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Comprehend the Challenger accident
Comprehend the Columbia accident
The Space Shuttle Program:Challenger and Columbia Accidents
Lesson OverviewThe Challenger accidentThe Columbia accident
The Challenger AccidentOn 28 January 1986 the space
shuttle Challenger blew upAll seven crew members
perished The Rogers Commission released
its report on 6 June 1986 The failure of the joint between
the two lower parts of the right solid-fuel rocket caused the accident
How Weather’s Effect on the Solid Rocket Boosters Caused the Accident
An O-ring is made of a resilient material - one capable of bouncing back to its original shape after being compressed
O-ring material wasn’t resilient at low temperatures
As scientists prepared Challenger, the temperature hovered around the freezing mark: 32 degrees F
How NASA Management Contributed to the Accident Rogers Commission found
failures in communication Conflict between engineering
data and management judgments
Management structure allowed flight-safety questions to bypass key shuttle managers
Changes NASA Made to Reduce the Possibility of Another Accident NASA redesigned the solid rocket
booster: O-rings were replaced NASA reorganized the management
structure; also strengthened its support for safety staff
Ordered improved communication among managers
Strengthened the flight readiness review
Committed to “criticality review and hazard analysis”
Developed new systems to allow astronauts to escape in the case of another faulty liftoff; improved the orbiter’s landing systems
Columbia AccidentOn 1 February 2003 Columbia broke up
on reentry into Earth’s atmosphereAll seven of the crew perishedPhysical cause of the Columbia disaster
was a breach in the thermal protection system
A chunk of insulating foam from the pressurized fuel cell hit and structurally damaged the reinforced carbon wing leading edge
The damage to the wing ultimately melted the wing’s thin aluminum spar – or structured support
How Damage to the Thermal Protection System
Caused the Accident Many times chunks of insulating
foam broke off at launch and dinged the thermal protection system
NASA had observed it so many times on orbiters that did return safely, they didn’t consider it a serious problem
How NASA Management Contributed to the Accident CAIB faulted NASA for its overly
ambitious flight schedule Too many people had responsibility
for both sticking to the flight schedule and maintaining safety
CAIB also touched on NASA’s organizational culture - the values, norms, and shared experiences of an organization
Changes NASA Made to Reduce the Possibility of Another Accident Efforts to reduce “foam
shedding” and strengthen the orbiter’s heat shield
Improved inspection routines before launches
Improved imaging of the shuttle, both at launch and during orbit
Establishment of a Technical Engineering Authority
Marking Period 3 ProjectAs you plan your concept of
operations this marking period consider:Design safetyTesting regimen and processContingency Plans: “What if it
does not go as planned”Communications and Control:
“Who is doing what?”
Comprehend the Challenger accident
Comprehend the Columbia accident
The Space Shuttle Program:Challenger and Columbia Accidents