Conflict Batch 2

8/11/2019 Conflict Batch 2

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G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacityas Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition forcertioraripursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside theResolution1dated September 27, 1995 and the Decision 2dated April 10, 1996 of the Court ofAppeals3in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533,4and the Orders5dated August 29, 1994 6and February 2,19957that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394.8

The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in the questionedDecision9, are as follows:

On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for itsairlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . .

On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a discodance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, bothSaudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels,they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in te(sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rapeplaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries forhelp and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and

Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.

When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officialsinterrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back toJakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA LegalOfficer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for theimmediate release of the detained crew members but did not succeed becauseplaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked intosomething she did not want because of her inability to understand the local dialect.She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local dialect.Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from theJakarta flights.

Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the

Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks ofdetention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDI (sic). InSeptember 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.

On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was alreadybehind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officerof SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to thepolice station where the police took her passport and questioned her about theJakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make


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a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to doso did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight outof Jeddah.

One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutesbefore the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the

plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, theChief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA officebrought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in

Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer andAllah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court onJune 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.

Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah onceagain and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so afterreceiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that theinvestigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.

In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogatedplaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour ofinterrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about totake off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight. Atthe Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. YahyaSaddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crewquarters, until further orders.

On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same courtwhere the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated toher in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Onlythen did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and

Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2)going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and(3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. 10

Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA.Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah tohelp her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domesticflight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the internationalflights. 11

Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her andallowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, 12she was terminated from the

service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint 13for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager.

On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss 14which raised the followinggrounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been


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waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try thecase.

On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) 15. Saudia filed areply 16thereto on March 3, 1994.

On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint17

wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as partydefendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss AmendedComplaint 18.

The trial court issued an Order 19dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss AmendedComplaint filed by Saudia.

From the Order of respondent Judge 20denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20,1994, its Motion for Reconsideration 21of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the trial courthas no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the properlaw applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada filed herOpposition 22(To Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration).

In the Reply 23filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its Motion forReconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does notapply, even if that ground is raised for the first time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that thePhilippines does not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant case, and hence,without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order 24dated February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIA'sMotion for Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed,thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed,thru counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi

Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994, considering that a perusalof the plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which is one for the recovery of actual, moraland exemplary damages plus attorney's fees, upon the basis of the applicablePhilippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, withinthe jurisdiction of this Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothingnew of substance which might cause the reversal or modification of the order soughtto be reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of the defendant, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 25

Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition withPrayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 26with the

Court of Appeals.

Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining Order 27datedFebruary 23, 1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unlessotherwise directed, in the interim.

In another Resolution 28promulgated on September 27, 1995, now assailed, the appellate court deniedSAUDIA's Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:


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The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED,after considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction(Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it appearing that herein petitioner is notclearly entitled thereto (Unciano Paramedical College, et.Al., v. Court of Appeals,et.Al., 100335, April 7, 1993, Second Division).

SO ORDERED.

On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant Petition 29for Review withPrayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995.

However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of Appeals rendered theDecision 30dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forumconsidering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code,and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held thatcertiorariis not the properremedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, andin case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.

On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for TemporaryRestraining Order 31dated April 30, 1996, given due course by this Court. After both parties submittedtheir Memoranda, 32the instant case is now deemed submitted for decision.

Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:

I

The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 basedon Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the proper law applicable is the law of theKingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this case involves what is known in privateinternational law as a "conflicts problem". Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippineswill sit in judgment of the acts done by another sovereign state which is abhorred.

II

Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a jurisdictionalrequirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of leave of court is now moot andacademic when this Honorable Court required the respondents to comment onpetitioner's April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For ATemporary Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further,the Revised Rules of Court should be construed with liberality pursuant to Section 2,Rule 1 thereof.

III

Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP NO.36533 entitled "Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al." and filed its

April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A TemporaryRestraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day reglementaryperiod as provided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 has not yet become final andexecutory and this Honorable Court can take cognizance of this case. 33


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From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues emerge for ourresolution:

I.

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR ANDTRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED "MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI

ARABIAN AIRLINES".

II.

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT INTHIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.

Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset. Itmaintains that private respondent's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the

application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissirule.34

On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based onArticles 19 35and 21 36of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law. 37

Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the interplay of eventsoccurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.

As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint 38dated June 23, 1994:

2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporationdoing business in the Philippines. It may be served with summons and other court

processes at Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.). Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building,114 Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.

xxx xxx xxx

6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government,the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks ofdetention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. InSeptember 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.

7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident wasalready behind her, her superiors reauested her to see MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal

Officer of SAUDIA in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her tothe police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about theJakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to makea statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to doso did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight outof Jeddah.

8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a fewminutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board


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the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, theChief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA officebrought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sigh a document written in

Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer andAllah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court onJune 27, 1993.Plaintiff then returned to Manila.

9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddahonce again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff didso after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manger, Aslam Saleemi, that theinvestigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.

10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court onJune 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judgeinterrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hourof interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was aboutto take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take thatflight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr.Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crewquarters, until further orders.

11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same courtwhere the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated toher in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Onlythen did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and

Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2)going to a disco, dancing, and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3)socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.

12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff sought the helpof the Philippines Embassy in Jeddah. The latter helped her pursue an appeal from

the decision of the court. To pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flightsof defendant SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served theinternational flights. 39

Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agreewith petitioner that the problem herein could present a "conflicts" case.

A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or morestates is said to contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable sincesocial and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographiclimits of their birth or conception. 40

The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many.41

The foreign element may simplyconsist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that acontract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, theforeign element may assume a complex form. 42

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is aresident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, byvirtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did


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transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise.

We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise.Aconflictsproblem presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction 43confronts the courta quo.

After a careful study of the private respondent's Amended Complaint, 44and the Comment thereon, wenote that she aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.

On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of hisduties, act with justice give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.

On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that iscontrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for

damages.

Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals, 45this Court held that:

The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the conceptof torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number ofmoral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in thestatutes.

Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus,we agree with private respondent's assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with

judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.

Based on the allegations 46in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court onjurisdiction 47we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over thesubject matter of the suit. 48Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 ofRepublic Act No. 7691, to wit:

Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "JudiciaryReorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusivejurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damagesof whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and cots or thevalue of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousandpesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, wherethe demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Twohundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)


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xxx xxx xxx

And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court the venue, Quezon City, isappropriate:

Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. [Now Regional Trial Court]

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where thedefendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff orany of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of theRTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant.Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles toa fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex","harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance.

But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum shouldrarely be disturbed. 49

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the courta quofound it best to hear the case in thePhilippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (privaterespondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere,i.e.in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where sheno longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness toher.

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience havebeen shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent)should be upheld.

Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filingher Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntarysubmitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.

The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions 50praying for the dismissal ofMorada's Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer InEx Abundante Cautelamdated February20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefsunder the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court'sjurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack ofjurisdiction.

As held by this Court inRepublic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.: 51

We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside from disputingthe lower court's jurisdiction over defendant's person, prayed for dismissal of thecomplaint on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action has prescribed. By interposingsuch second ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of anaffirmative defense on the basis of which it prayed the court to resolve controversy inits favor. For the court to validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., itnecessarily had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latter's person, who, being the


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proponent of the affirmative defense, should be deemed to have abandoned itsspecial appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.

Similarly, the case ofDe Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that;

When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of

the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objectingto the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object tothe jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the

jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose ofobjecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a generalappearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of theaction upon the further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter. 52

Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus,we find that the trial court has jurisdiction over the case and that its exercise thereof, justified.

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer twoimportant questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of thesignificant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legalsystem regulate the situation. 53

Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should ultimatelycontrol. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of

justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the problem ofdeciding which of these two important values should be stressed. 54

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain setof facts or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". Itis the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in aconflicts rule." 55The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law. 56

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operativefact. 57An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point ofcontact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contractclaim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situsof theres, the place of celebration,the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. 58

Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for thedetermination of the applicable law. 59These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors"could be any of the following:

(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or hisorigin;

(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;

(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated.In particular, thelex situsis decisive when real rights are involved;


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(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place wherea contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed.The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;

(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place ofperformance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be

exercised;

(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern theiragreement, thelex loci intentionis;

(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done.Thelex fori the law of the forum is particularly important because, as we haveseen earlier, matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of the claim involvedare governed by it; and because thelex foriapplies whenever the content of theotherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for thereason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and

(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legalrelationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractualrelationships particularly contracts of affreightment. 60(Emphasis ours.)

After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended Complaintdeemed admitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonablebasis for private respondent's assertion that although she was already working in Manila, petitionerbrought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of thecharges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while theywere in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges,including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.

There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the "handing over" or "turning over" of theperson of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties asemployer. Petitioner's purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately causedadditional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedlyfacilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner'sauthority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. Aspurportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of privaterespondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her personand reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redressfor the wrongs done, once duly proven.

Considering that the complaint in the courta quois one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or"point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct orlex loci actusoccurred.

And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as asitus of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in thePhilippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and workinghere. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rightsand in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and goodfaith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injuryallegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is theplace where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, socialstanding and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein


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private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of thealleged tort.

Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule oflex loci delicti commissi, moderntheories and rules on tort liability 61have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive atjust results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply

the "State of the most significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now,given the factual context of this case.

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, thefollowing contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importancewith respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where theconduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporationand place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between theparties is centered. 62

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in thePhilippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national,working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of internationalair carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was centered here, although it should bestressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that thePhilippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, 63raised by privaterespondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properlyestablished.

Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place"having the most interest in the problem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law ontort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issuesarising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdictionover the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City,which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's insistence that

"[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and proving theapplicable Saudi law on the matter." 64As aptly said by private respondent, she has "no obligation toplead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19and 21" of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, shenever alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. 65And as correctly held by the respondent appellatecourt, "considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia,then the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is". 66

Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the trial court'sdenial of defendant's (herein petitioner's) motion to dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction inorder and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available, and expeditious trialitself indicated by the nature of the case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimatelyconcerned with the ultimate outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but

also for the vindication of the country's system of law and justice in a transnational setting. Withthese guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try and adjudge the case in the light ofrelevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or elements involved. Nothingsaid herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging the results of the case in any mannerwhatsoever.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition forcertiorariis hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-93-18394entitled "Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby REMANDED to Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.


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SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Annex "A", PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, p. 36.

2 Annex "A", SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION, April 30, 1996;rollo, pp. 88-102.

3 Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas, and concurred in by AssociateJustice Jorge S. Imperial and Associate Justice Pacita Caizares-Nye.

4 Entitled "Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Hon. Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz, in his capacity asPresiding Judge of Branch 89 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City andMilagros P. Morada".

5 Issued by respondent Judge Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz of Branch 89, Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City.

6 Annex "B", PETITION, October 13, 1995;rollo, pp. 37-39.

7 Annex "B", PETITION, October 13, 1995;rollo, p. 40.

8 Entitled "Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines".

9 Supra, note 2.

10 Decision, pp. 2-4; see rollo, pp. 89-91.

11 Private respondent's Comment;rollo, p. 50.

12 Ibid., pp. 50-51.

13 Dated November 19, 1993, and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-18394, Branch89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

14 Dated January 14, 1994.

15 Dated February 4, 1994.

16 Reply dated March 1, 1994.

17 Records, pp. 65-84.

18 Rollo, p. 65.

19 Supra, note 6.

20 Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz.


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21 Dated September 19, 1994.

22 Records, pp. 108-116.

23 Records, pp. 117-128.

24 Supra, note 7.

25 Ibid.

26 Dated February 18, 1995; see supra, note 4.

27 Supra, note 7.

28 Records, p. 180.

29 Rollo, pp. 1-44.

30 Supra, note 2.

31 Rollo, pp. 80-86.

32 Memorandum for Petitioner dated October 9, 1996,rollo, pp. 149-180; andMemorandum for Private Respondent, October 30, 1996, rollo, pp. 182-210.

33 Rollo, pp. 157-159. All caps in the original.

34 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 14, rollo, p. 162.

35 Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance ofhis duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and goodfaith.

36 Art 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that iscontrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for thedamages.

37 Memorandum for Private Respondent, p. 9, rollo, p. 190.

38 Records, pp. 65-71.

39 Supra, note 17, pp. 65-68.

40 Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 edition, p. 3.

41 Ibid., citingCheshire and North, Private International Law, p. 5 by P.M. North andJ.J. Faucett (Butterworths; London, 1992).

42 Ibid.


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43 Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws, sixth edition (1984), p. 24, citingLeflar,TheLaw of Conflict of Laws, pp. 5-6.

44 Supra, note 17.

45 83 SCRA 237, 247.

46 Supra, note at 17, at p. 6. Morada prays that judgment be rendered againstSaudia, ordering it to pay: (1) not less than P250,000.00 as actual damages; (2) P4million in moral damages; (3) P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and (4)P500,000.00 in attorney's fees.

47 Baguioro v. Barrios, 77 Phil. 120.

48 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is defined as theauthority of a court to hear and decide cases of the general class to which theproceedings in question belong. (Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 487)

49 Supra, note 37, p. 58,citingGulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 350 U.S. 501, 67 Sup.Ct. 839 (1947).

50 Omnibus Motion to Dismiss dated January 14, 1994; Reply (to Plaintiff'sOpposition) dated February 19, 1994; Comment (to Plaintiffs Motion to Admit

Amended Complaint dated June 23, 1994) dated July 20, 1993; Manifestation andMotion to Dismiss Amended Complaint dated June 23, 1994 under date August 11,1994; and Motion for Reconsideration dated September 19, 1994.

51 18 SCRA 207, 213-214.

52 64 SCRA 23, 31.

53 Coquia and Pangalangan.Conflict of Laws, 1995 edition p. 65, citingVonMehren,Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 Cornell L. Rev. 927(1975).

54 Ibid.

55 Supra, note 40 at p. 94, citingFalconbridge,Essays on the Conflict of Laws, p.50.

56 Ibid.

57 Supra, note 37, at p. 136; cf.Mussbaum, Principle of Private International Law, p.173; and Rabel,The Conflict of Laws:A Comparative Study, pp. 51-52.

58 Supra, note 37, p. 137.

59 Ibid.

60 Supra, note 37, at pp. 138-139.


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61 Includes the (1) German rule of elective concurrence; (2) "State of the mostsignificant relationship" rule (the Second Restatement of 1969); (3) State interestanalysis; and (4) Caver's Principle of Preference.

62 Supra, note 37, p. 396.

63 Supra, note 59, p. 79,citingRuben v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 305, 113N.E. 2d 424, 431.

64 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 22;rollo, p. 170.

65 Memorandum for Private Respondent, pp. 21-22;rollo, pp. 202-203.

66 CA Decision, p. 10;rollo, p. 97.

297 SCRA 469 Conflict of Laws Private International LawSitusLocus Actus

Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and

some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to rape her in a

hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for help and two of her Arab co-workers were

arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to work in their Manila

office. While working in Manila, Saudia Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in

Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and

eventually sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim

customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her conviction and the Prince

determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her and sent her back to

the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for

damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the

ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law should be the law

of Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under the premises.

ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines contention is correct.HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a

motion to dismiss with petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively asked the court

to make a determination of Saudia Airliness rights hence a submission to the courts jurisdiction.

Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the complaint of

Morada, she is bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil Law and not of the

Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a

plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides

or where the defendant resides. Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case here because if

shell file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her(and of course, again, Philippine

Civil Law is the law invoked).

Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign elementinvolved, is the so called locus actus or where an act has been done. In the case at bar, Morada

was already working in Manila when she was summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to

meet with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was going to appear in a court

trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into appearing before a court trial which led to her wrongful

conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous, was committed in Manila and this led to her

humiliation, misery, and suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds


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that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct

took place).

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased,Executor andHeir-appellees,vs.HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA,oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving amongthings the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensenthe amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring MariaLucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in caseof death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., inaccordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will wasexecuted in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who isnow residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except myabove named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

x x x x x x x x x

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married toEduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she wasbaptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adoptedby me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currencythe same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the DavaoBranch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos

(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interestwhich may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

x x x x x x x x x

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIALUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of


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whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at mydeath and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and projectof partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that theresidue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofaras it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having beendeclared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by thelaws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies toHelen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in fullownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern theestate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entirelaw thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines andeven if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requiresthat the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that MariaHelen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she isdeemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of theState of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of theprovisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testatorhas the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominionover his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). OppositorMaria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these weredenied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREMECOURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THEINHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THEEXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE

APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONALLAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THETESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASEDEDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.


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home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon thePhilippines and make home in the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporarypresence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote somethingmore than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when heresided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears tohave considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended toabandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with thefollowing principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place ofpermanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning.Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a

place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides histime, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which wouldrequire his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to havesufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if hetreated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up hisformer "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choicerequires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requiresbodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence inthat place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a termused with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the mostpermanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.(Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the CivilCode of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the countrywhere it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order ofsuccession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity oftestamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whosesuccession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property andregardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of theterm "national law"is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the UnitedStates, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in forceonly within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted cannot, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other thanthe private law of the State of California.


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The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under theCalifornia Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner hedesires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellantinvokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it isdeemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We havechecked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the casecited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It isargued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State ofCalifornia, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern thedetermination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being inforce in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrineof the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referredback to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoihas been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refersa jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of lawof the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, thatis, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it isdifficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been

criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to theinternal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems nocompelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than tothe Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, butthose who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulasby getting off atthe second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents ofthe renvoiare a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule ofreference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoiplead that greateruniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the factthat the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the

two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whetherthe renvoishould be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of thelitigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigancourt rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had beenbrought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for thewoman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect towhich would hold liability, if both courts accepted therenvoi.


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The Restatement accepts the renvoitheory in two instances: where the title to land is inquestion, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases theConflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case,is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, aperson's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and everydivorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of

Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable propertyin Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to bedistributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflictof laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of thedeceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thingfor the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, orwhatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. Anexamination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon todetermine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to thenational law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So onthe surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a Frenchcourt and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this iswhat a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the lattercourse, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of theforum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter backagain to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this

judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing aparticular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of lawscontained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it hasbeen considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequentdiscussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptivelydesignated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operationof the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the maincontroversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of thedoctrine of renvoiis that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must

take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict oflaws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdictionprescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoihas generally beenrepudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoihas also been defined and the reasons for its application in acountry explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp.529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:


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The recognition of the renvoitheory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to beunderstood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state orcountry, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of acountry' means the whole of its law.

x x x x x x x x x

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, atNeuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationalsabroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shallbe determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where theact in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain thatone of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination ofa question to the same system of law.

x x x x x x x x x

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of anEnglishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, hemust first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon deathin accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make thedistribution in accordance with the law of nationality that is the English law he must

accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule appliedin In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules ofCalifornia are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principlecited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to suchof its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down ofresorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is inaccord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in mostmatters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directingthe manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at thetime of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost ascompletely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logicalthat, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestatesuccession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentarydispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond theborders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by theConflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the caseof intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court hassaid on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the


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domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin inthat international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, whenbusiness intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice ofboundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the nationallawis the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribedtwo sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other

jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for itscitizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If wemust enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 ofour Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandatethereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place wherethe property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Codeof the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16that the national lawof the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. Asexplained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our CivilCode is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes thereference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule inCalifornia, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciledin California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicilecan not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapableof determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the twostates, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. ThePhilippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of thedecedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law ofCalifornia provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code

of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parentrecognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in thecase at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizenof a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in eachcase that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with

Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is thePhilippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, theappellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the CivilCode of California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lowercourt with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.


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Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,concur.Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

Nationality Principle

Internal and Conflict RuleEdward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a

period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death.

In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as

his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate).

Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should

be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the

other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate

children not being entitled to anything under California law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the

successional rights of his heirs.

HELD:The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect thatthere are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians

domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California.

Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case

was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the determination of the successional

rights under Philippine law only.

G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate ofCharles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATEESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINECOMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant,vs.LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN,BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANOLUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES,ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFAPREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix inSp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.


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Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private respondents andappellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.

BARREDO, J .:p

Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorarito "declare all acts of the respondentcourt in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instanceof Iloilo) subsequent to the order of December 14, 1957 as null and void for having been issuedwithout jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning,or abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to perform or do any acts of administration, such asthose enumerated in the petition, and from exercising any authority or power as Regular

Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining manifestations, motion and pleadingsfiled by her and acting on them, and also to enjoin said court from allowing said private respondentto interfere, meddle or take part in any manner in the administration of the Testate Estate of CharlesNewton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch); with prayer for preliminaryinjunction, which was issued by this Court on August 8, 1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the petition

being particularly directed against the orders of the respondent court of October 12, 1966 denyingpetitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion forreconsideration of said order.

Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition, thirty-three (33)appeals from different orders of the same respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning theacts of administration of the respondent Magno on behalf of the testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.

THE FACTS

On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on November 22,1952 pertinently providing as follows:

FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of myestate.

SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of myestate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my belovedhusband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,during his natural lifetime.

THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shallhave the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, andhe is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of saidestate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any

other or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with orwithout general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term ortime, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the realproperty for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall passthe absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he mayelect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him,and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he mayneed or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwisedispose of any of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the


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City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoythe same during his lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide anyfarm land and sell lots therein. and may sell unimproved town lots.

FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, deviseand bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and

personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers andsisters, share and share alike, namely:

Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, EraRoman and Nimroy Higdon.

FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in itemFourth, above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it ismy will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointlythe share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived.

SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to be

executor of this, my last will and testament, and direct that no bond or other securitybe required of him as such executor.

SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the probate court, in theadministration of my estate, other than that necessary to prove and record this willand to return an inventory and appraisement of my estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4,Petition.)

This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 of respondentcourt on June 28, 1957, with the widower Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor,pursuant to the provisions thereof.

Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as Hodges) had beenappointed Special Administrator, in which capacity he filed a motion on the same date as follows:

URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TOCONTINUE THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM

ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN DOING WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING

Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned attorneys, to theHon. Court, most respectfully states:

1. That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament, a copy ofwhich is attached to the petition for probate of the same.

2. That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles Newton Hodges isdirected to have the right to manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceasedLinnie Jane Hodges, in the same way, a provision was placed in paragraph two, thefollowing: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of myestate, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold untohim, my said husband, during his natural lifetime."


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3. That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner was engagedin the business of buying and selling personal and real properties, and do such actswhich petitioner may think best.

4. That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants orascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as executor surviving

spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent.

5. That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze the business ofpetitioner and the deceased, especially in the purchase and sale of properties. Thatproper accounting will be had also in all these transactions.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N. Hodges (CharlesNewton Hodges) be allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he wasengaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while deceased Linnie JaneHodges was living.

City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.)

which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:

It appearing in the urgent ex-partemotion filed by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that thebusiness in which said petitioner and the deceased were engaged will be paralyzed,unless and until the Executor is named and appointed by the Court, the saidpetitioner is allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engagedand to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living.

SO ORDERED.

City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)

Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another motion thus:

MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGESTHAT THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER AND SUBSEQUENTTRANSACTIONS WHICH THE EXECUTOR MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THELAST WISH OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES.

Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his undersignedattorney, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:

1. That according to the last will and testament of the deceased Linnie Jane

Hodges, the executor as the surviving spouse and legatee named in the will of thedeceased; has the right to dispose of all the properties left by the deceased, portionof which is quoted as follows:

Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of myestate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my belovedhusband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,during his natural lifetime.


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Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shallhave the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, andhe is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of saidestate, by saleor any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of anyother or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyanceswith orwithout general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or

time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the realproperty for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall passthe absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he mayelect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him,and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he mayneed or desire. ...

2. That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal,but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.That during the lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee has the right to sell, convey,lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodgeswas and is engaged in the buy and sell of real and personal properties, even beforethe death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize said C.N. Hodges was filed inCourt, to allow him to continue in the business of buy and sell, which motion wasfavorably granted by the Honorable Court.

3. That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges had been buyingand selling real and personal properties, in accordance with the wishes of the lateLinnie Jane Hodges.

4. That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the herein Executor tohave all the sales, leases, conveyances or mortgages made by him, approved by theHon. Court.

5. That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases and

mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court. andsubsequent sales conveyances, leases and mortgages in compliances with thewishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, and within the scope of the terms of the lastwill and testament, also be approved;

6. That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly accounts, and theproperties conveyed can also be accounted for, especially the amounts received.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales, conveyances, leases,and mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court, and alsothe subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages in consonance with thewishes of the deceased contained in her last will and testament, be with authorization

and approval of the Hon. Court.

City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.

(Annex "G", Petition.)

which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14, 1957 as follows:

O R D E R


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As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the reasons stated inhis motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken all thesales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceasedLinnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby

APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased

Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will andtestament of the latter.

So ordered.

Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.

(Annex "H", Petition.)

On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for approval, Hodgesalleged:

Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of the deceased,renders the following account of his administration covering the period from January1, 1958 to December 31, 1958, which account may be found in detail in the individualincome tax return filed for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:

That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net worth of theestate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as well as the income andexpenses, copy of which is hereto attached and made integral part of this statementof account as Annex "A".

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that, the statement ofnet worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income and

expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the deceasedand marked as Annex "A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as substantialcompliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.

That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining theherein accounts be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee ofthe deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by theHonorable court.

City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.

(Annex "I", Petition.)

The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in its order worded thus:

Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the statement of networth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and liabilities, income andexpenses as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the deceasedand marked as Annex "A" is approved.

SO ORDERED.


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City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.

(Annex "J", Petition.)

His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and January 1, 1960 toDecember 31, 1960 were submitted likewise accompanied by allegations identical mutatis

mutandisto those of April 14, 1959, quoted above; and the respective orders approving the same,dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially identical to the above-quoted order of April21, 1959. In connection with the statements of account just mentioned, the following assertionsrelated thereto made by respondent-appellee Magno in her brief do not appear from all indicationsdiscernible in the record to be disputable:

Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" ofthe estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodgesand the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto,C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income ofP328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar ye

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