CONFESSINGTOANIMMORALACT:
ConsequencestoMoralBeliefsandDispositions
JoelCooper
PrincetonUniversity
Whataretheconsequencesofconfessingtoanimmoralact?Inthispaper,wewill
considerthedilemmaofpeoplewhoconfesstoimmoralactsthattheydidnotcommit.
Inlawenforcement,analltoocommonoccurrenceisforpolicetoconvincesuspectsto
confesstoacrimethattheyactuallydidnotcommit.Instancesofphysicallycoerced
confessionsnotwithstanding,ourfocusisontheuncoercedconfessioninwhichthe
accusediscajoledtoadmittoacriminalaction.Peoplemaybeaccusedofmoral
transgressionsinanynumberofsituationssuchascheatinginschoolorcommitting
fraudintheworkplace.Inthispaper,wewillpresentevidencethatsituationalevents
canleadinnocentpeopletomakefalseconfessions.Wewillthenpresentaviewofthe
psychologicalconsequencesoffalseconfessions.Wewillfocusonpeople’sbeliefthat
theyactuallycommittedthemoraltransgressionandwewillconsiderthedownstream
consequencestotheirself‐attributionsofdispositionalmorality.
OnJuly8,1997policeinNorfolk,VAapproachedUSNavysailorDaniel
Williamsandbroughthimtothepolicestationforquestioningregardingthemurder
ofhisneighbor,MichelleMoore‐Bosko.Afterseveralhoursofinterrogation,
WilliamsconfessedtomurderingMichelle.Thatconfessionwastheprimary
evidenceleadingtoaconvictionforcapitalrapeandmurder.Inhisconfession,
Williamsexplainedhowhebludgeonedhisneighborwithashoe.Whenitcameto
lightthatthevictimhadnotbeenbludgeonedbuthadbeenstrangled,Williams
signedanewconfessionthathehadstabbedandstrangledMoore‐Bosko.The
jurors’judgmentofWilliams’guiltwasnotaffectedbythechangeinthereported
methodofkillingMoore‐BoskoorbythefactthatWilliamsrecantedboth
confessions,claimingthathehadbeencoercedbythepolice.
WeknownowthatDanielWilliamsneitherrapednorkilledhisneighbor.At
trial,hesaidthesametothe12menandwomenwhoservedasjurors.Whywould
jurorsdisbelievehisswornverbalstatementonthewitnessstand,preferringto
maketheirjudgmentsbasedonarecantedconfession?Insomeways,thejurors’
decisionwasaneasyone.Wedonotbelievethatpeoplewouldconfesstocrimes
theydidnotcommit,especiallygiventheextremityoftheconsequencesthatfollow
fromaconfession.Sadly,thedatatellusotherwise.Inthecriminaljusticesystem,
casessuchasDanielWilliamsandseveralothers(Pratkanis&Aronson,2001)make
forpoignantreading.Analysesofconvictionsthatwereultimatelyoverturnedby
subsequentevidencerevealthatapproximately15%werebasedonfalse
confessions(BedauandRadelet,1987;Garrett,2008;Gudjonsson&Sigursdsson,
1994).
FALSECONFESSIONSOUTSIDETHECOURTROOM
Itisnotonlyaccusedperpetratorsofcrimeswhoarepressuredtoconfessto
actionstheydidnotcommit.Intheordinarybusinessoflife,peopleoccasionally
admittotransgressionsthatareuntrue.Sometimes,theconfessionismadeto
protectsomeoneelse.Achildinschoolmayadmittobreakingherteacher’svasein
ordertoprotectherbestfriendwhomshebelievedreallybrokeit.Aparentmay
taketheblameforachild’snotdoinghishomeworkonaparticularnightinorderto
mitigateanypunishmentforthechild.Onotheroccasions,peoplemayconfesstoa
behaviorbecausetheysuccumbtosocialpressure.Ateenagerinapick‐up
basketballgameagreesthathesteppedontheout‐of‐boundslinebecauseseveral
otherplayersmaketheaccusation.Althoughhebelieveshisfeetwereentirelyin
bounds,hegivesuptheball(i.e.,confessestosteppingontheline).Hisconfessionis
aresultofsocialinfluenceandhisdesiretoallowthegametocontinue.Another
reasonforfalseconfessionisthattheanticipatedconsequenceofnotconfessingis
greaterthantheconsequenceofconfessing.Achildwhofalselyconfessestohis
teacherthathebroketherulesbyspeakingduringaquietperiodmayanticipate
feweradverseconsequencesthantruthfullyrevealingthatitwastheclassbullywho
transgressed.Inthischapter,wetakethepositionthatfalseconfessionshave
consequencesforhowpeopleviewthemselves.Becausefalselyconfessinginvolves
intrinsicallymoraldecisions,suchconfessionsmayalterpeople’sviewsoftheirown
senseofmoralityaswellassubsequentmoralbehavior.
AttributionsofMoralDispositionsaboutOthers
Thenotionofhowpeoplemakeattributionsaboutotherpeople’spersonal
characteristicshaslongbeenthefocusofsocialpsychologicaltheorizing(Heider,
1958;Jones&Davis,1965;Kelley1972).Oureffectivelynavigatingthesocialworld
isincreasedtotheextentthatweunderstandotherpeople’spropensitytoact
consistentlyacrosssituations.JonesandDavis(1965)referredtosuch
understandingsas‘dispositions’anddelineatedmanyoftheprinciplesweuseto
inferpeople’sdispositionsfromanobservationoftheirbehaviors.Theprinciplesof
correspondentinferencesapplytomakingdispositionalinferencesaboutpeople’s
attitudes,kindness,maliciousness,oranyothertraitrelevanttoaperson’sactions.
Ifwewishtogaugeaperson’slevelofhelpfulness,forexample,wecanassessany
occasionsinwhichwehaveobservedthepersonactinahelpfulmanner.According
toJonesandDavis,weengageinasystematicprocessthatallowsustomakea
reasonableguessaboutaperson’intentiontoactinahelpfulmannerandusethe
intentiontoinferadisposition.
Consideracollegestudentwhoisthoughttohavecheatedonan
examination.Theunfairadvantagethatthestudentreceivedcanbedealtwithin
anynumberofwaysbutwewouldnotbesurprisedtoseesuchastudentsuspended
fromschool.Thestudent’sbehaviorsuggestsalevelofmoralityinconsistentwith
whatisexpectedfromcollegestudents.Theattributionofimmoralityaspersonal
dispositionsuggeststhatthestudentcannotbetrustedinsubsequentsituationsin
whichmoralbehaviorisexpected.Theattributionofadispositionallowsusto
predictthelikelihoodoffuturebehaviorthatrequiresethicsandmorality,whichin
turnpromptstheseparationofthisstudentfromhisschool.
Howdoweknowifthestudentintheaboveexampleactuallyengagedinthe
immoralbehaviorofwhichhestandsaccused?Ifwedidnotactuallyobservethe
behavior,wemayrelyonasecondlevelofbehavior–namely,thestudent’sverbal
statementaboutwhetherhedidordidnotcheat.Ifthestudentweretoconfessto
cheating,wewouldhavelittledoubtthattheimmoralbehavioroccurred.The
attributionofimmoralitywouldnotbedifficulttomake.
Itisimportanttounderstandwhywewouldbeconfidentthatthestudent
whoconfessedtocheatingisethicallychallenged.Althoughvarioustheoriesof
attributionconvergeonsimilarsetsofprinciples,ouranalysiscanbeguidedby
correspondentinferencetheory(Jones&Davis,1965;Jones,Kanouse,Kelley,
Nisbett,Valins&Weiner,1972).Attributionsofdispositionsoccurasafunctionof
people’sbehavior,providedthatwebelievethebehaviorisinformative.Thetwo
importantvariablesincorrespondenceinferencetheoryarethenumberof
noncommoneffectsofaperson’schosenbehaviorweightedbytheirsocial
desirability.Thatis,doesthebehaviorofconfessingproduceuniqueeffects
(comparedtonotconfessing)andarethoseeffectssomethingthatmostpeople
wouldenjoyhaving?Confessingtoanimmoralacthassevereconsequencesand
thoseconsequencesaremarkedlyundesired.Itisstraightforwardtodrawthe
correspondentinferenceandassumethatapersonwhoconfessestocheatingisa
cheater–i.e.,hasanimmoralcharacterdisposition.
Behaviorsthatarecoercedarenotinformativeforthepurposeofmakinga
dispositionalattribution.Theattributionanalysisthatresultsincorrespondent
inferencescannotproceedwhenbehavioriscoercedbecausetheactordidnot
intendtocreatethebehaviororitseffects.Yet,decadesofresearchhaveshownthat
observerssuccumbtothecorrespondencebias(Gilbert&Jones,1986)orthe
fundamentalattributionerror(Ross,1977).Despiteviolatingthelogicalrulesof
attribution,peoplehaveatendencytomakedispositionalinferencesonthebasisof
behavior,evenwhenthebehaviorwascoerced.Intheclassicresearchon
correspondencebias,JonesandHarris(1967)informedparticipantsthatanother
universitystudenthadwrittenanessayinfavorofCubanPresidentFidelCastro.
Dependingonexperimentalcondition,someparticipantsweretoldthatthestudent
hadchosentowriteinsupportofCastrowhereasothersweretoldthatthestudent
hadbeenassignedtheposition.Althoughparticipantsattributedhighestpro‐
Castroattitudestothestudentwhochosetowriteonthatside,theyalsoattributed
pro‐Castroattitudestothosewereassignedthetask.Thestudent’sbehaviorinthe
latterconditionshouldnothaveprovidedevenaclueabouthisattitudetoward
Castro.Nonetheless,peopleengagedinthecorrespondencebiasandmadeattitude
attributionsbasedonthecoercedbehavior.
JurorsandtheCorrespondenceBias.AccordingtoKassinandWrightsman
(1980:1985),themostdamningevidencegivenincourtisaconfession.Sincemost
casesthatarepresentedtojuriesinvolvenot‐guiltypleas,theconfessionsin
questionhavetypicallybeengiventopolicepriortotrial.Defendantsoftenclaim
thattheirconfessionswerecoercedorgivenunderduress.Suchexplanationsare
rarelysuccessful(Leo,2008;Leo&Ofshe,1998).SauerandWilkens(1999)found
thattheoverwhelmingmajorityofpotentialjurorsreportedthattheybelievedthat
suspectswould“almostneverconfess”tocrimestheydidnotdo.Leo(2008)quotes
aLosAngelesPoliceDepartmentpsychologistwhoasserted“Noamountof
badgeringwouldprompttheaveragepersontoadmittodoingsomethingthatawful
–ortoadmittoanycrime”(p.197).
Thefactisthatdefendantsdosuccumbtopressuretoconfesstoimmoraland
illegalactionsthattheydidnotcommit.Forthepast80years,theUnitedStates
courtshaveforbiddentheintroductionofconfessionsthatwerecoercedbyphysical
means.InBrownv.Mississippi(1936),theSupremeCourtreversedaguiltyverdict
onthegroundsthattheconfessionwasextractedviabruteforceandthatsuch
tacticsareaviolationofdefendants’rightstodueprocess.Asstandardsevolved
overthedecades,confessionsareadmissibletotheextentthatajudge,and
sometimesajury,findsthattheconfessionwasgivenwillingly,knowinglyandinthe
absenceofphysicalorpsychologicalcoercion.
Oneissuethattheadversariallegalsystemmustfaceisthatpoliceoften
questionsuspectswithanarrayofpsychologicaltechniquesdesignedtoelicit
confessions.Avarietyofproceduralmanualsdetailthepsychologicaland
environmentalpressuresthatcanhelpproduceconfessionsfromsuspects.Inbau,
Reid,BuckleyandJayne(2001)outlineanine‐stepprocedurethatiswidelyusedby
policetoelicitconfessions.Thesestepsincludeconvincingasuspectthatfirm
evidencealreadyexiststoconvictthemofthecrimeandthenworkingwiththe
suspecttogeneratemoralexcusestojustifythecrime.AccordingtoKassin&
McNally(1991),policeinterrogationtechniquescanbecategorizedintotwomain
approaches–minimizationandmaximization.Theformerreliesonthe
interrogator’screatingasenseofcamaraderiewiththesuspect.Theinterrogator
expressessympathyandunderstanding,offersface‐savingexcuses,putstheblame
onexternalfactorsanddownplaystheseverityoftheoffense.Thelattertechnique–
maximization‐‐utilizesintimidationtoscarethesuspect,exaggeratesfalse
incriminatingevidenceandthemagnitudeoftheconsequencesthatwilloccurinthe
absenceofaconfession.Becausepeopledonotbelieveanindividualwould
confesstosomethingheorshedidnotactuallydo(Sauer&Wilkins,1999),the
impactofaconfessiononjurors’attributionsofguiltismaximal.They
underestimatethesocialpsychologicalfactorsatplayduringtheinterrogation,
basingtheirultimatejudgmentontheeffectofconsequenceoftheconfession
instead.
TheEffectofFalseConfessionsontheConfessor.
Whatissometimeslostindiscussionsoffalseconfessionsistheeffectof
confessionsontheperpetrator.Intermsofthesocialpsychologyofattributions,
doesmakingaconfessionhaveanimpactonpeople’sownjudgmentofwhetherthey
actuallyengagedintheactivitytowhichtheyconfessed?Somecelebratedlegal
casessuggestthattheanswerissometimesyes.Eighteen‐year‐oldPeterReilly
returnedhomeonenighttofindhismotherhadbeenmurdered.AfterReillycalled
thepolicetoreporttheincident,thepoliceinterrogatedhim.Theyclaimed(falsely)
thatReillyhadfailedhislie‐detectortest.Analysisofthetranscriptsofhis
confession(Barthel,1976)showedReillyprogressingfromdenialtoconfusionto
self‐doubt.“Well,itlookslikeIreallydidit,”hetoldpolice.Twoyearsafterhis
conviction,conclusiveevidencewasuncoveredthatexoneratedhim.Hewasnot
nearhishomeonthenightofthemurder.
RecallthecaseagainstDanielWilliamswhoconfessedtothemurderofhis
neighbor.AlthoughWilliamswasconvictedonthebasisofhisconfession,he
continuedtomaintainthathisconfessionwasfalseandthathewasinnocentofthe
crime.Adifferentstorycanbetoldforco‐defendantJosephDick,whowasaccused
ofbeingMr.Williams’accomplice.Dickalsoconfessed.However,heinternalized
hisconfession,comingtobelievethathehadactuallybeenwithWilliamswhenthey
rapedandmurderedMsMoore‐Bosko.Herepeatedhisconfessionincourtand
testifiedagainstDanielWilliams.TheNorfolkdefendantswerereleasedfromprison
whenDNAevidenceshowedthatneitherWilliamsnorDickhadanythingtodowith
thecrimes.
FalseConfessionsandself‐perception.
KassinandKiechel(1996)addressedtheunderlyingissuethatrenders
confessionsexceptionallypowerfulincourts.Wouldanyoneactuallyconfesstoa
transgressionthatheorshedidnotcommit?Toprovidesomeexperimental
evidencetothisdebate,KassinandKeitelaskedwhetherpeoplewhofind
themselvesaccusedoftransgressionsapartfromthecriminaljusticesystemcould
besystematicallypersuadedtomakefalseconfession.Theysuggestedthattwo
elementsinpoliceinterrogationsseemtobepresentwhenfalseconfessionsare
obtained.Oneisthecreationofdoubtabouttheeventsthattookplaceandthe
secondisthecreationofabeliefthattheaccusershaveproofofthesuspect’sguilt.
Inacleverexperimentallaboratoryprocedure,KassinandKiechel(1996)
hadundergraduatesparticipateingroupsoftwoinwhattheythoughtwasa
reactiontimetask.Onememberofthepairwasactuallyaconfederateofthe
experimenter’s.OneachtrialoftheRTtask,theconfederatereadalistofwordsand
theparticipantwastotypethemintoacomputer.Theexperimenterexplainedthat
itwasimperativethattheparticipantnottouchtheALTkeythatwasadjacenttothe
spacebarbecausethatwouldcausethecomputertocrashandthedatatobelost.
Afteraminute’sactivity,thecomputerseemedtocrash.Theexperimenterhurried
intoexaminethecomputerandaccusedtheparticipantofhavingpressedthe
forbiddenkey.Initially,allparticipantsdeniedtheallegation.Inthehigh
vulnerabilitycondition,theparticipantswererenderedlesscertainofwhattheyhad
orhadnotdonebecausethetypingtaskwasconductedatafreneticpace.Inthelow
vulnerabilitycondition,itwasconductedataleisurelypace,allowingparticipantsto
beverycertainofwhattheyhadtyped.Thesecondvariableofinterestwas
whethertheparticipantbelievedtherewasincriminatingevidence.Thiswas
manipulatedintheformoftestimonygivenbytheconfederate.Inthefalsewitness
condition,theconfederateadmittedthatshehadseentheparticipanthittheALT
keythatterminatedtheprogram.Intheno‐witnesscondition,thesameconfederate
saidshehadnotseenwhathappened.
Toelicitcompliancewiththeaccusation,theexperimentertoldthe
participanttosignastatementthatheorshehittheALTkey.Theywerenotasked
iftheybelievedtheirconfession,butonlytomakeoneastheexperimenter
demanded.Theresultsshowedthatwhentherewasnoallegedwitnessandthe
paceofthetypinghadbeenslow,65%oftheparticipantsrefusedtosign.Onthe
otherhand,whenthepacewasquickandthusthetransgressionlesscertain,65%
agreedtosign.Thatpercentageroseto100%whentheuncertaintywascombined
withthewitness’testimony.WhathappenednextinKassin&Kiechel’sstudy
assessedthedegreetowhichpeopleactuallybelievedthattheyhadtransgressed.
Anotherstudentconfederate,posingasthenextparticipant,approachedthe
participantandaskedwhatthecommotionwasabout.Theparticipants’responses
wererecordedandassessedforwhethertheystatedunequivocallythattheyhadhit
theALTkey.Althoughnooneinthecertain‐nowitnessconditionadmittedto
havingcommittedtheforbiddenbehavior,65%ofparticipantswhowereinthefast‐
pacedconditionwithanaccusingwitnessfreelystatedthattheyhadcommittedthe
behavior.
BelievingYour(False)Confession:AnEmpiricalStudyonAttributionsofMorality.
Underwhatconditionsdopeoplebelievetheirfalseconfessions?From
KassinandKiechel’s(1996)work,webelievethatpeoplecanbeinfluencedtomake
falseconfessionsandthatpeoplesometimesbecomeconvincedoftheveracityof
thoseconfessions.Inthecurrentwork,weexaminetheconsequencesof
confessionsforpeople’sself‐attributions.Ifpeopleconfess,doesitaffecttheir
attributionoftheirowndispositions?Aretheylikelytousetheobservationoftheir
ownbehaviortodrawinferencesabouttheleveloftheirownmorality?
Wespeculatethatpeopleusetheirconfessionsasevidenceoftheir
dispositionsbutonlytotheextentthattheyfeeltheyhadachoiceinmakingtheir
confessions.Thisisconsistentwithanalysesfromcognitivedissonancetheory
(Festinger,1957),self‐perceptiontheory(Bem,1972)andattributiontheory
(Kelley,1972).Totheextentthatpeopleperceivetheirbehaviortobefreely
chosen,thenthatbehaviorisinfluentialindeterminingtheirinternaldispositions.
Facedwithknowledgethattheydescribedatransgression(i.e.,confessed),people
determinewhetherthatdescriptionwascoercedbytheenvironmentorwhetherit
wasgivenfreely.Ifthelatter,thenitbecomesinformationindeterminingone’sown
dispositions.
WeextendedKassin&Kiechel’sresearchtoanareaofmoralconcern–
namely,cheating.Weestablishedasituationinwhichstudents’performanceonan
examcouldbeimprovediftheytookextratimetocompletethequestions.We
accusedthestudentsofhavingcheatedontheexamand,usingtechniquesdrawn
frompolicemanuals(Inbauetal,2001),toinducestudentstoconfesstohaving
cheated.Wethenassessedthedegreetowhichthestudentsbelievedthattheyhad
actuallycheated.Finally,inadifferentcontext,weusedanindividualdifference
questionnairetoassessstudents’assessmentoftheirownreality.Wepredicted
thatwecouldinducestudentstoconfesstocheatingwhen,infact,theyhadnotdone
so.Wealsopredictedthatstudentswouldcometobelievethattheirconfessions
weretruetotheextentthattheyfelttheyhadachoicetoconfess.Finally,we
predictedthatifstudentsconfessedtocheatingandbelieved(falsely)thattheyhad
committedtheact,theywouldattributetothemselvesalowerlevelofethicaland
moraldisposition.
Inourempiricalstudy,undergraduatestudentsvolunteeredforastudy
investigatingmentalmodelstoimprovemathematicalabilities.Attheoutset,
participantsweretoldthatitwasimportanttogetanassessmentoftheircurrent
levelofmathematicsproficiency.Tothatend,theywouldtakeadifficultexamin
mathematicsandtheirscoreswouldbepublishedalongwiththescoresofallother
studentstakingtheexam.Thestudentsweregiven15minutestocompletethetest
onthecomputer.Theexperimenterexplainedthattheyshouldworkuntilthey
werefinishedbutthattheyabsolutelyshouldnotgobeyondthetimeprovided.The
experimenterstatedthathewouldleavethestudentalonewithhisorherworkand
wouldreturninabout15minutes.Thestudentwastoldtousetheclockthatwas
prominentlydisplayedonthecomputerastheofficialtimer.
Theallegedtransgression:Theexperimenterwaited17minutesbefore
returningtotheroom.Whenenteringtheroom,henotedthathehadintendedto
comebackafter15minutessothathecouldmonitorthestudent’sadherencetothe
rulesbut,unfortunately,ranlate.Heaskedparticipantswhethertheyhadusedthe
extratimeforanythingrelatedtothemathematicstest.Inacontrolcondition,the
student’sdenialthattheyhadusedextratimewastakenatfacevalue.Every
studentdeniedtakingextratime,whichwasanhonestandaccurateportraitofwhat
theyhaddone.
AccusingthePerpetrator:Afterinquiringaboutthestudentusingextratime,
theexperimenterconfrontedthestudentwiththenotionthatheorshemusthave
usedthetimetoworkonthemathtest.Heexplainedthattheusingextratime
includedsuchthingsaslookingoveryourwork,makingchangesorjustcontinuing
toworkafterthetimerreachedzero.Theexperimenteradoptedoneofthree
interrogationtechniquesadoptedfromthepoliceinterrogationhandbook.
NoChoiceConfession:Theexperimenterinthenochoiceconditiontoldthe
studentsthat,consideringtheyhadextratimeavailable,itwasrequiredthatthey
signastatementsayingthattheyhadusedtheextratimeonthemathexam.The
experimentertookresponsibilityforhavingallowedtheextratimebutexplained
thatwhensuchaneventhappens,heisrequiredtogetthestudenttosignaroutine
statementacknowledginguseofextratime.Onlythen,heexplained,canthestudy
continue.
ChoosingtoConfess:Minimization:Minimizationisaninterrogation
approachinwhichtheinterrogatoroffersunderstandingoftheallegedsituation,
offersface‐savingexcusesanddownplaystheseverityoftheoffense.Tothatend,
theexperimenterexplainedthatitwasnotamajorviolationiftheparticipantused
extratime,evokingthenotionthatitwasacommonandjustifiableoccurrence,and
thatsituationswiththiskindoftemptationoftenleadtopeopleviolatingtherules.
Hejustneededtheparticipanttoacknowledgethatheorsheusedextratimesothat
hecouldcodethedatadifferentlyforsubsequentanalysis.Theexperimenterstated,
“Ofcourseyoudonothavetosignthestatement,butitwouldbeveryhelpfulifyou
do.”
ChoosingtoConfess:Maximization.Inthiscondition,participantsweretold
thatcheatingonatest,eveninalaboratory,wasaviolationoftheuniversity’shonor
code.Thepenaltiescouldbesevere.Studentsweretoldthatitwouldbemuch
bettertosignastatementconfessingtouseextratimebecausethatwouldallowthe
datatobecodeddifferentlyandstillbeused.Ontheotherhand,failuretoadmitto
usingextratime‐‐iftheyhadactuallyusedit–wouldresultinsevereconsequences.
Moreover,theexperimenterrevealedthathehadhardevidencebecausethevideo
cameraonthecomputerhadrecordedtheentiresession.Heindicatedthathe
wouldcheckthevideoifthestudentdidnotadmittothetransgression.Thestudent
wasthengiventhechoiceaboutwhethertosigntheconfession.
MakingtheFalseConfession.Thevideocameraonthecomputerhad
actuallybeenusedduringthesession.Thevideosrevealedthatnoone,inanyofthe
conditions,hadactuallyviolatedthe15‐minutelimitation.Nooneinthecontrol
conditionadmittedtousingextratime.However,thedatainFigure1showthe
resultsforparticipantsinthethreeexperimentalconditions.Nineteenoftwenty
participantsinthenochoiceconditionscompliedwiththeexperimenter’s
instructiontosignaconfessionforatransgressionthattheydidnotcommit.Inthe
choiceconditions,72%oftheparticipantsagreedtoconfess,withthehighest
numbercominginthemaximizationcondition.Theminimizationand
maximizationconditionsdidnotdiffersignificantlyfromeachother.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Figure1
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
BelievingtheFalseConfession.Afterparticipantseitherdidordidnotsign
theirfalseconfessions,theexperimenterindicatedthathewouldhavetoterminate
thestudy.Heintroducedthestudy’s“principleinvestigator”whotoldparticipants
thatheneededtoaskthemquestions.Hefirstinquiredaboutwhetherthe
participantshadagreedtosignastatementabouttheirhavingusedextratime.He
thenadministeredaquestionnairethatincludedthecrucialitem,“Howmuchdoyou
believethatyouusedextratimeincompletingthetest?”Thequestionnairealso
asked,“Howmuchchoicedidyoufeelinconfessingornotconfessing?”Allitems
werefollowedby7‐pointscales.
Figure2presentstheresultsofthedegreetowhichstudentsreported
believingthattheyhadactuallyusedtheextratimethattheyhadconfessedto.The
resultsshowthatsigningaconfessionhadanimpactonbeliefbut,asexpected,the
effectvariedbycondition.Themeanbeliefinthecontrolconditioninwhichpeople
hadbeenaskediftheyusedtheextratimebutwerenotaskedforaconfessionwas
1.05.Inthenochoicecondition,thereportedbeliefwasminimallyandnon‐
significantlyhigher(M=1.15).Students’beliefsintheirowntransgressionswere
significantlyhigherinthechoiceminimization(M=2.9)andthechoicemaximization
conditions(M=2.3).Thechoiceconditionsweresignificantlydifferentfromtheno‐
choiceconditionandmarginallysignificantlydifferentfromeachother(p<.11).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Figure2
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Notsurprisingly,students’perceptionsofthedegreeofchoicetheyhadto
signaconfessionwerehigherinthechoicethanintheno‐choiceconditions.
However,itisinterestingthatstudentsperceivedmorechoiceintheminimization
thanthemaximizationcondition.Inotherwords,whenthreatenedwithsevere
consequencesforfailingtoreportatransgression(eventhoughtheyhadnot
transgressed),theysawtheirownfreedomasmoreseverelylimitedthanwhenthe
inducementswereminimal.Inaddition,thedegreeofbeliefthattheyhadactually
usedextratimewascorrelatedwiththeamountofdecisionfreedomtheythought
theyhad(r=.44).
ImpactofConfessionsonDispositions.Onedayfollowingtheexperimental
procedure,studentwerecontactedbye‐mailandaskediftheywerewillingtofill
outsomequestionsaspartofanongoingsurveyofpersonalityinstruments.No
mentionwasmadeofanyconnectiontothefalseconfessionstudy.Ifparticipants
agreed(94%oftheoriginalparticipantsagreed),theywereaskedtorespondonthe
computertoa10‐itemversionoftheRosenbergSelf‐Esteemscale.An11thitemwas
addedtothescale,whichstated,“IfeelIamanethicalperson.”Theresultsshowed
thatstudentswhohadsignedaconfessionandbelievedthattheyhadchoicetosign
theconfessionscoredlowerontheethicalpersonquestion(M=2.2vs.M=1.7,p
<.02)andlowerontheSESoverall(M=16.65vs.M=18.88),p<.05.)
IMPLICATIONSOFFALSECONFESSIONS:AchangeinMoralThinking
Thenewempiricalworkdescribedinthischapterdemonstratesthatpeople
canbeinducedtoconfesstoimmoralactions,evenwhentheyactedinamoral,
ethicalandlegalfashion.Fromtheperspectiveofathirdperson,confessionsof
immoral,unethicalbehaviorwillalmostcertainlybegristfortheattributionmill,
allowingsocialperceiverstoconcludethattheconfessordidindeedactinan
immoralwayandthatimmoralitycanbeascribedasapersonaldisposition.
Ifweourselvesareinducedtoconfesstoanimmoralbehavior,itisnot
apparentthatwewoulduseourfalseconfessionasevidencethatcommittedthe
immoralactorthatweareimmoralpeople.Ontheotherhand,varioustheories
includingcognitivedissonance(Cooper,2007;Festinger,1957)suggestthat
behaviorcanhavedramaticimpactonattitudesandbeliefs,providedthatitappears
tohavebeenfreelychosen.Ourresultssupportthelatternotion.Peoplewhowere
accusedofanactionthattheydidnotcommitwerenonethelesspersuadedto
confesstohavingcheated.Iftheybelievedthattheirconfessionwasmadewith
personalfreechoice,theyweremorelikelytobelievetheirownconfessionsrather
thantrusttheirmemoriesforwhattheyhadactuallydone.Andthosefreelychosen
confessionshadconsequences:Peoplenotonlybelievedthattheyhadacted
immorallybutalsoshowedalowersenseofself‐esteemandaloweredbeliefintheir
ownsenseofmoralcharacter.
Theimpactoffalseconfessionsonpersonalbeliefsissystematic.First,a
behaviormustbeelicitedthatconfirmsthetransgression.Thedegreeofcoercion
needstobeminimal.Thejustificationforconfessingmustalsobeminimal.Recall
thatthemaximizationstrategyinwhichtheconsequencesoffailingtoconfesswere
emphasizedsuccessfullyproducedconfessionsbutdidnotproducemuch
internalization.Rather,theminimizationstrategyledtopeoplebelievingthatthey
hadfreelychosentosigntheirconfessions,which,inturn,ledtobeliefchange.
Aninterestingquestioniswhetherfalseconfessionsleadtogreaterimmoral
behaviorinthefuture.Inthecurrentwork,falseconfessionsundertheappropriate
circumstancesledpeopletomakedispositionalattributionsaboutthemselvesthat
implyapossiblecascadeoffuturebehaviors.Usingadissonanceanalysis,Aronson
andCarlsmith(1962)showedthatpeopleprefertoactconsistentlywiththeirself‐
expectations,evenifthoseexpectationsareforfailingperformances.The
suggestionthenisthathavingpeopleconfesstoimmoralactsthattheyhadnot
actuallycommittedwillnotonlyloweraperson’smoralself‐esteembutalsoaffect
themoralityoffuturebehavior.
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Figures
Figure1.Percentageofparticipantswhosignedafalseconfession.
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