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8/11/2019 Concept of Other in Anthropology
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The 'Other' in Anthropology and PhilosophyAuthor(s): Sundar SarukkaiSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 24 (Jun. 14-20, 1997), pp. 1406-1409Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4405512.
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h e O t h e r
n
nthropology a n d
hilosophy
Sundar Sarukkai
The totion of the 'other' has become very
prevalent in social sciences. Here the 'other' is examined as it occurs
in
anthropology
and
philosophy,
primarily
through Levinas and Derrida. Based on this, a radical
revision of
anthropological knowledge,
'ethicall)
'oriented and
incorporating
subjectivity
as
an
essential element,
is
suggested.
Finall), it is argued that within such a frameworkfiction has to be considered as a valid ethnographic data.
M N SRINIVAS makes a few provocative
and timely comments n his recentarticleon
Indian
anthropology Srinivas 1996].
Two
important bservationshave to do with
the
notion
of
self-in-the-other nd he suggestion
that ndian
nthropologists
houldnow move
to the studyof the self fromself-in-the-other.
Unfortunately,
he has not
developed
these
concepts in
more detail.
The
thematisation
of the other
and the self is of fundamental
importancend s primarilynformed hrough
philosophyandpsychology. The aim of this
paper
s to
explicate the natureof
the other
and the self as
they occur
in
anthropology
and
philosophy,
hus
addressing he
nherent
tensions
in
ethnography.
After
a
brief introduction o
the way
the
other is
understood
in
anthropology,
the
more
philosophical approaches through
Levinas
and Derrida are
explained.
The
importanceof
cknowledging he
Levinasian
other
in
anthropological discourse
is
underlined.
This
demands of
ethnography
an
'ethical responsibility' owards
he
other
which will go beyond objectifying he other.
Srinivas' remarkson self-in-the-otherand
on
the
relevance
of
autobiography
as
ethnographys discussed nconnectionwith
this other.
Finally, it
is
argued that the
perpetual
absence of the other
which
manifests
itself
only
in
terms
of
its
traces
gives
a
valid reason to look towards
fiction
as a legitimate tool for
anthropological
studies.
The
Anthropological
'Other'
Jacob Pandian n his clear
exposition
on
anthropology
and the
other, suggests
that
the 'Judeo-Christian
ymbol(s) of divinity
and the Christianconceptionof the human
self'
[Pandian
1985:5],underliesthemodem
anthropological
iscourse.The construction
of
the
other was with
'characteristics
which
are
alien
to
the
western
tradition'
[Pandian
1985:6].
Modern
anthropology
arose when
it began to contrastand alienate he cultures
which were different from the
west,
and in
fact the
uniqueness
of
anthropology
itself
'stems from the use of
the
human other'.
The
primnary
ole
of
anthropology
thus
was a
process
of
'inventing
he
human
other'
in order
o
develop
a
theory
of
humankind.
This
anthropological other is basically
epistemological.
It is based on the notion
of
perceiveddifferences and is a
cognitive
process nvolving observation, ollection
of
dataandtheorising.Thus, there s a
plethora
of
human others which appear
in
anthropology.
Pandian lists some of the
dominantothers
used n thisdiscoursewhich
includesthe
fossil other,savage
other.
black
other and the ethnographicother.
In the
discourse
on
progress,development
and
rationality which had
become
characteristic f the west as described
by
themselves.the search for
the
basic human
condition gave rise to the fossil other. The
non-western people were seen to
embody
what the primeval west was before
its
'progress' and thus were seen as 'living
fossils'. The
historicalgrowthof
these
ideas
show inherent
deas
of
domination. Thus,
the
idea
of
the non-western people
as the
living fossil drewsupport rom he historical
and biological theories
of
the times.
Consistently,
he other
stood
for an inferior
human and was even
understood
in the
paradigm
of
the
native children as
against
the
adult west.
Much of these ideas overlap in the
constructionof the
savage other,
primarily
oriented towards
the
Africans and which
subsequently
encompassedeven the Indian
people. Similarly,
or the
black
other,
whose
continued
mportance
ies in the validation
of racism
itself.
Pandian also establishes a
critique
of
ethlnography
and the
ways
in which the
preoccupation
f the west
regarding
he
non-
west still reflectsmuchof theirprejudices.
The reasons
why ethnography tself
'works'
seems to be
more a reflection of economic
and social dynamics of inter-cultural
relationships. In fact, he suggests that
'eliminatingprejudice
would be
eliminating
anthropology' [Pandian
1985:92].
The
basic
problem
n
the
anthropological
other
is
that it
is
never a
recognition
of the
other;
rather t
is
just
an
epistemological
other which perhaps says more about the
epistemological
ystems
of the
ethnographer
rather han
any
'honest'
description
of
the
other.
Anthropology,
unlike other
sciences,
is
not.a
study
of inanimate-ness nd thus has
to
go beyond
the
epistemological
models
derived
fromthesedisciplines. suggestthat
the problem of the anthropologicalother is
due to this process, and one way out is to
look for anotherway to thematise he other,
through a process which will grant to
anthropology its unique status as a study
of humans.The way out is to re-understand
the other and perhaps integrate into its
epistemology an ethical responsibility
towards the
other.
The anthropological other is one based
purelyondifference.Butthisdoesnotaddress
the basic
ssue
of
the human elf constructing
the other.
The notion
of
the othercannot ie
only in difference; if so, thereis really no
difference in acknowledgingthe othemess
of a rose plantor a zebraand hatof a person.
Rightly too, one can make a distinction
between observing the behaviouralpatterns
of
a
community
of zebrasand a
community
of
people.
If
the latter
constitutes
ethnography,
then
ethnography comprises
more than
mere observation and
categorisation of behavioural patterns or
kinship tructures.Whatmakes heothemess
of humans the other is more than this.
Following Levinas, and ater
Derrida,
place
the thematisation
of
the
other
in
an ethical
domain. It is the ethical imperative, an
acknowledgement f thedemandof
the
other
that creates the
responsibility
towards
the
other.
It is this
responsibility,
which fills the
notion of
the other
in
Levinas, that
differentiates he otherness of zebra andof
humans.
The anthropological other, based on
difference,
has forsaken he
responsibility
of
the subject towards the other.
In
the model
of
epistemology of the physical sciences,
it
has
forsaken the notion
of
responsibility
from
the objectivedomain.Anthropological
knowledge,
n
constructing he
otherwithout
theethical mperative,acrificestheotherness
in order o
objectify
humans nto
things
and
subsume he other
nto the
'same'.
Objective,
rational
pistemology
is based on the denial
of
any
ethical relationbetween the
self and
the
object. Founding
its
epistemology
on
thismodel,ethnographys blind o thedictates
of the
other.This
anthropological
thermakes
animals out
of
humans,
if not worse.
A
reprieve
was
given
to
anthropology
n
the
guise
of Malinowski who
emphasised
the
importance
of
studying
alien
cultures
n
the form of
participant-observation.
But
1406 Economic and Political Weekly June 14, 1997
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3/5
Malinowski's
ethnography still remains
a
categorisation
of
difference, a
taxonomy of
humanobjects. It does
not even come close
to addressingthe
fundamentalproblemof
otherness.
Participant-observationttempts
to build on this
but its response falls
way
short.
The process of the
anthropological
'stranger'
seeking
to define
the native
has
made
the native alien
while upholding
the
autonomy
f the
western
elf. In his
scenario,
the alien
who invades the
territory
of
the
native takes
over the spirit of the native
by
constructing hem as the other. The
nature
of
the other in this case is vcry clear: it is
otheras
not-self. The
nitial
anthropological
othersuffers
ontinuously rom his
violence,
a violence of
the
refiguration
of
the
constitution of
the native self. This other
in this
case
is
all that the
ethnographer
s
not. It s this
othernessof the
ethnographer's
self that this
kind of ethnographic
study
yields andnot theselfof the native.
Coupled
to this is
the
distancing
of
subjectivity
in
staking
an
epistemological
claim
to
anthropologicalobservation which further
risks
osing the 'essence'
ofthe native's self.
This
activity s
in
its most fundamental
ense
an
objectification
of the natives which in the
process ends
up
objectifying
the
impartial
observer
him/herself.
In
participant bservation,
he 'distance';
of the
native from the
observer s
sought
to
be reduced
by becomingone of the natives.
The
dress,
the
customs and
language
are
borrowed,
however
imperfectly,
to fit the
gaze
of theobserver.But
afterall he
attempts
at
assimilation,
he
gaze
is still not lost.
Here
the other is understood differently. By
simulating
the
otherness
of
the
native,
the
observer
constructs
his
self as
'not-other'.
Although
in
opposition
to
constructing
he
otheras not-self. The
constructionof self as
'not-other'does
equalviolence
on
the
notion
of otherness. The
observing
self
continues
to remain
the
epistemological
'not-other'.
As
long
as the
gaze
of
the
observer
searches
out for
structuresuntold and
hidden
by
the
natives,
it becomes a
violent act. Violence
arises
here in the Levinasian
sense of not
heeding
the
ethical call of
the other,
the
ethicalcall
whichdemands
responsibility
of
theobservingself towardsthe native other.
Thus,
n
both
hesecasesof
anthropological
observation,
he other s
constructedandnot
realised on a
pre-categorical
level.
Only
epistemological categories of the other as
'not-self and the
self as 'not-other'
remain.
Both
these continue with the
supposition
that
there
is
no
responsibility
to the
other
andremain eaf
o its call. Suchan
abrogation
of
responsibility
is
only because the
epistemological
models
are
understoqd
o
be
so. But this
obviously
does not serve the
anthropological
concern and
opens
anthropology
o the charge of
colonialism.
II
The
Philosophical Other
I would like to
approach he discussion
of
the other n philosophyprimarily
hrough
Levinas
andDerrida.Levinas'coflcem
arises
at
a
pre-philosophical, pre-cognate level.
The
ability to
distinguish humans from
animals is
by
acknowledging the human
otherasother.This
other
s
more undamental
than
any human activity. It is
the
responsibility towards the other
that even
makes dialogical peech
andreason'possible
[Degnin 1995]. In his
reading of Levinas,
Degnin situates the
importance
of
the 'face
of
the other' as
evoking the subject.It
is
the
call
of the otheras one
like me which begets
this ethical
responsibility.Thus, theOther
is
the
first
truth,but not in
a cognitive sense.
Ratherthis truthis
the experience of the
ethical call that
eventuates
prior
to and is
constitutive of
reason, metaphysics and
discourse
[Degnin 1995].
When the self
attempts
to
subsume
the
other nto the
'same',
then
there
s
violence
done
against
the
other. There is an ethical
responsibility not to
violate the other by
reducing
t to one's own
system
of
thought.
The violence arises in
ignoring this a priori
ethical call.
Ignoring
he call is also to
view
the
other
as
an
object
of
knowledge. Doing
so, only
eliminates the
identity
of
the other
and
re-figures
t in
the
eyes
of
the
subject,
'thereby incorporating
he other into
the
identity
of the
constituting ubject'
[Powell
1995].
The deeper problem here
is
one of
representation.
he other s
represented,
nd
perhaps
even constituted
through,
this
representationn the way of the subject.It
is the
process
of
representing
heotherwhich
subsumes
it
into the
intelligibility
of
the
subject
and
negates
its
identity.
Levinas'
writings
on the
other
situateshis
concern
n
the ethical
space.
But thisethics
is
not the ethics
ordinarily
understood as
system
of moralsand
prescriptions.
He
points
the
path
not to a
theory
of
ethics but
of
orientingthe ubject owards
acknowledging
and
responding
o the
'ethical',
before
it is
categorised by
knowledge.
As
Derrida
remarks, what Levinas
proposes
to
understand
s
the
essence
of the
ethical
relation in general [Derrida 1978]. Ethics
has o
be basedon a
'pre-given
thicalrelation
to
which all ethics
responds' [Powell
1995].
Powell makes
the
point
that ethics is
dependent
on a
theory
of the
subject
and the
ethical edifice is
based on the
'active
agent
as the
foundationof ethics'.
Levinas
draws
us to the
recognition
of
the ethical which is
not
based
on
the
hegemony
of the
subject
but
ratheras
one which
responds
o the
pre-
cognitive
relationwith
the other. In
fact,
as
Powell
remarks,
the
very
notion of
subj}ectivity
risesonly because the
subject
is responding o the other, who is
prior to
the
subject n the
sense
that the
other makes
possible
the transformation romsubjectto
subjectivity.
Knowledgeof theother, n terms
of its
representation,omes after his
response
to the other
and
prior
to the
taking-up
of
history, I
have already responded to the
other, he
meaning
of
ethics has
alreadybeen
given, I have
already been subjectedto
the
history of the
other [Powell 1995].
In his later work[Levinas
1981], Levinas
shifted to the notion
of trace
in
order
to
understand
the other. The
Derridean
'differance' would be an
ideal
word to
describe
this
other
-
not
only
is
the
other
different but it is also in
perpetual
postponement. When I
grasp towards the
other,
I
am left
holding,
continuously,
races
of
the other. The traces
constitute the
perpetualabsence of the
other; because he
Other is
structurally
absent
-
always
unreachable
[Degnin 1995].
My
responsibility
towards
the other makes
me
plod
along diligently, going from one trace
to
the
next,
forever
thus
constructing
the
othemess. It
is
in this
acknowledgement
of
theperpetual
ostponement hat
heotherness
lies.
Acknowledging
this is
accepting the
implausibility
of
completeness; the
responsibility
ies in
accepting
what s
granted
and
to
plod
on in
the
path
of
possible
infinite
significations.
But this
responsibility
s
not
ontological, not
so
long
as it sees the other
only
as a
knowable
entity.
The
awareness
of the
other
in
terms of an
ethical
responsibility
is what makes
the
process
ontological. Thus,
in
order to be 'true' to
the
other,
ethnography
hould
base
itself on
the
concept
of
differance rather than
one
based on difference.
Theideaofthetraceis
importanttoDerrida
in his
critique
f the
'metaphysics
f
presence'
-
even as we
prioritisepresence
we
lose
all
that s
present
hrough
absence.
This
presence
of absence is
marked
hrough
with the trace
oftheother.
Keameypoints
out
that
although
the
early
Derrida's work
focused on the
epistemological
contrast
between
presence
and
absence,
his
later
works
show
'emphasis
on the
question
of
ethical
responsibility'
[Kearney1993].Theethical ssue hereshould
beunderstoodnthe
contextdescribed
bove;
as
Kearney
remarks,
deconstruction's
obsession with alterity is compatiblewith
the
ethics of
'increased
responsibility '
[Kearney
1993].
Deconstruction,
unlike
many
mistaken accounts of
it. partakes
a
responsibility
which n its foundational
ense
is
a
search for the other. The continued
onslaught
n the
reduction nd
representation
of the
other
impels
the
ethical
directedness
of
deconstructionwhich
above all becomes
'an openness
towards the
other'
[Kearney
1993].
The above
discussion
suggests that the
apparent
polarity of the self
and the
other
is still immersed n the
subject/objectdivide.
Economic and Political
Weekly
June
14, 1997
1407
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4/5
The presenceof the otheralso continuously
points to its absencewhich is manifestedby
its traces. The inevitability of
trace also
points o the impossibilityof having
a 'final'
reference which does
not refer to anything
else. Thecontinual
postponementof rasping
the
other n its fullness s
the absenceof
such
a reference.At the most fundamental
evel,
there is left only the notion of ethical
responsibility
which binds the self and the
other.Languagecannot
ranscend
his;
rather,
it
reflects
hisresponsibility
n its
full entirety
-
'language
is ethics' [Kearney 1993].
Thus, the philosophical deliberations
on
the other strikeat the fundamentalproblem
with the anthropologicalother. This
other
is
basedon
an
artificial
ubjectlobject ivide,
which,as manyphenomenologistshave
ong
argued,
is untenable. In fact, Derrida,
as
quoted by
Kearney,has
this to
say,
...it
is
the other
which invokes and provokes
the
subjectbefore any genuinc questioning
can
begin Kearney1993].Theabovediscussion
perhapspoints
to the
importance
f
integrat-
ing this notion of the other within the
anthropologicaldiscourse,
but
it is a
vexing
problem
as to how
one
integrates
he notion
of ethical
responsibility
withinan
epistemo-
logical system.
Althougha clear
answer is
not
available,
it
opens
us
to
the illusion
of
complete and closed description
of any
'object'
of
inquiry.
It also
suggests
that
anthropologyhould inddifferentparadigms
of
knowledge
whichare
basedon the
critique
of
westernmetaphysics.
One of the ways
of
doing this
is
discussed
in the final section.
III
Self-in-the-Other
Srinivas n his article
(1996) points
to an
underlying
difference'
between
an Indian
anthropologiststudying
Indian tribals
as
against
the
'foreign' anthropologist.
Since
the Indian anthropologist
and the tribals
inhabit the
'same cultural
urverse',
he
suggests
that he tribalsare
never
)tally
the
other.This relationshipof inhabitin-g
n
the
same
space
leads him to
suggest
that
n this
case it is self-in-the-other
which s
operative.
Whether this
will be acceptable to the
practicing
ield worker rom
another ulture
is not the issue addressedhere. My main
interest
s in
understanding
he other andin
this
context
the
other used by
Srinivas
also
carries with it the
baggage
of the anthro-
pological
other. Self-in-the-other
s
not an
ontological
category. The
other of Levinas
towards
which
the subject
has the ethical
engagement
is
'pre-philosophical
and
pre-
cognitive'.
But there
is
an
important onsequence
of
this
self-as-the-other.
would ike to
explicate
this in more
detail
by basing
it on
the
notion
of subjectivity,which, I suspect, s atthe
root
of this view.
If the tribalother is accessible
as a totally
objectifiedother
hen it does not matterwho
the ethnographers. In other words,
if
the
subject/object divide
is
enforced
in the
traditionalway, then the object
s 'out there'
waiting to be
discoveredand categorisedby
the ethnographer. The adequacy
of this
description
will then depend on the
competence of
the ethnographer.
Phenomenologists, in general, have
difficulty
in
accepting
such a facile
subject/
object divide.
To
them,
objectivity
is
intricately
enmeshed
with the notion
of
subjectivity.It is the subject's orientation
which informs what the object
is. Further
discussion on
this is
beyond
the scope
of
this
paper.
The
point
nevertheless
is
important
to place the
self-in-the-other as one more
expression
of the presence
of
subjectivity
n
all
humanactivity, including epistemology.
The perception
of theother.for example,
the tribalother,
is
dependenton
the
subject
who
perceives.
For an enthropologistwho
has a shared
history/culturewith the tribals,
the perceptionof the tribalswill definitely
be differentbecause
of
the
orientation
f
the
anthropologist
towards
the tribal other.
Srinivas' call to a
study
of
the self-in-the-
other suggests
a
revision in
the
way
anthropologists
should think
about the
subject/object
ichotomy.Immersed s they
are in western metaphysicalepistemology,
they
fail
to see the
importance
f
recognising
epistemological
systems
in
which
the
subjective plays
the central
part.
There
shouldbe a little caveatevenamong
anthropologists
o
the
claim that
the
study
of
tribals
by
an Indian
anthropologist
would
be 'different' than by a 'foreigner'. But
serious
disagreements
may
ariseon themerits
of
this
difference, primarily
because
of the
belief
that
there
is some true
knowledge
outside
us
waiting
to
be discovered.
But in
placing hisdebateon thephenomenologist's
position
on
subjectivity, hey
would be hard
pressed to counter
the
importance
of the
concept
of
self-in-the-other.
I
give
a
rather tenuous example
of the
importance
f the
role
cultural
history
of the
subject plays
in
ethnography.
f we look at
the idea
of the
other, primarily through
common
anguage
used
n
India,
we
find
that
the otherhas a different meaninghere than
in the west. There
is, maybe
in all Indian
languages,
a
conception
of the other
which
is
different from the
way
the
word is
used
in
English
or
French,
for
example.
The
commonly
used
word for the other
n
Tamil,
Kannada
r
Malayalam,
or
example,
s
'one
more'. The phrase 'one
more' has different
connotations than
the 'other'.
Firstly,
it
quantifies
his notionof otherness.
Secondly,
it
implies
that the
other
is
nothing
but one
more of the self. The
distancing
of
the
self
and the other s totally different
as reflected
in such usage. This conception hides in it
the notion of self-in-the-other.
n
Hindi, the
commonly used
word for
other
s
translated
as 'second' and ess
commonly,
'one
more'.
Once again, hese arequantified ermswhich
stand for the other and carry
with
them the
implication
of
the other
as
extension
of one's
self. For a person steeped in this tradition,
this
does make a
qualitative
difference in
constructing
he other. think
his,
n
essence,
is what Srinivas' call to Indian
anthropologists
s about.
IV
Autobiography and the
Other-in-the-Self
Srinivas suggests that the autobiography
of an individual should
be a valid
ethno-
graphic ool. 'Why cannot
an
anthropologist
treat his own
life
as an
ethnographic
ield
and
study
it?'
[Srinivas
1996]. I would
like
to
bring
this
importantpoint
nto
the
context
of the above discussion.
The essence of
autobiography
s the
other-
in-the-self. Self-in-the-other respondsto a
relationship primarily mediated spatially
between
the self and the other. It is this
perpetualdistance rom
he
self and he other
which underlies ethnography. A temporal
characters also
present
n
such
a
relationship
but
is not
manifested
in its
immediacy.)
The case of autobiography
s
different. It
is
fundamentally
n articulation f theother-
in-the-self. The self writes its
biography
at
a
given present.
The
reconstruction
of the
self
in
this act is to recordevents
in
the
past.
The autobiographybecomes a collection of
the residue of the self and is
temporally
constituted. The autobiography.s nothing
more than an inscriptionof the other within
oneself.
The self which inhabited itself
becomes
the otheronce
it
goes past
he
iving
moment.
Thus,
a life's recollection
gives
a
series of
pictures of the
other which is
continuously
connected o
the
present, iving
self.
Thisotheriscapturednotthroughpatial
distancing
of
the
self from the
other
but
purely
as a
temporal process.
The
anthropological
other-in-the-self
is
thus
a
recreation
of
the other
which inhabits
the
self.
The
ontological counterpart
f this
is not
available,
at least in
my reading
of
Levinas. But this point of omission can be
rectified. In
autobiography
as
a written
act,
as
self-reflection
of our
past,
the self comes
face to face with the other
which
once
inhabited
he
self.
Coming
face
to
face
with
my-other
has all
the characteristics f
coming
face to face with an-other.Levinasianethics
is
directed o
the
otheroutside
myself
without
taking
into account this
possibility
of the
response
of
myself
to
the other
which
resides
in
me. And this shows the
implausibility
of
the ethical
responsibility ndependent
f the-
.'direction'
of the gaze towards heother.The
ethical response to the other-in-my-self s
1408
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Political
Weekly
June
14,
1997
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5/5
different from the one
towards an other
spatially separated rom me. The call 'not
to kill'
[Degnin 1995], is a
corporeal call
which
neglects the possibility of the other
which resides in me,
unless, in this case, it
is seen as a call not to
commit suicide.
I
would ike to call thisethnographic tudy
of one's own life as
auto-ethnography. t is
easy to
understandwhy such a methodwould
belookeduponwithsuspicion.
Thedominant
reaction
against this
activity will be based
on
the excessive presence of
subjectivity
in such a
process. Since knowledge,
anthropologicalor
otherwise,
has
made a
virtue of making the
subject
invisible,
this
processof
auto-ethnographywould be seen
as
epistemologically suspect.
But as our
previous
rguments howed,
this
forcedexile
of the
subject
is
totally misplaced. The
richness of
epistemology
increases as the
subjectiveelement
is
absorbed.Thus, at the
conflux of
anthropologyand
philosophy we
can situate the
re-discovery
of the
subject
into our
knowledge games.
In this
case,
auto-ethnography
ecomes a valid tool of
anthropological knowledge.
Srinivas'
emphasis
on the
self-in-the-other and his
suggestion
of
auto-ethnography
hows his
underlying
unease
with
the exclusion of
the
subject
romthe
anthropological
discourse.
He,
tops
at
this
uncture
but an
extrapolation
of the above ideas
naturally
leads me to
consider
iction as a valid
ethnographic
ool.
V
Anthropology
and Fiction
The
relevance
of fiction in
anthropology
is not a new idea, as many quotable quotes
by
eminent
anthropologists
attest. What I
shall do here
is
suggest
cogent
reasons to
consider fiction as
a
valid
tool in
anthropology,
ased
on
theabove
arguments.
Fiction tands
as
the
exemplarof ubjective
construction
f the
world.
Anthropologyby
its exclusion of the
subjectiveposition by
objectifying
human
communities
and
by
creating
he
anthropological
other can
have
no
use
for
fiction.
This
distancing
of fiction
is best
exemplified by
the
way
anthropological
theris
constructed,
s
based
on
difference and
clearly
referential. The
ambiguityof the otheris repressed n order
to
get
as
'true' a
picture
as
possible.
Within
such
a
dogma, fiction,
by
its
exploding
possibilities,
n its
refusal o exile the
subject,
is
immediately
ruled out.
If
anthropology
s
willing
to
go beyond
this other it constructsand into
recognising
its
function as
answering
the ethical call of
the
other,
then we
will
have
to
address the
relevanceof fiction as
ethnographic
data.
It
is in the nature
of
the other that
such
a
possibility
arises.
The
other,
as mentioned
above,
is a trace as we grasp
toward,>
t,
it escapes leaving behind just
the trace of
its
presence. The complete grasping of the
otherig
mpossible. t sjust this
phenomenon
which is the spirit of
fiction. A story of
a
community, for
example, is filled with the
tracesof the
other, n termsof itspossibilities
and actualities.The
footprintsof the other
dot the
work of fiction which
when taken
together will allow us
an archive of traces.
It is within
this that the other is constituted.
Fictionis also a
method which allows for
subjective
orientations in
describing the
world.
The richness, the ambiguity and
contradictions of
this description are
anathema
o
the
objective
epistemological
schemes which rest
on the belief towards
attaining
completeness
and non-
contradiction.But as
we
have
seen, the world
cannot
sustain the
burden
of
being
broken
artificially nto the
subjectandobject;cannot
base itself on the
terrorof finite and closed
knowledge.
Thus,
if
anthropology
wants to extend its
domain
beyond 'objective'
ethnography,
f
it
s
willingto accept
ts
responsibilityowards
t4c other,
then the
relevance of fiction
as
a
valid epistemological tool should be
acknowledged. Since the other
is not
an
'object'
which
can
be
completely
accessed
through rational'
pistemologies,and since
its
presence derives
through
its
perpetual
absence,
fiction
becomes one
of the
most
important
ways through
which the traces
of
the
other can
be
identified.
Perhaps
there
is
a
lesson
in
this for
all
social
sciences,
including philosophy.
Philosophy
is not immune from such
a
criticism
and
artificial
distinctions
between
philosophy and
iterature re
also
untenable.
Rorty, who
perhaps hould
be
consideredas
the
spokesperson
or this
view,.shouldhave
the last
word:
...the
mportant
lace
to
draw
a
line is not
between
philosophy and
non-
philosophy
but rather
between
topicswhich
we know how
to argue
about
those
we do
not
[Rorty
1993].
[I hankMNSrinivasorenthusiasticiscussions
which
madethis
work
possible. I
also thank
Dhanu
Nayak or her
manycritical
omments.]
References
Degnin, Francis
Dominic (1995): 'Laughter
and
Metaphysics: Interruptionsof Levinas
and
Nietzche',
Philosophy Today, 39:1.
Derrida,Jacques 1978):
Writingand
Difference,
(translated
Alan
Bass),Universityof
Chicago
Press, p 111.
Kearney,
Richard 1993): 'Derrida's
EthicalRe-
turn' nGary
Madison(ed),
WorkingThrough
Derrida,
Northwestern
University Press.
Levinas,Emmanuel 198
1):Otherwise han
Being
or
Beyond
Essence, (translated
Alphonso
Lingis), MartinusNijhoff.
Pandian, Jacob (1985):
Anthropology and the
WesternTradition,
Waveland Press, Inc.
Powell, Jeffrey (1995): 'Levinas
Representing
Husserlon
Representation:
An
Ethics
Beyond
Representation',Philosophy
Today, 39:2.
Srinivas,
M
N
(1996): 'Indian
Anthropologists
and the
Study
of
Indian
Culture',
Economic
and
Political
Weekly,
Vol
XXXI,
No
11,
March.
Rorty, Richard
(1993): 'Is
Derrida
a
Transcendental
hilosopher'
n
Gary
Madison
(ed),
WorkingThroughDerrida,Northwestern
University
Press.
REVIEW OF WOMEN STUDIES
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Women's Paid Domestic
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Women Panchayat Members
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Female
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-Sheela Rani Chunkath
V
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