(ChayesandChayes1995;Downsetal.1996).Morerecently,scholarshavetakenamorepragmaticapproach,emphasizingthatenforcementandcapacitycanaffectcompliancesimultaneously;theymayinfactbemutuallyreinforcing(Tallberg2002;Urpelainen2010;Thompson2012).TheEU’scompliancesystem,forinstance,reliesonmechanismsthatimprovecapacityandonmechanismsthatdetectand,whennecessary,‘punish’violations(Montoya2008;Börzeletal.2012).Eveninthehumanrightsarena–arealminwhichnoncomplianceoftenresultsfromwillfuldisobediencebyactorswhochoosetobreakinternationalrules(Hafner-Burton2005)–severalrecentstudiesshowthatcompliancefailuresalsoresultfrombasicstructuralchallengessuchaslimitedbureaucratic/financialcapacitytotranslatetreatycommitmentsintopractice(Sanchez2009;Cole2015a,2015b;vonStein2015).Cole(2015a),forinstance,findsthatbureaucraticallystrongstatesaresignificantlybetterabletoimplementtheircivilandpoliticalrightsdutiesasdelineatedintheICCPR.InotherworkontheICESCR(2015b),hefindsthatratificationhasitsstrongestimpactsindevelopedcountries,whichheargueshavethestrongestcapacitytoimplementthosetreatyobligations.

Anothercritiqueofthecapacity/managementapproachtotreatycompliancecomesfromDownsetal.(1996),whoarguethatthereareseriousinferenceproblems.

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Capacity/management-focusedscholarsviewtherelativelygoodcomplianceandtherarityofpenalizinginstitutionsasgoodnewsforcooperation.Downsetal.(1996)arguethattheseobservationsinsteadindicatethatstatesareavoidingdeepcooperationbecausetheycannotdevelopthepunishmentmechanismsnecessarytosustainit.Themanagerialschool’sfindingsmaysimplytellusthatstatesareonlycommittingtoagreementsthatrequireminordeparturesfromwhattheywouldhavedoneintheabsenceofanagreement.Ireturntothisquestionlaterinthechapter.

6. ComplianceasaFunctionofIdentity,SocialContext,andLegitimacy

Scholarswhoemphasizeenforcementorcapacity/managementasdriversof(non)compliancerelychieflyoninstrumentalist,cost-benefit,logics.Thisisnottheonlywaytoapproachcompliance.Otherscholarsarguethatthisprovidesamyopicviewofgovernmentdecision-making.Leadersarealsoaffectedbytheiridentity(ies)andsocialcontext,aswellastheirperceptionsofagreements’legitimacy.Theseaffectcomplianceincomplexways,oftenoverlookedbystrictcost-benefitapproaches.

A. IdentityandSocialContext

Constructivistsemphasizethecomplexwaysinwhichnormsandidentityreshapeand/orcarrygreaterweightthandocost-benefitconsiderations(Jeppersonetal.1996;Koh1997).Akeyconcepthereisinternalization:thepointatwhichanormissodeeplyingrainedthatithasa‘takenforgranted’character(FinnemoreandSikkink1998).Thisistheendstageofmanyaccounts,butthemechanismsthatmotivatethisprocessaremany.Somearedubiousofthiscausalwayoflookingatthings(KratochwilandRuggie1966).Ireturntothisquestionlater.

Koh(1997,1998)emphasizestransnationallegalprocesses.Thistypicallystartswithaninternationalactor,A,incitinganinteractionwithanotheractor,B,inaninternationallegalforum.Thisforcesaninterpretationoftheglobalnorm(whichmayormaynotbecodifiedinaninternationalagreement)thatstructuresthesituation.Importantly,thetransactioncreates(oractivates,iftherulealreadyexists)alegalrulethatguidessubsequentrelationsbetweenAandB.Overtime,thisprocessreshapesB’sinterestandidentities,leadingittointernalizethenormsindomesticlaw,policy,andsocialpractice.Atthispoint,B‘obeys’thelaw–anactthatcarriesgreatersignificancethancompliancebecauseitresultsfromB’ssenseofobligation(Koh1997,1998).

ConstructivistIRscholarsoftenfocusonsocialization,aprocessbywhichbeliefsaboutrightandwrongbecomenorms(FinnemoreandSikkink1998),whichinturnreshapeinterests,identities,andbehavior(RisseandSikkink1999).(Isetasidethequestionofhowprincipledbeliefsbecomenorms,asitdoesnotpertaindirectlytocomplianceandinternalization).Theculminationisinternalizationofthenorm,buthowdostatesgetthere?Scholarsfocusonthreecoremechanisms:materialinducement,persuasion,andsocialization(Koh2005).Idiscussedthefirstoftheseearlier.Iexplorethelattertwoprocessesbelow.

Persuasionisaboutchangingmindsandattitudesintheabsenceofovertcoercion(Johnston2001:496).Pro-compliancegroupsenhancetheirpersuasiveappealbyframingissuessotheyresonatewithacceptednormsand/orarousestrongfeelings(KeckandSikkink1998).Argumentationisimportant.Forinstance,Finnemoreand

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Sikkink(1998)andRisseandSikkink(1999,2013)notethatgovernmentsoftenratifyHRAsevenwhentheydonotgenuinelyintendtocomply.Butoncetacticalconcessionssuchastheseareinplace,the‘logicofarguing’takesover.Governmentsmakeargumentativeconcessionsandofferjustifications.Domesticoppositiongroupsandotheradvocacynetworkstaketheseseriouslyandattemptanearnestdialogueabouthowtocurtailabuses.Continueddialogueandinstitutionalreformoftenleadtocomplianceand,eventually,norminternalization.Thomas(2001),forinstance,arguesthatEasternbloccountriesratifiedtheHelsinkiFinalActbecausetheywantedtogainlegitimacy,expectingthattheywouldneverhavetomakegoodonthosepromises.Butratificationhadunintendedconsequences.Therepeatedappealsto,andmobilizationaround,thesenormsarecreditedwithhelpingtoundermineSovietrule,therebypavingthepathfordemocratictransition.

Successfulpersuasionresultsincomplianceandinternalization.Successfulsocialinfluence,incontrast,oftenresultsincompliancewithoutinternalization(Johnston2001).Whymightgovernmentsconformtorulespubliclyeventhoughtheydonot(necessarily)accepttheirdesirabilityprivately?Governmentscare(tovaryingdegrees)abouttheperceptionsoftheircitizens,advocacynetworks,andotherstates.Here,FinnemoreandSikkink(1998)emphasizethreemotivations.First,governmentswanttolooklegitimateintheeyesofpeers,whichalsoaffectstheirdomesticlegitimacy.Second,governmentstypicallywantto‘belong’tosomedesirablereferencegroup.Finally,leaderswanttomaximizenational(andpersonal)esteem;theywantotherstolikethem,andtheywanttofeelgoodaboutthemselves.Thethreatofsocialpunishments–exclusion,shaming,dissonancefromtakingactionsinconsistentwithaparticularidentity–alsolooms(Johnston2001).Internationalconferencesplayaroleintheseprocessesbyimpartingnewinformationanddiffusingnewnorms.

‘Acculturation’–adoptingthebehaviorsofareferencegroup–isonemechanismofsocialinfluence(GoodmanandJinks2004,2008,2013).Ascomparedtotheliteratureinthepreviousparagraph,acculturationplacessomewhatgreateremphasisonthedisconnectthatcanemergebetweenpracticesandbeliefs.Inanacculturationmodel,themimickingstatemaynotviewthereferencegroup’sruleaslegitimate.Rather,itsimplyneedsto(1)carehowitisperceived;and(2)understandthatthereferencegroupvaluestherule.Hence,itisthesocialstructure–ratherthanrulecontent–thatdrivescompliance.ThisresonateswiththeWorldSocietyliteratureon‘decoupling,’whichnotesthattheactoftreatyratificationisoftendivorcedfromtherelevantpractice(Hafner-BurtonandTsutsui2005,2007).However,GoodmanandJinks(2013)emphasizethatdecouplingisnotalwaysabadthing;itfact,theyargue,itcansometimesfacilitatecompliance,byopeningupdomesticpoliticalopportunities,exposinghypocrisymoreclearlytoforeignanddomesticaudiences,andcreatingopportunitiesforstatestolearn(GoodmanandJinks2005,2013).

Criticsoftheliteratureonidentityandsocialpressureraiseseveralobjections.Someoftheliteraturediscussedabovemapsattributesofindividuals–discomfort,esteem,adesiretoconform–ontogovernments,whichisanuncomfortablefit.Statesdonothavefeelings.Leadersdo,butthisbegsmorequestions.Howcanweknowwhatleadersfeel?Howdoleaders’feelingstranslateintopolicy?Moreover,muchofthisliteraturefocuseson‘successful’cases.Weknowlessaboutpartiallysuccessfulorunsuccessfuloutcomes,althoughthisischanging(C.f.Carpenter2007;andseveralchaptersinRisseetal.2013).Finally,althoughmuchofthisresearchhasmadegreatereffortstospecifyunderwhat

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conditionsnormsandidentitymatter,itisstillchallengingtovalidateempirically(Keohane1997).Themovetowardindividual-levelanalysisinrecentquantitativeassessmentsoftreatycompliance,discussedlaterinthisarticle,hasgivenussometractiononsomeofthesequestions,whileleavingothersunanswered.

B. LegitimacyandFairness

Othersarguethatlegitimacyandfairnessarekeytounderstandingcompliance.ForFranck(1990),aruleislegitimatewhentheindividualsitaddressesbelieveithascomeintoexistenceandisappliedwithrightprocess.Thiscomprisesfourelements.First,thelawclearlycommunicateswhichbehaviorsarepermittedandwhicharenot.Second,therulecommunicatesauthorityviasymbolicritualsorotherformalities.Third,thelawrelatestootherrulesinthesysteminaprincipledmanner;likecasesreceivethesametreatment.Fourth,theruleisnotmadeinanadhocfashion,butratherthroughproceduresthatanorganizedcommunityaccepts(Franck1990).Whenalawfulfillsthesecriteria,itexertsa‘compliancepull’independentofthematerialconditionsthataffectstatepractice.

Criticschargethatinholdinglegitimacy,ratherthanjustice,asthechiefgoal,Franck(1990)favorsproceduralregularityandadherencetoruleseveniftheyareimmoralorunjust(Tesón1992).Franck’s(1995)subsequentworkisinpartanefforttoaddressthisquestion(Koh1997).Arule’sfairness,heargues,dependsontwoelements.First,thesubstantivecomponent:aruleisfairifitmeetsparties’expectationsofjustifiablecostsandbenefits.Second,theproceduralcomponent:legitimacy(asdefinedabove)isanimportantelementoffairness,althoughitaloneisinsufficient.Theseelementsareoftenintension,but“fairnessistherubricunderwhichthistensionisdiscursivelymanaged”(Franck1995:7).Here,Franckemphasizesdiscourse,reasoning,andrenegotiation–practicesthatarereminiscentofthoseintheconstructivistresearchdiscussedearlier.However,Franckplacesgreateremphasisonprocessthanonpersuasion:theback-and-forthinvolvedindiscussionanddebateleadsustofairerrulesanddecisions,whichinturnelicitbettercompliance.

Theseargumentsaboutlegitimacyandfairness,andtheirrelationtocompliance,leaveseveralquestionsopen.Legitimacyisdifficulttogaugeindependentlyofthecomplianceitismeanttoexplain(Bodansky2013).Arule’s‘compliancepull’isitsindexoflegitimacy(Franck1990),butlegitimacyalsoexplains‘compliancepull,’makingthereasoningcircular(Keohane1997).Moreover,therearequestionsaboutwhyandhowthediscursiveprocessthatunderliesthefairnessmechanismmakesrulesmoreobligatory(Koh1997).Moreover,Franck’sargumentsbegthequestion:iflegitimacyandfairnessleadtocompliance,whydogovernmentsnotalwayscreate‘legitimate’and‘fair’agreements?

Empiricaltestingofargumentsaboutlegitimacyandfairnesshasprovendifficultinthepast.However,scholarshavemadesomeprogressonthisquestioninrecentyears,thankstorecentdevelopmentsinvolvingsurveyexperiments.Inarecentsurvey,BechtelandScheve(2013)findthatrespondentsaresignificantlymoresupportiveofa‘polluterpays’agreementascomparedtooneinwhichonlyrichcountriespayforemissionsreductions.Theirinterpretationisthattheformerarrangementisfairer.Iffutureresearch,itwouldbeinterestingtoexplorethisquestionfurther,focusingmore

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specificallyoncompliance(ratherthaninstitutionaldesign,BechtelandScheve’semphasis),perhapsacrossvariousissue-areas.

7. AdditionalQuestions:SomeOld,SomeNew

A. DefinitionsofCompliance

Followingmuchoftheliterature,Ihaveusedaparticulardefinitionofcompliance:conformitytorules.Thisapproachfacesatleasttwocriticisms.OnecomesfromKingsbury(1998),whoarguesthattheconceptofcompliancedependsonone’stheoryoflaw.Mydefinitionisappropriateifweperceivelawasrulesintendedtoregulatebehavior.Butifwehaveaprocess-basedtheory,whichseeslawassomethingthatcreatesandshapesidentitiesandsocialrelations,thisdefinitiondoesnotwork.Attitudinalalignmentbecomesacoreconcern.Fromthisperspective,wecannotcomprehendhowILworkswithoutunderstandinghowitmoldsidentities(BrunéeandToope2010).Instead,weshouldbeexploringwhatreallymakesIL‘matter’:intentandinternalmotivation(HowseandTeitel2010).Becauserulesarebothregulativeandconstitutive,itisimpossibletoseparatethemfrombehaviorortomakecausalstatementsaboutthetwo(KratochwilandRuggie1986).SeealsoAgon2016foradiscussionofhowinstitutionalgoals,includingcomplianceobjectives,shiftovertimeanddependonthediscursivepracticesofinvolvedactors.

Asecondcritiquesuggeststhatafocusoncomplianceisitselfmisguided.Infixatingtheirattentiononconformitytorules,scholarshavemistakenlyascribedstatebehaviortoinstitutionalparticipation.Theyhavealsounderestimatedtheimpactofinstitutionsonstatesthat,despitemakingimprovements,arenotcompliant.Instead,weshouldbeinterestedineffectiveness(theextenttowhichatreatysolvestheproblemthatledtoitsformation)andimplementation(effortstoadministerpolicydirectives)(Young1994;BrownWeissandJacobson1998;Martin2013).Thiscritiquehastwomainimplications.First,weneedtothinkinamoreconsideredfashionaboutcounterfactuals,whichalsoinvolvescarefulinvestigationofwhatthetreatyisintendedtoaccomplish.Second,scholarsrelyingonquantitativemethodsneedtothinkmorethoroughlyabouttheirdependentvariable.

Theseareimportantpoints,buttheproblemmaynotbeasgraveasMartin(2013)suggests.Onthetheoreticalside,muchoftheliterature,whileusingthelanguageofcompliance,isinterestedineffects.Thisislargelyaproblemofvocabularyratherthantheory.Ontheempiricalside,weshouldcertainlyconsideralternatewaysofmeasuringtheoutcomeofinterest.Considerahypotheticaltreatyrequiringequalrepresentationofwomeninlegislatures.Astandardapproachwouldsimplymeasurethepercentageofparliamentarianswhoarewomen.Butthatisnottheonlywaytoevaluatetreatyeffects.Onemightarguethatsuchanapproachmissesimportantimprovementsincountrieswithhistoricallylowwomen’srepresentation.Accordingly,onemightinsteadmeasurechange,inrelationtosomebaseyearorthepreviousyear.Alternatively,onemightfocusonlegislationintendedtoimprovewomen’srepresentationinparliament.Alloftheaboveareviablemeasurements.Importantly,theyallcomebacktothebasicquestionofconformitytorules.Compliance,farfrombeingorthogonaltounderstandingcausaleffects,isanimportantcomponentofmeasureswemightdevelop.

B. EndogeneityandSelection

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Asdiscussedabove,scholarslikeDownsetal.(1996)arguethatcompliancedoesnot,byitself,demonstratethatILimposesmeaningfulrestraintsongovernmentpractice.Statesmaysimplybecreatingandjoiningagreementsthatrequireminordeparturesfromwhattheywouldhavedoneintheabsenceofanagreement.ThishasimportantimplicationsforhowwestudyIL’simpactonstatebehavior.Anytheoryofcompliancemustrecognizethatinstitutionaldesign,and/orthedecisiontoratify,isatleastinpartendogenous:statesareonlylikelytoinvesttimeandresourcesinagreementswithwhichtheyhavesomeinterestincomplying.Answeringthe‘whydostatescomply?’questionrequiresthatwealsounderstandwhystatesjoininthefirstplace(Downsetal1996;vonStein2005).

Mostscholarsnowagreewiththeabovepointsandrecognizetheneedformoresophisticatedstatisticalmodelingthatcontrolsforendogeneity/selectioneffects.Here,however,thereissignificantdisagreement.SomestudiesrelyonHeckman-styleapproaches(vonStein2005;MitchellandHensel2007;ConradandRitter2013).Othersemployinstrumentalvariable(s)(Simmons2009;Cole2015a,2015b;vonStein2015)orbivariateprobitmodeling(PowellandStaton2009;Conrad2014).Stillothersusematchingtechniques(SimmonsandHopkins2005;Hill2010;SpilkeandBöhmelt2013),sometimescombinedwithothermethods(Lupu2013,2015;Fariss2015).Ideally,theorywouldtelluswhichstatisticalapproachismostappropriate,analysisofthedatawouldprovideclues,andresultswouldnotvarysubstantiallydependingonthetechniqueemployed.Thisseemstobetheexceptionratherthantherule.

Therearemanycritiquesandquestionstoraisehere.OneimportantquestionforscholarslikeDownsetal.(1996)isthis:iftreatiessimplyembodyoutcomesinwhichstateswerealreadygoingtoengage,whyevenbothertocreateorratifytreaties?Imaginingforamomentthatthisextremeversionistrueforallstatesallthetime,treatiesstillfulfillimportantpurposes.Simplyhavingacleardefinitionofwhatconstitutes(non)compliancecanbeuseful(Morrow2002;2014).Thisisparticularlytrueinhighlytechnicalareas,wheremuchofthebattleliesinarticulatingacommonstandardandensuringthatallpartiesunderstandit(Urpelainen2010).Moreover,treatiescanserveanimportant‘screening’function,separatingstatesthatarewillingtoupholdthestandardfromthosethatarenot(Morrow2002).Asgametheoristshavelongunderstood,screeningcanrelyonexanteand/orexpostcosts.Theideabehindscreeningviaexantecostsisstraightforward.Iftheprocessofbeingapartyisonerous,orifmembershipisonlyavailabletostatesthathaveconvincinglydemonstratedtheirabilitytomeettheagreement’sterms,thenratificationisusefulbecauseitconveysinformationabout‘type’tootheractors(domesticgroups,markets,otherstates…).TheEU’sstringentaccessionprocessreliesinpartonsuchamechanism,combinedwithmanagerial-typemechanismssuchaspre-accessionassistance(Tallberg2002).

Ofcourse,toarguethattheendogenousnatureoftreatyratificationisaproblemforinferenceisnotthesameassayingthattreatiesnevermatter.Governmentstypicallyfacemultipleincentiveswhentheyconsiderjoininganinternationalagreement:ontheonehandtheymightbeconcernedabouttheirabilitytocomply,butontheotherhandtheymightfacestrongdomesticorpeerpressuretoratify(WotipkaandTsutsui2008).Hence,evenundercompleteinformation,governmentsmightfindthemselvespartiestotreatiesthatarechallengingtocomplywith(vonStein2015).Nordoesthecompleteinformationscenarioalwayshold.Indeed,governmentsare,toatleastsomedegree,behindaveilofignorancewhentheynegotiateandratifytreaties(Keohane1997).

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Governmentscanhedgeagainsttheseuncertaintiesviaescapeclausesandotherflexibilityprovisions(KucikandReinhardt2008;Helfer2012),butnotalltreatiescontaintheseprovisions.

Ifgovernmentsratifyandconditionsthenchange,makingcompliancemoredifficult,howdotheybehave?(Ofcourse,clausularebussicstantibuswasdesignedforsituationsinwhichconditionschangeandmakecompliancedifficult.Asdiscussedearlier,thisclausecanonlybereasonablyinvokedinlimitedcircumstances).Surprisingly,therehasbeenlittlesystematicinquiryspecificallyintothisquestion.OneexceptionisGriecoetal.(2009),whoexplorewhathappenswhenapoliticalpartywithanti-compliancepreferences‘inherits’atreatyratifiedbyapro-compliancegovernment.TheyfindthatpartisanshiftstotheleftleadtomorecurrentaccountrestrictionsandhencenoncompliancewithArticleVIIIoftheIMFTreaty.Nonetheless,beinglegallycommitteddoesappeartoimposesomeconstraint:facedwithashifttotheleft,signatoriesengageinfewerrestrictionsthandononsignatories.Similarly,vonStein(2015)positsthatcertainHRAscanbeexpectedtohavetheirstrongesteffectsincountriesthatratifyasnon-democraciesbutlatertransitiontodemocracy.

BacciniandUrpelainen(2014)makeaninterestingcorollarypoint,whichisthattreatiesmaystill‘matter’evenifweobservenodifferencebetweenpre-andpost-ratificationbehavior.Thereasonissimple:governmentsoftenbeginbringingpoliciesintoconformitywithrulesinthepost-negotiationphase,inthelead-uptoratification.‘Phase-ins’areusefulforreassuringcooperationpartners,anditisofteneasiertoadjustpoliciesincrementallyratherthanallatonceonthedayofratification.Insupportofthisargument,theyfindthatdevelopingcountriesbringtheirenvironmentalpracticesintocomplianceinthelead-uptoratificationofpreferentialtradeagreements.Thisisanimportantfinding,butitisunclearhowbroadlyitapplies.Foragreementsthatdonotinvolveexplicitissue-linkageortheneedtoreassurecooperationpartners,theoutcomesmightlookdifferent.

Awareoftheproblemsofselectionandendogeneitythatoftenplagueobservationaldata,severalscholarsarenowusingsurveyexperimentstogaugetheimpactofinternationallaw(ChiltonandTingley2013).Whilethisareaofresearchisstillbudding,wecanstillmakeafewobservationsaboutit.First,thesestudiesarevirtuallyunanimousinfindingthatinternationallaw‘matters.’Respondentsaresignificantlymorewillingtoopposeabehaviorifitviolatesinternationallaw,beittorturingcitizens(Wallace2013),emittinggreenhousegases(TomzandTingley2014),erectingtradebarriers(Tomz2008;Chaudoin2014),engagingindeadlybombingcampaigns(Chilton2015),orinterveninginmilitaryconflicts(TomzandWeeks2015).Second,theeffectofpoliticalideologyismixed.Forinstance,Wallace(2013)examinessupportfortheuseoftorture,andfindsthatILhasitsstrongestimpactonmoderatesandliberals,andpossiblynoeffectonheavyconservatives.Incontrast,Chilton(2015)exploressupportforbombingcampaignsthatcauseexcessiveciviliancasualties,andfindsthatILhasmuchlargerimpactsonRepublicansthanonDemocrats.Tomz(2008)looksatsupportforseveringtradewithBurma/Myanmar,andfindsthatDemocratsandRepublicansalikearesensitivetointernationallegalarguments.

Third,institutionaldesignhasmixedimpactsoncompliancepreferences.Acoredebateintheliteratureiswhetherbindinglaw(e.g.,aratifiedagreement)ismorepowerfulthannon-bindinglaw(e.g.,adeclaration).Hafner-Burtonetal.(2016)surveyNGO

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professionalsintheenvironmentalandhumanrightsarenas.Acrosstheboard,thesegroupsbelievethatinternationalagreementsareusefulforinducinggovernmentstocomply.However,thetwogroupsdivergeonthequestionoflegalform.Humanrightsactivistsviewbindingandnon-bindinglawasequallyuseful.Incontrast,environmentalistspreferbindingaccords.Wallace(2013)surveysasampleofthegeneralpopulationandfindsnoevidencethatrespondents’willingnesstocondonetheuseoftorturedependsontheanti-tortureconvention’sdegreeofbindingness.Interestingly,respondentsaremuchlesssupportiveoftheuseoftortureiftheagreementwasverypreciseand/ordelegatedauthoritytoaninternationalinstitution.

Finally,internationallawcompeteswithotherfactorsthatdrivecompliance.Themostobviousoftheseisinterests.Tomz’s(2008)respondents,forexample,weremuchmorewillingtobreakinternationallawbyseveringtradewithiftoldthatsuchanactionwouldhelptheUSeconomy.Similarly,TomzandWeeks’s(2015)respondentsweresubstantiallylesssupportiveofinterventiononbehalfofanallyinhigh-costsituations.Interestingly,moralityisalsoanimportantengineofcomplianceinIR/ILsurveyexperiments.TomzandWeeks(2015:12)reportthatrespondents’senseofmoralobligationhasthestrongestimpactonwillingnesstoabidebyalliancecommitments–evenstrongerthanreputation.Hafner-Burtonetal.’s(2015)findingthatelitesarewaryofmakingfalsepromiseseveniftheyareunenforceableopensupthepossibilitythatleadersareconcernedaboutthemoralimplicationsofreneging,althougha‘shadowofthefuture’explanationisalsopossible.

C. Quantification

Empirically,weknowagreatdealmoreaboutcompliancethanwedidjustadecadeorsoago.Throughoutthisprocess,researchershavemadechoicesaboutwhichquestionsandresearchtoolstoprivilege.Oneexampleofthisisthe‘quantification’ofthestudyofIL,atrendthatisevidentthroughoutthisarticle.Thismovehasbeenbeneficialinavarietyofways.Theabilitytocomparecountriesovertimehasmadeitpossibletomovebeyondtheidiosyncrasiesofaparticularcountryortime-periodtomakegeneralizableassessmentsofhowILworks.Insomecases,datahaveallowedcomparisonsacrossagreementsandissueareas,ataskthatisdifficultinacasestudy.Cutting-edgestatisticaltechniqueshavemadeitpossibletograpplewithchallengingquestionsofendogeneity.Therecentinjectionofsurveyexperimentsintoourtoolkithasenabledscholarstosidesteptheendogeneityproblem,bringingfreshinsightintohowinternationallawworks.

Atthesametime,thequantificationofthestudyofILhasitsperils.Wegaintheabilitytomakegeneralstatements,butlosetherichnessofunderstandingonegetsfromhoninginononecountryorafewcases.Existingmeasuresareoftenunabletodistinguishbetweendifferentmechanisms.Afinaldrawbackofquantitativeresearchisthatdebatesometimescomestofocusonmethodratherthansubstance.Tosomeextent,thisisunderstandable:masteryofthemethodsometimesrequiressophisticatedtechnicaldebate.Nonetheless,itbecomesproblematiciftheresultisadecouplingofmethodologicalandsubstantivediscussions,orifscholarswhousedifferentmethodologiesstoptalkingtoeachother–and/ortothepolicycommunity.

Insightfromqualitativeresearchbreatheslifeintoregressiontables;italsohelpsusto(better)naildowncausalmechanisms.Quantitatively-orientedscholarsdonot

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necessarilyneedtoconductin-depthcasestudiesorfieldresearchoftheirown,althoughtheymightfindthatsuchanapproachgivesthemaricherandmorerealisticunderstandingofhowinternationalworksinpractice.Conversely,scholarswhoemploycasestudiesandsimilarapproachesdonotnecessarilyneedtostartcollectinglargedatasets,buttheydoneedtoconsiderhowthecasesand/oroutcomesonwhichtheyfocusaffecttheirinferences(Geddes1990).Dialogacrossfields(politicalscience,IL,sociology,andsoon)andmethodologicalapproachescanonlyhelptoimprovethequalityoftreatycomplianceresearch.

8. Conclusion

ILisrarelyenforcedthroughinternationalcourts,backedbythethreatofinterventionbyastandingpoliceorarmy.Thisdoesnotmeanthatstatesconstantlybreaktheirinternationallegalpromises.Indeed,thisarticlehasshownthatvariousmechanisms–theproverbialcarrotsandsticks;technicalandfinancialassistance;tyinggoodbehaviortoaparticularidentity–can,dependingonone’sperspective,helptoensurethatstateskeeptheirinternationalpromisesmuchofthetime.Thisdoesnotmeanthatstatesalwaysabidebythetreatiestheysign/ratify.Indeed,akeyfindingtoemergefromthisoverviewisthatitisnotthecasethatalmostallstatesrespecttheirobligationsalmostallthetime(Henkin1979:47).

Recentresearchhastakenusalongwaytowardunderstandingbetterunderwhatconditionsgovernmentskeepthesepromises,buttherearemanyoutstandingquestions.Onepertainstotheuseofsurveyexperiments,whichhavebreathednewlifeintotreatycompliancedebates.Surveys,itiswellknown,haveexternalvalidityproblems(Hyde2015).Howmuchcanweinferfromthemaboutinternationallegalpracticeinthe‘realworld?’Researchersusingthistoolneedtodoasmuchastheycantoreplicatethat‘realworld,’inwhichleaders,activists,andordinarycitizensgrapplewithtradeoffs,uncertainty,limitationsoncognitivecapacity,andemotions.

Anotherquestionregardsthecomplianceliterature’sheavyfocusonwrittenagreements.Lessformalinstitutions,especiallycustomaryinternationallaw,havereceivedlimitedattentionintheIRliterature.FormanyIRscholars,unwrittenlawderivedthroughpracticefeelsslippery.Butcustomaryinternationallawmatterstolegalpractitionersandscholars.Arewemissingimportantelementsofthecompliancepuzzlebyfocusingonwrittenagreements?Theanswerstotheseandotherquestionswillhelpshapetheoreticalandempiricalapproachestocompliancewellintothefuture.

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Abstract:Ifthereisauthorityhigherthanthestate,whydogovernmentseverabidebythepactstheymakewitheachother?Forsome,theanswerissimple:statesonlyrespectagreementsthatfulfilltheirimmediateinterests.Othersaremorenuanced.Onegroupofscholarsviewscomplianceasaproblemofenforcement,arguingthatinternationalinducements,reciprocity,reputationalconcerns,and/ordomesticpolitics/institutionsregularlyhelpsustaincompliance.Othersdrawourattentiontocapacityormanagementproblemsasdriversofnoncompliance.Fromthisperspective,governmentsabidebytheircommitmentsthroughtheprovisionoftransparentagreements,technicalandfinancialassistance,andsoliddisputeresolution.Seenfromthisangle,mechanismsthat‘punish’noncompliance,forinstancebysuspendinginternationalinducementslikeforeignaid,infacttendtomakemattersworse.Finally,somescholarsperceivecompliancethroughthelensofsocialcontext,identity,and/orlegitimacy.Governmentskeeptheirpromisesbecausetheycarehowothersperceivethem,internalizenorms,and/orviewagreementsasvalidandfair.Thisarticleprovidesanoverviewofthesearguments,withastrongemphasisonrecentdevelopmentsininternationallawandinternationalrelations.SEEALSO:ForeignPolicyAnalysisandRationalChoiceModels;FormalInternationalInstitutionsandtheRegulationofFlowsofGoodsandServices;HumanRights:EffectivenessofInternationalandRegionalMechanisms;IdentityinInternationalRelations;TheInteractionofTheoryandData;InternalizationofInternationalLaw;InternationalEnvironmentalLaw;InternationalRelationsandComparativePolitics;TreatyLaw:NewTrends;TransnationalHumanRightsNetworks:SignificanceandChallenges


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