Conceptualizing “Post-Conflict Reconstruction”and “Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction” of Failed States

Yosef Jabareen

Published online: 21 February 2012# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Abstract In recent decades, the world has seen many internal violent conflicts that dramati-cally affect the social, economic, and political conditions of human geographies at multiplespatial scales, from the national level to the scale of individual cities and communities.Geography, as a multidimensional discipline, should be in a unique position to contribute tounderstanding of such conflicts and of post-conflict geographies and their futures in terms ofreconstruction and rebuilding. However, in the geography literature, there is little attentiongiven to post-conflict human geographies and their related subjects. At present, there are manyemerging post-conflict geographies, which would greatly benefit from theoretical and practicalknowledge to guide their future. This paper aims to contribute to building a foundation fordeveloping knowledge on reconstruction of post-conflict and ongoing conflict human geogra-phies. Based on the existing multidisciplinary bodies of knowledge on post-conflict reconstruc-tion, this paper develops a new conceptual framework for post-conflict reconstruction and forongoing conflict reconstruction as a more adequate way to understand and plan reconstructionin the face of ongoing conflict and offers new insights for the reconstruction agenda.

Keywords Post-conflict reconstruction . Ongoing conflict reconstruction . Failed states

Int J Polit Cult Soc (2013) 26:107–125DOI 10.1007/s10767-012-9118-3

Y. Jabareen (*)Faculty of Architecture and Town Planning at the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israele-mail: jabareen@mit.edu

Yosef. Jabareene-mail: jabareen@technion.ac.il

Y. JabareenHarvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Y. JabareenDepartment of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge,MA, USA

Y. JabareenAga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture at MIT, Cambridge, USA

Introduction

Since World War II, international actors such as the United Nations (UN), the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP)—in addition to donor governments and international and national non-governmentalorganization (NGO)—have paid increasing attention and committed specific resources to thetask of post-conflict reconstruction (Sulatan 2005). The post-war occupations of Germany andJapan set standards for an unprecedented mission of post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building in a long list of countries, including Germany (1945), Japan (1945), Congo (1961),Namibia (1989), El Salvador (1991), Cambodia (1993), Somalia (1992), Mozambique (1993),Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), Eastern Slavonia (1996), Sierra Leone (2000), Kosovo (2000),Afghanistan, Iraq (2003), and the Gaza Strip (2009). In recent years, post-conflict reconstruc-tion has evolved into a “grand strategy”with a “grand narrative,” the goals of which transcendshumanitarian aid and include the creation of a new global agenda, or a new regional agenda,global stability and security, and democracy building.

Nonetheless, a critical review of the interdisciplinary literature on “post-conflict recon-struction” and “nation building” leads to two main conclusions. The first is that there iscurrently a lack of comprehensive theory on post-conflict reconstruction. Indeed, after5 years of reconstruction in Iraq, an assessment report written by the Special InspectorGeneral for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) entitled Hard Lessons concludes that in 2009: “TheUnited States was still caught in a nation-building effort it had not anticipated and still didnot fully understand”(SIGIR 2009: 318).The report also notes the existence of a “recon-struction gap” or a gap between the number of projects promised and planned and thenumber of projects actually completed. This gap was the result of increased spending onsecurity needs, higher material costs, project delays, cost overruns, multiple reprogrammingsof reconstruction priorities, and added maintenance expenses (DoD IG Report 2007; SIGIR2009).In this context, a December 2008 article in the New York Times held that “among theoverarching conclusions of the history is that 5 years after embarking on its largest foreignreconstruction project since the Marshall Plan in Europe after World War II, the UnitedStates government has in place neither the policies and technical capacity nor the organiza-tional structure that would be needed to undertake such a program on anything approachingthis scale” (Glanz and Miller 2008). Five years after the invasion of Iraq, “the government asa whole has never developed a legislatively sanctioned doctrine or framework for planning,preparing and executing contingency operations in which diplomacy, development andmilitary action all figure” (SIGIR 2009).

The second conclusion is that the term “post-conflict” is “loosely defined” (Dodge 2006)and used casually in many completely different state contexts and political conditions.Approaches to post-conflict reconstruction address post-conflict conditions and focus onreconstruction efforts following violent conflicts, as in Europe (Marshall Plan) and Japanfollowing World War II and the more recent reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. How-ever, in recent years, there has been a need for reconstruction amidst ongoing conflict, as inIraq, Afghanistan, and the more recent instance of Gaza (2009). In these cases, the conflictpersists at fluctuating intensities. In Iraq, for example, “the scope of reconstruction was toooften unmatched by available security resources” and “to this day, Iraq’s reconstructionenvironment has never been truly ‘post-conflict’” (SIGIR 2009: 331).

Barakat Sulatan (2005) insightfully posits that when examining the reconstruction of Iraqas a case of post-war reconstruction, it is evident that “it does not conform to previouspatterns of conflict and reconstruction” (Sulatan 2005: 571). This is also true in the cases ofthe Gaza Strip and Afghanistan, where violent conflicts are ongoing. Overall, there is a

108 Jabareen

profound lack of theoretical and practical knowledge regarding how to plan reconstruction inthese contemporary multifaceted and complex cases in light of the persistence of politicalconflict and threats of war. Although numerous studies and reports have been published onvarious aspects of these operations, most have focused exclusively on the post-Cold Warperiod (RAND 2005: 1) and have adapted the concept of post-conflict reconstruction. In thisway, they are more often than not devoid of a unifying conceptual framework that isadequate for the state of affairs in the world today (Fig. 1).

Failed State Conditions

Exogenous Intervention

Sequencing

Security

Reconstruction Reduces Conflict

Multi-Level Actors

Inclusive Themes and a Holistic

Approach

Westernization of States

Provides Justification for

Intervention

Precondition for Initiating

Reconstruction

Critical Aspect of the

Reconstruction Planning

Necessary Environment for the

Success of Reconstruction

Economic Prosperity Reduces

Conflict and Builds Peace

Inclusive Reconstruction

Agents: From Local to

Micro/Macro Social, Political,

and Economic Transformation

“Civilization” and Liberalization

ofFailed States according to the

Western Model

Fig. 1 Concepts and attributes of the conceptual framework of post-conflict reconstruction

Post- and Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction of Failed States 109

Based on the existing interdisciplinary bodies of knowledge on post-conflict reconstruc-tion, this paper proposes a new conceptual framework for post-conflict reconstruction andfor ongoing-conflict reconstruction as a more adequate way to understand and plan recon-struction in the face of ongoing conflict and offers new insights for the reconstructionagenda. Against the background presented in this introductory section, the followingsections will discuss the methodology employed to construct the conceptual frameworkand explore the concepts of post-conflict reconstruction and the unique case of ongoing-conflict reconstruction. The final section will demonstrate the usefulness of these conceptualframeworks and conclude with some thoughts on the challenges facing the proponents ofpost-conflict reconstruction today and in the future.

Methodology

This article aims to build a conceptual framework for post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) thatis informed by various bodies of knowledge. In my theorization of PCR, I adopt theontological conceptualization of planes of immanence and the term concept used by Deleuzeand Guattari (1991). The conceptual framework for PCR is a plane of immanence that is “anobject of construction” (Bonta and Protevi 2004: 62–3), defined not by what it “contains butby the forces that intersect it and the things it can do” (Kaufman 1998: 6). In philosophicalterminology, immanence refers to “the act of being within a conceptual space” (Bonta andProtevi 2004; 98). In this manner, the conceptual framework of PCR refers to “a network, or‘a plane’, of interlinked concepts that together provides a comprehensive understanding of aphenomenon” (Jabareen 2009: 51). This plane is composed of concepts that “can beabstracted from bodies and states of affairs” (Bonta and Protevi 2004: 31). A conceptualframework, however, is not merely a collection of concepts but rather a construct composedof “consistent” concepts in which each plays an integral role and is intrinsically linked to theothers. This enables it to better provide “not a causal/analytical setting but, rather, aninterpretative approach to social reality” and to our understanding of the multiple andinterlinked concepts it encompasses (Jabareen 2009: 51).

The Definition of “Concept” According to Deleuze and Guattari (1991: 15), “every concepthas components and is defined by them” and “there is no concept with only one compo-nent.” These components define the consistency of the concept and are distinct, heteroge-neous, and inseparable from one another (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 15). It is a multiplicitybut not every multiplicity defines a concept. Every concept must be understood “relative toits own components, to other concepts, to the plane on which it is defined, and to theproblem it is supposed to resolve” (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 21). Moreover, everyconcept has its own history and typically contains ‘bits’ or components originating in otherconcepts. In other words, all concepts relate back to other concepts; they are always createdfrom something, and cannot be created from nothing.

A conceptual analysis method was used to build the conceptual framework. This methodis a grounded theory technique that aims “to generate, identify, and trace a phenomenon’smajor concepts, which together constitute its theoretical framework” (Jabareen 2009). Eachconcept possesses its own attributes, characteristics, assumptions, limitations, distinct per-spectives, and specific function within the conceptual framework. The methodology delin-eates the following stages in conceptual framework building: (a) mapping selected datasources; (b) reviewing the literature and categorizing the selected data; (c) identifying andnaming the concepts; (d) deconstructing and categorizing the concepts; (e) integrating the

110 Jabareen

concepts; (f) synthesis, resynthesis, and making it all make sense; (g) validating theconceptual framework; and (h) rethinking the conceptual framework. Initial constructionof the proposed conceptual framework, and identification of the major concepts of thephenomenon under discussion, was generated through qualitative process analysis basedon grounded theory method, which involves the extensive review and classification of theliterature addressing environmental, social, cultural, and urban aspects of resilience in avariety of disciplines and fields of study, such as sociology, anthropology, public policy,political science, economics, ecology, geography, and urban planning. This broad multidis-ciplinary framework is intended to ensure that the theory generated is relevant to as manydisciplines as possible, enabling them to expand the respective theoretical perspectives withwhich they approach the phenomenon.

The Concepts of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Based on the multiphase process outlined above, this study identifies eight key concepts thattogether enable us to theorize “post-conflict reconstruction.”

Concept 1: Failed State Conditions

The “failed state” is one of the most important concepts in the post-conflict reconstructionagenda. According to this agenda, the existence of a failed state justifies the exogenousintervention of other states, organizations, and bodies. Modern states are expected to providefor the national aspirations, security, and interests of their people. According to RobertRotberg (2003: 2), nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering publicgoods to persons living within designated state borders. However, according to Weber, anecessary condition for an entity to be a state is its ability to successfully uphold “a claim onthe monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in the enforcement of its order” (Weber 1964:154) over a designated territory and its population. Daniel Lambach (2007: 33) holds that thestate is sovereign in the sense that no political authority exists above it, and that the state isalso in control of the monopoly over taxation and the enforcement of the rules andregulations that bind every citizen. A state that is unable to exercise its monopolies overviolence, taxation and regulation in this way is considered a failed state or a collapsed state.Lambach (2007: 32) also reports that the concept of failed states has received a great deal ofattention in recent years, and that since September 11th it has entered the discourse ofinternational politics as a serious threat to the well-being and prosperity of Westerncountries. Milliken and Krause (2002: 753–754) conclude that “concern over the possibilityof state failure thus often has as much to do with dashed expectations about the achievementof modern statehood, or the functions that modern states should fulfill, as it does with theempirically-observed decomposition or collapse of the institutions of governance in differentparts of the world.”

The failed state therefore emerges as a concept representing a set of negative qualitiespossessed by states: states that are apprehensive, deeply conflicted, dangerous, divided,fragmented, and insecure; states that have no political legitimacy, provide only limitedpolitical goods, and lack democracy and an independent judiciary system; states that posea supreme threat to global security and a safe-haven for terrorists and their organizations;states that pose a threat to the flow of neoliberal economic globalization; states that arecorrupt and that provide strongholds for drug and arms traders, money launderers, andsmugglers; states with pervasive economic inequalities and declining GDPs; states in which

Post- and Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction of Failed States 111

loyalties, security, and trust are based not on modern institutions but rather on kinship andtribal and sectarian systems (see Dodge 2006; Fukuyama 2004a,b; Lambach 2007; Millikenand Krause 2002; Ottaway 2002; Ottaway and Mair 2004; Rotberg 2003).

Dodge (2006: 189) argues that “the total failure of state capacity in a given area posesdistinct problems for the international community, which discursively and materially has fewother tools through which to impose order…” and concludes that “the lack of a state in Iraqbecame a distinct problem for the imposition of international order.” Herbst (2004) suggeststhat in post-conflict situations, a great need exists for the systematic refurbishing of thepolitical, economic, and social fabric of the collapsed state—the state that has succeededneither in performing nor in providing political goods, and which has become a threat toitself and to others.

According to Carothers and Ottaway (2004: 1), “US foreign aid is designed to: supporttransformational development, stabilize and promote recovery in fragile states, addresshumanitarian needs, promote US interests, and address transnational and global ills.” Oneof the most important recommendation of Hard Lessons regards “the need to develop anagreed-upon doctrine and structure for contingency relief and reconstruction operations toguide the use of military and economic power so that the United States is ready when it nextmust intervene in a failed or failing state” (SIGIR 2009: 331). In the Iraqi case, “war onterror” has become an essential justification for American reconstruction of the country. InOctober 2003, President Bush asked Congress for supplemental appropriations for Iraq:

“…to assist the United States and our coalition partners in making additional progressin the war on terror. The Supplemental provides funds to ensure the success of our menand women in uniform. By working to establish Iraqi and Afghan nations that are free,prosperous, and at peace with their neighbors, the security of America and her citizenswill be enhanced” (Executive Office of the President 2003).

Policy makers believe that bringing the Iraqi and Afghan people “liberty and hope” byhelping them build democratic nations can prevent the use of these countries as key bases ofoperations for terrorists.

Fukuyama argues that failed states represent the greatest threat to an orderly world andthe root of the most serious problems of our contemporary world, from poverty and AIDS todrug trafficking and terrorism. In this spirit, he holds that “the failed state of Afghanistan wasso weak that it could in effect be hijacked by a non-state actor, the terrorist organization”(Fukuyama 2004a,b: 93). In his view, “the less-developed worlds are weak, and the end ofthe Cold War led to the emergence of a band of failed and troubled states from Europe toSouth Asia” (Fukuyama 2004a,b: 120). In this way, he hopes to guarantee internationalintervention in failed nations that could threaten the March of US domination during thetwenty-first century.

It is important to mention that we should be careful about this concept of failed states,which is central to the post-conflict reconstruction. Apparently, Iraq was not a failed stateuntil it was invaded. Gaza, if left to its own devices, would hardly be classified a failed state,as this is only due to outside intervention. Therefore, we identify failed states as those whohave been invaded and defeated by outside powers.

Concept 2: Exogenous Intervention

This concept suggests that exogenous state-building and military intervention is ultimatelyaimed at achieving the desired “international order.” Post-conflict reconstruction is under-taken by outsiders to rebuild collapsed states, and aim “to establish comprehensive and

112 Jabareen

lasting structures to rationalize competition within society by establishing a legitimate andaccountable state” (Dodge 2006: 190). Dodge regards the case of Iraq as

“…an external intervention into a foreign territory that attempts to legitimate itself interms of the betterment of the population it claims to be helping. By its very nature,and despite claims to the contrary, external state-building is bound to be ‘top down,’driven by dynamics, personnel and ideologies that have their origins completelyoutside the society they are operating in” (Dodge 2006: 190).

Moreover, there is wide consensus that rebuilding and reconstructing failed states isessential to the peace of the world and that when a state fails, the UN, internationalorganizations, the major powers, and “coalitions of the willing” all have a ‘strategic’ and‘moral’ responsibility to intervene on behalf of beleaguered citizens and to reduce the loss oflife (Rotberg 2003).

The post-conflict agenda justifies exogenous intervention in failed states or “troubleregions” in order to help the nations and their states be “safe,” “stable,” “democratic,” and“free.” In the case of Iraq, President Bush held that “Iraq is plenty capable of being a strong,independent nation,” and clarified that it was the USA’s objective “to help them become thatnation” (Al Zaman Newspaper May 18, 2004). “As we have done before,” he explainedelsewhere, “America is fighting on the side of liberty—liberty in Iraq, and liberty in theMiddle East” (President Bush's Radio Address on Iraq April 10, 2004).

It is important to note that exogenous intervention and the reconstruction that follows areconceived of as a major strategy to counter terrorism. According to President Bush, “Ademocratic Iraq has ruthless enemies because terrorists know the stakes in that country. Theyknow that a free Iraq in the heart of the Middle East will be a decisive blow against theirambitions for that region” (President Bush’s Address to the United Nations General Assem-bly September 21, 2004). In this way, reconstruction is meant to contribute to the establish-ment of a New Middle East, a region seen as the source of considerable ‘trouble.’ Whenasking Congress for supplemental funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, President Bush laid outhis general strategy for the countries and the region: “By helping the Iraqi and Afghanpeople build democratic nations,” he explained, “the United States and our allies arebringing liberty and hope to a troubled region” (Executive Office of the President 2003).Elsewhere, he made the following statement:

“The advance of freedom always carries a cost paid by the bravest among us. Americamourns the losses to our nation and to many others. And today I assure every friend ofAfghanistan and Iraq and every enemy of liberty, we will stand with the people ofAfghanistan and Iraq until their hopes of freedom and security are fulfilled. These twonations will be a model for the broader Middle East, a region where millions have beendenied basic human rights and simple justice. For too long, many nations, includingmy own, tolerated, even excused oppression in the Middle East in the name ofstability. The oppression became common, but stability never arrived. We must takea different approach. We must help the reformers of the Middle East as they work forfreedom and strive to build a community of peaceful, democratic nations” (PresidentBush’s address to the United Nations General Assembly September 21, 2004).

After noting the international community’s need for functioning states in order to imposeorder, Dodge notes that both

“…Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I and George W Bush in the aftermathof the attacks of 9/11—were faced with a similar conundrum: how to protect the USA

Post- and Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction of Failed States 113

by imposing order on an international system they perceived to be both fractured anddangerously unstable. For both, the dangers of instability came from the periphery ofthe system. The dilemma they faced was the extent to which restructuring was neededin order to secure long-term stability…. both Wilson and Bush sought to reimposestability by reworking the existing Westphalian notion of state sovereignty, thenapplying it to the developing world” (Dodge 2006: 190).

Fukuyama argues, “reconstruction requires rapid, massive outside intervention to stabi-lize conflicts, rebuild infrastructure, and deal with humanitarian issues. The local govern-ment,” he explains, “is, by definition, unable to provide these functions itself, and…is oftencompletely bypassed as foreign military forces, aid agencies, and NGOs flood into thecountry” (Fukuyama 2006: 7). He also holds that the efforts of nation building in Iraq andAfghanistan “recall the policies of the Cold War, when the United States was invested in thedevelopment of new states for strategic purposes in the contexts of a larger global struggle”(Fukuyama 2006:19). “As the Cold War became a global struggle,” he continues, “Amer-icans inside and outside the government saw colonial and newly independent areas of theglobe as key areas of competition with the Soviet Union” (Fukuyama 2006: 21). While UNintervention tends to be a low profile, small footprint approach to nation building and takesplace in less demanding circumstances, US intervention is consistently more ambitious andgrandiose, with rhetoric that tends toward the grandiloquent (RAND 2005). The USA oftenbecomes the victim of its own rhetoric when its higher standards are not met. According tothe study of RAND, UN-led nation-building missions enjoy a higher success rate than US-led efforts (RAND 2005: 32).

Concept 3: Sequencing

Many scholars agree that post-conflict reconstruction or state building should have a specificsequencing (Huntington 1968; Zakaria 2003; Carothers and Ottaway 2004; Fukuyama2007). Usually in the sequencing, security and order come first followed by economicdevelopment and only then democracy (Fukuyama 2007). There also seems to be consensusthat reconstruction with the wrong sequencing is risky. This is because although it mayfreeze the conflict temporarily, it will not prevent it from reemerging in the near future.

Fukuyama argues that the state-building process must start with the creation of a coherentnation, “something that usually requires changing borders or moving populations and hasseldom in human history been accomplished without violence” (Fukuyama 2007:10).Fromhis perspective, “state-building in a strict sense is about creating the Weberian monopoly oflegitimate violence over a defined territory and therefore has at its core the concentration ofthe means of coercion—in practical terms, armies and police—under the control of a centralpolitical authority” (Fukuyama 2007:11).This is followed by the development of other stateinstitutions, such as a taxing authority and agencies providing different types of publicgoods. Ultimately, Fukuyama believes that the liberal rule of law and democracy limits thecentral state’s authority to coerce, as liberalism subordinates its actions to a set of transparentand universal rules and democracy ensures that the exercise of power reflects popular will(Fukuyama 2007:11). If “the international community insists that state-building be accom-plished under liberal and democratic rules, rather than permitting the sequencing of state-building prior to the promotion of rule of law and democracy,” Fukuyama concludes, “it maysimply be freezing conflicts that will eventually reemerge, thereby threatening whateverdemocracy and rule of law has been achieved in the meantime” (Fukuyama 2007:12).Similarly, Mansfield (2007: 5) holds that “whenever possible, efforts to promote democracy

114 Jabareen

should try to follow a sequence of building institutions before encouraging mass competitiveelections. Democratizing in the wrong sequence not only risks bloodshed in the short term,but also the mobilization of durable illiberal forces with the capacity to block democraticconsolidation over the long term.”

According to Fukuyama, “Institutions matter,” and the issues of state strength or capacityand institutional quality are crucial. “Many economists have concluded that some of themost important variables affecting development are not economic but institutional andpolitical in nature,” he explains (Fukuyama 2004a,b: 29). Nonetheless, he concludes, “therecord…is not an impressive one, and in many cases our interventions have actually madethings worse” (Fukuyama 2004a,b: 20). For Larry Diamond, the existence of a state is afundamental condition for post-conflict reconstruction. In the case of Iraq, he argues, this hasbeen “…a big reason why the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] was unable to spendmost of the $18.6 billion for Iraqi reconstruction appropriated by Congress last fall. And itexplains why a country must first have a state before it can become a democracy. Theprimary requirement of a state is that it holds a monopoly on the use of violence. By thatmeasure, the body that the United States transferred power to in Baghdad on June 28 mayhave been a government—but it was not a state” (Diamond 2006: 176–177).

Moreover, according to Lieutenant General Jay Garner, who was appointed in 2003 asDirector of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq, sequencingin the case of the reconstruction of Iraq gave first priority to military actions and placed thebuilding of institutions lower on the list. “The Coalition must do five things,” he explainedthat “(1) destroy the insurgents; (2) rapidly re-establish the regular army; (3) stimulate theIraqi economy by cash infusions disseminated directly to families; (4) share oil revenuesequitably among all segments of the population; and (5) through a constitution written byIraqis, establish a carefully contrived mechanism for national governance based on thefederal system, with power distributed between a relatively weak central government anda number of empowered constituent territorial governments that reflect the ethnic andreligious divisions of the country” (Garner 2004: 6).

Conrad Crane suggests, “in the post-conflict posture following decisive military oper-ations against a target state, we normally envision a transitional reconstruction period duringwhich peace and a viable state are established” (Crane 2004: 27). Accordingly, the recon-struction period is divided into four distinct phases: (1) provision of security, (2) stabiliza-tion, (3) institution building, and (4) handover/redeploy. Moreover, reconstruction embracesthree vital objectives that must be met generally in the order shown: (a) achievement ofsecurity within the target state, (b) stabilization of local commerce, government, and servicesso that the populace can resume the rudiments of daily life, and (c) rebuilding the economyand the institutions of government while handing over the reins of authority to appropriatecivilian institutions or indigenous officials, and redeploying forces as quickly as possible.According to USAID (2005), these principles sum up the characteristics of successfulassistance for the achievement of development objectives (including economic growth,democracy, governance, and social transition) and are fundamental to the success ofassistance as an instrument of US foreign policy and national security.

Concept 4: Security

The Iraq and Afghanistan reconstruction efforts clearly demonstrate that security is a crucialfactor in reconstruction. In a debate session on Afghanistan at the 45th Munich SecurityConference, German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung stated: “I think it is absolutelynecessary we should implement the process (of security and reconstruction) in Afghanistan

Post- and Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction of Failed States 115

even more effectively. There can be no development without security, but there can be nosecurity without development either.”1

According to Hard Lessons (SIGIR 2009: 333), the first principle of contingency reliefand reconstruction operations to be drawn from Iraqi reconstruction is “Security is necessaryfor large-scale reconstruction to succeed.” The same report concludes: “a successful recon-struction program requires a balancing of security, political, and economic interests. Recon-struction cannot proceed on a large scale without the requisite security to protect thosecarrying out the projects and those overseeing them” (SIGIR 2009: 331).

Concept 5: Reconstruction Reduces Conflict

This concept suggests that a major role of post-conflict reconstruction is to reduce conflictwithin the failed state. It is commonly believed that post-conflict policies may offer thegreatest opportunities for reducing the risk of repeat conflict. Collier and Hoeffler hold: “aidreduces the risk of conflict by raising the growth rate. A higher growth rate directly reducesthe risk of conflict, and cumulatively, by raising the level of income, further reduces the risk.These effects also appear to apply in post-conflict situations” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004:18). According to their model of the effect of military intervention on risk, external military(peace-keeping) interventions appear to be highly cost-effective (Collier and Hoeffler 2002,2003). Bigombe et al. (2002) also find that development is significantly more effective inreducing the risk of conflict during the first post-conflict decade than it is in less focusedsituations of conflict prevention.

Reconstruction is therefore perceived as “an extension of political strategy”: “If war, asClausewitz said, is an extension of politics by other means,” concluded Hard Lessons, “sotoo is relief and reconstruction an extension of political, economic, and military strategy. Inthis regard, there is a distinct difference between pursuing reconstruction to catalyze long-term economic growth and deploying reconstruction to support a counterinsurgency cam-paign” (SIGIR 2009: 333).

According to RAND (2005), civil wars reduce prospective economic output by anaverage of 2.2% per year for the duration of the conflict. However, once peace is restored,economic activity resumes, and, in a number of cases, the economy has grown (RAND2005). Post-conflict military intervention is therefore highly cost-effective (Collier andHoeffler 2004; RAND 2005). Moreover, a recent study reveals a UN success rate of sevenout of eight societies left peaceful and six out of eight left democratic, which substantiatesthe view that nation-building can be an effective means of terminating conflicts, insuringagainst their reoccurrence, and promoting democracy (RAND 2005).

Concept 6: Westernization of Failed States: Democratization and Liberalization

According to this concept, the westernization of failed states through democratization andliberalization is an important aim of the reconstruction mission. Proponents of reconstructionregard the project as a major force contributing to the democratization of the native people of thefailed state. The project therefore aspires to “civilize” them and allow them to internalize theconcepts of democracy and capitalist market competition. Moreover, the western literature, andthe literature produced in the USA in particular, commonly holds that the model of reconstructionshould follow themodel of western liberal-democratic political culture. For example, Ottaway and

1 “Germany calls for more efforts to enhance security, reconstruction in Afghanistan.” Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/08/content_10783715.htm

116 Jabareen

Mair (2004: 1) assume that “it is now a universal rule that failing states must be rebuilt consistentwith the liberal democratic model, this is a relatively new idea.” Accordingly, the political andeconomic reconstruction of the failed states should be “remarkably similar regardless of the sizeand characteristics of the country being rebuilt” (Ottaway andMair 2004: 1). For this reason, theyhold that the international community should consider accepting “proto-state” formations we seeemerging in the west (Ottaway and Mair 2004).

In the aftermath of World War II, the reconstruction of Germany and Japan was aimed atfostering the emergence of democratic regimes (RAND 2005). On the eve of the invasion ofIraq, President Bush argued “that if setting up democracy in Japan and Germany after WW IIwas successful, then it should also be successful in Iraq” (Bridoux 2010). The early post-Cold War UN-led operations in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique fol-lowed a similar pattern. In each case, the UN mission’s responsibilities included initiating anexpeditious process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; encouraging politicalreconciliation; holding democratic elections; and overseeing the inauguration of a newnational government (RAND 2005: xvii; UN 1999; see also: Fusato 2005). Cambodia wasalso the first instance in which the United Nations became responsible for helping govern astate in transition from conflict to peace and democracy. The desired results of this approachinclude stability, democratization, and economic growth. The foreign military presence orthe presence of international peacekeepers can suppress renewed conflict and promoteeconomic growth rather than merely providing limited economic assistance (RAND2005). The common belief in the post-conflict reconstruction literature is that “democracycan be exported to non-Western societies” (RAND 2005: 33).

However, recent literature suggests that the post-conflict reconstruction efforts infailed states have met with limited achievement in Africa (Englebert and Tull 2008).In part, this is due to three flawed assumptions on which reconstruction efforts arepredicated: (1) that Western state institutions can be transferred to Africa; (2) that ashared understanding of “failure” and “reconstruction” exists among donors andAfrican leaders; and (3) that donors are capable of rebuilding African states. Putsimply, their ambitious goals are inconsistent with their financial, military, andsymbolic means (Englebert and Tull 2008). The recent report of the OSIGIR explainsthe failures of the reconstruction of Iraq as follows:

“The Marshall Plan was structured to restore the remnants of a democratic system. InIraq, the United States sought to implant an entirely new system of government,building democracy where a dictatorship or monarchy had long prevailed. The nationsin Western Europe had homogeneous societies, functioning institutions, a tradition ofdemocratic governance, and advanced technical knowledge. They were also at peace.Iraq lacked a history of democratic government, had weak public institutions, andnever had a diversified market economy [see Machado 2007]. Violence in Iraq,stemming chiefly from sectarian disputes, undermined every aspect of the reconstruc-tion effort. Above all, the Iraq program, unlike the Marshall Plan, never receivedadequate resources to match its ambitious vision” (SIGIR 2009: 161).

Following World War II, Europe was devastated and the Communist parties of WesternEurope were gaining popularity. In June 1947, US Secretary of State George C. Marshallannounced that the USAwould provide economic aid and equipment to help the economiesof Europe recover and rebuild themselves, a program that came to be known as the MarshallPlan. Katherine Marshall describes the Marshall Plan as “a huge package of assistance lentby the United States (with a little Canadian assistance) to Western Europe to assist inindustrial reconstruction and the reinforcement of the Western alliance as a viable alternative

Post- and Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction of Failed States 117

to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact” (Marshall 2008: xvi). Herbert Ellison and JamesHuntley offer the following observations:

“Under General MacArthur in Japan, and under British, French and American tutelagein Germany, the defeated peoples learned the values, habits and practices of democ-racy and free economic life….In both conquered countries, the thirst for modern ideaswas almost palpable. People learned fast and restructured their societies and govern-ments to reflect new ideas. The process of social interchange in the West soon becameself-perpetuating. Today, Germany and Japan are wholly different nations—firmdemocratic allies in the common effort to aid the less prosperous, to turn the wheelsof the world economy, and to help bear the burdens of international peacekeeping(Ellison and Huntley 1991).

At the time, Secretary of State George Marshall argued that

“There is convincing evidence that the people of Western Europe want to preservetheir free society and the heritage we share with them. To make that choice conclusivethey need our assistance…In helping them we will be helping ourselves—because, inthe larger sense, our national interests coincide with those of a free and prosperousEurope” (US Congress 1947: 9 in Jackson 2002).

Marshall declared that if European countries are

“Left to their own resources there will be…no escape from economic distress sointense, social discontent so violent, political confusion so widespread, and hope of thefuture so shattered that the historic base of Western civilization, of which we are bybelief and inheritance an integral part, will take on new form in the image of thetyranny we fought to destroy in Germany” (Jackson 2002: 250; Pogue 1987: 240).

According to Jackson, the Marshall “program is cast not merely as an initiative foreconomic recovery, but for civilizational recovery as well” (Jackson 2002: 250). He arguesthat: “in a way, postwar reconstruction created a new actor in world politics: Westerncivilization. This postwar new order is based on liberalism, multilateralism, and democraticsolidarity. The literature suggests that the success in Marshall Plan was due to the existenceof what Western Europe had before the first Marshall Plan”skills, habits, motivations,customs, and procedures required for the operation of a modern economy” (Jackson 2002:256). The lack of these attributes in other regions or countries resulted in a failure ofreconstruction (Machado 2007: 118).

Daniel Brumberg (2004: 35) holds that “it has been the practice of U.S. presidentialadministrations over the last 10 years to pursue a liberalization strategy in the regionwhereby various democracy aid programs were employed to encourage the emergence ofpolitical rights and civil liberties through civil society organizations.” In Iraq on September19, 2003, Paul Bremer enacted the now-infamous Order 39, announcing that 200 Iraqi statecompanies would be privatized and that foreign firms could acquire 100% ownership ofIraqi banks, mines, and factories, and allowing these firms to move 100% of their profits outof Iraq. The Economist declared the new rules to be a “capitalist dream.” Americanintentions for the Iraqi economy are clear. In the words of former Defense Secretary DonaldH. Rumsfeld, “Market systems will be favored, not Stalinist command systems.” In thisspirit, the American-led coalition promulgated a series of new laws meant to transform theeconomy. Scott Castle, the general counsel of the Coalition Provisional Authority suggeststhat “We believe the C.P.A. can undertake significant economic measures in Iraq particularlywhere those measures support coalition objectives and the security of coalition forces,” and

118 Jabareen

that there is “a close nexus between the economic health of Iraq and the security of Iraq”(Eviatar 2004: 1). In the words of President Bush:

“We have great respect for the people of Iraq and for all Arab peoples—respect fortheir culture and for their history and for the contribution they can make to the world.We believe that democracy will allow these gifts to flourish.” (President Bush reaf-firms commitments in Iraq, The Pentagon, Arlington, VA, USA, May 10, 2004).

Concept 7: Multi-level Actors

Since World War II, international actors such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and theUNDP—in addition to donor governments and international and national NGOs—have paidincreasing attention and committed specific resources to the task of post-conflict reconstruc-tion (Sulatan 2005). The UNDP emphasizes the importance of a “collective” approach toresponding to the needs of post-conflict countries and to helping those who require quickand effective support to achieve a sustainable peace (Sulatan 2005: 4).

Concept 8: Holistic Approach and Inclusive Themes of Reconstruction

Post-conflict reconstruction should follow a holistic approach and promote inclusive themesand principles in order to rebuild shattered, war-torn countries.

Themes of Reconstruction

Post-conflict reconstruction should include four interrelated basic components:

1 Political reconstruction, or the building of a legitimate and capable state. Developing thecapacity of people and systems is as important to reconstruction as bricks and mortar.The CPA’s reconstruction program focused chiefly on large infrastructure projects aimedat improving service delivery (Diamond 2006: 176). However, little of its money was setaside to boost government capacity (SIGIR 2009: 333). Political reconstruction mustalso focus on capacity-building, which aims to strengthen local institutions, transfertechnical skills, and promote appropriate policies (USAID 2005; UNDP (2006: 3), and isbased on the premise that “effective intervention requires that there is a functioninggovernance structure accepted by the population and supported by the internationalcommunity” (UNDP 2006: 3). USAID’s major strategy for Iraq calls for the establish-ment of democratic governance, for engaging people outside the political process, forexpanding political participation, and for building stable, pluralistic, and effectivenational institutions capable of safeguarding the interests of all people (UNDP 2006: 1).

2 Economic reconstruction, including the rebuilding of the country’s physical infrastruc-ture and the creation of rules and institutions that enable a market economy (Diamond2006: 176). The UNDP (2006: 3) warns, “peace must be restored for economic inter-vention to be meaningful.” The main principles of the economic strategies includepromoting a self-sustaining economy with the capacity to deliver essential services,restoring essential infrastructure; reforming economy so that it can be self-sustaining inthe future, and building institutional capacity to rejoin the international economiccommunity and improve the general welfare of all Iraqis (USAID 2006).

Moreover, as the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, a major goal ofeconomic development is to promote a new liberal economy based on the capitalist

Post- and Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction of Failed States 119

agenda of the USA and the West. The economic aims of such development are thefollowing: to create a framework by which these countries can participate in internationaltrade and the global economy while supporting foreign investment in an appropriatemanner; to develop a legal and regulatory environment that will enable the private sectorto grow; and to support privatization. In the case of Iraq, the strategy of USAID is to“continue to receive support in the privatization of state owned assets, a delicate butessential move to increase the role of the private sector in Iraq’s economic growth”(USAID 2006: 4).

The main idea behind community reconstruction has been to promote security. In thecase of Iraq, USAID recommends the support of “community-level action programswhich promote dialogue and decision-making by bringing together different segments ofcommunities prone to conflict” (USAID 2006: 2). Such programs should “supportpublic broadcasts that address conflict issues as well as groups and individuals thatpromote cooperation.” USAID also holds that “infrastructure rehabilitation willprovide unemployed and disengaged young men—often a key recruiting groundfor the insurgency—with opportunities for employment and economic advance-ment. Restored urban infrastructure, including sewage lines and water mains, willshow Iraqis concrete improvements while providing the foundation for localdevelopment”(USAID 2006: 2).

3 Social reconstruction, or reconstructing local communities with an eye toward address-ing urgent needs (UNDP 2006). The concept of community reconstruction has gainedpopularity since the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. It is believed that reconstructinglocal communities with the help of their leaders can play a key role in promoting securityand stability in the country. Social reconstruction also includes the creation or enhance-ment of a vibrant civil society, as well as the promotion of a political culture that fostersvoluntary cooperation and limitations on state power. Such support of civil society aimsto legitimize international and exogenous intervention. To this end, USAID’s Office ofTransition Initiatives instituted more than 50 small grants to assist local NGOs withactivities that are critical to the implementation of transition timelines in areas such ascivic education, civil society and media development, women’s participation, conflictmitigation, and transitional justice (USAID 2006: Report 42). In addition, the NationalEndowment for Democracy (NED) provided grants to the International RepublicanInstitute and the National Democratic Institute to foster civic participation in the politicalprocess, promote political party development and coalition building, and build thecapacity of NGOs. NED provided grants to NGOs working in Iraq to support humanrights awareness training for youth leaders, women’s rights monitoring projects, wom-en’s political and legal literacy, and the promotion of democratic public sector institu-tions (USAID 2006: Report 41). USAID holds that supporting locally driven efforts andhelping communities work together toward their own goals encourages inter-ethniccooperation. It also calls for supporting and encouraging collective citizen and govern-ment decision making to ultimately contribute to enhancing community welfare, resolv-ing conflicts, addressing gender-based disparities, and making governments moreaccountable and transparent (USAID 2006: 3). Diamond (2006: 176) argues that “socialcapital matters” and that “working through indigenous networks seems to increasecommunity acceptance and to provide a higher and more lasting degree of local securitythan military or private-security protection alone could achieve.”

4 Provision of general security—Security is a crucial precondition for the success of large-scale reconstruction (SIGIR 2009) and for the establishment of a safe and orderlyenvironment (Diamond 2006; SIGIR 2009).

120 Jabareen

Principles and Mechanism of Reconstruction

The principles and mechanisms of reconstruction assistance efforts are as follows:

1. Indigenous priorities: programs should be geared to indigenous priorities andneeds (SIGIR 2009). Hard Lessons suggests planning and implementing variousscales of projects in accordance with preferences determined by indigenousofficers (SIGIR 2009: 333). The UNDP (2006) suggests that the recoveryprogram should engage the local population in a dialogue that ensures not onlycapacity building but their full ownership of recommended interventions. Tothis end, the international community must work with local actors to rehabili-tate basic physical infrastructure, including health and education services, waterand sanitation systems, roads, telecommunications facilities, and irrigationsystems.

2. Integrative management: organizing the interagency system for contingency relief andreconstruction operations (SIGIR 2009).

3. Resource redistribution: many scholars argue that it is imperative to reconstruct stateinstitutions and to reorient and redirect resources and capacity at all levels of govern-ment. For example, during the reconstruction of post-apartheid South Africa, institu-tional changes were also directed toward dismantling the resource distribution legaciesof the apartheid era (Visser 2001). With the advent of post-apartheid national gover-nance, a number of policy frameworks aimed at planning and funding strategies forreconstructing these cities and delivering basic needs to the poor have emerged (Bondand Khosa 1999; Bond 2000).

4. Selectivity: allocate resources based on need, local commitment and foreign policyinterests (USAID 2005).

5. Ownership: build on the leadership, participation and commitment of the countryunder reconstruction and its people (USAID 2005).

6. Partnership: collaborate closely with governments, communities, donors,NGOs, the private sector, international organizations, and universities (USAID2005).

7. Sustainability: design programs to ensure their enduring impact (USAID 2005).8. Assessment: conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local con-

ditions (USAID 2005).9. Results: focus resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable and strategically-

focused objectives (USAID 2005).10. Flexibility: adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and max-

imize efficiency (USAID 2005).11. Accountability: design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective

checks and balances to guard against corruption (USAID 2005).12. Multi-scale: reconstruction activities are carried out on a number of scales. Some

of the most important reconstruction efforts take place at local levels in order toreduce hostility. Such projects include the following: repairing and refurbishingwater and sewage lines; cleaning highways by removing waste and debris;transporting water to remote villages; purchasing equipment for local policestations; upgrading schools and clinics; purchasing school supplies; removingordnance from public spaces, including schools; and refurbishing playgrounds,youth centers, libraries, other recreational facilities, and mosques (USAID 2005:Report 12).

Post- and Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction of Failed States 121

Concept 9: Socio-Spatial Structure

This concept takes into consideration the spatial distribution of social, ethnic, sectarian, and tribalgroups in countries under reconstruction and is critical for effectively dealing with intergroupconflicts with the potential to dramatically affect reconstruction projects. Recent lessons fromIraq and Afghanistan highlight this concept’s immense importance. In Iraq for example, Sunniareas have been more antagonistic to reconstruction efforts, while Kurdish areas have been morewelcoming. Nonetheless, this concept remains unaddressed by the literature, which treats entirecountries under reconstruction as monolithic and homogenous areas.

Discussion: The Conceptual Framework of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The above conceptualization analysis revealed eight key concepts that together compose theconceptual framework of post-conflict reconstruction. Each concept has a specific role andtheoretical function in this framework, but it is the concept of the failed state that constitutesits core and provides the desired legitimacy for exogenous intervention. Without thisconcept, making a case for intervention becomes much more difficult. Exogenous interven-tion, in turn, is a precondition and important justification for reconstruction and nation-building missions. Following intervention, mission sequencing, or setting the order ofactions to be undertaken, is crucial for the progress and success of the reconstruction effort.

The concept of security is also central to post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building.Indeed, without security, the entire state-building mission appears to be destined for failure, assecurity provides the necessary environment for the success of reconstruction. Dodge (2006:191) holds that “it is from the nature and quality of the security platform that all other attempts atstate-building emerge” (see also: Tilly 1992). One fundamental assumption inherent to post-conflict reconstruction is that reconstruction, and the process of economic development andgrowth it aspires to usher in, reduces the risk of internal conflict and future civil war. In this way,it is believed that development, economic prosperity, productivity, and improved income andstandard of living in a country creates conditions for peace. One of the leading proponents ofpost-conflict reconstruction, the World Bank, sees its role in post-conflict reconstruction assupporting “the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding ofthe socioeconomic framework of the society” (The World Bank 1998: 14).

The political agenda of post-conflict reconstruction is to transform a “failed state” into a“normal” state, according to the western liberal understanding of the term. This westerniza-tion of failed states is sought through the democratization and liberalization of their society,economy, and political structure. The philosophy underlying the grand missions of recon-struction and nation building is based on Western concepts of justice, statehood, and culture.The ultimate hope is that reconstruction will yield “a new” state—“a new Iraq” and “a newMiddle East”—that is “like the West,” and eventually bring about a new internationalpolitical order and a reconstructed hegemony.

Reconstruction missions usually have a grand agenda for transforming the “failed state”into “a new” entity, and to this end, the mission addresses social, political, economic, andcultural aspects of life in the country. In order to ensure the macro- and micro-levels ofbuilding a new society, the spectrum of reconstruction undertaken ranges from the construc-tion of bridges and sewer systems to the establishment of new parliaments and new civilsocieties. In order to ensure the success of such missions, there is a need for multi-levelactors and stakeholders, from donor countries and international organizations and fromcommunities and organizations in the country under reconstruction.

122 Jabareen

Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction

Today, a number of “post-conflict countries,” such as Iraq and Afghanistan, are stillexperiencing intense political, social, ethnic, and religious conflicts; high levels of violenceand human rights abuses; and large scale population displacements. As a result, in contrast tothe prevalent paradigm of post-conflict reconstruction discussed above, the reconstructionmission is taking place amidst deep ongoing conflict. The conceptual framework of ongoingconflict reconstruction consists of the same component concepts as post-conflict reconstruc-tion, but has different emphases. For example, the concept of security lies at the heart ofongoing conflict reconstruction and is understood as playing a decisive role in determiningthe level success. In contrast to post-World War II Germany in which security was not amajor issue, in Iraq, after years of occupation, security still remains the major concern of theelected Iraqi government, the American forces, and their allies.

Conclusion

This study offers the following significant conclusions:

1. Based on the assumption that PCR is a complexity phenomenon, this study offers amultifaceted and multidisciplinary method and conceptual framework for understandingPCR. The component concepts of PCR are interlinked, and the PCR framework is morethan just a sum of its parts.

2. PCR can serve as a tool to critically analyze reconstruction missions and to assessongoing and post-conflict reconstruction missions around the world, such as thoseunderway in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip.

3. This conceptual framework can serve as a tool for scholars and policy makers to assesscurrent and future reconstruction projects. It provides the ability to generate holisticpictures of existing PCR missions and their chances of success in the future. It alsosheds light on the inherent contradictions of such missions, such as the fact that whilereconstruction requires security, the continuing insurgency and a lack of security makesit impossible for real reconstruction to take place. This contradiction is not coincidentalbut rather stems from the conscious strategy of those trying to prevent the USA fromrestructuring local state and society. The conceptual framework throws this contradic-tion into sharp relief, and the greatest challenge for proponents of reconstruction hasbeen, and will continue to be to try to overcome it. As they do, it can be assumed thatinsurgent forces will continue to try to thwart their efforts.

References

Bigombe, B., Collier, P., & Sambanis, N. (2002). Policies for building post-conflict peace. Journal of AfricanEconomies, 9(3), 322–347.

Bond, P. (2000). Elite transitions: From apartheid to neoliberalism in South Africa. London: Pluto Press.Bond, P., & KHOSA, M. (1999) An RDP audit: a report to the African National Congress national executive

committee. Graduate School of Public and Development Management, Johannesburg and The HumanSciences Research Council of South Africa, Pretoria.

Bonta, M., & Protevi, J. (2004). Deleuze and geophilosophy: A guide and glossary. Edinburgh: EdinburghUniversity Press.

Bridoux, J. (2010). American foreign policy and postwar reconstruction: Comparing Japan and Iraq.London: Routledge.

Post- and Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction of Failed States 123

Carothers, T., & Marina O. (2004). States at risk—Stabilization and state-building by external intervention.Retrieved January 2004 at www.carnegieendowment.org.

Collier, P., & Anke, H. (2003). Military spending in post-conflict societies. Oxford: Centre for the Study ofAfrican Economies. mimeo.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2002).Military expenditure: threats, aid and arms races. Policy Research WorkingPaper 2927. Washington: World Bank.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). The challenge of reducing the global incidence of civil war. ChallengePaper. Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University,Copenhagen, p. 22.

Crane, C. (2004). Peacekeeping, nation-building and stabilization. In MatthewsJ. L. (Ed.) Winning the war bywinning the peace: Strategy for conflict and post-conflict in the 21st century: Conference report. FifteenthAnnual Strategy Conference of the Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 13–15, 2004 . p. 28. Retrieved from http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0412matthews.pdf.

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1991). What Is philosophy? New York: Columbia University Press.Diamond. L. (2006). What went wrong and right. In F. Fukuyama (ed.). Nation-building: beyond Afghanistan

and Iraq (pp. 173–195). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.DoD IG Report 07-INTEL-04, “Report on the pre-Iraqi war activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy,” February 9, 2007, and Hard Lessons.Dodge, T. (2006). Iraq: The contradictions of exogenous state-building in historical perspective. Third World

Quarterly, 27(1), 187–200Ellison H., & Huntley, J. (1991). For a Marshall Plan of modern ideas and practices: The Soviets must learn

entirely new ways of thinking and acting. International Herald Tribune, September 13, 1991.Englebert, P., & Denis, D. M. (2008). Postconflict reconstruction in Africa: Flawed ideas about failed states.

International Security, 32(4), 106–139.Eviatar, D. (2004) Free-market Iraq? Not so fast. New York Times, January 10, 2004.Executive Office of the President—Office of Management and Budget. Washington, D.C. Statement of Admin-

istration Policy—S. 1689 and H.R. 3289—Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq andAfghanistan Security and Reconstruction for FY 2004, and for Other Purposes. October, 13, 2003.

Fukuyama, F. (2004a). State-building: Governance and world order in the 21st century. Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press.

Fukuyama, F. (2004b). The imperative of state-building. Journal of Democracy, 15, 27.Fukuyama, F. (ed). (2006). Nation-building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press.Fukuyama, F. (2007). Liberalism versus state-building. Journal of Democracy, 18(3), 10–13.Fusato, M. (2005). Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants. In G. Burgess & H.

Burgess (Eds.), Beyond intractability. Boulder: Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado.Garner, J. (2004). Conference Keynote Address. In J. L. Matthews (Ed.) Winning the war by winning the

peace: Strategy for conflict and post-conflict in the 21st century: Conference report. Fifteenth AnnualStrategy Conference of the Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 13–15, p. 5–7. Retrieved from http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0412matthews.pdf.

Glanz, J., & Christian, M. T., 14.12.08. http://www.nytimes.com).Herbst, J. (2004). Let them fail: State failure in theory and practice: Implications for policy. In R. I. Rotberg

(Ed.), When states fail: Causes and consequences (pp. 302–318). Princeton: Princeton University Press.Huntington, P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.Jabareen, Y. (2009). Building conceptual framework: Philosophy, definitions and procedure. International

Journal of Qualitative Methods, 8(4), 49–62.Jackson, P. T. (2002). The West is the best: Occidentalism and postwar German reconstruction. In D. M. Green

(Ed.), Constructivism and comparative politics (pp. 230–260). New York: M.E. Sharp.Kaufman, E. (1998). Introduction. In E. Kaufman & K. J. Heller (Eds.), Deleuze and Guattari: New mapping

in politics, philosophy and culture (pp. 3–19). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Lambach, D. (2007). Close encounters in the third dimension: The regional effects of state failure. In D.

Lambach, & T. Debiel (Eds.), State failure revisited I: Globalization of security and neighborhood effects.Institute for Development and Peace. INEF Report 87/2007. http://inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/Report87.pdf.

Machado, B. (2007). In search of a usable past: The Marshall plan and postwar reconstruction today (pp.117–118). Lexington: George C. Marshall Foundation.

Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. L. (2007). The sequencing “fallacy”. Journal of Democracy, 18(3), 5–10.Marshall. K. (2008). The World Bank: From reconstruction to development to equity. London: Routledge.Milliken, J., & Krause, K. (2002). State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons

and Strategies. Development and Change, 33(5), 753–774.

124 Jabareen

Ottaway, M. (2002). Rebuilding state institutions in collapsed states. Development and Change, 33(5), 1001–1023.

Ottaway, M., & Mair, S. (2004). States at risk and failed states: putting security first. In: Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace: Policy Outlook, democracy and Rule of Law Project. Retrieved from www.carnegieendowment.org.

RAND; Dobbins, J., Jones, S. G., Crane, K., Rathmell, A., Steele, B., Teltschik, R., & Timils, A. (2005)America’s role in nation-building: From Germany to Iraq (p. 1). Santa Monica: RAND.

Rotberg, R. I. (2003). The failure and collapse of nation-states: Breakdown, prevention, and repair. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Rule of Law Project (September 2004) Retrieved June 2005 from www.carnegieendowment.org.SIGIR (2009). Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. The Office of the Special Inspector

General for Iraq Reconstruction (led by Stuart W. Bowen Jr).Sulatan, B. (2005). Post-Saddam Iraq: deconstructing a regime, reconstructing a nation. Third World Quar-

terly, 26(4–5), 571–591.Tilly, C. (1992). Coercion, capital, and European states: AD 990–1992. Oxford: Blackwell.UNDP (2006). Post-conflict reconstruction of communities and socio-economic development. UNDP Issue

Paper Prepared for the TICAD Conference on Consolidation of Peace, February 16–17, 2006, AddisAbaba, Ethiopia.

USAID (2005). Principles of development and reconstruction assistance. Retrieved from http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_nineprinciples.html.

USAID (2006). Iraq Transition Strategy Plan 2006–2008. Washington: USAID.Visser, G. (2001). Social justice, integrated development planning and post-apartheid urban reconstruction.

Urban Studies, 38, 1673–1699.Weber, M. (1964). The theory of social and economic organization (p. 154). New York: The Free Press.Zakaria, F. (2003). The future of freedom: Illiberal democracy at home and abroad. New York: W.W. Norton.

Post- and Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction of Failed States 125